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Operations Research

911 missions · 543 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Optimization·Captain: naimengye

The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management III: Dynamic PricingTextbook

Prices that respond to inventory

A retailer marking down a seasonal line, an airline raising fares as seats sell, a manufacturer pricing while restocking: each sets prices over time against a finite and changing inventory. Chapter 5 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) collects the structural theory of that problem. Without replenishment, the Bernoulli-arrival model of Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) gives a marginal value of capacity that falls with inventory and with time, hence prices that jump up at each sale and drift down between sales, and the deterministic fluid model bounds it from above. With replenishment, the model of Federgruen and Heching (1999) has a jointly concave and supermodular continuation value, from which the base-stock, posted-price policy follows: below a base-stock level order up to it and post a fixed price, above it order nothing and discount, more the higher the inventory. This mission formalizes those results with Proposition 5.3 as the goal.

Setting

Bernoulli demand (Sect. 5.2.2.2). One customer arrives per period with a random willingness to pay; the firm's decision is the demand rate d∈[0,1]d \in [0, 1]d∈[0,1], the probability of a sale at the inverse-demand price p(t,d)p(t, d)p(t,d), with revenue rate r(t,d)=d p(t,d)r(t, d) = d\,p(t, d)r(t,d)=dp(t,d) (revenueRate). The value function (5.12) is Vt(x)=max⁡d{r(t,d)−d ΔVt+1(x)}+Vt+1(x)V_t(x) = \max_{d}\{r(t, d) - d\,\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\} + V_{t+1}(x)Vt​(x)=maxd​{r(t,d)−dΔVt+1​(x)}+Vt+1​(x), VT+1=0V_{T+1} = 0VT+1​=0, Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 (bernoulliValue), and ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1)\Delta V_t(x) = V_t(x) - V_t(x-1)ΔVt​(x)=Vt​(x)−Vt​(x−1) (bernoulliDelta). The deterministic model (5.1) maximizes ∑tr(t,d(t))\sum_t r(t, d(t))∑t​r(t,d(t)) over rates with ∑td(t)≤C\sum_t d(t) \le C∑t​d(t)≤C (deterministicValue).

Pricing with replenishment (Sect. 5.3.2). Inventory may be negative (backorders). In period ttt with inventory xxx the firm orders up to y≥xy \ge xy≥x at unit cost ctc_tct​, chooses a rate d∈[0,dˉ]d \in [0, \bar d]d∈[0,dˉ], sells the random demand D(t,d,ξt)=at(ξt) d+bt(ξt)D(t, d, \xi_t) = a_t(\xi_t)\,d + b_t(\xi_t)D(t,d,ξt​)=at​(ξt​)d+bt​(ξt​) (additive, multiplicative or mixed noise), and pays the convex cost hth_tht​ on ending inventory. The value function (5.20) is Vt(x)=sup⁡y≥x, d{r(t,d)−ct(y−x)+Gt+1(y,d)}V_t(x) = \sup_{y \ge x,\, d}\{r(t, d) - c_t(y - x) + G_{t+1}(y, d)\}Vt​(x)=supy≥x,d​{r(t,d)−ct​(y−x)+Gt+1​(y,d)} with the continuation value Gt+1(y,d)=E[Vt+1(y−D(t,d,ξt))−ht(y−D(t,d,ξt))]G_{t+1}(y, d) = \mathbb E[V_{t+1}(y - D(t, d, \xi_t)) - h_t(y - D(t, d, \xi_t))]Gt+1​(y,d)=E[Vt+1​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))−ht​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))] (ReplPricing.value, contValue). Assumption 7.2, marginal revenue decreasing, is the concavity of r(t,⋅)r(t, \cdot)r(t,⋅).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.3

For every period, Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ is jointly concave on R×[0,dˉ]\mathbb R \times [0, \bar d]R×[0,dˉ], VtV_tVt​ is concave on R\mathbb RR, and Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ has increasing differences in (y,d)(y, d)(y,d), the supermodularity that the book states through its partial derivatives: replenishment_concave_supermodular.

Supporting targets

Proposition 5.2, the marginal value of capacity in the Bernoulli model decreases in ttt and in xxx; the upper bound of Sect. 5.2.2.3, the optimal deterministic revenue dominates the optimal expected stochastic revenue; and the base-stock, posted-price structure of Sect. 5.3.2.1, derived from Proposition 5.3: below the unconstrained optimum y0y^0y0 order up to it and use d0d^0d0, above it order nothing and use a rate at least d0d^0d0 that is nondecreasing in the inventory.

Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5-5.A.1 (the continuous-demand model without replenishment) are not targets; see the formalization scope. The deterministic sections (efficient prices, discrete price sets), the asymptotic optimality of the deterministic heuristic, the infinite-horizon stationary problem and the multiproduct and finite-population models carry no numbered results.

Significance

Proposition 5.3 is the structural core of joint pricing and inventory control: joint concavity makes the period problem a concave program, and supermodularity is what turns its solution into a policy, the base-stock, posted-price rule that Federgruen and Heching showed optimal and that later work on pricing with inventory builds on. Proposition 5.2 is the reason optimal dynamic prices in the stochastic single-item model rise at every sale and fall while inventory sits, the behaviour of Figure 5.5, and the deterministic upper bound is what justifies the fluid model as a benchmark and a heuristic, the pattern quantified in Table 5.6. None of these has a machine-checked proof; the replenishment result in particular needs the interplay of concavity, expectation and partial maximization on all of R\mathbb RR.

Difficulty

Proposition 5.2 is an induction whose step compares suprema over the rate interval, with the boundary condition Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 breaking the recursion at x=1x = 1x=1 and requiring r(t,0)=0r(t, 0) = 0r(t,0)=0. The deterministic bound is an induction on periods that uses the concavity of the deterministic value in the inventory (a concave program's value) to absorb the two branches of the Bernoulli recursion. The goal needs: integrability and continuity of Vt+1(y−D)−ht(y−D)V_{t+1}(y - D) - h_t(y - D)Vt+1​(y−D)−ht​(y−D) under bounded noise; that the expectation of a concave function of an affine map is jointly concave, and its increasing differences from those of the concave integrand; that a partial supremum of a jointly concave function over the convex feasible set {y≥x}\{y \ge x\}{y≥x} is concave in xxx; and the boundedness of the objective so that every supremum is a real number. The base-stock item is the segment argument that moves an unconstrained maximizer onto the boundary y=xy = xy=x and a monotone comparative-statics argument on the supermodular objective, with maxima attained by continuity on the compact rate interval.

Formalization scope

Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−tT + 1 - tT+1−t periods to go, the maxima are suprema, and the book's ranges are hypotheses. The demand is affine in the rate, which is the additive and multiplicative models the book names; with a merely convex demand (Assumption 5.1) the joint concavity of Proposition 5.3 fails when Vt+1−htV_{t+1} - h_tVt+1​−ht​ is not monotone, and the noise has bounded support, strengthening Assumption 7.6. The partial-derivative statements (iii)-(iv) are in difference form. Proposition 5.1 is not formalized: its model (5.11) evaluates Vt+1(x−D)V_{t+1}(x - D)Vt+1​(x−D) at negative inventories the model does not define while truncating revenue at xxx, and its Lemma 5-5.A.1 (joint concavity of r+r^+r+) is false as stated, its Hessian argument mistaking an indefinite matrix for a negative definite one; a counterexample is in the mission's check. The deterministic model restricts rates to [0,1][0, 1][0,1], the rates the Bernoulli model can realize.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • G. Gallego and G. J. van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • A. Federgruen and A. Heching, Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
  • W. Elmaghraby and P. Keskinocak, Dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations, Management Science 49(10), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1287.17315
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Markov Chain·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory X: Supply UncertaintyTextbook

When the supplier is the risk

Every model in the earlier chapters of this series treats demand as the uncertain quantity and supply as given. Chapter 9 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) reverses the roles: demand is deterministic and the supplier fails. A disruption is a binary event, modeled as a two-state Markov process between up and down periods, during which nothing can be ordered. The chapter's thesis, from Snyder and Shen (2006), is that supply uncertainty is a mirror image of demand uncertainty: the optimal base-stock level has the same critical-fractile form as the newsvendor solution but with the fractile taken over the disruption-length distribution (Tomlin 2006), and consolidation, which pools demand risk, now does nothing to expected cost and multiplies its variance, the risk-diversification effect of Schmitt, Sun, Snyder and Shen (2015). The chapter closes with the reliable fixed-charge location problem of Snyder and Daskin (2005). This mission formalizes the chapter's theorems on disruptions, with the risk-diversification theorem as its goal.

Setting

A supplier that is up is disrupted next period with probability α\alphaα; one that is down recovers with probability β\betaβ. The disruption chain records 000 when the supplier is up and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 in the nnn-th consecutive period of a disruption; its stationary distribution is π0=β/(α+β)\pi_0 = \beta/(\alpha+\beta)π0​=β/(α+β) and πn=αβα+β(1−β)n−1\pi_n = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha+\beta}(1-\beta)^{n-1}πn​=α+βαβ​(1−β)n−1 (disruptionPmf), with distribution function F(n)=∑i≤nπiF(n) = \sum_{i \le n}\pi_iF(n)=∑i≤n​πi​ (disruptionCdf).

A single location faces demand ddd per period, pays hhh per unit held and ppp per unit backordered per period, and follows a base-stock policy: it orders up to SSS in every up period and nothing in down periods. In the nnn-th period of a disruption it has S−(n+1)dS - (n+1)dS−(n+1)d units on hand or backordered, so its cost is g^(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+\hat g(S, n) = h[S-(n+1)d]^+ + p[(n+1)d - S]^+g^​(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+ (periodCost), and the expected cost per period is g(S)=∑nπng^(S,n)g(S) = \sum_n \pi_n \hat g(S, n)g(S)=∑n​πn​g^​(S,n) (meanCost), with variance V(S)V(S)V(S) over the disruption state (varCost). The critical fractile γ=p/(p+h)\gamma = p/(p+h)γ=p/(p+h) and F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ), the smallest nnn with F(n)≥γF(n) \ge \gammaF(n)≥γ, determine the optimal level.

In the reliable fixed-charge location problem (RFLP), sites fail independently with probability qqq and each customer is assigned to a chain of facilities: its level-rrr facility serves it when the rrr closer facilities are disrupted, until it is assigned to an emergency facility uuu that never fails and charges the penalty θi\theta_iθi​. The objective (9.61) is fixed cost plus expected transportation cost, with coefficients ψijr=hicijqr(1−q)\psi_{ijr} = h_i c_{ij} q^r (1-q)ψijr​=hi​cij​qr(1−q) (rflpPsi, rflpCost) under the constraints (9.62)-(9.67) (RFLPFeasible).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.9

For NNN identical locations and the centralized location formed by merging them (demand NdNdNd):

SC∗=NS∗,gC∗=gD∗=Ng∗,VC∗=NVD∗=N2V∗,S^*_C = NS^*, \qquad g^*_C = g^*_D = Ng^*, \qquad V^*_C = N V^*_D = N^2 V^*,SC∗​=NS∗,gC∗​=gD∗​=Ng∗,VC∗​=NVD∗​=N2V∗,

that is, an optimal single-location level SSS scales to the optimal centralized level NSNSNS, the centralized expected cost at NSNSNS is NNN times the single-location cost, and its variance is N2N^2N2 times the single-location variance. This is risk_diversification.

Supporting targets

Lemma 9.2, the stationary distribution and distribution function of the disruption chain; Lemma 9.4, that the optimal base-stock level is a multiple of ddd; Theorem 9.5, S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h))S^* = d + dF^{-1}(p/(p+h))S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h)), as the least minimizer of ggg; and Theorem 9.10, that in every optimal RFLP solution consecutive backup assignments are ordered by cost. Theorem 9.3, the optimality of base-stock policies, is cited by the book to Song and Zipkin without a model of the policy space and is not a target; Proposition 9.1 and the multisupplier results of Sect. 9.4 are left for a later mission, as discussed below.

Significance

Theorem 9.5 is the supply-side newsvendor formula: it says exactly how much inventory buys protection against disruptions of a given length, and it underlies the disruption models used in practice for raw-material buffers. Theorem 9.9 is the chapter's central insight and the reason supply and demand uncertainty call for opposite strategies: pooling reduces expected cost under demand uncertainty but only redistributes risk under supply uncertainty, concentrating it. Its three identities are what a risk-averse planner needs to compare the two designs by a mean-variance criterion. Theorem 9.10 is what lets the RFLP be formulated without ordering constraints and solved by Lagrangian relaxation like the UFLP.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 9.5 and the identities behind Theorem 9.9, sketches Lemma 9.4, and leaves Lemma 9.2 and Theorem 9.10 as exercises. The formal treatment of the piecewise-linear cost ggg and its finite differences is reusable for the yield-uncertainty and multi-supplier models of the same chapter.

Difficulty

The cost ggg is an infinite series whose terms grow linearly in nnn against a geometric weight, so every statement about it begins with summability, and the finite-difference identity Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p]\Delta g(S) = d[(h+p)F(S/d - 1) - p]Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p] requires exchanging a difference with a sum. Theorem 9.5 then needs the convexity and piecewise linearity of ggg to pass from a sign condition on slopes at multiples of ddd to a global minimum over all real SSS, and the identification of the least minimizer needs the slopes to be strictly negative below S∗S^*S∗. The obvious idea, treating the problem as a discrete newsvendor over multiples of ddd, is only half of the argument: it does not by itself exclude non-multiple minimizers, which is what Lemma 9.4 asserts.

Lemma 9.2 is elementary but the stationary equations involve a series over all down states, and the proof must establish summability before manipulating it. Theorem 9.9's scaling identities are termwise, but the optimality transfer in part 1 requires the scaling to preserve minimizers, which follows from the cost identity holding for every SSS.

Theorem 9.10 is an exchange argument on a binary program with layered constraints. The delicate case is the emergency facility: swapping it into a lower level is infeasible, and the correct move is to promote it and drop the later assignment, which changes the constraints for every higher level; the argument must show feasibility of the modified solution level by level.

Formalization scope

The disruption distribution is given by Lemma 9.2's formula rather than defined as the stationary distribution, and Lemma 9.2 shows it satisfies the stationary equations; the theorems assume 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1 and 0<β≤10 < \beta \le 10<β≤1, under which every series is a geometric series times a polynomial and is summable. The quantity F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ) enters Theorem 9.5 as a natural number kkk characterized by F(k)≥γF(k) \ge \gammaF(k)≥γ and F(n)<γF(n) < \gammaF(n)<γ for n<kn < kn<k, which exists since F(n)→1>γF(n) \to 1 > \gammaF(n)→1>γ; the conclusion asserts both optimality and leastness of d+dkd + dkd+dk among all real levels.

Theorem 9.9 is stated as the scaling of the single-location functions; the decentralized totals Ng∗Ng^*Ng∗ and NV∗NV^*NV∗ are the mean and variance of a sum of NNN independent copies, which the book asserts rather than derives, and are not modeled separately. In the RFLP, levels are indexed by Fin m, the emergency facility is a designated index uuu whose data satisfy the book's conventions through the hypotheses, and demands are positive with 0<q<10 < q < 10<q<1, both needed: with q=0q = 0q=0 or hi=0h_i = 0hi​=0 backup assignments are free and any order is optimal.

The EOQ with disruptions (Proposition 9.1) is a renewal-reward derivation without a formal model of the renewal process in the book, and the multisupplier newsvendor of Sect. 9.4 (Lemma 9.6, Theorems 9.7 and 9.8) rests on differentiability conditions the book defers to Dada et al. and on a lemma it leaves as an exercise; both are natural extensions on the same definitions rather than targets here.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 9. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
  • A. J. Schmitt, S. A. Sun, L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Centralization versus decentralization: risk pooling, risk diversification, and supply chain disruptions, Omega 52, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.10.010
  • L. V. Snyder and M. S. Daskin, Reliability models for facility location: the expected failure cost case, Transportation Science 39(3), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1040.0107
  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Supply and demand uncertainty in multi-echelon supply chains, working paper, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1080.0224
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Optimization·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory IX: Facility Location ModelsTextbook

Where to put the warehouses

Choosing where to open distribution centers is the strategic decision that fixes a supply chain's shape for years. The basic model, the uncapacitated fixed-charge location problem (UFLP) of Balinski (1965), trades the fixed cost of opening sites against the cost of transporting demand from open sites to customers. It is NP-hard, yet routinely solved to optimality, and the reason is a fact about its relaxations: the LP relaxation is unusually tight, and Lagrangian relaxation, which Cornuejols, Fisher and Nemhauser (1977) brought to location problems, gives the same bound with a subproblem solvable by inspection. Chapter 8 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops the UFLP, its Lagrangian relaxation and Erlenkotter's (1978) DUALOC dual-ascent method, then the p-median problem with Hakimi's (1965) node-optimality theorem and the covering models. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with the equality of the Lagrangian and LP bounds as its goal.

Setting

Customers i∈Ii \in Ii∈I have demands hih_ihi​; candidate sites j∈Jj \in Jj∈J have fixed costs fjf_jfj​; shipping one unit from jjj to iii costs cijc_{ij}cij​. A solution opens sites (xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1}) and assigns demand fractions (yij≥0y_{ij} \ge 0yij​≥0, ∑jyij=1\sum_j y_{ij} = 1∑j​yij​=1, yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​); its cost is ∑jfjxj+∑i∑jhicijyij\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i \sum_j h_i c_{ij} y_{ij}∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​hi​cij​yij​ (uflpCost, UFLPFeasible). The optimal value is z∗z^*z∗ (uflpOpt); relaxing xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1} to 0≤xj≤10 \le x_j \le 10≤xj​≤1 gives the LP relaxation with value zLPz_{LP}zLP​ (uflpLP).

Lagrangian relaxation removes the assignment constraints and charges λi\lambda_iλi​ per unit of violation. For fixed multipliers λ\lambdaλ the subproblem (UFLP-LRλ_\lambdaλ​) minimizes ∑jfjxj+∑i∑j(hicij−λi)yij+∑iλi\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i\sum_j (h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i) y_{ij} + \sum_i \lambda_i∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​(hi​cij​−λi​)yij​+∑i​λi​ over yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​, xxx binary, y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 (lagrObjective, LagrFeasible), with value zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) (zLR). It separates by site: the benefit of opening jjj is βj=∑imin⁡{0,hicij−λi}\beta_j = \sum_i \min\{0, h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i\}βj​=∑i​min{0,hi​cij​−λi​} (benefit), and jjj is opened iff βj+fj<0\beta_j + f_j < 0βj​+fj​<0. The best bound is the Lagrangian dual value zLR=max⁡λzLR(λ)z_{LR} = \max_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​=maxλ​zLR​(λ) (zLRbest).

DUALOC works with the condensed dual of the LP relaxation, whose variables viv_ivi​ satisfy ∑imax⁡{0,vi−c^ij}≤fj\sum_i \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\} \le f_j∑i​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}≤fj​ with c^ij=hicij\hat c_{ij} = h_i c_{ij}c^ij​=hi​cij​. A dual solution vvv and a site set J+J^+J+ form a primal-dual pair (PDP) when these constraints are tight on J+J^+J+ and every customer has a site in J+J^+J+ with c^ij≤vi\hat c_{ij} \le v_ic^ij​≤vi​; the primal solution opens J+J^+J+ and assigns each customer to its nearest open site j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) (NearestIn, primalX, primalY).

For the p-median problem on a network, the customers are the nodes, ddd is the shortest-path distance between nodes, and a facility may sit at position ttt along an edge (u,w)(u, w)(u,w) of length ℓ\ellℓ, at distance min⁡{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ}\min\{d(i,u) + t\ell, d(i,w) + (1-t)\ell\}min{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ} from node iii (NetPoint, netDist). The p-center problem minimizes the largest distance from a customer to its nearest of ppp open sites; pCenterValue c p is its optimal value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 8.2

For every instance with at least one candidate site,

zLP  =  zLR  =  sup⁡λzLR(λ).z_{LP} \;=\; z_{LR} \;=\; \sup_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda).zLP​=zLR​=λsup​zLR​(λ).

This is lagrangian_equals_lp.

Supporting targets

Theorem 8.1, the closed form zLR(λ)=∑jmin⁡{0,βj+fj}+∑iλiz_{LR}(\lambda) = \sum_j \min\{0, \beta_j + f_j\} + \sum_i \lambda_izLR​(λ)=∑j​min{0,βj​+fj​}+∑i​λi​ with its optimal solution; the bounds (8.16) zLR(λ)≤z∗z_{LR}(\lambda) \le z^*zLR​(λ)≤z∗ and (8.19) zLP≤zLR≤z∗z_{LP} \le z_{LR} \le z^*zLP​≤zLR​≤z∗; Theorem 8.3, the variable-fixing tests; Lemma 8.4, the DUALOC duality gap zP+−zD+=∑i∑j∈J+,j≠j+(i)max⁡{0,vi−c^ij}z^+_P - z^+_D = \sum_i \sum_{j \in J^+, j \ne j^+(i)} \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\}zP+​−zD+​=∑i​∑j∈J+,j=j+(i)​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}; Lemma 8.6, the characterization of complementary slackness violations; Theorem 8.7, Hakimi's theorem that some ppp nodes are optimal among all ppp-point sets; Lemma 8.8, the equivalence between the ppp-center value being at most rrr and a set cover of radius rrr with at most ppp sites. Proposition 8.5, which concerns the output of a specific procedure, is not a target.

Significance

Corollary 8.2 explains the behavior of every Lagrangian location code: the bound cannot beat the LP bound, so its value lies in the ease of the subproblem and in extensions to nonlinear location models (the location model with risk pooling of Chapter 12) where no LP is available. Theorem 8.1 is the subproblem solution those codes use; Theorem 8.3 is the variable-fixing device of Daskin, Snyder and others that shrinks branch-and-bound trees. Lemmas 8.4 and 8.6 are the analytical core of DUALOC, the method that made large UFLP instances solvable in the 1970s. Hakimi's theorem is the reason the ppp-median problem is a discrete problem at all, and Lemma 8.8 is the reason ppp-center problems are solved by bisection over covering problems rather than by their weak MIP formulation.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 and Lemma 8.6, cites Corollary 8.2 to Appendix D and Theorem 8.7 to Hakimi, and leaves Lemmas 8.4 and 8.8 as exercises. The formal treatment of the integrality property and of Lagrangian duality for a linear objective over a product of boxes is reusable for the p-median and capacitated variants the chapter goes on to discuss.

Difficulty

The goal is an LP duality statement in disguise, and the obvious idea, that zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) is the dual function of the LP relaxation, is exactly what needs proof. Two facts must be established: that for fixed λ\lambdaλ the subproblem over binary xxx has the same value as over x∈[0,1]x \in [0,1]x∈[0,1], because after the optimal yyy is substituted the objective is linear in xxx; and that the supremum over λ\lambdaλ of the resulting concave piecewise-linear function equals the LP minimum. The second is strong duality for a linear program, which Mathlib does not provide ready-made; it has to be obtained either through a Farkas-type argument or by exhibiting, for the LP optimum, a multiplier vector that attains it, which for this problem can be read off the LP dual. The book proves none of this; it invokes Lemma D.3.

The bounds (8.16) and (8.19) are easier but not free: the infima and suprema defining z∗z^*z∗, zLPz_{LP}zLP​ and zLRz_{LR}zLR​ must be shown attained, which needs finiteness of the binary choices and compactness of the assignment polytope. Theorem 8.3 depends on the value of the subproblem with one variable forced, which is Theorem 8.1 applied to a modified instance. Hakimi's theorem needs a concavity argument in each point's position and a bookkeeping step, since moving several points to nodes may merge them and the result must still have exactly ppp nodes. Lemma 8.8 is combinatorial and short once the ppp-center value is identified with a minimum over ppp-subsets.

Formalization scope

Customers and sites are Fin n and Fin m; demands, costs and fixed costs are arbitrary reals, as the book's formulations are, and the theorems that need it assume m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. Optimal values are infima or suprema of the sets of attainable objective values, all of which are nonempty and bounded under the stated hypotheses. The Lagrangian dual value is a supremum over all real multiplier vectors, so Corollary 8.2 asserts in particular that the supremum equals the attained LP value.

The DUALOC statements take the nearest-facility assignment j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) as a function a with the defining property, so ties are resolved by the hypothesis, and the complementary slackness violation is written exactly as (8.51) with (x+,y+)(x^+, y^+)(x+,y+) substituted. Hakimi's theorem is stated for a family of ppp points with repetition allowed, which is stronger than for a set. It assumes what the book's network supplies: the node distances satisfy the triangle inequality, since they are shortest-path distances, and every edge carrying a point is at least as long as the distance between its endpoints. The argument needs both: they make the ends of an edge coincide with its nodes, and without them a point on a short fictitious edge can beat every node. The set covering value in Lemma 8.8 is expressed through the existence of a cover with at most ppp sites rather than as a natural-number infimum, whose value 000 on infeasible instances would falsify the equivalence.

The definition module is shared by all ten items. The Lagrangian relaxation of the ppp-median problem (Sect. 8.3.2.2), the continuous knapsack subproblem of the capacitated problem, and Proposition 8.5 on the dual-ascent procedure are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • M. L. Balinski, Integer programming: methods, uses, computation, Management Science 12(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.253
  • G. Cornuejols, M. L. Fisher and G. L. Nemhauser, Location of bank accounts to optimize float, Management Science 23(8), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.23.8.789
  • D. Erlenkotter, A dual-based procedure for uncapacitated facility location, Operations Research 26(6), 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.6.992
  • S. L. Hakimi, Optimum distribution of switching centers in a communication network and some related graph theoretic problems, Operations Research 13(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.462
  • A. M. Geoffrion, Lagrangean relaxation for integer programming, Mathematical Programming Study 2, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0120690
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VIII: Supply Chain ContractsTextbook

Why the newsvendor orders too little

A retailer facing uncertain single-period demand and buying from a supplier at a wholesale price orders less than the two of them together would want. The reason is not irrationality but incentives: the retailer bears the whole cost of unsold stock while the supplier collects a margin on every unit ordered, so each party marks up its own cost and the combined markup, Spengler's (1950) double marginalization, depresses the order. Pasternack (1985) showed that a buyback credit for unsold units, priced correctly, realigns the retailer with the chain, and Cachon (2003) surveys the contracts that followed. Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops this as a Stackelberg game on the newsvendor model: the supplier sets contract terms, the retailer sets the order quantity. This mission formalizes the chapter's seven theorems, with the buyback allocation theorem, which shows that buyback both coordinates the chain and can divide its profit in any proportion, as the goal.

Setting

Demand DDD is a random variable with law on R\mathbb{R}R and mean μ\muμ. The retail price is rrr; the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs are csc_scs​ and crc_rcr​ with c=cs+cr<rc = c_s + c_r < rc=cs​+cr​<r; lost sales cost the two parties goodwill penalties psp_sps​ and prp_rpr​ with p=ps+prp = p_s + p_rp=ps​+pr​; unsold units salvage for v<crv < c_rv<cr​ (ContractData). With S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] the expected sales (expSales) and I(Q)=Q−S(Q)I(Q) = Q - S(Q)I(Q)=Q−S(Q) the expected leftover (expLeftover), a transfer payment T(Q)T(Q)T(Q) from retailer to supplier determines the two profits (retailerProfit, supplierProfit),

πr(Q)=(r−v+pr)S(Q)−(cr−v)Q−prμ−T(Q),πs(Q)=psS(Q)−csQ−psμ+T(Q),\pi_r(Q) = (r - v + p_r)S(Q) - (c_r - v)Q - p_r\mu - T(Q), \qquad \pi_s(Q) = p_s S(Q) - c_s Q - p_s\mu + T(Q),πr​(Q)=(r−v+pr​)S(Q)−(cr​−v)Q−pr​μ−T(Q),πs​(Q)=ps​S(Q)−cs​Q−ps​μ+T(Q),

whose sum Π(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ\Pi(Q) = (r - v + p)S(Q) - (c - v)Q - p\muΠ(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ (chainProfit) is independent of the contract. The chain-optimal quantity Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ; the retailer's and supplier's optimal quantities Qr∗Q^*_rQr∗​, Qs∗Q^*_sQs∗​ maximize their own profits. A contract coordinates the chain when Qr∗=Qs∗=Q0Q^*_r = Q^*_s = Q_0Qr∗​=Qs∗​=Q0​, stated here as equality of the sets of maximizers, and is a coordinating contract type when some choice of its parameters does this with both profits positive.

