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Operations Research

889 missions · 466 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Mean-Covariance Solutions for Stochastic Optimization II: An Inverse S-Shaped Derivative with Finite Limits Gives the Two-Point Support PropertyResearch Paper

Motivation

In stochastic optimization the law of a random return rrr is rarely known exactly, while its mean and variance can be estimated. A robust mean-covariance decision maker therefore evaluates a utility uuu by its worst case

U=inf⁡{ Eν[u(r)]:ν a law on R with mean μ and variance σ2 }.U=\inf\{\,E_\nu[u(r)] : \nu \text{ a law on } \mathbb R \text{ with mean } \mu \text{ and variance } \sigma^2\,\}.U=inf{Eν​[u(r)]:ν a law on R with mean μ and variance σ2}.

Popescu (Operations Research 55(1), 2007) shows that for large classes of utilities this infinite-dimensional problem collapses to a one-dimensional one. The paper projects multivariate problems to a single dimension (the subject of the first mission of this series) and then asks for which uuu the univariate worst case sits on laws with two support points. This mission formalizes the answer the paper gives for utilities whose marginal utility u′u'u′ is decreasing and changes curvature once, with finite limits: log-logistic utilities C+log⁡11+e−axC+\log\frac{1}{1+e^{-ax}}C+log1+e−ax1​ used in statistics and classification, and catenary-type utilities C−bcosh⁡(ax)C-b\cosh(ax)C−bcosh(ax), each plus a concave quadratic.

The result has a bounded-support precursor: Birge and Dulá (Annals of Operations Research 30, 1991, Theorem 5.1, as cited on p. 102 of Popescu 2007) proved an analogous two-point statement for functions on a bounded interval. Popescu's Proposition 5 is the unbounded version on the whole real line.

Setting

Let u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R.

  • The family Q\mathcal QQ collects the coefficient triples of quadratics lying below uuu: Q={(A,B,C)∣q(y)=Ay2+By+C≤u(y) ∀y∈R}\mathcal Q=\{(A,B,C) \mid q(y)=Ay^2+By+C\le u(y)\ \forall y\in\mathbb R\}Q={(A,B,C)∣q(y)=Ay2+By+C≤u(y) ∀y∈R}.
  • A two-point law with support {a,b}\{a,b\}{a,b}, a<ba<ba<b, puts mass p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) on aaa and 1−p1-p1−p on bbb. It has mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 when pa+(1−p)b=μpa+(1-p)b=\mupa+(1−p)b=μ and p(a−μ)2+(1−p)(b−μ)2=σ2p(a-\mu)^2+(1-p)(b-\mu)^2=\sigma^2p(a−μ)2+(1−p)(b−μ)2=σ2.
  • Two-point support property (Definition 1). uuu has it with respect to (μ,σ2)(\mu,\sigma^2)(μ,σ2) if some quadratic qqq with coefficients in Q\mathcal QQ meets uuu at two points a<ba<ba<b, i.e. q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a), q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b), and a two-point law with support {a,b}\{a,b\}{a,b}, mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 exists. uuu has the two-point support property if this holds for every μ∈R\mu\in\mathbb Rμ∈R and every σ>0\sigma>0σ>0.
  • Shapes (Definition 2). f:R→Rf:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rf:R→R is convex-concave if for some x0x_0x0​ it is convex on (−∞,x0)(-\infty,x_0)(−∞,x0​) and concave on (x0,∞)(x_0,\infty)(x0​,∞); concave-convex if −f-f−f is convex-concave; S-shaped if increasing and convex-concave; inverse S-shaped if −f-f−f is S-shaped. So an inverse S-shaped fff is decreasing, concave on (−∞,x0)(-\infty,x_0)(−∞,x0​) and convex on (x0,∞)(x_0,\infty)(x0​,∞).
  • Lemma 1's quadratic. For a<ba<ba<b and slopes qa,qbq_a,q_bqa​,qb​, set
A=qb−qa2(b−a),B=bqa−aqbb−a,C=bu(a)−au(b)b−a−ab qa−qb2(b−a),A=\frac{q_b-q_a}{2(b-a)},\quad B=\frac{bq_a-aq_b}{b-a},\quad C=\frac{bu(a)-au(b)}{b-a}-ab\,\frac{q_a-q_b}{2(b-a)},A=2(b−a)qb​−qa​​,B=b−abqa​−aqb​​,C=b−abu(a)−au(b)​−ab2(b−a)qa​−qb​​,

and q(y)=Ay2+By+Cq(y)=Ay^2+By+Cq(y)=Ay2+By+C (lemma1Quad).

  • The function ggg. For μ∈R\mu\in\mathbb Rμ∈R, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and y<μy<\muy<μ let z=μ+σ2/(μ−y)z=\mu+\sigma^2/(\mu-y)z=μ+σ2/(μ−y) (partnerPoint) and g(y)=u(z)−u(y)z−y−u′(y)+u′(z)2g(y)=\frac{u(z)-u(y)}{z-y}-\frac{u'(y)+u'(z)}{2}g(y)=z−yu(z)−u(y)​−2u′(y)+u′(z)​ (prop5Gap).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5 (p. 102)

If uuu is differentiable, u′u'u′ is inverse S-shaped, and the limits lim⁡y→−∞u′(y)\lim_{y\to-\infty}u'(y)limy→−∞​u′(y) and lim⁡y→+∞u′(y)\lim_{y\to+\infty}u'(y)limy→+∞​u′(y) exist and are finite, then

u satisfies the two-point support property.u \text{ satisfies the two-point support property.}u satisfies the two-point support property.

Milestones

  1. Proof of Lemma 1, first sentence. If a<ba<ba<b and u(b)−u(a)b−a=qa+qb2\frac{u(b)-u(a)}{b-a}=\frac{q_a+q_b}{2}b−au(b)−u(a)​=2qa​+qb​​, then q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a) and q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b).
  2. Tangency (p. 110). q′(a)=qaq'(a)=q_aq′(a)=qa​ and q′(b)=qbq'(b)=q_bq′(b)=qb​.
  3. Lemma 1. uuu has two-point support if and only if for all μ\muμ and σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 there are a<ba<ba<b and qa,qbq_a,q_bqa​,qb​ with
(b−μ)(μ−a)=σ2,u(b)−u(a)b−a=qa+qb2,q≤u on R.(b-\mu)(\mu-a)=\sigma^2,\qquad \frac{u(b)-u(a)}{b-a}=\frac{q_a+q_b}{2},\qquad q\le u \text{ on } \mathbb R.(b−μ)(μ−a)=σ2,b−au(b)−u(a)​=2qa​+qb​​,q≤u on R.
  1. Limits of ggg (p. 110). Under the goal's hypotheses, with ℓ±=lim⁡y→±∞u′(y)\ell_\pm=\lim_{y\to\pm\infty}u'(y)ℓ±​=limy→±∞​u′(y),
lim⁡y→−∞g(y)=ℓ−−u′(μ)2>0,lim⁡y→μ−g(y)=ℓ+−u′(μ)2<0.\lim_{y\to-\infty}g(y)=\frac{\ell_--u'(\mu)}{2}>0,\qquad \lim_{y\to\mu^-}g(y)=\frac{\ell_+-u'(\mu)}{2}<0 .y→−∞lim​g(y)=2ℓ−​−u′(μ)​>0,y→μ−lim​g(y)=2ℓ+​−u′(μ)​<0.
  1. A zero of ggg (p. 110). There is a<μa<\mua<μ with g(a)=0g(a)=0g(a)=0; with b=μ+σ2/(μ−a)b=\mu+\sigma^2/(\mu-a)b=μ+σ2/(μ−a) one has a<ba<ba<b, (b−μ)(μ−a)=σ2(b-\mu)(\mu-a)=\sigma^2(b−μ)(μ−a)=σ2 and u(b)−u(a)b−a=u′(a)+u′(b)2\frac{u(b)-u(a)}{b-a}=\frac{u'(a)+u'(b)}{2}b−au(b)−u(a)​=2u′(a)+u′(b)​.

Significance

The result. Through the paper's Proposition 4, two-point support turns the worst-case expected utility over all laws with mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 into a minimization over a single parameter p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) of pu(μ+(1−p)/p σ)+(1−p)u(μ−p/(1−p) σ)pu(\mu+\sqrt{(1-p)/p}\,\sigma)+(1-p)u(\mu-\sqrt{p/(1-p)}\,\sigma)pu(μ+(1−p)/p​σ)+(1−p)u(μ−p/(1−p)​σ). Combined with the projection property of the paper's Section 2, this gives tractable robust counterparts of multivariate stochastic programs whose objective depends on a linear combination x′Rx'Rx′R of random returns. Proposition 5 is the paper's sufficient condition that places a concrete class of utilities in this regime; it is also closed under adding any quadratic.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known. The formalization produces a checked characterization of two-point support (Lemma 1), a reusable encoding of convex-concave and S-shaped functions, and a proof of Proposition 5. The printed final step of the paper's proof is incomplete (see Difficulty), so a complete formal proof requires an argument the paper does not spell out.

Difficulty

Conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 1 come from a sign change of ggg on (−∞,μ)(-\infty,\mu)(−∞,μ): the two limits in milestone 4 need a l'Hôpital-type argument and the continuity of a monotone derivative. The central difficulty is condition (c): showing that the quadratic built from a pair (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) lies below uuu on the whole line. The obvious argument takes any zero aaa of ggg and counts the intersections of the linear q′q'q′ with the inverse S-shaped u′u'u′. This fails when u′u'u′ is affine on an interval: a zero of ggg can then produce a quadratic that coincides with uuu on [a,b][a,b][a,b] but crosses above uuu just left of aaa. A proof must therefore choose the zero of ggg, or the pair (a,b)(a,b)(a,b), with care, and the curvature hypotheses are not strict.

Formalization scope

  • Functions are ℝ → ℝ; u′u'u′ is deriv u, and the goal assumes Differentiable ℝ u. Finite limits are Tendsto (deriv u) atBot (𝓝 l) and Tendsto (deriv u) atTop (𝓝 l) for some real l; the one-sided limit at μ\muμ is along 𝓝[<] μ.
  • "Increasing" in Definition 2 is strict (StrictMono); the paper writes "nondecreasing" for the weak notion. Convexity and concavity are ConvexOn/ConcaveOn on the open half-lines Set.Iio x₀, Set.Ioi x₀, as printed.
  • A two-point law is encoded by its mass p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) on aaa, with a<ba<ba<b; this is equivalent to a probability measure on R\mathbb RR with support {a,b}\{a,b\}{a,b}, mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2.
  • "Intersects it at two points a,ba,ba,b" is read as q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a)q(a)=u(a) and q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b)q(b)=u(b) for some a<ba<ba<b (at least two contact points). This is the reading under which Lemma 1 is an equivalence.
  • The two-point support property quantifies over σ>0\sigma>0σ>0: no two-point law has variance 000, so including σ=0\sigma=0σ=0 would make the property false for every uuu.
  • The two-point support property is defined from Definition 1 (supporting quadratic plus feasible law), not from Lemma 1's conditions, so Lemma 1 is not a tautology. Every division by b−ab-ab−a, z−yz-yz−y or μ−y\mu-yμ−y occurs under a<ba<ba<b or y<μy<\muy<μ.

Useful infrastructure: l'Hôpital's rule at infinity (Analysis/Calculus/LHopital), Darboux's theorem for derivatives, the intermediate value theorem, and one-sided limits of monotone functions. The shape definitions of Definition 2 are reusable for S-shaped value functions elsewhere (prospect theory, sigmoidal utilities). Proofs of the milestones, of the goal, and alternative arguments for condition (c) are all welcome. Related platform work: Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization II.

Selected references

  • I. Popescu, Robust Mean-Covariance Solutions for Stochastic Optimization, Operations Research 55(1):98–112, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0353
  • J. R. Birge, J. H. Dulá, Bounding separable recourse functions with limited distribution information, Annals of Operations Research 30:277–298, 1991 (cited in Popescu 2007, reference list)
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization 1: Logarithmic Regret of Online Gradient DescentResearch Paper

Motivation

Online convex optimization is a repeated game between a learner and an adversary. In each round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T the learner commits to a point xtx_txt​ of a convex set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn; only then is a convex cost function ftf_tft​ revealed, and the learner pays ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​). The learner is judged by its regret: its total cost minus the total cost of the best fixed point chosen in hindsight. The model covers online portfolio selection, online regression, prediction with expert advice and the analysis of stochastic gradient methods, and it is the standard language of online learning theory.

Zinkevich (ICML 2003) showed that projected gradient descent with step sizes of order 1/t1/\sqrt t1/t​ has regret O(GDT)O(GD\sqrt T)O(GDT​) for any convex costs with gradients bounded by GGG on a set of diameter DDD, and this rate cannot be improved for linear costs. Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Machine Learning 69, 2007) asked what curvature buys. Their first result, the subject of this mission, is that the same algorithm with the faster step sizes 1/(Ht)1/(Ht)1/(Ht) has regret only logarithmic in TTT once every cost function is HHH-strongly convex. The paper's other three results (the Online Newton Step, Follow the Approximate Leader and Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization, for exp-concave costs) are the subject of the other missions of this series.

Setting

Fix n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N and a nonempty, closed, bounded, convex set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn, with the Euclidean norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ (§2.1, p. 171).

  • Cost functions. A sequence f1,f2,⋯:Rn→Rf_1,f_2,\dots:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf1​,f2​,⋯:Rn→R. Write ∇ft(x)\nabla f_t(x)∇ft​(x) for the gradient and ∇2ft(x)\nabla^2 f_t(x)∇2ft​(x) for the Hessian.
  • Gradient bound. A number GGG with ∥∇ft(x)∥2≤G\|\nabla f_t(x)\|_2\le G∥∇ft​(x)∥2​≤G for all x∈Px\in\mathcal Px∈P and all rounds ttt (p. 172).
  • HHH-strong convexity (p. 172). For H>0H>0H>0, fff is HHH-strongly convex on P\mathcal PP when it is twice differentiable and ∇2f(x)⪰HIn\nabla^2 f(x)\succeq H I_n∇2f(x)⪰HIn​ for every x∈Px\in\mathcal Px∈P, i.e. v⊤∇2f(x)v≥H∥v∥22v^\top\nabla^2 f(x)v\ge H\|v\|_2^2v⊤∇2f(x)v≥H∥v∥22​ for all vvv.
  • Euclidean projection. ΠP(y)\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)ΠP​(y) is the point of P\mathcal PP nearest to yyy, ΠP(y)=arg⁡min⁡x∈P∥x−y∥2\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)=\arg\min_{x\in\mathcal P}\|x-y\|_2ΠP​(y)=argminx∈P​∥x−y∥2​ (IsProj P y z).
  • Online Gradient Descent (Fig. 1, p. 174), with step sizes η1,η2,…\eta_1,\eta_2,\dotsη1​,η2​,…: x1∈Px_1\in\mathcal Px1​∈P is arbitrary, and in iteration t>1t>1t>1
xt=ΠP(xt−1−ηt∇ft−1(xt−1))x_t=\Pi_{\mathcal P}\bigl(x_{t-1}-\eta_t\nabla f_{t-1}(x_{t-1})\bigr)xt​=ΠP​(xt−1​−ηt​∇ft−1​(xt−1​))

(IsOGDRun P η f x).

  • Regret (p. 171): RegretT=∑t=1Tft(xt)−min⁡x∈P∑t=1Tft(x)\mathrm{Regret}_T=\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal P}\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x)RegretT​=∑t=1T​ft​(xt​)−minx∈P​∑t=1T​ft​(x), and RegretT(OGD)\mathrm{Regret}_T(\mathrm{OGD})RegretT​(OGD) is its supremum over all cost sequences.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 175)

For H>0H>0H>0, cost functions that are HHH-strongly convex on P\mathcal PP with gradients bounded by GGG on P\mathcal PP, and any run of Online Gradient Descent whose step after round ttt is ηt+1=1/(Ht)\eta_{t+1}=1/(Ht)ηt+1​=1/(Ht), for every T≥1T\ge1T≥1 and every u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P:

∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u)) ≤ G22H (1+log⁡T).\sum_{t=1}^{T}\bigl(f_t(x_t)-f_t(u)\bigr)\ \le\ \frac{G^2}{2H}\,\bigl(1+\log T\bigr).t=1∑T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u)) ≤ 2HG2​(1+logT).

This is LogRegretOCO.OGD.ogd_regret_bound. The constant is the paper's, and at T=1T=1T=1 the bound reads G2/(2H)G^2/(2H)G2/(2H).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (1), the strong-convexity inequality: for x,y∈Px,y\in\mathcal Px,y∈P, 2(f(x)−f(y))≤2∇f(x)⊤(x−y)−H∥y−x∥222(f(x)-f(y))\le 2\nabla f(x)^\top(x-y)-H\|y-x\|_2^22(f(x)−f(y))≤2∇f(x)⊤(x−y)−H∥y−x∥22​.
  2. Lemma 8 with A=InA=I_nA=In​: for a convex P\mathcal PP, z=ΠP(y)z=\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)z=ΠP​(y) and a∈Pa\in\mathcal Pa∈P, ∥y−a∥22≥∥z−a∥22\|y-a\|_2^2\ge\|z-a\|_2^2∥y−a∥22​≥∥z−a∥22​. This is already on the platform, proved, as UnderstandingML.projection_lemma, and is reused as a reference item.
  3. Eq. (2), the one-step inequality: for z=ΠP(x−ηg)z=\Pi_{\mathcal P}(x-\eta g)z=ΠP​(x−ηg), η>0\eta>0η>0, ∥g∥2≤G\|g\|_2\le G∥g∥2​≤G and u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P, 2g⊤(x−u)≤(∥x−u∥22−∥z−u∥22)/η+ηG22g^\top(x-u)\le(\|x-u\|_2^2-\|z-u\|_2^2)/\eta+\eta G^22g⊤(x−u)≤(∥x−u∥22​−∥z−u∥22​)/η+ηG2.

The last step of the argument is the harmonic-sum bound ∑t=1T1/t≤1+log⁡T\sum_{t=1}^T 1/t\le 1+\log T∑t=1T​1/t≤1+logT, which Mathlib already provides (harmonic_le_one_add_log).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 separates two regimes of online convex optimization: Θ(T)\Theta(\sqrt T)Θ(T​) regret for general convex costs and O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) for strongly convex ones, with an algorithm that costs one gradient and one projection per round. Through the online-to-batch conversion, the same step-size schedule gives the O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T/T)O(logT/T) rate of stochastic gradient descent on strongly convex objectives. The theorem is also the reference point for the paper's weaker exp-concavity assumption, under which the other three algorithms obtain O(nlog⁡T)O(n\log T)O(nlogT) regret.

Formalizing it. The result is proved and well known; what this mission adds is a machine-checked proof with the paper's exact constant. The Prove2Me platform holds a statement of the textbook version of this theorem (Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, Theorem 3.3), OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.online_gradient_descent_strongly_convex_regret, but it is Disproved: its regret is written with a real infimum over the decision set, which Lean evaluates to a junk value. No proved version of the logarithmic bound is on the platform. The strong-convexity inequality, the one-step projected-gradient inequality and the telescoping argument are reusable by every later formalization of gradient methods on the platform.

Difficulty

The argument is short, and its difficulty lies in the bookkeeping. The telescoping sum of squared distances cancels exactly only with the right step-size indexing: the step taken after round ttt must be 1/(Ht)1/(Ht)1/(Ht). Reading Fig. 1 literally with ηt=1/(Ht)\eta_t=1/(Ht)ηt​=1/(Ht) makes the step after round ttt equal to 1/(H(t+1))1/(H(t+1))1/(H(t+1)), and the sum then leaves an uncancelled term H2∥x1−x∗∥22\frac H2\|x_1-x^*\|_2^22H​∥x1​−x∗∥22​ that the printed bound does not contain. Strong convexity is a statement about the Hessian, so the curvature inequality (1) needs a second-order Taylor expansion along a segment of P\mathcal PP; convexity of P\mathcal PP keeps the segment inside the set where the Hessian bound holds. The projection step needs the obtuse-angle property of Euclidean projection onto a convex set.

Formalization scope

Points are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm (the sup norm of Fin n → ℝ would change the gradient bound). Cost functions are functions on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, as the paper's use of gradients and Hessians presupposes; the gradient is Mathlib's gradient, and the Hessian quadratic form is the second Fréchet derivative applied to (v,v)(v,v)(v,v). Rounds are 1-based: x 0, f 0 and η 1 are never read, and sums run over Finset.Icc 1 T. The run of the algorithm is a predicate on the whole trajectory, required at every round; the projection is a predicate (nearest point of P\mathcal PP), which is unique for nonempty closed convex P\mathcal PP.

Choices and corrections relative to the printed text:

  • Step-size index. Theorem 1 prints "step sizes ηt=1Ht\eta_t=\frac1{Ht}ηt​=Ht1​", while its proof sets ηt+1=1/(Ht)\eta_{t+1}=1/(Ht)ηt+1​=1/(Ht) for the step after round ttt. The goal uses the proof's indexing, as a hypothesis η (t + 1) = 1 / (H * t) for t≥1t\ge1t≥1 on the step sizes of Fig. 1.
  • Eq. (2). The paper prints "5∇t⊤(xt−x∗)5\nabla_t^\top(x_t-x^*)5∇t⊤​(xt​−x∗)"; the 555 is a typo for 222, and the milestone states 222. The verbatim milestone text keeps the printed 555.
  • Regret. Regret is stated against every comparator u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P; the minimum over the compact set P\mathcal PP is attained, so this is the paper's statement. The expectation in the paper's regret is vacuous for this deterministic algorithm, and the supremum over cost sequences is the universal quantifier over fff.
  • Hypotheses. Strong convexity and the gradient bound are required for the rounds 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T only. Convexity of each ftf_tft​, a standing assumption of §2.2, follows from HHH-strong convexity on the convex set P\mathcal PP and is not added. No diameter bound enters Theorem 1.

