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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On-Demand Delivery from Stores: Dynamic Dispatching and Routing with Random Demand II: A Route Whose Reduced Cost Exceeds ub − φ(RF1) Is in No Optimal Solution of the Routing Subproblem SF1Research Paper

Grocery chains and restaurants that promise delivery within an hour or less must decide, at each dispatch epoch, which drivers to send out and along which routes. Liu and Luo (arXiv:2107.13058v3; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023) model this as a finite-horizon dynamic program and solve its per-period approximation with a logic-based…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization IV: The A-Learning Threshold Δ Exceeds the O-Learning Threshold Λ If and Only If γ < max{2s/(2s+k), (√(s²+4sk) − s)/(2k)}Research Paper

A seller who customizes products for buyers must learn what each buyer wants, and buyers have private information about how much they value quality. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025; author copy SSRN 3994319) compares two ways of learning those preferences. Under A-Learning ("asking")…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? IV: When Pricing Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

Production in agriculture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and many other industries suffers from random yield: only a random fraction of a planned production run turns out usable. When a retailer buys from such a supplier, someone in the chain bears the risk that less arrives than was ordered. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang (SSRN 3546872; Manufacturing & Service…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 4: The Price of Anarchy Is Not Uniformly Hölder Continuous and No Game Has the Whole Space as a Hölder NeighborhoodResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game measures how much total cost is lost when a continuum of selfish users routes traffic instead of a central planner. Worst-case bounds on the PoA over classes of cost functions are classical: 4/34/34/3 for affine costs and Θ(β/ln⁡β)\Theta(\beta/\ln\beta)Θ(β/lnβ) for polynomial costs of degree at most β\betaβ (Roughgarden and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 5: For Small Total Demand the Price of Anarchy Exceeds 1 by at Most an Explicit Multiple of the Total DemandResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio between the total travel cost at a Wardrop equilibrium, where every traveller uses a cheapest route, and the minimum total cost a central planner could achieve. Worst-case bounds on the PoA are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002), but traffic studies observe that the empirical PoA…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Number TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 3: M Has a Divisor in [L, U] iff an Explicit Two-Item Periodic JRP Instance Has a Plan of Cost at Most L + U + 2M²(M + 1)Research Paper

The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is the multi-item extension of the economic order quantity (EOQ) model. Each item is reordered periodically and pays its own ordering and holding costs, and a joint ordering cost is shared by items ordered at the same time. Before this work no hardness result was known for the periodic JRP (p. 10), even though no exact…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information I: ProxyLabel with a Width Estimate ω′ ≥ ω/c Is e^c(ω′+1)/(1−1/k)^{k−1}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem, candidates arrive one at a time in uniformly random order, and a decision maker must accept or reject each one irrevocably. The decision maker sees exact scores, or at least a total ranking of the candidates seen so far. In hiring, admissions and procurement the observed scores are often biased: evaluations of candidates…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Achieving High Individual Service Levels Without Safety Stock? Optimal Rationing Policy of Pooled Resources II: The Max-Weighted-Service Policy Is Almost Surely Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Firms that serve several customers from shared capacity, such as a warehouse supplying several retailers, a flexible production line building several products, or an assemble-to-order system, often sign contracts that guarantee each customer an individual service level. Typical targets are the probability of filling a customer's whole demand (Type-I), the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper

Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's…

16 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Markov ChainProbabilityReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds I: An Extended MDP with δ-Optimistic Samples for Hitting Times Has Diameter at Most D/(1−δ)Research Paper

Regret bounds for reinforcement learning in a single, non-episodic Markov decision process (MDP) are stated in terms of the diameter DDD of the MDP: the worst expected time needed to travel between two states when the travel policy is chosen well. UCRL2 (Jaksch, Ortner and Auer, 2010) achieves regret O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​), against a lower bound of …

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 1: With Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Four Breach-Cost Regimes Separated by c = δσ/2, δσ/√2 and δσResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers privacy rights over the personal data that firms collect: data may be collected only with explicit consent (opt-in), consent is separated from the purchase itself, and a consumer may later have her data deleted (erasure, the "right to…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model II: Interoperability Mitigates Dominance, as Lower Interoperability Admits a Duopoly Equilibrium with an Even Larger Dominant PlatformResearch Paper

