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Operations Research

1,094 missions · 574 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXIII: Near-Optimality for Submodular MinimizationTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 10 turns from structure theory to algorithms: efficient methods for minimizing M-convex functions (via domain reduction) and submodular set functions (via Schrijver's and the Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige scaling algorithms). Most of chapter 10's numbered results are asymptotic running-time bounds for specific procedural algorithms — a genuinely different kind of claim from the rest of this book (see Formalization scope). This mission places the results of this block that ARE ordinary mathematical propositions: correctness certificates, min-max theorems, and structural facts the algorithms rely on and produce.

Setting

For an M-convex set B ⊆ Z^V, the central part B° (the vectors of B lying away from its boundary, defined via per-coordinate bounds ℓ°_B, u°_B) is what the domain reduction algorithm searches from. For a submodular set function ρ : 2^V → R, the base polyhedron B(ρ) and its extreme bases (one per linear ordering of V, via Eq. (10.12)) let any base be written as a convex combination of finitely many extreme bases (Eq. (10.13)); a candidate minimizer W is certified via the linear orderings representing an optimal base. The Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige (IFF) scaling algorithm relaxes this problem with a flow-augmentation parameter δ, maintaining a δ-feasible flow φ and vector z = x + ∂φ; near the end of a scaling phase, no augmenting path and no "active triple" together certify near-optimality.

Formalization targets

Goal: Near-optimality from the absence of augmenting paths (Proposition 10.20)

If S ⊆ W ⊆ V∖T, no arc of the auxiliary network leaves W, and no active triple exists, then z⁻(V) ≥ ρ(W)-nδ and x⁻(V) ≥ ρ(W)-n²δ; moreover W exactly minimizes ρ once δ is small enough relative to the smallest positive gap between two values of ρ. Chosen as goal: the book calls this "a key property of the scaling algorithm" and "a relaxation version of the min-max relation in Proposition 10.8", its own proof is the most substantial argument among this chunk's placed results, and Proposition 10.23 is a direct corollary of it.

Supporting structural targets

Proposition 10.8 is the min-max relation underlying the whole of section 10.2 (an Edmonds- intersection-theorem consequence, found by direct reading — the extractor's table missed it). Proposition 10.9 gives the three-part sufficient condition for optimality, in terms of the linear orderings representing an optimal base, that both Schrijver's algorithm and the IFF algorithm use as their termination criterion (also found by direct reading). Propositions 10.5-10.6 establish that the domain reduction algorithm's central part B° is always nonempty, via an explicit vector-extension step (Proposition 10.5 likewise missing from the extractor's table). Proposition 10.23 fixes individual coordinates once a scaling phase ends, and Proposition 10.24 gives the termination certificate for the IFF fixing algorithm's own separate graph-contraction procedure.

Significance

Chapter 10 is where this book cashes out its structure theory as algorithms with provable running times, and this mission places every result of that chapter's first two sections that is a mathematical proposition rather than a runtime bound: two min-max/optimality-certificate theorems (10.8-10.9) that are the combinatorial core making the following two strongly polynomial algorithms (Schrijver's, and Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige's) correct, one central-part nonemptiness fact (10.5-10.6) underlying the domain reduction algorithm, and the two fixing/termination certificates (10.23-10.24) that let the scaling algorithms actually output a minimizer with a proof of optimality attached, not just a numerical answer.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of submodular-function- minimization algorithms (sections 10.1-10.2). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including two results (Propositions 10.5 and 10.8) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Six numbered results in this block (Propositions 10.4, 10.7, 10.17, 10.18, 10.21, 10.22) are excluded as hard: each states a Big-O asymptotic bound on the running time, function-evaluation count, or internal-procedure-call count of a specific iterative algorithm (the domain reduction algorithm, its scaling variant, Schrijver's algorithm, the IFF scaling algorithm). Faithfully stating "this algorithm runs in O(g(n)) time" requires a cost-tracked operational semantics for that specific algorithm — a well-founded recursive procedure with an oracle for evaluating the input function, threading a step/evaluation counter, instantiated over an unbounded family of ground-set sizes n and numeric parameters (K∞, M) — which is a fundamentally different kind of formalization task (computational complexity theory) from every one of the roughly 280 other numbered results in this book, none of which require modeling the cost of computing them. See HARD.md.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq. Base M-convex-set vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions. Linear orderings of V are represented as bijections V ≃ Fin (Fintype.card V) rather than as lists, matching this series' established preference for order-indexed families over sequential data structures. Proposition 10.5's witness vector is stated as an existence claim (the mathematical content of the proposition), rather than by reconstructing the specific recursive modification procedure the book uses to produce it — a choice consistent with how this series has always formalized "the algorithm produces X" claims where X is a mathematical property, by asserting X's existence rather than executing the algorithm (see, e.g., mission 33-ch09c-networkflows's cycle-cancellation theorem). Six numbered results (Propositions 10.4, 10.7, 10.17, 10.18, 10.21, 10.22) are hard; see HARD.md. Contributions completing any of the seven sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 10.9 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • S. Iwata, L. Fleischer, and S. Fujishige, "A combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions," Journal of the ACM, 48 (2001), pp. 761-777 [102] (the IFF scaling algorithm this mission's Proposition 10.20 certifies).
  • A. Schrijver, "A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time," Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B, 80 (2000), pp. 346-355 [182] (Schrijver's algorithm, whose termination criterion is Proposition 10.9).
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XII: Steepest Descent for M-Convex Function MinimizationTextbook

Motivation

Chapters 6 through 9 characterized minimality for M-convex functions structurally (the M-optimality criterion, Theorem 6.26: a point is a global minimizer iff no local swap improves it) without saying how to find one. Chapter 10 turns that structural fact into an algorithm: the local characterization is the termination test of the simplest possible minimization procedure, steepest descent by coordinate swaps. This mission formalizes that algorithm and its two complexity bounds, plus a structural min-max identity for submodular base polyhedra that the chapter's heavier submodular-minimization algorithms build on. It is the first mission in this series whose goal names a method, not just a property of a class of functions — formalizing it faithfully means giving the algorithm itself a Lean representation that the complexity theorem then quantifies over, not just describing its output.

Setting

Let f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} be an M-convex function (MExchangeAxiom, chunk 06), n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣. The steepest descent algorithm repeatedly replaces the current point xxx by x−χu+χvx - \chi_u + \chi_vx−χu​+χv​ for a pair u≠vu \ne vu=v minimizing f(x−χu+χv)f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v)f(x−χu​+χv​), stopping when no such swap improves on f(x)f(x)f(x) — at which point, by the M-optimality criterion, xxx is a global minimizer. This mission represents a run of the algorithm as a sequence x:N→ZVx : \mathbb N \to \mathbb Z^Vx:N→ZV satisfying these step and termination relations directly, so that "the number of iterations" is a genuine property of any such run, not an informal gloss. Separately, for a submodular set function ρ:2V→R\rho : 2^V \to \mathbb Rρ:2V→R (chunk 04's SubmodularSetFunction), the base polyhedron B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) (chunk 04's BasePolyhedron) is the polytope {x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) ∀X, x(V)=ρ(V)}\{x \in \mathbb R^V : x(X) \le \rho(X)\ \forall X,\ x(V) = \rho(V)\}{x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) ∀X, x(V)=ρ(V)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 10.2 (iteration bound with tie-breaking)

For an M-convex function fff with finite ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1-diameter K1=max⁡{∥x−y∥1:x,y∈dom⁡f}K_1 = \max\{\|x-y\|_1 : x,y \in \operatorname{dom} f\}K1​=max{∥x−y∥1​:x,y∈domf} (Eq. (10.1)), the number of iterations in the steepest descent algorithm using the tie-breaking rule (10.2) — a fixed lexicographic rule for choosing among tied steepest pairs, based on an arbitrary but fixed ordering φ\varphiφ of VVV — is bounded by K1/2K_1/2K1​/2.

Milestones: Proposition 10.1, Proposition 10.8

Proposition 10.1: an unconditional warm-up — if fff has a unique minimizer x∗x^*x∗, any run of the plain (untied) algorithm from x0x^0x0 terminates within ∥x0−x∗∥1/2\|x^0 - x^*\|_1/2∥x0−x∗∥1​/2 iterations, with no tie-breaking rule needed. Proposition 10.8: a structural min-max identity, max⁡{x−(V):x∈B(ρ)}=min⁡{ρ(X):X⊆V}\max\{x^-(V) : x \in B(\rho)\} = \min\{\rho(X) : X \subseteq V\}max{x−(V):x∈B(ρ)}=min{ρ(X):X⊆V}, for a submodular set function ρ\rhoρ — chosen deliberately as a milestone that names no algorithm at all, in contrast to this mission's other two items.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 10.2 is the complexity backbone of §10.1: it is what turns "steepest descent terminates" (an easy monotonicity observation) into a genuine polynomial bound, and it is the base case the chapter's more elaborate scaling and domain-reduction algorithms (not drafted here) improve on. Proposition 10.8, though algorithm-free, is the structural fact ("verifying membership in B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) seems to need a submodular minimization procedure — but demonstrating optimality of a cut XXX only needs a base with x−(V)=ρ(X)x^-(V) = \rho(X)x−(V)=ρ(X)") that makes Schrijver's and the IFF algorithms' correctness proofs possible, and specializes chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem to the two-function case ρ1=ρ,ρ2=0\rho_1 = \rho, \rho_2 = 0ρ1​=ρ,ρ2​=0.

Formalizing it. A prior-art search (q=steepest descent, q=submodular minimization, q=base polyhedron) found no existing platform items for any of this chapter's results. This mission gives the first formal statement of an M-convex minimization algorithm's complexity, and directly reuses chunk 06's MExchangeAxiom/ArgMin/CharVec/DomZ and chunk 04's SubmodularSetFunction/BasePolyhedron — genuine cross-chunk substrate reuse spanning two different chapters' worth of prior missions.

Difficulty

The chapter's own framing (quoted in BRIEF.md) is that every other chapter's theorems state a property of a class of functions or sets, while this chapter's theorems state properties of a named algorithm run on such an object. Formalizing "the number of iterations in the steepest descent algorithm is bounded by ..." faithfully means giving the algorithm's steps (S0-S3) and termination test a Lean representation that the bound then quantifies over — stating the bound about "the minimizer" alone, with the algorithm silently dropped, would misrepresent the theorem as a fact about minimizers rather than about a procedure that finds one. This mission represents a run of the algorithm as an abstract sequence satisfying the book's own step-transition relations (documented in full in MODERATION_NOTES.md), letting the complexity theorems quantify over any valid run rather than committing to one executable implementation.

A second difficulty is scope: the chapter's recommended primary goal, Proposition 10.18 (Schrijver's algorithm's complexity), needs a scaling procedure with several auxiliary data structures — a materially larger definitional undertaking than steepest descent's simple greedy-swap loop. Per BRIEF.md's own explicit fallback authorization, this mission takes Proposition 10.2 as its goal instead; see HARD.md and MODERATION_NOTES.md for the full reasoning.

Formalization scope

Runs of the algorithm are represented as x : ℕ → V → ℤ satisfying IsSteepestDescentRun (plain) or IsSteepestDescentRunTieBreak (with the tie-breaking rule) — a step relation plus a termination test, with an explicit iteration count N the theorems bound. The tie-breaking key Φ(u,v)\Phi(u,v)Φ(u,v) (Eq. (10.2)) and its lexicographic order are formalized directly (a manual three-way comparison, not Mathlib's default componentwise Prod order). Both iteration bounds are stated as 2 * N ≤ k rather than N ≤ k / 2, avoiding natural-number division. Not drafted: the derived "hence ... in O(F⋅n2K1)O(F \cdot n^2 K_1)O(F⋅n2K1​) time" corollary of Proposition 10.2 (needs a cost-model primitive for "time" and "FFF" this mission does not otherwise use — the iteration-count bound itself, this proposition's genuine combinatorial content, is drafted in full); Schrijver's algorithm and everything in §10.2.2 onward; the steepest descent scaling algorithm, the domain reduction algorithm and its scaling variant (§10.1.2-10.1.3, structurally different algorithms); the quasi-M-convex extension mentioned immediately after Proposition 10.2. A trivializing formalization would state the iteration bound as an unconditional fact about "a" minimizer-finding procedure, or would drop the tie-breaking rule from Proposition 10.2 and thereby understate what the bound actually requires; neither is done.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXII: Network DualityTextbook

Motivation

Mission 32-ch09b-networkflows established the potential and negative-cycle optimality criteria for M-convex submodular flow problems. This mission finishes chapter 9 with the two topics that close it out: the constructive engine behind the negative-cycle criterion — cycle cancellation, which actually improves a nonoptimal flow rather than merely detecting suboptimality, resting on a delicate "unique-min condition" for bipartite matchings — and network duality, the chapter's capstone structural theorem showing that M-convexity and L-convexity are preserved (and their conjugacy is preserved) under transformation by an arbitrary network.

Setting

For a feasible integer flow ξ in the M-convex submodular flow problem MSFP2, a negative cycle in the auxiliary network (Gξ,ℓξ) witnesses suboptimality (mission 32's Theorem 9.20); cycle cancellation modifies ξ along a smallest such cycle to produce a strictly better flow ξ̄ (Eq. (9.75)). The unique-min condition for a pair (x,y) of integer vectors with ‖x-y‖∞=1 asks whether the bipartite graph G(x,y) — vertices the positive/negative supports of x-y, weights the M-convex exchange values Δf(x;v,u) — has a unique minimum-weight perfect matching; when it does, the M-convex exchange inequality of Proposition 6.25 becomes an equality. Separately, a network G=(V,A;S,T) with entrance set S and exit set T transforms a pair of functions f,g on Zˢ into induced functions f̃,g̃ on Zᵀ (Eqs. (9.81)-(9.82)), the minimum cost to meet a boundary specification at the exit given a production cost at the entrance and a transportation cost along arcs.

Formalization targets

Goal: Network duality for Z→Z functions (Theorem 9.26)

M-(resp. M♮^\natural♮-)convexity and integer-valuedness of f transfer to the induced f̃; L-(resp. L♮^\natural♮-)convexity and integer-valuedness of g transfer to g̃; and if f is M♮^\natural♮-convex, g is its L♮^\natural♮-conjugate, and each arc cost ga is the conjugate of fa, then g̃ is the conjugate of f̃. Chosen as goal: the book calls this "the harmonious relationship between network flow and M-/L-convexity", its own proof runs roughly six pages (the longest argument in this chunk), and it is the general fact from which Theorems 9.27-9.28 (analogues for other type combinations) and Notes 9.29-9.30 (the aggregation and infimal- convolution closure properties of M-convex functions, already placed in mission 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions's own Theorem 6.13) all descend.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 9.22 shows cycle cancellation strictly improves the objective; Propositions 9.23-9.25 are "the key ingredient" behind it: Proposition 9.23 shows the unique-min condition upgrades the M-convex exchange inequality to an equality, Proposition 9.24 gives a checkable characterization of when a bipartite weighted graph has a unique minimum-weight perfect matching, and Proposition 9.25 is the fact that makes the machine run — the specific pair (∂ξ,∂ξ̄) arising from cycle cancellation always satisfies the unique-min condition. Theorems 9.27 and 9.28 are the network duality theorem's own analogues for Z→R and R→R functions, the second restoring the conjugacy assertion (missing for Z→R) via the ordinary real Legendre-Fenchel transform.

Significance

Cycle cancellation is this book's constructive answer to the negative-cycle criterion: not just a certificate of suboptimality, but an actual improvement step, the combinatorial core of the cycle-canceling algorithm explained in section 10.4.3 (mission 35-ch10c-algorithms). Its correctness proof is one of the most intricate combinatorial arguments in the entire book — a proof by contradiction using a multiset-union identity (Eq. (9.80)) to derive a smaller negative cycle from an assumed non-uniqueness, itself resting on Proposition 9.24's Monge-like characterization of unique bipartite matchings. Network duality, meanwhile, is the theorem that explains why discrete convex analysis and network flow theory are so tightly intertwined throughout this book: it is the general mechanism (matroid induction, min-max relations, the M-convex aggregation and infimal-convolution closure properties) underlying nearly every construction chapter 2 introduced informally and chapter 6 proved piecemeal.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of cycle cancellation (section 9.5.2) and network duality (section 9.6). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing the platform's coverage of chapter 9 begun in missions 12-network-flows and 32-ch09b-networkflows; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Theorem 9.26's own proof needs the full weight of everything chapter 9 has built (Theorem 9.16's potential criterion for integer flows, the conjugacy theorem of chapter 8), which this mission does not re-prove (proofs are sorry throughout, per this pass's scope) but whose statement still needs the induced-function machinery built faithfully: since the general framework's optimal-value-type quantities can genuinely be -∞ (the book's own blanket hypothesis f̃ > -∞ acknowledges this), InducedFTilde/InducedGTilde are EReal-valued, following the same soundness discipline established in mission 31-ch08d-conjugacyduality for Lagrangian duality's derived quantities.

Formalization scope

Ground-set vertices V and arcs A are Fintype with DecidableEq. All base M-/L-convexity vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions. Functions "on Zˢ" for S a proper subset of the ground set are represented as ordinary V→Z functions required to vanish outside S (SupportedOn), rather than as functions on a dependent subset type — a padding-with-zero encoding consistent with this whole series' preference for a single ambient ground-set domain. C[R→R] (univariate real polyhedral convex functions, needed only for Theorem 9.28's arc costs) is formalized as ordinary midpoint-style convexity (IsConvexUnivariateR) rather than the book's own polyhedral characterization, since polyhedrality plays no role in Theorem 9.28's conclusion beyond ensuring the induced functions are well-behaved. All seven numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed in full, with no partial-coverage scope reduction. Contributions completing any of the seven sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 9.25 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota, "Valuated matroid intersection," SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 9 (1996), pp. 545-561 [135] (the unique-max lemma Proposition 9.23 reformulates, and the proof technique behind Proposition 9.25).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (network duality and cycle cancellation for the M-convex submodular flow problem).
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXI: The Potential Criterion for Network FlowsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 9 is where discrete convex analysis meets classical network flow theory: the minimum cost flow problem's three hallmark properties — an optimality criterion by potentials, an optimality criterion by negative cycles, and integrality of optimal solutions — are shown to survive, in a precise and increasingly general form, first for arbitrary polyhedral convex costs (MCFP3), then for the M-convex submodular flow problem (MSFP2/MSFP3), the chapter's own combinatorial generalization of the classical problem. This mission places the potential criterion (Theorem 9.4) and its cascade of six corollaries and generalizations, the block of results this book's own text uses to carry every other result in the chapter.

Setting

A digraph G = (V,A) with tail/head maps ∂⁺,∂⁻ : A → V. A flow ξ : A → R has boundary ∂ξ(v) = Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁺a=v} − Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁻a=v}. A potential p : V → R has coboundary δp(a) = p(∂⁺a) − p(∂⁻a). The minimum cost flow problem MCFP3 minimizes Γ₃(ξ) = Σₐ fₐ(ξ(a)) + f(∂ξ) over flows, for polyhedral convex arc costs fₐ : R → R∪{+∞} and boundary cost f : Rⱽ → R∪{+∞}; MCFP0 is its linear-cost, fixed-supply special case. The M-convex submodular flow problem MSFP3 is MCFP3 with f additionally M-convex; MSFP2 is its linear-arc-cost special case.

Formalization targets

Goal: The potential criterion for MCFP3 (Theorem 9.4)

For a feasible flow ξ, ξ is optimal for MCFP3 iff there is a potential p with ξ(a) a minimizer of the reduced arc cost fₐ[δp(a)] for every arc and ∂ξ a minimizer of the reduced boundary cost f[−p]; and any such optimal potential characterizes optimality of every feasible flow. This is the hub result of the whole chunk: the book states Theorem 9.14 is "immediate" from it, and every other placed result either specializes it directly or builds on that specialization.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 9.5 reformulates MCFP0's optimality as the absence of a negative cycle in an auxiliary network; Theorem 9.6 gives MCFP0's primal and dual integrality, the latter identifying the optimal-potential set as an L-convex polyhedron. Theorem 9.14 specializes the goal to MSFP3; Theorem 9.15 upgrades this to a full polyhedral and integrality structure theorem for MSFP3's optimal-flow-boundary and optimal-potential sets (M2-convex and L-convex polyhedra respectively); Theorem 9.16 is the integer-flow analogue, with the boundary set now literally M2-convex and the integer-optimal-potential set literally L-convex. Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 give the negative-cycle reformulation for MSFP2, real and integer flows respectively, generalizing Theorem 9.5 by admitting a third class of auxiliary arcs governed by the M-convex boundary cost's directional derivative (or its discrete difference, in the integer case).

Significance

This is the chapter's demonstration that M-convexity is not merely an abstract combinatorial axiom but the exact structural hypothesis under which classical network-flow duality survives intact: every one of the four "nice properties" the book opens the chapter with (potentials, negative cycles, integrality, efficient algorithms) is preserved verbatim in the M-convex generalization, and this mission's eight results are the proof of that claim for the first three. The chunk's own internal dependency structure — one foundational theorem (9.4) from which every other placed result descends by specialization or direct generalization — is itself characteristic of how this book organizes its combinatorial machinery around a single convex- analytic core.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of network flow duality under M-convexity (sections 9.1, 9.4, and 9.5). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, extending the platform's coverage of chapter 9 begun in mission 12-network-flows (which covered §9.1.1-9.1.2 and §9.3, the feasibility and max-flow min-cut results, deliberately leaving this block for later apparatus); no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The eight results span real- and integer-flow versions of two nested problem hierarchies (MCFP0 ⊂ MCFP3, MSFP2 ⊂ MSFP3) and two distinct optimality certificates (potentials, negative cycles), which this mission handles by building one shared apparatus — FeasibleFlowMCFP3, Gamma3, OptimalFlowMCFP3, IsOptimalPotential — that MCFP0 and MSFP3 both instantiate (MCFP0 literally as the linear-cost/singleton-boundary special case of Eq. (9.11)), and one shared generic cycle/negative-cycle apparatus (IsCycle, CycleLength, HasNegativeCycle) instantiated three times with different auxiliary-arc types (A⊕A for MCFP0, A⊕A⊕(V×V) for MSFP2's extra Cξ arcs governed by the boundary cost's directional derivative). "Primal integral" and "dual integral" polyhedral convex functions (the book's own C[Z|R→R]/C[R→R|Z] notation, used in Theorem 9.15) needed a modeling decision, since the book's own definition of these classes lies outside this chunk's page range; see Formalization scope.

Formalization scope

Ground-set vertices V and arcs A are Fintype with DecidableEq. All base M-/L-convexity vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions in this series. "Primal integral" (C[Z|R→R], M[Z|R→R]) is formalized as integer effective domain (IsDomainIntegerArc/IsDomainIntegerR); "dual integral" (C[R→R|Z], M[R→R|Z]) is formalized as the existence of an integer subgradient at every domain point (IsDualIntegralArc/IsDualIntegralR) — a standard equivalent characterization for polyhedral convex functions, and a deliberate modeling choice recorded in MODERATION_NOTES.md rather than a literal transcription of the book's own (out-of-range) definition of these two notation classes. All eight numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed in full, with no partial-coverage scope reduction. Contributions completing any of the eight sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 9.15 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Network Flows and Monotropic Optimization, Wiley, 1984 [178] (the classical potential/Fenchel-duality framework this mission's Theorem 9.4 adapts).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (the Lagrange duality and negative-cycle theory of section 9.5 this mission's Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 draw from).
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Best Arm Identification with Fixed Confidence II: Characterization of the Optimal Proportions of Arm DrawsResearch Paper

Motivation

In best arm identification with fixed confidence, a learner samples KKK unknown distributions ("arms") sequentially and must name the arm with the largest mean, with error probability at most a prescribed δ\deltaδ, using as few samples as possible. Garivier and Kaufmann (arXiv:1602.04589, COLT 2016) showed that every δ\deltaδ-PAC strategy needs, in expectation, at least T∗(μ) kl(δ,1−δ)T^*(\boldsymbol\mu)\,\mathrm{kl}(\delta,1-\delta)T∗(μ)kl(δ,1−δ) samples, where the characteristic time T∗(μ)T^*(\boldsymbol\mu)T∗(μ) is the value of a max–min optimization problem over the proportions of draws allocated to the arms. The maximizer of that problem, w∗(μ)w^*(\boldsymbol\mu)w∗(μ), is the allocation any asymptotically optimal strategy must follow; the Track-and-Stop algorithm of the same paper computes w∗(μ^)w^*(\hat{\boldsymbol\mu})w∗(μ^​) at plug-in estimates and tracks it.

A strategy can only track w∗w^*w∗ if w∗w^*w∗ can be computed. This mission formalizes the part of the paper (Section 2.2 and Appendix A) that turns the abstract max–min problem into an explicit recipe: a closed form for the inner infimum, and a characterization of w∗w^*w∗ through the root of one increasing scalar function. The problem had been solved in closed form before only for special cases, such as Poisson rewards with all suboptimal arms equal (Vaidhyan and Sundaresan, 2015); the paper's result covers every one-parameter exponential family.

Setting

A canonical one-parameter exponential family is a family of laws νθ\nu_\thetaνθ​, θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ, on R\mathbb RR with density exp⁡(θx−b(θ))\exp(\theta x-b(\theta))exp(θx−b(θ)) with respect to a reference measure ξ\xiξ. The law νθ\nu_\thetaνθ​ has mean b˙(θ)\dot b(\theta)b˙(θ); the set of attainable means is the mean space b˙(Θ)\dot b(\Theta)b˙(Θ). For means μ=b˙(θ)\mu=\dot b(\theta)μ=b˙(θ) and μ′=b˙(θ′)\mu'=\dot b(\theta')μ′=b˙(θ′) the Kullback–Leibler divergence is

d(μ,μ′)=KL(νθ,νθ′)=b(θ′)−b(θ)−b˙(θ)(θ′−θ).d(\mu,\mu')=\mathrm{KL}(\nu_\theta,\nu_{\theta'})=b(\theta')-b(\theta)-\dot b(\theta)(\theta'-\theta).d(μ,μ′)=KL(νθ​,νθ′​)=b(θ′)−b(θ)−b˙(θ)(θ′−θ).

Bernoulli laws and Gaussian laws with known variance are the standard examples.