A regret bound written with a real ⨅/sInf over P\mathcal PP, or a bound for an arbitrary sequence satisfying Eq. (2) instead of a run of the paper's algorithm, would not be Theorem 1; the goal quantifies over every comparator in P\mathcal PP and carries the run predicate, the Hessian hypothesis and the gradient bound. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: on the closed unit ball, ft(x)=H2∥x∥22f_t(x)=\frac H2\|x\|_2^2ft​(x)=2H​∥x∥22​ with G=HG=HG=H meets all of them.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the two inequalities and of the goal; a general projection lemma for positive semidefinite AAA (Lemma 8 in full, needed by the Online Newton Step mission) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic regret algorithms for online convex optimization, Machine Learning 69 (2007), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • M. Zinkevich, Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent, ICML 2003. https://www.aaai.org/Papers/ICML/2003/ICML03-120.pdf
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., MIT Press 2022 (Theorem 3.3). https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
  • S. Shalev-Shwartz, S. Ben-David, Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms, Cambridge University Press 2014 (Lemma 14.9, the projection lemma). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107298019
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Bandit AlgorithmsOptimizationProbability·Captain: naimengye

Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices II: Jobs, Parallel Machines, Search and Bandit-Dependent DiscountingTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 3 of Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices (2nd ed., doi:10.1002/9780470980033), asks which of the assumptions behind the index theorem can be dropped and which cannot, using the simplest bandit processes there are: jobs, which pay a single reward when they complete. Along the way it settles three questions that matter on their own. When identical machines run in parallel, which schedule of deterministic jobs minimizes the total completion time (Baker's theorem), and what does the equal-ratio case look like (Theorem 3.3)? When an object is hidden in one of several boxes and each search costs money and may fail, in what order should the boxes be searched (Blackwell's search-index theorem, Theorem 3.6)? And when two bandit processes discount at different rates, is there still an index policy (Nash's Theorem 3.4)? The search theorem is the chapter's example of what the index machinery yields once undiscounted criteria are admitted through the limit γ↓0\gamma \downarrow 0γ↓0; the scheduling results are the source of the counterexamples that show a second machine breaks the index structure.

Setting

Jobs on parallel machines. There are nnn jobs with service times si>0s_i > 0si​>0 and weights cic_ici​, and mmm identical machines. A schedule assigns each job a machine and a position in that machine's processing order; each machine processes its jobs consecutively. The completion time CiC_iCi​ of a job is the total service time of the jobs on its machine up to and including it; the flow time is ∑iCi\sum_i C_i∑i​Ci​ and the weighted flow time ∑iciCi\sum_i c_i C_i∑i​ci​Ci​. The load of a machine is the total service time assigned to it, and δj\delta_jδj​ is its excess over the average S/mS/mS/m. The SPT list schedule sorts the jobs by increasing service time and deals them out cyclically to the machines. The level of a job is its position counted from the end of its machine's schedule.

The search problem (Problem 3). A stationary object is hidden in one of nnn boxes, in box iii with probability pip_ipi​. A search of box iii costs cic_ici​ and finds the object with probability qiq_iqi​ if it is there. A search policy is a sequence of boxes; after NiN_iNi​ unsuccessful searches of box iii the posterior probability that the object is there is proportional to pi(1−qi)Nip_i(1-q_i)^{N_i}pi​(1−qi​)Ni​, and the search index of the box is pi′qi/cip'_i q_i/c_ipi′​qi​/ci​, the current probability of finding the object per unit cost. The expected cost of a policy is ∑kcσkPr⁡[not found by the first k searches]\sum_k c_{\sigma_k}\Pr[\text{not found by the first } k \text{ searches}]∑k​cσk​​Pr[not found by the first k searches].

Two discount factors. Bandit process AAA (state space SAS_ASA​, kernel PAP_APA​, reward rAr_ArA​) discounts at rate aaa and BBB at rate bbb; a reward obtained at time ttt is worth ata^tat or btb^tbt times its face value according to which process produced it. The cross indices are νAB(x)=sup⁡τ>0E∑t<τatrA(x(t))/E[1−bτ]\nu_{AB}(x) = \sup_{\tau>0} \mathbb{E}\sum_{t<\tau} a^t r_A(x(t)) \big/ \mathbb{E}[1 - b^\tau]νAB​(x)=supτ>0​E∑t<τ​atrA​(x(t))/E[1−bτ] and νBA(y)\nu_{BA}(y)νBA​(y) with the roles exchanged: each is computed from one process's stopping times but with the other's discount factor in the denominator. The book prints the denominator as E∫0τbt dt\mathbb{E}\int_0^\tau b^t\,dtE∫0τ​btdt and compares νAB(x)\nu_{AB}(x)νAB​(x) with νBA(y)\nu_{BA}(y)νBA​(y) at every time; both are corrected here (see the Theorem 3.4 item), since the printed rule is not optimal. The family is the two-armed Markov bandit of the Bandit Algorithms model on the disjoint union SA⊕SBS_A \oplus S_BSA​⊕SB​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6

For prior probabilities pi≥0p_i \ge 0pi​≥0 summing to one, detection probabilities 0<qi≤10 < q_i \le 10<qi​≤1 and costs ci>0c_i > 0ci​>0, a search policy is optimal if and only if at every step it searches a box of maximal current index pi′qi/cip'_i q_i / c_ipi′​qi​/ci​:

optimal(σ)  ⟺  ∀k, ∀i: pi(1−qi)Ni(k)qici≤pσk(1−qσk)Nσk(k)qσkcσk.\text{optimal}(\sigma) \iff \forall k,\ \forall i:\ \frac{p_i (1-q_i)^{N_i(k)} q_i}{c_i} \le \frac{p_{\sigma_k}(1-q_{\sigma_k})^{N_{\sigma_k}(k)} q_{\sigma_k}}{c_{\sigma_k}}.optimal(σ)⟺∀k, ∀i: ci​pi​(1−qi​)Ni​(k)qi​​≤cσk​​pσk​​(1−qσk​​)Nσk​​(k)qσk​​​.

Milestones

Theorem 3.3, as the identity ∑iciCi=κ2(∑isi2+S2/m+∑jδj2)\sum_i c_i C_i = \frac{\kappa}{2}\big(\sum_i s_i^2 + S^2/m + \sum_j \delta_j^2\big)∑i​ci​Ci​=2κ​(∑i​si2​+S2/m+∑j​δj2​) when ci=κsic_i = \kappa s_ici​=κsi​; Theorem 3.4 in discrete time and corrected, that a policy selecting, at time ttt, AAA when atνAB(x)>btνBA(y)a^t \nu_{AB}(x) > b^t \nu_{BA}(y)atνAB​(x)>btνBA​(y) and BBB when atνAB(x)<btνBA(y)a^t \nu_{AB}(x) < b^t \nu_{BA}(y)atνAB​(x)<btνBA​(y) attains the supremum of the bandit-dependently discounted payoff; Theorem 3.7, that SPT minimizes the flow time on mmm machines and that the optimal schedules are exactly those placing the rrr-th block of mmm longest jobs at level rrr from the end, for some order of the equal jobs.

Significance

Theorem 3.6 is the classical solution of the discrete search problem (Blackwell, reported by Matula 1964; Kadane 1969): the greedy rule in probability-per-cost is optimal, and every optimal policy is of that form. The book derives it from the index theorem through an auxiliary family of bandit processes (Problem 3A) and the undiscounted limit (Corollary 3.5), which is why it sits in this chapter; as a statement it is elementary and self-contained, and it is the template for the tax problems and Klimov's model of Chapter 4. Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.3 are the positive results about parallel machines that survive the loss of the index structure; Theorem 3.4 shows the index theorem's shape persisting under bandit-dependent discounting, with two twists: each index depends on the other process's discount factor, which is exactly why it does not extend to three processes, and the comparison at time ttt weighs the indices by ata^tat and btb^tbt, so the rule is not stationary in the states. The printed statement misses the second twist and misnormalizes the first; two one-state bandits paying 0.180.180.18 (a=0.9a = 0.9a=0.9) and 111 (b=0.5b = 0.5b=0.5) are best played B,B,BB, B, BB,B,B and then AAA forever, which no stationary rule does.

None of these is machine-checked. Formalizing them gives the platform an optimality theorem for an infinite-horizon search process with an explicit index characterization in both directions, the standard parallel-machine flow-time results with a precise uniqueness clause, and a first statement on the Bandit Algorithms two-armed model with unequal discounting.

Difficulty

For Theorem 3.6 the obvious route, comparing two adjacent searches, gives only that interchanging a pair in the wrong index order lowers the cost; turning that into optimality over all infinite sequences needs that an optimal policy exists (costs are bounded below by zero and the index policy has finite cost), that a policy neglecting a box of positive prior has infinite cost, and that any first deviation from the index rule can be improved by moving a later search forward, which requires tracking how the not-found probability changes along the whole tail. The converse direction is the same interchange run backwards, and the tie case must be handled so that the equivalence is exact. Theorem 3.7's first part follows from writing the flow time as ∑iℓisi\sum_i \ell_i s_i∑i​ℓi​si​ with ℓi\ell_iℓi​ the level and applying a rearrangement inequality over the multiset of levels, but the multiset of levels itself depends on how many jobs each machine gets, so balancing the machine counts is part of the argument; the uniqueness clause needs both that the multiset is forced and that the pairing of levels with service times is forced by strict monotonicity. Theorem 3.4 is the hardest: the book's proof changes the time scale of each process so that the two share a discount factor, which produces a semi-Markov family, and applies the index theorem there; in discrete time on the Markov model one needs either a discrete analogue of that argument or a direct prevailing-charge proof with two charge scales.

Formalization scope

Schedules are assignments of machines and positions with distinct positions on a machine, without idling; the flow-time quantities are finite sums over Fin n. The SPT schedule is defined by the ascending rank of a job (ties broken by index) and carries its own injectivity proof. The search cost is a series in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] of nonnegative terms, so no summability hypothesis is needed and "infinite cost" is literal; the index is stated unnormalized, pi(1−qi)Niqi/cip_i(1-q_i)^{N_i} q_i/c_ipi​(1−qi​)Ni​qi​/ci​, which orders the boxes exactly as the posterior index does. The two-discount family uses the platform's MarkovBanditPolicy 2 (S_A ⊕ S_B) and markovBanditMeasure with the kernel that moves an AAA-state by PAP_APA​ and a BBB-state by PBP_BPB​; the payoff is the round-by-round series ∑t(atE[r1{At=A}]+btE[r1{At=B}])\sum_t (a^t \mathbb{E}[r\mathbf 1\{A_t = A\}] + b^t \mathbb{E}[r\mathbf 1\{A_t = B\}])∑t​(atE[r1{At​=A}]+btE[r1{At​=B}]), absolutely summable for bounded rewards, and the policy condition is imposed at histories whose current states have the right types (all reachable histories do). Hypotheses: m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, service times positive; pi≥0p_i \ge 0pi​≥0, ∑pi=1\sum p_i = 1∑pi​=1, 0<qi≤10 < q_i \le 10<qi​≤1, ci>0c_i > 0ci​>0; countable state spaces, bounded rewards, a,b∈(0,1)a, b \in (0,1)a,b∈(0,1).

Trivializing readings are excluded: the search "iff" is over all sequences, not a finite horizon; the uniqueness clause is stated in full, with ties resolved by any ranking of the equal jobs; the cross indices are suprema over positive stopping times (denominators at least one), and the two-discount rule weighs the indices by ata^tat, btb^tbt. Welcome contributions: the rearrangement and level-count lemmas for schedules, the interchange lemma for the search cost, and a discrete prevailing-charge argument for Theorem 3.4.

Selected references

  • J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011, Chapter 3. doi:10.1002/9780470980033
  • D. W. Matula, A periodic optimal search, American Mathematical Monthly 71(1), 1964. doi:10.2307/2311300
  • J. B. Kadane, Quiz show problems, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 27(3), 1969. doi:10.1016/0022-247X(69)90140-2
  • K. R. Baker, Introduction to Sequencing and Scheduling, Wiley, 1974.
  • P. Nash, A generalized bandit problem, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 42(2), 1980. doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1980.tb01119.x
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control IV: LQR and the Riccati EquationTextbook

Motivation

The discrete-time Riccati equation is the central object of linear-quadratic optimal control — the design equation behind LQR/LQG controllers in every modern control stack. Proposition 4.4.1 of Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I (3rd ed., 2005, §4.1) packages its asymptotic theory: under controllability and observability the Riccati iteration converges to the unique positive semidefinite solution of the algebraic Riccati equation and the resulting closed loop is stable. Alongside it, Lemma 4.2.1 of §4.2 develops K-convexity, the analytical engine behind Scarf's optimality of (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) inventory policies — a foundational result of operations research. Neither the Riccati asymptotics nor K-convexity exists in Mathlib.

Setting

Matrices A∈Rn×nA \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times n}A∈Rn×n, B∈Rn×mB \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times m}B∈Rn×m, Q=C⊤C⪰0Q = C^\top C \succeq 0Q=C⊤C⪰0, R≻0R \succ 0R≻0. The Riccati operator (BertsekasRiccatiMap)

F(P)=A⊤(P−PB(B⊤PB+R)−1B⊤P)A+Q.F(P) = A^\top\big(P - P B (B^\top P B + R)^{-1} B^\top P\big) A + Q.F(P)=A⊤(P−PB(B⊤PB+R)−1B⊤P)A+Q.

(A,B)(A,B)(A,B) is controllable if [B,AB,…,An−1B][B, AB, \dots, A^{n-1}B][B,AB,…,An−1B] has rank nnn (BertsekasControllablePair); (A,C)(A,C)(A,C) is observable if (A⊤,C⊤)(A^\top, C^\top)(A⊤,C⊤) is controllable (BertsekasObservablePair). Separately, g:R→Rg : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}g:R→R is KKK-convex (BertsekasKConvex, Def. 4.2.1) if K+g(z+y)≥g(y)+zb(g(y)−g(y−b))K + g(z+y) \ge g(y) + \tfrac{z}{b}(g(y) - g(y-b))K+g(z+y)≥g(y)+bz​(g(y)−g(y−b)) for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, b>0b > 0b>0, yyy.

Target

∃ P≻0:F(P)=P,P unique among P′⪰0,Fk(P0)→P  ∀P0⪰0,ρ(A+BL)<1,\exists\, P \succ 0:\quad F(P) = P,\quad P \text{ unique among } P' \succeq 0,\quad F^{k}(P_0) \to P \ \ \forall P_0 \succeq 0,\quad \rho\big(A + BL\big) < 1,∃P≻0:F(P)=P,P unique among P′⪰0,Fk(P0​)→P  ∀P0​⪰0,ρ(A+BL)<1,

with L=−(B⊤PB+R)−1B⊤PAL = -(B^\top P B + R)^{-1} B^\top P AL=−(B⊤PB+R)−1B⊤PA — BertsekasDP.riccati_convergence_stability (goal). Milestones: Lemma 4.2.1(a)–(d) (kconvex_of_convex, kconvex_combination, kconvex_expectation, kconvex_sS_structure), culminating in the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure theorem for continuous coercive KKK-convex functions.

Significance

The Riccati result is the mathematical license behind steady-state LQR design: it guarantees the design equation has one meaningful solution, that iterating the finite-horizon recursion finds it, and that the resulting feedback is stabilizing. Formally it would seed a Mathlib-adjacent theory of matrix fixed-point iterations, positive semidefinite order, and spectral-radius stability. The K-convexity milestones are self-contained real analysis, each of independent reuse value for inventory theory; part (d) is the engine of (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)-policy optimality. All results are classical and proved in the book; the formal work is new.

Difficulty

The Riccati proof interleaves monotonicity of FFF on the psd cone, boundedness from controllability (a steering argument), positivity from observability, and stability extracted from the fixed-point identity via a Lyapunov argument — several pieces of matrix analysis (psd order, congruence, Schur-type manipulations, spectral radius vs. convergence of powers) that must be built or located in Mathlib. The naive route of diagonalizing AAA fails: nothing is symmetric about A+BLA + BLA+BL. For Lemma 4.2.1(d), the difficulty is that ggg is not convex: the minimizer structure must come from the K-convexity inequality applied at carefully chosen points, plus continuity and coercivity.

Formalization scope

Real matrices over Fin n; Matrix.PosSemidef/PosDef; matrix inverse is Mathlib's total inverse (zero on singular input — harmless here since B⊤PB+R≻0B^\top P B + R \succ 0B⊤PB+R≻0 along the relevant iterates, which the proof must establish); convergence in the entrywise topology; eigenvalues via spectrum ℂ of the complexified matrix, all strictly inside the unit circle. Rank-based controllability exactly as Def. 4.1.1. K-convexity is stated for all real KKK; note K≥0K \ge 0K≥0 is forced whenever it is satisfiable (z=0z = 0z=0), and the expectation milestone is stated for finitely supported disturbances (integrability automatic).

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific, 2005. (Prop. 4.4.1, Def. 4.1.1, §4.2, Lemma 4.2.1.) http://www.athenasc.com/dpbook.html
  • R. E. Kalman, Contributions to the theory of optimal control, Bol. Soc. Mat. Mexicana 5 (1960), 102–119.
  • H. Scarf, The optimality of (S, s) policies in the dynamic inventory problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford Univ. Press, 1960.
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Convex Optimization III: Conic Duality and the S-procedureTextbook

Two quadratic functions can be compared losslessly. The S-procedure says that, when the constraint is strictly feasible, the implication

q1(x)≤0  ⟹  q2(x)≤0,qk(x)=xTFkx+2gkTx+hk,q_1(x) \le 0 \;\Longrightarrow\; q_2(x) \le 0, \qquad q_k(x) = x^{T}F_k x + 2g_k^{T}x + h_k,q1​(x)≤0⟹q2​(x)≤0,qk​(x)=xTFk​x+2gkT​x+hk​,

holds if and only if a single nonnegative multiplier certifies it as a matrix inequality, λ[F1g1g1Th1]⪰[F2g2g2Th2]\lambda \begin{bmatrix} F_1 & g_1 \\ g_1^{T} & h_1\end{bmatrix} \succeq \begin{bmatrix} F_2 & g_2 \\ g_2^{T} & h_2\end{bmatrix}λ[F1​g1T​​g1​h1​​]⪰[F2​g2T​​g2​h2​​] for some λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0. It is a cornerstone of control theory, trust-region methods and robust optimization, and a rare case in which a nonconvex problem has zero duality gap. The route runs through the theory this mission builds from Boyd & Vandenberghe §5.8–5.9 and Appendix B: strong alternatives for convex inequality systems, cone-program strong duality under a generalized Slater condition, semidefinite programming duality, the LMI theorems of alternatives, and the hidden convexity of the joint range of two quadratic forms.

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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Convex Optimization I: Prékopa's TheoremTextbook

Log-concave functions are the meeting point of convex analysis and probability: densities of Gaussian, exponential, uniform and Wishart distributions are all log-concave, and countless facts of applied probability flow from one structural theorem — integrating out variables preserves log-concavity. This mission builds the convex-analysis spine of Boyd & Vandenberghe's Convex Optimization (Chapters 2–3) — separation and supporting hyperplanes, dual cones, the first- and second-order differential characterizations of convexity, Fenchel conjugacy — and climbs to Prékopa's theorem via the Prékopa–Leindler inequality, a landmark of Brunn–Minkowski theory absent from Mathlib.

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Machine LearningQuantum InformationStochastic Systems·Captain: tianyipeng

Markov Entanglement: Value Decomposition Error in Multi-agent MDPsResearch Paper

Value decomposition — approximating the value of a joint state by a sum of per-agent local values — is a staple of multi-agent dynamic programming and reinforcement learning, from index policies for restless bandits to modern MARL architectures, yet it is normally used without justification. Chen and Peng (arXiv:2506.02385) supply one. They show a multi-agent MDP admits an exact value decomposition precisely when its transition matrix is not entangled — a notion built in direct analogy with quantum entanglement — and then turn that qualitative characterisation into a quantitative one: a measure of Markov entanglement bounds the decomposition error in general. This mission formalizes that core theory. The goal is Theorem 6, the general N-agent bound in the occupancy-weighted norm; the milestones are the equivalence between separability and exact decomposition, the perturbation machinery that carries a one-step transition error into a value-function error, and the extensions to shared global state and shared rewards. The paper's restless-bandit application, which needs mean-field machinery of its own, is left to a second mission in the series.

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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Introduction to Linear Optimization X: Max-Flow Min-CutTextbook

How much flow can be sent from a source sss to a sink ttt through a network with arc capacities uij∈(0,∞]u_{ij}\in(0,\infty]uij​∈(0,∞] — and what certifies that no more is possible? This mission formalizes §7.4-7.5 of Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis. The circulation calculus of §7.4 supplies the two structural tools: the flow decomposition theorem (Lemma 7.1 — every nonzero nonnegative circulation is a positive combination f=∑iaifi\mathbf{f}=\sum_i a_i\mathbf{f}^if=∑i​ai​fi of simple circulations with only forward arcs, with integer aia_iai​ when f\mathbf{f}f is integer) and the optimality criterion for the minimum cost network flow problem (Theorem 7.6 — a feasible flow is optimal if and only if there is no unsaturated cycle with negative cost). Section 7.5 then formulates the maximum flow problem (max⁡bs\max b_smaxbs​ s.t. Af=b\mathbf{A}\mathbf{f}=\mathbf{b}Af=b, bt=−bsb_t=-b_sbt​=−bs​, bi=0b_i=0bi​=0 for i≠s,ti\ne s,ti=s,t, 0≤f≤u0\le\mathbf{f}\le\mathbf{u}0≤f≤u), defines augmenting paths (Definition 7.2: fij<uijf_{ij}<u_{ij}fij​<uij​ on forward arcs, fij>0f_{ij}>0fij​>0 on backward arcs) and the Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, and proves integer invariance and finite termination for integer capacities (Theorem 7.8). The goal is Theorem 7.10:

(a) if the Ford–Fulkerson algorithm terminates because no augmenting path can be found, the current flow is optimal;

(b) the value of the maximum flow equals the minimum cut capacity

C(S)=∑{(i,j)∈A∣i∈S, j∉S}uijC(S)=\sum_{\{(i,j)\in\mathcal{A}\mid i\in S,\,j\notin S\}}u_{ij}C(S)={(i,j)∈A∣i∈S,j∈/S}∑​uij​

— the archetypal combinatorial min-max theorem, which the book notes can also be read as LP duality (pp. 311-312).