The four contracts are their transfer payments. Wholesale price: T=wQT = wQT=wQ. Buyback: T=wQ−b I(Q)T = wQ - b\,I(Q)T=wQ−bI(Q), the supplier crediting bbb per unsold unit, with 0≤b≤r−v+pr0 \le b \le r - v + p_r0≤b≤r−v+pr​ and w=w(b)w = w(b)w=w(b) of (14.22). Revenue sharing: the retailer keeps a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of sales and salvage revenue, T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q)T = (w + (1-\phi)v)Q + (1-\phi)(r - v)S(Q)T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q), with w=w(ϕ)w = w(\phi)w=w(ϕ) of (14.34). Quantity flexibility: the supplier reimburses the retailer's loss w+cr−vw + c_r - vw+cr​−v on unsold units up to δQ\delta QδQ, T=wQ−(w+cr−v)∫(1−δ)QQF(t) dtT = wQ - (w + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)Q}^{Q} F(t)\,dtT=wQ−(w+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)QQ​F(t)dt, with w=w(δ)w = w(\delta)w=w(δ) of (14.46). For buyback, λ=(r−v+pr−b)/(r−v+p)\lambda = (r - v + p_r - b)/(r - v + p)λ=(r−v+pr​−b)/(r−v+p) is the retailer's share of the chain profit (buybackShare), and b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ (buybackB1, buybackB2) are the credits at which one party earns everything.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14.5

Under buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) at the chain-optimal Q0Q_0Q0​, the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in b∈[0,r−v+pr]b \in [0, r - v + p_r]b∈[0,r−v+pr​], with 0<b1<b2<r−v+pr0 < b_1 < b_2 < r - v + p_r0<b1​<b2​<r−v+pr​ and

πr(Q0,w(b1),b1)=Π(Q0),πs(Q0,w(b2),b2)=Π(Q0),\pi_r(Q_0, w(b_1), b_1) = \Pi(Q_0), \qquad \pi_s(Q_0, w(b_2), b_2) = \Pi(Q_0),πr​(Q0​,w(b1​),b1​)=Π(Q0​),πs​(Q0​,w(b2​),b2​)=Π(Q0​),

the supplier losing money for b<b1b < b_1b<b1​, both earning positive profit for b1<b<b2b_1 < b < b_2b1​<b<b2​, and the retailer losing money for b>b2b > b_2b>b2​. This is buyback_allocation.

Supporting targets

Equation (14.8), Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ iff Fˉ(Q0)=(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(Q_0) = (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(Q0​)=(c−v)/(r−v+p); Theorem 14.1, the wholesale price contract coordinates iff w=cs−c−vr−v+ppsw = c_s - \frac{c-v}{r-v+p}p_sw=cs​−r−v+pc−v​ps​, at which the supplier's profit is negative; Theorem 14.2, Qr∗<Q0Q^*_r < Q_0Qr∗​<Q0​ whenever w>csw > c_sw>cs​; Theorem 14.3, for IGFR demand the supplier's induced profit πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)) is unimodal; the identities (14.27) and (14.28), πr=λΠ+μ(λp−pr)\pi_r = \lambda\Pi + \mu(\lambda p - p_r)πr​=λΠ+μ(λp−pr​) and its complement under buyback; Theorem 14.4, buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) coordinates; Theorem 14.6, revenue sharing with w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) coordinates; Theorem 14.7, quantity flexibility with w(δ)w(\delta)w(δ) makes Q0Q_0Q0​ optimal for the retailer.

Significance

The chapter's theorems are the analytical basis of contract design in newsvendor supply chains. Theorem 14.1 and 14.2 make double marginalization precise: coordination by price alone is possible only at a price the supplier rejects, and any acceptable price makes the retailer under-order. Theorem 14.3 is what lets the supplier optimize the wholesale price at all, and is the reason the IGFR class of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is standard in the field. Theorems 14.4 to 14.6 show that buyback and revenue sharing coordinate and, through the share λ\lambdaλ, that the chain profit can be split arbitrarily, so a coordinating contract can be made acceptable to both parties. Theorem 14.7 shows the limits: quantity flexibility coordinates the retailer but not necessarily the supplier.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 14.1, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6 and 14.7 and leaves 14.2 as an exercise. The formalization of the fractile characterization and of the affine profit identities is reusable for the many contract types (sales rebates, quantity discounts) the chapter cites but does not analyze.

Difficulty

The wholesale price results are first-order conditions on concave functions, and the difficulty is entirely in the analysis: S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] has derivative Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) for every QQQ when FFF is continuous, which is a differentiation under the integral that has to be carried out for a Lipschitz integrand and an arbitrary law, and the maximizers of the concave profit must then be identified with the solutions of the fractile equation, including existence by the intermediate value theorem. Theorem 14.1's "only if" direction requires that a coincidence of maximizer sets pins the fractile and hence the price, which is where strict monotonicity of FFF enters.

Theorem 14.3 is the delicate one. The obvious approach, concavity of πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)), fails: the book stresses the function is not concave in general. The proof is a sign-change argument on the derivative (14.16), which is Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) times a bracket that IGFR makes decreasing, minus a constant; one must show the derivative is positive near 000, eventually negative, and crosses zero exactly once, and that the last needs both Fˉ\bar FFˉ strictly decreasing and the bracket positive at the crossing. Working with a density in Mathlib means relating the withDensity law to the distribution function throughout.

The buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility theorems are algebra once the right identity is found: πr\pi_rπr​ is an affine function of Π\PiΠ with slope λ\lambdaλ. The formalization must handle the boundary cases the book glosses over, where λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 or λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1 and one party is indifferent among all quantities, so "the same QQQ maximizes" holds only in one direction. Theorem 14.5 also needs Π(Q0)≤μ(r−c)\Pi(Q_0) \le \mu(r - c)Π(Q0​)≤μ(r−c), a Jensen-type bound S(Q)≤min⁡{Q,μ}S(Q) \le \min\{Q, \mu\}S(Q)≤min{Q,μ}, for b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0, and the ordering b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ needs Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, which the book's proof does not isolate.

Formalization scope

Demand is an arbitrary probability law on R\mathbb{R}R with finite mean, not assumed nonnegative; the book's own examples use normal demand. Optimal quantities are maximizers over all of R\mathbb{R}R (IsMaxOn … Set.univ), and coordination is the coincidence of maximizer sets, with the degenerate endpoints of the parameter ranges stated as one-directional. Where the book uses a density, continuity of the distribution function (NullSingletonClass) is assumed instead, except in Theorem 14.3, where the density fff is explicit, continuous on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (so the exponential law is included), positive on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and IGFR on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞). Strict monotonicity of FFF on R\mathbb{R}R is never assumed, since it would rule out every nonnegative demand law. Theorem 14.1 assumes ps>0p_s > 0ps​>0 and a positive chain optimum, Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(0) > (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p), both implicit in the book's proof.

The transfer payments are functions of QQQ and the profits are defined for every QQQ, so the theorems compare values of one family of functions; the book's Fˉ\bar FFˉ is 1−F1 - F1−F with Mathlib's cdf, and the quantity flexibility integral is an interval integral. Theorem 14.5 takes Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and ps,pr>0p_s, p_r > 0ps​,pr​>0 as hypotheses. Without positive goodwill costs its strict inequalities 0<b10 < b_10<b1​ and b2<r−v+prb_2 < r - v + p_rb2​<r−v+pr​ fail (at ps=0p_s = 0ps​=0, b1=0b_1 = 0b1​=0; at pr=0p_r = 0pr​=0, b2=r−v+prb_2 = r - v + p_rb2​=r−v+pr​).

The definition module is shared by all eleven items. The equivalence (14.42)-(14.43) of revenue sharing and buyback, the supplier's stationarity under quantity flexibility (Problem 14.11) and the allocation results for revenue sharing (14.40)-(14.41) are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
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Optimization·Captain: naimengye

Inventory Control VII: Multi-Echelon Lot Sizing and Roundy's 98 % ApproximationTextbook

Batch quantities that cannot be chosen one site at a time

Chapter 9 of Axsäter's Inventory Control opens with the observation that in a multi-echelon system it is not optimal to choose batch quantities installation by installation: the batch at one site is the demand pattern of the next site upstream. Even with constant customer demand the exact optimum can be complicated, and the book's Example 9.4 shows a four-stage serial system whose optimal batch at one stage alternates between two values over time. Roundy (1985, 1986) showed that this complexity can be avoided at a guaranteed price: restrict every batch quantity to be a power of two times a common basic quantity, nested from stage to stage, and the best such policy costs at most 2 % more than the optimum. The book presents the result for a serial system and remarks that the same approach handles assembly and distribution systems and, in Sect. 7.3.1.2, joint replenishments. It is the capstone of Chapter 9 and the multi-echelon payoff of the powers-of-two analysis of Chapter 7.

Setting

A serial system has NNN installations; installation iii produces item iii from one unit of item i+1i+1i+1, item NNN is obtained from an outside supplier, and item 1 faces a constant, continuous final demand ddd. Lead-times are zero, shortages are not allowed, production is instantaneous, and each batch quantity QiQ_iQi​ is constant over time. Installation iii has an ordering cost AiA_iAi​ per batch and an echelon holding cost eie_iei​ per unit and time unit, charged on the echelon stock (the stock at installation iii and everything downstream), so that the cost per time unit is the sum of NNN single-item costs of the chapter 4 form,

C(Q)  =  ∑i=1N(eiQi2+AidQi)(Eq. 9.17).C(Q) \;=\; \sum_{i=1}^{N}\Big(e_i\frac{Q_i}{2} + A_i\frac{d}{Q_i}\Big) \qquad\text{(Eq. 9.17).}C(Q)=i=1∑N​(ei​2Qi​​+Ai​Qi​d​)(Eq. 9.17).

The book first works out the two-level case, where the optimum has Q2=kQ1Q_2 = kQ_1Q2​=kQ1​ for a positive integer kkk, the cost (9.9) is the EOQ cost with modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​, and the best kkk is found from k∗=A2e1/(A1e2)k^{*} = \sqrt{A_2e_1/(A_1e_2)}k∗=A2​e1​/(A1​e2​)​ by a rounding rule.

For NNN stages, Roundy's constraints (9.16) require Qi=2kiQi−1Q_i = 2^{k_i}Q_{i-1}Qi​=2ki​Qi−1​ with nonnegative integers kik_iki​, so that every solution is nested. The relaxed constraints (9.18) require only Qi−1≤QiQ_{i-1} \le Q_iQi−1​≤Qi​; they are implied by (9.16), the relaxed problem is convex with linear constraints, and its solution QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is computed by aggregating consecutive stages whose cost ratios Ai/eiA_i/e_iAi​/ei​ decrease. Roundy's solution rounds QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel to Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q for a basic quantity qqq, chosen as in Proposition 7.2.

Formalization targets

Goal — Roundy's 98 % approximation

For d>0d > 0d>0, Ai>0A_i > 0Ai​>0, ei>0e_i > 0ei​>0 and any minimizer QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel of CCC over positive batch quantities satisfying (9.18), there exist q>0q > 0q>0 and integers m1≤⋯≤mNm_1 \le \dots \le m_Nm1​≤⋯≤mN​ such that Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q satisfies (9.16) and

C(2mq)  ≤  12 ln⁡2 C(Qrel).C\big(2^{m}q\big) \;\le\; \frac{1}{\sqrt 2\,\ln 2}\,C\big(Q^{\mathrm{rel}}\big).C(2mq)≤2​ln21​C(Qrel).

Supporting targets

The two-level results of Sect. 9.2.1: the equivalence of the installation and echelon cost forms (9.6) and (9.9); the optimal Q1Q_1Q1​ and cost (9.10)-(9.11) for a given kkk; the closed form and convexity of C(k)2C(k)^2C(k)2 (9.12) and the real minimizer k∗k^{*}k∗ (9.13); and the integer rounding rule with its corollary that A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ forces k=1k = 1k=1. For NNN stages: existence of the relaxed optimum; the aggregation lemma, that Ai/ei<Ai−1/ei−1A_i/e_i < A_{i-1}/e_{i-1}Ai​/ei​<Ai−1​/ei−1​ forces Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​; that (9.16) implies (9.18), so the relaxed optimum bounds every powers-of-two policy from below; and that rounding to the nearest power of two times qqq is monotone and lands within a factor 2\sqrt 22​.

Significance

The result itself. Roundy's theorem replaces an intractable lot-sizing problem by a closed-form computation with a provable 2 % guarantee, and the policies it produces are the nested, periodic schedules that production planning wants anyway. In Example 9.4 the rounding with q=1q = 1q=1 is already within 0.7 % of the relaxed bound. The two-level analysis has its own use: the modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​ are what the Blackburn-Millen heuristic of Sect. 9.3.2 feeds to the Wagner-Whitin algorithm under time-varying demand, and the condition A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ tells when a two-stage system collapses to one stage.

Formalizing it. The book proves the bound in a paragraph that leans on three earlier results: Proposition 7.2 for the rounding, the Lagrangean relaxation for the lower bound, and the aggregation algorithm for the structure of QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel. Formalizing it makes explicit what the paragraph glosses: that the multipliers vanish off tight constraints, that equal quantities round to equal quantities, and that the comparison class is the class of nested constant-batch policies. The published Proposition 7.2 (pot_two_percent) and the mean value 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2) are cited as reference items. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, rounding QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel item by item and invoking Proposition 7.2 for each, does not work: Proposition 7.2 bounds the rounded cost relative to each item's unconstrained optimum, and QirelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_iQirel​ is generally not that optimum. The proof must pass through the Lagrangean relaxation (9.19)-(9.20), under which QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is the unconstrained optimum for the modified holding costs ei′=ei−2λi+2λi+1e_i' = e_i - 2\lambda_i + 2\lambda_{i+1}ei′​=ei​−2λi​+2λi+1​, apply Proposition 7.2 there, and transfer the bound back using complementary slackness: the multiplier λi\lambda_iλi​ is positive only where Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​, and equal quantities round to equal quantities, so the correction terms λi(Qi−Qi−1)\lambda_i(Q_i - Q_{i-1})λi​(Qi​−Qi−1​) vanish for both QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel and its rounding. A solver therefore needs the KKT conditions for this convex program, or an equivalent direct argument through the aggregation structure (within an aggregate all quantities are equal and their sum is an EOQ problem). The two-level statements and the rounding lemma are elementary.

Formalization scope

Stages are indexed by Fin N; the cost is serialCost A e d Q = ∑ i, eoqCost (A i) d (e i) (Q i) with eoqCost imported from the chapter 4 definitions, and the two-level cost is eoqCost (A1 + A2/k) d (e1 + k e2) Q1 by definition, so the published eoq_optimal and eoq_cost_at_eoq apply to it directly. SerialNested and SerialPowerOfTwo are the constraints (9.18) and (9.16) on consecutive indices; for N≤1N \le 1N≤1 both hold vacuously and the goal is Proposition 7.2 for one item. potRound q Q is ⌊log⁡2(Q/q)+12⌋\lfloor \log_2(Q/q) + \tfrac12\rfloor⌊log2​(Q/q)+21​⌋.

All theorems assume d,Ai,ei>0d, A_i, e_i > 0d,Ai​,ei​>0 and positive batch quantities. The book says "nonnegative ordering and echelon holding costs"; strict positivity is needed for the relaxed problem to have a solution at all (ei=0e_i = 0ei​=0 or Ai=0A_i = 0Ai​=0 sends the optimal QiQ_iQi​ to ∞\infty∞ or 000), and it is what the book's own examples satisfy. The relaxed optimum enters the goal as a hypothesis, with existence stated separately; uniqueness is not used. The constant is the exact 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2).

Two readings are excluded. The bound is not against an arbitrary nested QQQ, for which it would be false, but against the relaxed optimum; and the comparison class is stated as nested constant-batch policies, the class the relaxed problem bounds directly, not the book's larger class of time-varying policies, which would need a dynamic model. The definitions are reusable for assembly systems and for the joint replenishment problem of Sect. 7.3.1.2, whose Roundy analysis is the same with a fictive item 0 of zero holding cost; contributions in that direction are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 9.2. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Robin Roundy, 98%-Effective Integer-Ratio Lot-Sizing for One-Warehouse Multi-Retailer Systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985, pp. 1416-1430. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
  • Robin Roundy, A 98%-Effective Lot-Sizing Rule for a Multi-Product, Multi-Stage Production/Inventory System, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(4), 1986, pp. 699-727. DOI 10.1287/moor.11.4.699
  • John A. Muckstadt and Robin O. Roundy, Analysis of Multistage Production Systems, in: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 4, Elsevier, 1993, pp. 59-131. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80182-4
  • Peter L. Jackson, William L. Maxwell and John A. Muckstadt, The Joint Replenishment Problem with a Powers-of-Two Restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985, pp. 25-32. DOI 10.1080/07408178508975268
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Inventory Control VI: Optimality of (R, Q) Policies When Ordering in BatchesTextbook

Why the policy class is not up for debate

Every model in Chapters 5 and 6 of Axsäter's Inventory Control assumes at the outset that the ordering policy is of (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) or (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) type. Section 6.2 asks whether better policies exist and answers, for the case in which there are no ordering costs but every order must be a multiple of a fixed batch quantity QQQ, that none do: Proposition 6.1, "an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy is optimal", with a proof the book attributes to Chen (2000). For Q=1Q = 1Q=1 it is the optimality of an order-up-to-SSS policy in the absence of ordering costs, and for continuous or Poisson demand it transfers to (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies, which are then the same thing. The proposition is the one place in the book where a policy is compared against every feasible alternative rather than against other members of its own family, and its proof is short enough to be given in full, which makes it the natural capstone of Chapter 6.

Setting

Demand is compound Poisson: customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ\lambdaλ and each demands an integral number of units, with sizes D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… independent and identically distributed with law fff on the positive integers, independent of the arrival process. The book's standing assumption that not all demands are multiples of some integer larger than one is kept. Writing TnT_nTn​ for the nnn-th arrival time, N(t)N(t)N(t) for the number of arrivals by time ttt and Sn=D0+⋯+Dn−1S_n = D_0 + \dots + D_{n-1}Sn​=D0​+⋯+Dn−1​, the total demand by time ttt is SN(t)S_{N(t)}SN(t)​.

The replenishment lead-time LLL is constant and D(L)D(L)D(L), the demand over a lead-time, has law DDD. A holding cost h>0h > 0h>0 and a shortage cost b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0 per unit and time unit are charged. There are no ordering costs, but all orders must be multiples of a given batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 and can only be triggered by customer demands. A policy is therefore any rule mmm that decides at each demand epoch how many batches to order; with initial position y0y_0y0​ the inventory position evolves as yn+1=yn−Dn+mnQy_{n+1} = y_n - D_n + m_nQyn+1​=yn​−Dn​+mn​Q (Eq. 6.22), and yt=yN(t)y_t = y_{N(t)}yt​=yN(t)​.

The standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 gives the cost rate at time t+Lt + Lt+L as

g(yt),g(k)=−b1(k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j],g(y_t), \qquad g(k) = -b_1(k - \mu') + (h+b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j],g(yt​),g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j],

the expected holding-plus-shortage cost rate of an inventory level k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L) (Eq. 6.20), which is convex in kkk with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞. The band cost is gˉ(y)=∑j=1Qg(y+j)\bar g(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{Q} g(y+j)gˉ​(y)=∑j=1Q​g(y+j) and RRR denotes an integer minimizing gˉ\bar ggˉ​. The (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy orders, as soon as the position is at or below RRR, the smallest number of batches that brings it above RRR; its position lives in the band {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} from the first order on. The performance measure is the long-run average cost rate 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt as T→∞T \to \inftyT→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal — Proposition 6.1

Almost surely, (1) for every policy mmm and every y0y_0y0​,

lim inf⁡T→∞1T∫0Tg(yt−Lm) dt  ≥  gˉ(R)Q,\liminf_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{m}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\ge\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q},T→∞liminf​T1​∫0T​g(yt−Lm​)dt≥Qgˉ​(R)​,

and (2) the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy attains it:

1T∫0Tg(yt−L(R,Q)) dt  ⟶  gˉ(R)Q.\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{(R,Q)}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\longrightarrow\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q}.T1​∫0T​g(yt−L(R,Q)​)dt⟶Qgˉ​(R)​.

Supporting targets

Lemma 6.1, that x↦g(z+xQ)x \mapsto g(z + xQ)x↦g(z+xQ) is convex and minimized at the representative of zzz in the band; the closed form of the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) position, y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ until the first order and the band representative of y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ afterwards; the uniform occupation of the band by the reduced process yt′y_t'yt′​, the book's "the steady state distribution can be shown to be uniform", and its consequence that the long-run average of g(yt′)g(y_t')g(yt′​) is gˉ(R)/Q\bar g(R)/Qgˉ​(R)/Q; Proposition 5.1 in the same ergodic form for the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy; and the two halves of the goal as separate statements.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 6.1 is what licenses the two-parameter policies on which the rest of the book's single-echelon theory is built, and it does so for the practically important case of batch ordering (pallets, containers, production lots). Its proof also explains why the policy works: the only quantity a policy controls is the residue class of the inventory position modulo QQQ, which no policy can influence, and the position within that class, which the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy always sets to the cheapest possible value. The book extends the same reasoning to other cost structures and to periodic review.

Formalizing it. The proposition is a theorem about the class of all policies, and the book's proof is pathwise: Lemma 6.1 compares any policy with the reduced process instant by instant, and an ergodic statement about the reduced process does the rest. Formalizing it therefore forces the policy class, the demand process and the long-run average to be written down exactly, which the book never does. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The pointwise comparison is elementary once Lemma 6.1 is available, and Lemma 6.1 is discrete convexity. The difficulty is entirely in the ergodic statement: that the reduced position yt′=y_t' = yt′​= (the band representative of y0−SN(t)y_0 - S_{N(t)}y0​−SN(t)​) spends a fraction 1/Q1/Q1/Q of the time at each point of the band, almost surely. In discrete time this is the convergence of occupation frequencies for an irreducible random walk on Z/QZ\mathbb{Z}/Q\mathbb{Z}Z/QZ with step law fff modulo QQQ, where irreducibility is exactly the aperiodicity assumption on fff, and the book's double-stochasticity argument (Eq. 5.33-5.34) identifies the uniform law as stationary. Passing to continuous time adds the exponential holding times: the time average is the arrival average weighted by i.i.d. holding times independent of the walk, which a strong law of large numbers turns back into the discrete statement. Mathlib has the strong law and the exponential law but no ergodic theorem for finite Markov chains, so that is the groundwork a solver must build. The naive route through the stationary distribution of the embedded chain at demand epochs is not enough on its own: for pure Poisson demand that chain is periodic, and the book itself notes it.

Formalization scope

A CompoundPoissonDemand on a probability space packages the rate, the size law with f0=0f_0 = 0f0​=0 and the aperiodicity condition, and two sequences of random variables, the gaps and the sizes, with their laws (expMeasure lam, the given pmf), independence within each sequence, and independence between the sequences. Arrival times are partial sums of the gaps, count t is the supremum of {n:Tn≤t}\{n : T_n \le t\}{n:Tn​≤t}, and cumDemand n is the partial sum of the sizes. A policy is a function m : ℕ → Ω → ℕ with no measurability requirement; ipPath and ipAt are the position after the nnn-th demand and at time ttt; rqIP and rqOrders are the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy, with a theorem identifying rqOrders as a policy in the general sense. avgCost is 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt with ys=y0y_s = y_0ys​=y0​ for s<0s < 0s<0. The cost function ggg is sPolicyCost from the previous mission, applied to a DiscreteDemand that the hypotheses tie to the process as the law of the demand in (0,L](0, L](0,L].

Conventions: Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1, L≥0L \ge 0L≥0, h,b1>0h, b_1 > 0h,b1​>0; RRR is any minimizer of gˉ\bar ggˉ​ (it exists by the divergence of ggg, proved in the previous mission); y0y_0y0​ is arbitrary. count and the interval integral take junk values on the null set where arrivals do not tend to infinity, which the almost-sure conclusions absorb. "lim inf⁡≥c\liminf \ge climinf≥c" is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, eventually ≥c−ε\ge c - \varepsilon≥c−ε", avoiding a liminf on R\mathbb{R}R that could be junk.

Two readings that would trivialize the goal are excluded: the lower bound is over every rule, not over stationary or measurable ones, and the achievability half is a genuine limit, not a bound. The demand model and the occupation-frequency theorems are reusable for Proposition 10.1 and the batch-ordering models of Sect. 10.5; contributions establishing the ergodic theorem for irreducible chains on a finite cyclic group are welcome and would close most of this mission.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3.1 and 6.2.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Fangruo Chen, Optimal Policies for Multi-Echelon Inventory Problems with Batch Ordering, Operations Research 48(3), 2000, pp. 376-389. DOI 10.1287/opre.48.3.376.12427
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Evan L. Porteus, Foundations of Stochastic Inventory Theory, Stanford University Press, 2002.
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Inventory Control V: Joint Optimization of Reorder Point and Batch QuantityTextbook

Two decisions that are usually taken separately

An (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy has two parameters. Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control chooses the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 chooses the reorder point RRR from a stochastic one with QQQ held fixed; the book presents this two-step practice as an adequate approximation. Section 6.1 asks what is lost by it and shows how to optimize both parameters jointly in one stochastic model. For discrete demand the answer, due to Federgruen and Zheng (1992), is an algorithm of remarkable simplicity: increase QQQ one unit at a time, keep the reorder point optimal along the way by a one-line rule, and stop at the first QQQ for which the cost goes up. The claim that this stopping rule finds the global optimum over all pairs (R,Q)(R, Q)(R,Q) is the capstone of Sect. 6.1.1.1 and the goal of this mission. The same idea is reused in the book for (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies (Sect. 6.1.1.2) and, in continuous form, for normally distributed demand (Sect. 6.1.2).

Setting

An item is controlled by a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy with integral reorder point RRR and batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1. Demand is discrete and stationary; the lead-time demand D(L)D(L)D(L) takes values in the nonnegative integers with probabilities pj=Pr⁡[D(L)=j]p_j = \Pr[D(L) = j]pj​=Pr[D(L)=j] and has a finite mean μ′\mu'μ′. The average demand per unit of time is μ\muμ. Costs are a holding cost hhh and a shortage cost b1b_1b1​, both per unit and time unit, and an ordering cost AAA per batch.

The building block is the cost of an (S−1,S)(S-1,S)(S−1,S) policy that keeps the inventory position at a fixed integer kkk. By the standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 the inventory level a lead-time later is k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L), and the average holding and shortage cost rate is (Eq. 6.3)

g(k)  =  −b1 (k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j].g(k) \;=\; -b_1\,(k - \mu') + (h + b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j].g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j].

Under the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the inventory position is uniformly distributed on {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} (Proposition 5.1), so the total average cost rate is (Eq. 6.4)

C(R,Q)  =  AμQ+1Q∑k=R+1R+Qg(k),C(R, Q) \;=\; \frac{A\mu}{Q} + \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k),C(R,Q)=QAμ​+Q1​k=R+1∑R+Q​g(k),

and C(Q)=min⁡RC(R,Q)C(Q) = \min_R C(R,Q)C(Q)=minR​C(R,Q) (Eq. 6.5), attained at an optimal reorder point R∗(Q)R^{*}(Q)R∗(Q). The ready rate S3(R)=Pr⁡[IL>0]=1Q∑k=R+1R+QPr⁡[D(L)≤k−1]S_3(R) = \Pr[IL > 0] = \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q}\Pr[D(L) \le k-1]S3​(R)=Pr[IL>0]=Q1​∑k=R+1R+Q​Pr[D(L)≤k−1] links the cost to service: raising the reorder point by one unit changes the cost by −b1+(h+b1)S3(R+1)-b_1 + (h + b_1)S_3(R+1)−b1​+(h+b1​)S3​(R+1) (Eq. 5.60).

Formalization targets

Goal — the Federgruen-Zheng stopping rule is optimal

Let Q∗≥1Q^{*} \ge 1Q∗≥1 be the smallest batch quantity with C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗)C(Q^{*}+1) \ge C(Q^{*})C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗) and let R∗R^{*}R∗ be an optimal reorder point for Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. Then

C(R∗,Q∗)  ≤  C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.C(R^{*}, Q^{*}) \;\le\; C(R, Q) \qquad\text{for all } R \in \mathbb{Z},\ Q \ge 1.C(R∗,Q∗)≤C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.