A bandit model is identified with its vector of means μ=(μ1,…,μK)∈b˙(Θ)K\boldsymbol\mu=(\mu_1,\dots,\mu_K)\in\dot b(\Theta)^Kμ=(μ1​,…,μK​)∈b˙(Θ)K. S\mathcal SS is the set of models with a unique optimal arm a∗(μ)a^*(\boldsymbol\mu)a∗(μ), and Alt(μ)={λ∈S:a∗(λ)≠a∗(μ)}\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)=\{\boldsymbol\lambda\in\mathcal S:a^*(\boldsymbol\lambda)\ne a^*(\boldsymbol\mu)\}Alt(μ)={λ∈S:a∗(λ)=a∗(μ)} is the set of alternatives. ΣK\Sigma_KΣK​ is the probability simplex. The transportation cost of proportions w∈ΣKw\in\Sigma_Kw∈ΣK​ and the objects of the paper are

cμ(w)=inf⁡λ∈Alt(μ)∑a=1Kwa d(μa,λa),T∗(μ)−1=sup⁡w∈ΣKcμ(w),w∗(μ)=argmax⁡w∈ΣKcμ(w).c_{\boldsymbol\mu}(w)=\inf_{\boldsymbol\lambda\in\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)}\sum_{a=1}^Kw_a\,d(\mu_a,\lambda_a),\qquad T^*(\boldsymbol\mu)^{-1}=\sup_{w\in\Sigma_K}c_{\boldsymbol\mu}(w),\qquad w^*(\boldsymbol\mu)=\operatorname*{argmax}_{w\in\Sigma_K}c_{\boldsymbol\mu}(w).cμ​(w)=λ∈Alt(μ)inf​a=1∑K​wa​d(μa​,λa​),T∗(μ)−1=w∈ΣK​sup​cμ​(w),w∗(μ)=w∈ΣK​argmax​cμ​(w).

The arms are sorted so that μ1>μ2≥⋯≥μK\mu_1>\mu_2\ge\dots\ge\mu_Kμ1​>μ2​≥⋯≥μK​. The parameterized Jensen–Shannon divergence is, for α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1],

Iα(μ1,μ2)=α d(μ1,αμ1+(1−α)μ2)+(1−α) d(μ2,αμ1+(1−α)μ2).I_\alpha(\mu_1,\mu_2)=\alpha\,d\big(\mu_1,\alpha\mu_1+(1-\alpha)\mu_2\big)+(1-\alpha)\,d\big(\mu_2,\alpha\mu_1+(1-\alpha)\mu_2\big).Iα​(μ1​,μ2​)=αd(μ1​,αμ1​+(1−α)μ2​)+(1−α)d(μ2​,αμ1​+(1−α)μ2​).

For a∈{2,…,K}a\in\{2,\dots,K\}a∈{2,…,K} let ga(x)=(1+x)I1/(1+x)(μ1,μa)g_a(x)=(1+x)I_{1/(1+x)}(\mu_1,\mu_a)ga​(x)=(1+x)I1/(1+x)​(μ1​,μa​) for x≥0x\ge0x≥0, let xa=ga−1x_a=g_a^{-1}xa​=ga−1​, and let x1≡1x_1\equiv1x1​≡1. Finally

Fμ(y)=∑a=2Kd(μ1,ma(y))d(μa,ma(y)),ma(y)=μ1+xa(y)μa1+xa(y).F_{\boldsymbol\mu}(y)=\sum_{a=2}^K\frac{d\big(\mu_1,m_a(y)\big)}{d\big(\mu_a,m_a(y)\big)},\qquad m_a(y)=\frac{\mu_1+x_a(y)\mu_a}{1+x_a(y)}.Fμ​(y)=a=2∑K​d(μa​,ma​(y))d(μ1​,ma​(y))​,ma​(y)=1+xa​(y)μ1​+xa​(y)μa​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 5)

With D=d(μ1,μ2)D=d(\mu_1,\mu_2)D=d(μ1​,μ2​): FμF_{\boldsymbol\mu}Fμ​ is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,D[[0,D[[0,D[, Fμ(0)=0F_{\boldsymbol\mu}(0)=0Fμ​(0)=0, Fμ(y)→∞F_{\boldsymbol\mu}(y)\to\inftyFμ​(y)→∞ as y→Dy\to Dy→D, the equation Fμ(y)=1F_{\boldsymbol\mu}(y)=1Fμ​(y)=1 has a unique solution y∗∈[0,D[y^*\in[0,D[y∗∈[0,D[, and

w∈w∗(μ)  ⟺  wa=xa(y∗)∑i=1Kxi(y∗)for every arm a.w\in w^*(\boldsymbol\mu)\iff w_a=\frac{x_a(y^*)}{\sum_{i=1}^Kx_i(y^*)}\quad\text{for every arm }a.w∈w∗(μ)⟺wa​=∑i=1K​xi​(y∗)xa​(y∗)​for every arm a.

The equivalence says at once that the argmax exists, that it is a single point, and that it is given by eq. (5).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 5): for every w∈ΣKw\in\Sigma_Kw∈ΣK​,
cμ(w)=min⁡a≠1(w1+wa) Iw1w1+wa(μ1,μa).c_{\boldsymbol\mu}(w)=\min_{a\ne1}(w_1+w_a)\,I_{\frac{w_1}{w_1+w_a}}(\mu_1,\mu_a).cμ​(w)=a=1min​(w1​+wa​)Iw1​+wa​w1​​​(μ1​,μa​).
  1. Claim after eq. (4) (p. 5): gag_aga​ is a strictly increasing one-to-one mapping from [0,+∞[[0,+\infty[[0,+∞[ onto [0,d(μ1,μa)[[0,d(\mu_1,\mu_a)[[0,d(μ1​,μa​)[.
  2. Lemma 4 (p. 5): for every maximizer w∗w^*w∗ and all a,b∈{2,…,K}a,b\in\{2,\dots,K\}a,b∈{2,…,K},
(w1∗+wa∗)Iw1∗w1∗+wa∗(μ1,μa)=(w1∗+wb∗)Iw1∗w1∗+wb∗(μ1,μb).(w^*_1+w^*_a)I_{\frac{w^*_1}{w^*_1+w^*_a}}(\mu_1,\mu_a)=(w^*_1+w^*_b)I_{\frac{w^*_1}{w^*_1+w^*_b}}(\mu_1,\mu_b).(w1∗​+wa∗​)Iw1∗​+wa∗​w1∗​​​(μ1​,μa​)=(w1∗​+wb∗​)Iw1∗​+wb∗​w1∗​​​(μ1​,μb​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 reduces a (K−1)(K-1)(K−1)-dimensional non-smooth max–min problem to finding the root of one continuous increasing function on a bounded interval, each evaluation of which requires K−1K-1K−1 scalar inversions. It gives existence and uniqueness of w∗(μ)w^*(\boldsymbol\mu)w∗(μ), which the paper's lower bound only presupposes, and it is the computational core of Track-and-Stop: without an explicit, well-posed w∗w^*w∗ the tracking strategy is not defined. Lemma 3 alone gives the closed form of the inner infimum used again in the analysis of the stopping rule.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To the best of our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof: the platform's existing best-arm-identification rows concern Gaussian arms and state the characteristic time at the level of measures, without this characterization. The mission produces a checked reduction for general one-parameter exponential families, including the edge cases the text passes over (ties among suboptimal arms, zero weights, the behaviour of xax_axa​ near the end of its domain).

Difficulty

The infimum in Lemma 3 ranges over Alt(μ)\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)Alt(μ), a set of models with a unique best arm, so it is an open condition: the minimizing configuration, in which λ1\lambda_1λ1​ and λa\lambda_aλa​ coincide, lies outside Alt(μ)\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)Alt(μ) and is only approached. Other arms may also compete for the best position. A statement in which the infimum is taken over the closed relaxation {λa≥λ1}\{\lambda_a\ge\lambda_1\}{λa​≥λ1​} is a lemma of the proof, not Lemma 3.

For Theorem 5, the equalization in Lemma 4 needs an argument that holds for every maximizer, not only for one found by a first-order condition, because the objective is a minimum of functions and is not differentiable. The monotonicity of FμF_{\boldsymbol\mu}Fμ​ needs the monotonicity of each xax_axa​ and of each ratio in the moving point mam_ama​, and the limit at DDD rests on the second-best arm(s) only, which is where the ordering μ1>μ2≥…\mu_1>\mu_2\ge\dotsμ1​>μ2​≥… enters. Finally the analytic facts about ddd (continuity, positivity off the diagonal, monotonicity in each argument) must be derived from the exponential family itself.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a model by μ : Fin K → ℝ with 2 ≤ K and every μ a in the mean space deriv F.b '' F.Θ. The paper's arm 111 is index 0, arm 222 is index 1. The exponential family is a structure ExpFamily whose parameter set is a nonempty open interval and whose b is twice continuously differentiable with b¨>0\ddot b>0b¨>0 on Θ\ThetaΘ. These two conditions are added to the paper's "convex, twice differentiable" and are disclosed: strict convexity is what makes the mean parameterization unique, and openness is what lets alternatives approach the boundary of Alt(μ)\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)Alt(μ). The reference measure and normalization are part of the structure but unused here.

The transportation cost is an infimum in EReal, so it is the true infimum of the set of values rather than a default 0. w∗(μ)w^*(\boldsymbol\mu)w∗(μ) is never defined by choice: "www is optimal" is a predicate, and Theorem 5 characterizes the set of such www. The functions xax_axa​ are the inverse of gag_aga​ on [0,+∞[[0,+\infty[[0,+∞[ and are evaluated only on [0,d(μ1,μ2)[[0,d(\mu_1,\mu_2)[[0,d(μ1​,μ2​)[. "Increasing" in Theorem 5 is stated as strictly increasing, as proved in Appendix A.2. Lemmas 3 and 4 and the claim on gag_aga​ assume only that arm 111 is the unique best arm, which is weaker than the paper's standing ordering.

A formalization that replaces Alt(μ)\mathrm{Alt}(\boldsymbol\mu)Alt(μ) by {λa≥λ1}\{\lambda_a\ge\lambda_1\}{λa​≥λ1​}, assumes the maximizer exists and is unique, or asserts only existence of some y∗y^*y∗ without the formula for w∗w^*w∗, does not state these results and is ruled out.

A complete development needs: basic calculus of exponential families (the Bregman form of ddd, its continuity and strict positivity off the diagonal, its monotonicity in the second argument), the inverse function of a continuous strictly monotone map on an interval, and compactness of the simplex. The divergence facts are reusable in every bandit mission built on exponential families. Proofs of the milestones, of auxiliary facts about ddd and IαI_\alphaIα​, and a sorry-free instance of ExpFamily (Bernoulli or unit-variance Gaussian) are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Garivier, E. Kaufmann, Optimal Best Arm Identification with Fixed Confidence, COLT 2016 (JMLR W&CP 49), arXiv:1602.04589v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04589
  • E. Kaufmann, O. Cappé, A. Garivier, On the Complexity of Best-Arm Identification in Multi-Armed Bandit Models, JMLR 17, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4443
  • N. K. Vaidhyan, R. Sundaresan, Learning to detect an oddball target, arXiv:1508.05572, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.05572
  • O. Cappé, A. Garivier, O.-A. Maillard, R. Munos, G. Stoltz, Kullback–Leibler upper confidence bounds for optimal sequential allocation, Annals of Statistics 41(3), 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.1136
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Mechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns: A Coordinating Target Rebate Helps the Retailer, and the Manufacturer iff Coordinated Effort Is at Least Twice Decentralized EffortResearch Paper

Motivation

A false failure return is a product returned by a consumer as defective although it has no functional or cosmetic defect; managers attribute such returns to installation difficulties, a mismatch with the consumer's preferences, and remorse. Ferguson, Guide and Souza report (pp. 376–377) that false failures account for up to 80% of Hewlett-Packard's inkjet printer returns, roughly 5% of sales, and that the per-unit cost of a false failure return to computer manufacturers is around 25% of the product's price. The manufacturer absorbs most of that cost, while the retailer is the party able to prevent the returns in the short term, by spending time with customers before the sale and supporting them after it. The retailer bears the cost of that effort but captures only part of its benefit, so without an incentive it exerts too little.

The paper (Ferguson, Guide & Souza, MSOM 2006) models this as a single-period manufacturer–retailer problem with non-contractible retailer effort, and asks which contracts restore the supply chain's optimal effort and who gains from them. It belongs to the literature on supply chain coordination with contracts (Cachon 2003) and on channel rebates with sales effort (Taylor 2002); its object is a target rebate, a payment to the retailer for every false failure return below a target.

Setting

A manufacturer with unit cost ccc sells to a retailer at wholesale price www, who sells at retail price ppp. Avoiding one false failure return is worth

Mm=m+δm(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr=r+δr(p−w) to the retailer,M_m = m + \delta_m(w - c) \ \text{to the manufacturer},\qquad R_r = r + \delta_r(p - w)\ \text{to the retailer},Mm​=m+δm​(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr​=r+δr​(p−w) to the retailer,

where mmm and rrr are the parties' return-processing costs and δm\delta_mδm​, δr\delta_rδr​ are the unit sale impacts of avoiding the return (p. 381). Both are assumed positive.

The retailer chooses an effort ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 at cost aρ2/2a\rho^2/2aρ2/2, a>0a > 0a>0. At effort ρ\rhoρ the number of false failures is a nonnegative random variable X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) with mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ, where β>0\beta > 0β>0 is the expected number at the minimum effort ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1. The coordinated supply chain earns

Π(ρ)=(Mm+Rr) β(1−1ρ)−aρ22,\Pi(\rho) = (M_m + R_r)\,\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - \frac{a\rho^2}{2},Π(ρ)=(Mm​+Rr​)β(1−ρ1​)−2aρ2​,

maximized at the coordinated effort ρC=[(Mm+Rr)β/a]1/3\rho^C = [(M_m + R_r)\beta/a]^{1/3}ρC=[(Mm​+Rr​)β/a]1/3. Without a contract the retailer earns πR(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rrβ(1−1/ρ)\pi_R(\rho) = -a\rho^2/2 + R_r\beta(1 - 1/\rho)πR​(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rr​β(1−1/ρ) and chooses the decentralized effort ρD=max⁡{(Rrβ/a)1/3,1}\rho^D = \max\{(R_r\beta/a)^{1/3}, 1\}ρD=max{(Rr​β/a)1/3,1}; the manufacturer then earns πM(ρD)=Mmβ(1−1/ρD)\pi_M(\rho^D) = M_m\beta(1 - 1/\rho^D)πM​(ρD)=Mm​β(1−1/ρD).

Under a target rebate contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) the retailer receives uuu for every false failure below the target TTT, so the profits become

πR(ρ∣T,u)=u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}−aρ22+Rrβ(1−1ρ),πM(ρ∣T,u)=Mmβ(1−1ρ)−u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}.\pi_R(\rho \mid T, u) = u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} - \frac{a\rho^2}{2} + R_r\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big),\qquad \pi_M(\rho \mid T, u) = M_m\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}.πR​(ρ∣T,u)=uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}−2aρ2​+Rr​β(1−ρ1​),πM​(ρ∣T,u)=Mm​β(1−ρ1​)−uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}.

The contract coordinates the supply chain when ρC\rho^CρC maximizes πR(⋅∣T,u)\pi_R(\cdot \mid T, u)πR​(⋅∣T,u) over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1. In the uniform case of §3.1, X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ)X(\rho) \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(0, 2\beta/\rho)X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ), and the contract must satisfy T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 383)

Assume a,β,Mm,Rr>0a, \beta, M_m, R_r > 0a,β,Mm​,Rr​>0 and (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a, and let X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) be uniform. For every coordinating contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) with u>0u > 0u>0, 0<T<2β/ρC0 < T < 2\beta/\rho^C0<T<2β/ρC,

πR(ρC∣T,u)≥πR(ρD)and(πM(ρC∣T,u)≥πM(ρD)  ⟺  ρC≥2ρD).\pi_R(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_R(\rho^D) \qquad\text{and}\qquad \Big(\pi_M(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_M(\rho^D) \iff \rho^C \ge 2\rho^D\Big).πR​(ρC∣T,u)≥πR​(ρD)and(πM​(ρC∣T,u)≥πM​(ρD)⟺ρC≥2ρD).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's §3–§3.1 and the appendix proof, in attack order: concavity of Π\PiΠ and optimality of ρC\rho^CρC (Eqs. (1)–(2)); ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1 in the interesting case; optimality of ρD\rho^DρD (Eqs. (3)–(4)); ρC≥ρD\rho^C \ge \rho^DρC≥ρD; Proposition 1 (concavity of the retailer's rebate profit when ∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0\partial^2 F(x\mid\rho)/\partial\rho^2 \le 0∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0); its uniform instance; the uniform closed form (8); the first-order condition (9); the coordinating target (10) together with the admissibility condition u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​; the manufacturer's profit Mmβ(ρC−2)/ρCM_m\beta(\rho^C - 2)/\rho^CMm​β(ρC−2)/ρC under a coordinating contract (25); the retailer's profit (27); and the retailer's gain in the two cases ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 (30) and ρD=1\rho^D = 1ρD=1 (31).

Significance

The result divides the effect of the contract between the two parties. The retailer is always at least as well off as without a contract; the manufacturer, who pays the rebate, gains exactly when the supply chain's optimal effort is at least twice what the retailer would exert alone. When ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 this is equivalent to Mm≥7RrM_m \ge 7R_rMm​≥7Rr​ (p. 383), so a target rebate pays for the manufacturer only when its own stake in avoiding a false failure dwarfs the retailer's. The companion result (10) shows that for every rebate u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​ exactly one admissible coordinating target exists, and none for u≤Mmu \le M_mu≤Mm​: a coordinating rebate is always larger than the manufacturer's own cost of a return.

The results are proved in the paper by calculus and algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of, and nothing on Prove2Me models non-contractible effort or target rebates. The mission produces a checked version of the paper's model with the expectation taken as a genuine integral against the uniform law, a formal notion of coordination as the retailer's optimization, and statements that make explicit which hypotheses each step of the appendix uses. The definitions of effort-dependent profits and coordination are reusable for other effort-inducing contracts in the same paper and in the sales-effort literature.

Difficulty

The algebra of the appendix is short once the first-order condition (9) holds at ρC\rho^CρC. The substance is getting there. Coordination is defined by optimality of ρC\rho^CρC for the retailer's profit, and that profit involves the expectation E{[T−X(ρ)]+}E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}E{[T−X(ρ)]+}, which is piecewise in ρ\rhoρ: it equals T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β only while T≤2β/ρT \le 2\beta/\rhoT≤2β/ρ, and T−β/ρT - \beta/\rhoT−β/ρ beyond. Deriving (9) requires showing that ρC\rho^CρC is an interior maximizer, that the expectation is differentiable there with the closed-form derivative, and that the side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC keeps ρC\rho^CρC in the closed-form region. The converse direction of (10), that the formula for TTT produces a coordinating contract, needs concavity of the piecewise profit on all of ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1, which is where Proposition 1 enters.

Replacing the expectation by the global formula T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β is the tempting shortcut and it changes the problem: for ρ>2β/T\rho > 2\beta/Tρ>2β/T the formula exceeds the true expectation, and the retailer's maximizer, hence the meaning of "coordinates", changes with it.

Formalization scope

All parameters are real numbers, bundled in a structure Params; MmM_mMm​ and RrR_rRr​ are Params.Mm and Params.Rr. Effort ranges over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 (Set.Ici 1); statements the paper makes for every positive effort (concavity of Π\PiΠ, the closed form (8)) are stated on ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0. Cube roots are Real.rpow with exponent 1/31/31/3 on positive bases. The uniform law is Lebesgue measure conditioned on [0,2β/ρ][0, 2\beta/\rho][0,2β/ρ], and the expectation is the Bochner integral against it. Coordination is IsMaxOn of the retailer's profit on Set.Ici 1 at ρC\rho^CρC.

Three conventions differ from the printed text, each recorded in the item's formalization note:

  1. The interesting case is printed as (m+r)β>a(m + r)\beta > a(m+r)β>a; the condition equivalent to the stated consequence ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1, which the proof uses, is (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a. The formalization uses the latter.
  2. The printed evaluation EX{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T(T−x)(ρ/2β) dxE_X\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} = u\int_0^T (T - x)(\rho/2\beta)\,dxEX​{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T​(T−x)(ρ/2β)dx carries a stray factor uuu; the expectation is T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β.
  3. Proposition 1 is stated for an arbitrary family of probability laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) whose distribution functions are C2C^2C2 in ρ\rhoρ with nonpositive second derivative for x∈[0,T]x \in [0,T]x∈[0,T]; the paper's further assumptions on FFF (differentiable, strictly increasing in xxx, mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ) are not imposed.

The side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC of §3.1 is a hypothesis of the goal and of the appendix milestones; without it a coordinating contract with u=Mmu = M_mu=Mm​ exists and the "if" direction fails. The unused page assertion δr<δm<1\delta_r < \delta_m < 1δr​<δm​<1 is not imposed.

The goal is not trivialized by its coordination hypothesis: coordination is the retailer's optimization over the true profit, and milestone (10) shows that coordinating contracts with T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC exist for every u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​, so the hypotheses are satisfiable (Example 1 of the paper, p. 384, is an instance). The retailer half of the goal is comparatively short under this definition of coordination; that is a property of the paper's theorem, not of the encoding. The manufacturer half needs (8), (9) and (25).

The development needs only Mathlib: real calculus (derivatives, concavity, Real.rpow) and Lebesgue integration against a conditioned Lebesgue measure. The model definitions (effort-dependent profits, coordination as the retailer's optimization) are reusable for the paper's other effort-inducing contracts. Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on expectations of [T−X]+[T - X]^+[T−X]+ under uniform laws.

Selected references

  • M. Ferguson, V. D. R. Guide Jr., G. C. Souza, Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 8(4):376–393, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1060.0112
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, Elsevier, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8):992–1007, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Applied Combinatorics VII: Minimum Spanning Trees and Dijkstra's AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

Two optimization problems on weighted networks sit at the base of operations research and algorithm design. The first asks for the cheapest way to connect every node of a network, such as a cable, pipeline or communication network. The answer is a minimum weight spanning tree. The second asks for the shortest route from a depot to every other node of a road or data network, the single-source shortest path problem. Chapter 12 of Keller and Trotter's Applied Combinatorics (appliedcombinatorics.org, CC BY-SA 4.0) treats both. It proves the structural lemmas behind the greedy spanning tree algorithms of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957), and the correctness of the shortest path algorithm of Dijkstra (1959).

The minimum spanning tree problem goes back to Borůvka (1926), who designed an electrical network for Moravia. Kruskal and Prim gave the two greedy algorithms taught today, and Dijkstra's 1959 note treated both problems. Dijkstra's shortest path method, with heap-based refinements such as Fredman and Tarjan (1987), remains the standard solver for non-negative lengths and a building block of routing, scheduling and network flow codes.

Setting

A graph G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) has a finite vertex set VVV and a set EEE of 2-element subsets of VVV. A weight w(e)∈N0w(e) \in \mathbb N_0w(e)∈N0​ is attached to each edge, and a set SSS of edges has weight w(S)=∑e∈Sw(e)w(S) = \sum_{e \in S} w(e)w(S)=∑e∈S​w(e). A spanning forest of GGG is an acyclic graph H=(V,S)H = (V, S)H=(V,S) with S⊆ES \subseteq ES⊆E. A spanning tree is a spanning forest that is connected. The weight of a spanning tree is the weight of its edge set. In Lean these are SimpleGraph V with [Fintype V], IsSpanningForest G H (H≤GH \le GH≤G and acyclic), IsSpanningTree G T (T≤GT \le GT≤G and a tree), and weight w T for a weight w : Sym2 V → ℕ.

A digraph G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) has E⊆V×VE \subseteq V \times VE⊆V×V with x≠yx \ne yx=y for every directed edge (x,y)(x, y)(x,y). Each directed edge has a length w(x,y)∈N0w(x, y) \in \mathbb N_0w(x,y)∈N0​. The length is extended by w(x,y)=∞w(x, y) = \inftyw(x,y)=∞ for non-edges. A directed path from aaa to bbb is a sequence (a=u0,…,ut=b)(a = u_0, \dots, u_t = b)(a=u0​,…,ut​=b) of distinct vertices in which consecutive pairs are directed edges. Its length is ∑i<tw(ui,ui+1)\sum_{i<t} w(u_i, u_{i+1})∑i<t​w(ui​,ui+1​). The distance dist⁡(a,b)∈N0∪{∞}\operatorname{dist}(a, b) \in \mathbb N_0 \cup \{\infty\}dist(a,b)∈N0​∪{∞} is the minimum length of a directed path from aaa to bbb, and is ∞\infty∞ when no such path exists. A shortest path is a directed path attaining it. In Lean this is WeightedDigraph V with ext, IsDirPath, pathLength, dist and IsShortestPath.

Dijkstra's algorithm (Algorithm 12.14) with root rrr and n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣ keeps a sequence σ\sigmaσ of permanent vertices, a value δ(x)∈N0∪{∞}\delta(x) \in \mathbb N_0 \cup \{\infty\}δ(x)∈N0​∪{∞} and a sequence P(x)P(x)P(x) for each vertex. Step 1 sets δ(r)=0\delta(r) = 0δ(r)=0, P(r)=(r)P(r) = (r)P(r)=(r), σ=(r)\sigma = (r)σ=(r), and δ(x)=w(r,x)\delta(x) = w(r, x)δ(x)=w(r,x), P(x)=(r,x)P(x) = (r, x)P(x)=(r,x) for x≠rx \ne rx=r. Step iii with 1<i<n1 < i < n1<i<n scans from the last permanent vertex viv_ivi​. For every temporary xxx it sets δ(x)←min⁡{δ(x),δ(vi)+w(vi,x)}\delta(x) \leftarrow \min\{\delta(x), \delta(v_i) + w(v_i, x)\}δ(x)←min{δ(x),δ(vi​)+w(vi​,x)}, and on a strict decrease it replaces P(x)P(x)P(x) by P(vi)P(v_i)P(vi​) followed by xxx. Each step ends by appending to σ\sigmaσ a temporary vertex of minimum δ\deltaδ, chosen arbitrarily among ties. The algorithm halts at Step nnn. DijkstraRun G r i s holds when some sequence of admissible choices leads to state s at the start of Step iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: correctness of Dijkstra's algorithm (Theorem 12.18)

For every halted state of every run, and every vertex xxx,

δ(x)=dist⁡(r,x),dist⁡(r,x)<∞  ⟹  P(x) is a shortest path from r to x.\delta(x) = \operatorname{dist}(r, x), \qquad \operatorname{dist}(r, x) < \infty \implies P(x) \text{ is a shortest path from } r \text{ to } x.δ(x)=dist(r,x),dist(r,x)<∞⟹P(x) is a shortest path from r to x.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 12.3. A spanning forest H=(V,S)H = (V, S)H=(V,S) of a graph on n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 vertices has ∣S∣≤n−1|S| \le n - 1∣S∣≤n−1 and exactly n−∣S∣n - |S|n−∣S∣ components. It is a spanning tree if and only if ∣S∣=n−1|S| = n - 1∣S∣=n−1.
  2. Proposition 12.4 (Exchange Principle). Let TTT be a spanning tree and xy∈E∖Txy \in E \setminus Txy∈E∖T. Then TTT contains a unique path x=x0,…,xt=yx = x_0, \dots, x_t = yx=x0​,…,xt​=y, and replacing any edge xixi+1x_i x_{i+1}xi​xi+1​ of it by xyxyxy gives a spanning tree.
  3. Lemma 12.6. In a connected weighted graph, let FFF be a spanning forest and CCC a component of FFF. A minimum weight edge leaving CCC lies in some spanning tree that has minimum weight among the spanning trees containing FFF.
  4. Proposition 12.16. Every prefix and every suffix of a shortest path is a shortest path.
  5. Proposition 12.17. When the algorithm halts, δ(v1)≤δ(v2)≤⋯≤δ(vn)\delta(v_1) \le \delta(v_2) \le \cdots \le \delta(v_n)δ(v1​)≤δ(v2​)≤⋯≤δ(vn​).