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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms XIII: Pure Exploration and Best-Arm IdentificationTextbook

Sometimes reward during learning is irrelevant — a pharmaceutical company running phase-II trials only cares about identifying the best treatment, as quickly and as reliably as possible. Chapter 33 of Lattimore–Szepesvári formalizes fixed-confidence best-arm identification: a policy together with a stopping time τ\tauτ and a recommendation must be sound (wrong with probability at most δ\deltaδ) while minimizing E[τ]\mathbb{E}[\tau]E[τ]. The information-theoretic complexity is c∗(ν)−1=sup⁡α∈Pk−1inf⁡ν′∈Ealt(ν)∑iαiD(νi,νi′)c^*(\nu)^{-1} = \sup_{\alpha\in\mathcal{P}_{k-1}} \inf_{\nu'\in\mathcal{E}_{alt}(\nu)} \sum_i \alpha_i D(\nu_i, \nu_i')c∗(ν)−1=supα∈Pk−1​​infν′∈Ealt​(ν)​∑i​αi​D(νi​,νi′​): every sound strategy needs E[τ]≥c∗(ν)log⁡14δ\mathbb{E}[\tau] \ge c^*(\nu)\log\frac{1}{4\delta}E[τ]≥c∗(ν)log4δ1​, and the Track-and-Stop algorithm — the goal theorem — achieves lim⁡δ→0E[τ]/log⁡(1/δ)=c∗(ν)\lim_{\delta\to 0} \mathbb{E}[\tau]/\log(1/\delta) = c^*(\nu)limδ→0​E[τ]/log(1/δ)=c∗(ν) exactly. The mission also covers the fixed-budget counterpart, sequential halving.

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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms IV: Bernoulli Bandits and KL-UCBTextbook

When rewards are binary — a click or no click, a cure or no cure — the subgaussian machinery of Missions I–III is not tight: the variance of a Bernoulli arm degrades near the boundary of [0,1][0,1][0,1], and the correct exponential rate is governed by the binary relative entropy d(p,q)=plog⁡pq+(1−p)log⁡1−p1−qd(p,q) = p\log\frac{p}{q} + (1-p)\log\frac{1-p}{1-q}d(p,q)=plogqp​+(1−p)log1−q1−p​ rather than a squared distance. Chapter 10 of Lattimore–Szepesvári develops Chernoff's tail bound in its information-theoretic form and the KL-UCB algorithm, whose upper confidence bounds are level sets of ddd. The goal theorem shows KL-UCB attains

lim sup⁡n→∞Rn/log⁡n=∑i:Δi>0Δi/d(μi,μ∗)\limsup_{n\to\infty} R_n/\log n = \sum_{i:\Delta_i>0} \Delta_i/d(\mu_i, \mu^*)n→∞limsup​Rn​/logn=i:Δi​>0∑​Δi​/d(μi​,μ∗)

— asymptotic optimality with exactly the constant demanded by the lower bound of Mission VII, strictly improving subgaussian UCB on every Bernoulli instance.

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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms VI: Information-Theoretic FoundationsTextbook

Every lower bound in bandit theory rests on one question: how hard is it to tell two probability measures apart from a sample? The answer is quantified by the relative entropy D(P,Q)D(P,Q)D(P,Q), and the sharpest elementary tool is the Bretagnolle–Huber inequality: for any event AAA, P(A)+Q(Ac)≥12exp⁡(−D(P,Q))P(A) + Q(A^c) \ge \frac{1}{2}\exp(-D(P,Q))P(A)+Q(Ac)≥21​exp(−D(P,Q)) — no test can distinguish PPP from QQQ with total error probability below 12e−D(P,Q)\frac{1}{2}e^{-D(P,Q)}21​e−D(P,Q). This mission formalizes Chapter 14 of Lattimore–Szepesvári: the Bretagnolle–Huber inequality (the goal theorem, proved via Le Cam's inequality ∫p∧q≥12(∫pq)2\int p \wedge q \ge \frac{1}{2}(\int\sqrt{pq})^2∫p∧q≥21​(∫pq​)2), Pinsker's inequality δ(P,Q)≤D(P,Q)/2\delta(P,Q) \le \sqrt{D(P,Q)/2}δ(P,Q)≤D(P,Q)/2​, and the closed-form divergences between Gaussians and Bernoullis. These half-page inequalities power every impossibility result in Missions VII, XI and beyond.

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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management II: The EMSR Protection Level for Two Nested Fare ClassesTextbook

Why airlines protect seats

An airline sells the seats of one flight in several fare classes at different prices, all drawn from one shared cabin. Discount fares are bought early, under advance-purchase restrictions, while most high-fare requests arrive close to departure. Accepting every early low-fare request fills the aircraft with cheap passengers and turns away late high-fare passengers; refusing too many leaves seats empty. Seat inventory control decides how many seats to keep away from the low fare. Peter Belobaba's 1987 MIT thesis (Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7) introduced the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) model for this decision, and EMSR-type rules remain the basis of the booking-limit logic in airline revenue management systems.

Timeline. Littlewood (1972, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings; reprinted 2005) proposed accepting a low-fare request as long as its fare is at least the high fare times the probability of selling all remaining seats to high-fare passengers. Analysts at Trans World Airlines (1973) and Richter at Lufthansa (1982) gave equivalent formulations for the dynamic case. Belobaba (1987, Ch. 5) restated the two-class rule as a static protection level for nested inventories and extended it heuristically to many classes. Brumelle and McGill (Operations Research 41, 1993) and Curry (Transportation Science 24, 1990) later proved optimality of nested protection levels for any number of classes under low-to-high arrivals, and showed that Belobaba's multi-class EMSR levels are not optimal for three or more classes. This mission concerns only the two-class result, which is correct.

Setting

A single flight leg has capacity C∈NC \in \mathbb NC∈N. Class 1 has fare f1f_1f1​, class 2 has fare f2f_2f2​, with 0≤f2≤f10 \le f_2 \le f_10≤f2​≤f1​. The numbers of requests for the two classes are random variables r1,r2r_1, r_2r1​,r2​ with values in N\mathbb NN, defined on a probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) and independent. There are no cancellations, no no-shows, and a refused request is lost.

The inventory is nested: a class-1 request is accepted as long as any seat is unsold. A protection level S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0, \dots, C\}S∈{0,…,C} is the number of seats reserved for class 1; it sets the class-2 booking limit BL2=C−SBL_2 = C - SBL2​=C−S. All class-2 requests arrive before any class-1 request. Class 2 therefore books min⁡(r2,C−S)\min(r_2, C - S)min(r2​,C−S) seats and class 1 books min⁡(r1,C−min⁡(r2,C−S))\min(r_1, C - \min(r_2, C-S))min(r1​,C−min(r2​,C−S)), and the realised revenue is

RS=f2min⁡(r2,C−S)+f1min⁡(r1, C−min⁡(r2,C−S)).R_S = f_2 \min(r_2, C - S) + f_1 \min\bigl(r_1,\, C - \min(r_2, C - S)\bigr).RS​=f2​min(r2​,C−S)+f1​min(r1​,C−min(r2​,C−S)).

The expected revenue is Rˉ(S)=E[RS]\bar R(S) = \mathbb E[R_S]Rˉ(S)=E[RS​].

The tail probability of class 1 is Pˉ1(S)=P[r1≥S]\bar P_1(S) = P[r_1 \ge S]Pˉ1​(S)=P[r1​≥S], the probability of receiving SSS or more class-1 requests, and the expected marginal seat revenue of the SSS-th class-1 seat is

EMSR1(S)=f1⋅Pˉ1(S).\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) = f_1 \cdot \bar P_1(S).EMSR1​(S)=f1​⋅Pˉ1​(S).

For a single class with SSS seats the expected revenue is f1 E[min⁡(r1,S)]f_1\,\mathbb E[\min(r_1, S)]f1​E[min(r1​,S)], and EMSR1(S)\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S)EMSR1​(S) is its increment from S−1S-1S−1 to SSS seats. The EMSR protection level S21S_2^1S21​ is the largest integer S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0, \dots, C\}S∈{0,…,C} with

EMSR1(S)≥f2.\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) \ge f_2 .EMSR1​(S)≥f2​.

In Lean these objects are nestedRevenue, expectedNestedRevenue, tailProb, classRevenue, emsr and emsrProtectionLevel in SeatInventory.Nested.

Formalization targets

Goal: Eqs. (5.15)–(5.16), optimality of the EMSR protection level

Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21)for all S∈{0,…,C}.\bar R(S) \le \bar R(S_2^1) \qquad \text{for all } S \in \{0, \dots, C\}.Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21​)for all S∈{0,…,C}.

The goal fixes no distribution: it holds for every pair of independent N\mathbb NN-valued demands, and S21S_2^1S21​ depends only on f2/f1f_2/f_1f2​/f1​ and the law of r1r_1r1​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (5.11). f1E[min⁡(r1,S)]−f1E[min⁡(r1,S−1)]=f1P[r1≥S]f_1\mathbb E[\min(r_1,S)] - f_1\mathbb E[\min(r_1,S-1)] = f_1 P[r_1 \ge S]f1​E[min(r1​,S)]−f1​E[min(r1​,S−1)]=f1​P[r1​≥S] for S≥1S \ge 1S≥1.
  2. Eqs. (6.1)–(6.2). Pˉ1\bar P_1Pˉ1​ and, for f1≥0f_1 \ge 0f1​≥0, EMSR1\mathrm{EMSR}_1EMSR1​ are non-increasing in SSS.
  3. Eq. (4.8), Littlewood's rule, already on the platform as RevenueManagement.littlewood_marginal_value (Talluri and van Ryzin's Eq. (2.1), proved).
  4. Sect. 5.2, p. 112. Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21)\bar R(S) \le \bar R(S_2^1)Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21​) for S21≤S≤CS_2^1 \le S \le CS21​≤S≤C: a smaller booking limit for class 2 cannot raise expected revenue.
  5. Sect. 5.2, p. 114. With the same class-2 limit C−SC - SC−S, the expected nested revenue is at least the expected revenue of two distinct inventories with SSS and C−SC - SC−S seats, strictly if f1>0f_1 > 0f1​>0 and P[r2<C−S, r1>S]>0P[r_2 < C - S,\ r_1 > S] > 0P[r2​<C−S, r1​>S]>0.

Significance

The two-class result says that, for a static booking limit set once before sales open and low-fare demand arriving first, the airline needs only the high-fare demand distribution and the fare ratio to set the optimal limit; the low-fare forecast is irrelevant. This is the rule that the thesis then applies class by class in multi-class nested systems, and it is the base case against which the later exact multi-class theory (Brumelle–McGill, Curry) is checked. Milestone 5 makes precise why nested inventories dominate the distinct-inventory allocation of the thesis's Sect. 5.1 with the same class-2 limit.

The result is classical and proved, in the sense that the optimality of a two-class threshold policy follows from Littlewood's argument and from the dynamic-programming treatment in Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004, Ch. 2). On Prove2Me, Littlewood's marginal rule and the dynamic-programming optimality of nested protection levels (RevenueManagement.static_optimal_controls) are formalized, but in Bellman form: there the protection level is defined through the value function of a dynamic program. What is not formalized is the statement in Belobaba's form, where the protection level is the explicit threshold of f1P[r1≥S]f_1 P[r_1 \ge S]f1​P[r1​≥S] against f2f_2f2​ and the objective is the explicit expected revenue of a booking limit. Connecting the two forms, and the comparison with distinct inventories, is the work of this mission.

Difficulty

The expected revenue couples the two demands through the capacity left by class 2, so Rˉ\bar RRˉ is not a sum of single-class revenues and is not separately concave in an obvious way. The step that requires care is the increment Rˉ(S)−Rˉ(S−1)\bar R(S) - \bar R(S-1)Rˉ(S)−Rˉ(S−1): it is not EMSR1(S)−f2\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) - f_2EMSR1​(S)−f2​, as the thesis's sentence after the milestone on p. 112 suggests, because the extra protected seat matters only on the event that class 2 would have reached its limit. Independence of r1r_1r1​ and r2r_2r2​ is what makes that event's probability factor out; without independence the threshold rule is not optimal. The discrete reading matters too: with P[r1>S]P[r_1 > S]P[r1​>S] in place of P[r1≥S]P[r_1 \ge S]P[r1​≥S] the rule is off by one seat and the claim fails.

Formalization scope

Conventions the Lean statements commit to:

  • Demands are N\mathbb NN-valued measurable random variables r₁ r₂ : Ω → ℕ on a probability space μ; the goal and milestone 4 assume IndepFun r₁ r₂ μ. The thesis writes continuous densities (Eqs. (5.1)–(5.5)) but requires integer seat counts; the discrete model is used throughout.
  • Pˉ1(S)=P[r1≥S]\bar P_1(S) = P[r_1 \ge S]Pˉ1​(S)=P[r1​≥S], as in Eq. (6.2) and the prose of Eq. (5.11), not P[r1>S]P[r_1 > S]P[r1​>S] as in Eq. (5.2).
  • The EMSR protection level is the largest S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0,\dots,C\}S∈{0,…,C} with f1P[r1≥S]≥f2f_1 P[r_1 \ge S] \ge f_2f1​P[r1​≥S]≥f2​ (Eq. (5.15)); Eq. (5.16)'s equality is the continuous idealisation and is not stated.
  • Booking order: all class-2 requests precede all class-1 requests (pp. 108, 112). This order is built into the revenue formula, not assumed separately.
  • Fares satisfy 0≤f2≤f10 \le f_2 \le f_10≤f2​≤f1​; the thesis has f1>f2f_1 > f_2f1​>f2​, and the statements also cover equality.
  • Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded revenues, probabilities are μ.real; seat counts use truncated subtraction only where S≤CS \le CS≤C.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: S21S_2^1S21​ is defined by the threshold of (5.15), never as an argmax of expected revenue, and the expected revenue is computed from the realised revenue of the booking process, not postulated as a sum of marginal terms.

The multi-class EMSR levels of Eqs. (5.19)–(5.29) and the dynamic revision of Eqs. (5.31)–(5.32) are out of scope. Proofs need the discrete expectation identity E[min⁡(r,S)]−E[min⁡(r,S−1)]=P[r≥S]\mathbb E[\min(r,S)] - \mathbb E[\min(r,S-1)] = P[r \ge S]E[min(r,S)]−E[min(r,S−1)]=P[r≥S] and expectation of products of independent bounded functions, both in Mathlib's reach and reusable for other single-leg revenue models. Proofs of any milestone, and a proof of the goal from milestones 1, 2 and 4 plus the matching lower-half argument, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. P. Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, PhD thesis, MIT, Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7, 1987 (no DOI).
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • S. L. Brumelle and J. I. McGill, Airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes, Operations Research 41, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
  • R. E. Curry, Optimal airline seat allocation with fare classes nested by origins and destinations, Transportation Science 24, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.24.3.193
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions I: Degeneracy and Termination of the Simplex Method under Bland's RuleTextbook

Motivation

The simplex method is the standard algorithm for linear programming, and its correctness rests on one question: does it stop? Each pivot of the method moves from one dictionary to another without decreasing the objective value, but a pivot can leave the objective unchanged. When that happens repeatedly, the method can return to a dictionary it has already visited and loop forever. This behaviour, cycling, is not hypothetical: Vanderbei's Chapter 3 exhibits a problem with four decision variables and three constraints on which the "largest coefficient" entering rule with a natural tie-breaking rule cycles through six dictionaries (Vanderbei 2014, pp. 26–27).

The chapter answers the question with two pivoting rules under which the simplex method provably terminates, and then draws the consequence that makes linear programming a finite theory: the fundamental theorem of linear programming. This mission formalizes the chapter's four numbered theorems in Vanderbei's own setting of standard-form problems with slack variables.

Timeline. Hoffman (1953) and Beale (1955) gave the first examples of cycling. The perturbation and lexicographic methods go back to Charnes (1952) and to Dantzig, Orden and Wolfe (1955). Bland (1977) introduced the smallest-index rule and proved that the simplex method terminates under it (Bland 1977).

Setting

A linear program in standard form has mmm constraints and nnn decision variables:

maximize ∑j=1ncjxjsubject to∑j=1naijxj≤bi (i=1,…,m),xj≥0 (j=1,…,n).\text{maximize } \sum_{j=1}^n c_j x_j \quad\text{subject to}\quad \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij}x_j \le b_i\ (i=1,\dots,m),\qquad x_j \ge 0\ (j=1,\dots,n).maximize j=1∑n​cj​xj​subject toj=1∑n​aij​xj​≤bi​ (i=1,…,m),xj​≥0 (j=1,…,n).

A solution xxx is feasible if it satisfies every constraint, and optimal if in addition it maximizes the objective among feasible solutions. The problem is infeasible if no feasible solution exists, and unbounded if it has feasible solutions with arbitrarily large objective values.

The slack variables wi=bi−∑jaijxjw_i = b_i - \sum_j a_{ij}x_jwi​=bi​−∑j​aij​xj​ are appended to the list of variables as xn+i=wix_{n+i} = w_ixn+i​=wi​, so that the constraints become the linear system [A I] x=b[A\ I]\,x = b[A I]x=b with x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 in Rn+m\mathbb{R}^{n+m}Rn+m. A dictionary is given by a set B\mathcal BB of mmm basic indices whose columns of [A I][A\ I][A I] are linearly independent; the remaining indices N\mathcal NN are nonbasic. Solving for the basic variables gives

ζ=ζˉ+∑j∈Ncˉjxj,xi=bˉi−∑j∈Naˉijxj(i∈B).\zeta = \bar\zeta + \sum_{j\in\mathcal N}\bar c_j x_j,\qquad x_i = \bar b_i - \sum_{j\in\mathcal N}\bar a_{ij}x_j\quad (i\in\mathcal B).ζ=ζˉ​+j∈N∑​cˉj​xj​,xi​=bˉi​−j∈N∑​aˉij​xj​(i∈B).

The basic solution of the dictionary sets the nonbasic variables to zero. The dictionary is feasible if bˉi≥0\bar b_i \ge 0bˉi​≥0 for every i∈Bi\in\mathcal Bi∈B, and degenerate if bˉi=0\bar b_i = 0bˉi​=0 for some i∈Bi\in\mathcal Bi∈B.

The simplex method (Phase II) starts at a feasible dictionary and repeats a pivot: an entering variable xkx_kxk​ is chosen among the nonbasic variables with cˉk>0\bar c_k > 0cˉk​>0, and a leaving variable xlx_lxl​ among the basic variables with aˉlk>0\bar a_{lk} > 0aˉlk​>0 that minimize the ratio bˉl/aˉlk\bar b_l/\bar a_{lk}bˉl​/aˉlk​; then xkx_kxk​ becomes basic and xlx_lxl​ nonbasic. The method stops when no cˉj\bar c_jcˉj​ is positive (the dictionary is optimal) or when the entering column has no positive aˉik\bar a_{ik}aˉik​ (the problem is unbounded). A pivoting rule resolves the remaining choices. Bland's rule chooses both the entering and the leaving variable as the candidate with the smallest index. The lexicographic rule perturbs the right-hand sides by symbols 0<ϵm≪⋯≪ϵ1≪0<\epsilon_m\ll\dots\ll\epsilon_1\ll0<ϵm​≪⋯≪ϵ1​≪ all data and chooses the leaving variable by the perturbed ratio test.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (termination under Bland's rule, p. 31)

From every feasible dictionary D0D_0D0​, there is no infinite sequence of pivots

D0→D1→D2→⋯D_0\to D_1\to D_2\to\cdotsD0​→D1​→D2​→⋯

in which both the entering and the leaving variable follow Bland's rule; and a finite sequence of such pivots reaches a dictionary DTD_TDT​ at which the method stops, optimal or exhibiting unboundedness.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.1 (p. 27): if the simplex method fails to terminate, it must cycle, i.e. an infinite run visits some dictionary twice.
  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 30): the simplex method always terminates when the leaving variable is selected by the lexicographic rule.
  • Theorem 3.4 (p. 33), the fundamental theorem: (1) with no optimal solution the problem is infeasible or unbounded; (2) if a feasible solution exists, a basic feasible solution exists; (3) if an optimal solution exists, a basic optimal solution exists.

Significance

The result. Termination under Bland's rule is what turns the simplex method from a heuristic into an algorithm. Combined with Phase I, it yields the fundamental theorem of linear programming, which reduces the search for an optimum to finitely many basic solutions and underlies the duality theory of the following chapters. Bland's rule also needs no perturbation or extra bookkeeping, and it is the anticycling rule used in many correctness proofs of simplex-type and combinatorial pivoting algorithms, including oriented-matroid programming.

Formalizing it. All four theorems are classical and proved. The Prove2Me library has the lexicographic rule and a nondegenerate termination theorem in the tableau setting of Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (equality form Ax=bAx=bAx=b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0, full row rank), and the existence of basic feasible and optimal solutions in that form. It has no statement of Bland's theorem, and none of Vanderbei's dictionary formulation over [A I][A\ I][A I]. This mission produces a machine-checkable model of dictionaries and pivoting rules in that formulation, and targets Bland's theorem, whose proof is a genuine combinatorial argument rather than a monotonicity argument.