Supporting targets

The increment identity g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1+(h+b1)Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]g(k+1) - g(k) = -b_1 + (h+b_1)\Pr[D(L) \le k]g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1​+(h+b1​)Pr[D(L)≤k]; convexity of ggg on Z\mathbb{Z}Z together with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞; Eq. (5.60) and the convexity of C(⋅,Q)C(\cdot, Q)C(⋅,Q) in RRR; Eq. (5.61), that the largest RRR with S3(R)≤b1/(h+b1)S_3(R) \le b_1/(h+b_1)S3​(R)≤b1​/(h+b1​) is optimal for its QQQ; existence of an optimal RRR for every QQQ; the recursion (6.6)-(6.7), R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)}R^{*}(Q+1) \in \{R^{*}(Q) - 1, R^{*}(Q)\}R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)} chosen by comparing g(R∗(Q))g(R^{*}(Q))g(R∗(Q)) with g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)g(R∗(Q)+Q+1), and C(Q+1)=C(Q)QQ+1+min⁡{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}1Q+1C(Q+1) = C(Q)\frac{Q}{Q+1} + \min\{g(R^{*}(Q)), g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)\}\frac{1}{Q+1}C(Q+1)=C(Q)Q+1Q​+min{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}Q+11​; the equivalence C(Q+1)≥C(Q)  ⟺  min⁡{⋅}≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q) \iff \min\{\cdot\} \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)⟺min{⋅}≥C(Q) and the monotonicity of that minimum in QQQ; and the existence of some QQQ at which the costs stop decreasing.

Significance

The result itself. Joint optimization typically enlarges the batch and lowers the reorder point relative to the two-step procedure, and the book's Example 6.1 puts the resulting cost saving at a few percent. The Federgruen-Zheng procedure makes the exact joint optimum for discrete demand as cheap to compute as the two-step approximation, because each step of the recursion evaluates ggg at two points. It is the exact benchmark against which the book's approximate techniques for normal demand (Sects. 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) are judged, and its structural core, that the optimal window of QQQ consecutive inventory positions grows one neighbour at a time, is the discrete-convexity fact behind the whole of Sect. 6.1.

Formalizing it. The mathematics is settled. What the mission produces is a Lean development in which the steps the book marks "evident" and "obvious" are separate statements: that the recursion preserves optimality, that the marginal cost of enlarging the batch is monotone, and that a minimum over RRR exists at all. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea, to argue that C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is convex in QQQ and stop at its first increase, does not work as stated: C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is a minimum over RRR of a ratio and is not convex in general. What is true, and what the proof uses, is that the marginal cost (Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1) - QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q) is nondecreasing, because it equals the smaller of the two ggg-values adjacent to the optimal window. Establishing the recursion (6.6) is where discrete convexity is needed: one must show that the best window of Q+1Q+1Q+1 consecutive positions is obtained from the best window of QQQ by adding a neighbour, which fails for non-convex ggg. The window sums R↦∑k=R+1R+Qg(k)R \mapsto \sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k)R↦∑k=R+1R+Q​g(k) are themselves convex in RRR with increments g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1)g(R+Q+1) - g(R+1)g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1), and the argument compares a competing window with the optimal one through the end terms. The remaining steps are finite algebra and an induction on QQQ from Q∗Q^{*}Q∗.

Formalization scope

A DiscreteDemand is a function p:N→Rp : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}p:N→R with p≥0p \ge 0p≥0, ∑p=1\sum p = 1∑p=1 and a summable first moment; Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]\Pr[D(L) \le k]Pr[D(L)≤k] is a finite sum over 0≤j≤k0 \le j \le k0≤j≤k, empty for k<0k < 0k<0. The reorder point ranges over Z\mathbb{Z}Z and the batch quantity over N\mathbb{N}N, with Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 assumed in every statement because Lean's division by 000 is 000. Convexity of a function on Z\mathbb{Z}Z is stated as nondecreasing increments, and divergence as Tendsto g (cocompact ℤ) atTop.

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) enters the goal as a function CQ together with the hypothesis that CQ Q is the least value of R↦C(R,Q)R \mapsto C(R, Q)R↦C(R,Q); the stopping index Q∗Q^{*}Q∗ is characterized by the two conditions that define "the smallest QQQ with C(Q+1)≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)", and R∗R^{*}R∗ by optimality at Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. That these objects exist is the content of two separate items, so the goal is not vacuous: a minimum over RRR exists for every QQQ because g→∞g \to \inftyg→∞, and the costs cannot decrease forever because the average of the QQQ smallest values of ggg tends to infinity. The positivity of AAA and μ\muμ is the book's setting and is assumed where it appears.

The uniform inventory position of Proposition 5.1, which needs the book's assumption that not all demands are multiples of an integer larger than one, is taken as given in the cost formula (6.4), as the book does; the proposition itself is the subject of the next mission of this series. The definitions are reusable for the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimization of Sect. 6.1.1.2 and for the multi-echelon batch-ordering results of Sect. 10.5; contributions formalizing the Zheng-Federgruen (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) algorithm on top of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.9.1 and 6.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng and Awi Federgruen, Finding Optimal (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) Policies Is About as Simple as Evaluating a Single Policy, Operations Research 39(4), 1991, pp. 654-665. DOI 10.1287/opre.39.4.654
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
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Inventory Control IV: Reorder Points under Normally Distributed DemandTextbook

Where the reorder point comes from

Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control fixes the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 asks the question that deterministic models cannot answer: with demand random and a replenishment lead-time LLL, when should the next batch be ordered? Under a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the answer is a single number, the reorder point RRR, and Sections 5.3 through 5.9 are one sustained computation of what a given RRR buys. The chapter's own capstone is Eq. (5.67): if backorders are charged at b1b_1b1​ per unit and time unit and stock at hhh, the cost-minimizing reorder point is exactly the one whose fill rate is b1/(h+b1)b_1/(h+b_1)b1​/(h+b1​). The book calls the relationship "even more striking" than its discrete counterpart, and it is used in practice in both directions: a backorder cost prescribes a service level, and a chosen service level reveals the backorder cost a planner is implicitly assuming (Eq. 5.68).

Setting

An order for a fixed batch quantity Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is triggered whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus outstanding orders minus backorders) falls to the reorder point RRR, and it arrives LLL time units later. Demand is continuous and normally distributed; the demand over a lead-time has mean μ′\mu'μ′ and standard deviation σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. Two modelling facts from the book are taken as the definition of the steady state. First (Sect. 5.3.1), the inventory position IPIPIP is uniformly distributed on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the book proves this for compound Poisson demand (Proposition 5.1) and adopts it as an accurate approximation for continuous demand. Second (Sect. 5.3.2, Eq. 5.35), the inventory level a lead-time later is the inventory position now minus the demand in between,

IL(t+L)  =  IP(t)−D(t,t+L),IL(t+L) \;=\; IP(t) - D(t, t+L),IL(t+L)=IP(t)−D(t,t+L),

with the two terms independent. The law of ILILIL is therefore the image of the product of a uniform and a normal law under subtraction, and everything in the chapter is a functional of it:

  • the distribution function F(x)=Pr⁡[IL≤x]F(x) = \Pr[IL \le x]F(x)=Pr[IL≤x] and its density fff;
  • the ready rate S3=Pr⁡[IL>0]S_3 = \Pr[IL > 0]S3​=Pr[IL>0], which for continuous demand equals the fill rate S2S_2S2​, the fraction of demand met from stock on hand;
  • the expected cost rate C(R)=E[h (IL)++b1 (IL)−]C(R) = \mathbb{E}\big[h\,(IL)^{+} + b_1\,(IL)^{-}\big]C(R)=E[h(IL)++b1​(IL)−], holding cost on positive stock and backorder cost on negative stock, Eq. (5.56).

The closed forms run through the standard normal loss function G(x)=∫x∞(v−x)φ(v) dvG(x) = \int_x^\infty (v-x)\varphi(v)\,\mathrm{d}vG(x)=∫x∞​(v−x)φ(v)dv of Eq. (5.40), published with the newsboy mission and reused here, and through its integral, the second loss function H(x)=∫x∞G(v) dvH(x) = \int_x^\infty G(v)\,\mathrm{d}vH(x)=∫x∞​G(v)dv of Eq. (5.64). Both are tabulated in the book's Appendix 2, and both recur in Chapters 6, 9 and 10.

Formalization targets

Goal — Eq. (5.67)

For h,b1,Q,σ′>0h, b_1, Q, \sigma' > 0h,b1​,Q,σ′>0 and any μ′\mu'μ′, a reorder point RRR minimizes CCC over R\mathbb{R}R if and only if

S2(R)  =  S3(R)  =  b1h+b1.S_2(R) \;=\; S_3(R) \;=\; \frac{b_1}{h + b_1}.S2​(R)=S3​(R)=h+b1​b1​​.

The biconditional carries both halves of the book's sentence: the stationary point is the optimum ("the optimal RRR is obtained for dC/dR=0\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = 0dC/dR=0") and the optimum is stationary ("in the optimal solution we have S2=S3=b1/(h+b1)S_2 = S_3 = b_1/(h+b_1)S2​=S3​=b1​/(h+b1​)").

Supporting targets

In the order the chapter builds them: Eq. (5.41), G′=Φ−1G' = \Phi - 1G′=Φ−1, with GGG decreasing and convex; Eq. (5.39), the distribution function by conditioning on the inventory position; Eq. (5.42), its closed form F(x)=σ′Q[G(R−x−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−x−μ′σ′)]F(x) = \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-x-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-x-\mu'}{\sigma'})]F(x)=Qσ′​[G(σ′R−x−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−x−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.43), the density; Eq. (5.52), the fill rate 1−σ′Q[G(R−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−μ′σ′)]1 - \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]1−Qσ′​[G(σ′R−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.55), the expected backorders E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) covered by one batch, and Eq. (5.54), that 1−E(B)/Q1 - \mathbb{E}(B)/Q1−E(B)/Q is the same fill rate; integrability of the cost rate and the mean E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′\mathbb{E}(IL) = R + Q/2 - \mu'E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′; Eq. (5.63), E(IL)−=∫−∞0F\mathbb{E}(IL)^{-} = \int_{-\infty}^0 FE(IL)−=∫−∞0​F; Eq. (5.64), the closed form of HHH and H′=−GH' = -GH′=−G; Eq. (5.65), the cost C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1)σ′2Q[H(R−μ′σ′)−H(R+Q−μ′σ′)]C = h(R + Q/2 - \mu') + (h+b_1)\frac{\sigma'^2}{Q}[H(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - H(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1​)Qσ′2​[H(σ′R−μ′​)−H(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.66), dC/dR=−b1+(h+b1)S2\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = -b_1 + (h+b_1)S_2dC/dR=−b1​+(h+b1​)S2​; and the convexity of CCC in RRR.

Significance

The result itself. The reorder point is the one parameter of an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy that stochastic demand actually decides, and Eq. (5.67) says that deciding it by cost and deciding it by service level are the same decision, with an explicit dictionary between the two. That is why the book can present service-level constraints (Sect. 5.7) and shortage costs (Sect. 5.9) as interchangeable ways of specifying the same thing, and why it warns, immediately after Eq. (5.67), that the equivalence is only valid when QQQ is given: with an ordering cost and a joint optimization of RRR and QQQ it fails, which is Chapter 6's problem.

The intermediate formulas have independent standing. Eq. (5.42) is the single expression from which every service measure of the chapter is computed, and Eq. (5.65) is the cost function that Chapter 6 extends by an ordering cost, Eq. (6.10), and optimizes iteratively. The second loss function HHH returns in the periodic-review fill rate of Eq. (5.86) and in the two-echelon batch-ordering model of Sect. 10.5.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; the value is that the steady-state model becomes an explicit measure, so that formulas the book obtains by manipulating integrals whose existence it never questions become theorems about that measure. Integrability of the cost rate is a target of its own for exactly that reason. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious route is the book's, and it is not the hard part: once FFF is known in closed form, every later identity is calculus on GGG and HHH. The work is upstream of that. The distribution function (5.39) is a conditioning argument over the product measure, a Fubini step in which the inner probability is a Gaussian tail; the density (5.43) is a derivative of a parameter-dependent integral; and Eq. (5.63) exchanges the order of two integrals over an unbounded region, which needs integrability of ILILIL itself. The derivative (5.66) is then obtained from the closed form (5.65), not by differentiating under an expectation, which is what makes the goal reachable: CCC is a smooth function of RRR with an explicitly increasing derivative, and Eq. (5.67) follows from strict convexity together with the fact that the fill rate is a continuous, strictly increasing function of RRR ranging over (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A solver who starts from the expectation and tries to differentiate it directly will meet the kink of x+x^{+}x+ at 000 and a dominated-convergence argument; the integrated route avoids both.

Formalization scope

The inventory position is rqPosition R Q, Lebesgue measure conditioned on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the lead-time demand is newsboyDemand m s, Mathlib's gaussianReal m (s^2).toNNReal from the newsboy mission, with m=μ′m = \mu'm=μ′ and s=σ′s = \sigma's=σ′; and rqLevel R Q m s is the pushforward of their product under (u,d)↦u−d(u, d) \mapsto u - d(u,d)↦u−d. Two lemmas in the definition file record that both are probability measures when Q>0Q > 0Q>0. The distribution function, ready rate and cost are the measure of (−∞,x](-\infty, x](−∞,x], the measure of (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and a Bochner integral against this law.

Every statement assumes Q>0Q > 0Q>0 and σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. At Q=0Q = 0Q=0 the conditioned measure is the zero measure and every integral is 000, so a statement without the hypothesis would be true and empty; at σ′=0\sigma' = 0σ′=0 the demand is a point mass and FFF has jumps. The mean μ′\mu'μ′ is unrestricted, as none of the formulas depends on its sign, and reorder points may be negative, which the book explicitly allows in Sect. 5.8. Costs hhh and b1b_1b1​ are positive in every statement that involves them, and E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) is stated for Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 because its closed form holds there.

Two trivializing readings are ruled out. The cost is not defined as a formula in HHH but as an expectation, so the closed form (5.65) has content; and because Lean's Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, integrability of the cost rate is stated as a theorem rather than assumed, otherwise a zero cost would make every reorder point optimal. The goal quantifies optimality over all real competing reorder points, not a neighbourhood.

A complete development needs Gaussian tail integrals, differentiation of parameter-dependent integrals, Fubini on a product of a bounded interval with the line, and the strict monotonicity of the Gaussian distribution function. The loss functions GGG and HHH and the inventory-level law are reusable across the rest of the series; contributions that establish the same identities for an arbitrary continuous lead-time demand with a finite mean, where Eqs. (5.39), (5.63) and (5.66) hold verbatim, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • George Hadley and Thomson M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1), 1992, pp. 87-103. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • Kaj Rosling, Inventory Cost Rate Functions with Nonlinear Shortage Costs, Operations Research 50(6), 2002, pp. 1007-1017. DOI 10.1287/opre.50.6.1007.346
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Complex Scheduling III: Interval Consistency Tests for the RCPSPTextbook

Motivation

Exact methods for the resource-constrained project scheduling problem — branch-and-bound over activity lists or over start-time assignments, and the lower-bound computations inside them — live or die by how much of the search space can be discarded before it is enumerated. The standard tool is constraint propagation: deducing, from the precedence, resource and time-window data, new precedence relations i→ji\to ji→j that every feasible schedule must satisfy, and tighter time windows for the activities. Brucker and Knust's Section 3.6 (doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23929-8) presents the family of interval consistency tests — input, output, input-or-output and their negations — that constraint-programming schedulers apply at every node of the search, following Carlier and Pinson (An algorithm for solving the job-shop problem, Management Science 35, 1989, doi:10.1287/mnsc.35.2.164) and Baptiste, Le Pape and Nuijten (Constraint-Based Scheduling, Kluwer, 2001, doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1479-4). Every test is an instance of one theorem, Theorem 3.7, and its cumulative-resource analogue, Theorem 3.8. Those two theorems, and the tests as their corollaries, are this mission.

Setting

The instance is the RCPSP of mission I: activities 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1 with integer processing times pip_ipi​, renewable resources kkk with capacities RkR_kRk​ and demands rikr_{ik}rik​, and precedence arcs; a schedule is an integer start-time vector SSS, feasible when it meets the precedences and never exceeds a capacity. Section 3.6 adds three things.

Relations. A conjunction i→ji\to ji→j holds in SSS when Si+pi≤SjS_i+p_i\le S_jSi​+pi​≤Sj​. Two activities are parallel, i∥ji\parallel ji∥j, when they overlap for at least one time unit, and a disjunction i−ji-ji−j is the negation of that: i→ji\to ji→j or j→ij\to ij→i. The instance carries a set CCC of conjunctions and a set DDD of disjunctions that every feasible schedule must satisfy; initially C0C_0C0​ is the precedence relation and D0D_0D0​ the pairs whose combined demand exceeds some capacity, and propagation adds to them.

Disjunctive sets. A set III of at least two activities is disjunctive when any two of its members are related by a disjunction or a conjunction, so no two are ever processed together: the activities of a unit-capacity resource, the jobs of a single machine, the operations of one job in a shop. Its total processing time is P(I)=∑i∈IpiP(I)=\sum_{i\in I}p_iP(I)=∑i∈I​pi​.

Time windows. Each activity has a head rir_iri​ and a deadline did_idi​, and a feasible schedule has ri≤Sir_i\le S_iri​≤Si​ and Si+pi≤diS_i+p_i\le d_iSi​+pi​≤di​. An activity starts first in a set JJJ when no activity of JJJ starts earlier, and ends last when none completes later.

For a cumulative resource kkk the work of activity iii is wi=rikpiw_i=r_{ik}p_iwi​=rik​pi​ and W(J)=∑i∈JwiW(J)=\sum_{i\in J}w_iW(J)=∑i∈J​wi​.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 3.7 (printed p. 169)

Let III be a disjunctive set, J⊆IJ\subseteq IJ⊆I, and J′,J′′J',J''J′,J′′ proper subsets of JJJ with J′∪J′′≠∅J'\cup J''\ne\emptysetJ′∪J′′=∅. If

max⁡ν∈J∖J′, μ∈J∖J′′ν≠μ(dμ−rν)<P(J),\max_{\substack{\nu\in J\setminus J',\ \mu\in J\setminus J''\\ \nu\ne\mu}}\bigl(d_\mu-r_\nu\bigr)<P(J),ν∈J∖J′, μ∈J∖J′′ν=μ​max​(dμ​−rν​)<P(J),

then in every feasible schedule an activity from J′J'J′ starts first in JJJ or an activity from J′′J''J′′ ends last in JJJ.

The first infeasibility test (printed p. 169)

If some nonempty J⊆IJ\subseteq IJ⊆I has max⁡μ∈Jdμ−min⁡ν∈Jrν<P(J)\max_{\mu\in J}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J}r_\nu<P(J)maxμ∈J​dμ​−minν∈J​rν​<P(J), no feasible schedule exists.

The input test (3.123) and the output test (3.124) (printed p. 171)

For Ω⊆I\Omega\subseteq IΩ⊆I nonempty and i∈I∖Ωi\in I\setminus\Omegai∈I∖Ω: if max⁡μ∈Ω∪{i}dμ−min⁡ν∈Ωrν<P(Ω)+pi\max_{\mu\in\Omega\cup\{i\}}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in\Omega}r_\nu<P(\Omega)+p_imaxμ∈Ω∪{i}​dμ​−minν∈Ω​rν​<P(Ω)+pi​ then i→ji\to ji→j for all j∈Ωj\in\Omegaj∈Ω; symmetrically, if max⁡μ∈Ωdμ−min⁡ν∈Ω∪{i}rν<P(Ω)+pi\max_{\mu\in\Omega}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in\Omega\cup\{i\}}r_\nu<P(\Omega)+p_imaxμ∈Ω​dμ​−minν∈Ω∪{i}​rν​<P(Ω)+pi​ then j→ij\to ij→i for all j∈Ωj\in\Omegaj∈Ω.

The input-or-output test (printed p. 170)

For i,j∈J⊆Ii,j\in J\subseteq Ii,j∈J⊆I, ∣J∣≥2|J|\ge 2∣J∣≥2: if max⁡μ∈J∖{j}dμ−min⁡ν∈J∖{i}rν<P(J)\max_{\mu\in J\setminus\{j\}}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J\setminus\{i\}}r_\nu<P(J)maxμ∈J∖{j}​dμ​−minν∈J∖{i}​rν​<P(J) then iii starts first in JJJ or jjj ends last in JJJ, and i→ji\to ji→j when i≠ji\ne ji=j.

Theorem 3.8 (printed p. 186)

For a cumulative resource kkk, J⊆IkJ\subseteq I_kJ⊆Ik​ and proper subsets J′,J′′J',J''J′,J′′ of JJJ: if Rk(max⁡μ∈J∖J′′dμ−min⁡ν∈J∖J′rν)<W(J)R_k\bigl(\max_{\mu\in J\setminus J''}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J\setminus J'}r_\nu\bigr)<W(J)Rk​(maxμ∈J∖J′′​dμ​−minν∈J∖J′​rν​)<W(J) then an activity from J′J'J′ starts first in JJJ or an activity from J′′J''J′′ ends last in JJJ.

Significance

Theorem 3.7 is the single statement behind a whole toolbox. Every interval consistency test in the literature — the input and output tests that fix a new conjunction, the input-or-output test, the negation tests that only shrink a window — is the theorem with a particular choice of J′J'J′ and J′′J''J′′, and the book's Section 3.6.4 derives them one by one. A propagation engine that applies these tests to a fixpoint is what makes branch-and-bound for the job shop and the RCPSP practical; Carlier and Pinson's solution of the 10×10 job-shop instance is the historical demonstration. Theorem 3.8 extends the same reasoning from disjunctive to cumulative resources by replacing "no overlap" with "at most RkR_kRk​ units per time unit", the energetic-reasoning viewpoint that the rest of Section 3.6.5 develops.

The results are elementary and proved; formalizing them fixes, once, what "feasible" means in the presence of the relation sets CCC and DDD and time windows, on top of the RCPSP model of mission I. That layer is reusable: the start-start distance matrix of Section 3.6.2 and the symmetric-triple rules of Section 3.6.3 are statements about the same schedules and the same relations. Nothing here is on the platform or in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Theorem 3.7 is the correct one, and its difficulty is in the bookkeeping. If no activity of J′J'J′ starts first and none of J′′J''J′′ ends last, the first starter is some ν∈J∖J′\nu\in J\setminus J'ν∈J∖J′ and the last finisher some μ∈J∖J′′\mu\in J\setminus J''μ∈J∖J′′, and every activity of JJJ is processed inside [Sν, Sμ+pμ]⊆[rν,dμ][S_\nu,\,S_\mu+p_\mu]\subseteq[r_\nu,d_\mu][Sν​,Sμ​+pμ​]⊆[rν​,dμ​]. Since the activities of a disjunctive set are pairwise non-overlapping, their total length P(J)P(J)P(J) fits in that interval, contradicting (3.121). The formal work is the packing lemma: pairwise disjoint integer intervals inside an interval of length LLL have total length at most LLL, which requires ordering the activities by start time and an induction that Mathlib does not supply.

The subtle point is the restriction ν≠μ\nu\ne\muν=μ in (3.121). The book allows it because "an activity which starts first cannot complete also last" when there are at least two activities with positive durations. The formal statement reads "starts first" and "ends last" with ≤\le≤, which makes the theorem true without a positivity hypothesis: when the restriction empties the index set, J∖J′=J∖J′′={x}J\setminus J'=J\setminus J''=\{x\}J∖J′=J∖J′′={x}, the conclusion holds because xxx cannot be both the unique first starter and the unique last finisher of a disjunctive set with two or more members. A solver should expect to handle that corner separately.

For the tests the extra step is turning "starts first" into a conjunction i→ji\to ji→j, which uses the disjunction between iii and jjj together with positive processing times: with pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 an activity could start at the same instant as iii without violating the disjunction, so the tests carry the positivity hypothesis that Theorem 3.7 itself does not need. Theorem 3.8 replaces the packing lemma by a work-counting lemma: over an interval of length LLL a resource of capacity RkR_kRk​ supplies at most RkLR_kLRk​L units, and every activity of JJJ consumes rikpir_{ik}p_irik​pi​ of them.

Formalization scope

Schedules are integer start-time vectors on Fin n, as in missions I and II, and a feasible schedule of this mission is one that is FeasibleSchedule for the RCPSP instance (mission I), respects the arcs of CCC (RespectsArcs, mission II), satisfies the disjunctions of DDD and lies within the time windows; these four hypotheses are the book's "feasible schedule" in Section 3.6 and are carried on every statement, although the arguments use only the last two, or, for Theorem 3.8, the resource constraint and the windows. The sets CCC and DDD are parameters, not derived from the instance, since propagation enlarges them.

Every inequality "max⁡(⋅)−min⁡(⋅)<P\max(\cdot)-\min(\cdot)<Pmax(⋅)−min(⋅)<P" is stated as the family of inequalities dμ<rν+Pd_\mu<r_\nu+Pdμ​<rν​+P over the same index pairs. This is equivalent, avoids natural-number subtraction, and gives an empty index set the value the convention max⁡∅=−∞\max\emptyset=-\inftymax∅=−∞ would: the hypothesis is then vacuous. "Starts first" and "ends last" use ≤\le≤. Proper-subset hypotheses J′⊂JJ'\subset JJ′⊂J, J′′⊂JJ''\subset JJ′′⊂J are the book's; the first infeasibility test needs JJJ nonempty, and the input-or-output test needs ∣J∣≥2|J|\ge 2∣J∣≥2.

A trivializing reading is ruled out on the disjunctive side by the nonemptiness hypotheses (an empty JJJ would make the infeasibility test's family vacuous and its conclusion false) and on the cumulative side by the observation that Theorem 3.8 with J′=J′′=∅J'=J''=\emptysetJ′=J′′=∅ asserts infeasibility, which is the book's intended reading. Welcome contributions beyond the milestones: the input-negation and output-negation tests, the window-tightening rules of Section 3.6.4, and the SSD-matrix results of Section 3.6.2.

Selected references

  • Peter Brucker and Sigrid Knust, Complex Scheduling, 2nd ed., Springer, 2012, Section 3.6. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23929-8
  • Jacques Carlier and Eric Pinson, An algorithm for solving the job-shop problem, Management Science 35 (1989). doi:10.1287/mnsc.35.2.164
  • Philippe Baptiste, Claude Le Pape and Wim Nuijten, Constraint-Based Scheduling, Kluwer, 2001. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1479-4
  • Ulrich Dorndorf, Erwin Pesch and Toàn Phan-Huy, Constraint propagation techniques for the disjunctive scheduling problem, Artificial Intelligence 122 (2000). doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(00)00040-0
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Scheduling Algorithms V: Preemptive Scheduling on Uniform MachinesTextbook

Motivation

When several processors share a workload, the first question is how long the workload takes if it is spread out as well as possible. If a job may be interrupted and resumed later, possibly on another processor — preemption, the setting of operating systems, of communication links and of any resource that can be time-shared — the answer is a closed formula, and it is one of the oldest results in scheduling: McNaughton's wrap-around rule of 1959 (Scheduling with deadlines and loss functions, Management Science 6, doi:10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1) shows that on identical machines the optimal makespan is the larger of the longest job and the average load. Horvath, Lam and Sethi (A level algorithm for preemptive scheduling, Journal of the ACM 24, 1977, doi:10.1145/321992.321995) extended this to machines of different speeds, and Gonzalez and Sahni (Preemptive scheduling of uniform processor systems, Journal of the ACM 25, 1978, doi:10.1145/322047.322055) gave the fast algorithm with few preemptions. Brucker's Chapter 5 (doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5) presents the level-algorithm version, and this mission formalizes the statements it proves about schedules.

Setting

There are nnn jobs with processing requirements p1,…,pn>0p_1,\dots,p_n>0p1​,…,pn​>0 and mmm uniform machines with speeds s1,…,sm>0s_1,\dots,s_m>0s1​,…,sm​>0: running job iii on machine jjj for a period of length ℓ\ellℓ performs sjℓs_j\ellsj​ℓ units of its requirement, so the whole job would take pi/sjp_i/s_jpi​/sj​ time units there. Identical machines are the case s1=⋯=sm=1s_1=\dots=s_m=1s1​=⋯=sm​=1.