Milestones 4 and 5 are the two statements the book's proof of the goal rests on. Milestones 1–3 are the spanning tree half of the chapter. Lemma 12.6 is the result from which the book derives the correctness of Kruskal's and Prim's algorithms.

Significance

Theorem 12.18 certifies that one pass of nnn steps computes all distances from rrr and a shortest path tree, with no condition on the digraph beyond non-negative lengths. Lemma 12.6 is the cut property. Every greedy minimum spanning tree method (Kruskal, Prim, Borůvka) is an instance of it, and the exchange principle is the matroid basis-exchange axiom specialised to the graphic matroid.

All of these results are classical and proved. None is formalized in this form on the platform. Mathlib has spanning trees of connected graphs, uniqueness of paths in acyclic graphs, and the edge count n−1n - 1n−1 of a tree. It has no edge–component count for forests, no exchange principle, no weighted spanning trees, and no Dijkstra. On Prove2Me, FamousTheorems.tree_card_edges_6b and ClassicalGaps.isAcyclic_edges_eq_card_sub_one_imp_connected cover only the tree case of Proposition 12.3. KServer.mst_cut_property is a cut property for complete graphs encoded by parent maps, a different statement. The label-correcting algorithm of Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control II (BertsekasDP.label_correcting_*) is a different algorithm: it keeps an open list and scans in arbitrary order, not by minimum label.

Difficulty

The goal is a statement about the final state of a run, but the facts it depends on only become visible across steps: a permanent vertex's δ\deltaδ and PPP never change again, and δ(x)\delta(x)δ(x) is always the length of the current P(x)P(x)P(x). None of this is recorded in the final state itself. An argument over the steps of the run has to show that each P(x)P(x)P(x) remains a path with distinct vertices, including when edges of length 000 allow ties. It also has to handle the value ∞\infty∞, where ∞+a=∞\infty + a = \infty∞+a=∞ and a comparison between two infinite values never counts as a decrease. Tie-breaking is arbitrary, so no argument may depend on which minimum is chosen. For Lemma 12.6 the difficulty is the exchange step: removing an edge of a tree path and adding a crossing edge must again give a tree that still contains the forest FFF, and this is a statement about cycles and components, not about counts.

Formalization scope

  • Graphs are SimpleGraph V over a Fintype V. Weights are Sym2 V → ℕ (the book's w:E→N0w : E \to \mathbb N_0w:E→N0​; values off EEE are never used). Acyclic, tree and connected components are Mathlib's. In Proposition 12.3, ∣S∣=n−k|S| = n - k∣S∣=n−k is written ∣S∣+k=n|S| + k = n∣S∣+k=n and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 is assumed, which the bound n−1n - 1n−1 presupposes.
  • Lemma 12.6 assumes GGG connected, the section's standing assumption (p. 239). The page's "to avoid trivialities, we assume n≥3n \ge 3n≥3" is not imposed, because the statement holds for every nnn. The crossing edge may have either endpoint in CCC.
  • Lengths in the digraph are ℕ, and δ\deltaδ and distances are ℕ∞, where ∞\infty∞ is ⊤, never a large finite number. A version with real or ℝ≥0 lengths would be a generalization and is not what is asked.
  • Dijkstra's algorithm is defined step by step exactly as on pp. 246–247, including δ(x)=w(r,x)=∞\delta(x) = w(r, x) = \inftyδ(x)=w(r,x)=∞ and P(x)=(r,x)P(x) = (r, x)P(x)=(r,x) for non-neighbours at Step 1. The goal quantifies over every halted state, so it holds for every tie-breaking. A halted state always exists; a sorry-free check of this is in the workspace. For a vertex not reachable from rrr the book is silent. The distance there is read as ∞\infty∞, and the shortest-path conclusion is asserted only at finite distance.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: δ\deltaδ is computed by the update rule of Algorithm 12.14, not defined as the distance, and the theorem is not stated for an arbitrary procedure satisfying its own conclusion.
  • The book uses no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) bounds or approximate constants in these statements, so there are no constants to instantiate.
  • Reusable infrastructure: a list-based theory of directed paths and distances in ℕ∞, the invariants of Dijkstra's algorithm, and forest edge counting. Contributions of general lemmas (walks shortcut to paths without increasing length, component counts under edge insertion) are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. T. Keller and W. T. Trotter, Applied Combinatorics, 2017 Edition, Chapter 12. https://www.appliedcombinatorics.org/
  • E. W. Dijkstra, "A note on two problems in connexion with graphs", Numerische Mathematik 1 (1959) 269–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01386390
  • J. B. Kruskal, "On the shortest spanning subtree of a graph and the traveling salesman problem", Proc. AMS 7 (1956) 48–50. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1956-0078686-7
  • R. C. Prim, "Shortest connection networks and some generalizations", Bell System Technical Journal 36 (1957) 1389–1401. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1957.tb01515.x
  • M. L. Fredman and R. E. Tarjan, "Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved network optimization algorithms", J. ACM 34 (1987) 596–615. https://doi.org/10.1145/28869.28874
  • O. Borůvka, "O jistém problému minimálním", Práce Moravské přírodovědecké společnosti 3 (1926) 37–58. https://dml.cz/handle/10338.dmlcz/500114
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXVIII: The Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 8 is where discrete convex analysis explains why it needed two separate notions — M-convexity (exchangeability) and L-convexity (submodularity) — rather than one. The answer is conjugacy: under the classical Legendre-Fenchel transform, the two classes turn out to be exactly dual to each other, the discrete analogue of the fact that convex analysis's transform is self-dual within a single class of convex functions. Mission 10-conjugacy-i proved the integer-lattice version of this fact (Theorem 8.12) but explicitly deferred the polyhedral version — Theorem 8.4, the chapter's own headline "Conjugacy theorem" — noting it needed a real-variable M-/L-convex-function layer the series had not yet built. That layer now exists, built across missions 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions. This mission proves Theorem 8.4 and its companions: the polar-cone correspondence it induces, its nonpolyhedral generalization, the separation and Fenchel-duality theorems for M♮-/L♮-convex functions, and the basic theory of M2-convex functions (sums of M-convex functions), which the Edmonds intersection theorem's own combinatorics is built from.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡x[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x [\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)]f∙(p)=supx​[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]. A polyhedral convex function fff is M-convex (f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R]) if it satisfies (M-EXC[R]); ggg is L-convex (g∈L[R→R]g \in L[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]g∈L[R→R]) if it satisfies (SBF[R]) and (TRF[R]). A concave function hhh is always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h, an ordinary convex function, so every "f≥hf \ge hf≥h" hypothesis is restated as "f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0" — an equivalent formulation avoiding any need to represent −∞-\infty−∞ in the codomain. A polyhedral cone's polar is C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}C^\circ = \{y : \langle y,x\rangle \le 0\ \forall x \in C\}C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}. A function is M2-convex if it is the sum of two M-convex functions.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjugacy theorem (Theorem 8.4)

The classes of polyhedral M-convex functions and polyhedral L-convex functions are in one-to-one correspondence under the Legendre-Fenchel transform: f∈M⇒f∙∈Lf \in M \Rightarrow f^\bullet \in Lf∈M⇒f∙∈L, g∈L⇒g∙∈Mg \in L \Rightarrow g^\bullet \in Mg∈L⇒g∙∈M, and the transform is an involution (f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g) on each class, with the identical statement for the M♮^\natural♮/L♮^\natural♮ variants. This is the theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i deferred, citing exactly the missing infrastructure this series has since built.

Supporting structural targets

Twelve further results build the surrounding theory. Proposition 8.2 gives the easy two-variable case of the general submodularity-preservation fact (Theorem 8.1, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i); Proposition 8.3 is the technical minimizer-difference lemma the goal's harder direction is built from. Theorem 8.5 derives the M-convex/L-convex cone polarity from the goal, and Theorem 8.6 extends the correspondence beyond the polyhedral case to general closed proper convex functions. Proposition 8.14 and Theorems 8.15-8.16 build the separation theory for M♮-/L♮-convex and concave function pairs, with integral witnesses when the functions are integer valued; Theorem 8.21 (parts 1-2) derives the Fenchel-type strong-duality equality these separation theorems make possible. Propositions 8.29-8.30 and Theorem 8.31 (plus Theorem 8.32, found by direct reading immediately after 8.31) build the basic theory of M2-convex functions: their domains and minimizer sets are M2-convex, they are integrally convex, and their global optimality reduces to a finite local check.

Significance

The goal is the theorem that retroactively explains this entire series' two-track structure: missions 20-25 (M-convex sets and functions) and 08/21/26-28 (L-convex sets and functions) are not two independent theories that happen to share techniques — they are conjugate images of each other, so every theorem proved on one side has a dual counterpart automatically available on the other via Theorem 8.4. This is made concrete immediately: Theorem 8.5's cone polarity and the diagram the book draws connecting M0[R]M_0[\mathbb R]M0​[R], 0L[R→R]0L[\mathbb R\to\mathbb R]0L[R→R], and submodular set functions S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R] (already correspondences this series proved independently, in missions 24-ch06d-mconvexfunctions and 28-ch07d-lconvexfunctions) are shown to be facets of one single conjugacy fact rather than three separate coincidences. The separation and Fenchel duality theorems (8.15, 8.16, 8.21) are the discrete analogues of the two theorems every convex optimization course opens with, and the book is explicit that they are not corollaries of the classical versions plus convex extensibility — they carry genuinely combinatorial content, specializing to Frank's discrete separation theorem and Edmonds's intersection theorem as examples the book itself gives.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the duality at the heart of discrete convex analysis, the reason the theory needed two dual notions rather than one. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing a theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i explicitly left for a future session once the necessary polyhedral apparatus existed, and including one result (Theorem 8.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal's harder direction (L⇒M) would try to verify the exchange inequality for g∙g^\bulletg∙ directly from the definition of the transform; the book's actual proof instead identifies the exchange inequality with a statement about weighted minimizers of ggg itself via Proposition 8.3 (the minimizer-difference bound), converting a claim about the conjugate function into a claim about ggg's own combinatorial structure — a genuine change of perspective, not a direct calculation. Proposition 8.3's own proof is the hardest single argument in this block: it derives the minimizer-difference bound by a contradiction argument that constructs an explicit pair of "worse" minimizers via a join/meet perturbation and derives a strict inequality from Theorem 7.29's translation inequality — a multi-step combinatorial argument with no direct shortcut.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; convex functions are WithTop ℝ valued throughout (never EReal, except for the Legendre-Fenchel transform itself, whose defining supremum/infimum can genuinely be infinite). All thirteen numbered results found in this chunk's page range — the twelve in BRIEF.md's own table plus Theorem 8.32 — are placed, with one documented scope reduction: Theorem 8.21 states only its real-attainment parts (1)-(2), not the integer-attainment refinement of parts (3)-(4), which needs a separate argument no other result in this chunk requires — see HARD.md. Concave functions hhh are always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h and every inequality f≥hf \ge hf≥h restated as f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0, avoiding WithTop ℝ negation entirely. This chunk's own BRIEF.md inherited the chapters-4-7 page-offset boilerplate (printed = PDF −-− 19); chapter 8 uses offset 18, confirmed against the PDF's own footers — every citation here uses the corrected offset. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared from missions 10-conjugacy-i, 20-ch04b-mconvexsets, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets, 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions, and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the thirteen sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 8.3 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 [152] (the polyhedral M-/L-convex conjugacy theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model III: The Reduced Linear Program Is Equivalent to the Choice-Based Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

Network revenue management decides which products to make available to arriving customers when products share scarce resources: an airline sells itineraries (products) that consume seats on flight legs (resources), and each itinerary has a fare. When customers choose among the offered products, rather than asking for one fixed product, the standard planning tool is a deterministic linear program that replaces random choices by their expected values. Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004, Columbia CORC technical report TR-2004-01) and Liu and van Ryzin (2008) formulated this choice-based linear program; its solution drives bid-price and offer-set policies used in practice.

The difficulty is size. The choice-based program has one variable for each subset of products, 2n2^n2n in all, and is solved by column generation, whose pricing subproblem is itself an assortment problem. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) show that when customers choose under the Markov chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (2016), the choice-based program is equivalent to a linear program with only 2n2n2n variables and m+nm+nm+n constraints. This mission formalizes that equivalence, Theorem 7 of the paper.

Setting

There are nnn products, N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Under the Markov chain choice model a customer first visits product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If the product she visits is offered, she buys it. Otherwise she moves from product jjj to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, or leaves without buying with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. The paper assumes throughout that

λj>0and∑i∈Nρj,i<1for all j∈N.\lambda_j>0\quad\text{and}\quad\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1\qquad\text{for all } j\in N.λj​>0andi∈N∑​ρj,i​<1for all j∈N.

For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ is the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is offered, which is its purchase probability, and Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ is the expected number of visits to jjj while it is not offered. The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is the solution of the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j∈N,Pj,S=0  ∀j∉S,Rj,S=0  ∀j∈S.P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j\in N,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\notin S,\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\in S .Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j∈N,Pj,S​=0  ∀j∈/S,Rj,S​=0  ∀j∈S.

Dropping the constraints tied to SSS gives the polyhedron

H={(x,z)∈R+2n:xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi  ∀j∈N}.\mathcal H=\Big\{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+ : x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\}.H={(x,z)∈R+2n​:xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​  ∀j∈N}.

The network has mmm resources, M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m}, with capacities cqc_qcq​; the selling horizon has TTT periods; product jjj earns rjr_jrj​ and consumes aq,ja_{q,j}aq,j​ units of resource qqq. With uSu_SuS​ the probability of offering SSS in a period, the (Choice Based) linear program is

max⁡u∈R+2n{∑S⊆N∑j∈NTrjPj,SuS: ∑S⊆N∑j∈NTaq,jPj,SuS≤cq ∀q∈M, ∑S⊆NuS=1},\max_{u\in\mathbb R^{2^n}_+}\Big\{\sum_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}T r_jP_{j,S}u_S:\ \sum_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}Ta_{q,j}P_{j,S}u_S\le c_q\ \forall q\in M,\ \sum_{S\subseteq N}u_S=1\Big\},u∈R+2n​max​{S⊆N∑​j∈N∑​Trj​Pj,S​uS​: S⊆N∑​j∈N∑​Taq,j​Pj,S​uS​≤cq​ ∀q∈M, S⊆N∑​uS​=1},

and the (Reduced) linear program is

max⁡(x,z)∈R+2n{∑j∈NTrjxj: ∑j∈NTaq,jxj≤cq ∀q∈M, xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi ∀j∈N}.\max_{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}T r_jx_j:\ \sum_{j\in N}Ta_{q,j}x_j\le c_q\ \forall q\in M,\ x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \forall j\in N\Big\}.(x,z)∈R+2n​max​{j∈N∑​Trj​xj​: j∈N∑​Taq,j​xj​≤cq​ ∀q∈M, xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​ ∀j∈N}.

In (Reduced), xjx_jxj​ is the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is available and zjz_jzj​ the expected number of visits while it is not.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

Let (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) be an optimal solution of (Reduced). Then there are subsets S1,…,SK⊆NS^1,\dots,S^K\subseteq NS1,…,SK⊆N and positive scalars γ1,…,γK\gamma^1,\dots,\gamma^Kγ1,…,γK with ∑kγk=1\sum_k\gamma^k=1∑k​γk=1 such that

x^=∑k=1KγkPSk,z^=∑k=1KγkRSk,\hat x=\sum_{k=1}^K\gamma^kP_{S^k},\qquad \hat z=\sum_{k=1}^K\gamma^kR_{S^k},x^=k=1∑K​γkPSk​,z^=k=1∑K​γkRSk​,

and for any such subsets and scalars the vector u^\hat uu^ with u^Sk=γk\hat u_{S^k}=\gamma^ku^Sk​=γk and u^S=0\hat u_S=0u^S​=0 for S∉{S1,…,SK}S\notin\{S^1,\dots,S^K\}S∈/{S1,…,SK} is optimal for (Choice Based), with objective value equal to that of (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) in (Reduced). In particular the two programs have the same optimal value.

Milestones

  1. (Balance) has a unique and nonnegative solution for every offer set (§2, p. 1325).
  2. Lemma 1: an extreme point (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) of H\mathcal HH equals (PS,RS)(P_{S},R_{S})(PS​,RS​) for S={j:x^j>0}S=\{j:\hat x_j>0\}S={j:x^j​>0} (p. 1326).
  3. Lemma 10: H\mathcal HH is bounded (quoted on p. 1331; proved in the online appendix).
  4. Every point of H\mathcal HH is a positive convex combination of finitely many extreme points of H\mathcal HH (proof of Theorem 7, p. 1331).
  5. Every feasible uuu of (Choice Based) yields the feasible point x~j=∑SPj,SuS\tilde x_j=\sum_S P_{j,S}u_Sx~j​=∑S​Pj,S​uS​, z~j=∑SRj,SuS\tilde z_j=\sum_S R_{j,S}u_Sz~j​=∑S​Rj,S​uS​ of (Reduced), with the same objective value (proof of Theorem 7, p. 1332).

Significance

The result. Theorem 7 replaces a program with 2n2^n2n columns by one with 2n2n2n variables and m+nm+nm+n constraints, solvable directly by any LP solver, and it returns an optimal solution of the original program, not only its value. The optimal value is the standard upper bound on the optimal expected revenue of a network revenue management policy, and the dual variables of the capacity constraints are the bid prices used to control sales. The decomposition of part 1 is what turns the small program's solution back into offer-set frequencies that a policy can implement; Section 7 of the paper makes that decomposition algorithmic (a separate mission of this series).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to the best of available knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof checks the link between polyhedral geometry (extreme points of H\mathcal HH and the solutions of (Balance)) and linear-programming optimality, and records exactly which properties of the Markov chain choice model are used: the standing assumptions enter through uniqueness and nonnegativity of (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) and through boundedness of H\mathcal HH.

Difficulty

The inequality "(Reduced) ≥\ge≥ (Choice Based)" is a direct computation: averaging the (Balance) equations with weights uSu_SuS​ lands in H\mathcal HH. The reverse direction is where the obvious argument fails. A point of H\mathcal HH has no offer set attached to it, and a general polyhedron need not be the convex hull of its extreme points: it can contain lines or rays. The argument requires that H\mathcal HH is bounded, which depends on the substochasticity ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1, and that each extreme point is exactly some (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​), which uses the structure of the balance equations and the uniqueness of their solution. Neither follows from general linear-programming facts. In Lean, the finite vertex representation of a bounded polyhedron is also not a one-line consequence of Mathlib's Krein–Milman theorem, which gives only the closure of the convex hull.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n, offer sets Finset (Fin n), resources Fin m. The model is a structure Model n holding λ\lambdaλ, ρ\rhoρ (rho j i =ρj,i=\rho_{j,i}=ρj,i​, the transition from jjj to iii) and the standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1; the nonnegativity ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0, implicit in the paper because the ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ are probabilities, is an added field. (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon, and milestone 1 is what identifies it with the paper's unique solution. H\mathcal HH is a subset of (Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin n → ℝ), extreme points are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ, and boundedness is Bornology.IsBounded. TTT is a natural number entering as a real factor exactly where the paper writes it; ccc, aaa, rrr carry no sign conditions, as in the paper. "Optimal solution" means feasible and at least as good as every feasible point; no supremum is used.

Two conventions are disclosed. The paper defines u^\hat uu^ by u^Sk=γk\hat u_{S^k}=\gamma^ku^Sk​=γk; the formalization sets u^S=∑k:Sk=Sγk\hat u_S=\sum_{k:S^k=S}\gamma^ku^S​=∑k:Sk=S​γk, which agrees when the SkS^kSk are distinct and is the only consistent reading otherwise. Milestone 5 is stated for every feasible uuu of (Choice Based), while the paper applies it to an optimal one; its argument uses only feasibility. No printed statement needed correction.

The goal is not only the decomposition of part 1, which is milestones 2 and 4 combined: it also asserts optimality of u^\hat uu^ and equality of the optimal values, and a formalization that drops part 2 does not state Theorem 7. Part 2 is required for every decomposition, and part 1 guarantees one exists, so part 2 is not vacuous.

A complete development needs the vertex representation of polytopes (reusable beyond this mission; LinearOptimization.polyhedron_resolution on the platform proves the resolution theorem in another encoding), the theory of substochastic matrices behind (Balance) (invertibility of I−QˉI-\bar QI−Qˉ​ with a nonnegative inverse), and finite-sum manipulations over Finset (Fin n). Contributions to any milestone, and bridges to existing polyhedral results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0172
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey, Managing Flexible Products on a Network, Computational Optimization Research Center Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004 (technical report; no DOI).
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model II: Optimal Offer Sets Grow with Remaining Capacity and Remaining TimeResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental firms sell a fixed stock of capacity (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and control revenue mainly by deciding which products (fare classes, rate plans) to make available at each moment. When customers substitute between products, the decision in each period is an assortment: a subset of products to offer. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 2004) formulated this single resource revenue management problem as a dynamic program for a general choice model, and showed that structural properties of the optimal policy depend strongly on how customers choose.

The Markov chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (technical report 2013; Oper. Res. 2016) describes substitution by a Markov chain on the products and approximates a broad class of random-utility models. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) study assortment and revenue management problems under this model. This mission formalizes their structural result for the single resource problem (Theorem 5): there is an optimal policy whose offer sets are nested in the remaining capacity and in the remaining time, so that it can be implemented by protection levels, one capacity threshold per product and period.

Setting

There are nnn products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. A customer arrives to purchase product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If jjj is offered she buys it; otherwise she moves to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, and leaves with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. The paper assumes λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑i∈Nρj,i<1\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1∑i∈N​ρj,i​<1 for all jjj. For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, the purchase probabilities Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ and the visit counts Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ of unavailable products solve the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j,Pj,S=0  (j∉S),Rj,S=0  (j∈S).P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ (j\notin S),\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ (j\in S).Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j,Pj,S​=0  (j∈/S),Rj,S​=0  (j∈S).

With product revenues rjr_jrj​, the (Assortment) problem is max⁡S⊆N∑jPj,Srj\max_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j}P_{j,S}r_jmaxS⊆N​∑j​Pj,S​rj​, and its (Dual) linear program is

min⁡v∈Rn{∑jλjvj:vj≥rj, vj≥∑iρj,ivi  ∀j}.\min_{v\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{\sum_{j}\lambda_jv_j : v_j\ge r_j,\ v_j\ge\sum_{i}\rho_{j,i}v_i\ \ \forall j\Big\}.v∈Rnmin​{j∑​λj​vj​:vj​≥rj​, vj​≥i∑​ρj,i​vi​  ∀j}.

In the single resource problem there are TTT periods and ccc units of capacity. In each period at most one customer arrives; a sale of product jjj earns rjr_jrj​ and uses one unit. The optimal expected revenue Vt(x)V_t(x)Vt​(x) from period ttt on with xxx units left satisfies the (Single Resource) dynamic program

Vt(x)=max⁡S⊆N{∑j∈NPj,S{rj+Vt+1(x−1)−Vt+1(x)}}+Vt+1(x),V_t(x)=\max_{S\subseteq N}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}\{r_j+V_{t+1}(x-1)-V_{t+1}(x)\}\Big\}+V_{t+1}(x),Vt​(x)=S⊆Nmax​{j∈N∑​Pj,S​{rj​+Vt+1​(x−1)−Vt+1​(x)}}+Vt+1​(x),

with VT+1(x)=0V_{T+1}(x)=0VT+1​(x)=0 and Vt(0)=0V_t(0)=0Vt​(0)=0. An optimal subset S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) is a maximizer of the problem on the right side. The marginal value of capacity is ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1)\Delta V_t(x)=V_t(x)-V_t(x-1)ΔVt​(x)=Vt​(x)−Vt​(x−1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 1329)

There exists an optimal policy, i.e. a choice of maximizers S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) for all 1≤t≤T1\le t\le T1≤t≤T, 1≤x≤c1\le x\le c1≤x≤c, such that

S^t(x−1)⊆S^t(x)andS^t−1(x)⊆S^t(x).\hat S_t(x-1)\subseteq \hat S_t(x)\qquad\text{and}\qquad \hat S_{t-1}(x)\subseteq\hat S_t(x).S^t​(x−1)⊆S^t​(x)andS^t−1​(x)⊆S^t​(x).

The offer set shrinks as capacity runs down, and it is smaller when more periods remain.

Milestones

  1. (§2, p. 1325) The (Balance) equations have a unique nonnegative solution for every SSS.
  2. (Theorem 2, p. 1326) If v^\hat vv^ is optimal for (Dual), then {j:v^j=rj}\{j:\hat v_j=r_j\}{j:v^j​=rj​} is optimal for (Assortment).
  3. (Lemma 3, p. 1327) For η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, with v^η\hat v^\etav^η optimal for (Dual) with revenues rj−ηr_j-\etarj​−η,
{j:v^jη=rj−η}⊆{j:v^j0=rj}.\{j:\hat v^\eta_j=r_j-\eta\}\subseteq\{j:\hat v^0_j=r_j\}.{j:v^jη​=rj​−η}⊆{j:v^j0​=rj​}.
  1. ((Single Resource), pp. 1328–1329) The value functions satisfy the printed recursion Vt(x)=max⁡S{∑jPj,S{rj+Vt+1(x−1)}+{1−∑jPj,S}Vt+1(x)}V_t(x)=\max_S\{\sum_jP_{j,S}\{r_j+V_{t+1}(x-1)\}+\{1-\sum_jP_{j,S}\}V_{t+1}(x)\}Vt​(x)=maxS​{∑j​Pj,S​{rj​+Vt+1​(x−1)}+{1−∑j​Pj,S​}Vt+1​(x)} and the boundary conditions.
  2. (Proof of Theorem 5, p. 1329) ΔVt+1(x)≤ΔVt+1(x−1)\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\le\Delta V_{t+1}(x-1)ΔVt+1​(x)≤ΔVt+1​(x−1) and ΔVt+1(x)≤ΔVt(x)\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\le\Delta V_t(x)ΔVt+1​(x)≤ΔVt​(x).

Significance

Theorem 5 makes the optimal policy a protection level policy: for each product jjj and period ttt there is a threshold xˉjt\bar x_{jt}xˉjt​ such that jjj is offered exactly when at least xˉjt\bar x_{jt}xˉjt​ units remain. The policy can then be stored as n Tn\,TnT numbers instead of a table of subsets, and each product can be controlled separately, which is how airline inventory systems are organized. The paper also shows (Table 2, p. 1330) that the products need not be closed in revenue order: a higher-fare product can be closed before a lower-fare one, so the result is genuinely about nested sets, not about nested fare classes. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) show that under the multinomial logit model an optimal assortment consists of a number of products with the largest revenues; the Markov chain choice model does not have this property (Table 1, p. 1328), so their structure of the optimal policy does not carry over directly.

The result is proved in the paper. No part of it is formalized on Prove2Me. The monotonicity of marginal values for an abstract choice model is published and proved as RevenueManagement.choice_marginal_values, stated over the definitions RevenueManagement_singleResource; milestone 5 is the same statement for this paper's dynamic program and can be bridged to it. A complete development here produces machine-checked Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 for the Markov chain choice model, which are reusable for any assortment problem under this model.