Difficulty

The natural argument for termination is monotonicity: each pivot increases the objective, so no dictionary repeats. It fails exactly at degenerate pivots, where the step length bˉl/aˉlk\bar b_l/\bar a_{lk}bˉl​/aˉlk​ is zero and the objective and the basic solution do not change. Bland's rule gives no potential function that strictly increases along degenerate pivots, so the proof has to reason about a hypothetical cycle as a whole: which variables enter and leave the basis within it, and how two dictionaries of the cycle, in which the same variable leaves and later enters, constrain each other's coefficients. Relating the coefficients of two different dictionaries of the same problem is the step that has no counterpart in the model's definitions and has to be developed.

For Theorem 3.2, the symbols ϵi\epsilon_iϵi​ cannot be replaced by a fixed small real number: the method treats them as formal quantities on separate scales, and the statement is about that symbolic rule.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, Fin m → ℝ, and the constraint matrix is Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The n+mn+mn+m variables are indexed by Fin (n + m) with the decision variables first and the slacks after them, which is the order x1,…,xn,xn+1=w1,…,xn+m=wmx_1,\dots,x_n,x_{n+1}=w_1,\dots,x_{n+m}=w_mx1​,…,xn​,xn+1​=w1​,…,xn+m​=wm​ that Bland's rule compares. A dictionary is a structure holding its basic set, a proof that it has mmm elements and a proof that its columns of [A I][A\ I][A I] are linearly independent; the coefficients bˉ,aˉ,cˉ,ζˉ\bar b,\bar a,\bar c,\bar\zetabˉ,aˉ,cˉ,ζˉ​ are computed as coordinates in the basis of basic columns. A dictionary is therefore determined by its basic set, as the proof of Theorem 3.1 uses. "Basic solution" is defined through such a dictionary, not as a support condition.

Termination is stated as the nonexistence of an infinite run from a feasible dictionary, for Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The goal adds that a finite Bland run reaches a stopping dictionary, so that it cannot hold because pivots fail to exist. The lexicographic rule is encoded by lexicographic comparison of the coefficient vectors (bˉi,ri1,…,rim)/aˉik(\bar b_i, r_{i1},\dots,r_{im})/\bar a_{ik}(bˉi​,ri1​,…,rim​)/aˉik​ of the perturbed ratios; the symbol ϵp\epsilon_pϵp​ is attached in the starting dictionary to its ppp-th basic variable in increasing index order, which for the initial dictionary is the ppp-th constraint. Unboundedness in Theorem 3.4 is "for every MMM a feasible solution with objective >M>M>M", as defined on p. 7. The statements carry no explicit constants.

A formalization that stated Theorem 3.3 for arbitrary pivot sequences with pairwise distinct bases would be Theorem 3.1's counting argument, not Bland's theorem; the goal is stated for pivots that follow Bland's rule and only those.

A complete development needs: the pivot update of a dictionary and the invariance of the solution set under it, feasibility preservation by the ratio test, the relation between the objective rows of two dictionaries, and finiteness of the set of bases. These are reusable for any later formalization of simplex-type algorithms. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of Theorem 3.3, and Phase I (to connect Theorem 3.4 with the algorithm) are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. J. Vanderbei, Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions, 4th ed., International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 196, Springer, 2014, Chapter 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7630-6
  • R. G. Bland, New finite pivoting rules for the simplex method, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):103–107, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.103
  • G. B. Dantzig, A. Orden, P. Wolfe, The generalized simplex method for minimizing a linear form under linear inequality restraints, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 5(2):183–195, 1955. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1955.5.183
  • E. M. L. Beale, Cycling in the dual simplex algorithm, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):269–275, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020406
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, §3.4 (lexicographic rule and Bland's rule in tableau form).
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems III: Approximating Sequences for the Discounted Cost CriterionTextbook

Motivation

Optimal control of queueing systems leads to Markov decision problems whose state space is countably infinite (buffer contents, numbers of customers) and whose costs are unbounded (holding costs grow with the queue). Such a problem cannot be solved on a computer as it stands. The standard remedy is to truncate: solve a finite problem on the states {0,1,…,N}\{0,1,\dots,N\}{0,1,…,N} and hope that its value and its optimal policy approximate those of the original problem as NNN grows. Linn Sennott's approximating sequence method (ASM) makes this hope precise. For the expected discounted cost criterion, Sections 4.6–4.7 of Sennott's book (Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999) identify a single condition, Assumption DC(α\alphaα), that is necessary and sufficient for convergence of the truncated values, and give checkable sufficient conditions for it.

The method matters because naive truncation can fail. The book's Example 4.6.1 has a chain whose value at state 000 is finite, yet a natural truncation produces values VαN(0)≥αN2/((1−α)[N(1−α)+α])→∞V^N_\alpha(0)\ge \alpha N^2/((1-\alpha)[N(1-\alpha)+\alpha])\to\inftyVαN​(0)≥αN2/((1−α)[N(1−α)+α])→∞. How the probability that would leave the truncated set is redistributed decides whether the computation is meaningful.

Earlier truncation schemes (Fox 1971; White 1980, 1982; Hernández-Lerma 1986; Cavazos-Cadena 1986; Whitt 1978–79; see the bibliographic notes on p. 81 of the book and Puterman 1994) require bounded rewards or pass directly to an algorithm. The ASM instead produces a sequence of finite Markov decision chains that can be studied in their own right; the material of Sections 4.6–4.7 is presented in the book as new.

Setting

A Markov decision chain (MDC) Δ\DeltaΔ has a countable state space SSS; for each state iii a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​; nonnegative finite costs C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a); and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) with ∑jPij(a)=1\sum_j P_{ij}(a)=1∑j​Pij​(a)=1. A policy θ\thetaθ chooses the action at time ttt at random from a distribution θ(⋅∣ht)\theta(\cdot\mid h_t)θ(⋅∣ht​) on AitA_{i_t}Ait​​ that may depend on the entire history ht=(i0,a0,…,it−1,at−1,it)h_t=(i_0,a_0,\dots,i_{t-1},a_{t-1},i_t)ht​=(i0​,a0​,…,it−1​,at−1​,it​). A stationary policy fff always chooses f(i)∈Aif(i)\in A_if(i)∈Ai​ in state iii. Fix a discount factor α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). The discounted cost of θ\thetaθ and the discounted value function are

Vθ,α(i)=∑t≥0αtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i],Vα(i)=inf⁡θVθ,α(i),V_{\theta,\alpha}(i)=\sum_{t\ge0}\alpha^tE_\theta[C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i],\qquad V_\alpha(i)=\inf_\theta V_{\theta,\alpha}(i),Vθ,α​(i)=t≥0∑​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i],Vα​(i)=θinf​Vθ,α​(i),

both in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], the infimum over all policies. A policy is discount optimal if Vθ,α=VαV_{\theta,\alpha}=V_\alphaVθ,α​=Vα​.

An approximating sequence (ΔN)N≥N0(\Delta_N)_{N\ge N_0}(ΔN​)N≥N0​​ consists of finite nonempty sets SNS_NSN​ increasing to SSS and, for i∈SNi\in S_Ni∈SN​ and a∈Aia\in A_ia∈Ai​, probability distributions Pij(a;N)P_{ij}(a;N)Pij​(a;N) on SNS_NSN​ with Pij(a;N)→Pij(a)P_{ij}(a;N)\to P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a;N)→Pij​(a) as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞. The finite MDC ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ has state space SNS_NSN​ and the same actions and costs; VαNV^N_\alphaVαN​ is its value function and fαNf^N_\alphafαN​ a stationary policy attaining the minimum in its discount optimality equation

VαN(i)=min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+α∑j∈SNPij(a;N)VαN(j)},i∈SN.V^N_\alpha(i)=\min_{a\in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a)+\alpha\sum_{j\in S_N}P_{ij}(a;N)V^N_\alpha(j)\Big\},\qquad i\in S_N.VαN​(i)=a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+αj∈SN​∑​Pij​(a;N)VαN​(j)},i∈SN​.

An augmentation type approximating sequence (ATAS) keeps the original probabilities inside SNS_NSN​ and redistributes the excess probability Pir(a)P_{ir}(a)Pir​(a), r∉SNr\notin S_Nr∈/SN​, according to augmentation distributions qj(i,a,r,N)q_j(i,a,r,N)qj​(i,a,r,N) on SNS_NSN​: Pij(a;N)=Pij(a)+∑r∉SNPir(a)qj(i,a,r,N)P_{ij}(a;N)=P_{ij}(a)+\sum_{r\notin S_N}P_{ir}(a)q_j(i,a,r,N)Pij​(a;N)=Pij​(a)+∑r∈/SN​​Pir​(a)qj​(i,a,r,N).

Assumption DC(α\alphaα): for every i∈Si\in Si∈S, Wα(i):=lim sup⁡NVαN(i)<∞W_\alpha(i):=\limsup_{N}V^N_\alpha(i)<\inftyWα​(i):=limsupN​VαN​(i)<∞ and Wα(i)≤Vα(i)W_\alpha(i)\le V_\alpha(i)Wα​(i)≤Vα​(i).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6.3

The following are equivalent:

(i) lim⁡N→∞VαN(i)=Vα(i)<∞  (i∈S);(ii) Assumption DC(α).\text{(i)}\ \lim_{N\to\infty}V^N_\alpha(i)=V_\alpha(i)<\infty\ \ (i\in S);\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \text{Assumption DC}(\alpha).(i) N→∞lim​VαN​(i)=Vα​(i)<∞  (i∈S);(ii) Assumption DC(α).

Under either, every limit point of (fαN)N≥N0(f^N_\alpha)_{N\ge N_0}(fαN​)N≥N0​​ (a stationary fff with fNr(i)=f(i)f^{N_r}(i)=f(i)fNr​(i)=f(i) eventually along a subsequence, for each iii) is discount optimal for Δ\DeltaΔ.

Milestones

  • Lemma 4.6.2: lim inf⁡NVαN≥Vα\liminf_N V^N_\alpha\ge V_\alphaliminfN​VαN​≥Vα​ for every approximating sequence.
  • Proposition 4.7.1: bounded costs imply DC(α\alphaα).
  • Lemma 4.7.2: taboo probabilities of avoiding S−SNS-S_NS−SN​ converge to the ttt-step transition probabilities.
  • Lemma 4.7.3: for the first passage time Ti(N)T_i(N)Ti​(N) out of SNS_NSN​ under a stationary policy, E[αTi(N)]→0E[\alpha^{T_i(N)}]\to0E[αTi​(N)]→0.
  • Proposition 4.7.4: if Vα<∞V_\alpha<\inftyVα​<∞ and the ATAS sends excess probability to a finite set, DC(α\alphaα) holds.
  • Corollary 4.7.5: the case of a single distinguished state zzz, with the relative form of the optimality equation for ΔN\Delta_NΔN​.
  • Proposition 4.7.6: if Vα<∞V_\alpha<\inftyVα​<∞ and the augmentation distributions satisfy ∑j∈SNqj(i,a,r,N)vα,n(j)≤vα,n(r)\sum_{j\in S_N}q_j(i,a,r,N)v_{\alpha,n}(j)\le v_{\alpha,n}(r)∑j∈SN​​qj​(i,a,r,N)vα,n​(j)≤vα,n​(r) for all n≥0n\ge0n≥0, then VαN≤VαV^N_\alpha\le V_\alphaVαN​≤Vα​ on SNS_NSN​.

Significance

Theorem 4.6.3 turns the question "does truncation work?" into the verification of one inequality between a lim sup and the true value, and it delivers both the value and an optimal stationary policy from finite computations. Propositions 4.7.4–4.7.6 give conditions that hold in the queueing models of the book with unbounded holding costs, and Corollary 4.7.5 supplies the computational form used for the inventory model of Chapter 5. The discounted theory is also the stepping stone to the average cost ASM of Chapter 8, which is built on discounted approximations.

All results are proved in the book. None of them is formalized: the platform has no statement about approximating sequences or state truncation of countable-state MDPs, and Mathlib has no Markov decision processes. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the convergence theorem and its sufficient conditions, for general history-dependent randomized policies and [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued costs.

Difficulty

The value functions are infima over uncountably many history-dependent policies and may be infinite, so no contraction argument applies: costs are unbounded and VαV_\alphaVα​ is only the minimal nonnegative solution of its optimality equation. Passing to the limit in NNN inside ∑j∈SNPij(a;N)VαN(j)\sum_{j\in S_N}P_{ij}(a;N)V^N_\alpha(j)∑j∈SN​​Pij​(a;N)VαN​(j) is an interchange of limit and infinite sum under a moving probability measure, with no dominating function in general; Example 4.6.1 shows that the interchange genuinely fails. The upper bound of Proposition 4.7.4 requires comparing ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ with Δ\DeltaΔ along a coupled first passage out of SNS_NSN​, which needs the taboo-probability estimates of Lemmas 4.7.2–4.7.3. The obvious idea of bounding VαNV^N_\alphaVαN​ by sup⁡C/(1−α)\sup C/(1-\alpha)supC/(1−α) works only for bounded costs (Proposition 4.7.1).

Formalization scope

The state type S is countable ([Countable S]); actions live in a type Act, with a finite nonempty Finset of admissible actions per state. Costs are ℝ≥0, transition probabilities and all value functions are ℝ≥0∞, so infima over policies are lattice infima and +∞+\infty+∞ is a legitimate value. A general policy is a function of the history, encoded as the list of past state–action pairs (most recent first) and the current state; the expected cost at time ttt is the [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued sum over histories. VαV_\alphaVα​ is the infimum over all such policies; a stationary policy enters as the policy putting mass one on f(i)f(i)f(i). The discount factor is α : ℝ≥0 with 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1 (the chapter's standing assumption). ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ is an MDC on the subtype SNS_NSN​; VαN(i)V^N_\alpha(i)VαN​(i) is extended by 000 when N<N0N<N_0N<N0​ or i∉SNi\notin S_Ni∈/SN​, a convention that affects finitely many NNN for each fixed iii and hence no limit in NNN. Limits, lim sups and lim infs are along Filter.atTop in ℝ≥0∞. Taboo probabilities and the first passage quantity E[αT]=∑n≥1αnP(T=n)E[\alpha^{T}]=\sum_{n\ge1}\alpha^nP(T=n)E[αT]=∑n≥1​αnP(T=n) (so α∞=0\alpha^\infty=0α∞=0) are defined combinatorially from the transition probabilities.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: VαV_\alphaVα​ is not an infimum over stationary policies only (which would make optimality of limit points close to definitional), DC(α\alphaα) keeps both of its conditions, and statement (i) of the goal includes finiteness of VαV_\alphaVα​.

A complete development needs the minimality of VαV_\alphaVα​ among nonnegative solutions of the discount optimality equation (Theorem 4.1.4, chunk II of this series), Fatou-type lemmas for sums against converging distributions (Appendix A, chunk XI), and compactness of stationary policies (Proposition B.5). Contributions of these as reusable lemmas about countable-state MDCs are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Sections 4.6–4.7, pp. 73–81. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior IX: Solutions for Acyclic RelationsTextbook

Motivation

The solution concept of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) is defined from two ingredients: a set of imputations and a domination relation between them. A solution is a set of imputations that is internally stable (no member dominates another) and externally stable (every non-member is dominated by some member). In §65 of the book the authors observe that this definition never uses what imputations and domination actually are. They abstract it to an arbitrary set DDD and an arbitrary relation S\mathcal SS on DDD, and ask which properties of S\mathcal SS guarantee that exactly one solution exists.

The abstract notion is what graph theory now calls a kernel of a directed graph: draw an arc x→yx \to yx→y whenever xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; a solution is a set of vertices that is independent and absorbs every vertex outside it. Kernels appear in combinatorial game theory (the losing positions of a finite impartial game form a kernel of its move graph) and in the theory of preference and choice.

Timeline.

  • 1944 (1st ed.; 3rd ed. 1953, reprinted 2007): von Neumann and Morgenstern define solutions for an arbitrary relation (§65), show that a finite set with an acyclic relation has exactly one solution (65:X), and that acyclicity is necessary for every subset to have a unique solution (65:Z).
  • 1953: M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, extends existence (not uniqueness) to finite relations without cycles of odd length.

Setting

Let DDD be an arbitrary set and S\mathcal SS an arbitrary relation on DDD; xSyx\mathcal S yxSy is read "xxx dominates yyy". A solution (in DDD for S\mathcal SS) is a set V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D with

(65:1)V={ y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V }.\text{(65:1)}\qquad V = \{\, y \in D : x\mathcal S y \text{ holds for no } x \in V \,\}.(65:1)V={y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V}.

For E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D, an element xxx is a maximum of EEE if x∈Ex \in Ex∈E and no y∈Ey \in Ey∈E has ySxy\mathcal S xySx; the set of maxima is EmE^mEm.

For m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, condition (Am)(A_m)(Am​) says: never x1Sx0,x2Sx1,…,xmSxm−1x_1\mathcal S x_0, x_2\mathcal S x_1, \dots, x_m\mathcal S x_{m-1}x1​Sx0​,x2​Sx1​,…,xm​Sxm−1​ with x0=xmx_0 = x_mx0​=xm​ and all xi∈Dx_i \in Dxi​∈D. The relation is acyclic if it satisfies every (Am)(A_m)(Am​), m=1,2,…m = 1, 2, \dotsm=1,2,…; in particular never xSxx\mathcal S xxSx. It is strictly acyclic if there is no infinite sequence x0,x1,x2,…x_0, x_1, x_2, \dotsx0​,x1​,x2​,… in DDD with xi+1Sxix_{i+1}\mathcal S x_ixi+1​Sxi​ for every iii. Property (65:K) says that every non-empty E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has Em≠⊖E^m \ne \ominusEm=⊖. A partial ordering (65:B) is a transitive relation for which at most one of x=yx = yx=y, xSyx\mathcal S yxSy, ySxy\mathcal S xySx holds.

For the main theorem the book constructs a candidate solution by induction (65.7.1): A1=DA_1 = DA1​=D; Bi=AimB_i = A_i^mBi​=Aim​; CiC_iCi​ is the set of elements of AiA_iAi​ dominated by some element of BiB_iBi​; Ai+1=Ai−Bi−CiA_{i+1} = A_i - B_i - C_iAi+1​=Ai​−Bi​−Ci​. With i0i_0i0​ the first index for which Ai0=⊖A_{i_0} = \ominusAi0​​=⊖,

(65:2)V0=B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1.\text{(65:2)}\qquad V_0 = B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}.(65:2)V0​=B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​.

In Lean the elements live in a type α, D V : Set α, and S : α → α → Prop with S x y meaning xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; the predicates are IsSolution D S V, maxima E S, IsAcyclic, IsStrictlyAcyclic, HasMaximaProperty, IsPartialOrdering, ConditionG, and the construction stageA, stageB, stageC, V0.

Formalization targets

Goal: (65:X)

If DDD is finite and S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD, then

∃! V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution  ⟺  V=V0.\exists!\, V:\ V \text{ is a solution in } D \text{ for } \mathcal S, \qquad\text{and}\qquad V \text{ is a solution} \iff V = V_0 .∃!V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution⟺V=V0​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (65:I) For a partial ordering, a finite DDD satisfies (65:G): every non-maximal yyy is dominated by some maximum.
  2. (65:H) For a partial ordering of an arbitrary DDD: VVV is a solution   ⟺  \iff⟺ (65:G) holds and V=DmV = D^mV=Dm.
  3. (65:O:c) Strict acyclicity implies acyclicity; for finite DDD the two are equivalent.
  4. (65:P) (65:K)   ⟺  \iff⟺ strict acyclicity, for arbitrary DDD.
  5. (65:S) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, some AiA_iAi​ is empty.
  6. (65:V) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, every solution equals V0V_0V0​.
  7. (65:W) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, V0V_0V0​ is a solution.
  8. (65:Z) If every E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has a unique solution in EEE for S\mathcal SS, then S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD.

Significance

The result itself. (65:X) is the most general of the book's three existence-and-uniqueness theorems for solutions (complete ordering, partial ordering, acyclic relation; 65.8.1). For games proper it has no direct application: the set of imputations of an essential game has no maxima, so (65:K) fails (65.9.1). Its role is to isolate a sufficient condition for a unique solution. With (65:Z), and applied to every subset of DDD, it characterizes the finite relations for which every subset has exactly one solution: exactly the acyclic ones (65.8.2). In graph language it is the statement that a finite directed acyclic graph has exactly one kernel. In combinatorial game theory this is the partition of the positions of a finite impartial game into P- and N-positions. The complete- and partial-ordering results (65:E)–(65:I) are the special cases the book treats first.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and fully proved in the book; to the best of our knowledge none of them is on the Prove2Me platform, and Mathlib has well-foundedness (WellFounded, RelEmbedding of ℕ) but no kernel or von Neumann–Morgenstern solution notion for an abstract relation. The mission produces machine-checked proofs of the book's §65 chain: the equivalence of (65:K) with strict acyclicity for arbitrary sets, the finite equivalence of acyclicity and strict acyclicity, the explicit construction of V0V_0V0​, and the characterization of 65.8.2.