A preemptive schedule is a finite list of pieces, each a job, a machine, a start time and a stop time. It is feasible for the data (s,p)(s,p)(s,p) when every piece lies in [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), no two pieces on the same machine overlap, no two pieces of the same job overlap (a job is on at most one machine at any instant), and every job iii receives total work exactly pip_ipi​ over its pieces. Its makespan Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​ is the largest stop time; the completion time CiC_iCi​ of job iii is the largest stop time of one of its pieces. A schedule is nonpreemptive when every job consists of a single piece.

Following Section 5.1.2 the data are sorted, p1≥⋯≥pnp_1\ge\dots\ge p_np1​≥⋯≥pn​ and s1≥⋯≥sms_1\ge\dots\ge s_ms1​≥⋯≥sm​, with n≥mn\ge mn≥m, and one writes Pj=∑i≤jpiP_j=\sum_{i\le j}p_iPj​=∑i≤j​pi​, Sj=∑i≤jsiS_j=\sum_{i\le j}s_iSj​=∑i≤j​si​. For a set AAA of jobs, h(A)=S∣A∣h(A)=S_{|A|}h(A)=S∣A∣​ if ∣A∣≤m|A|\le m∣A∣≤m and h(A)=Smh(A)=S_mh(A)=Sm​ otherwise: the largest combined speed that ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ jobs can use at one instant.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 5.8 (printed p. 127)

The optimal makespan of Q∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡Q\mid pmtn\mid C_{\max}Q∣pmtn∣Cmax​ is the bound (5.5):

w  =  max⁡{max⁡j=1m−1PjSj, PnSm},w \;=\; \max\Bigl\{\max_{j=1}^{m-1}\frac{P_j}{S_j},\ \frac{P_n}{S_m}\Bigr\} ,w=max{j=1maxm−1​Sj​Pj​​, Sm​Pn​​},

in the sense that some feasible preemptive schedule has makespan exactly www and no feasible preemptive schedule has a smaller makespan.

The lower bound (5.5) (printed p. 125)

Every feasible preemptive schedule has makespan at least www.

P∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡P\mid pmtn\mid C_{\max}P∣pmtn∣Cmax​ (printed p. 108)

On identical machines, LB=max⁡{max⁡ipi, 1m∑ipi}LB=\max\{\max_i p_i,\ \tfrac1m\sum_i p_i\}LB=max{maxi​pi​, m1​∑i​pi​} is a lower bound on the makespan and is attained by some feasible preemptive schedule.

Condition (5.8) (printed p. 129)

The jobs can be scheduled preemptively within [0,T][0,T][0,T] if and only if ∑i∈Api≤T h(A)\sum_{i\in A}p_i\le T\,h(A)∑i∈A​pi​≤Th(A) for every set AAA of jobs.

Theorem 5.7 (printed p. 121)

For P∣pmtn∣∑wiCiP\mid pmtn\mid\sum w_iC_iP∣pmtn∣∑wi​Ci​ with nonnegative weights there is an optimal schedule without preemption.

Significance

Theorem 5.8 turns an optimization over an infinite family of schedules into a formula in the data, and the formula is tight in both directions: each of its terms is a resource bound that some schedule meets exactly. That is what makes preemptive makespan minimization one of the few parallel-machine problems that is solvable at all — its nonpreemptive counterpart P2∥Cmax⁡P2\parallel C_{\max}P2∥Cmax​ is NP-hard (p. 124) — and it is why the preemptive relaxation appears as a bound inside branch-and-bound methods for the nonpreemptive problems.

Condition (5.8) is the form in which the result is reused. It is a Hall-type condition, one inequality per set of jobs, and it is exactly what Section 5.1.2 needs to prove Theorem 5.9, which decides Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​ by a maximum flow in an expanded network. Theorem 5.7 is the complementary statement for the other classical objective: for total weighted completion time preemption buys nothing, so the nonpreemptive solutions of Section 5.1.1 are optimal in the larger class too.

On status: every statement here is classical and proved, and the formalization adds a checked model of preemptive schedules. Mathlib has no scheduling material, and the platform's SchedulingAlgorithms series so far models only single-machine sequences (missions I, II, IV) and two-machine permutation flow shops (mission III), none of which allow a job to be split. The piece-list model of this mission is the first reusable object for preemptive and parallel-machine problems, and the later sections of Chapter 5 — Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​, P∣pmtn∣Lmax⁡P\mid pmtn\mid L_{\max}P∣pmtn∣Lmax​ — are stated in it.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea for the goal is to run McNaughton's rule with the speeds ignored. It fails on uniform machines: filling machines one after another does not respect the constraint that a long job on a slow machine is not done when a short job on a fast one is. The correct idea is the level algorithm — always process the jobs of highest remaining requirement on the fastest free machines, sharing machines among tied jobs — and the difficulty is in the analysis rather than the idea. The proof of Theorem 5.8 has to show that the schedule it produces ends exactly at one of the terms of www: either no machine idles before the end, giving Pn/SmP_n/S_mPn​/Sm​, or the machines finish in speed order with the first jjj jobs busy from time 000, giving Pj/SjP_j/S_jPj​/Sj​. Making that case analysis rigorous requires tracking that the order of remaining requirements is preserved over time (the invariant (5.6)) and that ties are broken consistently.

A second, formal difficulty is that the level algorithm's output is defined by continuous-time events (the next completion, the next time two levels coincide), so producing an explicit finite list of pieces with the required properties is itself a construction. Any proof must build a concrete schedule; "the infimum of makespans equals www" is not the goal.

For the lower bound the trap is the opposite: it is tempting to argue only with total capacity SmTS_mTSm​T, which gives Pn/SmP_n/S_mPn​/Sm​ but not Pj/SjP_j/S_jPj​/Sj​. The latter needs the rule that a job is on at most one machine at a time, so that jjj jobs run at combined speed at most SjS_jSj​; a model that let a job be split across machines simultaneously would make the theorem false, and the definition of feasibility rules it out explicitly.

Formalization scope

A schedule is a List of Pieces over jobs Fin n and machines Fin m, with real start and stop times. Feasibility is the three-part condition of the Setting, disjointness of two pieces meaning one stops no later than the other starts. Work is measured with the machine's speed, so the same definitions cover identical machines as the constant speed 111. Pieces of length zero and unsorted lists are allowed; both are harmless.

The sorted orders are hypotheses Antitone p and Antitone s, the speeds and requirements are positive, m≥1m\ge 1m≥1 and, where the book assumes it, n≥mn\ge mn≥m. The book's normalization s1=1s_1=1s1​=1 is not assumed: every statement here is invariant under scaling all speeds, and the book uses the normalization only for a running-time estimate. The bound www is defined as the maximum of an explicit nonempty finite set, so no supremum of an empty or unbounded set occurs; LBLBLB takes a proof that n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 so that max⁡ipi\max_i p_imaxi​pi​ is meaningful.

Two things are deliberately not stated. The level algorithm itself is not transcribed: Theorem 5.8 is stated as the existence of an optimal schedule of makespan www, which is what its proof establishes. And Theorem 5.9, the flow characterization for Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​, is left for a later mission, since it needs release times and the expanded network on top of this model.

A trivializing reading is excluded by the existential form of the goal and of Theorem 5.7: each asserts that an optimal schedule exists, not merely that any optimal schedule has a property. A proof of the goal has to construct a schedule; a proof of Theorem 5.7 has to construct a nonpreemptive one that beats every preemptive competitor. Contributions welcome beyond the milestones: a general lemma that a feasible schedule can be normalized to sorted, positive-length pieces, and a proof that (5.8) for the sets {1,…,j}\{1,\dots,j\}{1,…,j} is equivalent to w≤Tw\le Tw≤T.

Selected references

  • Peter Brucker, Scheduling Algorithms, 5th ed., Springer, 2007, Chapter 5. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5
  • Robert McNaughton, Scheduling with deadlines and loss functions, Management Science 6 (1959). doi:10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1
  • E. C. Horvath, S. Lam and R. Sethi, A level algorithm for preemptive scheduling, Journal of the ACM 24 (1977). doi:10.1145/321992.321995
  • Teofilo Gonzalez and Sartaj Sahni, Preemptive scheduling of uniform processor systems, Journal of the ACM 25 (1978). doi:10.1145/322047.322055
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach IX: General Packing-Covering ConstraintsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 4's framework (formalized in this series' 04-framework mission) solves the online covering-packing pair only in the restricted setting a(i,j) ∈ {0,1}, b(j) = 1 — every constraint is an unweighted "cover me with at least one of these" condition. Chapter 14 delivers the promise made at the very start of the survey (p. 115: "we show how to extend the ideas we present here to handle general (non-negative) values of a(i,j) and b(j)"): fully general non-negative coefficients, normalized so every constraint reads ∑_i a(i,j)x(i) ≥ 1. This mission formalizes both halves of that generalization — the packing scheme (Theorem 14.1, with a matching lower bound, Lemma 14.2, showing an extra additive term is unavoidable) and the covering scheme (Theorem 14.3, the goal).

Setting

Fix a finite set I of primal (covering) variables with positive costs c(i), and a finite set J of dual (packing) variables/covering constraints, with a(i,j) ≥ 0 for every pair (Fig. 14.1). The packing scheme (Section 14.1) is parameterized by a target competitive ratio B > 0: on each new dual variable y(j) and its coefficients a(i,j), the algorithm increases y(j) continuously and each x(i) by an explicit exponential increment function until the new primal constraint is satisfied, achieving B-competitiveness for the packing objective at the cost of an additive O(log(a_i(max)/a_i(min))) term (beyond the multiplicative O(log n)) in how much each dual constraint can be violated — qualitatively different from Chapter 4's purely multiplicative O(log d) bound, and Lemma 14.2 proves this additive term cannot be removed. The covering scheme (Section 14.2) instead works in phases: each phase assumes a doubling lower bound α(r) on OPT and "forgets" its primal/dual variables once the primal cost exceeds α(r), restarting with α(r+1) = 2α(r) — a structurally different mechanism from Chapter 4's direct algorithms, needed because with general coefficients a single monotone run can no longer be analyzed via one potential function alone.

Formalization targets

Theorem 14.3 (the goal, p. 253): for any B > 0, the phase-based covering scheme (each constraint normalized to ∑_i a(i,j)x(i) ≥ 1/B) is competitive with an explicit ratio 8 log(2n)/B, taken directly from the proof's own final displayed chain, 2α(r) ≤ 4α(r-1) ≤ (8 log(2n)/B) Y(r-1) ≤ (8 log(2n)/B) OPT (p. 253-254) — the theorem's own statement only gives O(log n/B), so this explicit constant is this mission's own instantiation from the proof, not an independent derivation and not a transcription of a displayed theorem-level formula (flagged, per this series' explicit-constants rule).

Two milestones, in attack order:

  • Theorem 14.1 (p. 249): the packing scheme is B-competitive, and violates each dual constraint by at most the book's own exact displayed bound c(i)·2log(1 + n·a_i(max)/a_i(min))/B (Claim (3) — the exact constant the proof establishes, not the theorem headline's O(·) simplification).
  • Lemma 14.2 (p. 251): a matching lower bound, on the book's own explicit single-constraint instance, showing the additive log(a(max)/a(min)) term of Theorem 14.1 is necessary.

Significance

This chapter is the survey's demonstration that the primal-dual framework's core technique survives its most natural generalization, at the price of an explicit extra term the chapter also proves is unavoidable — a tight characterization, not merely an upper bound. Every other online covering/packing chapter in this survey (set cover, routing, ad-auctions, bounded allocation) is technically a special case of this chapter's general model; Chapter 4's restricted framework is the pedagogical entry point, and this chapter is where the general theory actually lives. No formal development of the general packing-covering problem was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20; this mission is the first.

Difficulty

Two distinct obstacles, mirroring this chapter's own two schemes. First, Theorem 14.1's proof (p. 249-251) establishes its per-round primal/dual derivative inequality via a direct calculus argument (differentiating the explicit increment function) — formalized here as a hypothesis (hX_le_BY) standing for that calculation, not reproduced, since the goal is a faithful statement of the resulting competitive ratio, and the increment function's own exponential form is transcribed in the theorem's docstring but the differentiation itself is out of scope. Second, Theorem 14.3's phase-based mechanism is genuinely stateful across an unbounded number of phases (each phase resets its own primal/dual variables while the LP's actual variables retain the running maximum) — modeling this process explicitly is comparable in complexity to Chapter 13's level-based algorithm, and this mission makes the same scope choice: the mechanism's output (the resulting cost/profit relationship, hX_le_ratio) is taken as a hypothesis standing for the book's own Claims (1) and (3) combined, rather than constructed phase-by-phase.

Formalization scope

GeneralInstance I J bundles Fig. 14.1's fully general LP data (a(i,j) ≥ 0, c(i) > 0) — restated locally (not importing 04-framework's CoveringInstance) per this series' rule against cross-draft imports, even though this chapter is the direct generalization of that one. aMax/aMin are the per-variable (not per-instance) maximum and minimum-non-zero coefficients Theorem 14.1 needs. harmonicNum is restated locally (duplicated from 13-bounded-allocation's own definition, for the same no-cross-draft-import reason). Both goal-adjacent theorems use this series' weak-duality "competitive against any feasible comparison solution" pattern (04-framework, reused as a convention, not re-derived): Theorem 14.1 against any feasible packing comparison (matching that it concerns the packing side), Theorem 14.3 against any feasible covering comparison (matching the covering side). Welcome contributions: completing the three sorrys (Theorem 14.1's calculus argument, Theorem 14.3's phase-based mechanism constructed explicitly, and Lemma 14.2's direct summation argument, which is the most tractable of the three to actually prove), and formalizing the sanity check that both schemes reduce to Chapter 4's Algorithm 1/2/3 when a(i,j) ∈ {0,1}, b(j) = 1 (checked by hand in SELF_REVIEW.md, not as a Lean lemma).

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VIII: The Bounded Allocation ProblemTextbook

Motivation

The classical online allocation (AdWords) problem has a tight 1 - 1/e competitive ratio in general, achieved by the water-level algorithm and matched by a lower bound in which the number of buyers interested in each item can be as large as the total number of buyers. Buchbinder and Naor's Chapter 13 observes that in many realistic settings each item's interested-buyer set is much smaller than the total buyer population, and shows this structural fact — an explicit bound d on interested buyers per item — provably beats 1 - 1/e for every finite d, via a deliberately non-water-level algorithm. This mission formalizes that algorithm's competitive ratio and its matching lower bound.

Setting

A seller offers items to n buyers one at a time; buyer i has budget B(i) > 0. Each item j has a fixed price b(j) > 0 and a set S(j) of interested buyers with |S(j)| ≤ d. The fractional LP relaxation (Fig. 13.1) allocates y(i,j) ∈ [0,1] of item j to buyer i, subject to each item being sold at most once in total and each buyer's spending never exceeding budget; the seller's objective is to maximize total revenue ∑_j ∑_{i∈S(j)} b(j)y(i,j). Buyers are partitioned into d+1 levels by the fraction of budget spent so far (level k = spent between k/d and (k+1)/d); on each new item, the allocation algorithm splits it equally among the interested buyers in the lowest non-empty level, moving to the next level once that level's buyers are exhausted or saturated — deliberately not the naive "water-level" rule of splitting among the least-spent buyers, which the book shows cannot beat 1-1/e even for small d. The analysis tracks a piecewise-linear trade-off potential function f_d, built from a geometric sequence, that relates each buyer's level to their contribution to a feasible primal (covering) solution.

Formalization targets

Theorem 13.1 (the goal, p. 240): the allocation algorithm is C(d)-competitive, with the book's own explicit closed form C(d) = 1 - (d-1)/(d(1+1/(d-1))^{d-1}) — strictly better than 1 - 1/e for every finite d, approaching it as d → ∞ (Table 13.1). Formalized via the survey's standard weak-duality pattern (as in 04-framework's Theorem 4.3): given the algorithm's per-item primal/dual cost changes satisfying the book's core inequality ΔX(j) ≤ (1/C(d))ΔY(j) (established there by a potential-function case analysis, not reproduced here), the algorithm's realized profit is C(d)-competitive against any feasible comparison allocation.

Lemma 13.2 (milestone, p. 244): a matching lower bound, C(d) ≤ 1 - (k - kH(d) + ∑_{i=1}^k H(d-i))/d, where H is the harmonic number and k is the largest value with H(d) - H(d-k) ≤ 1.

Significance

This chapter is the survey's demonstration that a structural restriction invisible to the classical 1-1/e lower bound — a bound on demand concentration, not on budgets or prices — can be exploited algorithmically, and the exploiting algorithm is not the naive generalization of the water-level rule but a genuinely different level-based, "who's-behind" allocation rule. No formal development of the bounded allocation problem was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20; this mission is the first.

Difficulty

The chapter's own proof of Theorem 13.1 (p. 241-244) is a page-and-a-half case analysis on how an item's fractional allocation crosses level boundaries, bookkeeping the change in both the primal potential-function value and the dual profit through several sub-cases (an item fully absorbed by one level; an item that empties a level and continues into the next; a level exhausting every interested buyer's budget). This mission formalizes the resulting per-item inequality ΔX(j) ≤ (1/C(d))ΔY(j) as a hypothesis (the theorem's own headline claim, not a case-by-case re-derivation) rather than modeling the stateful, order-dependent level-allocation process itself — the same scope choice this series makes for Chapter 11's randomized rounding process, where the book similarly omits (there, entirely; here, gives but does not ask this mission to reproduce) the underlying case analysis. The potential function f_d and its connection to the algorithm's primal variable (allocX) are formalized precisely, since they are what the goal's proof and Lemma 13.2 both depend on structurally, even though the case analysis linking them to ΔX/ΔY is left as the theorem's sorry.

Formalization scope

AllocationInstance I J bundles the LP data of Fig. 13.1 (S, B, b, d ≥ 2, ∀j, |S(j)|≤d) — restated locally per this series' rule that concurrent drafts cannot import each other, even though the problem is a special case of Chapter 10's ad-auctions model (the two chapters' algorithms differ: Chapter 10's is proportional-to-remaining-budget, this chapter's is level-based). geomSeq/potential transcribe the geometric sequence a_t and the potential function f_d at its level grid points exactly (not extended to non-grid-point reals, since Theorem 13.1's and Lemma 13.2's own statements only need the grid values). allocX connects the potential function to the algorithm's primal variable via each buyer's final level t(i). packingFeasible/packingValue transcribe Fig. 13.1's dual/packing LP with a genuine two-index allocation y : I → J → ℝ (not collapsed to a single per-item variable, unlike Chapter 4's simpler 0/1-coefficient framework). harmonicNum is the ordinary harmonic number. The level-based algorithm's literal stateful per-item update rule (which buyers move between which levels, in what order, within a single item's allocation) is not modeled directly — a documented scope reduction (STATUS.md), not a substitution of the "water-level" algorithm the book explicitly warns against (this mission's theorem13_1 commits to neither algorithm's literal rule, only to the resulting invariant the book's own proof establishes for the level-based one). Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys, and modeling the level-allocation process explicitly enough to derive hinvariant from first principles.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
  • B. Kalyanasundaram, K. Pruhs. An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching. Theoretical Computer Science, 233(1-2):319-325, 2000 (cited as [73], the 1-1/e lower bound).
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach V: Online RoutingTextbook

Motivation

Network routing is one of the paradigmatic applications of the online primal-dual method: requests for bandwidth between a source and target arrive one at a time, and the algorithm must commit bandwidth to paths without knowing future requests. Chapter 4 already gave a simple (3, O(log n))-competitive routing algorithm as an illustration of the general framework. This chapter asks for something qualitatively stronger: a uni-criteria (1, O(log n))-competitive algorithm — one that routes the full optimal bandwidth (no loss on the throughput side at all), paying only in a bounded edge-capacity violation. The chapter shows this exact-throughput guarantee is achievable, and is moreover the key building block for several other routing objectives (fair routing, max-min fairness) built on top of it in Section 9.2 — a (1, O(log n))-competitive algorithm composes into those richer objectives in a way a merely constant-factor-lossy algorithm does not.

Setting

Fix a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E), ∣V∣=n|V|=n∣V∣=n, ∣E∣=m|E|=m∣E∣=m, with integer edge capacities u:E→Nu: E \to \mathbb{N}u:E→N. Routing requests rir_iri​ arrive online, each demanding one unit of bandwidth between a source and target; in the splittable model (this chapter's comparison class), a request's bandwidth may be divided across multiple paths. A (c1,c2)(c_1,c_2)(c1​,c2​)-competitive algorithm routes at least 1/c11/c_11/c1​ of the maximum possible bandwidth while guaranteeing every edge's load (bandwidth allocated divided by capacity) is at most c2c_2c2​. The chapter's generic algorithm (Section 9.1) maintains, for each of O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) copies G0,…,GkG_0,\dots,G_kG0​,…,Gk​ of the graph (copy jjj keeping only edges of capacity at least mjm^jmj, each capped at min⁡(u(e),mj+2)\min(u(e), m^{j+2})min(u(e),mj+2)), a primal-dual pair matching Chapter 4's own routing LP (Fig. 9.1, identical to Fig. 4.2): a request is routed on the shortest path (by the copy's current primal edge-lengths x(e,j)x(e,j)x(e,j)) if that length is below 111, multiplicatively updating x(e,j)x(e,j)x(e,j) on the path's edges; otherwise, subject to a capacity-limited fallback rule, on an arbitrary feasible path.

Formalization targets

Theorem 9.2 (goal, p. 204): the algorithm is (1, O(log n))-competitive with respect to all splittable routing solutions — exact throughput (ratio 1), edge load at most O(log n).

Lemma 9.1 (milestone, p. 202-204): a single copy GjG_jGj​'s own guarantee, which Theorem 9.2's proof composes across all copies: the algorithm accepts at least MMM (the maximum splittable bandwidth achievable in GjG_jGj​, out of the requests introduced to it) and incurs load O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) on every edge of GjG_jGj​.

Significance

This is the survey's demonstration that the online primal-dual method, in its most basic form (a single accumulating dual sum driving a multiplicative primal update, exactly Chapter 4's framework), scales to a genuinely harder bicriterion objective once composed across a carefully constructed family of graph copies — the copies are what let the algorithm avoid ever needing to reason about which of the exponentially many sis_isi​-tit_iti​ paths to consider, reducing routing to a sequence of independent shortest-path computations. The chapter's own Section 9.2 builds a coordinate-wise-competitive fair-routing algorithm directly on top of Theorem 9.2 (not formalized here), and its Notes section places (1,O(log⁡n))(1, O(\log n))(1,O(logn))-competitiveness as "a crucial non-trivial step" the chapter needed before those richer objectives became tractable at all. No prior formalization of online routing, splittable or otherwise, was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (search below).

Difficulty

This is the most algorithmically intricate chapter in this series: the algorithm processes each request against every one of O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) graph copies, each copy running its own instance of the Chapter-4-style primal-dual update, and Theorem 9.2's own proof composes Lemma 9.1's per-copy guarantee via a combinatorial backward induction (partitioning the offline-optimal solution's paths into groups by bottleneck capacity, and showing group by group that the algorithm's cumulative routed bandwidth across the top levels dominates the cumulative optimal bandwidth in those groups) together with a separate geometric argument bounding how many copies any single edge can meaningfully appear in. Fully modeling the copy construction, the request-routing process, and both composition arguments from first principles was judged to exceed this mission's time budget without sacrificing the faithfulness of what does get stated (per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 6). Instead: Lemma 9.1 is formalized via the two facts its own proof isolates as doing the real work — a weak-duality contradiction bound (stepB ≥ M − uMin) and the step-(1c) fallback's own greedy-fill rule for part (i); the multiplicative-update invariant x(e,j) ≤ 2 for part (ii), whose consequence — the exact constant 2 + 6·log₂n — is re-derived from scratch in this mission (the displayed equation this derivation depends on was garbled by the PDF's text extraction; it was confirmed against the actual typeset page image before drafting, see SELF_REVIEW.md). Theorem 9.2 then composes Lemma 9.1 across copies via two explicit, clearly-labeled hypotheses standing for the book's own backward-induction accounting and edge-multiplicity argument, respectively — genuine mathematical content this mission does not re-derive, named honestly as hypotheses rather than silently assumed away or approximated by a weaker statement.

Formalization scope

No shared data structure was introduced: every quantity in both theorems (bandwidths, capacities, loads) is a plain real-number hypothesis-level parameter, since neither theorem's own content needs a reusable instance record (unlike the packing/covering CoveringInstance of 04-framework, this chapter's per-copy quantities are consumed once each, not threaded through a family of algorithms). per_copy_guarantee (Lemma 9.1) takes the weak-duality bound, the step-(1c) fill rule, and the x(e,j)≤2 invariant as hypotheses and derives both parts of the lemma's conclusion by real algebra (a sign case-split for part (i); Real.logb/rpow manipulation for part (ii)). routing_competitive (Theorem 9.2) takes Lemma 9.1's guarantee (universally quantified over the copy index J, a general Fintype) plus the two composition hypotheses described above, and derives the bicriterion conclusion by summation, transitivity, and scaling. This correctly rules out the trivializing formalization in which the composition hypotheses are strengthened to directly assert the theorem's own conclusion (each is a strictly weaker, independently-motivated fact — the backward-induction accounting identity and the geometric edge-multiplicity bound — checked in MODERATION_NOTES.md against this exact failure mode). Reals throughout; Real.logb 2 for log₂. Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys (Lemma 9.1's part (i) is short algebra; part (ii) needs Real.rpow/Real.logb lemmas; Theorem 9.2's is transitivity/summation once its hypotheses are in hand), and — the natural follow-on — formalizing the copy construction and the backward-induction/edge-multiplicity arguments hquota/hload_aggregation currently stand in for, which would upgrade them from hypotheses to theorems in their own right; Section 9.2's coordinate-wise-competitive fair-routing algorithm (Theorem 9.3) and the matching lower bound (Lemma 9.5) are further natural follow-ons.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach IV: Generalized CachingTextbook

Motivation

Caching is a two-level memory-management problem — the fast level (cache) can hold only kkk items, and the algorithm must decide, online, which item to evict whenever the current request misses — that is normally analyzed through the competitive ratio of ad hoc marking or LRU-style rules. Buchbinder and Naor's survey [1] instead recasts weighted caching (non-uniform fetching costs) as an instance of the covering/packing linear program, and derives a fractional online algorithm through the same primal-dual recipe formalized in this series' 04-framework mission (Chapter 4), but for a genuinely different LP shape: the caching LP's right-hand side varies from constraint to constraint, unlike Chapter 4's uniform b(j)=1b(j)=1b(j)=1. This mission covers Sections 7.1-7.2 of Chapter 7, "Generalized Caching": the fractional weighted-caching algorithm and its 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk)-competitive analysis. Sections 7.3-7.4, which further generalize to non-uniform page sizes (not just costs), are out of scope — a natural follow-on mission, not attempted here (see Formalization scope).

Setting

Fix a finite set VVV of primal variables x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j) — one per page ppp and each of its eviction intervals between its jjj-th and (j+1)(j{+}1)(j+1)-th request — with fetching cost c(p,j)=cp≥1c(p,j) = c_p \ge 1c(p,j)=cp​≥1 (the book's standing weighted-caching assumption), and a finite set Time\mathrm{Time}Time of online constraints, one per request time ttt, revealed in the order enumerated by Time\mathrm{Time}Time. The eviction-charged LP formulation (the book charges for evicting pages rather than fetching them, an equivalent reformulation up to an additive constant independent of the request sequence) constrains, at each time ttt: ∑v∈S(t)xv≥rhs(t)\sum_{v \in S(t)} x_v \ge \mathrm{rhs}(t)∑v∈S(t)​xv​≥rhs(t), where S(t)S(t)S(t) is the set of currently-active eviction variables for pages present until ttt (excluding the page just requested) and rhs(t)=∣B(t)∣−k\mathrm{rhs}(t) = |B(t)| - krhs(t)=∣B(t)∣−k is the amount of cache space those pages must collectively vacate. The Lagrangian dual has a variable y(t)y(t)y(t) per request time and a variable z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) per eviction interval, with dual constraint (∑t∣v∈S(t)y(t))−zv≤cv\big(\sum_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y(t)\big) - z_v \le c_v(∑t∣v∈S(t)​y(t))−zv​≤cv​. As in Chapter 4, primal variables may only increase and the algorithm sees each constraint only upon its arrival.