Difficulty

The obvious argument chooses, for each (t,x)(t,x)(t,x), any maximizer of the stage problem. This fails: the stage problems have ties, and an arbitrary choice of maximizers need not be nested, so the theorem is an existence statement about a coordinated choice. The dependence of Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ on SSS is through the solution of a linear system, so the effect of adding or removing a product on the other purchase probabilities has no simple sign, and optimal assortments need not be nested by revenue (Table 1, p. 1328). The link between two stage problems is that their revenues differ by the same constant for all products, and what has to be shown is that such a uniform shift moves an optimal assortment in a controlled direction. Revenues in the stage problems, rj−ΔVt+1(x)r_j-\Delta V_{t+1}(x)rj​−ΔVt+1​(x), can be negative.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n, offer sets Finset (Fin n), the paper's ⊂\subset⊂ is non-strict inclusion ⊆\subseteq⊆. The model is a structure with fields λ\lambdaλ, ρ\rhoρ and the standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0, ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1; ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0 is added as a field because the ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ are probabilities. (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon; milestone 1 states that it is the unique nonnegative one. The value function is defined by recursion on the number of periods to go, and VtV_tVt​ is used only for 1≤t≤T+11\le t\le T+11≤t≤T+1. Maxima over S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N are taken over the finite family of all subsets, so they are attained; dual optimality is "feasible and no worse than every feasible point".

One hypothesis is added to Theorem 5 and milestone 5, and disclosed: ∑jλj≤1\sum_j\lambda_j\le1∑j​λj​≤1, implied by the paper's description of at most one arrival per period (it makes 1−∑jPj,S1-\sum_jP_{j,S}1−∑j​Pj,S​ a probability). No sign condition is placed on the revenues, as on the page. Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 are stated for arbitrary real revenues, as the proof of Theorem 5 applies them to rj−ΔVt+1(x)r_j-\Delta V_{t+1}(x)rj​−ΔVt+1​(x). The first inclusion of Theorem 5 is stated for x≥2x\ge2x≥2: with x−1=0x-1=0x−1=0 units there is no decision, and the paper reads S^t(0)\hat S_t(0)S^t​(0) as ∅\emptyset∅. The existential requires every S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) in range to be optimal for its stage problem; a statement without that clause would be satisfied by the empty sets and is ruled out.

Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 need LP duality for (Dual) and the (Balance) system; milestone 5 needs the standard induction on the dynamic program, or a bridge to the published choice_marginal_values (with arrival probabilities 111 and choice model Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​). Proofs of any milestone, and bridges to published Mathlib or platform LP duality results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model I: The Dual Linear Program Yields an Optimal AssortmentResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline decides which products to make available, and customers choose among what is offered. When a preferred product is missing, many customers substitute to another product instead of leaving. Assortment optimization asks which subset of products to offer so that the expected revenue from a customer is as large as possible, and its answer depends entirely on the choice model used to describe substitution.

The Markov chain choice model was introduced by Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (EC 2013; Oper. Res. 64(4), 2016), who showed that it contains the multinomial logit model as a special case and proposed it as an approximation of general random-utility choice models. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) study revenue management under this model. Their first result, the subject of this mission, is that the assortment problem, a search over all 2n2^n2n offer sets, is solved by one linear program with nnn variables. The same paper uses this result for its dynamic single-resource and network results, which are the subjects of the companion missions II–IV of this series.

Timeline:

  • 2013/2016: Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal introduce the model and give a polynomial-time assortment algorithm.
  • 2017: Feldman and Topaloglu show that the optimal assortment is read off an optimal solution of a dual linear program (their Theorem 2), and derive structural and capacity-control consequences.

Setting

There are nnn products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. A customer arrives to purchase product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If the product she visits is offered, she buys it. Otherwise she transitions to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ and checks whether iii is offered, or leaves without buying with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. Throughout, λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0, ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0 and ∑i∈Nρj,i<1\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1∑i∈N​ρj,i​<1 for all jjj.

For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, let Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ be the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is offered (the probability that jjj is purchased) and Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ the expected number of visits to jjj while it is not offered. The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is the unique solution of the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j∈N,Pj,S=0  ∀j∉S,Rj,S=0  ∀j∈S.P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j\in N,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\notin S,\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\in S .Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j∈N,Pj,S​=0  ∀j∈/S,Rj,S​=0  ∀j∈S.

With revenue rj∈Rr_j\in\mathbb Rrj​∈R for product jjj, the (Assortment) problem is max⁡S⊆N∑j∈NPj,Srj\max_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}r_jmaxS⊆N​∑j∈N​Pj,S​rj​. Two linear programs enter: the maximization of ∑jrjxj\sum_j r_jx_j∑j​rj​xj​ over the polyhedron

H={(x,z)∈R+2n: xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi  ∀j∈N},\mathcal H=\Big\{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+:\ x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\},H={(x,z)∈R+2n​: xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​  ∀j∈N},

and its dual

min⁡v∈Rn{∑j∈Nλjvj: vj≥rj  ∀j∈N,  vj≥∑i∈Nρj,ivi  ∀j∈N}.(Dual)\min_{v\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}\lambda_jv_j:\ v_j\ge r_j\ \ \forall j\in N,\ \ v_j\ge\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}v_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\}.\qquad\text{(Dual)}v∈Rnmin​{j∈N∑​λj​vj​: vj​≥rj​  ∀j∈N,  vj​≥i∈N∑​ρj,i​vi​  ∀j∈N}.(Dual)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1326)

For every optimal solution v^\hat vv^ of (Dual), the set S^={j∈N:v^j=rj}\hat S=\{j\in N:\hat v_j=r_j\}S^={j∈N:v^j​=rj​} is an optimal assortment:

∑j∈NPj,S rj ≤ ∑j∈NPj,S^ rjfor all S⊆N.\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}\,r_j\ \le\ \sum_{j\in N}P_{j,\hat S}\,r_j\qquad\text{for all } S\subseteq N .j∈N∑​Pj,S​rj​ ≤ j∈N∑​Pj,S^​rj​for all S⊆N.

Milestones, in the order the paper uses them

  1. (p. 1325) The (Balance) equations have a unique nonnegative solution for every SSS.
  2. Lemma 1 (p. 1326): for an extreme point (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) of H\mathcal HH and Sx^={j:x^j>0}S_{\hat x}=\{j:\hat x_j>0\}Sx^​={j:x^j​>0}, Pj,Sx^=x^jP_{j,S_{\hat x}}=\hat x_jPj,Sx^​​=x^j​ and Rj,Sx^=z^jR_{j,S_{\hat x}}=\hat z_jRj,Sx^​​=z^j​ for all jjj.
  3. (p. 1326) The linear program over H\mathcal HH has an optimal solution, and its optimal value equals the optimal value of (Assortment).
  4. (p. 1326) (Dual) has an optimal solution, and its optimal value equals that of the linear program over H\mathcal HH.
  5. (p. 1326, proof of Theorem 2) An optimal v^\hat vv^ satisfies v^j=rj\hat v_j=r_jv^j​=rj​ or v^j=∑iρj,iv^i\hat v_j=\sum_i\rho_{j,i}\hat v_iv^j​=∑i​ρj,i​v^i​ for each jjj.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces a combinatorial problem over 2n2^n2n offer sets to a linear program, so the assortment problem under the Markov chain choice model is solvable in polynomial time. The same structure drives the rest of the paper: the dual variables v^j\hat v_jv^j​ are used to show that optimal offer sets shrink when all revenues fall by a common amount, to show that the optimal offer sets of the single-resource dynamic program are nested in the remaining capacity and time, and to reduce the choice-based network linear program to a compact one.

The result is proved in the paper. This mission produces a machine-checked version of it and of its supporting lemmas; to the knowledge of the mission author no formalization of the Markov chain choice model exists. The definition layer (the model, the (Balance) solution, H\mathcal HH and (Dual)) is the first formal encoding of this choice model and is shared, with the same encoding, by missions II–IV.

Difficulty

The obvious route, comparing ∑jPj,Srj\sum_jP_{j,S}r_j∑j​Pj,S​rj​ across offer sets directly, fails because Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ is defined only implicitly through a linear system whose coefficient matrix changes with SSS; there is no closed-form expression that can be compared across offer sets, and enumerating the 2n2^n2n sets is exponential. The connection to linear programming needs an exact correspondence between the vertices of H\mathcal HH and the (Balance) solutions, which is a statement about polyhedra, not about Markov chains. Even well-posedness is not free: existence, uniqueness and nonnegativity of (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) depend on the row sums ∑iρj,i\sum_i\rho_{j,i}∑i​ρj,i​ being strictly below one. Mathlib has extreme points of convex sets but no ready-made theory of vertices of polyhedra or of linear programming duality in this form.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0-based), offer sets are Finset (Fin n) (the paper's S⊂NS\subset NS⊂N is non-strict inclusion, so every subset including ∅\emptyset∅ and NNN is an offer set), and rho j i is ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, the transition from jjj to iii. The model structure carries the paper's standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1 (p. 1325) and the implicit nonnegativity ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0. Revenues are arbitrary reals with no sign assumption. R2n\mathbb R^{2n}R2n is (Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin n → ℝ), and extreme points are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ.

The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon; milestone 1 states that it satisfies (Balance), is nonnegative and equals every solution, so all statements are about the paper's (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) and not about a junk value. Every optimum (of (Assortment), of the linear program over H\mathcal HH, of (Dual)) is stated as "feasible and at least as good as every feasible point", never through sSup or sInf. The goal is stated for every optimal v^\hat vv^ of (Dual), which is what the proof uses; uniqueness of v^\hat vv^ is neither assumed nor claimed. Replacing the hypothesis "v^\hat vv^ optimal for (Dual)" by "v^\hat vv^ feasible for (Dual)" would make the statement false, and an existential over v^\hat vv^ would weaken it; neither is the target.

No hypothesis beyond the paper's is added. Two printed index slips on pp. 1325–1326 (a garbled sum in the discussion after (Balance), and ∑iρi,jz^j\sum_i\rho_{i,j}\hat z_j∑i​ρi,j​z^j​ for ∑iρi,jz^i\sum_i\rho_{i,j}\hat z_i∑i​ρi,j​z^i​ in the proof of Lemma 1) are not part of any statement here.

Welcome contributions: the existence and uniqueness of (Balance) solutions via Neumann series for substochastic matrices, a characterization of vertices of polyhedra given by equality constraints and nonnegativity, and a strong duality statement usable for this primal–dual pair. These are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis IX: The Discrete Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

The Legendre-Fenchel transform is the single most structurally important operation in convex analysis: for a proper closed convex function fff, its conjugate f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x \{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)} is again proper closed convex, and the transform is an involution — f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet} = ff∙∙=f. This one fact underlies duality theory across optimization: every strong-duality theorem is, at bottom, a statement about conjugate pairs. Chapters 6 and 7 of this book developed M-convex and L-convex functions as if they were two separate theories, each with its own exchange axiom, optimality criterion, and proximity theorem. Chapter 8 reveals they were never separate: the Legendre-Fenchel transform, suitably discretized, is a bijection between the two classes. This mission formalizes that discrete conjugacy theorem together with its classical real-valued precursor and a genuine function-level generalization of Edmonds's intersection theorem, completing the picture that chunks 06 through 09 built the two halves of.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb R^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}; fff is submodular if f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y)f(x)+f(y) \ge f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) and supermodular under the reverse inequality. For f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞}, the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform restricts the same supremum formula to p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV: f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb Z^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV} for p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV — a genuinely different object from the real-valued transform, since the supremum is now over integer xxx only, and the codomain is checked back against the discrete M-/L-convexity axioms of chunks 06–09. The integer biconjugate f∙∙f^{\bullet\bullet}f∙∙ is the transform applied twice. fff is integer valued if every finite value it takes is an integer (the classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z], L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] of the goal theorem are exactly the M-/L-convex functions with this property).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.12 (the discrete conjugacy theorem)

(1) The classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z] and L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] are in one-to-one correspondence under the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform: for f∈M[Z→Z]f \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∈M[Z→Z] and g∈L[Z→Z]g \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∈L[Z→Z], f∙∈L[Z→Z]f^\bullet \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∙∈L[Z→Z], g∙∈M[Z→Z]g^\bullet \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∙∈M[Z→Z], f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, and g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g. (2) The same correspondence holds between M♮[Z→Z]M^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M♮[Z→Z] and L♮[Z→Z]L^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L♮[Z→Z].

Milestones: Theorem 8.1, Proposition 8.11, Theorem 8.17

Theorem 8.1: the conjugate of a real-valued submodular function is always supermodular — the classical warm-up, and evidence that submodularity/supermodularity is not symmetric under conjugation on its own (the converse fails). Proposition 8.11: the integer biconjugate recovers fff at any point with a nonempty integer subdifferential — the fact that makes discrete biconjugation meaningful at all. Theorem 8.17 (the M-convex intersection theorem): a point jointly minimizes a sum of two M♮^\natural♮-convex functions if and only if a single linear functional separately certifies it as a minimizer of each perturbed function — the function-level generalization of chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem for M-convex sets.

Significance

The result itself. The discrete conjugacy theorem is, in the book's own words, "the unifying result of the entire book": every theorem proved separately for M-convex functions (chunks 06–07) has an exact mirror for L-convex functions (chunks 08–09) precisely because the Legendre-Fenchel transform carries one class to the other. Theorem 8.17's function-level Edmonds generalization shows the payoff directly — the classical matroid-intersection-style min-max duality of chunk 04 was never really about sets; it is a special case (indicator functions) of a duality that holds for the whole class of M-convex functions.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for conjugate functions, discrete conjugacy, or this generality of intersection theorem. This mission gives the first formal statement of the discrete conjugacy theorem, distinguishing it carefully from its real-valued (polyhedral) precursor, Theorem 8.4 — a genuinely different, harder theorem this mission does not draft (see Formalization scope), since the integer bijection needs the M-/L-proximity theorems of chunks 06–09 to control integrality under convex extension, while the real-valued case does not.

Difficulty

The obvious approach — try to prove the discrete conjugacy theorem directly by mimicking the real-valued proof (Theorem 8.4) with ℤ in place of ℝ everywhere — fails, because the real-valued proof's key step (Proposition 8.3, an infimal-convolution argument comparing arg min sets of perturbed polyhedral functions) has no immediate discrete analogue: a discrete arg min need not vary continuously with the perturbation the way a polyhedral one does. The book's actual strategy instead routes through the convex extension of the discrete function (chunk 06/08's bridge to chapter 3's integral convexity), applies the already-proved real-valued conjugacy theorem to the extension, and then must separately argue that the resulting conjugate, restricted back to integer points, is again integer-valued and satisfies the discrete exchange axiom — an argument that needs different treatment depending on whether the original function's domain is bounded or unbounded (an exhaustion argument via restriction to a growing integer interval, invoking chunk 06's proximity theorem to control convergence). Skipping this discreteness argument and treating the real-valued theorem as if it settled the integer case would silently discard exactly the chapter's own point.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq. ConvexConjugate (the discrete transform) has domain and codomain both (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ, obtained by taking the defining supremum in EReal (a complete lattice, so it is always total) and projecting back via a new FromEReal map — this is what lets the biconjugate f•• typecheck as an equality of functions of the same type as f. ConvexConjugateR (the real-valued transform, used only by the milestone Theorem 8.1) is a separate object with no shared code, per the explicit warning against conflating the two transforms; the two never appear in the same item.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would draft only the real-valued case (Theorem 8.4) as if it were the discrete theorem, or would silently allow WithTop ℝ's subtraction-avoidance convention to change which values are compared; neither is done. Theorem 8.4 itself (the polyhedral conjugacy theorem) is not drafted in this mission at all — it would require a fresh, otherwise-unused polyhedral M-/L-convex-function layer on Rⱽ that no other item here needs (see MODERATION_NOTES.md). The M-/L-separation theorems (8.15, 8.16) and the Fenchel-type duality theorem (8.21) are likewise left for a follow-on mission; contributions building the polyhedral bridge or the separation theorems, which depend on machinery this mission establishes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem IV: Insertion Heuristics Can Return Poor k-Optimal ToursResearch Paper

Motivation

Insertion heuristics build a traveling salesman tour one city at a time: start from a single city, and at each step choose a city not yet on the subtour and splice it into the subtour where it lengthens the subtour least. Local search heuristics start from a tour and repeatedly replace a few of its edges by others while this shortens the tour. Both families are standard in practice, and a natural engineering idea is to combine them: run an insertion heuristic, then polish the result by local search. The question this mission formalizes is whether local optimality of the insertion tour certifies anything about its quality.

Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis (SIAM J. Comput. 6(3), 1977) answered this for graphs satisfying the triangle inequality. Their §4 proves that nearest and cheapest insertion always return a tour of length at most 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) times the optimal length, and their Theorem 5 shows this bound is attained. Their §7 then shows that the very tour attaining the bound is kkk-optimal for every k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4: no exchange of kkk edges shortens it. So the insertion bound is tight even for tours that local search with kkk-changes cannot improve.

Timeline, as far as this mission is concerned:

  • 1965: Lin (Bell System Tech. J. 44) defines kkk-optimal tours and uses 3-optimal local search.
  • 1973: Lin and Kernighan (Oper. Res. 21) generalize the edge-exchange neighbourhoods.
  • 1977: Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis prove the 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) upper bound for nearest and cheapest insertion (Theorem 4 and its corollary), its tightness for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 (Theorem 5), the existence of kkk-optimal tours with the same ratio (Theorem 6, stated for n≥8n\ge 8n≥8), and the Corollary combining the two.

Setting

A traveling salesman graph on nnn nodes is the node set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} with a distance d(i,j)≥0d(i,j)\ge 0d(i,j)≥0 that is symmetric and satisfies the triangle inequality d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)\le d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k). A tour is a Hamiltonian circuit; its length is the sum of its edge lengths; OPTIMAL is the least length of a tour. As in the paper, the identically zero distance is excluded, so OPTIMAL >0>0>0.

A subtour is a circuit on a subset of the nodes (a single node is a subtour without edges). For a subtour TTT and a node k∉Tk\notin Tk∈/T, TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is obtained by deleting an edge (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) of TTT minimizing d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)-d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y) and adding (x,k)(x,k)(x,k) and (k,y)(k,y)(k,y); COST(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is the resulting increase in length. An insertion method chooses nodes a0,a1,…,an−1a_0,a_1,\dots,a_{n-1}a0​,a1​,…,an−1​, starts from T1={a0}T_1=\{a_0\}T1​={a0​} and sets Ti+1=TOUR(Ti,ai)T_{i+1}=\mathrm{TOUR}(T_i,a_i)Ti+1​=TOUR(Ti​,ai​); INSERT is the length of TnT_nTn​. Nearest insertion chooses aia_iai​ minimizing d(Ti,x)=min⁡y∈Tid(y,x)d(T_i,x)=\min_{y\in T_i}d(y,x)d(Ti​,x)=miny∈Ti​​d(y,x) over x∉Tix\notin T_ix∈/Ti​; cheapest insertion chooses aia_iai​ minimizing COST(Ti,x)(T_i,x)(Ti​,x). Ties are broken arbitrarily.

A kkk-change of a tour deletes kkk of its edges and adds kkk other edges so that another tour is obtained. A tour is kkk-optimal if no kkk-change produces a strictly shorter tour.

The extremal instance is the circle (Nn,dn)(N_n,d_n)(Nn​,dn​): nnn cities equally spaced on a circular road, with dn(i,j)d_n(i,j)dn​(i,j) the smallest m≥0m\ge 0m≥0 with i−j≡mi-j\equiv mi−j≡m or j−i≡m(modn)j-i\equiv m \pmod nj−i≡m(modn). The insertion run of Theorem 5 inserts the cities in the order 1,2,…,n1,2,\dots,n1,2,…,n and produces the zig-zag tour TnT_nTn​: city 1, then the even cities in increasing order, then the odd cities in decreasing order.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Corollary to Theorem 6

For n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 and 4k≤n4k\le n4k≤n there is a traveling salesman graph with OPTIMAL >0>0>0 on which some run of nearest insertion, and some run of cheapest insertion, return a kkk-optimal tour with

INSERTOPTIMAL=2(1−1n).\frac{\mathrm{INSERT}}{\mathrm{OPTIMAL}}=2\left(1-\frac1n\right).OPTIMALINSERT​=2(1−n1​).

Milestones

  1. The insertion run on the circle: the subtours TiT_iTi​ and nodes ai=i+1a_i=i+1ai​=i+1 form an insertion run that obeys both the nearest and the cheapest rule (proof of Theorem 5).
  2. On the circle, TnT_nTn​ has length 2(n−1)2(n-1)2(n−1) and OPTIMAL =n=n=n (proof of Theorem 5).
  3. Theorem 5: for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 there is a graph with INSERT/OPTIMAL =2(1−1/n)=2(1-1/n)=2(1−1/n) for both methods.
  4. Equation (7.4): the length of a tour of the circle is the sum over unit edges eee of COUNT(e,T)(e,T)(e,T), the number of times eee is traversed when each tour edge is replaced by a shortest arc.
  5. Every tour of the circle is odd or even (all counts of one parity), eq. (7.5).
  6. TnT_nTn​ is the shortest even tour, so every tour shorter than TnT_nTn​ is odd.
  7. TnT_nTn​ is kkk-optimal for every k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4.
  8. Theorem 6: for n≥8n\ge 8n≥8 there is a graph with a tour that is kkk-optimal for all k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4 and has LOCALOPT/OPTIMAL =2(1−1/n)=2(1-1/n)=2(1−1/n).

Significance

The result. The Corollary shows that the 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) worst-case guarantee of nearest and cheapest insertion cannot be improved by requiring that the returned tour survive kkk-change local search, for kkk up to a quarter of the number of cities. Theorem 6 says more generally that kkk-optimality with k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4 does not bound the ratio to the optimum below 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n). Together with the paper's upper bound, the insertion guarantee is exact, and it stays exact after local polishing with small neighbourhoods.

Formalizing it. All statements are proved in the paper; none, to our knowledge, has been machine-checked. The platform has an upper bound for nearest insertion (SupplyChainTheory, Theorem 10.7, ratio at most 2) but no tightness example and no notion of kkk-optimality. This mission produces a reusable definition of kkk-changes against arbitrary tours, the circle metric, and the parity-counting argument on a cycle, and it supplies the calculations the paper omits ("We omit these calculations but note that they require the assumption n≥6n\ge 6n≥6").

Difficulty

Two steps carry the weight. First, the omitted calculations for the insertion run: at each stage one must show that inserting aia_iai​ between i−1i-1i−1 and iii minimizes the insertion increase over every edge of the zig-zag subtour, and that no other outside city can be inserted for less than 2; the claim fails for n=4n=4n=4 and n=5n=5n=5, so the verification must use n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 in an essential way. Second, kkk-optimality is a statement about every tour at edge difference kkk, not about 2-opt segment reversals or any specific move family. A search over moves of a special form does not establish it; the argument must bound the length of an arbitrary tour at edge difference kkk from below.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n, so the paper's node mmm is index m−1m-1m−1 and ai=i+1a_i=i+1ai​=i+1 is index iii; subtour indices stay 1-based (T1=[a0]T_1=[a_0]T1​=[a0​], approximation TnT_nTn​). A distance is d : Fin n → Fin n → ℝ with the structure IsTSPDist (symmetric, nonnegative, triangle inequality, and d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0; the last is a normalization absent from the paper that changes no length). A tour is an Equiv.Perm (Fin n), a subtour a list read cyclically; OPTIMAL is Finset.univ.inf' over permutations, the true minimum. TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is insertion at a position minimizing the new length; COST is a minimum over positions; the nearest-insertion distance (4.1) takes values in WithTop ℝ, so no junk value arises. kkk-optimality compares the tour with every permutation whose edge set (unordered pairs) misses exactly kkk of the tour's edges. Ratios are multiplied out.

COUNT(e,T)(e,T)(e,T) needs a choice of shortest arc for antipodal pairs when nnn is even; the formalization takes the arc through min⁡(x,y),…,max⁡(x,y)\min(x,y),\dots,\max(x,y)min(x,y),…,max(x,y). The paper's argument does not depend on this choice.

Deviations from the printed text: the Corollary is stated for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 (the printed statement says only 4k≤n4k\le n4k≤n, but its proof uses the example of Theorem 5, which exists for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6; for k=0k=0k=0, n=3n=3n=3 the printed statement is false). Theorem 6 keeps its printed n≥8n\ge 8n≥8. In the proof of Theorem 5 the paper writes "(4.2) holds" where the cheapest-insertion condition (4.3) is meant; the formal statement uses (4.3).

The existence statements carry OPTIMAL >0>0>0, the paper's standing assumption (1.1). Without it, the zero distance would make every length zero and every tour kkk-optimal, which would satisfy the ratio equations trivially; that formalization is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular the omitted insertion calculations and the parity lemma, and reusable lemmas on cyclic lists and edge sets of permutations.

Selected references

  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns, P. M. Lewis II, An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem, SIAM J. Comput. 6(3):563–581, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • S. Lin, Computer solutions of the traveling salesman problem, Bell System Tech. J. 44:2245–2269, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1965.tb04146.x
  • S. Lin, B. W. Kernighan, An effective heuristic algorithm for the traveling-salesman problem, Oper. Res. 21(2):498–516, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.2.498
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders III: A Greedy Price-Update Algorithm Is a 2-Approximation for XOS BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a set of mmm items is sold to nnn bidders who value bundles of items rather than single items. Spectrum auctions, procurement of transportation lanes and the allocation of cloud resources all have this form, and the central algorithmic question is how to allocate the items so as to maximize the social welfare, the sum of the bidders' values for what they receive. Even to describe a general valuation takes 2m2^m2m numbers, so algorithms access the bidders through queries, and the achievable approximation depends on the class of valuations allowed.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010) study bidders without complementarities. For the class of XOS valuations, maxima of additive valuations, which strictly contains the submodular valuations, they give LP-based algorithms and, in §3.3, a purely combinatorial algorithm: bidders arrive one at a time, take their demanded bundle at the current item prices, and raise the prices of what they took. Its analysis charges the welfare of any allocation to the item prices the algorithm sets, an argument that uses only the demand and XOS oracles.

Setting

The items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and the bidders 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n.

  • An additive valuation (a clause) www assigns nonnegative values w(1),…,w(m)w(1),\dots,w(m)w(1),…,w(m) to the items and w(S)=∑j∈Sw(j)w(S)=\sum_{j\in S}w(j)w(S)=∑j∈S​w(j) to a bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M.
  • An XOS valuation vvv is given by a nonempty finite set of clauses {w1,…,wt}\{w_1,\dots,w_t\}{w1​,…,wt​} (its XOS expression) through v(S)=max⁡kwk(S)v(S)=\max_k w_k(S)v(S)=maxk​wk​(S). A clause wkw_kwk​ with wk(S)=v(S)w_k(S)=v(S)wk​(S)=v(S) is a maximizing clause for SSS. Every XOS valuation is normalized, v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, and monotone.
  • An allocation is a tuple of pairwise disjoint bundles O1,…,OnO_1,\dots,O_nO1​,…,On​; items may stay unallocated. Its welfare is ∑ivi(Oi)\sum_i v_i(O_i)∑i​vi​(Oi​).
  • A demand oracle for bidder iii answers, given item prices p∈Rmp\in\mathbb R^mp∈Rm, a bundle maximizing vi(T)−∑j∈Tpjv_i(T)-\sum_{j\in T}p_jvi​(T)−∑j∈T​pj​. An XOS oracle answers, given a bundle SSS, a maximizing clause for SSS in viv_ivi​.