Difficulty

Most of the individual steps are short. The work is in making the book's finite induction precise. The sets AiA_iAi​ are defined recursively and V0V_0V0​ refers to the first empty stage i0i_0i0​. The uniqueness proof (65:V) is a minimal-counterexample argument over the stage index, which moves between "smallest kkk with y∉Aky \notin A_ky∈/Ak​" and the disjoint decomposition (65:U) of DDD into the BiB_iBi​ and CiC_iCi​. A tempting shortcut, taking an arbitrary well-founded rank function instead of the book's construction, proves existence and uniqueness but not that the solution is the V0V_0V0​ of (65:2), which is part of the goal. For (65:P) and (65:O:c) the difficulty is the passage between finite cycles and infinite chains. Going from a chain in a finite set to a repetition needs a pigeonhole argument, and going from a set without maxima to a chain needs dependent choice.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. An ambient type α; D, E, V are Set α; the relation is S : α → α → Prop and is only ever consulted on elements of the set under consideration, so it is the book's relation on DDD (or its restriction to EEE). Finite and infinite sequences are functions ℕ → α.
  • Solutions. IsSolution D S V is the set equation (65:1) literally; it forces V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D. Uniqueness in the goal is ∃! over all V : Set α, not over a subtype; there is no degenerate reading in which the solution is fixed by construction.
  • Acyclicity. IsAcyclic D S requires (Am)(A_m)(Am​) for every m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, all cycle elements in DDD. The case m=0m = 0m=0 is excluded, as in the book (it would be unsatisfiable). This is equivalent to the absence of a Relation.TransGen loop inside DDD, but the book's form is stated.
  • Construction. Stages are indexed from 000: stageA D S k is the book's Ak+1A_{k+1}Ak+1​. V0 D S is the union of all BiB_iBi​, which equals B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​ because every later BiB_iBi​ is empty.
  • Standing hypotheses instantiated. (65:S), (65:V), (65:W) and the goal (65:X) carry the hypotheses of 65.7.1, "DDD finite and S\mathcal SS acyclic" (for finite DDD equivalently strictly acyclic, i.e. (65:K)), as D.Finite and IsAcyclic D S. (65:H) and (65:I) carry the partial-ordering hypothesis (65:B:a), (65:B:b) of 65.5.1, and (65:I) also finiteness of DDD. (65:O:c), (65:P) and (65:Z) are for arbitrary DDD and S\mathcal SS, as 65.6.2 and 65.8.2 state. The empty DDD is allowed everywhere; there the unique solution is ⊖\ominus⊖.
  • Not stated. The infinite case of (65:X) and of (65:Y), which the book leaves open (65.7.1, 65.8.3, question (65:9)); the complete-ordering results (65:E), (65:F), which silently assume D≠⊖D \neq \ominusD=⊖; the counting statement (65:8).
  • Needed infrastructure. Finite-set induction and pigeonhole on Set.Finite, dependent choice for (65:P). The definitions are reusable for any later work on kernels of digraphs and on abstract stable sets. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §65, pp. 587–602. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, Annals of Mathematics 58 (1953), 573–590. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969755
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior III: Mixed Strategies, the Minimax Theorem and Good StrategiesTextbook

Motivation

A zero-sum two-person game in normalized form is a real matrix H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​): player 1 chooses a row τ1\tau_1τ1​, player 2 simultaneously chooses a column τ2\tau_2τ2​, and player 2 pays player 1 the amount H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​). Matrix games are the base case of non-cooperative game theory, the prototype of every minimax statement in optimization, statistics (Wald's decision theory) and online learning, and, through their equivalence with linear programming, a standard tool of operations research.

Chapter III of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; third edition 1953) gives the book's complete solution of these games. Timeline:

  • 1928. J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Math. Annalen 100, proves that every matrix game has a value in mixed strategies (the minimax theorem), by a topological argument. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • 1937. von Neumann's growth-model paper gives a second proof via a fixed-point argument, later generalized by Kakutani (1941).
  • 1938. J. Ville gives the first elementary proof, based on convexity.
  • 1944. The Theory of Games presents Ville's route: a theorem of the alternative for matrices (§16) yields the minimax theorem (17:6), from which §17 derives the structure of the sets of good strategies.
  • 1951. Gale, Kuhn and Tucker, and Dantzig, relate matrix games to linear-programming duality.

Setting

Player 1 has β1≥1\beta_1 \ge 1β1​≥1 pure strategies τ1\tau_1τ1​, player 2 has β2≥1\beta_2 \ge 1β2​≥1 pure strategies τ2\tau_2τ2​, and H\mathcal HH is an arbitrary real β1×β2\beta_1 \times \beta_2β1​×β2​ matrix (14.1.1). A mixed strategy of player 1 is a probability vector ξ\xiξ in the simplex

Sβ1={ξ∈Rβ1:ξτ1≥0, ∑τ1ξτ1=1},S_{\beta_1} = \Big\{ \xi \in \mathbb R^{\beta_1} : \xi_{\tau_1} \ge 0,\ \sum_{\tau_1} \xi_{\tau_1} = 1 \Big\},Sβ1​​={ξ∈Rβ1​:ξτ1​​≥0, τ1​∑​ξτ1​​=1},

and similarly η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​ for player 2. The pure strategy τ\tauτ is the coordinate vector δτ\delta^{\tau}δτ. The expected payoff is the bilinear form (17:2)

K(ξ,η)=∑τ1=1β1∑τ2=1β2H(τ1,τ2) ξτ1ητ2.K(\xi, \eta) = \sum_{\tau_1=1}^{\beta_1} \sum_{\tau_2=1}^{\beta_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\, \xi_{\tau_1} \eta_{\tau_2}.K(ξ,η)=τ1​=1∑β1​​τ2​=1∑β2​​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​ητ2​​.

The good strategies of player 1 form the set Aˉ\bar AAˉ of those ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​ at which Min⁡ηK(ξ,η)\operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta)Minη​K(ξ,η) assumes its maximum; those of player 2 form the set Bˉ\bar BBˉ of those η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​ at which Max⁡ξK(ξ,η)\operatorname{Max}_\xi K(\xi, \eta)Maxξ​K(ξ,η) assumes its minimum ((17:B:a), (17:B:b)). A saddle point of KKK is a pair with K(ξ′,η)≤K(ξ,η)≤K(ξ,η′)K(\xi', \eta) \le K(\xi, \eta) \le K(\xi, \eta')K(ξ′,η)≤K(ξ,η)≤K(ξ,η′) for all ξ′,η′\xi', \eta'ξ′,η′. With pure strategies alone one has v1=Max⁡τ1Min⁡τ2Hv_1 = \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1}\operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2}\mathcal Hv1​=Maxτ1​​Minτ2​​H and v2=Min⁡τ2Max⁡τ1Hv_2 = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2}\operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1}\mathcal Hv2​=Minτ2​​Maxτ1​​H; the game is specially strictly determined when v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​.

For a general real function ϕ(x,y)\phi(x, y)ϕ(x,y) (§13) the same notions are Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ, Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMiny​Maxx​ϕ, saddle points, and the sets AϕA^\phiAϕ (maximizers of Min⁡yϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \phiMiny​ϕ) and BϕB^\phiBϕ (minimizers of Max⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​ϕ), always under the book's standing hypothesis that these maxima and minima exist.

Formalization targets

Goal: (17:D), good strategies characterized by their supports

For all ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​ and η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​: ξ∈Aˉ\xi \in \bar Aξ∈Aˉ and η∈Bˉ\eta \in \bar Bη∈Bˉ if and only if

ξτ1=0 whenever ∑τ2H(τ1,τ2)ητ2<max⁡τ1′∑τ2H(τ1′,τ2)ητ2,\xi_{\tau_1} = 0 \text{ whenever } \sum_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\eta_{\tau_2} < \max_{\tau_1'} \sum_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1', \tau_2)\eta_{\tau_2},ξτ1​​=0 whenever τ2​∑​H(τ1​,τ2​)ητ2​​<τ1′​max​τ2​∑​H(τ1′​,τ2​)ητ2​​, ητ2=0 whenever ∑τ1H(τ1,τ2)ξτ1>min⁡τ2′∑τ1H(τ1,τ2′)ξτ1.\eta_{\tau_2} = 0 \text{ whenever } \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\xi_{\tau_1} > \min_{\tau_2'} \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2')\xi_{\tau_1}.ητ2​​=0 whenever τ1​∑​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​>τ2′​min​τ1​∑​H(τ1​,τ2′​)ξτ1​​.

The statement fixes no value and no constant; it says which pairs of mixed strategies are optimal.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (13:A*) Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ≤Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phi \le \operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ≤Miny​Maxx​ϕ.
  2. (13:D*) If Max⁡Min⁡=Min⁡Max⁡\operatorname{Max}\operatorname{Min} = \operatorname{Min}\operatorname{Max}MaxMin=MinMax, the saddle points of ϕ\phiϕ are exactly Aϕ×BϕA^\phi \times B^\phiAϕ×Bϕ.
  3. (17:A) Min⁡ηK(ξ,η)=Min⁡τ2∑τ1H(τ1,τ2)ξτ1\operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta) = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\xi_{\tau_1}Minη​K(ξ,η)=Minτ2​​∑τ1​​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​, and dually for Max⁡ξ\operatorname{Max}_\xiMaxξ​.
  4. (16:C) For every matrix a(i,j)a(i, j)a(i,j) exactly one of: some x∈Smx \in S_mx∈Sm​ with ∑ja(i,j)xj≤0\sum_j a(i,j)x_j \le 0∑j​a(i,j)xj​≤0 for all iii; some w∈Snw \in S_nw∈Sn​ with ∑ia(i,j)wi>0\sum_i a(i,j)w_i > 0∑i​a(i,j)wi​>0 for all jjj.
  5. (16:F) The weak form with ≥0\ge 0≥0 in place of >0> 0>0.
  6. (17:6) The minimax theorem: a saddle point of KKK exists (already on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax, proved).
  7. (17:C:f) ξ∈Aˉ\xi \in \bar Aξ∈Aˉ and η∈Bˉ\eta \in \bar Bη∈Bˉ iff ξ,η\xi, \etaξ,η is a saddle point of KKK.

After the goal: (17:E) the game is specially strictly determined iff each player has a pure good strategy.

Significance

(17:D) is the complementary-slackness description of the optimal strategy pairs of a matrix game: a good strategy puts weight only on pure strategies that are best replies to the opponent's good strategy, and conversely any pair of mutually supported best replies is optimal. It is the basis of support-enumeration methods for matrix games, of the equalizing arguments used to solve small games by hand (the book's Chapter IV applies it to Matching Pennies, Stone–Paper–Scissors and Poker), and of the rectangular structure Aˉ×Bˉ\bar A \times \bar BAˉ×Bˉ of the set of optimal pairs. (17:E) connects the mixed-strategy solution to the pure-strategy theory of §14 and to the perfect-information games of §15.

The results are classical and proved in the book. The minimax theorem itself is already machine-checked on the platform (AGT.zero_sum_minimax), and Mathlib contains Sion's minimax theorem and the basic saddle-point lemmas for extended-real functions on sets. This mission adds the book's own chain: the §13 saddle-point calculus under its standing attainment hypothesis, the theorems of the alternative (16:C) and (16:F) in the simplex-normalized form the book uses, the reduction (17:A) to pure strategies, and the characterizations (17:C:f), (17:D), (17:E) of good strategies, which are not on the platform in any form.

Difficulty

The "if" direction of (17:D) cannot be proved from the support conditions alone by local reasoning: that a pair of mutual best replies consists of good strategies uses that the value Max⁡ξMin⁡ηK\operatorname{Max}_\xi \operatorname{Min}_\eta KMaxξ​Minη​K equals Min⁡ηMax⁡ξK\operatorname{Min}_\eta \operatorname{Max}_\xi KMinη​Maxξ​K, i.e. the minimax theorem. Without that equality the "if" direction of (13:D*) fails (points of Aϕ×BϕA^\phi \times B^\phiAϕ×Bϕ exist but are not saddle points), so the calculus of §13 alone does not suffice. Likewise (16:C) is not a direct instance of the Farkas lemma forms on the platform: its alternatives are normalized to the simplex and the second one is strict, and both the existence and the mutual exclusion must be shown.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions, fixed throughout:

  • Pure strategies are Fin β₁, Fin β₂ (numbered from 000), the matrix is H : Fin β₁ → Fin β₂ → ℝ, and SβS_\betaSβ​ is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin β).
  • Nonempty strategy sets (β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1, from "τ = 1, …, β" in 14.1.1): every theorem assumes 0 < β₁, 0 < β₂, or mixed strategies ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​, η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​, which force it. The theorems of the alternative assume n,m≥1n, m \ge 1n,m≥1 (a matrix with rows and columns).
  • Standing hypothesis of 13.2.1 ("we are restricting our considerations to such functions, for which Max and Min exist"): the §13 results (13:A*), (13:D*) are stated for an arbitrary ϕ:X×Y→R\phi : X \times Y \to \mathbb Rϕ:X×Y→R under the predicate MaxMinAttained φ, which says that Min⁡yϕ(x,y)\operatorname{Min}_y \phi(x, y)Miny​ϕ(x,y), Max⁡xϕ(x,y)\operatorname{Max}_x \phi(x, y)Maxx​ϕ(x,y), Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ and Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMiny​Maxx​ϕ are attained. (13:D*) also carries the hypothesis of 13.5.2 that saddle points exist, stated as Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ=Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phi = \operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ=Miny​Maxx​ϕ.
  • Max⁡\operatorname{Max}Max and Min⁡\operatorname{Min}Min are the real ⨆, ⨅; they are the book's attained values under the hypotheses above (compactness of the simplex and continuity of KKK for the mixed game). (17:A) asserts attainment explicitly (IsLeast, IsGreatest). "Does not assume its maximum at τ1\tau_1τ1​" in the goal is written without any Max operator.
  • Aˉ\bar AAˉ, Bˉ\bar BBˉ are defined as maximizers and minimizers directly from KKK, not through an assumed value v′v'v′.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: Aˉ\bar AAˉ and Bˉ\bar BBˉ are not taken as hypotheses or defined through the support conditions, strategy sets cannot be empty, and no Max over an empty or unbounded set occurs.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (16:C) (from Mathlib's convex separation or from a platform Farkas lemma) and the bridge from AGT.zero_sum_minimax to (17:C:f). The §13 lemmas and the (17:A) reduction are reusable by any mission about matrix games or bilinear saddle points.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §§13, 16, 17. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • J. Ville, "Sur la théorie générale des jeux où intervient l'habileté des joueurs", in É. Borel, Traité du calcul des probabilités et de ses applications, IV.2, Gauthier-Villars, 1938, 105–113.
  • S. Kakutani, "A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem", Duke Mathematical Journal 8 (1941), 457–459. https://doi.org/10.1215/S0012-7094-41-00838-4
  • D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, "Linear programming and the theory of games", in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, 317–329.
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization I: Edmundson–Madansky Bounds for Independent Random Data and Simple RecourseTextbook

Motivation

In a two-stage stochastic linear program a decision xxx is taken before random data ξ\xiξ are observed, and a corrective recourse decision yyy is taken afterwards at a cost. The objective contains the expectation of an optimal value of a linear program, ∫Q(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\int Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)∫Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω), and for continuous or high-dimensional ξ\xiξ that integral cannot be evaluated exactly. Practical methods therefore replace ξ\xiξ by a discrete random vector and control the error by computable lower and upper bounds on the expected recourse cost. Chapter 2 of Ermoliev and Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), by P. Kall, A. Ruszczyński and K. Frauendorfer, surveys these bounds as they were used in the codes of the time: Jensen's inequality from below, the Edmundson–Madansky inequality from above, and the special structure of simple recourse, where the expected cost is available in closed form.

Timeline. Jensen's inequality (1906) gives the lower bound for a convex integrand. A. Madansky, "Bounds on the expectation of a convex function of a multivariate random variable", Ann. Math. Statist. 30 (1959), and H. P. Edmundson (RAND report, 1956) gave the upper bound by the two-point law on the endpoints of an interval, and its product version for independent components. Kall and Stoyan (1982), Huang, Ziemba and Ben-Tal (1977), Frauendorfer and Kall (1988) developed partition refinement of both bounds, the scheme this chapter describes; Frauendorfer (1988) extended the upper bound to dependent data on boxes.

Setting

The two-stage problem (2.11) is: minimize ψ(x)=cTx+∫ΩQ(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\psi(x)=c^Tx+\int_\Omega Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)ψ(x)=cTx+∫Ω​Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω) subject to Ax=bAx=bAx=b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0. The recourse cost Q(x,ξ)Q(x,\xi)Q(x,ξ) is the optimal value of the second-stage problem (2.12),

Q(x,ξ)=min⁡{qTy:Wy=h−Tx, y≥0},ξ=(q,h,T),Q(x,\xi)=\min\{q^Ty : Wy=h-Tx,\ y\ge 0\},\qquad \xi=(q,h,T),Q(x,ξ)=min{qTy:Wy=h−Tx, y≥0},ξ=(q,h,T),

with a deterministic m2×n2m_2\times n_2m2​×n2​ matrix WWW (fixed recourse), and Q=+∞Q=+\inftyQ=+∞ when (2.12) is infeasible. Throughout the chapter the book assumes complete recourse, {Wy:y≥0}=Rm2\{Wy:y\ge0\}=\mathbb R^{m_2}{Wy:y≥0}=Rm2​, and dual feasibility: for every realization of qqq some uuu satisfies WTu≤qW^Tu\le qWTu≤q. Under these assumptions QQQ is finite. The expected recourse function is Q(x)=∫Q(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\mathcal Q(x)=\int Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)Q(x)=∫Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω).

The Edmundson–Madansky law of an interval [a,b][a,b][a,b], a<ba<ba<b, with mean ξ0\xi^0ξ0 puts mass p1=(b−ξ0)/(b−a)p_1=(b-\xi^0)/(b-a)p1​=(b−ξ0)/(b−a) at aaa and p2=(ξ0−a)/(b−a)p_2=(\xi^0-a)/(b-a)p2​=(ξ0−a)/(b−a) at bbb (2.32). For a box Ξ=×j=1m[aj,bj]\Xi=\times_{j=1}^m[a_j,b_j]Ξ=×j=1m​[aj​,bj​] and means ξj0\xi^0_jξj0​, the vector ξ^\hat\xiξ^​ with independent components of these two-point laws sits at the vertex vvv with probability ∏jpj(vj)\prod_j p_j(v_j)∏j​pj​(vj​).

Simple recourse is the case W=[I,−I]W=[I,-I]W=[I,−I], q=[q+,q−]q=[q^+,q^-]q=[q+,q−] with qj++qj−≥0q^+_j+q^-_j\ge0qj+​+qj−​≥0, deterministic TTT and random hhh only. With χ=Tx\chi=Txχ=Tx the recourse cost splits into one-row costs Qj(χj,hj)=qj+(hj−χj)Q_j(\chi_j,h_j)=q^+_j(h_j-\chi_j)Qj​(χj​,hj​)=qj+​(hj​−χj​) if hj≥χjh_j\ge\chi_jhj​≥χj​, and qj−(χj−hj)q^-_j(\chi_j-h_j)qj−​(χj​−hj​) otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Edmundson–Madansky bound for independent components (p. 46)

If ξ\xiξ has independent components ξj∈[aj,bj]\xi_j\in[a_j,b_j]ξj​∈[aj​,bj​] with means ξj0\xi^0_jξj0​, and φ\varphiφ is convex on Ξ=×j[aj,bj]\Xi=\times_j[a_j,b_j]Ξ=×j​[aj​,bj​], then

Eφ(ξ)≤∑v∈vert Ξ(∏j=1mpj(vj))φ(v).E\varphi(\xi)\le\sum_{v\in\mathrm{vert}\,\Xi}\Big(\prod_{j=1}^m p_j(v_j)\Big)\varphi(v).Eφ(ξ)≤v∈vertΞ∑​(j=1∏m​pj​(vj​))φ(v).

The book applies it to φ=Q(x,⋅)\varphi=Q(x,\cdot)φ=Q(x,⋅); the goal is stated for every convex φ\varphiφ, with the explicit weights of (2.32).

Milestones

  1. Properties (b), (d), (e) of p. 40: Q(x,⋅)Q(x,\cdot)Q(x,⋅) is piecewise linear and convex in (h,T)(h,T)(h,T); Q(⋅,ξ)Q(\cdot,\xi)Q(⋅,ξ) is convex piecewise linear in xxx; the expected recourse function is finite and convex under finite second moments.
  2. The Jensen lower bound (2.26)–(2.27) on a partition (a published, proved theorem, reused).
  3. The dual-multiplier lower bound (2.30)–(2.31).
  4. The one-dimensional Edmundson–Madansky inequality (2.32)–(2.34).
  5. For simple recourse: separability (2.46)–(2.49), the closed form (2.51) of EQjEQ_jEQj​, and the bounds (2.55)–(2.56) from the one-block problem.

Significance

The upper bound is the half of the bounding scheme that is not automatic. Jensen's inequality needs only a mean; an upper bound on the expectation of a convex function needs a bounded support and, in the product form, independence. Together they give a certified interval for the optimal value of a two-stage problem, and repeated partitioning of the support shrinks that interval; this is the basis of the sequential approximation methods of §2.2.4 and of later codes. The dual-multiplier bound and the simple-recourse formulas are the pieces that make those intervals cheap to compute.

The results are classical and proved in the literature cited on the page. The one-dimensional Edmundson–Madansky inequality and the general extreme-point form of the upper bound (a measure on the extreme points reproducing the barycentre) are already formalized on Prove2Me in the Introduction to Stochastic Programming series, as is the partition Jensen bound. The product form for independent components is not: deriving it from the extreme-point form requires constructing the product kernel, which is the content of this mission. The recourse properties (b), (d), (e) for a general distribution with finite second moments, the dual-multiplier bound and the simple-recourse formulas are not formalized anywhere known to this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument inducts on the dimension, applying the one-dimensional inequality in one coordinate while the others are held fixed. That step needs the conditional law of the remaining coordinates given the first to be their unconditional law, i.e. independence expressed as a product decomposition of the joint law, and it needs φ\varphiφ with one coordinate replaced by an endpoint to remain convex on the lower-dimensional box and integrable. For dependent components the inequality is false with these weights: on [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2 with means (12,12)(\tfrac12,\tfrac12)(21​,21​) and φ(x,y)=(x−y)2\varphi(x,y)=(x-y)^2φ(x,y)=(x−y)2, the product law gives 12\tfrac1221​ while mass 12\tfrac1221​ at (1,0)(1,0)(1,0) and at (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) gives 111. The book's remark that the product law is extremal among all laws on Ξ\XiΞ with the given mean fails for this reason when m≥2m\ge2m≥2, and is not part of this mission.