The Fractional Caching algorithm (p. 153-154) sets each x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j) to jump from 000 to 1/k1/k1/k the first time its dual constraint tightens, then increases continuously according to an exponential function of the accumulated dual sum until it saturates at 111 (at which point z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) begins absorbing further dual increase at the same rate, freezing x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j)). This is a genuinely different LP shape from Chapter 4's framework (non-uniform, time-varying right-hand side) reusing the same complementary-slackness design pattern as that chapter's Algorithm 3.

Formalization targets

Theorem 7.1 (the goal, p. 154), given the algorithm's final dual values y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 and primal feasibility:

(∀v, ∑t∣v∈S(t)yt−zv≤cv(1+ln⁡k)) ⟹ (∀x′′ feasible, ∑vcvxv≤2(1+ln⁡k)∑vcvxv′′),\Big(\forall v,\ \textstyle\sum_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y_t - z_v \le c_v(1+\ln k)\Big) \ \Longrightarrow\ \Big(\forall x''\text{ feasible},\ \textstyle\sum_v c_v x_v \le 2(1+\ln k)\sum_v c_v x''_v\Big),(∀v, ∑t∣v∈S(t)​yt​−zv​≤cv​(1+lnk)) ⟹ (∀x′′ feasible, ∑v​cv​xv​≤2(1+lnk)∑v​cv​xv′′​),

i.e. the algorithm is 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk)-competitive, with the constant taken verbatim from the book's own theorem statement (no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) instantiation needed here, unlike most goals in this series). The antecedent is itself Eq. (7.2) (p. 155), formalized as the milestone dual_near_feasible: the algorithm's dual solution, scaled down by 1+ln⁡k1+\ln k1+lnk, is feasible — the book's own intermediate step, derived from the fact that every cachingX value is capped at 111.

Significance

Chapter 7 is the first chapter in this survey to apply the online primal-dual method to an LP whose right-hand side is not uniformly 111 (unlike Chapters 4 and 5), demonstrating the method's reach beyond the "simplified" 0/1-coefficient covering LP that 04-framework formalizes. The 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk) fractional guarantee is also the analytical core of the chapter's randomized rounding result (Theorem 7.3, not part of this mission — see Formalization scope), which converts it into an actual O(log⁡k)O(\log k)O(logk)-competitive randomized algorithm against an adaptive adversary, and of the chapter's further generalization to non-uniform page sizes (Theorem 7.5, Sections 7.3-7.4). No formal development of weighted or generalized caching was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (searches below); the existing KServer.* namespace formalizes a different, unweighted, uniform kkk-server model and shares no substrate with this mission. This mission is the first.

Difficulty

As with 04-framework's Algorithm 3, the central obstacle is characterizing an online process by its final output alone: cachingX is defined as the algorithm's own closed-form update rule (threshold-then-exponential, capped once x(p,j)=1x(p,j)=1x(p,j)=1), evaluated at the run's final accumulated dual values, rather than as an independently-constrained free variable — the latter would let xxx and yyy be chosen to satisfy the conclusion's inequalities directly, trivializing the claim that a specific online algorithm achieves this ratio. Establishing that the capped closed form is faithful (not merely an invented convention) requires the same monotonicity argument 04-framework's alg3X uses, adapted to this chapter's extra z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) term inside the exponent (present here; absent from Chapter 4's Algorithm 3). The proof's own structure — splitting the primal cost into a 0→1/k0\to1/k0→1/k contribution (C1C_1C1​) bounded via complementary slackness and a 1/k→11/k\to11/k→1 contribution (C2C_2C2​) bounded via a derivative/telescoping argument over the continuous accumulation process (Eqs. (7.6)-(7.10), p. 155-157) — is, as in Chapter 4, a genuinely dynamic fact about the trajectory, not encoded as a hypothesis; the mission states the theorem faithfully and leaves the sorry for that argument, per this series' documented-simplification convention.

Formalization scope

CachingInstance V Time bundles S : Time → Finset V, rhs : Time → ℝ (unlike 04-framework's CoveringInstance, whose right-hand side is fixed at 111 throughout), c : V → ℝ with hc_pos : ∀v, 1 ≤ c v (the book's own literal cp ≥ 1, not a strengthening), and k : ℕ with hk_pos : 0 < k. dualSum inst y v := ∑_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y_t, matching 04-framework's pattern. cachingX inst y z v is a noncomputable def: 0 before activation, otherwise min 1 ((1/k) exp((dualSum - z - c v)/c v)), so "the algorithm's output" is genuinely a function of its dual trajectory. Reals throughout; Real.log for the book's natural log ln⁡\lnln. Explicitly out of scope: Section 7.3's rounding apparatus (Theorem 7.3, the map from fractional to randomized-integral cache states) and Section 7.4's non-uniform-page-size generalization (Theorem 7.5) — both are natural follow-on missions building on this one's CachingInstance and cachingX, not attempted here per this chunk's own BRIEF.md, which flags Theorem 7.1 alone as "a complete, self-contained mission goal" when the rounding apparatus proves too heavy for a single pass. Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys, and the Section 7.3-7.4 follow-on mission.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach III: Metrical Task Systems on a Weighted StarTextbook

Motivation

The metrical task system (MTS) problem is one of the earliest and most general online models: a server occupies a state in a metric space, requests arrive with per-state service costs, and the server may change state (paying the metric's transition cost) before serving each request. On a general metric, competitive algorithms are hard to design directly. Chapter 6 shows that on a weighted star metric — the simplest genuinely non-uniform metric, a hub with leaves at varying distances — the online primal-dual framework of Chapter 4 becomes applicable, but only after a change of rules: the chapter defines a new MTS model, in which the server may change state only at the boundary of a "phase" (an interval during which its accumulated service cost reaches the state's own transition charge), and shows this new model is cost-equivalent, up to a constant factor, to the standard model. This equivalence is what licenses recasting the (new-model) problem as a covering linear program with the online primal-dual framework directly applicable — the chapter's actual algorithmic payoff (an unnumbered O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive result, Section 6.2) rests entirely on it.

Setting

Fix a set of leaves VVV (the book's finite {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}) of a weighted star, each leaf iii at distance d′(i)≥0d'(i) \ge 0d′(i)≥0 from the center. The chapter immediately collapses the full star metric to a single per-state transition charge d(i):=2d′(i)d(i) := 2d'(i)d(i):=2d′(i), since on a star every transition i→ji \to ji→j costs at most d′(i)+d′(j)d'(i) + d'(j)d′(i)+d′(j), and charging the doubled source leaf's distance alone (never charging for arriving) upper-bounds every transition cost independent of destination. A standard-model solution is a finite sequence of runs, each specifying a state sis_isi​ occupied and the service cost wi≥0w_i \ge 0wi​≥0 accumulated while in that state, ending with a transition (cost d(si)d(s_i)d(si​)) to the next run's state; its total cost is ∑i(wi+d(si))\sum_i (w_i + d(s_i))∑i​(wi​+d(si​)). A new-model solution is a finite sequence of phases, each specifying a state visited; a phase's cost is exactly d(state)d(\text{state})d(state) regardless of how much service actually occurred during it (a state change is only permitted once a phase's accumulated service reaches the phase's own ddd-value), so the new model's total cost is ∑id(si)\sum_i d(s_i)∑i​d(si​).

Formalization targets

Lemma 6.1 (goal, p. 144): any standard-model solution's runs (s,w)(s, w)(s,w) transform into a new-model solution whose cost is at most 2⋅∑i(wi+d(si))2 \cdot \sum_i (w_i + d(s_i))2⋅∑i​(wi​+d(si​)); in particular OPTn(σˉ)≤2⋅OPTo(σˉ)OPT_n(\bar\sigma) \le 2 \cdot OPT_o(\bar\sigma)OPTn​(σˉ)≤2⋅OPTo​(σˉ).

Lemma 6.2 (milestone, p. 145): any new-model solution's phases (s,w)(s, w)(s,w), with each phase's actual service wi≤d(si)w_i \le d(s_i)wi​≤d(si​), are simultaneously a legal standard-model solution (the same trajectory, recosted) whose standard-model cost is at most 2⋅∑id(si)2 \cdot \sum_i d(s_i)2⋅∑i​d(si​).

Together (stated in the book but not separately numbered, hence not a formalization target here): a ccc-competitive algorithm in the new model implies a 4c4c4c-competitive algorithm in the standard model.

Significance

This is a model-equivalence result, a distinct and recurring pattern in online algorithm design from the competitive-ratio bounds formalized elsewhere in this series: rather than analyzing an algorithm directly, the chapter first shows that solving an easier, more restricted version of the problem (state changes only at phase boundaries) loses only a constant factor, and only then designs an algorithm for the restricted version. The technique generalizes (the chapter's own Notes section places it in the context of Borodin et al.'s original MTS bounds, and of later work on hierarchically well-separated trees for general metrics), but this chapter gives its cleanest, self-contained instance: two short, tight (factor-2 each direction) transformations between two formally distinct online cost models. No prior formalization of metrical task systems on a weighted star, or of this new/standard model equivalence, was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (search below); the platform's existing KServer.* campaign formalizes a different online problem (uniform-metric kkk-server) with a different metric structure and is not adjacent substrate for this chapter's weighted-star MTS model.

Difficulty

The central obstacle is representing "a solution" at a level of abstraction faithful to the book's own proof without committing to a full continuous-time process model (states as functions of a real time variable, phases as recursively-defined stopping times, requests as an explicit arriving sequence) that neither lemma's own proof actually needs. Both proofs work entirely at the granularity of a solution's runs (standard model) or phases (new model) — finite sequences of (state, cost) data — never referencing continuous time except to justify that this decomposition exists. This mission formalizes both lemmas at exactly that granularity: a run/phase sequence indexed by Fin k, with costStandard/costNewPhases the book's own displayed cost formulas. Lemma 6.1's proof genuinely constructs a new object (the delayed-transition solution S′S'S′) and only bounds its cost, never gives S′S'S′ a closed form — formalized here as an existential over a per-segment cost witness w', bounded above and below exactly as the proof's own argument does (with the lower bound d(s i) ≤ w' i serving as the guard against the vacuous witness w' = 0, since without it the existential is trivially satisfiable and asserts nothing). Lemma 6.2's proof, by contrast, reuses the same trajectory in both models with no construction at all, formalized directly as a cost comparison between costStandard and costNewPhases applied to the identical (s, w) data.

Formalization scope

WeightedStar V bundles centerDist : V → ℝ (the book's d′d'd′) with non-negativity; WeightedStar.d is the collapsed charge d(i)=2d′(i)d(i) = 2d'(i)d(i)=2d′(i). costStandard/costNewPhases are literal transcriptions of the two models' displayed cost formulas over a Fin k-indexed run/phase sequence. standard_to_new (Lemma 6.1) is the existential described above; new_to_standard (Lemma 6.2) is the direct cost comparison. Reals throughout; V is left a general Type* (not assumed Fintype) since neither lemma's own statement needs the chapter's finiteness assumption ∣V∣=N|V|=N∣V∣=N — that assumption only matters for the unnumbered O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive claim of Section 6.2, out of scope per BRIEF.md's explicit instruction (no numbered theorem to formalize it against). This correctly rules out the trivializing formalization in which "new-model solution" is left as an unconstrained free variable satisfying only the conclusion's own inequality, or in which the star structure is dropped entirely in favor of an arbitrary metric (the chapter's own reduction to a per-state charge d(i)d(i)d(i), rather than a full metric d:V×V→Rd: V\times V\to\mathbb Rd:V×V→R, is precisely what the star's structure licenses, and is preserved here via WeightedStar.d rather than a bare hypothesis-level function). Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys (Lemma 6.1's needs an explicit construction of S′S'S′ and its per-segment cost bound; Lemma 6.2's is a short termwise algebraic argument), and formalizing the Section 6.2 covering-LP algorithm and its O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive claim as a follow-on mission once it can be stated against a numbered result.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
  • Bansal et al., reference [14] of this chapter's own bibliography (not independently verified by this mission), cited by the book as the source of the weighted-star MTS results this chapter presents ("The results in this chapter are based on the work of Bansal et al. [14]," p. 147).
  • Borodin, Linial, Saks, reference [29] of this chapter's own bibliography (not independently verified by this mission), cited as the paper that originally formulated the standard MTS model and its tight 2N−12N-12N−1 deterministic bound (p. 147).
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Orders VIII: Closure of the Convexity Orders Under Random SumsTextbook

Counting terms and comparing the resulting sums

Chapters III and IV formalize what it means for one random variable to be "more spread out" or "larger and more spread out" than another. Chapter VIII asks a different kind of question: if the number of terms in a sum of i.i.d. random variables is itself random, and one count is larger than another in one of these orders, does the resulting random sum inherit the comparison? This mission formalizes the chapter's own answer — Theorem 8.A.13 — a clean, self-contained closure result that needs only the icx/icv/cx orders from Chunks 03/04 (restated locally) and one nonnegative-integer-valued index, without the heavier parametric-family apparatus (SICX, SICV, SIL, and the stochastic-convexity-of-a-family notions) that occupies most of the rest of the chapter.

The icx/icv/cx orders, restated for this chapter

This chapter restates the univariate increasing convex, increasing concave and convex orders (Chunks 04 and 03's own subjects) locally, since drafts cannot import another mission's definitions: for random variables X,YX,YX,Y, X≤icxYX\le_{icx}YX≤icx​Y [X≤icvYX\le_{icv}YX≤icv​Y] if E[φ(X)]≤E[φ(Y)]E[\varphi(X)]\le E[\varphi(Y)]E[φ(X)]≤E[φ(Y)] for every increasing convex [concave] φ:R→R\varphi:\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}φ:R→R for which the expectations exist, and X≤cxYX\le_{cx}YX≤cx​Y if the same holds for every convex φ\varphiφ (dropping "increasing"). Theorem 8.A.13 applies these same three orders to nonnegative-integer-valued random variables M,NM,NM,N — a special case of the real-valued order (after the coercion N→R\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{R}N→R), not a separate discrete order, per this chapter's own pitfall 1.

Formalization target

Goal: closure of the icx/icv/cx orders under random sums (Theorem 8.A.13)

Let {Yk,k∈N++}\{Y_k, k\in\mathbb{N}_{++}\}{Yk​,k∈N++​} be i.i.d. nonnegative random variables, independent of the two nonnegative discrete random variables MMM and NNN. Then

M≤icx[≤icv] N  ⟹  ∑k=1MYk≤icx[≤icv]∑k=1NYk,M≤cxN  ⟹  ∑k=1MYk≤cx∑k=1NYk.M\le_{icx}[\le_{icv}]\,N \implies \sum_{k=1}^{M}Y_k \le_{icx}[\le_{icv}]\sum_{k=1}^{N}Y_k, \qquad M\le_{cx}N \implies \sum_{k=1}^{M}Y_k \le_{cx}\sum_{k=1}^{N}Y_k.M≤icx​[≤icv​]N⟹k=1∑M​Yk​≤icx​[≤icv​]k=1∑N​Yk​,M≤cx​N⟹k=1∑M​Yk​≤cx​k=1∑N​Yk​.

Comparing the number of terms propagates to a comparison of the resulting random sums. This is "an application of these notions in establishing a stochastic inequality," in the book's own words right before the theorem — the formal content behind Example 8.A.2's claim that a homogeneous Poisson process is SIL, via the semigroup property of Example 8.A.7 (neither a numbered theorem, so neither is drafted as a milestone here — cited as background only, per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 5).

The book's proof defines ψ(n)=E[φ(∑k=1nYk)]\psi(n) = E[\varphi(\sum_{k=1}^n Y_k)]ψ(n)=E[φ(∑k=1n​Yk​)] for an increasing convex [concave] φ\varphiφ and observes (via the unnumbered Example 8.A.4) that ψ\psiψ is itself increasing and convex [concave] in nnn; the icx/icv order on M,NM,NM,N then transfers directly to ψ(M)\psi(M)ψ(M) vs. ψ(N)\psi(N)ψ(N), giving part (a). Part (b) follows from part (a) together with the equal-means fact E[∑k=1MYk]=E[∑k=1NYk]E[\sum_{k=1}^M Y_k]=E[\sum_{k=1}^N Y_k]E[∑k=1M​Yk​]=E[∑k=1N​Yk​] under M≤cxNM\le_{cx}NM≤cx​N (Theorem 4.A.35, a Chapter 4 result not restated in this mission).

Significance

Random sums are the natural model for aggregate risk, total service time, or total demand when the number of contributing terms is itself uncertain — the number of claims in an insurance period, the number of customers served, the number of jobs in a batch. Theorem 8.A.13 is the tool that lets an analyst reduce a comparison of two such aggregates to a comparison of the (often much simpler) counting processes that generate them, without having to reason about the joint distribution of the sums directly. It is also the concrete instance, stripped of the rest of the chapter's parametric-family machinery, of a pattern that recurs throughout the book: an order on an index set (here, the count MMM vs. NNN) transferring through a monotone/convex construction (here, summation) to an order on the resulting random variables — the same shape Chunk 06's Theorem 6.B.16(b) and Chunk 07's Theorem 7.A.9 each illustrate in their own settings.

No platform prior art exists: GET /theorems?q=random+sum, q=compound+distribution, q=Poisson+process, and q=renewal return nothing usable (the last returns only MarkovMixing/CLT-adjacent hits, not classical renewal or compound-sum results, confirmed at triage time and re-checked this session). This mission restates the icx/icv/cx orders and their random-sum closure as a self-contained result, independently drafted since drafts cannot import Chunks 03/04's Lean.

Difficulty

The chief formalization risk is treating M≤icxNM\le_{icx}NM≤icx​N as a separate "discrete" order rather than the same real-valued order applied to N\mathbb{N}N-valued random variables after coercion — this chapter's own pitfall 1. A second risk is drafting ∑k=1MYk\sum_{k=1}^{M}Y_k∑k=1M​Yk​ as a fixed-length sum with MMM substituted in afterward, rather than a genuine random (randomly-stopped) sum where MMM is itself random and independent of the {Yk}\{Y_k\}{Yk​} sequence — this chapter's own pitfall 2; the independence hypothesis has to be carried explicitly, not left as an unstated convention. A third risk, common to every bracketed theorem in this series, is conflating the icx and icv cases of part (a) into a single Or-joined statement rather than two clearly distinguished conjuncts — this chapter's own pitfall 3.

A different kind of risk, specific to this chapter, is scope creep into the parametric-family apparatus (SI, SCX, SICX, SIL, and the "family indexed by θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ" definitions) that occupies most of Chapter 8: as BRIEF.md's own Setup note observes, that apparatus is heavier than the rest of the book (a family, a parameter set, and several bracketed cases per definition), and a trivializing risk specific to it — flagged in this chapter's pitfall 4 — is a family predicate that is vacuously true for a degenerate parametrization (e.g. Θ\ThetaΘ a singleton). This mission avoids that risk entirely by choosing the one clean, self-contained closure theorem in the chapter that needs none of it.

Formalization scope

The icx/icv/cx orders are restated locally (IcxOrder, IcvOrder, ConvexOrder, univariate, real-valued), exactly matching Chunks 04 and 03's own shapes, since drafts cannot import another mission's definitions. M,N:Ω→NM,N:\Omega\to\mathbb{N}M,N:Ω→N are nonnegative-integer-valued; the orders are applied to them via the coercion fun ω => (M ω : ℝ) (resp. N), matching pitfall 1 exactly — no separate discrete-order predicate is introduced. The i.i.d. sequence is drafted as Y : ℕ → Ω → ℝ (indexing Y 0, Y 1, … for the book's Y_1, Y_2, …, a one-step reindexing noted explicitly rather than left implicit), with iIndepFun Y μ for mutual independence and IdentDistrib (Y j) (Y k) μ μ for every j, k for identical distribution, plus 0 ≤ᵐ[μ] Y k for nonnegativity. The random sum itself is ∑ k ∈ Finset.range (M ω), Y k ω — a genuine randomly-stopped sum, per pitfall 2 — and independence of {Yk}\{Y_k\}{Yk​} from (M,N)(M,N)(M,N) jointly is IndepFun (fun ω => (M ω, N ω)) (fun ω k => Y k ω) μ, treating the whole sequence as one ℕ → ℝ-valued random element, stated as an explicit hypothesis rather than an implicit convention. The theorem's three conjuncts (icx, icv, cx) mirror the book's own single Theorem 8.A.13, whose part (a) bundles the icx/icv brackets and whose part (b) states the cx case separately, per pitfall 3.

A trivializing formalization this mission rules out: substituting M into a fixed-length Finset.range n sum after the fact (erasing the random-stopping structure that makes this a random-sum theorem at all) rather than genuinely summing over Finset.range (M ω), and treating M ≤icx N as anything other than the same real-valued order Chunks 03/04 define, applied after coercion. This mission draws on no platform prior art (searches for "random sum", "compound distribution", "Poisson process" and "renewal" as of 2026-09-18 return nothing usable). Unlike every other chapter in this series so far, this mission has no milestone theorems: every other numbered result near the goal in this chapter needs the parametric-family apparatus this mission deliberately avoids, and the un-numbered facts the goal's own proof cites (Example 8.A.4's potential-function monotonicity, Example 8.A.7's semigroup property) cannot be milestones per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 5 — see STATUS.md for the full accounting.

Selected references

  • M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer Series in Statistics, Springer, 2007, Chapter 8 (Stochastic Convexity and Concavity), §8.A.1–8.A.2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
  • This series' Chunk 03 (StochasticOrders.Convex) and Chunk 04 (StochasticOrders.MonotoneConvex), for the univariate convex and increasing convex/concave orders this chapter restates locally.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supermodularity and Complementarity VI: The Core of a Convex GameTextbook

Motivation

A cooperative game with side payments models a set of economic agents who can form coalitions and split the proceeds. The central question is stability: is there a way to split the total payoff among all the players so that no subset of them would do better by breaking away and acting on its own? The set of such stable splits is the core, introduced by Gillies [1959] and studied extensively since (Shapley [1971], Shapley [1953]). Sharkey [1982c] surveys the core's role in the economics of natural monopoly, where "no coalition wants to secede" is exactly the condition that a cost-sharing scheme is defensible against any subgroup of customers.

The core of an arbitrary cooperative game can be empty — there may be no split that satisfies every coalition simultaneously — and even when nonempty it can be hard to exhibit a point in it, since it is cut out by 2n2^n2n linear inequalities. Shapley [1971] identified a large and economically natural class, the convex games (characteristic functions that are supermodular in the coalition), for which the core is always nonempty, and for which an explicit family of core points — one per ordering of the players — can be written down directly. This mission formalizes Shapley's theorem and its later sharpening: this book's central result of Chapter 5, together with a genuine converse (Moulin [1990], sharpening an observation of Sharkey [1982a]) and comparative-statics theorem (Topkis [1987]) showing how these core points move as the underlying economics changes.

Setting

Fix a finite set of players N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. A characteristic function fff assigns a real number f(S)f(S)f(S) to every coalition S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, with f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0; f(S)f(S)f(S) is the net return a coalition SSS could earn on its own. The pair (N,f)(N,f)(N,f) is a cooperative game, and throughout this chapter fff is assumed superadditive: f(S′)+f(S′′)≤f(S′∪S′′)f(S') + f(S'') \le f(S' \cup S'')f(S′)+f(S′′)≤f(S′∪S′′) for disjoint S′,S′′S', S''S′,S′′. A payoff vector y∈RNy \in \mathbb{R}^Ny∈RN is feasible if ∑i∈Nyi=f(N)\sum_{i \in N} y_i = f(N)∑i∈N​yi​=f(N), and acceptable if ∑i∈Syi≥f(S)\sum_{i \in S} y_i \ge f(S)∑i∈S​yi​≥f(S) for every coalition SSS. The core is the set of payoff vectors that are both:

Core(N,f)={y∈RN:∑i∈Nyi=f(N) and f(S)≤∑i∈Syi ∀S⊆N}.\mathrm{Core}(N,f) = \Big\{ y \in \mathbb{R}^N : \sum_{i \in N} y_i = f(N) \text{ and } f(S) \le \sum_{i \in S} y_i \ \forall S \subseteq N \Big\}.Core(N,f)={y∈RN:i∈N∑​yi​=f(N) and f(S)≤i∈S∑​yi​ ∀S⊆N}.

(N,f)(N,f)(N,f) is a convex game if fff is supermodular on the Boolean lattice of coalitions: f(S)+f(S′)≤f(S∪S′)+f(S∩S′)f(S) + f(S') \le f(S \cup S') + f(S \cap S')f(S)+f(S′)≤f(S∪S′)+f(S∩S′) for all S,S′S, S'S,S′. ("Convex" is the game-theory literature's name for this supermodularity property; it has no relation to convexity of sets or of real functions, a collision the book itself flags.) Equivalently, by Theorem 2.6.1/2.6.4, a game is convex exactly when the marginal value f(S∪{i})−f(S)f(S \cup \{i\}) - f(S)f(S∪{i})−f(S) of any player iii to any coalition SSS not containing iii increases as SSS grows — the more players already committed to a project, the more valuable one more player is to it.

Given a permutation π\piπ of NNN, let Sπ(j)={π(1),…,π(j)}S_\pi(j) = \{\pi(1),\dots,\pi(j)\}Sπ​(j)={π(1),…,π(j)}. The greedy algorithm builds the payoff vector yπy^\piyπ by paying each player its marginal contribution when added in the order π\piπ: yπ(j)π=f(Sπ(j))−f(Sπ(j−1))y^\pi_{\pi(j)} = f(S_\pi(j)) - f(S_\pi(j-1))yπ(j)π​=f(Sπ​(j))−f(Sπ​(j−1)). The Shapley value pays player iii the average of yiπy^\pi_iyiπ​ over all n!n!n! permutations π\piπ, equivalently ∑S⊆N∖{i}∣S∣!(n−∣S∣−1)!n!(f(S∪{i})−f(S))\sum_{S \subseteq N\setminus\{i\}} \frac{|S|!(n-|S|-1)!}{n!}(f(S\cup\{i\}) - f(S))∑S⊆N∖{i}​n!∣S∣!(n−∣S∣−1)!​(f(S∪{i})−f(S)).

A core is large if every acceptable payoff vector is dominated, coordinatewise, by one in the core; a subgame (N′,f)(N',f)(N′,f) restricts fff to subsets of N′⊆NN' \subseteq NN′⊆N; a core is totally large if the core of every subgame is large.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 5.2.1 (Shapley [1971])

if (N,f) is a convex game, then for every permutation π, yπ∈Core(N,f);Core(N,f)≠∅;Shapley value∈Core(N,f).\text{if } (N,f) \text{ is a convex game, then for every permutation } \pi,\ y^\pi \in \mathrm{Core}(N,f); \quad \mathrm{Core}(N,f) \ne \emptyset; \quad \text{Shapley value} \in \mathrm{Core}(N,f).if (N,f) is a convex game, then for every permutation π, yπ∈Core(N,f);Core(N,f)=∅;Shapley value∈Core(N,f).

The weakest stable statement here is already the union of these three claims: nonemptiness of the core (b) is a formal consequence of (a) for any single permutation, and (c) is a genuinely separate fact about the average of the yπy^\piyπ's, not implied by (a) and (b) alone.

Milestones

  • Lemma 5.2.1(a): ∑i∈Sπ(j)yiπ=f(Sπ(j))\sum_{i \in S_\pi(j)} y^\pi_i = f(S_\pi(j))∑i∈Sπ​(j)​yiπ​=f(Sπ​(j)) for every j=1,…,nj = 1,\dots,nj=1,…,n — the partial-sum identity the goal's proof of acceptability is built on.
  • Theorem 5.2.6 (Moulin [1990]): a cooperative game is convex if and only if its core is totally large — the converse direction that a large core alone (Theorem 5.2.1's easy corollary) does not give.
  • Theorem 5.2.7(a,b) (Topkis [1987]): if the characteristic function ftf^tft of a family of games has increasing differences in a parameter ttt (a complementary parameter), the greedy payoff vector and the Shapley value both increase in ttt.

