Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VIII: Supply Chain ContractsTextbook
Why the newsvendor orders too little
A retailer facing uncertain single-period demand and buying from a supplier at a wholesale price orders less than the two of them together would want. The reason is not irrationality but incentives: the retailer bears the whole cost of unsold stock while the supplier collects a margin on every unit ordered, so each party marks up its own cost and the combined markup, Spengler's (1950) double marginalization, depresses the order. Pasternack (1985) showed that a buyback credit for unsold units, priced correctly, realigns the retailer with the chain, and Cachon (2003) surveys the contracts that followed. Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops this as a Stackelberg game on the newsvendor model: the supplier sets contract terms, the retailer sets the order quantity. This mission formalizes the chapter's seven theorems, with the buyback allocation theorem, which shows that buyback both coordinates the chain and can divide its profit in any proportion, as the goal.
Setting
Demand is a random variable with law on and mean . The retail price is
; the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs are and with ;
lost sales cost the two parties goodwill penalties and with ; unsold
units salvage for (ContractData). With the expected
sales (expSales) and the expected leftover (expLeftover), a transfer
payment from retailer to supplier determines the two profits (retailerProfit,
supplierProfit),
whose sum (chainProfit) is independent of the
contract. The chain-optimal quantity maximizes ; the retailer's and supplier's
optimal quantities , maximize their own profits. A contract coordinates the
chain when , stated here as equality of the sets of maximizers, and is a
coordinating contract type when some choice of its parameters does this with both profits
positive.
The four contracts are their transfer payments. Wholesale price: . Buyback:
, the supplier crediting per unsold unit, with
and of (14.22). Revenue sharing: the retailer keeps a fraction of sales
and salvage revenue, , with of
(14.34). Quantity flexibility: the supplier reimburses the retailer's loss on
unsold units up to , , with
of (14.46). For buyback, is the
retailer's share of the chain profit (buybackShare), and (buybackB1,
buybackB2) are the credits at which one party earns everything.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 14.5
Under buyback with at the chain-optimal , the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in , with and
the supplier losing money for , both earning positive profit for , and
the retailer losing money for . This is buyback_allocation.
Supporting targets
Equation (14.8), maximizes iff ; Theorem 14.1, the wholesale price contract coordinates iff , at which the supplier's profit is negative; Theorem 14.2, whenever ; Theorem 14.3, for IGFR demand the supplier's induced profit is unimodal; the identities (14.27) and (14.28), and its complement under buyback; Theorem 14.4, buyback with coordinates; Theorem 14.6, revenue sharing with coordinates; Theorem 14.7, quantity flexibility with makes optimal for the retailer.
Significance
The chapter's theorems are the analytical basis of contract design in newsvendor supply chains. Theorem 14.1 and 14.2 make double marginalization precise: coordination by price alone is possible only at a price the supplier rejects, and any acceptable price makes the retailer under-order. Theorem 14.3 is what lets the supplier optimize the wholesale price at all, and is the reason the IGFR class of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is standard in the field. Theorems 14.4 to 14.6 show that buyback and revenue sharing coordinate and, through the share , that the chain profit can be split arbitrarily, so a coordinating contract can be made acceptable to both parties. Theorem 14.7 shows the limits: quantity flexibility coordinates the retailer but not necessarily the supplier.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 14.1, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6 and 14.7 and leaves 14.2 as an exercise. The formalization of the fractile characterization and of the affine profit identities is reusable for the many contract types (sales rebates, quantity discounts) the chapter cites but does not analyze.
Difficulty
The wholesale price results are first-order conditions on concave functions, and the difficulty is entirely in the analysis: has derivative for every when is continuous, which is a differentiation under the integral that has to be carried out for a Lipschitz integrand and an arbitrary law, and the maximizers of the concave profit must then be identified with the solutions of the fractile equation, including existence by the intermediate value theorem. Theorem 14.1's "only if" direction requires that a coincidence of maximizer sets pins the fractile and hence the price, which is where strict monotonicity of enters.
Theorem 14.3 is the delicate one. The obvious approach, concavity of , fails:
the book stresses the function is not concave in general. The proof is a sign-change argument
on the derivative (14.16), which is times a bracket that IGFR makes decreasing,
minus a constant; one must show the derivative is positive near , eventually negative, and
crosses zero exactly once, and that the last needs both strictly decreasing and the
bracket positive at the crossing. Working with a density in Mathlib means relating the
withDensity law to the distribution function throughout.
The buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility theorems are algebra once the right identity is found: is an affine function of with slope . The formalization must handle the boundary cases the book glosses over, where or and one party is indifferent among all quantities, so "the same maximizes" holds only in one direction. Theorem 14.5 also needs , a Jensen-type bound , for , and the ordering needs , which the book's proof does not isolate.
Formalization scope
Demand is an arbitrary probability law on with finite mean, not assumed
nonnegative; the book's own examples use normal demand. Optimal quantities are maximizers over
all of (IsMaxOn … Set.univ), and coordination is the coincidence of maximizer
sets, with the degenerate endpoints of the parameter ranges stated as one-directional. Where the
book uses a density, continuity of the distribution function (NullSingletonClass) is assumed
instead, except in Theorem 14.3, where the density is explicit, continuous on
(so the exponential law is included), positive on , and IGFR on .
Strict monotonicity of on is never assumed, since it would rule out every
nonnegative demand law. Theorem 14.1 assumes and a positive chain
optimum, , both implicit in the book's proof.
The transfer payments are functions of and the profits are defined for every , so the
theorems compare values of one family of functions; the book's is with
Mathlib's cdf, and the quantity flexibility integral is an interval integral. Theorem 14.5
takes , and as hypotheses. Without positive goodwill costs
its strict inequalities and fail (at , ; at
, ).
The definition module is shared by all eleven items. The equivalence (14.42)-(14.43) of revenue sharing and buyback, the supplier's stationarity under quantity flexibility (Problem 14.11) and the allocation results for revenue sharing (14.40)-(14.41) are natural extensions on the same definitions.
Selected references
- L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
- B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
- G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
- M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
- G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
- J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964