The greedy price-update algorithm. Start with all bundles empty and all prices pj=0p_j=0pj​=0. For i=1,…,ni=1,\dots,ni=1,…,n: let SiS_iSi​ be bidder iii's demand at the current prices; remove the items of SiS_iSi​ from the bundles of the earlier bidders; let qiq^iqi be the maximizing clause for SiS_iSi​ in viv_ivi​; set pj=qjip_j=q^i_jpj​=qji​ for j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​. Write pkp^kpk for the prices after stage kkk (p0=0p^0=0p0=0), pk(T)=∑j∈Tpjkp^k(T)=\sum_{j\in T}p^k_jpk(T)=∑j∈T​pjk​, and A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ for the final bundles.

In the Lean development these objects are XOSExpr, XOSExpr.val, IsAllocation, welfare, IsDemandOracle, IsXOSOracle, greedyState, greedyPrices and greedyAlloc in the namespace ComplementFreeCA.XOSGreedy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3

For XOS valuations v1,…,vnv_1,\dots,v_nv1​,…,vn​, every demand oracle and every XOS oracle, and every allocation O1,…,OnO_1,\dots,O_nO1​,…,On​,

∑i=1nvi(Oi)  ≤  2∑i=1nvi(Ai).\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(O_i)\;\le\;2\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(A_i).i=1∑n​vi​(Oi​)≤2i=1∑n​vi​(Ai​).

The comparison with every allocation is the paper's comparison with the optimal allocation.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.4. The final prices are paid for by the algorithm's welfare:
pn(M)≤∑ivi(Ai).p^n(M)\le\sum_i v_i(A_i).pn(M)≤i∑​vi​(Ai​).
  1. Lemma 3.5. Prices never decrease: pjk≤pjk′p^k_j\le p^{k'}_jpjk​≤pjk′​ for all items jjj and stages k≤k′k\le k'k≤k′.
  2. Lemma 3.6. For every allocation OOO,
∑ivi(Oi)≤2 pn(M).\sum_i v_i(O_i)\le 2\,p^n(M).i∑​vi​(Oi​)≤2pn(M).

Three further statements are included without being milestones: the output A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ is an allocation (used implicitly by the paper); the first sentence of the proof of Lemma 3.6, that with Δi=pi(M)−pi−1(M)\Delta^i=p^i(M)-p^{i-1}(M)Δi=pi(M)−pi−1(M) one has Δi=max⁡T⊆M(vi(T)−pi−1(T))\Delta^i=\max_{T\subseteq M}\bigl(v_i(T)-p^{i-1}(T)\bigr)Δi=maxT⊆M​(vi​(T)−pi−1(T)); and the factor 222 is attained on the paper's two-item, two-bidder example (p. 9).

Significance

Theorem 3.3 shows that a factor-2 approximation of the optimal welfare for XOS bidders needs no linear program: one pass over the bidders, one demand query and one XOS query each. The paper's LP-based algorithm of §3.2 attains the better ratio e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1), and Theorem 4.1 of the paper shows that for the larger class of complement-free bidders no (2−ϵ)(2-\epsilon)(2−ϵ)-approximation is possible with polynomial communication.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces a formal model of XOS valuations, demand and XOS oracles and the greedy run that is reusable for other price-based arguments, and a formal proof of the guarantee for every tie-breaking in both oracles.

Difficulty

The argument is elementary, but its bookkeeping is where a formal proof can go wrong. Items move between bidders: an item taken from an earlier bidder in step (b) is re-priced in step (d), and every priced item lies in exactly one final bundle. Lemma 3.4 needs this invariant across all nnn stages, together with the fact that a maximizing clause for the demanded set bounds viv_ivi​ on every subset, which holds because it is a clause of viv_ivi​ itself, not merely an additive function agreeing with viv_ivi​ on SiS_iSi​. Lemma 3.5 is a contradiction argument using optimality of the demand; Lemma 3.6 telescopes the price increases and needs prices to stay nonnegative. The argument must hold for arbitrary oracle answers, so no canonical demand can be assumed.

Formalization scope

  • Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), values in ℝ. An XOS valuation is represented by its expression: a nonempty Finset (Fin m → ℝ) of clauses with nonnegative entries, evaluated with Finset.sup'. The paper's standing assumptions, normalized and monotone valuations (p. 1), hold automatically in this representation.
  • The oracles are function parameters dem : Fin n → (Fin m → ℝ) → Finset (Fin m) and cl : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → (Fin m → ℝ) with hypotheses IsDemandOracle and IsXOSOracle; every theorem holds for every such pair, so no tie-breaking rule is fixed.
  • The run is a recursion on the stage: stage k+1k+1k+1 processes the 0-based bidder kkk, i.e. the paper's bidder k+1k+1k+1; after stage nnn the state is constant.
  • The paper's goal compares with the optimal allocation; the Lean goal compares with every allocation, which is equivalent and avoids an argmax. Stating the bound against one particular allocation, or against the algorithm's own output, would be trivial and is excluded.
  • There are no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) constants: the factor 222 is the paper's.
  • Printed slip: the model on p. 1 writes an allocation as S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​; it is one bundle per bidder, S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​.
  • Out of scope: running time, the cost of simulating oracles (Proposition 2.1), and communication lower bounds.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones and of the goal, and reusable lemmas on the invariant that every priced item lies in exactly one final bundle.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities, Games and Economic Behavior 55(2):270–296, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders II: Clause-Based Randomized Rounding for XOS BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers mmm indivisible items to nnn bidders, each of whom values bundles of items rather than single items. Allocating the items so as to maximize the total value (the social welfare) is the central optimization problem of the area: it models spectrum auctions, procurement and resource allocation, and it is NP-hard and hard to approximate for general valuations. A large literature therefore studies restricted classes of valuations without complementarities. Among them the class XOS (valuations that are a maximum of additive valuations, also called fractionally subadditive) sits strictly between submodular and subadditive valuations and has become a standard benchmark class in algorithmic game theory.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010) gave, among other results, a randomized algorithm that approximates the optimal welfare for XOS bidders within a factor 1/(1−(1−1/n)n)1/(1-(1-1/n)^n)1/(1−(1−1/n)n), which is at most e/(e−1)≈1.582e/(e-1)\approx 1.582e/(e−1)≈1.582. The algorithm rounds the standard LP relaxation and resolves conflicts between bidders using the XOS structure. This mission formalizes that guarantee (Theorem 3.2 of the paper).

A short timeline: Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan (EC 2001) introduced the XOS terminology and a 2-approximation for submodular bidders; the conference version of the present paper (STOC 2005) gave the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) bound for XOS with demand and XOS oracles; Feige (STOC 2006) extended the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) ratio to XOS bidders with demand oracles only and gave a 2-approximation for subadditive bidders.

Setting

Items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and bidders are N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} with n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Bidder iii has a valuation viv_ivi​ assigning a real number vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) to every bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. An allocation is a tuple (O1,…,On)(O_1,\dots,O_n)(O1​,…,On​) of pairwise disjoint bundles; its welfare is ∑ivi(Oi)\sum_i v_i(O_i)∑i​vi​(Oi​).

A clause is an additive valuation www given by nonnegative item values w1,…,wmw_1,\dots,w_mw1​,…,wm​, with w(S)=∑j∈Swjw(S)=\sum_{j\in S}w_jw(S)=∑j∈S​wj​. A valuation vvv is XOS if there is a nonempty finite set WWW of clauses with

v(S)=max⁡w∈W ∑j∈Swj(S⊆M).v(S)=\max_{w\in W}\ \sum_{j\in S}w_j\qquad(S\subseteq M).v(S)=w∈Wmax​ j∈S∑​wj​(S⊆M).

A clause of WWW attaining the maximum for SSS is a maximizing clause for SSS in vvv; an XOS oracle returns one (arbitrarily, if several attain it).

The LP relaxation has a variable xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ for every bidder iii and bundle SSS and asks to maximize OPT∗=∑i,Sxi,Svi(S)\mathrm{OPT}^*=\sum_{i,S}x_{i,S}v_i(S)OPT∗=∑i,S​xi,S​vi​(S) subject to ∑i∑S∋jxi,S≤1\sum_{i}\sum_{S\ni j}x_{i,S}\le1∑i​∑S∋j​xi,S​≤1 for each item jjj, ∑Sxi,S≤1\sum_S x_{i,S}\le1∑S​xi,S​≤1 for each bidder iii, and xi,S≥0x_{i,S}\ge0xi,S​≥0.

Randomized rounding draws a preallocation S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​: independently for each bidder iii, bundle SSS is chosen with probability xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ and the empty bundle with the remaining probability 1−∑Sxi,S1-\sum_S x_{i,S}1−∑S​xi,S​. The preallocation can give an item to several bidders.

The algorithm of §3.2: (i) draw a preallocation from an optimal LP solution xxx; (ii) let pi=(p1i,…,pmi)p^i=(p^i_1,\dots,p^i_m)pi=(p1i​,…,pmi​) be the maximizing clause for SiS_iSi​ in viv_ivi​; (iii) give each item jjj to a bidder iii with pji≥pji′p^i_j\ge p^{i'}_jpji​≥pji′​ for all i′i'i′. Write ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG for the welfare of the resulting allocation.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

For every XOS profile, every optimal LP solution xxx, every choice of maximizing clauses, every tie-breaking in step (iii) and every allocation OOO,

(1−(1−1n)n)∑ivi(Oi) ≤ E[ALG].\Big(1-\Big(1-\frac1n\Big)^n\Big)\sum_i v_i(O_i)\ \le\ \mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}].(1−(1−n1​)n)i∑​vi​(Oi​) ≤ E[ALG].

Milestones

  1. ∑ivi(Oi)≤OPT∗\sum_i v_i(O_i)\le\mathrm{OPT}^*∑i​vi​(Oi​)≤OPT∗ for an optimal LP solution (step (i) of the proof of Theorem 3.1).
  2. Pointwise, ALG≥∑jQj\mathrm{ALG}\ge\sum_j Q_jALG≥∑j​Qj​ with Qj=max⁡ipjiQ_j=\max_i p^i_jQj​=maxi​pji​.
  3. Eq. (1): for 1≤k≤n1\le k\le n1≤k≤n and X1,…,Xk∈[0,1]X_1,\dots,X_k\in[0,1]X1​,…,Xk​∈[0,1] with ∑Xi≤1\sum X_i\le1∑Xi​≤1,
1−∏i≤k(1−Xi) ≥ 1−(1−∑Xik)k ≥ (1−(1−1k)k)∑Xi ≥ (1−(1−1n)n)∑Xi.1-\prod_{i\le k}(1-X_i)\ \ge\ 1-\Big(1-\tfrac{\sum X_i}{k}\Big)^k\ \ge\ \Big(1-\big(1-\tfrac1k\big)^k\Big)\sum X_i\ \ge\ \Big(1-\big(1-\tfrac1n\big)^n\Big)\sum X_i .1−i≤k∏​(1−Xi​) ≥ 1−(1−k∑Xi​​)k ≥ (1−(1−k1​)k)∑Xi​ ≥ (1−(1−n1​)n)∑Xi​.
  1. Lemma 3.3: E[Qj]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)∑i∑S∋jxi,S pj(i,S)\mathbb E[Q_j]\ge(1-(1-1/n)^n)\sum_i\sum_{S\ni j}x_{i,S}\,p^{(i,S)}_jE[Qj​]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)∑i​∑S∋j​xi,S​pj(i,S)​ for every feasible xxx.
  2. E[ALG]≥(1−(1−1/n)n) OPT∗(x)\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\ge(1-(1-1/n)^n)\,\mathrm{OPT}^*(x)E[ALG]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)OPT∗(x) for every feasible xxx.

Milestone 5 is stronger than the goal (it compares with the fractional value); the goal is stated against the integral optimum because that is what Theorem 3.2 asserts.

Significance

The bound 1−(1−1/n)n≥1−1/e1-(1-1/n)^n\ge1-1/e1−(1−1/n)n≥1−1/e is a constant-factor guarantee for a class that includes every submodular valuation, obtained from nothing more than the LP relaxation and the clause structure of XOS. It shows that the integrality gap of the configuration LP for XOS bidders is at most 1/(1−(1−1/n)n)1/(1-(1-1/n)^n)1/(1−(1−1/n)n), a fact reused in later work on welfare maximization, online allocation and posted-price mechanisms. The per-item analysis (Lemma 3.3 and Eq. (1)) is the same "1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e" correlation-gap argument that recurs in submodular maximization and prophet-inequality proofs.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces a Lean statement and proof of the guarantee with the randomness made explicit, a reusable model of the configuration LP and of randomized rounding over bundles, and a formal version of the inequality in Eq. (1), which is independently useful.

Difficulty

Each piece of the argument is short; the work is in the bookkeeping. The preallocation is infeasible, so welfare cannot be read off from the rounding directly; the proof reduces it to per-item quantities QjQ_jQj​ and then lower-bounds E[Qj]\mathbb E[Q_j]E[Qj​] by comparing with a different assignment of item jjj that is not the algorithm's. The expectation of that auxiliary assignment involves a product of probabilities over bidders ordered by a conditional expectation, and the final bound needs the calculus inequality of Eq. (1) together with a summation by parts. A naive attempt to bound E[ALG]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]E[ALG] bidder by bidder fails, because a bidder's received bundle is not contained in its preallocated bundle, and the clause values of other bidders decide what it receives.

Formalization scope

  • Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), valuations Finset (Fin m) → ℝ. XOS is stated through its expression: each viv_ivi​ comes with a nonempty finite clause set WiW_iWi​ of nonnegative clauses, and vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) is attained by a clause of WiW_iWi​ and bounded by all of them. Normalization and monotonicity, the paper's standing assumptions (p. 1), follow from this.
  • The LP has a variable for every bundle, including ∅\emptyset∅. "Optimal" is stated as feasible and not beaten by any feasible solution; existence of an optimum is not asserted.
  • The rounding is a finite product distribution over profiles σ:Fin n→\sigma:\mathrm{Fin}\,n\toσ:Finn→ bundles, with bidder iii's law qi(S)=xi,S+1[S=∅](1−∑Txi,T)q_i(S)=x_{i,S}+\mathbf 1[S=\emptyset](1-\sum_T x_{i,T})qi​(S)=xi,S​+1[S=∅](1−∑T​xi,T​); expectations are finite sums.
  • The XOS oracle is a function parameter with its specification, and step (iii) is any rule selecting a bidder with maximal clause value; every statement quantifies over all of them.
  • "Approximation" in Theorem 3.2 is read in expectation, as its proof establishes. There are no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) constants in this mission.
  • Printed slip: the display of Lemma 3.3 (and the identity for OPT∗\mathrm{OPT}^*OPT∗ before it) sums xi,Spj(i,S)x_{i,S}p^{(i,S)}_jxi,S​pj(i,S)​ over all (i,S)(i,S)(i,S); the proof's final line restricts to S∋jS\ni jS∋j, and the printed version is false. The Lean states Lemma 3.3 with S∋jS\ni jS∋j.
  • Running time, the ellipsoid method and oracle complexity are out of scope.
  • Ruled out as trivializing: dropping the LP constraints on xxx (the item constraint is what makes Eq. (1) apply), stating the bound for a fixed preallocation instead of the expectation, or allowing negative clause values.

A complete development needs finite product distributions over bundles, the AM–GM inequality, monotonicity of (1−1/k)k(1-1/k)^k(1−1/k)k, and a summation-by-parts argument. The LP and rounding model are reusable for the other randomized-rounding results of the paper; proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders, STOC 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060681
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities, EC 2001. https://doi.org/10.1145/501158.501161
  • U. Feige, On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive, STOC 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132540
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders I: LP Rounding for Subadditive BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers mmm indivisible items to nnn bidders, each of whom values bundles of items rather than single items. Allocating the items to maximize total value is the basic welfare problem of spectrum auctions, procurement and resource allocation, and it is the running example of algorithmic mechanism design. For general valuations no polynomial-time algorithm achieves a ratio polynomially better than m\sqrt mm​ under standard assumptions, so positive results require restricting the valuations. The most natural restriction is complement freeness (subadditivity): a bundle is never worth more than the sum of its parts.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010; conference version STOC 2005) gave the first polynomial-time algorithms with sub-polynomial approximation ratios for complement-free bidders given demand oracles. This mission formalizes their Section 3.1 algorithm, which rounds the linear-programming relaxation of the auction and splits the resulting infeasible solution into feasible ones.

Timeline. Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan (2001) introduced the complement-free hierarchy and treated submodular bidders. The original version of the algorithm formalized here claimed an O(log⁡m)O(\log m)O(logm) ratio; Feige observed that the same algorithm achieves O(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)O(\log m/\log\log m)O(logm/loglogm) and that its ratio is at least Ω(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)\Omega(\sqrt{\log m/\log\log m})Ω(logm/loglogm​) (Feige, SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009). Feige then obtained a constant ratio (222) for subadditive bidders by a different rounding.

Setting

Items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and bidders N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Bidder iii has a valuation viv_ivi​ assigning a real value vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) to each bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. Every valuation is normalized, vi(∅)=0v_i(\emptyset)=0vi​(∅)=0, and monotone, S⊆T⇒vi(S)≤vi(T)S\subseteq T\Rightarrow v_i(S)\le v_i(T)S⊆T⇒vi​(S)≤vi​(T). A valuation is complement free if v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T)v(S\cup T)\le v(S)+v(T)v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T) for all S,TS,TS,T. An allocation is a tuple (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) of pairwise disjoint bundles; its welfare is ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​), and OPTOPTOPT denotes the largest welfare.

The LP relaxation has a variable xi,S≥0x_{i,S}\ge0xi,S​≥0 for each bidder and bundle, with ∑i,S∋jxi,S≤1\sum_{i,S\ni j}x_{i,S}\le1∑i,S∋j​xi,S​≤1 for each item jjj and ∑Sxi,S≤1\sum_S x_{i,S}\le1∑S​xi,S​≤1 for each bidder iii; its objective is ∑i,Sxi,Svi(S)\sum_{i,S}x_{i,S}v_i(S)∑i,S​xi,S​vi​(S), with optimum OPT∗≥OPTOPT^*\ge OPTOPT∗≥OPT. Randomized rounding lets each bidder independently draw bundle SSS with probability xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ and ∅\emptyset∅ with the remaining probability. The result, a preallocation, has expected welfare OPT∗OPT^*OPT∗ but may give an item to several bidders.

The algorithm takes k=⌊3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m⌋k=\lfloor 3\log m/\log\log m\rfloork=⌊3logm/loglogm⌋ and:

  1. rounds until the preallocation (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) has every item in at most kkk bundles and ∑ivi(Si)≥OPT∗/3\sum_i v_i(S_i)\ge OPT^*/3∑i​vi​(Si​)≥OPT∗/3;
  2. splits each SiS_iSi​ into layers SirS_i^rSir​, r=1,…,kr=1,\dots,kr=1,…,k, where SirS_i^rSir​ holds the items of SiS_iSi​ that appear in exactly r−1r-1r−1 of S1,…,Si−1S_1,\dots,S_{i-1}S1​,…,Si−1​;
  3. picks the layer index rrr maximizing ∑ivi(Sir)\sum_i v_i(S_i^r)∑i​vi​(Sir​) and sets Ti=SirT_i=S_i^rTi​=Sir​;
  4. if some bidder has vi(M)≥∑i′vi′(Ti′)v_i(M)\ge\sum_{i'}v_{i'}(T_{i'})vi​(M)≥∑i′​vi′​(Ti′​), gives that bidder everything instead.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1, with the explicit ratio

For all sufficiently large mmm, for normalized, monotone, complement-free valuations and an optimal LP solution xxx with value OPT∗OPT^*OPT∗:

  1. if OPT∗>3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*>3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗>3maxi​vi​(M), one rounding meets the two conditions of step 1 with probability >1/6>1/6>1/6;
  2. from any preallocation meeting them, every admissible run of steps 2–4 outputs an allocation with
∑ivi(outputi) ≥ OPT3k,k=⌊3log⁡mlog⁡log⁡m⌋;\sum_i v_i(\text{output}_i)\ \ge\ \frac{OPT}{3k},\qquad k=\Big\lfloor\frac{3\log m}{\log\log m}\Big\rfloor;i∑​vi​(outputi​) ≥ 3kOPT​,k=⌊loglogm3logm​⌋;
  1. if OPT∗≤3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*\le3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗≤3maxi​vi​(M), the bidder maximizing vi(M)v_i(M)vi​(M) alone achieves OPT/3OPT/3OPT/3.

Milestones

  • OPT≤OPT∗OPT\le OPT^*OPT≤OPT∗ (proof, step (i)).
  • The layers of each index form an allocation and partition each SiS_iSi​ (proof, step (ii)).
  • Complement freeness gives ∑rvi(Sir)≥vi(Si)\sum_r v_i(S_i^r)\ge v_i(S_i)∑r​vi​(Sir​)≥vi​(Si​), and the best layer has welfare ≥OPT∗/(3k)\ge OPT^*/(3k)≥OPT∗/(3k) (proof, step (iii)).
  • Lemma 3.1: independent Bernoulli variables with ∑ipi≤1\sum_i p_i\le1∑i​pi​≤1 exceed 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm with probability ≤1/m2\le1/m^2≤1/m2.
  • Lemma 3.2: for XXX a sum of independent [0,1][0,1][0,1] variables with mean μ\muμ, Pr⁡[∣X−μ∣≥α]≤μ/α2\Pr[|X-\mu|\ge\alpha]\le\mu/\alpha^2Pr[∣X−μ∣≥α]≤μ/α2.
  • §3.1.1: some item appears more than 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm times with probability ≤1/m\le1/m≤1/m; the preallocation's welfare falls below OPT∗/3OPT^*/3OPT∗/3 with probability <3/4<3/4<3/4.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 was among the first polynomial-time approximation guarantees for welfare maximization with general subadditive bidders, and its layering argument is the standard way to turn an LP solution that is feasible up to a factor kkk into a feasible allocation losing only a factor kkk for subadditive objectives. The same argument applies to the kkk-duplicates auction and reappears in later rounding schemes. Lemma 3.1 is the standard balls-in-bins tail bound behind every log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m\log m/\log\log mlogm/loglogm load estimate.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized, on this platform or in Mathlib, as far as searches show. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the algorithm's guarantee with an explicit constant 3k3k3k in place of O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), a precise statement of the probabilistic step, and reusable statements of two concentration inequalities for sums of independent bounded variables.

Difficulty

The combinatorial part (steps (ii) and (iii)) is short. The difficulty is in step (i). The rounding is a product distribution over bundles, while the count of an item is a sum over bidders of indicators that depend on each bidder's whole bundle; connecting the finite product law to independent Bernoulli variables, and then to Lemma 3.1, requires building the independence structure explicitly. Lemma 3.1 itself does not follow from a Chernoff bound with a fixed relative deviation: the threshold 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm grows with mmm while the mean stays at most 111, and the bound must hold uniformly in the number of variables, which a fixed-deviation Chernoff statement does not give. Finally, the event-BBB bound needs the preallocation's welfare as a sum of independent variables in [0,1][0,1][0,1], which requires rescaling by max⁡ivi(M)\max_i v_i(M)maxi​vi​(M) and monotonicity.

Formalization scope

Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), valuations Finset (Fin m) → ℝ. Normalization and monotonicity, the paper's standing assumptions (p. 1), are hypotheses of the goal. log⁡\loglog is the natural logarithm; the paper does not fix a base. The rounding law is written as explicit finite sums over profiles σ:Fin n→Finset (Fin m)\sigma:\texttt{Fin } n\to\texttt{Finset (Fin } m)σ:Fin n→Finset (Fin m) with product weights, so independence across bidders is literal; Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 are stated measure-theoretically with Mathlib's iIndepFun.

Explicit constants and conventions that replace the paper's notation:

  • The ratio O(k)=O(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)O(k)=O(\log m/\log\log m)O(k)=O(logm/loglogm) is stated as 3k3k3k with k=⌊3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m⌋k=\lfloor3\log m/\log\log m\rfloork=⌊3logm/loglogm⌋, the constant the proof establishes (step (iii), p. 6). "Sufficiently large mmm" is an existential m0m_0m0​.
  • The w.l.o.g. scaling max⁡ivi(M)=1\max_i v_i(M)=1maxi​vi​(M)=1 and the split at OPT∗=3OPT^*=3OPT∗=3 become the scale-free split at OPT∗=3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*=3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗=3maxi​vi​(M).
  • The choice of rrr in step (iii) and of the bidder in step (iv) are universally quantified over all admissible choices.