Significance

Theorem 5.2.1 is the reason convex games are the tractable case of cooperative game theory: it turns an existence question about 2n2^n2n linear inequalities into an explicit construction (any ordering of the players gives a point in the core), and it identifies the Shapley value — an axiomatically motivated but a priori only feasible payoff rule — as one that always respects every coalition's participation constraint on this class. Theorem 5.2.6 shows this is not an accident of the sufficient condition: total largeness of the core is a genuine characterization of convexity, so "does every subgame's core dominate every acceptable vector" is an equivalent, purely core-theoretic way to test convexity. Theorem 5.2.7 gives the comparative statics that make convex games useful in applied models (Chapter 5's later sections build monopoly, surplus sharing, and procurement games on exactly this apparatus): as a game's characteristic function improves in a complementary way with some parameter (a price, a technology level, a capacity), every player's greedy payoff and Shapley value improve monotonically, with no separate argument needed for each application.

Formalizing this mission produces, for the first time on the platform, machine-checked statements of the core, convex games, the greedy algorithm and the Shapley value — definitions that later missions in this series's own polyhedral-structure sections, and any future cooperative-game-theory mission, can reuse rather than re-derive. All three results already have a complete proof in the literature; this mission's remaining work is formalizing that known argument, not any open mathematics.

Difficulty

The routine first idea — check acceptability for the greedy vector one subset at a time using only the definition of supermodularity — does not directly work: Theorem 5.2.1(a)'s proof needs to compare a subset S′S'S′ against the initial coalitions Sπ(j)S_\pi(j)Sπ​(j) built by the particular permutation π\piπ, splitting S′S'S′ by the first and last time one of its elements appears in π\piπ's order and applying supermodularity along the resulting chain, not a single inequality. Theorem 5.2.6's converse direction is the harder half: showing a totally large core forces supermodularity requires constructing an auxiliary characteristic function g(S)=max⁡S⊆S′⊆N(f(S′)−∑i∈S′yi′′)g(S) = \max_{S \subseteq S' \subseteq N} \big(f(S') - \sum_{i \in S'} y''_i\big)g(S)=maxS⊆S′⊆N​(f(S′)−∑i∈S′​yi′′​) from an arbitrary acceptable vector y′′y''y′′ and showing ggg is itself supermodular (via Theorem 2.6.4 and Theorem 2.7.6, results from the earlier monotone-comparative-statics chapter this mission depends on) before the argument closes.

Formalization scope

Players are modeled as Fin n and a characteristic function as f : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ; a payoff vector is y : Fin n → ℝ, and the core's feasibility and acceptability conditions are stated with respect to Finset.univ (the whole player set) or a coalition U : Finset (Fin n) for a subgame, never approximated by a finite sample of coalitions or by feasibility alone — the acceptability condition genuinely quantifies over every subset. The Shapley value's coefficient is the exact rational weight S.card.factorial * (n - S.card - 1).factorial / n.factorial cast to ℝ, not a placeholder constant. The greedy algorithm's InitialCoalition σ j uses Lean's 0-indexed Equiv.Perm (Fin n) throughout, with the book's 1-indexed Sπ(j)S_\pi(j)Sπ​(j) absorbed into the definition rather than into the index j, so the definition and the goal read the same j consistently. Theorem 5.2.7(c), which needs Theorem 5.2.4's convex-combination-of-extreme-points machinery beyond this section, is out of scope for this mission.

A trivializing formalization would state acceptability only on singleton coalitions, or would let n = 0/an empty player set stand in for the general case; neither is used here — every Core/IsLargeCore statement quantifies over arbitrary subsets, and none of the theorems restrict n.

This mission reuses Supermodularity.Monotonicity.SupermodularOn and Supermodularity.Monotonicity.IncreasingDifferencesOn from this series's chunk II (02-monotonicity) rather than restating supermodularity or increasing differences for coalitions from scratch. InitialCoalition, Core, GreedyPayoff, IsConvexGame, IsLargeCore, IsTotallyLargeCore and ShapleyValue are new to this mission and reusable by any later mission on cooperative games, polymatroids, or the polyhedral structure of the core (Section 5.2.3 of this chapter). Contributions completing the sorrys — Theorem 5.2.1(a)'s chain-splitting argument, Theorem 5.2.6's auxiliary-function construction, and Theorem 5.2.7(a,b)'s direct comparison — are all welcome.

Selected references

  • L. S. Shapley, "Cores of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, 1(1), 1971, 11–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753431
  • L. S. Shapley, "A value for n-person games," in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 1953, 307–317.
  • H. Moulin, "Cores and large cores when population varies," International Journal of Game Theory, 19(3), 1990, 219–232. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766437
  • W. W. Sharkey, "Cooperative games with large cores," International Journal of Game Theory, 11(3-4), 1982, 175–182. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766193
  • D. M. Topkis, "Activity optimization games with complementarity," European Journal of Operational Research, 28(3), 1987, 358–368. https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(87)90232-5
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 2011, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supermodularity and Complementarity III: Assortative Matching under SupermodularityTextbook

Motivation

Which workers end up at which firms, and does higher quality always land at the more productive employer? This is the question of assortative matching: whether an efficient assignment pairs the best workers with the best firms, the second-best with the second-best, and so on down the line. The question has a long history in labor economics. Becker [1973] showed, for the simplest case of two-sided homogeneous firms and a single worker characteristic, that profit maximization under complementarity forces exactly this kind of sorting. Kremer [1993] extended the analysis to firms with many workers of a single type, under a specific Cobb–Douglas production function. What was missing was a general theory: one that covers firms hiring several types of workers simultaneously, firms that differ in efficiency, and labor markets of any degree of tightness, while still deriving sorting from a single primitive economic condition rather than from functional-form assumptions.

Topkis's Chapter 3, §3.2 supplies exactly that theory, as an application of the book's central tool — supermodularity — to the assignment problem. The condition that drives every result in this mission is a single complementarity hypothesis on the firms' profit functions: no concavity, no differentiability, no specific functional form. That a purely order-theoretic hypothesis pins down the qualitative shape of an optimal assignment is the mission's central content, and the platform currently has no lattice-theoretic treatment of matching at all — its one matching result formalizes Gale–Shapley two-sided stable matching by preference, an entirely different mechanism (see Formalization scope below).

Setting

Fix nnn worker types, indexed i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, each with a lattice XiX_iXi​ of available worker qualities, and mmm firms, indexed j=1,…,mj = 1,\dots,mj=1,…,m. A matching assigns to each firm jjj a vector of qualities xj=(x1j,…,xnj)∈∏i=1nXix^j = (x^j_1,\dots,x^j_n) \in \prod_{i=1}^n X_ixj=(x1j​,…,xnj​)∈∏i=1n​Xi​ — one worker of each type hired by that firm (a firm that hires no worker of some type, or several, is accommodated by adjoining an artificial "no worker" element to XiX_iXi​, or by splitting a type into several, as Topkis notes on p. 97; the model itself needs neither device). If firm jjj hires the quality vector xxx, it earns profit f(x,j)∈Rf(x,j) \in \mathbb{R}f(x,j)∈R; the dependence on jjj reflects differences among firms such as technology or management efficiency. A matching is optimal if it maximizes the total profit ∑j=1mf(xj,j)\sum_{j=1}^m f(x^j,j)∑j=1m​f(xj,j) over every matching.

A matching is increasing if x1⪯x2⪯⋯⪯xmx^1 \preceq x^2 \preceq \cdots \preceq x^mx1⪯x2⪯⋯⪯xm — a single chain, firm by firm, under the pointwise order on ∏iXi\prod_i X_i∏i​Xi​ — and ordered if every two of its firm-assignments are comparable (a weaker, only pairwise, condition). The labor market is loose if each firm's hiring problem can be solved by unconstrained maximization over the whole quality space ∏iXi\prod_i X_i∏i​Xi​, without regard to the other firms' decisions, and tight if the supply of each worker type is exactly mmm, so a feasible matching must assign every available worker to exactly one firm.

The hypothesis common to every result is that f(x,j)f(x,j)f(x,j) is supermodular in the joint variable (x,j)(x,j)(x,j) on (∏iXi)×{1,…,m}\bigl(\prod_i X_i\bigr) \times \{1,\dots,m\}(∏i​Xi​)×{1,…,m}: for every (x,j)(x,j)(x,j) and (x′,j′)(x',j')(x′,j′), f(x,j)+f(x′,j′)≤f(x∨x′,j∨j′)+f(x∧x′,j∧j′)f(x,j) + f(x',j') \le f(x\vee x', j\vee j') + f(x\wedge x', j\wedge j')f(x,j)+f(x′,j′)≤f(x∨x′,j∨j′)+f(x∧x′,j∧j′). By Theorem 2.6.1 of Chapter 2, this is equivalent to fff having increasing differences both between any two worker types' qualities (complementarity among the worker types) and between each worker type's quality and the firm index (complementarity between quality and firm efficiency).

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 3.2.3

f supermodular in (x,j) on (∏i=1nXi)×{1,…,m} ⟹ ∃ x increasing and optimal.f \text{ supermodular in } (x,j) \text{ on } \Bigl(\textstyle\prod_{i=1}^n X_i\Bigr)\times\{1,\dots,m\} \ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\, x \text{ increasing and optimal.}f supermodular in (x,j) on (∏i=1n​Xi​)×{1,…,m} ⟹ ∃x increasing and optimal. If, in addition, the labor market is tight, every increasing (tight) matching is optimal.\text{If, in addition, the labor market is tight, every increasing (tight) matching is optimal.}If, in addition, the labor market is tight, every increasing (tight) matching is optimal.

Existence of an increasing optimal matching, with no loose-market hypothesis — the general case, and the harder of this mission's results to formalize, since its proof is a non-constructive lexicographic-minimization argument rather than a direct reduction to per-firm optimization.

Supporting milestones

  • Theorem 3.2.1 (the loose case): under an unconstrained labor market, each firm's set of optimal hiring decisions is increasing in the firm index with respect to the induced set ordering, and an increasing optimal matching exists — proved directly from Chapter 2's monotone-comparative-statics theorems (mission II of this series).
  • Theorem 3.2.4: joint supermodularity in (x,j)(x,j)(x,j) together with strict supermodularity in xxx alone, for each fixed jjj, forces every optimal matching to be ordered.
  • Theorem 3.2.5: joint strict supermodularity in (x,j)(x,j)(x,j) forces every optimal matching to be increasing, the stronger of the two conclusions.

Significance

The result gives a clean, hypothesis-light account of assortative matching: sorting by quality is a structural consequence of complementarity in the profit function, not an artifact of a particular production technology. It generalizes Becker's and Kremer's special cases to arbitrarily many worker types, heterogeneous firms, and any degree of labor-market tightness, identifying supermodularity in (x,j)(x,j)(x,j) as the single condition doing all the work. Formalizing it contributes a genuinely new object to the platform: a firm-quality matching model driven by lattice-theoretic complementarity rather than by preference orderings, together with the four distinct comparative-statics conclusions (loose-market optimality, general existence, orderedness, increasingness) that the strength of the supermodularity hypothesis buys. No prior formalized proof of any of these four theorems exists on the platform or, to the author's knowledge, in any other proof assistant library.

Difficulty

The obvious approach — prove the goal (Theorem 3.2.3) by reducing to the loose case, firm by firm, as in Theorem 3.2.1 — does not work, because the loose-market argument crucially uses that each firm's decision does not constrain any other's; without that, a locally optimal per-firm choice need not combine into a globally optimal matching. Topkis's actual proof is non-constructive: among all optimal matchings, pick one that lexicographically minimizes the "latest" failure of the increasing property (a well-ordering argument over the finite but unbounded set of optimal matchings, not an inequality chase), then show that if it still fails to be increasing, exchanging the two offending firms' assignments via ∨,∧\vee,\wedge∨,∧ strictly increases total profit — contradicting optimality by supermodularity. Formalizing this requires setting up the lexicographic minimization (over pairs (j,i)(j,i)(j,i) ordered by jjj then iii) as a well-founded induction, not merely restating the inequality (3.2.3) at the end of the proof.

Formalization scope

Worker-type quality spaces XiX_iXi​ are modeled as finite, nonempty lattices (Lattice, Fintype, Nonempty); firms are indexed by Fin m. A matching is Fin m → ∀ i, X i with no constraint beyond membership — the general matching problem (3.2.1) imposes no injectivity or supply constraint on its own, a modeling choice Topkis's own text supports (p. 96: the "{xi1,…,xim}⊆Xi\{x^1_i,\dots,x^m_i\}\subseteq X_i{xi1​,…,xim​}⊆Xi​" representation of a matching "may not distinguish between all distinct assignments of workers to firms if the qualities of different workers of any given type are not all distinct, but that ambiguity is inconsequential"). Tightness is instead formalized as an explicit feasibility predicate (a bijection between firms and the mmm available workers of each type) supplied as a hypothesis exactly where a tight-market theorem needs it, never folded into the general optimality predicate.

A trivializing formalization to avoid: collapsing Theorem 3.2.4's "ordered" conclusion and Theorem 3.2.5's "increasing" conclusion into the same statement, or conflating their two distinct supermodularity hypotheses (joint-non-strict-plus-per-firm-strict versus jointly strict) — the mission's four milestones are kept as four genuinely different claims with their own hypotheses, not variations proved once and restated. AGT.stable_matching_exists (Gale–Shapley) is not reused here, despite the shared word "matching": it produces a two-sided, preference-based stable matching with no notion of aggregate profit, a mechanism unrelated to this mission's profit-maximizing, supermodularity-driven assignment.

Reused from earlier missions in this series: the induced set ordering InducedSetOrder (mission I) and joint supermodularity SupermodularOn (mission II), both published platform definitions. Contributions most welcome on the goal theorem's lexicographic-minimization argument, the mission's hardest step.

Selected references

  • G. S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973), 813–846. https://doi.org/10.1086/260084
  • M. Kremer, The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993), 551–575. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118400
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 2011 (orig. 1998). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Stochastic Programming V: The Integer L-Shaped MethodTextbook

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic programs with recourse are already hard to optimize when the recourse problem is a linear program: Chapters 4–6 of this series show how the L-shaped method exploits the recourse function's convexity and polyhedrality to converge finitely by cutting planes. Adding integrality restrictions destroys both properties. Birge and Louveaux open Chapter 7 by naming the consequence directly: "properties of stochastic integer programs are scarce," duality is lost, and the recourse value Q(x)Q(x)Q(x) for even a single first-stage point xxx may itself require solving an integer program from scratch, with no warm start available across scenarios (Birge & Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer 2011, p. 290).

Section 7.2 isolates the one structural feature that still buys finite convergence: first-stage variables restricted to {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}. Laporte and Louveaux's Integer L-shaped method (1993) exploits this by combining a branch-and-bound search over the finitely many binary first-stage points with a new family of optimality cuts, valid wherever a finite lower bound on the recourse value is available. This mission formalizes that method's specification and its finite-convergence guarantee, together with the two propositions its proof rests on.

Setting

A stochastic integer program (SIP) extends a two-stage stochastic linear program with fixed recourse (Chapter 3's Recourse.Instance: first-stage data A,b,cA, b, cA,b,c, fixed recourse matrix WWW, and KKK scenarios of (qk,hk,Tk)(q_k, h_k, T_k)(qk​,hk​,Tk​) with probabilities pkp_kpk​) by two further restrictions:

(SIP)min⁡x∈XcTx+Eξmin⁡y{q(ω)Ty∣W(ω)y=h(ω)−T(ω)x, y∈Y}s.t. Ax=b,(\mathrm{SIP}) \quad \min_{x \in X} c^{\mathsf T}x + \mathbb E_\xi \min_y \{ q(\omega)^{\mathsf T} y \mid W(\omega)y = h(\omega) - T(\omega)x,\ y \in Y\} \quad \text{s.t. } Ax = b,(SIP)x∈Xmin​cTx+Eξ​ymin​{q(ω)Ty∣W(ω)y=h(ω)−T(ω)x, y∈Y}s.t. Ax=b,

where XXX restricts the first stage and YYY restricts the recourse variable — typically requiring integrality of yyy. Section 7.2's standing hypothesis narrows XXX further: every coordinate of xxx is binary. Write Q(x)Q(x)Q(x) for the resulting recourse value (a possibly-infinite expectation, by the same convention as the continuous case) and C(x)C(x)C(x) for the value of the continuous relaxation, obtained by dropping the restriction YYY and keeping only y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 — exactly the recourse value Chapter 3's Recourse.Instance already computes.

The method needs one further hypothesis, Assumption 2: a finite lower bound LLL with L≤min⁡x{Q(x)∣Ax=b, x∈X}L \le \min_x \{Q(x) \mid Ax=b,\ x \in X\}L≤minx​{Q(x)∣Ax=b, x∈X}, not required to be tight. For a subset SSS of the first-stage index set, write δ(x,S)=∑i∈Sxi−∑i∉Sxi\delta(x,S) = \sum_{i \in S} x_i - \sum_{i \notin S} x_iδ(x,S)=∑i∈S​xi​−∑i∈/S​xi​, and let indicator(S)\mathrm{indicator}(S)indicator(S) be the binary point with xi=1x_i = 1xi​=1 for i∈Si \in Si∈S, xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0 otherwise — δ(x,S)\delta(x,S)δ(x,S) measures how far a binary point xxx is from matching SSS exactly, reaching its maximum ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ only at x=indicator(S)x = \mathrm{indicator}(S)x=indicator(S).

Formalization targets

Proposition 1 (continuous cuts survive integrality)

e−ETx≤C(x)  ⟹  e−ETx≤Q(x)e - E^{\mathsf T}x \le C(x) \implies e - E^{\mathsf T}x \le Q(x)e−ETx≤C(x)⟹e−ETx≤Q(x)

Any L-shaped optimality cut valid for the continuous relaxation's value remains valid for the true, integrality-restricted recourse value, since C(x)≤Q(x)C(x) \le Q(x)C(x)≤Q(x) pointwise.

Proposition 3 (a cut from one binary feasible solution)

θ≥(qS−L)(∑i∈Sxi−∑i∉Sxi)−(qS−L)(∣S∣−1)+L\theta \ge (q_S - L)\Bigl(\sum_{i \in S} x_i - \sum_{i \notin S} x_i\Bigr) - (q_S-L)(|S|-1) + Lθ≥(qS​−L)(i∈S∑​xi​−i∈/S∑​xi​)−(qS​−L)(∣S∣−1)+L

is a valid lower bound on Q(x)Q(x)Q(x) for every binary first-stage-feasible xxx, given a binary feasible point indicator(S)\mathrm{indicator}(S)indicator(S) with true recourse value qSq_SqS​ and a lower bound LLL satisfying Assumption 2.

Proposition 4 — the mission's goal

Under Assumption 2, the Integer L-shaped method — the branch-and-bound search over binary first-stage points, tightened at each iteration by a fresh cut of the Proposition 3 form — finitely converges to an optimal solution of an SIP with relatively complete recourse and binary first-stage variables, when one exists. "Finitely" is quantified explicitly: a bound of 2n12^{n_1}2n1​ on the number of iterations, the number of distinct binary first-stage points.

Significance

Proposition 4 is the chapter's payoff: it turns "solve an SIP with binary first-stage variables" from an open-ended search into a procedure with a certified stopping point, at the cost of one additional hypothesis (a computable lower bound LLL) that is often easy to obtain by relaxing the second-stage integrality restriction, as the book's Example 1 illustrates directly. Propositions 1 and 3 are the two soundness facts the method's cuts rest on: Proposition 1 lets an implementation reuse the continuous L-shaped method's own optimality cuts as valid (if weaker) constraints, and Proposition 3 supplies the chapter's genuinely new cut, tailored to the binary structure and strong enough by itself to guarantee termination.

Formalizing this mission fixes, machine-checkably, the exact hypotheses under which the method is correct — in particular, that "binary" is load-bearing (the finiteness bound is literally 2n12^{n_1}2n1​) and that "relatively complete recourse" cannot be dropped, since it is what keeps the recourse value from becoming +∞+\infty+∞ at a feasible point. No result here has, to the mission's knowledge, been formalized elsewhere; the propositions and the method's specification are drafted fresh.

Difficulty

The recourse function QQQ is neither convex nor polyhedral once yyy is integer-restricted, so the argument cannot follow the continuous L-shaped method's proof line for line — that proof leans on QQQ's convexity to certify a cut from finitely many bases. Proposition 3's cut instead argues purely combinatorially: δ(x,S)≤∣S∣\delta(x,S) \le |S|δ(x,S)≤∣S∣ for every binary xxx, with equality forcing x=indicator(S)x = \mathrm{indicator}(S)x=indicator(S), so the cut's right-hand side collapses to the true value qSq_SqS​ exactly there and falls to at most LLL everywhere else — a fact about the finitely many binary points of {0,1}n1\{0,1\}^{n_1}{0,1}n1​, not about QQQ's analytic structure. The natural first idea, adapting a continuous L-shaped cut by simply restricting its domain to binary xxx, fails: nothing forces such a cut to be tight at the current iterate, so it need not exclude a revisited point, and finite convergence (the content Proposition 4 actually asserts, not just "an optimum exists") would be lost.

Formalization scope

The mission represents first-stage points as Fin n1 → ℝ with a Binary predicate (∀ i, x i = 0 ∨ x i = 1) rather than a Fin n1 → Bool type, so that the master problem's feasible region and its binary-restricted subset share one ambient space, matching how the book moves between XXX and its binary points. The second-stage restriction YYY is left an arbitrary Set (Fin n2 → ℝ); taking it to be all of Rn2\mathbb R^{n2}Rn2 recovers exactly Chapter 3's continuous recourse value, without a second definition. Flagged (moderator review, 2026-09-19): Proposition 1's own C(x)C(x)C(x) is the book's Y‾\overline YY-based continuous/LP-relaxation of YYY (Eq. (1.3)-(1.4)), which can retain bounds YYY imposes beyond integrality — the book's own worked example on the same page gives binary Y={0,1}m2Y=\{0,1\}^{m_2}Y={0,1}m2​, so Y‾=[0,e]\overline Y=[0,e]Y=[0,e], not y≥0y\ge0y≥0 alone. This mission's prop1_cuts_valid_for_sip uses the dropped-YYY relaxation (only y≥0y \ge 0y≥0) rather than Y‾\overline YY, which coincides with the book's C(x)C(x)C(x) only when YYY is itself an unbounded integrality restriction; the theorem is a narrower result than the book's Proposition 1 whenever YYY carries additional structure, though it remains true as stated because the dropped-YYY value is unconditionally ≤\le≤ the book's Y‾\overline YY-based C(x)C(x)C(x), which is itself ≤Q(x)\le Q(x)≤Q(x) — see the item's own Formalization Note for the full argument. The existential lower bound LLL of Assumption 2 is kept a bare existentially-quantified real, never sharpened to a formula, matching the book's own "no requirement is made that the bound LLL should be tight."

The Integer L-shaped method's branch-and-bound bookkeeping (Steps 0, 1, 3, 4: pendant-node list management, bound-based fathoming, and branching on a violated integrality restriction) is abstracted into a direct optimization over the binary first-stage feasible set at each iteration, since Proposition 3's cut is proved valid there without appeal to any specific branching order — the same level of abstraction the Chapter 5 mission uses for the continuous L-shaped method's own master-problem bookkeeping. What is retained explicitly is the part the finiteness bound actually depends on: Step 5's recourse-value computation and Step 6's binary choice between fathoming and adding a fresh cut, modeled as a state machine whose state is the finite set of binary points already excluded by a cut. A formalization that dropped this state machine — asserting only "if Assumption 2 and relatively complete recourse hold, an optimal solution exists" — would trivialize the proposition's actual content, the finite bound on the number of steps; this mission keeps that bound as an explicit, checkable part of the goal statement.

Definitions reused from earlier missions in this series: StochasticProg.Recourse.Instance (Chapter 3) for the underlying two-stage recourse data and its continuous-relaxation value. Contributions welcome on strengthening Proposition 4's proof to also derive Proposition 3 as a lemma, and on formalizing the improved cuts of Propositions 5–7 (out of scope here, left for a possible follow-up mission).

Selected references

  • J.R. Birge and F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer 2011, Chapter 7, §7.2. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
  • G. Laporte and F. Louveaux, "The integer L-shaped method for stochastic integer programs with complete recourse," Operations Research Letters 13(3), 1993, 133–142.
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OptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks VIII: Flow Level Models and the Stability of alpha-Fair AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 7 of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014) studies a network with a fixed set of users, and shows that a decentralized rate control converges to a fair allocation. Chapter 8 asks the question one time scale up. Files finish and their flows leave; new files arrive and new flows appear. The number of flows on each route is therefore itself a random process, and the rate allocation — assumed to settle instantly, since rate control runs much faster than files arrive and depart — depends on it.

The question is whether this system is stable: does the number of flows in progress stay bounded, or does it grow without limit? The answer is the best one could hope for. A weighted α\alphaα-fair allocation, the family that contains proportional fairness, TCP fairness, max-min fairness and throughput maximization as special cases, is stable exactly when the offered load at each resource is below that resource's capacity. No more is required — no condition coupling different resources, no dependence on α\alphaα, no dependence on the topology beyond the loads themselves.

Setting

A network has JJJ resources and RRR routes with incidence matrix AAA. Let nrn_rnr​ be the number of flows active on route rrr and xrx_rxr​ the rate given to each of them, so route rrr consumes nrxrn_rx_rnr​xr​ at each resource it uses. Flows arrive on route rrr as a Poisson process of rate νr\nu_rνr​ and carry files that are exponentially distributed with parameter μr\mu_rμr​, so

nr→nr+1 at rate νr,nr→nr−1 at rate μrnrxr(n),n_r\to n_r+1 \text{ at rate } \nu_r, \qquad n_r\to n_r-1 \text{ at rate } \mu_rn_rx_r(n),nr​→nr​+1 at rate νr​,nr​→nr​−1 at rate μr​nr​xr​(n),

and ρr=νr/μr\rho_r=\nu_r/\mu_rρr​=νr​/μr​ is the load on route rrr.

Given weights wr>0w_r>0wr​>0 and α∈(0,∞)\alpha\in(0,\infty)α∈(0,∞), the weighted α\alphaα-fair allocation is the solution of

maximize ∑rwrnrxr1−α1−αsubject to ∑r:j∈rnrxr≤Cj, x≥0,(8.1)\text{maximize } \sum_r w_rn_r\frac{x_r^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} \quad\text{subject to } \sum_{r:j\in r}n_rx_r\le C_j,\ x\ge0, \tag{8.1}maximize r∑​wr​nr​1−αxr1−α​​subject to r:j∈r∑​nr​xr​≤Cj​, x≥0,(8.1)

with ∑rwrnrlog⁡xr\sum_r w_rn_r\log x_r∑r​wr​nr​logxr​ in place of the objective when α=1\alpha=1α=1. Written in the aggregate rates Xr=nrxrX_r=n_rx_rXr​=nr​xr​ this becomes

maximize G(X)=∑rwrnrαXr1−α1−αsubject to ∑r:j∈rXr≤Cj, X≥0.(8.4)\text{maximize } G(X)=\sum_r w_rn_r^{\alpha}\frac{X_r^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} \quad\text{subject to } \sum_{r:j\in r}X_r\le C_j,\ X\ge0. \tag{8.4}maximize G(X)=r∑​wr​nrα​1−αXr1−α​​subject to r:j∈r∑​Xr​≤Cj​, X≥0.(8.4)

The family interpolates between the fairness notions of Chapter 7: α→0\alpha\to0α→0 with w≡1w\equiv1w≡1 maximizes throughput, α=1\alpha=1α=1 is weighted proportional fairness, α=2\alpha=2α=2 with wr=1/Tr2w_r=1/T_r^2wr​=1/Tr2​ is TCP fairness, and α→∞\alpha\to\inftyα→∞ with w≡1w\equiv1w≡1 approaches max-min fairness.

Formalization targets

Goal — the drift inequality behind Theorem 8.2

Suppose the load respects every capacity, ∑r:j∈rρr<Cj\sum_{r:j\in r}\rho_r<C_j∑r:j∈r​ρr​<Cj​ for all jjj. Then there is an ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, depending only on the loads and capacities, such that for every flow count nnn and the α\alphaα-fair aggregate rates X=X(n)X=X(n)X=X(n),

∑rwrρr−αnrα(ρr−Xr)  ≤  −ϵ∑rwrnrαρr1−α.\sum_r w_r\rho_r^{-\alpha}n_r^{\alpha}\bigl(\rho_r-X_r\bigr) \;\le\;-\epsilon\sum_r w_rn_r^{\alpha}\rho_r^{1-\alpha}.r∑​wr​ρr−α​nrα​(ρr​−Xr​)≤−ϵr∑​wr​nrα​ρr1−α​.