For the recourse properties the difficulty is bookkeeping: QQQ is an extended-real optimal value, and finiteness, measurability in ω\omegaω and integrability must be derived from complete recourse, dual feasibility and the moment hypothesis rather than assumed.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions from finite index types to R\mathbb RR (ι → ℝ), matrices are Mathlib Matrix, and random data live on a probability space (Ω, P). The recourse cost is an EReal infimum over the feasible set, so infeasibility gives +∞+\infty+∞ and unboundedness −∞-\infty−∞ exactly as on p. 39; theorems that integrate it carry complete recourse and dual feasibility, which make it finite. The expected recourse function integrates the real part of the recourse cost. Independence of the components is ProbabilityTheory.iIndepFun; the box is Set.pi univ (fun j => Icc (a j) (b j)), with aj<bja_j<b_jaj​<bj​, and values in the box are required almost surely. The upper bound is the explicit sum over Boolean vertex labels of products of the weights (2.32); no abstract extremal measure is used.

Conventions fixed where the page is silent or ambiguous:

  • Properties (b), (d), (e) are stated on all of Rn1\mathbb R^{n_1}Rn1​: under the standing complete-recourse assumption K2=Rn1K_2=\mathbb R^{n_1}K2​=Rn1​. "Convex piecewise linear" is rendered as a maximum of finitely many affine functions.
  • The book's hypothesis of finite second moments in (e) is kept as stated, componentwise.
  • The book writes QQQ for both Q(x,ξ)Q(x,\xi)Q(x,ξ) and Q(x)\mathcal Q(x)Q(x), and reuses Q~\tilde QQ~​, ψ~\tilde\psiψ~​ for different functions in (2.27) and (2.30)–(2.31); the Lean names are recourseCost, expectedRecourse and dualLowerBound.
  • In (2.51) a conditional mean on a null event is 000 in Lean; it always appears multiplied by that event's probability, so the formula is unchanged.
  • In (2.56) the minimum is a real infimum over the nonempty first-stage feasible set; attainment is not claimed.
  • No constant of the chapter is hidden behind O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅); all bounds are explicit.

A goal stated for affine φ\varphiφ (where it is an equality), or with ξ^\hat\xiξ^​ allowed to be any discrete law with the right mean, would be trivial or a different theorem; the weights are the products of (2.32), and independence of the components is a hypothesis.

A complete development needs: finite-dimensional LP duality with extended-real values (reusable across all recourse missions), measurability and integrability of optimal-value functions, the conditional-independence step for product measures, and the one-dimensional chord inequality. The partitioned upper bound (2.37) and the discrete reformulation (2.21), (2.28) are natural follow-up statements on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • P. Kall, A. Ruszczyński, K. Frauendorfer, "Approximation Techniques in Stochastic Programming", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 2, pp. 33–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • A. Madansky, "Bounds on the expectation of a convex function of a multivariate random variable", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30 (1959), 743–746. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177706203
  • P. Kall, Stochastic Linear Programming, Springer 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-66252-2
  • R. J-B Wets, "Stochastic programs with fixed recourse: the equivalent deterministic program", SIAM Review 16 (1974), 309–339. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016053
  • K. Frauendorfer, "Solving SLP recourse problems with arbitrary multivariate distributions — the dependent case", Mathematics of Operations Research 13 (1988), 377–394. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.3.377
  • J. R. Birge, F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, Springer 1997, Ch. 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97617
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design I: MinWork Is a Strongly Truthful n-Approximation Mechanism for Task Scheduling on Unrelated MachinesResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithmic mechanism design asks for algorithms whose inputs are held by self-interested parties. Each party reports its private data, the algorithm computes an outcome, and payments are arranged so that no party gains by misreporting. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001). Their running example is task scheduling on unrelated machines: kkk tasks are distributed among nnn machines owned by different agents, each agent knows only its own processing times, and the designer wants to minimize the make-span.

Without incentives the problem is classical: minimizing make-span on unrelated machines is NP-hard and admits a polynomial 2-approximation (Lenstra, Shmoys, Tardos, 1990). With selfish agents the question changes: which approximation ratios can a truthful mechanism guarantee? This mission formalizes the paper's upper bound, the MinWork mechanism, which is the benchmark every later lower bound for truthful scheduling is compared with.

Timeline.

  • 1961: Vickrey introduces the second-price auction (J. Finance 16).
  • 1971–1973: Clarke and Groves generalize it to the VCG family of truthful mechanisms for utilitarian objectives (Groves, Econometrica 41, 1973).
  • 1999/2001: Nisan and Ronen show MinWork is a strongly truthful nnn-approximation, and that no truthful mechanism beats ratio 2.
  • 2007: Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali raise the deterministic lower bound to 1+21+\sqrt21+2​ for n≥3n \ge 3n≥3; Koutsoupias and Vidali later raise it to 1+φ≈2.6181+\varphi \approx 2.6181+φ≈2.618.
  • 2023: Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács prove the Nisan–Ronen conjecture: no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves a ratio below nnn (STOC 2023, arXiv:2301.11905), so MinWork is optimal among deterministic truthful mechanisms.

Setting

There are nnn agents and kkk tasks. Agent iii's type is the vector ti=(t1i,…,tki)t^i = (t^i_1,\dots,t^i_k)ti=(t1i​,…,tki​) of positive times, tji>0t^i_j > 0tji​>0 being the time agent iii needs to perform task jjj. A type vector is t=(t1,…,tn)t = (t^1,\dots,t^n)t=(t1,…,tn). An allocation xxx sends each task jjj to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks agent iii receives. The make-span of xxx is

g(x,t)=max⁡i∑j∈xitji,g(x,t) = \max_{i} \sum_{j \in x^i} t^i_j ,g(x,t)=imax​j∈xi∑​tji​,

and agent iii's valuation is vi(x,ti)=−∑j∈xitjiv^i(x,t^i) = -\sum_{j \in x^i} t^i_jvi(x,ti)=−∑j∈xi​tji​.

A direct mechanism asks every agent to declare a type, computes an allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) from the declared vector ddd, and hands agent iii a payment pi(d)p^i(d)pi(d). Agent iii's utility is pi(d)+vi(x(d),ti)p^i(d) + v^i(x(d), t^i)pi(d)+vi(x(d),ti), with tit^iti its true type. The mechanism is truthful if declaring tit^iti maximizes agent iii's utility for every declaration of the others, and strongly truthful if truth-telling is the only such dominant strategy. An allocation rule is a ccc-approximation if g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t)g(x(t),t) \le c \cdot g(y,t)g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t) for every type vector ttt and every allocation yyy.

The MinWork mechanism allocates each task to an agent with minimal declared time for it, breaking ties arbitrarily. For each task it wins, an agent receives the second-best declared time min⁡i′≠idji′\min_{i' \ne i} d^{i'}_jmini′=i​dji′​:

pi(d)=∑j∈xi(d)min⁡i′≠idji′.p^i(d) = \sum_{j \in x^i(d)} \min_{i' \neq i} d^{i'}_j .pi(d)=j∈xi(d)∑​i′=imin​dji′​.

The Lean development uses the same names: load, makespan, IsTruthful, IsStronglyTruthful, IsApprox, IsMinWorkAlloc, secondBest, minTime, minWorkPay.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 and every MinWork allocation rule xxx with payments ppp as above,

(x,p) is strongly truthfulandg(x(t),t)≤n⋅g(y,t)  for all positive t and all allocations y.(x,p)\ \text{is strongly truthful} \quad\text{and}\quad g(x(t),t) \le n \cdot g(y,t)\ \ \text{for all positive } t \text{ and all allocations } y .(x,p) is strongly truthfulandg(x(t),t)≤n⋅g(y,t)  for all positive t and all allocations y.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1 (Groves): a VGC mechanism is truthful. This is an existing platform theorem, used as a reference.
  2. MinWork belongs to the VGC family. Its allocation maximizes ∑ivi(ti,x)\sum_i v^i(t^i,x)∑i​vi(ti,x), and its payment is ∑i′≠ivi′(ti′,x(t))+h−i\sum_{i'\ne i} v^{i'}(t^{i'},x(t)) + h^{-i}∑i′=i​vi′(ti′,x(t))+h−i with h−i=∑jmin⁡i′≠itji′h^{-i} = \sum_j \min_{i'\ne i} t^{i'}_jh−i=∑j​mini′=i​tji′​.
  3. Claim 4.2: MinWork is strongly truthful.
  4. g(x(t),t)≤∑jmin⁡itjig(x(t),t) \le \sum_{j} \min_i t^i_jg(x(t),t)≤∑j​mini​tji​.
  5. g(y,t)≥1n∑jmin⁡itjig(y,t) \ge \frac1n \sum_j \min_i t^i_jg(y,t)≥n1​∑j​mini​tji​ for every allocation yyy.
  6. Claim 4.3: MinWork is an nnn-approximation.

Significance

The theorem gives the first positive result for truthful scheduling: a mechanism that is truthful in the strongest sense and is within a factor nnn of optimal, whatever the tie-breaking rule. Every lower bound in the paper (Theorems 4.6, 4.10 and 4.12) and in the later literature measures itself against this ratio. Since the 2023 resolution of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, the ratio nnn is known to be tight for deterministic truthful mechanisms.

The result is proved in the paper; it is not known to be formalized in any proof assistant. The platform already has Groves' theorem in an abstract form (AGT.vcg_incentive_compatible). This mission connects that abstract statement to a concrete combinatorial mechanism, and it adds the strict part of strong truthfulness for any number of tasks and agents, which the paper proves only for one task and two agents. The vocabulary (make-span over unrelated machines, direct scheduling mechanisms, strong truthfulness) is shared with the seven later missions of this series.

Difficulty

Truthfulness follows from Groves' theorem once MinWork is identified as a VGC mechanism. The identification requires the payment identity at every declared vector and under every tie-breaking rule, including ties at the winning time. The main difficulty is the strict part of strong truthfulness. A misreport that differs from the truth only on one task must still be shown to lose strictly for some declarations of the others. Those declarations must stay positive, and on every other task they must leave the outcome unchanged. The paper's proof covers only one task and two agents and leaves the general case as "similar". Its printed inequality also has the two utilities in the wrong order (see below), so it cannot be transcribed directly.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n and tasks are Fin k. An allocation is a function Fin k → Fin n, and an agent may receive no task. Types are positive reals, and every truthfulness and approximation quantifier ranges over positive true types, positive misreports and positive declarations of the others.
  • Payments are handed to the agent, so utility is the payment minus the true time spent. Payments are computed from the declared vector, never from true types.
  • The allocation rule is a parameter satisfying the MinWork specification (IsMinWorkAlloc). Every result holds for every tie-breaking rule, including rules that depend on the whole declared vector. No particular argmin is fixed.
  • n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 is a hypothesis of the goal and of the truthfulness items: with a single agent the paper's second-best minimum is undefined. The approximation items need only n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. There is no hypothesis on kkk.
  • The make-span and both minima are Finset.sup' / Finset.inf' over nonempty finite sets, so they are true maxima and minima with no default values.
  • Strong truthfulness is formalized as truthfulness plus: every misreport di≠tid^i \ne t^idi=ti is strictly worse than the truth for some positive declarations of the others. Given truthfulness this is equivalent to Definition 5. A formalization that states only that truth-telling is dominant, or proves strictness only for single-task instances, does not meet the goal. Neither does an existential ratio in place of nnn.
  • Printed slip: in the proof of Claim 4.2 (p. 177) the case di>tid^i > t^idi>ti reads "the utility for agent iii is ti−di<0t^i - d^i < 0ti−di<0, instead of 0 in the case of truth-telling". With the Definition 11 payments the misreporting agent loses the task (utility 0), and the truthful agent wins it with utility d3−i−ti>0d^{3-i} - t^i > 0d3−i−ti>0. The milestone text keeps the paper's words; the Lean statements assert what the argument establishes.
  • Out of scope: running time ("polynomial time"), and the paper's general revelation-principle framework (Proposition 2.1).
  • Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, and a reusable lemma connecting the local VGC milestone to AGT.vcg_incentive_compatible.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács, A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture, STOC 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.11905
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Selected Topics in Column Generation III: Ryan–Foster Branching — a Fractional Basic Set-Partitioning Solution Covers Some Row Pair FractionallyResearch Paper

Motivation

Column generation solves linear programs with far too many variables to list: one works with a small subset J′⊆JJ' \subseteq JJ′⊆J of the columns, the restricted master problem (RMP), and adds columns of negative reduced cost as a pricing problem finds them (Lübbecke and Desrosiers 2005, §2.1). Many integer programs from vehicle routing, crew scheduling and crew pairing are reformulated so that the master problem is a set-partitioning problem: every row (a customer, a flight leg, a task) must be covered by exactly one selected column (a route, a pairing, a schedule). The linear relaxation of such a master is solved by column generation, and an integer solution is then sought by branch-and-price, branch-and-bound with column generation at every node.

Branching in branch-and-price is not free. Fixing a master variable λj\lambda_jλj​ to 000 does not stop the pricing problem from regenerating the same column, and handling that complicates the pricing problem. The rule that avoids this for set partitioning goes back to Ryan and Foster (1981): branch on a pair of rows, requiring them to be covered either by the same column or by two different columns. Both requirements are constraints the pricing problem can respect directly. Lübbecke and Desrosiers call it "the most common scheme in conjunction with column generation" (§7.3, p. 1020) and state the proposition that makes it well defined as their Proposition 3.

Timeline:

  • 1981: Ryan and Foster introduce the pair-of-rows branching rule for set partitioning in crew scheduling.
  • 1998: the branch-and-price survey of Barnhart et al. (1998) presents the rule as the branching scheme for set-partitioning masters.
  • 2005: Lübbecke and Desrosiers state it as Proposition 3 of their survey, attributing it to Ryan and Foster without proof.

Setting

Rows are indexed by {1,…,m}\{1, \dots, m\}{1,…,m} and columns by a finite set J′J'J′. A matrix A=(arj)∈{0,1}m×∣J′∣A = (a_{rj}) \in \{0,1\}^{m \times |J'|}A=(arj​)∈{0,1}m×∣J′∣ has every entry equal to 000 or 111; column jjj covers row rrr when arj=1a_{rj} = 1arj​=1. The set-partitioning system of the RMP's linear relaxation is

Aλ=1,λ≥0,λ∈RJ′.A\lambda = \mathbf 1, \qquad \lambda \ge \mathbf 0, \qquad \lambda \in \mathbb R^{J'} .Aλ=1,λ≥0,λ∈RJ′.

A vector λ\lambdaλ is a basic feasible solution of this system when it satisfies all its constraints and, among the constraints active at λ\lambdaλ (the mmm equality rows, and the constraints λj≥0\lambda_j \ge 0λj​≥0 with λj=0\lambda_j = 0λj​=0), there are ∣J′∣|J'|∣J′∣ linearly independent ones. Equivalently, λ\lambdaλ is feasible and the columns of AAA in the support of λ\lambdaλ are linearly independent. A solution is fractional when it is not a 0/10/10/1 vector, λ∉{0,1}∣J′∣\lambda \notin \{0,1\}^{|J'|}λ∈/{0,1}∣J′∣.

For two rows r,sr, sr,s the Ryan–Foster quantity is ∑j∈J′arjasjλj\sum_{j \in J'} a_{rj} a_{sj} \lambda_j∑j∈J′​arj​asj​λj​, written pairCover A lam r s in Lean: the total weight on the columns that cover both rows. For r=sr = sr=s it is the row sum, equal to 111 on every feasible λ\lambdaλ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 1020)

For every 0/10/10/1 matrix AAA and every fractional basic feasible solution λ\lambdaλ of Aλ=1A\lambda = \mathbf 1Aλ=1, λ≥0\lambda \ge \mathbf 0λ≥0,

∃ r,s∈{1,…,m}:0<∑j∈J′arj asj λj<1.\exists\, r, s \in \{1, \dots, m\}: \qquad 0 < \sum_{j \in J'} a_{rj}\, a_{sj}\, \lambda_j < 1 .∃r,s∈{1,…,m}:0<j∈J′∑​arj​asj​λj​<1.

The two rows are automatically distinct. The statement concerns every fractional basic solution, not only an optimal one, and no cost vector enters it.

Milestone: the branches keep every integer solution (§7.3, p. 1020)

For every 0/10/10/1 solution λ∈{0,1}∣J′∣\lambda \in \{0,1\}^{|J'|}λ∈{0,1}∣J′∣ of Aλ=1A\lambda = \mathbf 1Aλ=1 and every pair of rows r,sr, sr,s,

∑j∈J′arj asj λj∈{0,1}.\sum_{j \in J'} a_{rj}\, a_{sj}\, \lambda_j \in \{0, 1\} .j∈J′∑​arj​asj​λj​∈{0,1}.

This is the paper's requirement that "integer solutions remain intact" (p. 1019), specialised to the two branches "=1= 1=1" and "=0= 0=0" of the paragraph after Proposition 3.

Significance

Proposition 3 is what makes Ryan–Foster branching a valid branching scheme in the sense of §7.3: the current fractional solution violates both branches for the chosen pair, so it is excluded from both children, while by the milestone every integer solution survives in one of them. The same pair-of-rows idea underlies branching in bin packing, graph colouring, vehicle routing and crew scheduling codes, where it is used because both branches translate into constraints on the pricing problem rather than on individual master variables.

The paper states the result and refers its proof to Ryan and Foster (1981); no machine-checked version of the proposition is known. This mission produces a formal statement tied to a standard, representation-aware definition of basic solutions (Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis Definition 2.9, already on the platform) and, once proved, a verified lemma that any formal development of branch-and-price for set partitioning can cite.

Difficulty

An argument that uses only feasibility and a fractional coordinate cannot work. Without basicness the claim is false: with one row and two identical columns, A=[1 1]A = [1\ 1]A=[1 1], the vector λ=(12,12)\lambda = (\tfrac12, \tfrac12)λ=(21​,21​) is feasible and fractional, yet the only pair of rows is r=sr = sr=s, whose quantity is 111. The difficulty is to turn basicness, a linear-algebra condition, into a combinatorial statement about which rows the fractional columns cover. A set-partitioning matrix need not have full row rank, so the familiar description of basic solutions through an invertible basis matrix is not available in general.

Formalization scope

  • Rows are Fin m and columns Fin n, so J′J'J′ is identified with {0,…,n−1}\{0, \dots, n-1\}{0,…,n−1}. AAA is a real matrix Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ with the hypothesis IsZeroOneMatrix A (every entry 000 or 111); λ\lambdaλ is lam : Fin n → ℝ, since λ is a Lean keyword. Columns are 0/10/10/1 vectors; the equivalent reading as subsets of the rows is only prose.
  • "Basic solution" is not defined in the paper. It is read as Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis Definition 2.9 for the standard-form constraint family: LinearOptimization.IsBasicFeasibleSolution (LinearOptimization.stdFormSystem A (fun _ => 1)) lam, from the platform definitions BasicSolution and ActiveConstraints. This definition needs no full-row-rank assumption, which a set-partitioning matrix need not satisfy, and it is not replaced by an ad hoc support condition.
  • Typo correction. The paper writes "i.e., λ∉{0,1}m\lambda \notin \{0,1\}^mλ∈/{0,1}m". Since λ\lambdaλ has one coordinate per column, the statement reads it as λ∉{0,1}∣J′∣\lambda \notin \{0,1\}^{|J'|}λ∈/{0,1}∣J′∣: ¬ IsZeroOneVector lam.
  • The rows r,sr, sr,s range over all of {1,…,m}\{1, \dots, m\}{1,…,m}, including r=sr = sr=s, as on the page; no distinctness is assumed or required.
  • "Fractional basic solution" is any such solution, not the RMP optimum; no costs or optimality hypothesis enter.
  • The milestone reads the paragraph after Proposition 3, together with the validity requirement "integer solutions remain intact" (p. 1019), as the dichotomy for all 0/10/10/1 solutions of Aλ=1A\lambda = \mathbf 1Aλ=1. The sentence about transferring the branching information to the pricing problem is not formalized.
  • Edge cases: for m=0m = 0m=0 basicness forces λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0, and for n=0n = 0n=0 the vector is empty; in both cases no fractional basic solution exists and the goal is vacuous, as on the page.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: dropping basicness makes the goal false (the [1 1][1\ 1][1 1] example above), dropping the 0/10/10/1 hypothesis on AAA changes the meaning of the quantity, and replacing "fractional basic" by an unsatisfiable hypothesis would make it empty; the hypotheses are satisfied, for instance, by three rows, the columns {1,2},{2,3},{1,3}\{1,2\}, \{2,3\}, \{1,3\}{1,2},{2,3},{1,3} and λ=(12,12,12)\lambda = (\tfrac12, \tfrac12, \tfrac12)λ=(21​,21​,21​).

A complete development needs linear-algebra facts about basic solutions of standard-form systems without a rank assumption (support columns linearly independent), which are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: that characterization as a lemma, and proofs of the milestone and of the goal.

Selected references

  • M. E. Lübbecke and J. Desrosiers, Selected Topics in Column Generation, Operations Research 53(6):1007–1023, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0234
  • D. M. Ryan and B. A. Foster, An integer programming approach to scheduling, in A. Wren (ed.), Computer Scheduling of Public Transport, North-Holland, 1981, pp. 269–280.
  • C. Barnhart, E. L. Johnson, G. L. Nemhauser, M. W. P. Savelsbergh and P. H. Vance, Branch-and-Price: Column Generation for Solving Huge Integer Programs, Operations Research 46(3):316–329, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.46.3.316
  • D. Bertsimas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Definition 2.9.
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions II: Random Gradient Descent for Smooth and Strongly Convex ProblemsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in engineering, simulation-based design and machine learning give access to the objective only through its values: the function is computed by a black-box code, and derivatives are unavailable or too expensive to program. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods address this setting. Classical derivative-free methods (pattern search, Nelder–Mead, model-based trust regions) come with weak or no global complexity guarantees for convex problems.