Printed slips resolved in the statements:

  • Lemma 3.1 mixes nnn and mmm. Here the number of variables is arbitrary, "sufficiently large" refers to mmm, and ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1 is relaxed to ∑ipi≤1\sum_ip_i\le1∑i​pi​≤1, which is what the application uses.
  • The display after Lemma 3.1 writes the threshold log⁡m/(3log⁡log⁡m)\log m/(3\log\log m)logm/(3loglogm); the lemma's 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm is used.
  • "Pr⁡[∨jEj]<1/n\Pr[\vee_jE_j]<1/nPr[∨j​Ej​]<1/n" and "≤1/n+3/4\le 1/n+3/4≤1/n+3/4" should read 1/m1/m1/m.
  • The event BBB is defined without its sum; it means ∑ivi(Si)<OPT∗/3\sum_iv_i(S_i)<OPT^*/3∑i​vi​(Si​)<OPT∗/3.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the guarantee assumes the item-count bound (without it the layers do not cover the bundles), the probability statements assume an LP-feasible xxx, neither the layer index nor the step-(iv) bidder is fixed, and the ratio is the explicit 3k3k3k rather than an unspecified constant. Running time, the ellipsoid method and oracle complexity are out of scope. Contributions of general concentration lemmas for sums of independent bounded variables are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • U. Feige, On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):122–142, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680977
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial Auctions with Decreasing Marginal Utilities, Games and Economic Behavior 55(2):270–296, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006
  • M. Mitzenmacher, E. Upfal, Probability and Computing, Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813603
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🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis VII: The L-Optimality Criterion and the Proximity TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Submodularity — the diminishing-returns property g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(p \vee q) + g(p \wedge q)g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q) on a lattice — is one of the most useful structural hypotheses in combinatorial optimization, underlying efficient algorithms for network flows, matroid theory, and set-function minimization. Chapter 7 studies L-convex functions: functions on the integer lattice ZV\mathbb Z^VZV that are submodular and linear along the all-ones direction. This is the "dual" notion, under the conjugacy developed later in the book, to chunk 06's M-convex functions, and it inherits the same strong minimization theory — a purely local optimality criterion and a proximity theorem with an explicit distance bound — while additionally supporting a genuinely new characterization with no M-convex counterpart: discrete midpoint convexity, the direct lattice analogue of the classical real-valued midpoint convexity condition. This mission formalizes the chapter's definitional theorem, its midpoint-convexity characterization, the L-optimality criterion, and the L-proximity theorem itself.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A function g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} with nonempty effective domain is an L-convex function if it satisfies (SBF[Z]): g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(p \vee q) + g(p \wedge q)g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q) for all p,qp, qp,q (∨,∧\vee, \wedge∨,∧ componentwise max/min), and (TRF[Z]): there is r∈Rr \in \mathbb Rr∈R with g(p+1)=g(p)+rg(p + \mathbf 1) = g(p) + rg(p+1)=g(p)+r for all ppp, where 1\mathbf 11 is the all-ones vector. An L♮^\natural♮-convex function is one whose lift to the extended ground set {0}∪V\{0\} \cup V{0}∪V is L-convex; equivalently (Theorem 7.1), ggg satisfies the translation-submodularity axiom (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]): g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1))g(p) + g(q) \ge g((p - \alpha\mathbf 1) \vee q) + g(p \wedge (q + \alpha\mathbf 1))g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1)) for all p,qp, qp,q and all nonnegative integers α\alphaα. Discrete midpoint convexity asks g(p)+g(q)≥g(⌈(p+q)/2⌉)+g(⌊(p+q)/2⌋)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(\lceil (p+q)/2 \rceil) + g(\lfloor (p+q)/2 \rfloor)g(p)+g(q)≥g(⌈(p+q)/2⌉)+g(⌊(p+q)/2⌋) componentwise. For α\alphaα a positive integer, a point satisfies scaled local optimality if g(pα)≤g(pα±αχY)g(p_\alpha) \le g(p_\alpha \pm \alpha \chi_Y)g(pα​)≤g(pα​±αχY​) for every Y⊆VY \subseteq VY⊆V.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.18 (the L-proximity theorem)

Assume α\alphaα is a positive integer and n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣. (1) If ggg is L-convex with g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1) for all ppp, and pα∈dom⁡gp_\alpha \in \operatorname{dom} gpα​∈domg satisfies g(pα)≤g(pα+αχY)g(p_\alpha) \le g(p_\alpha + \alpha\chi_Y)g(pα​)≤g(pα​+αχY​) for all Y⊆VY \subseteq VY⊆V, then arg⁡min⁡g≠∅\arg\min g \ne \emptysetargming=∅ and there is p∗∈arg⁡min⁡gp^* \in \arg\min gp∗∈argming with the componentwise bound

pα≤p∗≤pα+(n−1)(α−1)1.p_\alpha \le p^* \le p_\alpha + (n-1)(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1.pα​≤p∗≤pα​+(n−1)(α−1)1.

(2) If ggg is L♮^\natural♮-convex and pαp_\alphapα​ satisfies the two-sided version, then there is p∗p^*p∗ with pα−n(α−1)1≤p∗≤pα+n(α−1)1p_\alpha - n(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1 \le p^* \le p_\alpha + n(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1pα​−n(α−1)1≤p∗≤pα​+n(α−1)1. The bound is a genuine vector (lattice-order) inequality, not an ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞-norm bound — the form later chapters' applications need.

Milestones: Theorems 7.1, 7.7, 7.14

Theorem 7.1: L♮^\natural♮-convexity (defined via the lift) is equivalent to the direct translation-submodularity axiom. Theorem 7.7: this same class is also characterized by discrete midpoint convexity — a three-way equivalence with the approach property (L♮^\natural♮-APR[Z]) as a bridge — giving L-convexity a genuinely different, more geometric face than anything available on the M-convex side. Theorem 7.14 (the L-optimality criterion): global optimality reduces to a purely local check against the sign-pattern neighbors p±χYp \pm \chi_Yp±χY​, mirroring chunk 06's Theorem 6.26 but with the plain L-convex case additionally requiring the periodicity condition g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1).

Significance

The result itself. Discrete midpoint convexity (Theorem 7.7) is philosophically important: it shows the lattice-submodularity definition of L-convexity is not an arbitrary discretization choice but coincides exactly with the most direct discrete analogue of ordinary midpoint convexity, the classical characterization of convex functions via f((p+q)/2)≤(f(p)+f(q))/2f((p+q)/2) \le (f(p)+f(q))/2f((p+q)/2)≤(f(p)+f(q))/2. The L-optimality criterion and L-proximity theorem give L-convex minimization the same algorithmic footing as M-convex minimization (chunk 06): scaling algorithms for L-convex objectives — which arise naturally from network flow and submodular-function duality — inherit a provable, dimension-and-scale-explicit distance guarantee between a coarse-scale local optimum and the true minimizer.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for L-convex functions, discrete midpoint convexity, or the L-optimality/proximity theorems. This mission gives the first formal statement of these results, completing (alongside chunk 06's M-convex-function results) both halves of the exchange-axiom-based theory that chapter 8's conjugacy duality later unifies.

Difficulty

A natural shortcut, given the structural parallel to chunk 06, is to assume the L-proximity theorem's proof is a mechanical relabeling of the M-proximity theorem's proof. It is not: the M-convex proof (chunk 06) crucially uses the exchange axiom's additive four-term inequality to build a chain of strictly improving points, whereas the L-convex proof instead exploits (TRF[Z])'s periodicity directly — it reduces to the case pα=0p_\alpha = 0pα​=0 using translation invariance, then constructs a minimal (with respect to the lattice order) point among all sufficiently good solutions and shows this minimality, combined with submodularity (SBF[Z]), forces the componentwise bound. The vector (rather than norm) form of the conclusion is not cosmetic: it is exactly what this lattice-order argument naturally produces, and is the form needed by later chapters' applications.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} is (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ. Unlike chunk 06's M-convex axiom, (SBF[Z]), (TRF[Z]), and (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]) are stated for all of ZV\mathbb Z^VZV, not restricted to dom⁡g\operatorname{dom} gdomg, so no explicit import of chunk 05's L-convex-set vocabulary was needed for dom g's structure (unlike the corresponding note in chunk 06's BRIEF.md, which flagged the same concern for dom f). L♮^\natural♮-convexity is represented via an explicit lift to Option V, matching the book's own primary definition, with the direct axiom (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]) kept as a separate object related to it by Theorem 7.1.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would convert its componentwise vector bound into an ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞-norm bound (losing the direction-of-approach information the vector form carries) or drop Part (1)'s periodicity hypothesis g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1); neither is done here. Propositions establishing dom g as an L-convex set, the L/L♮^\natural♮ relationship (Theorem 7.3), the submodular-set-function embedding (Proposition 7.4), and several structural closure properties are cut from this mission's scope (see MODERATION_NOTES.md) but are natural targets for a follow-on mission or for chunk 09, which builds directly on this chunk's exchange-axiom vocabulary, mirroring chunks 06→07.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Maximal Monotonicity of Subdifferential Mappings II: Subdifferentials Are Exactly the Maximal Cyclically Monotone Operators, Unique up to an Additive ConstantResearch Paper

Motivation

A differentiable convex function on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is determined, up to an additive constant, by its gradient, and a vector field is a gradient of a convex function exactly when it satisfies a monotonicity condition along closed cycles. Convex analysis and optimization need the same statement for nonsmooth and extended-valued functions on infinite-dimensional spaces: the subdifferential replaces the gradient, and the question becomes which multivalued maps from a Banach space to its dual arise as subdifferentials, and how much of the function they determine. The answer underlies the treatment of optimality conditions, variational inequalities and evolution equations governed by subdifferentials, where one works with the operator ∂f\partial f∂f and needs to recover fff from it.

Timeline.

  • 1966: R. T. Rockafellar, Characterization of the subdifferentials of convex functions, Pacific J. Math. 17 (DOI 10.2140/pjm.1966.17.497), studied cyclically monotone operators and stated the characterization of subdifferentials as the maximal cyclically monotone operators (its Theorem 3), together with the maximal monotonicity of subdifferentials (its Theorem 4).
  • 1969: H. Brézis pointed out a gap in the 1966 proofs of maximality and uniqueness: a family of dual vectors xε∗x_\varepsilon^*xε∗​ used in the argument might increase unboundedly in norm as ε→0\varepsilon \to 0ε→0.
  • 1970: Rockafellar, On the maximal monotonicity of subdifferential mappings, Pacific J. Math. 33 (DOI 10.2140/pjm.1970.33.209), repaired the argument for arbitrary real Banach spaces, proving Theorem A (maximal monotonicity of ∂f\partial f∂f) and Theorem B (the characterization treated here).

Setting

Let EEE be a real Banach space with dual E∗E^*E∗, and write ⟨x,x∗⟩\langle x, x^* \rangle⟨x,x∗⟩ for the value of x∗∈E∗x^* \in E^*x∗∈E∗ at x∈Ex \in Ex∈E. A proper convex function on EEE is a function f:E→(−∞,+∞]f : E \to (-\infty, +\infty]f:E→(−∞,+∞], not identically +∞+\infty+∞, with f((1−λ)x+λy)≤(1−λ)f(x)+λf(y)f((1-\lambda)x + \lambda y) \le (1-\lambda)f(x) + \lambda f(y)f((1−λ)x+λy)≤(1−λ)f(x)+λf(y) for all x,y∈Ex, y \in Ex,y∈E and 0<λ<10 < \lambda < 10<λ<1. It is lower semicontinuous (lsc) in the norm topology. Its subdifferential is the multivalued map

∂f(x)={ x∗∈E∗∣f(y)≥f(x)+⟨y−x,x∗⟩  ∀y∈E }.\partial f(x) = \{\, x^* \in E^* \mid f(y) \ge f(x) + \langle y - x, x^* \rangle \ \ \forall y \in E \,\}.∂f(x)={x∗∈E∗∣f(y)≥f(x)+⟨y−x,x∗⟩  ∀y∈E}.

A multivalued map T:E→E∗T : E \to E^*T:E→E∗ is a cyclically monotone operator if

⟨x0−x1,x0∗⟩+⋯+⟨xn−1−xn,xn−1∗⟩+⟨xn−x0,xn∗⟩≥0whenever xi∗∈T(xi), i=0,…,n,\langle x_0 - x_1, x_0^* \rangle + \cdots + \langle x_{n-1} - x_n, x_{n-1}^* \rangle + \langle x_n - x_0, x_n^* \rangle \ge 0 \qquad\text{whenever } x_i^* \in T(x_i),\ i = 0, \dots, n,⟨x0​−x1​,x0∗​⟩+⋯+⟨xn−1​−xn​,xn−1∗​⟩+⟨xn​−x0​,xn∗​⟩≥0whenever xi∗​∈T(xi​), i=0,…,n,

and maximal cyclically monotone if, in addition, its graph {(x,x∗)∣x∗∈T(x)}\{(x, x^*) \mid x^* \in T(x)\}{(x,x∗)∣x∗∈T(x)} is not properly contained in the graph of any other cyclically monotone operator. The conjugate of fff is f∗(x∗)=sup⁡x∈E(⟨x,x∗⟩−f(x))f^*(x^*) = \sup_{x \in E} (\langle x, x^* \rangle - f(x))f∗(x∗)=supx∈E​(⟨x,x∗⟩−f(x)) on E∗E^*E∗, and j(x)=12∥x∥2j(x) = \tfrac12\|x\|^2j(x)=21​∥x∥2. In the Lean development these are ProperConvex, subdiff, IsCyclicallyMonotone, IsMaximalCyclicallyMonotone, conj and halfSqNorm, in the namespace RockafellarMaxMono.Cyclic.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem B (p. 210)

For every multivalued map T:E→E∗T : E \to E^*T:E→E∗ on a real Banach space EEE,

(∃f lsc proper convex with T=∂f)  ⟺  T is maximal cyclically monotone,\bigl(\exists f \text{ lsc proper convex with } T = \partial f\bigr) \iff T \text{ is maximal cyclically monotone},(∃f lsc proper convex with T=∂f)⟺T is maximal cyclically monotone,

and if fff and ggg are lsc proper convex with ∂f=T=∂g\partial f = T = \partial g∂f=T=∂g, then g=f+cg = f + cg=f+c for a real constant ccc. Both halves are one statement.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (3.7) For a finite continuous convex function fff on a real Banach space, ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) is nonempty and weak* compact and f′(x;u)=max⁡{⟨u,x∗⟩∣x∗∈∂f(x)}f'(x;u) = \max\{\langle u, x^* \rangle \mid x^* \in \partial f(x)\}f′(x;u)=max{⟨u,x∗⟩∣x∗∈∂f(x)}.
  2. Finite continuous case (pp. 214–215). For finite continuous convex f,gf, gf,g on a real Banach space, ∂g(x)⊃∂f(x)\partial g(x) \supset \partial f(x)∂g(x)⊃∂f(x) for all xxx implies g=f+constg = f + \mathrm{const}g=f+const.
  3. (3.1) ∂(f+j)(x)=∂f(x)+∂j(x)\partial(f + j)(x) = \partial f(x) + \partial j(x)∂(f+j)(x)=∂f(x)+∂j(x) for lsc proper convex fff.
  4. Proposition 1 x∗∗∈∂f∗(x∗)x^{**} \in \partial f^*(x^*)x∗∗∈∂f∗(x∗) if and only if x∗∗x^{**}x∗∗ is a weak** limit of a bounded net xix_ixi​ with xi∗∈∂f(xi)x_i^* \in \partial f(x_i)xi∗​∈∂f(xi​), xi∗→x∗x_i^* \to x^*xi∗​→x∗ in norm.
  5. (p. 213) (f+j)∗(f + j)^*(f+j)∗ is finite and continuous on E∗E^*E∗.
  6. (p. 211) f∗∗f^{**}f∗∗ restricted to EEE is fff.
  7. (3.6) For lsc proper convex f,gf, gf,g: ∂g(x)⊃∂f(x)\partial g(x) \supset \partial f(x)∂g(x)⊃∂f(x) for all xxx implies g=f+constg = f + \mathrm{const}g=f+const.

Significance

The result. Theorem B gives an intrinsic description of subdifferential maps: an operator is the subdifferential of a closed proper convex function if and only if it satisfies the cycle inequality and cannot be enlarged without violating it. The uniqueness clause says that a closed convex function is recovered from its subdifferential up to a constant, the nonsmooth counterpart of recovering a function from its gradient. Milestone 7 is stronger than uniqueness: a one-sided inclusion ∂f⊆∂g\partial f \subseteq \partial g∂f⊆∂g already forces g=f+cg = f + cg=f+c, and this is what gives maximality.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, and nothing of it is formalized on the platform. Mathlib has convex functions, continuous duals, biduals and weak-* topologies, but not extended-valued subdifferentials on Banach spaces, conjugate duality in the nonreflexive setting, or monotone operator theory. This mission produces formal statements of the paper's steps, the standard max formula for directional derivatives on a Banach space, and the Fenchel conjugate facts the argument uses, each as a separate target.

Difficulty

In a reflexive space the argument is short, because ∂f∗\partial f^*∂f∗ is the inverse of ∂f\partial f∂f. In a nonreflexive space it is not: ∂f∗\partial f^*∂f∗ maps E∗E^*E∗ into E∗∗E^{**}E∗∗, and points of E∗∗∖EE^{**} \setminus EE∗∗∖E appear. The naive route, transferring the inclusion ∂f⊆∂g\partial f \subseteq \partial g∂f⊆∂g to the conjugates by inverting the maps, breaks down there, and the 1966 argument failed at a related step, where the dual vectors in an approximation could be unbounded. Relating ∂f∗\partial f^*∂f∗ to ∂f\partial f∂f without reflexivity is where the difficulty sits; the boundedness of the approximating nets in Proposition 1 is essential and cannot be dropped. The finite continuous case and the max formula (3.7) are needed on an arbitrary Banach space, including the dual E∗E^*E∗, not only on EEE.

Formalization scope

EEE is a real Banach space (NormedAddCommGroup, NormedSpace ℝ, CompleteSpace); E∗E^*E∗ is StrongDual ℝ E with the operator norm, E∗∗E^{**}E∗∗ is StrongDual ℝ (StrongDual ℝ E), and E↪E∗∗E \hookrightarrow E^{**}E↪E∗∗ is NormedSpace.inclusionInDoubleDual. No reflexivity, inner product or finite dimension is assumed. Explicit readings:

  • Values in (−∞,+∞](-\infty, +\infty](−∞,+∞] are EReal with the requirement f(x)≠−∞f(x) \ne -\inftyf(x)=−∞; convexity is the paper's inequality for 0<λ<10 < \lambda < 10<λ<1 in EReal arithmetic. Lower semicontinuity is in the norm topology.
  • A multivalued map is E → Set (StrongDual ℝ E); T=∂fT = \partial fT=∂f means T(x)=∂f(x)T(x) = \partial f(x)T(x)=∂f(x) for every xxx.
  • The cycle inequality quantifies over all n∈Nn \in \mathbb{N}n∈N and points indexed by Fin (n + 1) with wrap-around addition, so the last term is ⟨xn−x0,xn∗⟩\langle x_n - x_0, x_n^* \rangle⟨xn​−x0​,xn∗​⟩. Maximality is graph inclusion among cyclically monotone operators, not among monotone operators.
  • The uniqueness constant is a real number, never ±∞\pm\infty±∞.
  • "⊃\supset⊃" in (3.6) is non-strict inclusion, and the hypothesis is one-sided.
  • A net is a nonempty directed partially ordered index type with convergence along atTop; weak** convergence is pointwise convergence on E∗E^*E∗; "bounded" is a uniform norm bound.
  • "Finite and continuous" for (f+j)∗(f+j)^*(f+j)∗ means equal everywhere to a continuous real-valued function. The max in (3.7) is IsGreatest, so it is attained; the directional derivative is the limit along λ→0+\lambda \to 0^+λ→0+.
  • The print's "∂(f+j)=∂f(x)+∂j(x)\partial(f + j) = \partial f(x) + \partial j(x)∂(f+j)=∂f(x)+∂j(x)" in (3.1) is read as ∂(f+j)(x)\partial(f+j)(x)∂(f+j)(x).

A formalization that drops lower semicontinuity, allows an extended-real constant, or replaces "maximal cyclically monotone" by "maximal monotone" states a different, and in the first two cases false or trivial, theorem; the statements here keep all three.

The proof reduces Theorem B to milestone 7 through Theorem 1 of Rockafellar (1966) and its Corollary 2, which are not stated in this paper and are not milestones; formal statements of them are welcome as supporting theorems. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: extended-valued subdifferentials and conjugates on normed spaces, the Fenchel–Moreau identity on EEE, the sum rule with a continuous function, and the max formula for directional derivatives.

Selected references

  • R. T. Rockafellar, On the maximal monotonicity of subdifferential mappings, Pacific J. Math. 33 (1970), 209–216. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1970.33.209
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Characterization of the subdifferentials of convex functions, Pacific J. Math. 17 (1966), 497–510. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1966.17.497
  • G. J. Minty, On the monotonicity of the gradient of a convex function, Pacific J. Math. 14 (1964), 243–247. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1964.14.243
  • J.-J. Moreau, Fonctionnelles convexes, mimeographed lecture notes, Collège de France, 1967.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsConvex OptimizationDiscrete Geometry+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXIII: Directional Derivatives and Subdifferentials of M-Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

An M-convex function is defined on the integer lattice, but chapter 6's earlier results (companion missions 06-mconvex-functions-i, 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions) show it always extends to a genuine convex function on real space. Once that extension exists, every tool of classical convex analysis — directional derivatives, subdifferentials, positive homogeneity — becomes available, and the natural question is whether these classical objects remain combinatorially special when applied to an M-convex function's extension. This mission answers that question at its sharpest: the directional derivative of an M-convex function at any point is again a positively homogeneous M-convex function, its subdifferential is exactly the admissible-potential set of a distance function satisfying the triangle inequality, and this correspondence between positively homogeneous M-convex functions and triangle-inequality distance functions is itself a clean one-to-one correspondence. This closes the loop between chapters 4-5 (M-convex and L-convex sets, distance functions) and the continuous convex-analytic machinery chapter 8 needs for its duality theory.

Companion missions 06-mconvex-functions-i, 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, and 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions cover this chapter's optimality theory, algebraic toolkit, and convex-extensibility characterization. This mission builds the vocabulary those results also need (redeclared here, since sibling drafts cannot yet import one another) and proves the chapter's real-variable capstones: the transfer of M-convexity's basic operations, optimality criterion, and supermodularity to the polyhedral (real-variable) setting, the identification of positively homogeneous M-convex functions with distance functions satisfying the triangle inequality, and — this mission's goal — the full directional-derivative/subdifferential correspondence.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. A polyhedral convex function g:RV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:RV→R∪{+∞} is (polyhedral) M-convex if it satisfies the real-variable exchange axiom (M-EXC[R]): for x,y∈dom⁡Rgx,y \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} gx,y∈domR​g and u∈supp⁡+(x−y)u \in \operatorname{supp}^+(x-y)u∈supp+(x−y), some v∈supp⁡−(x−y)v \in \operatorname{supp}^-(x-y)v∈supp−(x−y) and α0>0\alpha_0 > 0α0​>0 make the exchange inequality hold on α∈[0,α0]\alpha \in [0,\alpha_0]α∈[0,α0​]; M♮-convex if its lift to one extra coordinate is M-convex. The directional derivative of ggg at x∈dom⁡Rgx \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} gx∈domR​g in direction ddd is g′(x;d)=inf⁡t>0(g(x+td)−g(x))/tg'(x;d) = \inf_{t>0} (g(x+td) - g(x))/tg′(x;d)=inft>0​(g(x+td)−g(x))/t. A function is positively homogeneous if g(tx)=t⋅g(x)g(tx) = t \cdot g(x)g(tx)=t⋅g(x) for all t>0t > 0t>0; write 0M[R→R]0M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[R→R] for the positively homogeneous polyhedral M-convex functions. A distance function γ\gammaγ satisfying the triangle inequality and its set of admissible potentials D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ) were introduced in chapter 5; the subdifferential ∂Rf(x)={p:f(y)−f(x)≥⟨p,y−x⟩ ∀y}\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x) = \{p : f(y) - f(x) \ge \langle p, y-x \rangle\ \forall y\}∂R​f(x)={p:f(y)−f(x)≥⟨p,y−x⟩ ∀y} generalizes this to any function fff at a point xxx in its domain.

Formalization targets

Goal: the directional-derivative/subdifferential correspondence

For f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R] and x∈dom⁡Rfx \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} fx∈domR​f, setting γf,x(u,v)=f′(x;−χu+χv)\gamma_{f,x}(u,v) = f'(x;-\chi_u+\chi_v)γf,x​(u,v)=f′(x;−χu​+χv​):

γf,x satisfies the triangle inequality,∂Rf(x)=D(γf,x)≠∅,f′(x;⋅)=γf,x^(⋅),\gamma_{f,x} \text{ satisfies the triangle inequality}, \quad \partial_{\mathbb R} f(x) = D(\gamma_{f,x}) \ne \emptyset, \quad f'(x;\cdot) = \widehat{\gamma_{f,x}}(\cdot),γf,x​ satisfies the triangle inequality,∂R​f(x)=D(γf,x​)=∅,f′(x;⋅)=γf,x​​(⋅),

with the analogous statement for f∈M[Z→R]f \in M[\mathbb Z \to \mathbb R]f∈M[Z→R] at an integer point xxx, using γf,x(u,v)=f(x−χu+χv)−f(x)\gamma_{f,x}(u,v) = f(x-\chi_u+\chi_v)-f(x)γf,x​(u,v)=f(x−χu​+χv​)−f(x) (Theorem 6.61). This is the weakest stable form: it identifies the subdifferential exactly, as a set, rather than bounding its size or complexity, and holds at every point of the domain uniformly.

Supporting structural targets

Ten further results build the real-variable toolkit and the positive-homogeneity correspondence this goal completes: the transfer of M♮-convexity, the basic operations, the optimality criterion, supermodularity, and weighted-minimizer polyhedrality to the real-variable setting (Theorems 6.48-6.52, Proposition 6.53), the identification of the classes 0M[Z∣R→R]0M[\mathbb Z|\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[Z∣R→R] and 0M[R→R]0M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[R→R] and the compatibility of convex extension with positive homogeneity (Proposition 6.56), the two directions of the correspondence between positively homogeneous M-convex functions and triangle-inequality distance functions (Propositions 6.57-6.58, Theorem 6.59), and the fact that a directional derivative of an M-convex function is itself positively homogeneous and M-convex (Proposition 6.60).

Significance

Theorem 6.61 is the technical bridge that lets discrete convex analysis borrow the entire apparatus of classical convex duality: because the subdifferential of an M-convex function is always the admissible-potential set of a chapter-5 distance function, every fact already proved about D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ) (its polyhedral structure, its own L-convexity, its relationship to shortest paths) transfers immediately to subdifferentials of M-convex functions. This is exactly the mechanism the book calls out as essential for Chapter 8's separation theorem for M♮-convex functions. The 0M↔T0M \leftrightarrow T0M↔T correspondence (Theorem 6.59) is independently significant: it says the positively homogeneous special case of M-convex function theory — which is what directional derivatives of any M-convex function reduce to, by Proposition 6.60 — is exactly as rich as ordinary shortest-path distance function theory, no more and no less, so nothing new needs to be built to understand local behavior at a point.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of how the discrete exchange axiom interacts with directional differentiation and subgradients, a bridge chapter between the purely combinatorial theory of chapters 4-6 and the duality theory of chapter 8. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, extending the shared Lean vocabulary (MExchangeAxiomR, DirDeriv, GammaHat) the Discrete Convex Analysis series builds on; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to Theorem 6.61 would try to compute ∂Rf(x)\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)∂R​f(x) directly from the definition of subgradient and separately verify it happens to equal some D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ); the book's actual proof instead derives the equality of sets from the M-optimality criterion (Theorem 6.52) applied pointwise: p∈∂Rf(x)p \in \partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)p∈∂R​f(x) is shown, via a chain of logical equivalences, to be exactly the condition defining D(γf,x)D(\gamma_{f,x})D(γf,x​), so no separate verification of polyhedrality or nonemptiness is needed beyond what Theorem 6.52 and Proposition 6.60 already supply. The genuine difficulty is upstream, in Proposition 6.60 itself: showing a directional derivative is M-convex requires exploiting the local validity of the identity f(x+d)−f(x)=f′(x;d)f(x+d)-f(x) = f'(x;d)f(x+d)−f(x)=f′(x;d) for small ∥d∥1\|d\|_1∥d∥1​ (Eq. (6.85)) and then extending the exchange property from that neighborhood to all of RV\mathbb R^VRV using positive homogeneity — a two-step argument with no single-step shortcut, since the exchange axiom's defining inequality is not obviously homogeneous-invariant on its own.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; real-domain functions are (V→ℝ)→WithTop ℝ. The directional derivative is built directly as an infimum of difference quotients over t>0t>0t>0, matching the book's own local characterization (Eq. (6.85)) without a separate limit construction. Positive homogeneity and the classes 0M[R→R]/0M[Z→R] are stated exactly as the book defines them (the latter via positive homogeneity of the convex extension, not of f itself, since f is undefined off Zⱽ). Theorems 6.49-6.50 restate 4 of their 8 operations (matching the identical scope decision for chunk 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions's Theorem 6.13); Theorem 6.61 omits the dual-integral refinement clauses for the M[R→R|Z]/ M[Z→Z] sub-classes. Both reductions are documented, not trivializing omissions — see Difficulty above and HARD.md/MODERATION_NOTES.md. No numeric constants are hard-coded anywhere in this mission. This mission's definitions are redeclared from chunks 06-mconvex-functions-i, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets (for the distance-function/admissible-potential vocabulary), 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, and 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 6.60 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 (the polyhedral M-convex function theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XX: Perpetual American Options and Credit GrantingTextbook

Motivation

An American option may be exercised at any moment up to maturity, so pricing one is not an integration problem but a stopping problem: the holder must decide, at each date and in each state of the market, whether the payoff available now beats the option value of waiting. A perpetual American put pushes this to its limit — there is no maturity at all, so the horizon is unbounded and the problem has no terminal condition to induct backwards from. What replaces the terminal condition is a fixed point characterization, and the classical answer, going back to McKean (1965) and Merton (1973) in continuous time and to Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) in the binomial model, is that the price is the smallest superharmonic majorant of the payoff.

Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 11 (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011) derives this from their own general unbounded-horizon stopping theory rather than from stochastic analysis, and in the same chapter applies the bounded-horizon version to a problem from banking rather than trading: when should a bank cancel a credit line? The two halves share one mathematical shape — a stopping problem whose optimal policy turns out to be of threshold type — and this mission formalizes both, with the perpetual put as the goal.

Setting

The binomial model (§11.1). A stock moves from price xxx to xuxuxu with risk-neutral probability qqq and to xdxdxd with 1−q1-q1−q, where 0<d<u0 < d < u0<d<u, and the discount factor is β∈(0,1]\beta \in (0,1]β∈(0,1]. The defining relation of the risk-neutral measure,

βqu+β(1−q)d=1,\beta q u + \beta(1-q)d = 1,βqu+β(1−q)d=1,

is carried as a hypothesis of the model: it is what makes the discounted stock price a martingale, and the proofs use it directly.

The American put with strike KKK pays (K−x)+(K-x)^+(K−x)+ when exercised. With nnn periods to maturity its price satisfies the recursion J0(x)=(K−x)+J_0(x) = (K-x)^+J0​(x)=(K−x)+ and

Jn(x)=max⁡{(K−x)+, β(qJn−1(xu)+(1−q)Jn−1(xd))}=:TJn−1(x),J_n(x) = \max\Big\{(K-x)^+,\ \beta\big(q J_{n-1}(xu) + (1-q)J_{n-1}(xd)\big)\Big\} =: \mathcal{T}J_{n-1}(x),Jn​(x)=max{(K−x)+, β(qJn−1​(xu)+(1−q)Jn−1​(xd))}=:TJn−1​(x),

the maximum being "exercise now" against "hold". Proposition 11.1.2 describes the price πn(x):=JN−n(x)\pi_n(x) := J_{N-n}(x)πn​(x):=JN−n​(x) at time nnn of an option maturing at NNN: it is continuous in xxx, decreasing in nnn, and — the part that carries the argument — x↦πn(x)+xx \mapsto \pi_n(x) + xx↦πn​(x)+x is increasing, even though πn\pi_nπn​ itself decreases in xxx. That single reformulation, obtained by adding xxx to both sides of the recursion and using the risk-neutral relation, is what yields the threshold structure: there are exercise boundaries K=:xN∗≥xN−1∗≥⋯≥x0∗≥0K =: x_N^* \ge x_{N-1}^* \ge \dots \ge x_0^* \ge 0K=:xN∗​≥xN−1∗​≥⋯≥x0∗​≥0 with τ∗=inf⁡{n≤N∣Xn≤xn∗}\tau^* = \inf\{n \le N \mid X_n \le x_n^*\}τ∗=inf{n≤N∣Xn​≤xn∗​} optimal. Exercise when the stock falls far enough, and the boundary rises as maturity approaches.

The perpetual put (Theorem 11.1.3, the goal). With no expiration date the price at time zero is a supremum over all stopping times, τ≤∞\tau \le \inftyτ≤∞ included:

P(x):=sup⁡τ≤∞ExQ[βτ(K−Sτ)],P(x) := \sup_{\tau \le \infty} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}_x\big[\beta^\tau (K - S_\tau)\big],P(x):=τ≤∞sup​ExQ​[βτ(K−Sτ​)],

with the stopping reward set to zero on {τ=∞}\{\tau = \infty\}{τ=∞}. The theorem says four things: PPP is the limit of the finite-maturity prices JnJ_nJn​; PPP solves TP=P\mathcal{T}P = PTP=P and satisfies 0≤P≤K0 \le P \le K0≤P≤K; PPP is the smallest superharmonic function majorizing (K−x)+(K-x)^+(K−x)+; and, if the value Jf∗J_{f^*}Jf∗​ of the exercise-region policy dominates TJf∗\mathcal{T}J_{f^*}TJf∗​, then PPP equals that value and τ∗=inf⁡{n∣Xn∈E∗}\tau^* = \inf\{n \mid X_n \in E^*\}τ∗=inf{n∣Xn​∈E∗}, the hitting time of E∗={x∣P(x)=(K−x)+}E^* = \{x \mid P(x) = (K-x)^+\}E∗={x∣P(x)=(K−x)+}, is optimal.

The conditional in part d) is the book's own and is not decoration: without it the exercise region need not deliver an optimal stopping time, and the unconditional version is a different, false statement. The boundedness 0≤P≤K0 \le P \le K0≤P≤K in b) is likewise a genuine claim rather than a side remark — the fixed point equation alone admits other solutions, and it is boundedness together with minimality that pins PPP down among them.

Credit granting (§11.2). A bank holds a credit contract of maximal duration NNN. Each period it observes a rating class xnx_nxn​ evolving as a Markov process QXQ^XQX, and chooses to extend — earning c(x)c(x)c(x) — or to cancel, ending the contract. The value iteration is Jn(x)=max⁡{0, c(x)+β∫Jn−1 dQX(⋅∣x)}J_n(x) = \max\{0,\ c(x) + \beta\int J_{n-1}\,dQ^X(\cdot|x)\}Jn​(x)=max{0, c(x)+β∫Jn−1​dQX(⋅∣x)}. Under two structural assumptions — ccc increasing, and QXQ^XQX stochastically monotone, so that a better-rated borrower stays better-rated — Theorem 11.2.1 gives the same shape of answer as the option: cancel exactly when the rating falls below a threshold xn∗x_n^*xn∗​, and those thresholds rise as the remaining duration shortens, since a marginal borrower is no longer worth keeping when there is little time left to recover.

Theorem 11.2.2 repeats this when the borrower is not rated at all. The bank has only a prior μ0\mu_0μ0​ on the repayment probability and one signal per period; the state (s,n)(s,n)(s,n) records sss positive signals out of nnn, and the expected repayment probability is the posterior mean q(s,n)q(s,n)q(s,n). Monotonicity here is for the order of p. 342 — more positive signals and fewer negative ones — and not the coordinatewise order, under which the claim would be false: an extra signal that is negative makes the state worse.

What is being asked

Formalize Theorem 11.1.3 in full, all four parts: the limit identification, the fixed point equation with its bounds, the minimality among superharmonic majorants, and the conditional optimality of the exercise-region stopping time. The three milestones are Proposition 11.1.2, the finite-horizon put whose threshold structure the perpetual case specializes, and the two credit granting theorems, which run the same bounded-horizon argument on a different model.

The stopping-time apparatus is built rather than assumed: the stock path, the law Q\mathbb{Q}Q pinned by its finite-dimensional distributions, stopping times valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb{N}\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, and the reward vanishing at ∞\infty∞. Part a) of the goal is the identification of the supremum with lim⁡nJn\lim_n J_nlimn​Jn​, so carrying PPP as an abstract function would make the theorem vacuous.

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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XIX: Theory of Optimal Stopping ProblemsTextbook

Motivation

A gambler watching a sequence unfold has to decide, at each moment and knowing only the past, whether to take what is on the table or wait for something better. That is the whole of optimal stopping, and it is one of the few problems in stochastic control with a clean and completely general answer: the value of the problem is the smallest superharmonic function dominating the immediate payoff. Snell (1952) proved the martingale form; the dynamic-programming form is due to Chow, Robbins and Siegmund. It is the structure behind the pricing of American options, the secretary problem, sequential hypothesis testing, and the bandit problems of Chapter 5.

Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 10 (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011) derives this from their own Markov-decision machinery rather than from martingale theory, which makes the whole development elementary and self-contained: a stopping problem is a Markov Decision Problem whose action space is {continue, stop}, so Chapter 2's finite-horizon theory and Chapter 7's unbounded-horizon theory apply to it verbatim. The chapter then runs the resulting theory on three classical problems and solves each one in closed form.

Setting

The problem. A Markov process (X_n) on a Borel space E is observed. A stopping time is a random time τ with {τ ≤ n} ∈ F_n — "upon observing the process until time n we can decide whether or not τ has already occurred". Stopping at τ collects

Rτ:=∑k=0τ−1ck(Xk)+gτ(Xτ),R_\tau := \sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} c_k(X_k) + g_\tau(X_\tau),Rτ​:=k=0∑τ−1​ck​(Xk​)+gτ​(Xτ​),

a running reward c_k while continuing and a stopping reward g_τ at the end, and the problem is to find V_N^*(x) := sup_{τ ≤ N} E_x[R_τ] (10.1). Assumption (B_N) — finiteness of the supremum of the positive parts — is what makes this well posed.

The reduction (Theorem 10.1.2). Take A = {0,1}, let a = 0 mean continue and a = 1 mean stop, and make the transition law uncontrollable on continuation and absorbing on stopping. A policy π = (f_0,…,f_{N-1}) induces the stopping time τ_π = inf{n | f_n(X_n) = 1} ∧ N, and conversely every stopping time is a history-dependent policy. The theorem says the two suprema agree: the extra history buys nothing.

The recursion (Theorems 10.1.3, 10.1.5). The Bellman operator becomes a two-branch maximum,

Tv(x)=max⁡{g(x), c(x)+β∫v(x′)QX(dx′∣x)},\mathcal{T}v(x) = \max\Big\{g(x),\ c(x) + \beta\int v(x')Q^X(dx'|x)\Big\},Tv(x)=max{g(x), c(x)+β∫v(x′)QX(dx′∣x)},

with no action variable left in it. In the stationary case J_0 = g, J_n = \mathcal{T}J_{n-1}; the J_n increase, the sets S_n^* = {J_n = g} shrink — "the tendency to stop is non-decreasing as time goes by" — and the optimal rule is "stop on first entry into S_{N-n}^*".

The unbounded horizon (§10.2). Now the reward is discounted, R_τ = Σ β^k c(X_k) + β^τ g(X_τ) for τ < ∞, the value is V_∞^*(x) = sup_{τ<∞} E_x[R_τ], and there is no terminal condition to induct from. Three candidate values present themselves: V_∞^*; G = sup_π liminf_n J_{nπ}, a supremum over policies of limits of finite-horizon values; and J = lim_n J_n, which exists by monotonicity. Theorem 10.2.2, the goal, says all three coincide, that the common value solves J = \mathcal{T}J and satisfies 0-free bounds, and — the characterization — that it is the smallest c-superharmonic function majorizing g.

Turning the value into a rule (Theorems 10.2.3, 10.2.7, Corollaries 10.2.6, 10.2.8). Knowing the value is not knowing when to stop. Theorem 10.2.3 produces the stopping region as S^* = {J = g} = {d ≥ 0} where d = lim_n d_n, under two conditions that Corollary 10.2.6 then gives three checkable sufficient conditions for. Theorem 10.2.7 is the practical one, the One-Step-Look-Ahead Rule: if the set where stopping now beats stopping one step later is closed under the transition law, then the myopic rule is globally optimal. Corollary 10.2.8 adds monotonicity and gets a threshold.

Three applications (§10.3). The house seller who receives i.i.d. offers and pays maintenance on each rejection should accept the first offer above an explicit threshold, obtained as the maximiser of a one-dimensional function (Theorem 10.3.1). The secretary problem's value function is computed exactly (Proposition 10.3.2), giving the classical rule — reject the first k^*, then take the first leader — with success probability (k^*/N)h(k^*) and k^*(N)/N → 1/e (Theorem 10.3.3). And when the offers' distribution has an unknown parameter, MTP_2 of the likelihood propagates into monotonicity of the value in the information state (Theorem 10.3.4), with a fully explicit solution for the exponential/Inverse-Gamma conjugate pair (Theorem 10.3.6).

What is being asked

Formalize Theorem 10.2.2 in full: the three-way equality of V_∞^*, G and J, the fixed point equation, and — the part that carries the theorem — minimality among all functions that are both c-superharmonic and above g. Asserting only that J is such a function, or only one of the two conditions, is a strictly weaker and different claim.

The twelve milestones are the rest of the chapter, in attack order: the reduction and the two recursions, then the unbounded-horizon apparatus, then the three worked problems.

The stopping-time apparatus is built rather than assumed — the chain's law pinned by its finite-dimensional distributions, stopping times valued in ℕ ∪ {∞}, rewards vanishing at ∞ — because every theorem here is the identification of a supremum over stopping times with something computable, and carrying the value as an abstract function would make them vacuous. Every supremum is taken as a least upper bound against an explicit set of achievable values rather than by sSup, so that a set unbounded above is not silently given the value 0.

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AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Diffusion approximations for open queueing networks with service interruptions 1: explicit Lipschitz bounds for the oblique reflection mapResearch Paper

Motivation

Heavy-traffic and fluid approximations for open queueing networks are obtained by writing the queue-content process as a deterministic function of a simpler netput process (arrivals minus potential service, corrected for routing) and then transferring a functional limit theorem for the netput through that function. The function is the multidimensional reflection map of Harrison and Reiman (Harrison and Reiman 1981), extended from continuous paths to paths with jumps by Reiman (Reiman 1984). The transfer works only if the map is continuous, and quantitative bounds on the approximation error require it to be Lipschitz with a known modulus.

Chen and Whitt (Chen and Whitt 1993) use this map to derive diffusion approximations for networks whose servers are subject to interruptions. Before doing so, Section 2 of the paper supplies "explicit Lipschitz bounds" for the map in the uniform topology: a bound in the Harrison–Reiman scaling (Proposition 2.1) and a new bound that depends on the routing matrix only through its powers (Proposition 2.3).

Timeline. Harrison and Reiman (1981) proved existence, uniqueness and continuity of the map on continuous paths for a routing matrix of spectral radius less than one. Reiman (1984) extended it to paths with jumps. Chen and Mandelbaum (Leontief systems, RBV's and RBM's, 1991, cited in the paper as [4]) noted that a minor extension of the argument makes the map Lipschitz on D([0,T],Rn)D([0,T],\mathbb R^n)D([0,T],Rn) with the uniform topology. Chen and Whitt (1993, Section 2) made the Lipschitz constants explicit.

Setting

Fix a dimension nnn and an n×nn\times nn×n matrix QQQ whose transpose QtQ^{\mathsf t}Qt is substochastic: all entries of QQQ are nonnegative and every column sum of QQQ is at most 111. Assume also Qk→0Q^k \to 0Qk→0 as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. With Markovian routing, QtQ^{\mathsf t}Qt is the routing matrix of an open network of nnn queues.

Vectors c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn carry the norm ∥c∥=∑j∣cj∣\|c\| = \sum_j |c_j|∥c∥=∑j​∣cj​∣, and matrices carry the maximum absolute column sum ∥P∥=max⁡j∑i∣Pij∣\|P\| = \max_j \sum_i |P_{ij}|∥P∥=maxj​∑i​∣Pij​∣ (Eq. (2.5)). D([0,T],Rn)D([0,T],\mathbb R^n)D([0,T],Rn) is the space of paths that are right-continuous with left limits on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. For a path xxx, ∣x∣∈Rn|x|\in\mathbb R^n∣x∣∈Rn is the vector of coordinatewise sup norms, ∣x∣j=sup⁡0≤t≤T∣xj(t)∣|x|_j = \sup_{0\le t\le T}|x_j(t)|∣x∣j​=sup0≤t≤T​∣xj​(t)∣, and ∥x∥=∥∣x∣∥=∑jsup⁡t∣xj(t)∣\|x\| = \big\||x|\big\| = \sum_j \sup_{t}|x_j(t)|∥x∥=​∣x∣​=∑j​supt​∣xj​(t)∣.

The reflection of x∈Dx \in Dx∈D is the pair (y,z)=(ψ(x),ϕ(x))(y,z) = (\psi(x),\phi(x))(y,z)=(ψ(x),ϕ(x)) with y∈Dy \in Dy∈D and

z=x+(I−Q) y≥0,yj nondecreasing, yj(0)=0,∫0Tzj(t) dyj(t)=0(1≤j≤n).z = x + (I-Q)\,y \ge 0, \qquad y_j \text{ nondecreasing},\ y_j(0) = 0, \qquad \int_0^T z_j(t)\,dy_j(t) = 0 \quad (1\le j\le n).z=x+(I−Q)y≥0,yj​ nondecreasing, yj​(0)=0,∫0T​zj​(t)dyj​(t)=0(1≤j≤n).

The last condition says that yjy_jyj​ increases only when zj=0z_j = 0zj​=0. In queueing terms, zzz is the vector of queue contents and yyy the cumulative idleness. The operator πx(y)=(Qy−x)↑∨0\pi_x(y) = (Qy - x)^{\uparrow}\vee 0πx​(y)=(Qy−x)↑∨0, where f↑(t)=sup⁡0≤s≤tf(s)f^{\uparrow}(t) = \sup_{0\le s\le t} f(s)f↑(t)=sup0≤s≤t​f(s) coordinatewise, has the reflection as its fixed point (Eq. (2.4)). Write γ=∥Qn∥\gamma = \|Q^n\|γ=∥Qn∥.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.3

For all x1,x2∈Dx_1,x_2\in Dx1​,x2​∈D with reflections (ψ(xi),ϕ(xi))(\psi(x_i),\phi(x_i))(ψ(xi​),ϕ(xi​)),

∣ψ(x1)−ψ(x2)∣≤(I−Q)−1∣x1−x2∣componentwise,(2.9)|\psi(x_1)-\psi(x_2)| \le (I-Q)^{-1}|x_1-x_2| \quad\text{componentwise},\tag{2.9}∣ψ(x1​)−ψ(x2​)∣≤(I−Q)−1∣x1​−x2​∣componentwise,(2.9) ∥ψ(x1)−ψ(x2)∥≤∥(I−Q)−1∥ ∥x1−x2∥≤∑k=0∞∥Qk∥ ∥x1−x2∥≤n1−γ∥x1−x2∥,(2.10)\|\psi(x_1)-\psi(x_2)\| \le \|(I-Q)^{-1}\|\,\|x_1-x_2\| \le \sum_{k=0}^\infty \|Q^k\|\,\|x_1-x_2\| \le \frac{n}{1-\gamma}\|x_1-x_2\|,\tag{2.10}∥ψ(x1​)−ψ(x2​)∥≤∥(I−Q)−1∥∥x1​−x2​∥≤k=0∑∞​∥Qk∥∥x1​−x2​∥≤1−γn​∥x1​−x2​∥,(2.10) ∥ϕ(x1)−ϕ(x2)∥≤(1+∥I−Q∥ ∥(I−Q)−1∥)∥x1−x2∥≤(1+2n1−γ)∥x1−x2∥.(2.11)\|\phi(x_1)-\phi(x_2)\| \le \big(1+\|I-Q\|\,\|(I-Q)^{-1}\|\big)\|x_1-x_2\| \le \Big(1+\frac{2n}{1-\gamma}\Big)\|x_1-x_2\|.\tag{2.11}∥ϕ(x1​)−ϕ(x2​)∥≤(1+∥I−Q∥∥(I−Q)−1∥)∥x1​−x2​∥≤(1+1−γ2n​)∥x1​−x2​∥.(2.11)

The constants are those of the paper. The goal fixes nothing beyond the standing assumptions on QQQ.

Milestones

  1. Existence and uniqueness of the reflection for x∈Dx\in Dx∈D with x(0)≥0x(0)\ge0x(0)≥0 (Section 2, p. 337).
  2. Eq. (2.4): given (2.1)–(2.2), the complementarity condition (2.3) is equivalent to y=πx(y)y = \pi_x(y)y=πx​(y).
  3. γ=∥Qn∥<1\gamma = \|Q^n\| < 1γ=∥Qn∥<1 (p. 338).
  4. Proposition 2.2: ∥πxk(y1)−πxk(y2)∥≤∥Qk∣y1−y2∣∥≤∥y1−y2∥\|\pi_x^k(y_1)-\pi_x^k(y_2)\| \le \|Q^k|y_1-y_2|\| \le \|y_1-y_2\|∥πxk​(y1​)−πxk​(y2​)∥≤∥Qk∣y1​−y2​∣∥≤∥y1​−y2​∥ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1, the factor γ\gammaγ for k≥nk\ge nk≥n, and πxk(y1)→ψ(x)\pi_x^k(y_1)\to\psi(x)πxk​(y1​)→ψ(x).
  5. Proposition 2.1: for Q∗=Λ−1QΛQ^* = \Lambda^{-1}Q\LambdaQ∗=Λ−1QΛ with Λ\LambdaΛ diagonal and ∥Q∗∥=α<1\|Q^*\| = \alpha<1∥Q∗∥=α<1, the moduli ∥Λ∥∥Λ−1∥/(1−α)\|\Lambda\|\|\Lambda^{-1}\|/(1-\alpha)∥Λ∥∥Λ−1∥/(1−α) for ψ\psiψ and 1+∥I−Q∥∥Λ∥∥Λ−1∥/(1−α)1 + \|I-Q\|\|\Lambda\|\|\Lambda^{-1}\|/(1-\alpha)1+∥I−Q∥∥Λ∥∥Λ−1∥/(1−α) for ϕ\phiϕ.
  6. Remark (2.1): for n=1n=1n=1, Q=0Q=0Q=0 the bounds are attained.
  7. Remark (2.2): for two queues in series, (2.10) gives modulus 222, while (2.7) gives at best 444 (every modulus ≥4\ge 4≥4 is attained, 444 at z=1/2z = 1/2z=1/2).

Significance

Proposition 2.3 makes the queue-content and idleness processes of an open network Lipschitz functions of the netput, in the uniform norm, with a modulus computed from the routing matrix alone. Combined with the fact that Lipschitz continuity in the uniform topology passes to the Skorohod J1J_1J1​ and M1M_1M1​ topologies (Section 2 of the paper), it is what turns a functional central limit theorem for arrival and service processes into a heavy-traffic limit for the network. The paper uses it in exactly this way in Sections 3–4. Explicit moduli also yield rates: an error of order ε\varepsilonε in the netput produces an error of at most nε/(1−γ)n\varepsilon/(1-\gamma)nε/(1−γ) in the idleness process.

On the formal side, the results are proved in the paper, but neither the reflection map nor D([0,T],Rn)D([0,T],\mathbb R^n)D([0,T],Rn) has a machine-checked development in Mathlib or on this platform. The mission would provide a reusable definition of the oblique reflection map with a Lebesgue–Stieltjes complementarity condition, its fixed-point characterization, and certified Lipschitz constants, as a foundation for any later formal heavy-traffic limit.

Difficulty

The componentwise bound (2.9) is short once the fixed-point form of the map is available. The difficulty lies in the infrastructure beneath it. The fixed-point characterization (2.4) is a one-dimensional Skorokhod-problem argument carried out coordinatewise for paths with jumps, where the complementarity condition must be handled through Lebesgue–Stieltjes measures. A jump of yjy_jyj​ is allowed at a time where zj=0z_j = 0zj​=0 even if zjz_jzj​ was positive just before. Existence needs the iterates πxk(0)\pi_x^k(0)πxk​(0) to converge in DDD and the limit to satisfy (2.1)–(2.3). The explicit constants involve (I−Q)−1(I-Q)^{-1}(I−Q)−1, ∑k∥Qk∥\sum_k\|Q^k\|∑k​∥Qk∥ and γ=∥Qn∥<1\gamma = \|Q^n\|<1γ=∥Qn∥<1. The last inequality is a combinatorial fact about transient substochastic matrices. It does not follow from ∥Q∥≤1\|Q\|\le1∥Q∥≤1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ, and ∥P∥\|P\|∥P∥ is the maximum absolute column sum. Paths are functions ℝ → Fin n → ℝ, of which only the restriction to [0,T][0,T][0,T] matters. Membership in D([0,T],Rn)D([0,T],\mathbb R^n)D([0,T],Rn) is the predicate IsCadlagOn T x: right-continuous on [0,T)[0,T)[0,T), left limits on (0,T](0,T](0,T], and (redundantly) bounded on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. The reflection is the predicate IsReflection Q T x y z. Every theorem is stated for all pairs satisfying it, so no choice function and no junk value are involved. Condition (2.3) is encoded as "the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure dyjdy_jdyj​ of {t∈[0,T]:zj(t)>0}\{t\in[0,T]: z_j(t)>0\}{t∈[0,T]:zj​(t)>0} is zero". For z≥0z\ge0z≥0 this is equivalent to ∫0Tzj dyj=0\int_0^T z_j\,dy_j=0∫0T​zj​dyj​=0. πxk\pi_x^kπxk​ is Nat.iterate, (I−Q)−1(I-Q)^{-1}(I−Q)−1 is Mathlib's matrix inverse (invertible under the standing assumptions), and ∑k∥Qk∥\sum_k\|Q^k\|∑k​∥Qk∥ is a tsum stated together with its summability.

Corrections and conventions, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • The norm (2.6). The page prints ∥x∥=sup⁡t∑j∣xj(t)∣\|x\| = \sup_t\sum_j|x_j(t)|∥x∥=supt​∑j​∣xj​(t)∣. Under that norm Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 are false for n≥2n\ge2n≥2. With Q=0Q=0Q=0, n=2n=2n=2, T=1T=1T=1, x1≡0x_1\equiv0x1​≡0 and x2=(−1[0.1,0.2),−1[0.3,0.4))x_2 = (-\mathbf 1_{[0.1,0.2)}, -\mathbf 1_{[0.3,0.4)})x2​=(−1[0.1,0.2)​,−1[0.3,0.4)​), one gets ∥x1−x2∥=1\|x_1-x_2\|=1∥x1​−x2​∥=1 but ψ(x2)=(1[0.1,1],1[0.3,1])\psi(x_2) = (\mathbf 1_{[0.1,1]},\mathbf 1_{[0.3,1]})ψ(x2​)=(1[0.1,1]​,1[0.3,1]​) has norm 222. The paper's proofs are valid for ∥x∥=∑jsup⁡t∣xj(t)∣\|x\| = \sum_j\sup_t|x_j(t)|∥x∥=∑j​supt​∣xj​(t)∣, which is used throughout. In dimension one the two norms coincide.
  • (2.8) prints ϕ(x1)−ϕ(x1)\phi(x_1)-\phi(x_1)ϕ(x1​)−ϕ(x1​). The formalization states ϕ(x1)−ϕ(x2)\phi(x_1)-\phi(x_2)ϕ(x1​)−ϕ(x2​).
  • (2.2)–(2.3) print the index range 1≤j≤J1\le j\le J1≤j≤J. The dimension is nnn.
  • x(0)≥0x(0)\ge0x(0)≥0 is added to the existence item. Conditions (2.1)–(2.2) force z(0)=x(0)z(0)=x(0)z(0)=x(0), so no reflection exists otherwise. The Lipschitz bounds are stated for all solution pairs and are vacuous exactly when some xi(0)x_i(0)xi​(0) has a negative coordinate.
  • Proposition 2.1 assumes only that Λ\LambdaΛ is diagonal with nonzero entries. All quantities depend on ∣Λ∣|\Lambda|∣Λ∣, so this covers the positive scaling of Harrison and Reiman.
  • Eq. (2.4) keeps the standing assumptions on QQQ as on the page, although the equivalence does not use them.