The left-hand side is the drift of the Lyapunov function L(n)=∑r(wr/μr)ρr−αnrα+1/(α+1)L(n)=\sum_r(w_r/\mu_r)\rho_r^{-\alpha}n_r^{\alpha+1}/(\alpha+1)L(n)=∑r​(wr​/μr​)ρr−α​nrα+1​/(α+1), by the identity (8.3); the right-hand side is the book's displayed bound. The single ϵ\epsilonϵ is uniform in nnn, which is what a Foster–Lyapunov argument needs, and it is the whole deterministic content of Theorem 8.2's sufficiency half.

Supporting levels

The derivative wrnrαXr−αw_rn_r^{\alpha}X_r^{-\alpha}wr​nrα​Xr−α​ of the objective, in the same form for every α∈(0,∞)\alpha\in(0,\infty)α∈(0,∞) including α=1\alpha=1α=1 (Exercise 8.3); strict concavity of the objective; the characterization of the optimum by xr=(wr/∑j∈rpj)1/αx_r=(w_r/\sum_{j\in r}p_j)^{1/\alpha}xr​=(wr​/∑j∈r​pj​)1/α with primal and dual feasibility and complementary slackness (Exercise 8.4); the tangent-plane inequality (8.5) that concavity gives at the optimum; the drift identity (8.3); and that α=1\alpha=1α=1 recovers weighted proportional fairness, connecting this chapter to Proposition 7.4 of mission VII.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 8.2 says the stability region of an α\alphaα-fair network is the largest it could possibly be — the same region a single isolated resource would have — and that it does not shrink as α\alphaα varies. That is a strong statement about a large design space, and it is not automatic: section 8.4 of the book exhibits rate allocation schemes for which it fails, so the natural condition (8.2) is a property of α\alphaα-fairness and not of rate allocation in general. Since the family covers the fairness notions actually implemented in transport protocols, the theorem is what licenses treating "is the load below capacity?" as the only capacity-planning question at flow level.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; the theorem is due to Bonald and Massoulié (2001), with the fluid-limit machinery from Gromoll and Williams and from Massoulié. What the mission produces is a machine-checked α\alphaα-fair allocation — objective, derivative, concavity, KKT conditions — and the exact drift inequality, on top of the congestion-control layer published in mission VII of this series, whose networkFeasible and linkFlow it reuses. Mathlib has no network utility maximization and no fairness criteria.

Difficulty

The proof is short but the step that makes it work is easy to miss. The drift is ∑rwrnrαρr−α(ρr−Xr)\sum_r w_rn_r^{\alpha}\rho_r^{-\alpha}(\rho_r-X_r)∑r​wr​nrα​ρr−α​(ρr​−Xr​), and there is no reason for this to be negative term by term — some routes are over-served and some under-served. What makes the sum negative is that ρ\rhoρ is itself a feasible point of the same optimization problem (8.4) that XXX solves, and GGG is concave, so the tangent plane at ρ\rhoρ lies above GGG:

G′(U)⋅(U−X)≤G(U)−G(X)≤0for every feasible U.G'(U)\cdot(U-X)\le G(U)-G(X)\le0 \quad\text{for every feasible } U .G′(U)⋅(U−X)≤G(U)−G(X)≤0for every feasible U.

Since G′(U)r=wrnrαUr−αG'(U)_r=w_rn_r^{\alpha}U_r^{-\alpha}G′(U)r​=wr​nrα​Ur−α​, taking U=ρU=\rhoU=ρ gives the drift ≤0\le0≤0 immediately. Strict negativity comes from taking U=(1+ϵ)ρU=(1+\epsilon)\rhoU=(1+ϵ)ρ instead, which is still feasible because (8.2) is a strict inequality, and then dividing through by (1+ϵ)α(1+\epsilon)^{\alpha}(1+ϵ)α. The whole argument is one application of concavity at a cleverly chosen point, and the choice of that point is the content.

The scaling that makes it uniform in nnn is the other thing to notice: ϵ\epsilonϵ depends only on how much slack (8.2) leaves, not on nnn, because nnn enters G′G'G′ only through the common factor nrαn_r^{\alpha}nrα​ that appears on both sides.

Formalization scope

Resources and routes are indexed by finite types, the incidence matrix is real-valued with entries 000 or 111, and the feasible set is mission VII's networkFeasible, so Chapters 7 and 8 agree on what a feasible flow vector is. The objective is stated in the aggregate variables Xr=nrxrX_r=n_rx_rXr​=nr​xr​ of problem (8.4) rather than the per-flow rates of (8.1): they are equivalent, but (8.4) is the form the drift argument uses and the form in which the feasible set does not depend on nnn.

The objective is defined with an explicit case split at α=1\alpha=1α=1, exactly as the book defines it, and the derivative milestone asserts that the resulting derivative has the same form wrnrαXr−αw_rn_r^{\alpha}X_r^{-\alpha}wr​nrα​Xr−α​ in both cases — which is the point of Exercise 8.3. Powers are real exponents, so positivity of the flow counts, weights, loads and rates is hypothesised wherever a power appears.

What is formalized and what is quoted. Theorem 8.2 is a statement about positive recurrence of a Markov process, proved by a Foster–Lyapunov criterion whose remaining hypotheses the book leaves to Exercises 8.6 and D.2. There is no theory of continuous-time Markov chains on a countable state space in Mathlib to state positive recurrence against, so this mission formalizes the deterministic drift inequality that carries the argument and quotes the probabilistic wrapper. The inequality is exactly the one the book displays, including the ϵ\epsilonϵ, and the necessity half — that the process is unstable when (8.2) fails — is a coupling argument and is quoted too.

The goal is not vacuous: the hypotheses are satisfiable, and for a single resource of capacity CCC the α\alphaα-fair optimum is Xr=Cwr1/αnr/∑sws1/αnsX_r=Cw_r^{1/\alpha}n_r/\sum_sw_s^{1/\alpha}n_sXr​=Cwr1/α​nr​/∑s​ws1/α​ns​, for which the inequality holds with ϵ=C/∑rρr−1\epsilon=C/\sum_r\rho_r-1ϵ=C/∑r​ρr​−1 and strictly positive slack.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: the single-resource equilibrium distribution of Exercise 8.1 and the geometric law of the total number of flows; the bounded-drift estimate of Exercise 8.6; the necessity half of Theorem 8.2; the limiting cases α→0\alpha\to0α→0 and α→∞\alpha\to\inftyα→∞; and the instability examples of section 8.4.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 8 (pp. 186–199); problem (8.1), Theorem 8.2, equations (8.2)–(8.5). DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • T. Bonald and L. Massoulié, Impact of fairness on Internet performance, ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 29 (2001), 82–91. DOI 10.1145/384268.378433
  • J. Mo and J. Walrand, Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 8 (2000), 556–567. DOI 10.1109/90.879343
  • L. Massoulié, Structural properties of proportional fairness: stability and insensitivity, Annals of Applied Probability 17 (2007), 809–839. DOI 10.1214/105051607000000014
  • H. C. Gromoll and R. J. Williams, Fluid limits for networks with bandwidth sharing and general document size distributions, Annals of Applied Probability 19 (2009), 243–280. DOI 10.1214/08-AAP541
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Control TheoryOptimization·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks VII: Internet Congestion Control and the Primal AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

When a file is transferred over the Internet, no part of the network decides how fast it should go. The machines inside the network forward packets; when a resource is heavily loaded it drops or marks one; the destination reports that to the source; and the source slows down, then gradually speeds up again until the next signal. This end-to-end cycle of increase and decrease is TCP, and it is the mechanism by which the Internet discovers available capacity and divides it among competing flows.

Chapter 7 of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014) asks what such a scheme converges to. The answer is the chapter's organizing idea: the decentralized dynamics solve a global optimization problem that no participant can see. Each source knows only its own rate and the congestion signals it receives; no machine anywhere holds the link-route incidence matrix; and yet the flow rates converge to the unique maximizer of a concave network utility, and that maximizer is the proportionally fair allocation. This is the same phenomenon as the electrical network of Chapter 4, now with the local rule chosen so that the global objective is the one we want.

Setting

A network has JJJ resources and RRR routes, with link-route incidence matrix AAA: Ajr=1A_{jr}=1Ajr​=1 when route rrr uses resource jjj. Route rrr carries a time-varying flow rate xr(t)>0x_r(t)>0xr​(t)>0, and the load on resource jjj is ∑s:j∈sxs(t)\sum_{s:j\in s}x_s(t)∑s:j∈s​xs​(t).

Each resource jjj generates congestion signals at rate

μj(t)=pj(∑s:j∈sxs(t)),\mu_j(t)=p_j\Bigl(\sum_{s:j\in s}x_s(t)\Bigr),μj​(t)=pj​(s:j∈s∑​xs​(t)),

where pjp_jpj​ is non-negative, continuous, increasing and not identically zero — one may read pj(y)p_j(y)pj​(y) as the probability that a packet is dropped or marked at resource jjj under load yyy. The primal algorithm is the response of the sources:

ddtxr(t)=κr(wr−xr(t)∑j∈rμj(t)),r∈R,(7.5)\frac{d}{dt}x_r(t)=\kappa_r\Bigl(w_r-x_r(t)\sum_{j\in r}\mu_j(t)\Bigr), \qquad r\in\mathcal{R}, \tag{7.5}dtd​xr​(t)=κr​(wr​−xr​(t)j∈r∑​μj​(t)),r∈R,(7.5)

with wr,κr>0w_r,\kappa_r>0wr​,κr​>0: a steady increase proportional to the weight wrw_rwr​, and a decrease proportional to the stream of congestion signals received. Both sums are local — over the resources on route rrr, and over the routes through resource jjj — so nothing in the network needs to know AAA.

The network problem network(A,C;w)\mathrm{network}(A,C;w)network(A,C;w) of section 7.1 is to maximize ∑rwrlog⁡xr\sum_r w_r\log x_r∑r​wr​logxr​ over x≥0x\ge0x≥0 with Ax≤CAx\le CAx≤C, and a feasible xxx is weighted proportionally fair when every feasible yyy satisfies ∑rwr(yr−xr)/xr≤0\sum_r w_r (y_r-x_r)/x_r\le0∑r​wr​(yr​−xr​)/xr​≤0.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 7.6, global stability of the primal algorithm

U(x)=∑rwrlog⁡xr−∑j∫0∑s:j∈sxspj(y) dyU(x)=\sum_{r}w_r\log x_r-\sum_{j}\int_0^{\sum_{s:j\in s}x_s}p_j(y)\,dyU(x)=r∑​wr​logxr​−j∑​∫0∑s:j∈s​xs​​pj​(y)dy

is a Lyapunov function for (7.5): the unique maximizer xˉ\bar xxˉ of UUU over the positive orthant is an equilibrium point, and every trajectory of the primal algorithm converges to it.

The goal asserts both halves of the book's last sentence: that xˉ\bar xxˉ maximizes UUU, and that the trajectory converges to it. It fixes no rate of convergence and no basin restriction beyond starting in the interior, which is what "global" means here.

Supporting levels

Proposition 7.4, that solving network(A,C;w)\mathrm{network}(A,C;w)network(A,C;w) and being weighted proportionally fair are the same condition; strict concavity of UUU on the positive orthant; the partial derivative ∂U/∂xr=wr/xr−∑j∈rpj(⋅)\partial U/\partial x_r=w_r/x_r-\sum_{j\in r}p_j(\cdot)∂U/∂xr​=wr​/xr​−∑j∈r​pj​(⋅) that identifies the maximizer; the equivalence between a stationary point of UUU and an equilibrium of (7.5); and the Lyapunov identity (7.7),

ddtU(x(t))=∑rκrxr(t)(wr−xr(t)∑j∈rpj(⋅))2 ≥0.\frac{d}{dt}U(x(t))=\sum_r\frac{\kappa_r}{x_r(t)}\Bigl(w_r-x_r(t)\sum_{j\in r}p_j(\cdot)\Bigr)^2\ \ge 0 .dtd​U(x(t))=r∑​xr​(t)κr​​(wr​−xr​(t)j∈r∑​pj​(⋅))2 ≥0.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 7.6 is the statement that a decentralized rule solves a centralized problem. Its practical content is that the choice of pjp_jpj​ and wrw_rwr​ determines what is optimized, so a protocol designer who wants a particular notion of fairness can get it by choosing the local rule accordingly — the α\alphaα-fair family of Chapter 8 is exactly this dial. Its theoretical content is the identification of the limit: because UUU's first term is ∑rwrlog⁡xr\sum_r w_r\log x_r∑r​wr​logxr​, the limit is the weighted proportionally fair allocation, which by Proposition 7.4 is the solution of the network problem and, by Remark 7.5, also the Nash bargaining solution and a market-clearing equilibrium. Three quite different notions of "the right allocation" coincide, and a simple end-to-end feedback rule finds it.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; the model and the theorem are from Kelly, Maulloo and Tan (1998). What the mission produces is a machine-checked congestion-control model — the network problem, proportional fairness, the primal dynamics and the Lyapunov function — and a statement of the convergence result in a form later work can cite. Mathlib has no network utility maximization and no congestion control.

Difficulty

The Lyapunov identity is a chain-rule computation and is not the hard part, and neither is ddtU≥0\frac{d}{dt}U\ge0dtd​U≥0. The gap the book flags explicitly is between "UUU increases along trajectories" and "x(t)→xˉx(t)\to\bar xx(t)→xˉ": a strictly increasing Lyapunov function does not by itself force convergence, because the derivative could decay fast enough for the system to stall short of the maximum. The book closes it with a compactness argument — the trajectory is trapped in {x:U(x)≥U(x(0))}\{x: U(x)\ge U(x(0))\}{x:U(x)≥U(x(0))}, which is compact, and on the complement of an ϵ\epsilonϵ-ball around xˉ\bar xxˉ within that set the derivative (7.7) is continuous and therefore bounded away from zero, so only finite time can be spent there. Reproducing that argument is the substance of the goal, and it needs the compactness of the sublevel set, which comes from strict concavity and the growth of −∫0ypj-\int_0^{y}p_j−∫0y​pj​.

A second difficulty is one of representation rather than mathematics. The primal algorithm is an ODE, and a formal statement must say what a trajectory is. Here a trajectory is given as a differentiable function satisfying (7.5) pointwise, with positivity assumed rather than derived; deriving positivity from the dynamics is a separate (true, and welcome) result.

Formalization scope

Resources and routes are indexed by finite types and the incidence matrix is real-valued with entries constrained to 000 or 111, matching the book and the convention of mission IV of this series, whose linkFlow is reused here. Flow vectors live in the positive orthant, stated as ∀ r, 0 < x r: the utility contains log⁡xr\log x_rlogxr​, which has no meaning at xr=0x_r=0xr​=0, and the book's own maximum is interior to the positive orthant.

The network problem's objective is maximized over the intersection of the feasible set with the positive orthant rather than over x≥0x\ge0x≥0, since log⁡0\log 0log0 is not a real number; the fairness condition, by contrast, is quantified over all feasible yyy including boundary points, exactly as the book states it, and the inequality ∑rwr(yr−xr)/xr≤0\sum_r w_r(y_r-x_r)/x_r\le0∑r​wr​(yr​−xr​)/xr​≤0 is meaningful there.

A trajectory is a function of real time satisfying the derivative condition at each t≥0t\ge0t≥0, and staying in the positive orthant is a hypothesis. The equilibrium xˉ\bar xxˉ is given by its stationarity condition wr=xˉr∑j∈rpj(⋅)w_r=\bar x_r\sum_{j\in r}p_j(\cdot)wr​=xˉr​∑j∈r​pj​(⋅) rather than by an existence claim, so the goal is about the trajectory rather than about solving the fixed-point equation; that the stationary point is the maximizer is the first conjunct of the conclusion, so nothing is assumed about it that is not also proved.

The goal cannot be satisfied vacuously: the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable — for instance one resource, one route, p(y)=yp(y)=yp(y)=y, w=κ=1w=\kappa=1w=κ=1, xˉ=1\bar x=1xˉ=1 — and the conclusion is a genuine limit.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: that the positive orthant is invariant under (7.5); uniqueness and existence of the max-min fair allocation; Theorem 7.2 on problem decomposition into user and network problems; Theorem 7.8, the corresponding global stability result for the TCP-like system of section 7.4; and the dual algorithm of section 7.6.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 7 (pp. 151–185); Proposition 7.4, Theorem 7.6, equations (7.4)–(7.7). DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • F. P. Kelly, A. K. Maulloo and D. K. H. Tan, Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability, Journal of the Operational Research Society 49 (1998), 237–252. DOI 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600523
  • F. P. Kelly, Charging and rate control for elastic traffic, European Transactions on Telecommunications 8 (1997), 33–37. DOI 10.1002/ett.4460080106
  • J. F. Nash, The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18 (1950), 155–162. DOI 10.2307/1907266
  • S. H. Low and D. E. Lapsley, Optimization flow control I: basic algorithm and convergence, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 7 (1999), 861–874. DOI 10.1109/90.811451
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks V: Random Access and the Critical Rate of Backoff SchemesTextbook

Motivation

When many stations share one broadcast channel, something has to decide who transmits. A token passed around the stations works when there are few of them and none is silent for long, but it scales badly and breaks if the token is lost. The alternative is to let stations transmit whenever they like and use randomness to recover from the resulting collisions. That is the design of ALOHA, built in the 1970s to connect terminals across the Hawaiian islands, and of Ethernet, and of essentially every contention-based access protocol since.

Chapter 5 of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014) asks what such protocols can achieve, and the answers are largely negative. ALOHA with a fixed retransmission probability jams: with probability one there is a finite random time after which every slot contains a collision and no packet ever succeeds again, for every positive arrival rate. Ethernet's binary exponential backoff does better, but only just: it has a positive critical arrival rate, above which only finitely many packets are ever transmitted, and it is still not positive recurrent at rates where it does transmit infinitely many. The chapter's general statement is the one this mission targets: any backoff slower than exponential jams at every positive arrival rate.

Setting

Time is slotted, and a transmission attempt occupies exactly one slot. New packets arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν\nuν, so the number arriving in a slot is Poisson with mean ν\nuν. A slot in which exactly one station transmits carries its packet successfully; a slot in which two or more transmit is a collision and carries nothing.

In an acknowledgement-based scheme a station learns nothing about the channel except whether its own transmissions succeeded. A packet arriving in slot ttt attempts transmission in slots t+x0,t+x1,…t+x_0, t+x_1, \dotst+x0​,t+x1​,… with 1=x0<x1<⋯1 = x_0 < x_1 < \cdots1=x0​<x1​<⋯, the sequence chosen independently for each packet, and

h(x)=P(x∈X),h(1)=1h(x) = \mathbb{P}(x \in X), \qquad h(1) = 1h(x)=P(x∈X),h(1)=1

is the retransmission function. For ALOHA, h(x)=fh(x) = fh(x)=f for every x>1x > 1x>1; for Ethernet's binary exponential backoff, ∑r≤th(r)∼log⁡2t\sum_{r \le t} h(r) \sim \log_2 t∑r≤t​h(r)∼log2​t.

Now imagine the channel externally jammed from time 000, so that every retransmission actually occurs. The attempts in slot ttt are then Poisson with mean ν∑r=1th(r)\nu\sum_{r=1}^{t}h(r)ν∑r=1t​h(r), and the probability that fewer than two attempts are made in slot ttt is

Pt=(1+ν∑r=1th(r))exp⁡(−ν∑r=1th(r)).P_t=\Bigl(1+\nu\sum_{r=1}^{t}h(r)\Bigr)\exp\Bigl(-\nu\sum_{r=1}^{t}h(r)\Bigr).Pt​=(1+νr=1∑t​h(r))exp(−νr=1∑t​h(r)).

The expected number of such slots is H(ν)=∑t≥1PtH(\nu)=\sum_{t\ge1}P_tH(ν)=∑t≥1​Pt​, which is decreasing in ν\nuν, and the critical rate is

νc=inf⁡{ν:H(ν)<∞}.\nu_c=\inf\{\nu : H(\nu)<\infty\}.νc​=inf{ν:H(ν)<∞}.

Theorem 5.11 of the book says νc\nu_cνc​ deserves its name: below it infinitely many packets are transmitted with probability one, above it only finitely many.

Formalization targets

Goal — condition (5.7): slower-than-exponential backoff has νc=0\nu_c=0νc​=0

1log⁡t∑x=1th(x)⟶∞⟹H(ν)=∑t≥1Pt<∞  for every ν>0.\frac{1}{\log t}\sum_{x=1}^{t}h(x)\longrightarrow\infty \quad\Longrightarrow\quad H(\nu)=\sum_{t\ge1}P_t<\infty \ \text{ for every } \nu>0 .logt1​x=1∑t​h(x)⟶∞⟹H(ν)=t≥1∑​Pt​<∞  for every ν>0.

Since H(ν)<∞H(\nu)<\inftyH(ν)<∞ for every positive ν\nuν, the critical rate is νc=0\nu_c=0νc​=0, and by Theorem 5.11 the expected number of successful transmissions is finite at every positive arrival rate. The goal fixes no constant and no rate: it says only that the dividing line between "jams always" and "has a positive capacity" sits at logarithmic growth of ∑x≤th(x)\sum_{x\le t}h(x)∑x≤t​h(x), which is exponential growth of the backoff.

Supporting levels

The ALOHA drift calculation of section 5.1 and its consequence that the drift is positive once the backlog is large enough; the summability ∑np(n)<∞\sum_n p(n)<\infty∑n​p(n)<∞ that combines with Borel–Cantelli to give Proposition 5.3; the monotonicity of PtP_tPt​ in ν\nuν; the opposite extreme, that a scheme with ∑xh(x)<∞\sum_x h(x)<\infty∑x​h(x)<∞ — one that gives up on a packet after finitely many attempts — has νc=∞\nu_c=\inftyνc​=∞; that ALOHA's own retransmission function satisfies condition (5.7); and the bound of Remark 5.14, that a positive recurrent acknowledgement-based scheme needs ν≤e−ν\nu\le e^{-\nu}ν≤e−ν and hence ν<0.5672\nu<0.5672ν<0.5672, which is strictly below Ethernet's νc=log⁡2\nu_c=\log 2νc​=log2.

Significance

The result itself. Condition (5.7) is the chapter's structural statement about random access, and it is a sharp one. Any retransmission rule under which a packet keeps trying at a rate that does not decay fast enough — a fixed probability, a polynomially growing backoff, anything short of exponential — has critical rate zero: the channel jams at every positive load. Exponential backoff is not a tuning choice, it is the minimum that makes the protocol work at all, and the log⁡b\log blogb formula for a backoff by factor bbb (Exercise 5.7) then says how much capacity each choice of bbb buys. The gap recorded in Remark 5.14 is the other half of the picture: even above the threshold, "infinitely many packets get through" is much weaker than "the backlog is stable", and between 0.5670.5670.567 and log⁡2≈0.693\log 2 \approx 0.693log2≈0.693 Ethernet does the first and provably not the second.

Formalizing it. None of this is open; the analysis is due to Kelly and MacPhee (1987) and Aldous (1987). What the mission contributes is a machine-checked account of the analytic core: the definitions of PtP_tPt​, H(ν)H(\nu)H(ν) and νc\nu_cνc​, the two extremes of the classification, and the ALOHA calculations. Mathlib has no protocol analysis and nothing about random access channels.

Difficulty

The obstacle is a modelling one and it is worth stating plainly rather than discovering halfway through. The chapter's headline results — Proposition 5.3 that ALOHA jams almost surely, Theorem 5.11 that νc\nu_cνc​ is the critical rate, Theorem 5.15 that geometric Ethernet is transient — are statements about sample paths of a Markov chain built on a Poisson arrival stream, and their proofs are coupling arguments comparing a system started empty with one started with a backlog. Nothing in Mathlib supports that construction, and building it is a research-scale project rather than a chapter. This mission therefore formalizes the analytic half and quotes the probabilistic half, which is the same division the book itself makes when it computes νc\nu_cνc​ for a scheme: Theorem 5.11 is proved once, and every subsequent statement about a protocol is a convergence question about ∑tPt\sum_t P_t∑t​Pt​.

Within that analytic half the difficulty is real but ordinary. The summand PtP_tPt​ is a product of a factor growing with ∑r≤th(r)\sum_{r\le t}h(r)∑r≤t​h(r) and one decaying exponentially in it, so the growth hypothesis has to be turned into a summable bound without assuming any regularity of hhh beyond non-negativity — in particular ∑r≤th(r)\sum_{r\le t}h(r)∑r≤t​h(r) need not be eventually monotone in any useful quantitative sense, only divergent faster than log⁡t\log tlogt.

Formalization scope

The retransmission function is any non-negative real sequence; the normalization h(1)=1h(1)=1h(1)=1 is not imposed, since none of the statements need it and imposing it would exclude the comparison schemes. PtP_tPt​ and the partial sums are real-valued, and "H(ν)<∞H(\nu)<\inftyH(ν)<∞" is stated as summability of the sequence rather than as a bound on an extended-real sum, so convergence is asserted rather than assumed. The goal is stated for each fixed ν>0\nu>0ν>0 separately, which is what makes νc=0\nu_c=0νc​=0; it is not stated as a claim about the infimum, because the infimum of the set {ν:H(ν)<∞}\{\nu : H(\nu)<\infty\}{ν:H(ν)<∞} adds nothing once the set is known to be all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The growth hypothesis is the book's condition (5.7) verbatim: (log⁡t)−1∑x≤th(x)→∞\bigl(\log t\bigr)^{-1}\sum_{x\le t}h(x)\to\infty(logt)−1∑x≤t​h(x)→∞. Note that at t=0t=0t=0 and t=1t=1t=1 the quotient involves log⁡t≤0\log t \le 0logt≤0 and is not meaningful; divergence to infinity is an eventual statement, so this costs nothing, but it is why the hypothesis is a limit rather than a pointwise bound.

The mission is not vacuous in either direction: the ALOHA milestone exhibits a retransmission function satisfying the hypothesis, and the ∑xh(x)<∞\sum_x h(x)<\infty∑x​h(x)<∞ milestone exhibits one that fails it as strongly as possible, with H(ν)=∞H(\nu)=\inftyH(ν)=∞ for every ν\nuν.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: Ethernet's ∑r≤th(r)∼log⁡2t\sum_{r\le t}h(r)\sim\log_2 t∑r≤t​h(r)∼log2​t and the resulting νc=log⁡2\nu_c=\log 2νc​=log2; the generalization νc=log⁡b\nu_c=\log bνc​=logb of Exercise 5.7; the scheme h(x)=1/(xlog⁡x)h(x)=1/(x\log x)h(x)=1/(xlogx) with νc=∞\nu_c=\inftyνc​=∞; the continuous-time halving νc=12log⁡b\nu_c=\frac12\log bνc​=21​logb of Kelly and MacPhee; and, for anyone willing to build the probabilistic layer, Proposition 5.3 and Theorem 5.11 themselves.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 5 (pp. 108–132); Definition 5.1, Proposition 5.3, Theorems 5.11 and 5.15, condition (5.7), Examples 5.8, 5.12 and 5.13, Remark 5.14. DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • N. Abramson, The ALOHA system — another alternative for computer communications, AFIPS Conference Proceedings 37 (1970), 281–285. DOI 10.1145/1478462.1478502
  • F. P. Kelly and I. M. MacPhee, The number of packets transmitted by collision detect random access schemes, Annals of Probability 15 (1987), 1557–1568. DOI 10.1214/aop/1176991992
  • D. J. Aldous, Ultimate instability of exponential back-off protocol for acknowledgement-based transmission control of random access communication channels, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 33 (1987), 219–223. DOI 10.1109/TIT.1987.1057295
  • R. M. Metcalfe and D. R. Boggs, Ethernet: distributed packet switching for local computer networks, Communications of the ACM 19 (1976), 395–404. DOI 10.1145/360248.360253
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks IV: Decentralized Optimization and Wardrop EquilibriaTextbook

Motivation

A network of resistors solves an optimization problem. Nobody tells the electrons what to do; each one moves under a purely local rule, and the current distribution that emerges minimizes energy dissipation over all distributions satisfying Kirchhoff's node law. Add a wire and the network can only become easier to traverse. This is the encouraging case, and Chapter 4 of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014) opens with it.