Nesterov and Spokoiny (Found. Comput. Math. 17 (2017) 527–566) showed that replacing the gradient by a finite difference along a random Gaussian direction yields methods whose expected complexity is that of the corresponding gradient method multiplied by a factor proportional to the dimension. Their paper is a standard reference for zeroth-order convex optimization and for Gaussian smoothing, and its oracle and analysis are reused in bandit convex optimization, zeroth-order stochastic optimization (e.g. Ghadimi–Lan 2013) and derivative-free reinforcement learning.

This mission concerns Section 5 of the paper: the random gradient method RGμ\mathcal{RG}_\muRGμ​ for smooth convex functions and its linear rate for strongly convex ones.

Setting

Let EEE be a real inner product space of finite dimension nnn, with norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. (The paper works with a space carrying an operator B=B∗≻0B = B^* \succ 0B=B∗≻0 and norm ∥x∥=⟨Bx,x⟩1/2\|x\| = \langle Bx, x\rangle^{1/2}∥x∥=⟨Bx,x⟩1/2; choosing ⟨B⋅,⋅⟩\langle B\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨B⋅,⋅⟩ as the inner product gives exactly this setting, and the dual norm ∥⋅∥∗\|\cdot\|_*∥⋅∥∗​ becomes the norm of the Riesz representative.)

A function f:E→Rf : E \to \mathbb Rf:E→R belongs to C1,1(E)C^{1,1}(E)C1,1(E) with constant L1L_1L1​ if it is differentiable and ∥∇f(x)−∇f(y)∥≤L1∥x−y∥\|\nabla f(x) - \nabla f(y)\| \le L_1\|x - y\|∥∇f(x)−∇f(y)∥≤L1​∥x−y∥ for all x,yx, yx,y. It is strongly convex with parameter τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 if f(y)≥f(x)+⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩+τ2∥y−x∥2f(y) \ge f(x) + \langle \nabla f(x), y - x\rangle + \frac{\tau}{2}\|y-x\|^2f(y)≥f(x)+⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩+2τ​∥y−x∥2 for all x,yx, yx,y.

Let uuu be a standard Gaussian vector of EEE (coordinates in any orthonormal basis are independent N(0,1)N(0,1)N(0,1)). The Gaussian approximation of fff with parameter μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 is fμ(x)=Euf(x+μu)f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E_u f(x + \mu u)fμ​(x)=Eu​f(x+μu), and the moments are Mp=Eu∥u∥pM_p = \mathbb E_u\|u\|^pMp​=Eu​∥u∥p. The random gradient-free oracle returns, for a sampled direction uuu,

B−1gμ(x)=f(x+μu)−f(x)μ u(μ>0),B−1g0(x)=f′(x,u) u,B^{-1}g_\mu(x) = \frac{f(x+\mu u) - f(x)}{\mu}\, u \quad (\mu > 0), \qquad B^{-1}g_0(x) = f'(x,u)\, u,B−1gμ​(x)=μf(x+μu)−f(x)​u(μ>0),B−1g0​(x)=f′(x,u)u,

and the symmetric oracle is B−1g^μ(x)=f(x+μu)−f(x−μu)2μuB^{-1}\hat g_\mu(x) = \frac{f(x+\mu u) - f(x - \mu u)}{2\mu}uB−1g^​μ​(x)=2μf(x+μu)−f(x−μu)​u.

Consider f∗=min⁡x∈Ef(x)f^* = \min_{x\in E} f(x)f∗=minx∈E​f(x) for a convex f∈C1,1(E)f \in C^{1,1}(E)f∈C1,1(E), assumed solvable with a minimizer x∗x^*x∗, and n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. The random gradient method RGμ\mathcal{RG}_\muRGμ​ (Eq. (54), p. 546) is:

Method RGμ\mathcal{RG}_\muRGμ​: Choose x0∈Ex_0 \in Ex0​∈E. Iteration k≥0k \ge 0k≥0. a). Generate uku_kuk​ and corresponding gμ(xk)g_\mu(x_k)gμ​(xk​). b). Compute xk+1=xk−hB−1gμ(xk)x_{k+1} = x_k - hB^{-1}g_\mu(x_k)xk+1​=xk​−hB−1gμ​(xk​).

The directions u0,u1,…u_0, u_1, \dotsu0​,u1​,… are independent standard Gaussian vectors, and ϕk=Ef(xk)\phi_k = \mathbb E f(x_k)ϕk​=Ef(xk​) (with ϕ0=f(x0)\phi_0 = f(x_0)ϕ0​=f(x0​)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8 (p. 546)

With step size h=14(n+4)L1h = \frac{1}{4(n+4)L_1}h=4(n+4)L1​1​ and any μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, for every N≥0N \ge 0N≥0,

1N+1∑k=0N(ϕk−f∗)≤4(n+4)L1∥x0−x∗∥2N+1+9μ2(n+4)2L125,\frac{1}{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}(\phi_k - f^*) \le \frac{4(n+4)L_1\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{N+1} + \frac{9\mu^2(n+4)^2L_1}{25},N+11​k=0∑N​(ϕk​−f∗)≤N+14(n+4)L1​∥x0​−x∗∥2​+259μ2(n+4)2L1​​,

and, if fff is strongly convex with parameter τ>0\tau > 0τ>0, then with δμ=18μ2(n+4)225τL1\delta_\mu = \frac{18\mu^2(n+4)^2}{25\tau}L_1δμ​=25τ18μ2(n+4)2​L1​,

ϕN−f∗≤12L1[δμ+(1−τ8(n+4)L1)N(∥x0−x∗∥2−δμ)].\phi_N - f^* \le \frac12 L_1\left[\delta_\mu + \left(1 - \frac{\tau}{8(n+4)L_1}\right)^{N}\big(\|x_0-x^*\|^2 - \delta_\mu\big)\right].ϕN​−f∗≤21​L1​[δμ​+(1−8(n+4)L1​τ​)N(∥x0​−x∗∥2−δμ​)].

Both bounds are one theorem with one proof in the paper, so the goal states their conjunction, with every constant as printed.

Milestones

The milestones are the results the paper's proof of Theorem 8 rests on, in attack order:

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 534): Mp≤np/2M_p \le n^{p/2}Mp​≤np/2 for p∈[0,2]p \in [0,2]p∈[0,2] and np/2≤Mp≤(p+n)p/2n^{p/2} \le M_p \le (p+n)^{p/2}np/2≤Mp​≤(p+n)p/2 for p≥2p \ge 2p≥2.
  2. Theorem 3.1, (32) (p. 537): Eu∥g0(x)∥∗2≤(n+4)∥∇f(x)∥∗2\mathbb E_u\|g_0(x)\|_*^2 \le (n+4)\|\nabla f(x)\|_*^2Eu​∥g0​(x)∥∗2​≤(n+4)∥∇f(x)∥∗2​ at a point of differentiability.
  3. Theorem 4.2, (35) (p. 538): Eu∥gμ(x)∥∗2≤μ22L12(n+6)3+2(n+4)∥∇f(x)∥∗2\mathbb E_u\|g_\mu(x)\|_*^2 \le \frac{\mu^2}{2}L_1^2(n+6)^3 + 2(n+4)\|\nabla f(x)\|_*^2Eu​∥gμ​(x)∥∗2​≤2μ2​L12​(n+6)3+2(n+4)∥∇f(x)∥∗2​, and the same with μ28\frac{\mu^2}{8}8μ2​ for g^μ\hat g_\mug^​μ​.
  4. Eq. (21) (pp. 534–535): for μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, fμf_\mufμ​ is differentiable with ∇fμ(x)=EuB−1gμ(x)\nabla f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E_u B^{-1}g_\mu(x)∇fμ​(x)=Eu​B−1gμ​(x).
  5. Eq. (25) (p. 535): Eu⟨∇f(x),u⟩u=∇f(x)\mathbb E_u \langle\nabla f(x), u\rangle u = \nabla f(x)Eu​⟨∇f(x),u⟩u=∇f(x), the μ=0\mu = 0μ=0 counterpart.
  6. Convexity of fμf_\mufμ​ (p. 533) and Eq. (11): f≤fμf \le f_\muf≤fμ​ for convex fff.
  7. Theorem 1, (19) (p. 534): ∣fμ(x)−f(x)∣≤μ22L1n|f_\mu(x) - f(x)| \le \frac{\mu^2}{2}L_1 n∣fμ​(x)−f(x)∣≤2μ2​L1​n.

Significance

The result. Theorem 8 shows that a method using two function values per iteration reaches accuracy ϵ\epsilonϵ on a smooth convex problem in O(nϵL1∥x0−x∗∥2)O(\frac{n}{\epsilon}L_1\|x_0 - x^*\|^2)O(ϵn​L1​∥x0​−x∗∥2) iterations, and in O(nL1τln⁡L1∥x0−x∗∥2ϵ)O(\frac{nL_1}{\tau}\ln\frac{L_1\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{\epsilon})O(τnL1​​lnϵL1​∥x0​−x∗∥2​) iterations under strong convexity, provided μ\muμ is small enough. This is nnn times the complexity of the deterministic gradient method, which is the natural price for replacing an nnn-dimensional gradient by one directional estimate. The strongly convex bound makes explicit the bias floor 12L1δμ\frac12 L_1\delta_\mu21​L1​δμ​ caused by the finite-difference step, and shows that it vanishes for the limiting method RG0\mathcal{RG}_0RG0​.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a reusable Gaussian-smoothing layer on Mathlib's stdGaussian (moments of the Gaussian norm, differentiation of fμf_\mufμ​ under the integral, variance bounds of random oracles) and a complete expected-complexity proof of a randomized first-order method, in which the probabilistic structure (independent directions, iterates depending only on past directions, tower property) has to be handled explicitly.

Difficulty

The deterministic part of the argument is the textbook analysis of gradient descent. The difficulty is in the Gaussian facts it uses. The obvious bound on the oracle's second moment, E⟨∇f(x),u⟩2∥u∥2≤∥∇f(x)∥2M4≤(n+4)2∥∇f(x)∥2\mathbb E\langle\nabla f(x),u\rangle^2\|u\|^2 \le \|\nabla f(x)\|^2 M_4 \le (n+4)^2\|\nabla f(x)\|^2E⟨∇f(x),u⟩2∥u∥2≤∥∇f(x)∥2M4​≤(n+4)2∥∇f(x)∥2, loses a factor of nnn and would give a quadratic dependence on dimension; the (n+4)(n+4)(n+4) of (32) needs a sharper computation. The moment bounds of Lemma 1 for non-integer ppp and the differentiation under the integral in (21) are measure-theoretic steps that Mathlib does not package. Finally, the step from per-iteration inequalities to bounds on ϕk\phi_kϕk​ requires conditioning on the past directions, which must be set up on a probability space carrying the whole sequence u0,u1,…u_0, u_1, \dotsu0​,u1​,….

Formalization scope

EEE is an arbitrary finite-dimensional real inner product space with MeasurableSpace and BorelSpace, nnn is Module.finrank ℝ E, and ∇f\nabla f∇f is Mathlib's gradient. Expectations over uuu are Bochner integrals against ProbabilityTheory.stdGaussian E. A run of RGμ\mathcal{RG}_\muRGμ​ lives on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): measurable directions uku_kuk​, jointly independent (iIndepFun) with law stdGaussian E, iterates with x0x_0x0​ deterministic and the update holding for every kkk and outcome. ϕk\phi_kϕk​ is ∫ ω, f (x k ω) ∂P. The oracle is defined by cases, with f′(x,u)uf'(x,u)uf′(x,u)u at μ=0\mu = 0μ=0 (f′(x,u)f'(x,u)f′(x,u) the one-sided directional derivative of Eq. (23), a Filter.limUnder, which equals fderiv ℝ f x u for differentiable fff), so the goal covers every μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 as the paper claims. L1L_1L1​ and τ\tauτ are any constants satisfying the defining inequalities. The standing assumptions of Section 5 (convexity, a global minimizer x∗x^*x∗, n≥2n \ge 2n≥2) and L1>0L_1 > 0L1​>0 are explicit hypotheses; n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 is needed for the constant 9/259/259/25.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the oracle is the random finite difference along i.i.d. standard Gaussian directions, not the true gradient (which would be deterministic gradient descent), and every expectation in the statements is of a quantity that is integrable under the stated hypotheses, so no bound holds through a junk value of a non-integrable integral.

A complete development needs Gaussian moment computations in finite dimension, differentiation under the integral sign for fμf_\mufμ​, the variance bounds of the oracles, and a conditional-expectation argument for the iteration. The smoothing layer is reusable for the companion missions on random search for nonsmooth problems and on the accelerated random method, and for other zeroth-order methods. Contributions of any of the milestones, of general Gaussian-integrability lemmas, or of alternative proofs are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17(2):527–566, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23(4):2341–2368, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • Yu. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization: A Basic Course, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions I: Random Search for Nonsmooth Convex ProblemsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in engineering, simulation-based design and machine learning give access to the values of an objective function but not to its gradient: the function is computed by a black-box program, by a simulator, or by a model whose derivatives are unavailable or too expensive. Zeroth-order (or derivative-free) methods use only function values. Classical direct-search methods of this kind usually come without complexity bounds.

Nesterov and Spokoiny (Found. Comput. Math. 17 (2017) 527–566) showed that a very simple randomized scheme has explicit, dimension-dependent worst-case complexity bounds. The idea is to replace the gradient by a finite difference of fff along a random Gaussian direction. The resulting oracle is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of a smoothed version of fff. Their analysis is the reference point for the later literature on zeroth-order stochastic optimization, bandit convex optimization and gradient-free training.

This mission covers the paper's result for nonsmooth convex problems over a closed convex set: the projected random search method RSμ\mathcal{RS}_\muRSμ​ and its convergence bound, Theorem 6.

Setting

Let EEE be a real inner product space of finite dimension nnn, with norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. (The paper works with a space carrying a positive definite operator BBB and the norm ⟨Bx,x⟩1/2\langle Bx, x\rangle^{1/2}⟨Bx,x⟩1/2. This is the same thing as an arbitrary finite-dimensional inner product space, with BBB encoding the inner product, and the development is written in that generality.)

A function f:E→Rf : E \to \mathbb Rf:E→R is Lipschitz continuous with constant L0≥0L_0 \ge 0L0​≥0 if ∣f(x)−f(y)∣≤L0∥x−y∥|f(x) - f(y)| \le L_0 \|x - y\|∣f(x)−f(y)∣≤L0​∥x−y∥ for all x,yx, yx,y. The paper calls this class C0,0(E)C^{0,0}(E)C0,0(E) and writes L0(f)L_0(f)L0​(f) for the constant.

Let uuu be a standard Gaussian vector in EEE: its coordinates in any orthonormal basis are independent N(0,1)N(0,1)N(0,1) variables. For μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 the Gaussian smoothing of fff is

fμ(x)=Eu f(x+μu),f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E_u\, f(x + \mu u),fμ​(x)=Eu​f(x+μu),

and the Gaussian moments are Mp=Eu∥u∥pM_p = \mathbb E_u \|u\|^pMp​=Eu​∥u∥p.

For μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 the random gradient-free oracle at xxx draws uuu and returns the vector

gμ(x)=f(x+μu)−f(x)μ u.g_\mu(x) = \frac{f(x+\mu u) - f(x)}{\mu}\, u .gμ​(x)=μf(x+μu)−f(x)​u.

It costs two function values.

The problem is

f∗=min⁡x∈Qf(x),f^* = \min_{x \in Q} f(x),f∗=x∈Qmin​f(x),

where Q⊆EQ \subseteq EQ⊆E is closed and convex, fff is convex and Lipschitz, and x∗∈Qx^* \in Qx∗∈Q is a minimizer. With πQ\pi_QπQ​ the Euclidean projection onto QQQ, positive steps h0,h1,…h_0, h_1, \ldotsh0​,h1​,… and a starting point x0∈Qx_0 \in Qx0​∈Q, the random search method RSμ\mathcal{RS}_\muRSμ​ iterates

xk+1=πQ(xk−hk gμ(xk)),x_{k+1} = \pi_Q\big(x_k - h_k\, g_\mu(x_k)\big),xk+1​=πQ​(xk​−hk​gμ​(xk​)),

drawing a fresh independent Gaussian direction uku_kuk​ at every iteration. The iterates are random. Write ϕk=Ef(xk)\phi_k = \mathbb E f(x_k)ϕk​=Ef(xk​) and SN=∑k=0NhkS_N = \sum_{k=0}^N h_kSN​=∑k=0N​hk​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

For every N≥0N \ge 0N≥0,

1SN∑k=0Nhk(ϕk−f∗)≤μL0 n1/2+1SN[12∥x0−x∗∥2+(n+4)22L02∑k=0Nhk2].\frac{1}{S_N}\sum_{k=0}^{N} h_k(\phi_k - f^*) \le \mu L_0\, n^{1/2} + \frac{1}{S_N}\left[\frac12\|x_0 - x^*\|^2 + \frac{(n+4)^2}{2} L_0^2 \sum_{k=0}^{N} h_k^2\right].SN​1​k=0∑N​hk​(ϕk​−f∗)≤μL0​n1/2+SN​1​[21​∥x0​−x∗∥2+2(n+4)2​L02​k=0∑N​hk2​].

The step sizes, the smoothing parameter and the horizon are left free, so every step-size rule in the paper follows from this one inequality. The constants are the paper's.

Milestones

The facts about smoothing and the oracle on which the goal rests, in the paper's order:

  1. Lemma 1: Mp≤np/2M_p \le n^{p/2}Mp​≤np/2 for p∈[0,2]p \in [0,2]p∈[0,2] and np/2≤Mp≤(p+n)p/2n^{p/2} \le M_p \le (p+n)^{p/2}np/2≤Mp​≤(p+n)p/2 for p≥2p \ge 2p≥2.
  2. Theorem 1 (18): ∣fμ(x)−f(x)∣≤μL0n1/2|f_\mu(x) - f(x)| \le \mu L_0 n^{1/2}∣fμ​(x)−f(x)∣≤μL0​n1/2.
  3. Convexity of fμf_\mufμ​ for convex fff.
  4. Eq. (11): fμ≥ff_\mu \ge ffμ​≥f for convex fff.
  5. Eq. (21): ∇fμ(x)=Eu gμ(x)\nabla f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E_u\, g_\mu(x)∇fμ​(x)=Eu​gμ​(x) for μ>0\mu > 0μ>0.
  6. Theorem 4.1 (34): Eu∥gμ(x)∥2≤L02(n+4)2\mathbb E_u \|g_\mu(x)\|^2 \le L_0^2 (n+4)^2Eu​∥gμ​(x)∥2≤L02​(n+4)2.
  7. Theorem 2 (μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0): f(y)≥f(x)−μL0n1/2+⟨∇fμ(x),y−x⟩f(y) \ge f(x) - \mu L_0 n^{1/2} + \langle \nabla f_\mu(x), y - x\ranglef(y)≥f(x)−μL0​n1/2+⟨∇fμ​(x),y−x⟩ for all yyy, where at μ=0\mu = 0μ=0 the vector is the limiting ∇f0(x)=Eu[f′(x,u) u]\nabla f_0(x) = \mathbb E_u[f'(x,u)\,u]∇f0​(x)=Eu​[f′(x,u)u] of Eq. (24).

Significance

Theorem 6 shows that a method using only function values, with no subgradient, solves nonsmooth convex problems with the classical projected-subgradient guarantee. Two things change: L02L_0^2L02​ is multiplied by (n+4)2(n+4)^2(n+4)2, and a bias μL0n1/2\mu L_0 n^{1/2}μL0​n1/2 appears, which can be made as small as desired. With suitable μ\muμ, hkh_khk​ and NNN an ϵ\epsilonϵ-accurate expected value is reached in O(n2L02R2/ϵ2)O(n^2 L_0^2 R^2/\epsilon^2)O(n2L02​R2/ϵ2) oracle calls. The factor n2n^2n2 quantifies the cost of not having gradients. The same analysis carries over to stochastic objectives (the paper's Theorem 7).

The results are proved in the paper. As far as is known, none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean development of Gaussian smoothing on an arbitrary finite-dimensional inner product space: the moment bounds, the approximation, convexity and gradient identities, and the oracle variance bound. On top of it sits the full convergence theorem for a randomized projected method, stated for the actual random process rather than for an idealized expectation recursion. The smoothing layer is reusable: the same facts underlie the smooth and accelerated random methods of the same paper and most Gaussian-smoothing analyses in zeroth-order optimization.

Difficulty

A plain subgradient analysis does not apply. The vector gμ(xk)g_\mu(x_k)gμ​(xk​) is not a subgradient of fff, nor an unbiased estimate of one. It is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of a different function, fμf_\mufμ​, and its second moment grows with the dimension. The argument therefore has to move between fff and fμf_\mufμ​ at exactly the right places, using properties of fμf_\mufμ​ that hold for every nonsmooth Lipschitz fff.

Those properties are genuinely analytic. Differentiating fμf_\mufμ​ requires differentiating a Gaussian integral of a function that need not be differentiable. The moment bounds need estimates of E∥u∥p\mathbb E\|u\|^pE∥u∥p for real ppp. In the probabilistic part, xkx_kxk​ depends on u0,…,uk−1u_0, \ldots, u_{k-1}u0​,…,uk−1​, and each one-step estimate has to be integrated using the independence of uku_kuk​ from the past. Mathlib provides the standard Gaussian measure and independence, but no Gaussian smoothing, no projection onto convex sets and no conditional-expectation argument for this kind of recursion.