Digital markets with strong network effects (messaging, social networks, app stores) tend to concentrate: a platform with more users is worth more to each user. Interoperability, the ability of a platform's users to interact with the users of rival platforms, is a central remedy in current competition policy; the EU Digital Markets Act (2022) mandates it…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Scores for Multivariate Distributions and Level Sets II: The Level Set Score (S′)^Γ Is Consistent for the α Level Set {f_Y ∗ w ≥ α}Research Paper

A forecaster who issues a probability distribution for a multivariate quantity, such as the joint demand at several locations or the joint returns of several assets, is often judged not on the whole distribution but on a region it implies: the set of outcomes whose cumulative probability, or smoothed density, exceeds a threshold. Such level sets are the…

14 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model I: Adding a Third Platform Can Produce an Equilibrium Whose Dominant Platform Outsizes Every Platform of Every Duopoly EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets organized by platforms (social networks, marketplaces, messaging services) exhibit network effects: a user values a platform more when more users join it. A standing concern in competition policy is that such markets "tip" towards one dominant platform, and the usual remedy proposed is to foster entry. Ekmekci, White and Wu (Platform Competition and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? III: Under Partial Multihoming, the Equilibrium Price and Profit Are Hump-Shaped in the Network EffectResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services and messaging apps share two features: users value a platform more when more people use it (network effects), and some users buy access to more than one platform (multihoming). In the standard Hotelling model where every consumer buys exactly one good, network effects intensify competition: a stronger network effect…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 2: On a Nonempty Open Set of Distributions Some Nonintersectional Policy Achieves Representation along Every Identity DimensionResearch Paper

Admissions offices and employers that run affirmative action usually measure representation one identity dimension at a time: the share of women among those admitted, the share of Black applicants, and so on. Applicants, however, belong to intersectional groups (Black women, white men, …), and a policy that looks balanced along every dimension can still…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes I: With Patience at Least 2, Attenuated Random-Order Probing Gives Every Edge a(e)·Pr[e Is Free] ≥ β*Research Paper

In offline stochastic matching a graph is given in which every edge is present only with some known probability, and the only way to find out is to probe it: a probed edge that turns out to be present must be added to the matching at once. Each vertex may also limit how many of its edges are probed (its patience). The model captures applications in which a…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 3: The Explore-First Greedy Procedure Is Consistent with a Budget Linear in kResearch Paper

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks which of kkk simulated systems has the largest mean performance when every observation is costly. It is a basic tool of simulation optimization: choosing a staffing level, an inventory policy or a network design from a large catalogue of candidates that can only be evaluated by noisy simulation. In the fixed-budget formulation…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 2: Under the Slippage Configuration with a Common Variance the Greedy PCS Lower Bound Is TightResearch Paper

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks how to spend a fixed budget of simulation runs on kkk competing system designs so that the design with the largest mean performance is identified with high probability. When kkk runs into the thousands or millions, the relevant question is how the total budget must grow with kkk. Li, Fan and Hong (arXiv:2303.02951v3, published in M…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 2: The High-Quality Influencer's Defensive Fake-Account Purchase Falls in Antifake Effort If Condition (22) Holds, and Otherwise Rises Then FallsResearch Paper

Fake follower accounts are sold openly to social media influencers, who buy them because advertisers and new followers read a large follower count as a sign of quality. Platforms respond with antifake effort: detection, removal and registration hurdles that make fake accounts more expensive to operate, but that also impose a nuisance cost on legitimate…

13 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Opinion Dynamics on Directed Complex Networks 1: On Graph Sequences Admitting a Strong Coupling, the Typical Stationary Opinion Converges to the Root Opinion R* of the Local Weak LimitResearch Paper

Linear models of opinion formation go back to DeGroot (DeGroot 1974), in which every individual repeatedly replaces their opinion by a weighted average of the opinions of the people they listen to, and to Friedkin and Johnsen (Friedkin–Johnsen 1990), who added a persistent internal opinion. Fraiman, Lin and Olvera-Cravioto (arXiv:2209.00969v2, Mathematics…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 1: For Generic Score Distributions No Nonintersectional Policy Yields a Representative Outcome but an Intersectional One DoesResearch Paper

Affirmative action policies are usually designed reductively: one adjustment for women, another for a racial minority, a third for applicants from low-income families. An applicant who belongs to several categories gets the combined adjustments. A long literature in sociology and law, beginning with Crenshaw's account of intersectionality (1989), argues…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
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