Road traffic is the discouraging case. Drivers also follow a local rule — take the fastest route — and the pattern that emerges is again characterized by an optimization problem, but not the one anyone wants solved. Braess's paradox is the sharp form of the discrepancy: in a small road network carrying six cars per unit time, every route takes 83 time units at equilibrium; open an extra road, and at the new equilibrium every route takes 92. Building road capacity made everyone slower. The difference from the electrical case is that a driver's choice imposes a delay on everyone else sharing the road and the driver does not pay for it, and correcting that — pricing the externality — is how a decentralized rule can be made to produce good global behaviour. That idea recurs in Chapters 7 and 8 of the book as the basis of Internet congestion control.

Setting

The network is a set J\mathcal{J}J of JJJ directed links. A route rrr is a subset of links, and R\mathcal{R}R is the set of RRR routes under consideration — not necessarily all physically possible ones. The link-route incidence matrix AAA has Ajr=1A_{jr}=1Ajr​=1 when j∈rj \in rj∈r and Ajr=0A_{jr}=0Ajr​=0 otherwise. Writing xrx_rxr​ for the flow on route rrr, the flow on link jjj is

yj=∑rAjrxr,that is y=Ax.y_j=\sum_{r}A_{jr}x_r, \qquad\text{that is } y = Ax.yj​=r∑​Ajr​xr​,that is y=Ax.

Each link has a delay function Dj(yj)D_j(y_j)Dj​(yj​), continuous and increasing in the flow on that link, and the delay along a route is the sum of the delays of its links, ∑jDj(yj)Ajr\sum_j D_j(y_j)A_{jr}∑j​Dj​(yj​)Ajr​. Drivers care only about getting from origin to destination: S\mathcal{S}S is the set of source–destination pairs, each route rrr serves exactly one of them, written s(r)s(r)s(r), and the flow requirement between pair σ\sigmaσ is fσf_\sigmafσ​.

A routing pattern is stable when no driver has an incentive to switch. Definition 4.2 makes this precise: a Wardrop equilibrium is a feasible vector of route flows xxx such that

xr>0  ⟹  ∑jDj(yj)Ajr=min⁡r′∈s(r)∑jDj(yj)Ajr′,y=Ax.x_r>0 \;\Longrightarrow\; \sum_{j}D_j(y_j)A_{jr}=\min_{r'\in s(r)}\sum_{j}D_j(y_j)A_{jr'}, \qquad y = Ax .xr​>0⟹j∑​Dj​(yj​)Ajr​=r′∈s(r)min​j∑​Dj​(yj​)Ajr′​,y=Ax.

Every route actually carrying traffic is a shortest route, in delay, for the traffic it carries.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 4.3, a Wardrop equilibrium exists

∃ x≥0  with Hx=f  such that x is a Wardrop equilibrium.\exists\, x \ge 0 \ \text{ with } Hx=f \ \text{ such that } x \text{ is a Wardrop equilibrium.}∃x≥0  with Hx=f  such that x is a Wardrop equilibrium.

The goal asserts existence only, for an arbitrary network, arbitrary route set and arbitrary continuous increasing delay functions. It fixes no uniqueness claim, because the equilibrium flows need not be unique even though the link loads are, and no efficiency claim, because Braess's paradox is precisely the statement that the equilibrium is not efficient.

Supporting levels

Kirchhoff's node law as the equations satisfied by the expected reward in the random-walk game of section 4.1; the two Braess networks of Figures 4.4a and 4.4b, with their equilibrium delays 838383 and 929292; convexity of ∫0yD(u) du\int_0^{y}D(u)\,du∫0y​D(u)du for increasing DDD; the optimization characterization that makes the goal reachable — a minimizer of ∑j∫0yjDj(u) du\sum_j\int_0^{y_j}D_j(u)\,du∑j​∫0yj​​Dj​(u)du over the feasible flows is a Wardrop equilibrium; and the exact externality decomposition of the queueing network of section 4.3.1.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 4.3 is what makes the Wardrop equilibrium a usable object: a traffic model that could fail to have an equilibrium would be describing nothing. Its proof does more than establish existence — it identifies the equilibrium as the solution of a specific convex program, minimizing ∑j∫0yjDj(u) du\sum_j\int_0^{y_j}D_j(u)\,du∑j​∫0yj​​Dj​(u)du. That function is not the total delay ∑jyjDj(yj)\sum_j y_jD_j(y_j)∑j​yj​Dj​(yj​), and the gap between the two is exactly Braess's paradox: selfish routing optimizes the wrong objective. Once the two objectives are written side by side, the fix is readable off them, and it is the fix used in practice — a toll on link jjj equal to yjDj′(yj)y_jD_j'(y_j)yj​Dj′​(yj​), the marginal delay a driver imposes on everyone else, makes the selfish objective coincide with the social one. Section 4.3 then carries the same accounting into queueing and loss networks, where the derivative of the mean cost splits into a term for the delay a customer suffers and a term for the knock-on cost it inflicts.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; Wardrop stated the principle in 1952 and Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten gave the optimization formulation in 1956. What the mission produces is a machine-checked model of selfish routing — incidence matrix, link flows, delay functions, the equilibrium condition — and a formal record of Braess's paradox as a concrete pair of networks rather than a story. Mathlib has no traffic or congestion-game theory.

Difficulty

Existence is not a fixed-point argument in the obvious variable: the best-response map of the routing game is not continuous, since a small change in flows can flip which route is shortest and move all the traffic. The book's route is to replace the equilibrium condition by the stationarity conditions of a convex program on a compact feasible set, where existence is routine and the content is the translation. The translation is where the care is needed, and it is stated here as a separate milestone: the first-order conditions say the Lagrange multiplier λs(r)\lambda_{s(r)}λs(r)​ equals the route delay on routes carrying traffic and is a lower bound on the others, which is Definition 4.2 restated.

The subtlety worth naming in advance is that "increasing" is doing real work in two different places. It makes ∫0yD(u) du\int_0^{y}D(u)\,du∫0y​D(u)du convex, which is what makes the program tractable; and it is what makes each Dj(yj)D_j(y_j)Dj​(yj​) interpretable as a price. Neither convexity of DjD_jDj​ itself nor strict monotonicity is needed, and assuming them would be assuming more than the book does.

Formalization scope

Links, routes and source–destination pairs are indexed by finite types. The incidence matrix is real-valued with entries constrained to be 000 or 111, matching the book's definition in this chapter (unlike Chapter 3, which allows general non-negative integers). The map from routes to source–destination pairs is given as a function sss rather than as the matrix HHH, which is exactly the book's statement that each column of HHH sums to 111.

Delay functions are total functions R→R\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}R→R, continuous and monotone. This excludes the vertical asymptote that Figure 4.5 permits — a link with a finite capacity at which delay blows up — and that restriction is recorded here rather than left implicit. The equilibrium condition is stated as the inequality "delay on r≤delay on r′\text{delay on } r \le \text{delay on } r'delay on r≤delay on r′ for every r′r'r′ serving the same pair", which is Definition 4.2 with the minimum written out; the two are equivalent because rrr itself serves s(r)s(r)s(r), and the inequality form avoids having to produce a minimum over a possibly empty set.

The goal is not vacuous: the feasibility hypotheses (fσ≥0f_\sigma\ge0fσ​≥0, and each source–destination pair served by at least one route) are exactly what makes the feasible set non-empty, and without them the existence claim would be false rather than trivial.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: uniqueness of the equilibrium link loads yyy; the marginal-cost toll that aligns the selfish and social optima; Rayleigh monotonicity (Exercise 4.3, that effective resistance does not decrease when a resistance is increased); the price of anarchy for affine delays; and Theorem 4.6 on the derivatives of the loss-network rate of return with respect to offered traffic and capacity.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 4 (pp. 85–107); Definition 4.2, Theorem 4.3, sections 4.1–4.3. DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 1 (1952), 325–362. DOI 10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire and C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, 1956.
  • D. Braess, Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung, Unternehmensforschung 12 (1968), 258–268. DOI 10.1007/BF01918335
  • Peter Doyle and J. Laurie Snell, Random Walks and Electric Networks, Mathematical Association of America, 1984. arXiv:math/0001057
  • R. G. Gallager, A minimum delay routing algorithm using distributed computation, IEEE Transactions on Communications 25 (1977), 73–85. DOI 10.1109/TCOM.1977.1093711
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Markov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks II: Migration Processes and Product FormTextbook

Motivation

A queueing network is a collection of service stations through which customers — jobs, packets, telephone calls, patients — move one at a time. The state of such a network is a vector of occupancy counts, one per station, and the number of states grows exponentially in the number of stations, so solving the equilibrium equations directly is hopeless for any network worth modelling. The product form is what rescues the subject: for a large and identifiable class of networks the equilibrium distribution factorizes into one term per station, as if the stations were independent, and a network of JJJ stations costs JJJ one-dimensional calculations instead of one exponentially large one.

Chapter 2 of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014) establishes this for migration processes, the Markov model in which individuals move between colonies one at a time at a rate that factorizes as λjkφj(nj)\lambda_{jk}\varphi_j(n_j)λjk​φj​(nj​): a part depending only on the two colonies and a part depending only on the occupancy of the source. The class covers single-server and sss-server queues, infinite-server queues, and networks of them, open or closed.

Setting

There are JJJ colonies, and a state is a vector n=(n1,…,nJ)n = (n_1,\dots,n_J)n=(n1​,…,nJ​) of non-negative integers, njn_jnj​ being the number of individuals in colony jjj. Three operators move one individual:

Tjkn  moves one from j to k,Tj→n  removes one from j,T→kn  adds one to k.T^{jk}n \ \text{ moves one from } j \text{ to } k, \qquad T^{j\to}n \ \text{ removes one from } j, \qquad T^{\to k}n \ \text{ adds one to } k .Tjkn  moves one from j to k,Tj→n  removes one from j,T→kn  adds one to k.

An open migration process is the Markov process on Z+J\mathbb{Z}_+^JZ+J​ with transition rates

q(n,Tjkn)=λjkφj(nj),q(n,Tj→n)=μjφj(nj),q(n,T→kn)=νk,q(n, T^{jk}n)=\lambda_{jk}\varphi_j(n_j), \qquad q(n, T^{j\to}n)=\mu_j\varphi_j(n_j), \qquad q(n, T^{\to k}n)=\nu_k ,q(n,Tjkn)=λjk​φj​(nj​),q(n,Tj→n)=μj​φj​(nj​),q(n,T→kn)=νk​,

where φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0)=0φj​(0)=0: nothing leaves an empty colony. Immigration into colony kkk is Poisson of rate νk\nu_kνk​. Taking μ≡0\mu\equiv 0μ≡0 and ν≡0\nu\equiv 0ν≡0 and restricting to states of a fixed total ∑jnj=N\sum_j n_j = N∑j​nj​=N gives a closed migration process. Setting φj(n)=min⁡(n,s)\varphi_j(n)=\min(n,s)φj​(n)=min(n,s) models an sss-server queue at colony jjj; φj(n)=n\varphi_j(n)=nφj​(n)=n models individuals moving independently.

The traffic equations define (αj)(\alpha_j)(αj​) from the rates. In the open case they are

αj(μj+∑kλjk)  =  νj+∑kαkλkj,j=1,…,J,\alpha_j\Bigl(\mu_j+\sum_k \lambda_{jk}\Bigr) \;=\; \nu_j+\sum_k \alpha_k\lambda_{kj}, \qquad j = 1,\dots,J,αj​(μj​+k∑​λjk​)=νj​+k∑​αk​λkj​,j=1,…,J,

and in the closed case αj∑kλjk=∑kαkλkj\alpha_j\sum_k \lambda_{jk}=\sum_k \alpha_k\lambda_{kj}αj​∑k​λjk​=∑k​αk​λkj​ with αj>0\alpha_j>0αj​>0 and ∑jαj=1\sum_j\alpha_j=1∑j​αj​=1. Finally set

gj=∑n=0∞αj n∏r=1nφj(r).g_j=\sum_{n=0}^{\infty}\frac{\alpha_j^{\,n}}{\prod_{r=1}^{n}\varphi_j(r)} .gj​=n=0∑∞​∏r=1n​φj​(r)αjn​​.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 2.8, the product form of an open migration process

If g1,…,gJ<∞g_1,\dots,g_J<\inftyg1​,…,gJ​<∞ then

π(n)=∏j=1Jπj(nj),πj(m)=gj−1 αj m∏r=1mφj(r)\pi(n)=\prod_{j=1}^{J}\pi_j(n_j), \qquad \pi_j(m)=g_j^{-1}\,\frac{\alpha_j^{\,m}}{\prod_{r=1}^{m}\varphi_j(r)}π(n)=j=1∏J​πj​(nj​),πj​(m)=gj−1​∏r=1m​φj​(r)αjm​​

is an equilibrium distribution: it satisfies the equilibrium equations for the open migration rates, and it sums to one over Z+J\mathbb{Z}_+^JZ+J​. Both halves are asserted, because the first alone is satisfied by every positive multiple of π\piπ and the second is what makes the convergence hypothesis gj<∞g_j<\inftygj​<∞ do work.

Supporting levels

The closed-network product form of Theorem 2.4; the two families of partial balance equations (2.3) and (2.4) that the proof reduces to; Theorem 2.9, that the time reversal of a stationary open migration process is again an open migration process with rates λjk′=αkλkj/αj\lambda'_{jk}=\alpha_k\lambda_{kj}/\alpha_jλjk′​=αk​λkj​/αj​, μj′=νj/αj\mu'_j=\nu_j/\alpha_jμj′​=νj​/αj​ and νk′=αkμk\nu'_k=\alpha_k\mu_kνk′​=αk​μk​; the single M/M/1 queue that the chapter starts from; the cycle identity (2.6) behind Little's law; and the traffic equations of Kendall's family-size process, an open migration process with infinitely many colonies.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 2.8 says that at a fixed time the occupancies n1,…,nJn_1,\dots,n_Jn1​,…,nJ​ of an open migration network are independent, each distributed as if its colony were fed by a Poisson stream of rate αjλj\alpha_j\lambda_jαj​λj​ — even though the actual arrival stream into a colony is in general not Poisson, and the occupancies are emphatically not independent as processes. That gap between the one-time-marginal and the process is the reason the theorem is useful and the reason it is easy to misapply. Everything downstream in the book rests on it: the loss networks of Chapter 3 are the truncation of a product-form process to a capacity set, and the flow-level models of Chapter 8 ask when a product form survives a bandwidth-sharing policy. Theorem 2.9 supplies the reversibility argument from which Burke's theorem and the Poisson character of the exit streams follow.

Formalizing it. The mathematics is classical — Jackson (1957), Whittle (1968), Kelly (1979) — and none of it is open. What the mission produces is a machine-checked model of a queueing network: the migration operators, the rate matrix, the traffic equations and the product form, in a form later missions in this series import rather than restate. Mathlib has no queueing theory and no theory of continuous-time Markov chains on a countable state space, so this is the first such development. It builds on the DetailedBalance / FullBalance layer published in mission I.

Difficulty

An open migration process is not reversible — the detailed balance equations fail, as Figure 2.5 of the book shows with an arrival stream of geometrically sized bursts — so the method of Chapter 1 does not apply and the equilibrium equations must be met head on. The content of the proof is that they split: a separate balance holds for each colony jjj (rate of individuals leaving colony jjj equals rate arriving into it) and one more across the boundary with the outside world, and each of those is equivalent to a traffic equation. Finding that split is the step, and it is why the partial balance equations are milestones in their own right.

The formal obstacle is different and worth naming. The equilibrium equation at a state nnn sums over the states that can jump into nnn, and the naive transcription ∑j,kπ(Tjkn)q(Tjkn,n)\sum_{j,k}\pi(T^{jk}n)q(T^{jk}n,n)∑j,k​π(Tjkn)q(Tjkn,n) silently assumes TjknT^{jk}nTjkn is a state, which fails when nj=0n_j=0nj​=0. Over Z+J\mathbb{Z}_+^JZ+J​ such a term must be dropped, and a formalization that keeps it — with nj−1n_j-1nj​−1 read as truncated subtraction — states something false.

Formalization scope

The state space is Fin J → ℕ, a function from a finite index type of colonies to occupancy counts, with J finite; no irreducibility is assumed, since none of the statements below need it. Rates are real-valued and the whole rate matrix is a single function of two states, assembled as a sum of indicator terms over the possible transitions, so the equilibrium equations can be stated as the FullBalance predicate of mission I, with unconditional sums over the countable state space. This is what avoids the trap above: a sum over actual states never includes a would-be-negative one, and any spurious coincidence of operators at a boundary carries a φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0)=0φj​(0)=0 factor and contributes nothing.

Conventions the development commits to: λjj=0\lambda_{jj}=0λjj​=0, so a transfer is always between distinct colonies; φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0)=0φj​(0)=0 and φj(r)>0\varphi_j(r)>0φj​(r)>0 for r≥1r\ge 1r≥1; αj>0\alpha_j>0αj​>0; and gjg_jgj​ is asserted via HasSum, which states convergence and the value at once, rather than as an extended real that might be infinite. Occupancy vectors use truncated natural subtraction, so the partial balance and reversed-rate statements carry an explicit nj≥1n_j\ge 1nj​≥1 where the book's state space carries it implicitly; the goal itself does not need such a guard.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out by the second conjunct of the goal: the equilibrium equations alone are a homogeneous linear condition satisfied by π≡0\pi\equiv 0π≡0, whereas the requirement that π\piπ sum to 111 forces the constants gjg_jgj​ to be exactly the ones stated.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: Burke's theorem (2.1) and the Poisson character of the exit streams, Corollary 2.10, the closed-form of the telephone banking example (Exercise 2.6), the Chinese restaurant process of Exercise 2.13, and Bartlett's theorem (2.17) on linear migration processes over a general space.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 2 (pp. 22–48); Theorems 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 2.13, equations (2.1)–(2.6). DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • James R. Jackson, Networks of waiting lines, Operations Research 5 (1957), 518–521. DOI 10.1287/opre.5.4.518
  • P. Whittle, Equilibrium distributions for an open migration process, Journal of Applied Probability 5 (1968), 567–571. DOI 10.2307/3211921
  • Frank Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2011 (reissue of the 1979 edition), Chapters 2 and 3.
  • David G. Kendall, Some problems in mathematical genealogy, in Perspectives in Probability and Statistics (J. Gani, ed.), Academic Press, 1975, 325–345.
  • John D. C. Little, A proof for the queuing formula: L=λWL = \lambda WL=λW, Operations Research 9 (1961), 383–387. DOI 10.1287/opre.9.3.383
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Markov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks I: Erlang's Formula for a Single LinkTextbook

Motivation

In the early twentieth century Agner Krarup Erlang worked for the Copenhagen Telephone Company and faced a sizing question that every shared-resource operator still faces: how many parallel circuits must a telephone link carry so that an arriving call is almost never turned away? The answer he published — the Erlang loss formula — is still the standard dimensioning tool for circuit-switched links, call centres, hospital beds, rental fleets, and any system in which a customer who finds every server occupied leaves rather than waits.

The formula is the first capstone of Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina's Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2014), where it closes Chapter 1 and supplies the building block for the loss networks of Chapter 3. It is also the cleanest possible demonstration of the book's method: write down the transition rates of a Markov process, guess that the process is reversible, solve the detailed balance equations, and read the answer off the normalizing constant. This mission formalizes that chapter: the reversibility apparatus, the birth-and-death chain of the loss link, and Erlang's formula itself.

Setting

A link carries CCC parallel circuits. Calls arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ\lambdaλ and each call, while it lasts, occupies one circuit for an exponentially distributed holding time of parameter μ\muμ; holding times are independent of one another and of the arrival times. A call that arrives to find all CCC circuits busy is lost — it does not queue.

Let X(t)∈{0,1,…,C}X(t)\in\{0,1,\dots,C\}X(t)∈{0,1,…,C} be the number of busy circuits. Then XXX is a Markov process with transition rates

q(j,j+1)=λ(j=0,…,C−1),q(j,j−1)=jμ(j=1,…,C),q(j,j+1)=\lambda \quad (j=0,\dots,C-1), \qquad q(j,j-1)=j\mu \quad (j=1,\dots,C),q(j,j+1)=λ(j=0,…,C−1),q(j,j−1)=jμ(j=1,…,C),

and q(j,k)=0q(j,k)=0q(j,k)=0 otherwise. A collection of numbers π=(π(j))\pi=(\pi(j))π=(π(j)) is in detailed balance with rates qqq when

π(j) q(j,k)=π(k) q(k,j)for all j,k,\pi(j)\,q(j,k)=\pi(k)\,q(k,j)\qquad\text{for all }j,k,π(j)q(j,k)=π(k)q(k,j)for all j,k,

and satisfies the equilibrium (full balance) equations when

π(j)∑kq(j,k)=∑kπ(k) q(k,j)for all j.\pi(j)\sum_k q(j,k)=\sum_k \pi(k)\,q(k,j)\qquad\text{for all }j .π(j)k∑​q(j,k)=k∑​π(k)q(k,j)for all j.

Detailed balance is the statement that, in equilibrium, transitions from jjj to kkk occur as frequently as transitions from kkk to jjj. Writing ν=λ/μ\nu=\lambda/\muν=λ/μ for the traffic intensity, Erlang's formula is

E(ν,C)=νC/C!∑j=0Cνj/j!.E(\nu,C)=\frac{\nu^{C}/C!}{\sum_{j=0}^{C}\nu^{j}/j!}.E(ν,C)=∑j=0C​νj/j!νC/C!​.

Formalization targets

Goal — Erlang's formula

π in detailed balance with q, ∑j=0Cπ(j)=1⟹π(C)=E ⁣(λμ,C).\pi \text{ in detailed balance with } q, \ \sum_{j=0}^{C}\pi(j)=1 \quad\Longrightarrow\quad \pi(C)=E\!\left(\tfrac{\lambda}{\mu},C\right).π in detailed balance with q, j=0∑C​π(j)=1⟹π(C)=E(μλ​,C).

The goal fixes no numerical constant: it says that whatever probability vector solves the detailed balance equations of the loss link assigns exactly E(ν,C)E(\nu,C)E(ν,C) to the blocking state. The hypothesis is detailed balance rather than full balance, which is what the book's derivation actually uses and is the stronger assumption to discharge.

Supporting levels

π(j)=νjj! π(0),∑j=0Cj π(j)=ν(1−E(ν,C)),ddνE(ν,C)=−(1−E(ν,C))(E(ν,C)−E(ν,C−1)),\pi(j)=\frac{\nu^{j}}{j!}\,\pi(0), \qquad \sum_{j=0}^{C} j\,\pi(j)=\nu\bigl(1-E(\nu,C)\bigr), \qquad \frac{d}{d\nu}E(\nu,C)=-\bigl(1-E(\nu,C)\bigr)\bigl(E(\nu,C)-E(\nu,C-1)\bigr),π(j)=j!νj​π(0),j=0∑C​jπ(j)=ν(1−E(ν,C)),dνd​E(ν,C)=−(1−E(ν,C))(E(ν,C)−E(ν,C−1)),

together with the reversibility results that justify the method: detailed balance implies full balance, the reversed process of Proposition 1.1 has rates q′(j,k)=π(k)q(k,j)/π(j)q'(j,k)=\pi(k)q(k,j)/\pi(j)q′(j,k)=π(k)q(k,j)/π(j) and retains π\piπ as an equilibrium distribution, and q′=qq'=qq′=q holds exactly when π\piπ and qqq are in detailed balance.

Significance

The result itself. E(ν,C)E(\nu,C)E(ν,C) is the blocking probability of the link, so it converts a traffic measurement ν\nuν and a target grade of service into a circuit count. It is insensitive: the same formula holds for any holding-time distribution with mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, which is why it survives as an engineering tool far outside the exponential model that produces it here. Chapter 3 of the book builds loss networks on top of it, and the Erlang fixed point that approximates a whole network is a system of coupled copies of this one formula. The derivative identity is the ingredient that makes E(ν,C)E(\nu,C)E(ν,C) tractable in optimization: it shows EEE is increasing in ν\nuν, and the recursion it encodes is how the formula is evaluated numerically without overflow.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open mathematics; the value of the mission is a machine-checked statement of the loss model and a reusable reversibility layer. Mathlib has no theory of detailed balance or of reversible Markov processes over a countable state space, so this mission contributes the first: the predicates DetailedBalance and FullBalance, the reversed rate matrix, and the three structural facts relating them. Those are shared by every later mission in this series — the migration processes of Chapter 2 and the loss networks of Chapter 3 are all proved reversible or quasi-reversible by exactly these means.

Difficulty

The obvious route to π(C)\pi(C)π(C) is to solve the equilibrium equations directly, and for a birth-and-death chain that is a three-term recursion whose general solution needs two boundary conditions. Detailed balance replaces it with a two-term recursion and one boundary condition, and the whole content of the reversibility section is that the substitution is legitimate. The remaining work is bookkeeping that Lean makes less forgiving than the page does: the detailed balance equations must be indexed so that the j=0j=0j=0 and j=Cj=Cj=C boundaries are not silently assumed away, the normalizing sum must be shown positive before it can be inverted, and the induction that produces νj/j!\nu^{j}/j!νj/j! has to carry the Fin (C+1) index through Nat.factorial. For the derivative identity, the naive differentiation of a quotient gives (∑j≤C−1νj/j!)\left(\sum_{j\le C-1}\nu^{j}/j!\right)(∑j≤C−1​νj/j!) in the numerator, and recognizing it as (1−E(ν,C))\bigl(1-E(\nu,C)\bigr)(1−E(ν,C)) times the denominator is the step that produces the stated form.

Formalization scope

The state space is Fin (C + 1), so the link with CCC circuits has C+1C+1C+1 states and finiteness is built in; π\piπ is a plain function Fin (C + 1) → ℝ constrained by hypotheses rather than a PMF, so that the normalization ∑jπ(j)=1\sum_j \pi(j) = 1∑j​π(j)=1 appears explicitly wherever it is used. FullBalance is written with unconditional sums (tsum) over an arbitrary state space, so the same predicate serves the countable chains of later chapters; over a Fintype it is the finite sum. Rates are real-valued and q j j = 0 by construction, matching the book's convention that a Markov process must change state when it jumps.

The rates carry λ,μ>0\lambda,\mu>0λ,μ>0 as hypotheses. This rules out the degenerate reading in which μ=0\mu = 0μ=0 makes every downward rate vanish: with μ=0\mu=0μ=0 the detailed balance equations force π(j)λ=0\pi(j)\lambda = 0π(j)λ=0 for j<Cj<Cj<C, so the only normalized solution is the point mass at CCC, and π(C)=1\pi(C)=1π(C)=1 while Lean evaluates E(λ/0,C)=E(0,C)=0E(\lambda/0,C)=E(0,C)=0E(λ/0,C)=E(0,C)=0 for C≥1C\ge1C≥1; the goal would be false. Erlang's formula is stated for the last state Fin.last C, not for an unconstrained index, so it cannot be satisfied by a degenerate reindexing.

Contributions welcome beyond the listed items: the insensitivity of E(ν,C)E(\nu,C)E(ν,C) to the holding time distribution, the recursion E(ν,C)=νE(ν,C−1)/(C+νE(ν,C−1))E(\nu,C)=\nu E(\nu,C-1)/(C+\nu E(\nu,C-1))E(ν,C)=νE(ν,C−1)/(C+νE(ν,C−1)), the finite-source variant πM(j)∝(Mj)(η/μ)j\pi_M(j)\propto\binom{M}{j}(\eta/\mu)^{j}πM​(j)∝(jM​)(η/μ)j and the PASTA statement that an arriving call in that model sees πM−1\pi_{M-1}πM−1​, and the parking-space identity ∑C≥0E(ν,C)\sum_{C\ge 0}E(\nu,C)∑C≥0​E(ν,C) of Exercise 1.9.

Selected references

  • Frank Kelly and Elena Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 1 (pp. 13–21), equations (1.2), (1.4), (1.5), Proposition 1.1, Exercises 1.7 and 1.8. DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139565363
  • A. K. Erlang, Solution of some problems in the theory of probabilities of significance in automatic telephone exchanges, Elektrotkeknikeren 13 (1917), 5–13.
  • Frank Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2011 (reissue of the 1979 edition), Chapter 1.
  • J. R. Norris, Markov Chains, Cambridge University Press, 1998. DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511810633
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