A trivializing formalization would read (2.3) through a Bochner integral, which is 000 for non-integrable integrands, or take suprema over unbounded families. The measure-zero encoding and the boundedness built into IsCadlagOn rule both out. A sorry-free check shows that Remark (2.1)'s jump example satisfies IsReflection.

Welcome contributions: a general API for càdlàg paths on [0,T][0,T][0,T] (boundedness, measurability, running suprema), the one-dimensional Skorokhod lemma for càdlàg paths, and the Neumann series for transient substochastic matrices. All of these are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • H. Chen and W. Whitt, Diffusion approximations for open queueing networks with service interruptions, Queueing Systems 13 (1993) 335–359. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01149260
  • J. M. Harrison and M. I. Reiman, Reflected Brownian motion on an orthant, Annals of Probability 9 (1981) 302–308. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176994428
  • M. I. Reiman, Open queueing networks in heavy traffic, Mathematics of Operations Research 9 (1984) 441–458. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.9.3.441
  • H. Chen and A. Mandelbaum, Discrete flow networks: diffusion approximations and bottlenecks, Annals of Probability 19 (1991) 1463–1519. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176990220
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems III: The Worst-Case Ratio of the Weighted Algorithm B2Research Paper

Motivation

MAXIMUM SATISFIABILITY asks for a truth assignment satisfying as many clauses of a given set as possible. It was among the first NP-hard optimization problems for which an approximation algorithm came with a proven worst-case guarantee. In Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems (J. Comput. System Sci. 9, 1974, doi:10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9), David S. Johnson set up a framework for measuring such guarantees and analyzed two heuristics for the problem. The second of these, algorithm B2, weights each clause by 2−∣C∣2^{-|C|}2−∣C∣ and repeatedly sets a literal so that the heavier side is satisfied. On inputs whose clauses all have at least kkk literals, it satisfies at least a 1−2−k1 - 2^{-k}1−2−k fraction of the optimum.

B2 is the ancestor of a line of work on MAX-SAT approximation:

  • 1974. Johnson proves the 2k/(2k−1)2^k/(2^k-1)2k/(2k−1) bound for B2 on MS(k) and the (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k bound for the unweighted greedy algorithm B1.
  • 1994. Goemans and Williamson (SIAM J. Discrete Math. 7) present Johnson's algorithm as the derandomization, by conditional expectations, of the uniformly random assignment, and combine it with LP rounding to obtain a 3/43/43/4-approximation.
  • 1999. Chen, Friesen and Zheng (JCSS 58) show that B2 is a 2/32/32/3-approximation on general inputs, sharper than the 1/21/21/2 that Johnson's bound gives at k=1k = 1k=1.

Setting

A literal is a variable xix_ixi​ or its negation xˉi\bar x_ixˉi​. A clause is a finite set of literals. A truth assignment is a set TTT of literals containing no pair {xi,xˉi}\{x_i, \bar x_i\}{xi​,xˉi​}; it satisfies a clause CCC when C∩T≠∅C \cap T \ne \emptysetC∩T=∅. An input is a finite set SSS of clauses, and S∗S^*S∗ is the largest ∣S′∣|S'|∣S′∣ over subsets S′⊆SS' \subseteq SS′⊆S satisfied by one truth assignment. MS(k) is the restriction to inputs in which every clause contains at least kkk distinct literals.

Algorithm B2 keeps a set SUB of satisfied clauses, a set LEFT of unsettled clauses, the literals LIT still available, and a weight w(C)w(C)w(C) per clause, starting from w(C)=2−∣C∣w(C) = 2^{-|C|}w(C)=2−∣C∣, SUB=∅\mathrm{SUB} = \emptysetSUB=∅, LEFT=S\mathrm{LEFT} = SLEFT=S. While some literal of LIT occurs in a clause of LEFT, it picks any such literal yyy. Let YT be the clauses of LEFT containing yyy and YF those containing yˉ\bar yyˉ​. If ∑YTw≥∑YFw\sum_{\mathrm{YT}} w \ge \sum_{\mathrm{YF}} w∑YT​w≥∑YF​w, it makes yyy true, moves YT to SUB and doubles the weight of each clause of YF; otherwise it does the symmetric move with yˉ\bar yyˉ​. Finally it removes y,yˉy, \bar yy,yˉ​ from LIT. When no literal of LIT remains in LEFT it returns SUB.

The choice of yyy is free, so several outputs may be choosable on one input. Johnson measures the algorithm by its worst choosable output, through the ratio r(B2,S)=S∗/∣SUB∣r(B2, S) = S^*/|\mathrm{SUB}|r(B2,S)=S∗/∣SUB∣ and its maximum R[B2,MS(k)](n)R[B2, \mathrm{MS}(k)](n)R[B2,MS(k)](n) over inputs of size at most nnn.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, with the equality range corrected

For every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, every SSS in MS(k) and every SUB choosable by B2 on SSS,

(2k−1) S∗≤2k ∣SUB∣,(2^k - 1)\,S^* \le 2^k\,|\mathrm{SUB}|,(2k−1)S∗≤2k∣SUB∣,

and for every k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 there are SSS in MS(k) and a choosable SUB with ∣SUB∣>0|\mathrm{SUB}| > 0∣SUB∣>0 and

(2k−1) S∗=2k ∣SUB∣.(2^k - 1)\,S^* = 2^k\,|\mathrm{SUB}|.(2k−1)S∗=2k∣SUB∣.

The paper states equality "for all sufficiently large nnn" for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1. At k=1k = 1k=1 this is false: the ratio 2 would require every clause to be a unit clause and all clauses to be jointly satisfiable, and on such inputs B2 satisfies everything. The goal therefore asserts tightness for k≥2k \ge 2k≥2. A separate item states that at k=1k = 1k=1 the ratio is never attained.

Milestones

  1. Initially, the total weight of LEFT is at most ∣S∣/2k|S|/2^k∣S∣/2k.
  2. No iteration increases the total weight of LEFT, so at halting it is still at most ∣S∣/2k|S|/2^k∣S∣/2k.
  3. At halting, every clause left in LEFT has weight exactly 111.
  4. At halting, ∣LEFT∣≤∣S∣/2k|\mathrm{LEFT}| \le |S|/2^k∣LEFT∣≤∣S∣/2k and ∣SUB∣≥∣S∣(1−2−k)|\mathrm{SUB}| \ge |S|(1 - 2^{-k})∣SUB∣≥∣S∣(1−2−k).
  5. The eight-clause instance for k=3k = 3k=3 has S∗=8S^* = 8S∗=8 and admits a choosable output of size 777.

Significance

The bound 1−2−k1 - 2^{-k}1−2−k is exactly the expected fraction of clauses a uniformly random assignment satisfies on MS(k). B2 attains it deterministically, and the proof bounds ∣SUB∣|\mathrm{SUB}|∣SUB∣ against ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ rather than against S∗S^*S∗, a feature the paper points out. For k=3k = 3k=3 the constant 8/78/78/7 was later shown by Håstad (2001) to be optimal among polynomial-time algorithms unless P = NP, so the guarantee of this 1974 algorithm is best possible for MAX-E3-SAT.

Formalizing the result produces a machine-checked potential-function argument for a nondeterministic algorithm: the invariant links each clause's weight to how many of its literals have been removed. The mission also records a correction to the printed statement at k=1k = 1k=1. The paper's proof is complete; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists.

Difficulty

The obvious argument follows the counting proof for algorithm B1 and compares clauses saved with clauses wounded in each step. It fails here: B2 can wound more clauses than it saves in a step, and the bound holds only in the weighted sense. The weight of a clause is not a static quantity. It is 2−∣C∣2^{-|C|}2−∣C∣ times 222 to the number of its literals already discarded, and this invariant must be carried through every step, including clauses that contain both yyy and yˉ\bar yyˉ​. Tightness needs an explicit input and an explicit adversarial run that exploits the tie in Step 4, and then a proof that every assignment of the remaining variables kills exactly one clause.

Formalization scope

  • Literals and clauses. A literal is a pair (variable index in N\mathbb NN, sign). Clauses are Finsets of literals, and an input is a Finset of clauses, so there are no duplicate clauses. Truth assignments are partial and consistent. S∗S^*S∗ is a maximum over the finite, nonempty family of satisfiable subsets.
  • B2 as a relation. B2 is a nondeterministic run relation, and "choosable" means reachable by finitely many steps from the initial state and halting. Step 3 allows a literal of either sign. The tie in Step 4 goes to yyy, and the comparison and doublings use the weights before the update. Weights are rationals.
  • Size-free ratios. The size-dependent R[B2,MS(k)](n)R[B2, \mathrm{MS}(k)](n)R[B2,MS(k)](n) is replaced by statements about every input (upper bound) and one attaining input (tightness). The two forms are equivalent because RRR is a maximum over finitely many inputs and nondecreasing in nnn.
  • No division. All ratios are multiplied out, so no division by zero can make a bound vacuous.
  • Trivializations ruled out. A deterministic tie-break in Step 3 or 4, or tightness at a single fixed kkk, would be a weaker theorem and is not acceptable. So is stating only the upper bound.

The definitions (the MS layer, the run relation) can be reused by other MAX-SAT approximation results, and an identical MS layer appears in the companion mission on algorithm B1. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, of the k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 tightness family, and of the k=1k = 1k=1 correction.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems, J. Comput. System Sci. 9 (1974) 256–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9
  • J. Chen, D. K. Friesen, H. Zheng, Tight bound on Johnson's algorithm for maximum satisfiability, J. Comput. System Sci. 58 (1999) 622–640. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcss.1998.1610
  • M. X. Goemans, D. P. Williamson, New 3/4-approximation algorithms for the maximum satisfiability problem, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 7 (1994) 656–666. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895480192243516
  • J. Håstad, Some optimal inapproximability results, J. ACM 48 (2001) 798–859. https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502098
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XVII: Random-Horizon Consumption-Investment and the De Finetti Dividend ProblemTextbook

Motivation

An insurance company collects premia and pays claims each period; the difference is a random, signed quantity that can push the company's risk reserve up or down. At the start of every period, before that period's premia and claims are realized, the company's owners may pay themselves a dividend out of the current reserve — but once the reserve goes negative the company is ruined and stops operating for good. How should the owners time and size these payments to maximize the total expected discounted dividend paid out before ruin? This is the classical De Finetti dividend problem, one of risk theory's oldest optimization questions, and Chapter 9 §9.2 of Bäuerle and Rieder's Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance (Springer, 2011) solves its fully discrete-time version by identifying the exact combinatorial shape of the optimal policy — not just proving one exists. This mission also covers §9.1, a different application of Chapter 7's contracting theory to a consumption-investment problem whose planning horizon is itself random rather than fixed or infinite.

Setting

The dividend model is a stationary Markov Decision Model on the integers: the state x∈Zx \in \mathbb Zx∈Z is the current risk reserve, the action a∈{0,1,…,x}a \in \{0,1,\dots,x\}a∈{0,1,…,x} (for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0; only a=0a=0a=0 is available once ruined) is the dividend paid, the reward is r(x,a):=ar(x,a):=ar(x,a):=a, and the reserve evolves by i.i.d. increments ZnZ_nZn​ (premia minus claims) after the dividend is deducted. Because the reward is bounded by an explicit function of the state (Lemma 9.2.2), Chapter 7's general existence theory applies directly, and the value function J∞J_\inftyJ∞​ satisfies a genuine Bellman equation. The chapter's real content begins once existence is established: Theorem 9.2.3 pins down enough analytic structure of J∞J_\inftyJ∞​ and its largest-maximizing policy f∗f^*f∗ (monotonicity, a Lipschitz-type inequality, and a self-consistency identity) to drive a purely combinatorial argument that f∗f^*f∗'s shape is a finite alternation of "pay nothing" and "pay down to a fixed level" intervals — a band-policy (Definition 9.2.5). Section 9.1's random-horizon consumption-investment model reuses the same Chapter 7 machinery in a different setting: the usual (c,a)(c,a)(c,a) (consumption, portfolio) decision each period, but where the horizon itself ends after each period with probability 1−p1-p1−p, making the effective one-period discount βp\beta pβp rather than β\betaβ.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 9.2.9, states the section's main claim in one sentence: the stationary policy (f∗,f∗,… )(f^*,f^*,\dots)(f∗,f∗,…) is optimal and is a band-policy. Short as it is stated, its proof assembles every earlier result of the section. The milestones supply that assembly, in order: Lemma 9.2.2 gives the model's bounding function and the resulting integrability/convergence facts; Theorem 9.2.3 gives the value-function bounds and the self-consistency identity f∗(x−f∗(x))=0f^*(x-f^*(x))=0f∗(x−f∗(x))=0; Corollary 9.2.4 checks the two sign-definite degenerate cases directly from Theorem 9.2.3; Proposition 9.2.6 proves the top threshold ξ:=sup⁡{x∣f∗(x)=0}\xi := \sup\{x \mid f^*(x)=0\}ξ:=sup{x∣f∗(x)=0} is finite (not merely well-defined) and that f∗f^*f∗ is a simple barrier above it; Proposition 9.2.8 proves the increment property below ξ\xiξ that forces each band's shape; and Theorem 9.2.10 (a postscript refinement, stated after the goal) shows the wave lengths are bounded once the reserve's downward jumps are themselves bounded, collapsing to a single barrier-policy in the extreme case. Theorem 9.1.1, the random-horizon consumption-investment verification theorem, is included as a full item but is not a milestone of this goal, since its content and proof belong to a different, disjoint model — see Difficulty.

Significance

Band-policies and the discrete-time De Finetti dividend problem have no substrate anywhere in Mathlib or on the platform, and the result is a genuinely deep, classical one: a discrete-time analogue of the continuous-time De Finetti barrier-strategy theory, obtained here by pure dynamic-programming argument rather than the stochastic-calculus techniques the continuous-time theory usually relies on. The mission is explicit that the goal's conclusion is the general band-policy structure, not the strictly weaker barrier-policy special case that Theorem 9.2.10 b) proves only under an extra hypothesis (bounded downward jumps) — stating the goal with a barrier-policy conclusion instead would understate what Theorem 9.2.9 actually proves.

Difficulty

The central formalization challenge is Definition 9.2.5's own combinatorial intricacy: a band-policy is specified by an alternating chain of thresholds 0≤c0<d1≤c1<d2≤⋯≤dn≤cn0 \le c_0 < d_1 \le c_1 < d_2 \le \dots \le d_n \le c_n0≤c0​<d1​≤c1​<d2​≤⋯≤dn​≤cn​ with a positive-width gap condition on every wave, and the policy's four piecewise branches case-split on which wave (if any) the current state falls into. This mission renders it existentially over the witnessing (n,c,d)(n,c,d)(n,c,d) rather than as one closed-form function, a faithful but more verbose transcription that avoids conflating the different branch conditions. A second difficulty is Proposition 9.2.6's own finiteness claim: ξ\xiξ is a supremum over a subset of N0\mathbb N_0N0​ that could, in principle, be unbounded, and Mathlib's convention for sSup over the naturals returns a finite junk value (000) even for an unbounded set — using it directly would silently trivialize "ξ<∞\xi<\inftyξ<∞" into a claim that is true regardless of the proposition's actual mathematical content. This mission instead states the proposition by exhibiting the finite value of ξ\xiξ directly, so that "ξ\xiξ is finite" survives as genuine content that the theorem's proof must establish. A third difficulty is scope: Theorem 9.1.1's random-horizon consumption-investment model shares no state space, action space, or definitions with the dividend model of the goal, despite both appearing in this chunk's assigned page range; it is formalized as a genuine application of a locally-restated copy of Chapter 7's contracting theory, but is excluded from the milestone list proper since it plays no role in the goal's own proof.

Formalization scope

The dividend model's transition law is built from Mathlib's PMF (probability mass function) type on Z\mathbb ZZ, which supplies the "probabilities sum to one" fact automatically rather than as a separate hypothesis. J_\infty, \delta, and every finite-horizon value function throughout this mission use this whole book series' Filter.limsup-of-truncations convention for infinite-horizon reward, restated locally (own namespace copy, per this series' file-ownership boundary) from chunk 07a's identical apparatus rather than imported. The consumption-investment model of §9.1 is formalized with the number of risky assets ddd as an explicit type parameter and its admissible-portfolio and domain restrictions as separate, citable fields rather than folded silently into the reward or transition definitions.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • B. De Finetti, "Su un'impostazione alternativa della teoria collettiva del rischio", Transactions of the XVth International Congress of Actuaries, 1957 (the original continuous-time dividend problem this chapter's discrete-time analogue is modeled on).
  • H. Schmidli, Stochastic Control in Insurance, Springer, 2008 (cited by Remark 9.2.1 for the reduction from a continuous dividend-payout action space to the integer setting used throughout this section).
  • H. U. Gerber, "Games of economic survival with discrete- and continuous-income processes", Operations Research, 1972 (an early discrete-time treatment of the same class of problems, in the spirit this chapter's own model follows).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium II: For Almost Every Game, Limits of Calibrated Learning Are Exactly the Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is a joint distribution over the players' strategy profiles from which no player gains by deviating from a recommended strategy. A central question of learning in games is which equilibria repeated play of simple, myopic rules can reach. Foster and Vohra (1997) answered it for calibrated forecasting: if each player forecasts the opponent with a calibrated rule and best-responds to the forecast, the empirical distribution of play approaches the set of correlated equilibria (their Theorem 1). That result has become a basic reference point for no-regret and calibration-based learning in games (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000).

This mission formalizes the paper's converse. Theorem 1 says calibrated learning ends up in the correlated equilibria; the converse says it can end up at any of them, for almost every game. Together the two results characterize exactly which long-run outcomes calibrated learning with best responses can produce.

Setting

Two players choose strategies from finite sets S(1)S(1)S(1) with mmm elements and S(2)S(2)S(2) with nnn elements; player iii receives payoff ui(x,y)∈Ru_i(x,y)\in\mathbb{R}ui​(x,y)∈R and maximizes it. A game G=(u1,u2)G=(u_1,u_2)G=(u1​,u2​) is a pair of real m×nm\times nm×n matrices, that is, a point of R2mn\mathbb{R}^{2mn}R2mn; a set of games has measure zero if it is Lebesgue-null in R2mn\mathbb{R}^{2mn}R2mn.

A joint distribution DDD on S(1)×S(2)S(1)\times S(2)S(1)×S(2) is a correlated equilibrium if for every map Φ:S(1)→S(1)\Phi:S(1)\to S(1)Φ:S(1)→S(1), ∑x,yD(x,y)u1(Φ(x),y)≤∑x,yD(x,y)u1(x,y)\sum_{x,y}D(x,y)u_1(\Phi(x),y)\le\sum_{x,y}D(x,y)u_1(x,y)∑x,y​D(x,y)u1​(Φ(x),y)≤∑x,y​D(x,y)u1​(x,y), and symmetrically for player 2. π(G)\pi(G)π(G) is the set of correlated equilibria.

Play is repeated in rounds t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. Before each round, player 1 issues a forecast f1(t)f_1(t)f1​(t), a probability vector over S(2)S(2)S(2), produced by a deterministic forecasting rule from the history of play so far; player 2 likewise forecasts player 1. For a forecast sequence fff and the opponent's plays zzz, let N(p,t)N(p,t)N(p,t) be the number of the first ttt rounds with forecast ppp, and ρ(p,j,t)\rho(p,j,t)ρ(p,j,t) the fraction of those rounds in which the opponent played jjj (zero if N(p,t)=0N(p,t)=0N(p,t)=0). The forecasts are calibrated if for every jjj

∑p∣ρ(p,j,t)−pj∣ N(p,t)t ⟶ 0(t→∞).\sum_p |\rho(p,j,t)-p_j|\,\frac{N(p,t)}{t}\ \longrightarrow\ 0 \qquad (t\to\infty).p∑​∣ρ(p,j,t)−pj​∣tN(p,t)​ ⟶ 0(t→∞).

Each player then plays RiR_iRi​ of its forecast, where the best-reply function RiR_iRi​ picks a best response to every forecast and does not depend on the round. Dt(x,y)D_t(x,y)Dt​(x,y) is the fraction of the first ttt rounds in which (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) was played.

λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G), the set of limit points of calibrated forecasts, consists of the DDD for which some best-reply functions R1,R2R_1,R_2R1​,R2​ and some calibrated forecasting rules make Dt(x,y)→D(x,y)D_t(x,y)\to D(x,y)Dt​(x,y)→D(x,y) for all (x,y)(x,y)(x,y).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 47)

for Lebesgue-almost every G∈R2mn:λ(G)=π(G).\text{for Lebesgue-almost every } G\in\mathbb{R}^{2mn}:\qquad \lambda(G)=\pi(G).for Lebesgue-almost every G∈R2mn:λ(G)=π(G).

Milestones

  1. λ(G)⊆π(G)\lambda(G)\subseteq\pi(G)λ(G)⊆π(G) for every game (Theorem 1 restated, p. 46).
  2. Every joint distribution DDD is the limiting empirical distribution of a deterministic play sequence supported on {D>0}\{D>0\}{D>0} (p. 47).
  3. Along such a sequence the conditional forecasts p1,t=D(xt,⋅)/∑yD(xt,y)p_{1,t}=D(x_t,\cdot)/\sum_yD(x_t,y)p1,t​=D(xt​,⋅)/∑y​D(xt​,y) and p2,t=D(⋅,yt)/∑xD(x,yt)p_{2,t}=D(\cdot,y_t)/\sum_xD(x,y_t)p2,t​=D(⋅,yt​)/∑x​D(x,yt​) are calibrated (p. 47).
  4. In a correlated equilibrium each recommended strategy is a best response to its conditional forecast (p. 47).
  5. For almost every payoff matrix, each set Mb(x)M_b(x)Mb​(x) of forecasts to which xxx is a best response is either empty or contains a forecast in the open simplex at which xxx is the unique best response (p. 47).
  6. The perturbed forecasts pi=(1−1/i)p∗+(1/i)qp_i=(1-1/i)p^*+(1/i)qpi​=(1−1/i)p∗+(1/i)q converge to p∗p^*p∗ and keep a unique best reply (p. 48).
  7. For the 3×33\times33×3 game of p. 48, a correlated equilibrium lies outside λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G), and λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G) is the single point mass on (C,2)(C,2)(C,2).

Significance

Theorem 1 by itself leaves open whether calibration selects among correlated equilibria, for instance toward Nash equilibria or toward particular payoffs. Theorem 2 closes that question negatively for generic games: every correlated equilibrium is the genuine limit, not merely an accumulation point, of calibrated play with stationary best replies. As the paper notes, adding the assumption that the limit exists therefore does not refine the equilibrium reached, in contrast with Fudenberg and Kreps's result for asymptotically myopic Bayesian play. The 3×33\times33×3 example shows that the genericity hypothesis cannot be dropped.

The results are proved in the 1997 paper; none is formalized. A complete development produces a reusable layer for repeated two-player games (calibration, empirical distributions, best-reply maps, correlated equilibria), a genericity lemma for best-response regions that is useful beyond this paper, and a machine-checked version of an argument that the paper gives only in outline.

Difficulty

The natural construction takes a correlated equilibrium DDD, a play sequence realizing DDD, and forecasts equal to the conditional distributions of DDD. The forecasts are then calibrated and each played strategy is a best response. What fails is the best-reply function: two strategies x′≠x′′x'\ne x''x′=x′′ can have the same conditional forecast p∗p^*p∗, while a stationary R1R_1R1​ maps p∗p^*p∗ to only one strategy. Separating them needs forecasts near p∗p^*p∗ at which each is the unique best response, and that exists only when the best-response regions have nonempty relative interior, a property that fails on a null set of games (the 3×33\times33×3 example) and whose genericity must be proved. The perturbed forecasts are no longer exactly equal to the conditional frequencies, so calibration has to be re-established with errors that vanish along the sequence.

Formalization scope

  • Strategies are Fin m and Fin n; payoffs are real matrices; players maximize. A game is a point of (Fin m → Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin m → Fin n → ℝ) with Mathlib's volume (Lebesgue measure on R2mn\mathbb{R}^{2mn}R2mn), and "almost every" is ∀ᵐ.
  • A correlated equilibrium is the joint-distribution form of p. 44 (a joint distribution with the two deviation inequalities).
  • Forecasting rules map finite histories to probability vectors; the play is generated recursively from the rules and the best-reply functions. Best-reply functions are arbitrary stationary selections of a best response at every probability vector; they may not depend on the round, since round-dependent tie-breaking enlarges λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G) (the matching pennies example of p. 46).
  • Rounds are 0,…,t−10,\dots,t-10,…,t−1; D0=0D_0=0D0​=0. The calibration sum runs over the forecasts issued so far, which is the paper's sum over all ppp since the other terms vanish.
  • λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G) requires convergence of DtD_tDt​, not a subsequence. Replacing the limit by a limit point, or stating only π(G)⊆λ(G)\pi(G)\subseteq\lambda(G)π(G)⊆λ(G), does not formalize the theorem.
  • The page's sentence "Almost every game has the property that all the sets Mb(x)M_b(x)Mb​(x) have non-empty interior" is false for dominated strategies (Mb(x)=∅M_b(x)=\emptysetMb​(x)=∅ on an open set of games). Milestone 5 states the dichotomy the page's argument proves: empty or with relative interior.
  • The page prints the denominator of p2,tp_{2,t}p2,t​ as ∑xD(xt,y)\sum_{x}D(x_t,y)∑x​D(xt​,y); the mission uses ∑xD(x,yt)\sum_xD(x,y_t)∑x​D(x,yt​).

The theorems are stated from the mission's own definitions of the game, calibration and λ(G)\lambda(G)λ(G); no statement is vacuous: at m=0m=0m=0 or n=0n=0n=0 both sides of the goal are empty, and the 3×33\times33×3 example exercises every definition. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, the genericity lemma (Lebesgue-null sets of linear degeneracies), and the calibration estimates for the perturbed forecasts.

Selected references

  • D. P. Foster and R. V. Vohra, Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 40–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0595
  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • A. P. Dawid, The well-calibrated Bayesian, Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (1982), 605–610. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1982.10477856
  • D. Fudenberg and D. M. Kreps, Learning mixed equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993), 320–367. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1021
  • S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153
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