Formalization scope

The space is E with [NormedAddCommGroup E] [InnerProductSpace ℝ E] [FiniteDimensional ℝ E] [MeasurableSpace E] [BorelSpace E], and nnn is Module.finrank ℝ E. No lower bound on nnn is assumed. The Gaussian is ProbabilityTheory.stdGaussian E, and expectations are Bochner integrals against it. fμf_\mufμ​ is the definition smoothing, MpM_pMp​ is moment (with real exponent Real.rpow), and gμg_\mugμ​ is oracle.

The projection is the relation IsMetricProjection Q y z (z∈Qz \in Qz∈Q and zzz is a nearest point of QQQ to yyy). The run is the predicate IsRandomSearchRun: directions uk:Ω→Eu_k : \Omega \to Euk​:Ω→E on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), measurable, mutually independent (iIndepFun) and each with law stdGaussian E; a deterministic x0∈Qx_0 \in Qx0​∈Q; and the update above for every kkk and every outcome.

ϕk\phi_kϕk​ is ∫f(xk) dP\int f(x_k)\,dP∫f(xk​)dP. The Lipschitz constant L0≥0L_0 \ge 0L0​≥0 is any constant satisfying the Lipschitz inequality. It is an explicit hypothesis, because the paper's bound uses L0(f)L_0(f)L0​(f), which presupposes f∈C0,0(E)f \in C^{0,0}(E)f∈C0,0(E). The smoothing parameter satisfies μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and every step satisfies hk>0h_k > 0hk​>0.

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out. First, an expectation of a non-integrable function would be 000 as a Bochner integral; Lipschitz continuity of fff makes every expectation in the mission integrable, and no statement relies on the junk value. Second, a run whose directions are not independent standard Gaussians, or whose update uses a subgradient instead of the finite difference, is a different theorem (the projected subgradient method). The run predicate fixes the paper's process exactly. A run exists for every closed QQQ containing x0x_0x0​ (on the countable product of Gaussians), so the goal is not vacuous.

A complete development needs:

  • Gaussian integration by parts, or differentiation under the integral, for Lipschitz integrands;
  • moment estimates for the standard Gaussian norm;
  • existence and nonexpansiveness of projections onto closed convex sets;
  • an expectation argument for the random recursion.

The smoothing lemmas, the moment bounds and the projection facts are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas about stdGaussian and projections, and alternative proofs of Lemma 1 (for example through the chi distribution).

Selected references

  • Yu. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17(2):527–566, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • Yu. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization: A Basic Course, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
  • A. D. Flaxman, A. T. Kalai, H. B. McMahan, Online convex optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient, SODA 2005. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0408007
  • J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, M. J. Wainwright, A. Wibisono, Optimal rates for zero-order convex optimization: the power of two function evaluations, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 61(5):2788–2806, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2139
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CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem I: With a Subadditive Demand Estimator the Two-Index Vehicle Flow Formulation Is ExactResearch Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) asks for delivery routes of minimum cost. Each route starts and ends at a depot, every customer is visited exactly once, and the demand served on a route does not exceed the vehicle capacity. The problem is central in logistics and one of the most studied problems in combinatorial optimization. Its standard exact methods are branch-and-cut algorithms built on the two-index vehicle flow formulation, a 0/1 program over arcs whose capacity constraints are the rounded capacity inequalities (RCIs); see Laporte, Nobert and Desrochers (1985) and Semet, Toth and Vigo (2014).

In practice customer demands are uncertain. A chance-constrained CVRP requires each route to respect its capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under a known distribution. That distribution is rarely known. Most solution methods also need independent demands. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) study the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP. There the chance constraint must hold for every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP of plausible distributions. The ambiguity set may contain dependent distributions and uncountably many of them, so it is not clear a priori that the problem can be solved by the usual branch-and-cut machinery. This mission formalizes the paper's answer to that question: its Theorem 1 and the counterexample that precedes it.

Setting

The graph is complete and directed. Its nodes are V={0,…,n}V=\{0,\dots,n\}V={0,…,n} and its arcs are A={(i,j)∈V×V:i≠j}A=\{(i,j)\in V\times V:i\neq j\}A={(i,j)∈V×V:i=j}. Node 000 is the depot and VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} are the customers. There are mmm vehicles, indexed by K={1,…,m}K=\{1,\dots,m\}K={1,…,m}, each of capacity Q>0Q>0Q>0. Traversing the arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) costs c(i,j)≥0c(i,j)\ge 0c(i,j)≥0; costs may be asymmetric.

A route Rk=(Rk,1,…,Rk,nk)\mathbf R_k=(R_{k,1},\dots,R_{k,n_k})Rk​=(Rk,1​,…,Rk,nk​​) is an ordered list of customers, with Rk,0=Rk,nk+1=0R_{k,0}=R_{k,n_k+1}=0Rk,0​=Rk,nk​+1​=0. A route set R=(R1,…,Rm)∈P(VC,m)\mathbf R=(\mathbf R_1,\dots,\mathbf R_m)\in\mathfrak P(V_C,m)R=(R1​,…,Rm​)∈P(VC​,m) partitions VCV_CVC​ into mmm nonempty ordered routes. Its cost is c(R)=∑k∑l=0nkc(Rk,l,Rk,l+1)c(\mathbf R)=\sum_{k}\sum_{l=0}^{n_k}c(R_{k,l},R_{k,l+1})c(R)=∑k​∑l=0nk​​c(Rk,l​,Rk,l+1​).

The demand vector q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn is random. The ambiguity set P\mathcal PP is a set of probability distributions of q~\tilde{\boldsymbol q}q~​ and ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) is the risk level. The problem RVRP(P\mathcal PP) minimizes c(R)c(\mathbf R)c(R) over route sets such that

P[∑i∈Rkq~i≤Q]≥1−ϵ∀ P∈P, ∀ k∈K.\mathbb P\Big[\textstyle\sum_{i\in\mathbf R_k}\tilde q_i\le Q\Big]\ge 1-\epsilon\qquad\forall\,\mathbb P\in\mathcal P,\ \forall\,k\in K .P[∑i∈Rk​​q~​i​≤Q]≥1−ϵ∀P∈P, ∀k∈K.

With Q-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x:Q[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb Q\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x:\mathbb Q[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}Q-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x:Q[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}, the demand estimator of the paper's Eq. (2) is

dP(S)=max⁡{⌈1Qsup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]⌉,1}(S≠∅),dP(∅)=0.d_{\mathcal P}(S)=\max\left\{\left\lceil\frac1Q\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\right\rceil,1\right\}\quad(S\neq\emptyset),\qquad d_{\mathcal P}(\emptyset)=0 .dP​(S)=max{⌈Q1​P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]⌉,1}(S=∅),dP​(∅)=0.

The problem 2VF(P\mathcal PP) minimizes ∑(i,j)∈Ac(i,j)xij\sum_{(i,j)\in A}c(i,j)x_{ij}∑(i,j)∈A​c(i,j)xij​ over x∈{0,1}Ax\in\{0,1\}^Ax∈{0,1}A with in- and out-degree 111 at every customer and mmm at the depot, and with the RCIs

∑i∈V∖S∑j∈Sxij≥dP(S)∀ S⊆VC, S≠∅.\sum_{i\in V\setminus S}\sum_{j\in S}x_{ij}\ge d_{\mathcal P}(S)\qquad\forall\,S\subseteq V_C,\ S\neq\emptyset .i∈V∖S∑​j∈S∑​xij​≥dP​(S)∀S⊆VC​, S=∅.

A route set induces the arc vector with xij=1x_{ij}=1xij​=1 exactly when (i,j)=(Rk,l,Rk,l+1)(i,j)=(R_{k,l},R_{k,l+1})(i,j)=(Rk,l​,Rk,l+1​) for some k,lk,lk,l (the paper's Eq. (3)). The estimator satisfies the subadditivity condition (S) if dP(S∪T)≤dP(S)+dP(T)d_{\mathcal P}(S\cup T)\le d_{\mathcal P}(S)+d_{\mathcal P}(T)dP​(S∪T)≤dP​(S)+dP​(T) for all S,T⊆VCS,T\subseteq V_CS,T⊆VC​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Assume q~≥0\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q~​≥0 P\mathbb PP-a.s. for all P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P, and assume dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​ is real valued and satisfies (S). Then:

(i)  R feasible in RVRP(P) ⟹ x(R) feasible in 2VF(P),  c(x(R))=c(R);(ii)  x feasible in 2VF(P) ⟹ x=x(R) for an RVRP(P)-feasible R, unique up to reordering routes, c(x)=c(R).\begin{aligned} &\text{(i)}\ \ \mathbf R \text{ feasible in RVRP}(\mathcal P)\ \Longrightarrow\ x(\mathbf R)\text{ feasible in 2VF}(\mathcal P),\ \ c(x(\mathbf R))=c(\mathbf R);\\ &\text{(ii)}\ \ x\text{ feasible in 2VF}(\mathcal P)\ \Longrightarrow\ x=x(\mathbf R)\text{ for an RVRP}(\mathcal P)\text{-feasible }\mathbf R,\text{ unique up to reordering routes},\ c(x)=c(\mathbf R). \end{aligned}​(i)  R feasible in RVRP(P) ⟹ x(R) feasible in 2VF(P),  c(x(R))=c(R);(ii)  x feasible in 2VF(P) ⟹ x=x(R) for an RVRP(P)-feasible R, unique up to reordering routes, c(x)=c(R).​

Milestones

  1. The chance constraint Q[X~≤τ]≥1−ϵ\mathbb Q[\tilde X\le\tau]\ge1-\epsilonQ[X~≤τ]≥1−ϵ is equivalent to Q-VaR1−ϵ[X~]≤τ\mathbb Q\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]\le\tauQ-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]≤τ (p. 720).
  2. Eq. (1): a route satisfies its robust chance constraint if and only if the worst-case VaR of its cumulative demand is at most QQQ.
  3. Example 1: an instance with two customers where a route set is RVRP(P\mathcal PP)-feasible, yet its induced flow violates the RCI for S={1,2}S=\{1,2\}S={1,2}, since dP({1,2})≥3d_{\mathcal P}(\{1,2\})\ge3dP​({1,2})≥3.
  4. Example 1 (continued): on that instance dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​ violates (S).
  5. Theorem 1 (i) and 6. Theorem 1 (ii), stated separately.

Significance

Theorem 1 separates the modeling question from the algorithmic one. Whenever the ambiguity set yields a subadditive estimator, the distributionally robust CVRP is solved exactly by a two-index flow branch-and-cut. The only change from the deterministic case is the right-hand side dP(S)d_{\mathcal P}(S)dP​(S) of the RCIs, however many distributions P\mathcal PP contains. The companion missions of this series show that (S) holds for every moment ambiguity set (Theorem 2 of the paper) and compute dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​ for several classes of such sets. Example 1 shows that the hypothesis cannot be dropped: ambiguity sets that pin down each customer's marginal distribution break the equivalence.

The paper's proofs are in its online supplement; no machine-checked version of these statements exists. Formalizing them produces a checked reduction between a stochastic routing model and an integer program. It also produces reusable definitions of route sets, induced arc flows and RCIs over directed graphs with a depot.

Difficulty

Direction (ii) is a graph decomposition. A 0/1 vector with the prescribed degrees splits into mmm depot cycles plus possibly depot-free subtours. The RCIs, through the max⁡{⋅,1}\max\{\cdot,1\}max{⋅,1} in dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​, must exclude the subtours, and the RCI on the customers of a single route must enforce that route's chance constraint. Uniqueness up to reordering requires that directed routes are recovered from arcs.

Direction (i) is where (S) enters. The naive argument bounds the number of vehicles entering SSS by dP(S)d_{\mathcal P}(S)dP​(S) directly from the chance constraints. It fails because the chance constraints control each route separately, while dP(S)d_{\mathcal P}(S)dP​(S) looks at the joint worst case of the demands in SSS; Example 1 is exactly this failure. A set SSS is typically visited by several routes, each covering only part of it. Relating the per-route guarantees to the joint quantity dP(S)d_{\mathcal P}(S)dP​(S) needs both hypotheses of the theorem: nonnegative demands and (S).

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based; the paper's customer iii is i - 1). Nodes are Fin (n+1) with the depot 0 and customer i at i.succ, and vehicles are Fin m. A route set is R : Fin m → List (Fin n): every route is nonempty and the concatenated routes are a permutation of all customers. Arc vectors are ℕ-valued functions on ordered node pairs, with values in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and the non-arcs (i,i)(i,i)(i,i) fixed to 000.

Distributions are measures on Fin n → ℝ, and the ambiguity set is a set of probability measures. Chance constraints are written ENNReal.ofReal (1 - ε) ≤ P {q | …}. Value-at-risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1 - ε. The worst-case VaR is a real sSup and dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​ is integer valued.

Two conventions implicit on the page are explicit hypotheses:

  • Q>0Q>0Q>0, because (2) divides by QQQ;
  • boundedness of the VaR values for every customer set, which encodes the paper's declaration dP:2VC→R+d_{\mathcal P}:2^{V_C}\to\mathbb R_+dP​:2VC​→R+​.

A real sSup of an unbounded set is 000 in Lean. Without the boundedness hypothesis every such estimator would silently equal 111 and (ii) would fail. For an empty ambiguity set the Lean estimator equals 111 on nonempty sets, as the paper's does.

The RCIs range over all nonempty customer sets with the depot on the outside. The estimator keeps the ceiling and the max⁡{⋅,1}\max\{\cdot,1\}max{⋅,1}. 2VF feasibility mentions neither routes nor chance constraints. RVRP feasibility does not mention dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​. A formalization in which either side refers to the other, or in which dPd_{\mathcal P}dP​ drops the max⁡{⋅,1}\max\{\cdot,1\}max{⋅,1}, is not this theorem.

Useful contributions include lemmas on the decomposition of degree-constrained 0/1 arc vectors into depot cycles, monotonicity of VaR under almost-sure ordering, and the CDF right-continuity behind milestone 1.

Related platform work: SupplyChainTheory_vrp formalizes a different, symmetric, unit-demand VRP and is not reused.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal, W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert, M. Desrochers, Optimal routing under capacity and distance restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
  • F. Semet, P. Toth, D. Vigo, Classical exact algorithms for the capacitated vehicle routing problem, in P. Toth, D. Vigo (eds.), Vehicle Routing: Problems, Methods, and Applications, 2nd ed., SIAM, 2014, 37–57. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973594.ch2
  • J. Lysgaard, A. N. Letchford, R. W. Eglese, A new branch-and-cut algorithm for the capacitated vehicle routing problem, Mathematical Programming 100(2):423–445, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0481-8
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Best Arm Identification with Fixed Confidence III: δ-PAC Guarantee of Chernoff's Stopping Rule for Bernoulli BanditsResearch Paper

Motivation

In best arm identification with fixed confidence, a learner samples KKK unknown distributions ("arms") one at a time, and must eventually stop and name the arm with the largest mean, with an error probability at most a prescribed risk δ\deltaδ, while using as few samples as possible. The problem goes back to the sequential design of experiments (Chernoff, 1959; Even-Dar, Mannor and Mansour, 2006) and underlies adaptive A/B testing, clinical trial design and hyperparameter selection.

Any fixed-confidence strategy consists of three parts: a sampling rule, a stopping rule and a decision rule. Garivier and Kaufmann (arXiv:1602.04589, COLT 2016) proposed the Track-and-Stop strategy, the first shown to match the asymptotic lower bound on the expected sample complexity. Its stopping rule is a generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) test, Chernoff's stopping rule. Its correctness, the guarantee that the recommended arm is wrong with probability at most δ\deltaδ, must hold whatever the sampling rule, which is what allows the sampling rule to be tuned freely for efficiency. This mission formalizes that guarantee for Bernoulli arms, Theorem 10 of the paper, with its explicit threshold β(t,δ)=log⁡(2t(K−1)/δ)\beta(t,\delta) = \log(2t(K-1)/\delta)β(t,δ)=log(2t(K−1)/δ).

Setting

The arms are A={1,…,K}\mathcal A = \{1,\dots,K\}A={1,…,K}. A Bernoulli bandit model is a mean vector μ=(μ1,…,μK)∈[0,1]K\boldsymbol\mu = (\mu_1,\dots,\mu_K) \in [0,1]^Kμ=(μ1​,…,μK​)∈[0,1]K: pulling arm aaa returns reward 111 with probability μa\mu_aμa​ and 000 otherwise, independently of the past. The class S\mathcal SS contains the models with a unique optimal arm a∗(μ)a^*(\boldsymbol\mu)a∗(μ), i.e. μa∗>μi\mu_{a^*} > \mu_iμa∗​>μi​ for all i≠a∗i \ne a^*i=a∗.

At round ttt the learner chooses an arm AtA_tAt​ as a (possibly randomized) function of the past observations and observes a reward XtX_tXt​. Write Na(t)N_a(t)Na​(t) for the number of pulls of arm aaa among the first ttt rounds, sa(t)s_a(t)sa​(t) for the number of those pulls that returned 111, and μ^a(t)=Na(t)−1∑s≤tXs1{As=a}\hat\mu_a(t) = N_a(t)^{-1}\sum_{s \le t} X_s \mathbb 1\{A_s = a\}μ^​a​(t)=Na​(t)−1∑s≤t​Xs​1{As​=a} for the empirical mean. The likelihood of arm aaa's observations under mean uuu is pu(X‾Na(t)a)=usa(t)(1−u)Na(t)−sa(t)p_u(\underline X^a_{N_a(t)}) = u^{s_a(t)}(1-u)^{N_a(t)-s_a(t)}pu​(X​Na​(t)a​)=usa​(t)(1−u)Na​(t)−sa​(t).

The GLR statistic for "arm aaa is at least as good as arm bbb" is

Za,b(t)=log⁡max⁡μa′≥μb′pμa′(X‾Na(t)a) pμb′(X‾Nb(t)b)max⁡μa′≤μb′pμa′(X‾Na(t)a) pμb′(X‾Nb(t)b).Z_{a,b}(t) = \log \frac{\max_{\mu'_a \ge \mu'_b} p_{\mu'_a}(\underline X^a_{N_a(t)})\, p_{\mu'_b}(\underline X^b_{N_b(t)})}{\max_{\mu'_a \le \mu'_b} p_{\mu'_a}(\underline X^a_{N_a(t)})\, p_{\mu'_b}(\underline X^b_{N_b(t)})}.Za,b​(t)=logmaxμa′​≤μb′​​pμa′​​(X​Na​(t)a​)pμb′​​(X​Nb​(t)b​)maxμa′​≥μb′​​pμa′​​(X​Na​(t)a​)pμb′​​(X​Nb​(t)b​)​.

Chernoff's stopping rule with exploration rate β(t,δ)\beta(t,\delta)β(t,δ) is

τδ=inf⁡{t≥1:∃a∈A, ∀b≠a, Za,b(t)>β(t,δ)},\tau_\delta = \inf\{t \ge 1 : \exists a \in \mathcal A,\ \forall b \ne a,\ Z_{a,b}(t) > \beta(t,\delta)\},τδ​=inf{t≥1:∃a∈A, ∀b=a, Za,b​(t)>β(t,δ)},

and the decision rule recommends a^τδ∈argmax⁡aμ^a(τδ)\hat a_{\tau_\delta} \in \operatorname{argmax}_a \hat\mu_a(\tau_\delta)a^τδ​​∈argmaxa​μ^​a​(τδ​).

The Krichevsky–Trofimov (KT) distribution on binary sequences x∈{0,1}nx \in \{0,1\}^nx∈{0,1}n is kt(x)=∫01(πu(1−u))−1pu(x) du\mathrm{kt}(x) = \int_0^1 \big(\pi\sqrt{u(1-u)}\big)^{-1} p_u(x)\,\mathrm dukt(x)=∫01​(πu(1−u)​)−1pu​(x)du, the Bernoulli likelihood mixed over the Beta(1/2,1/2)(1/2,1/2)(1/2,1/2) prior.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10

For every δ∈(0,1)\delta \in (0,1)δ∈(0,1), every sampling strategy, and the threshold β(t,δ)=log⁡(2t(K−1)/δ)\beta(t,\delta) = \log\big(2t(K-1)/\delta\big)β(t,δ)=log(2t(K−1)/δ),

∀μ∈S,Pμ(τδ<∞, a^τδ≠a∗)≤δ.\forall \boldsymbol\mu \in \mathcal S,\qquad \mathbb P_{\boldsymbol\mu}\big(\tau_\delta < \infty,\ \hat a_{\tau_\delta} \ne a^*\big) \le \delta .∀μ∈S,Pμ​(τδ​<∞, a^τδ​​=a∗)≤δ.

Milestone: Lemma 11 (Willems, Shtarkov and Tjalkens, 1995)

kt\mathrm{kt}kt is a probability law on {0,1}n\{0,1\}^n{0,1}n, and for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1,

sup⁡x∈{0,1}n sup⁡u∈[0,1]pu(x)kt(x)≤2n.\sup_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}\ \sup_{u\in[0,1]} \frac{p_u(x)}{\mathrm{kt}(x)} \le 2\sqrt n .x∈{0,1}nsup​ u∈[0,1]sup​kt(x)pu​(x)​≤2n​.

Milestone: the pairwise crossing bound of Appendix C.1

With Ta,b=inf⁡{t:Za,b(t)>β(t,δ)}T_{a,b} = \inf\{t : Z_{a,b}(t) > \beta(t,\delta)\}Ta,b​=inf{t:Za,b​(t)>β(t,δ)}, for all arms with μa<μb\mu_a < \mu_bμa​<μb​,

Pμ(Ta,b<∞)≤δK−1.\mathbb P_{\boldsymbol\mu}(T_{a,b} < \infty) \le \frac{\delta}{K-1}.Pμ​(Ta,b​<∞)≤K−1δ​.

Significance

Theorem 10 decouples correctness from efficiency. Because the guarantee holds for every sampling strategy, any sampling rule, including the C-Tracking and D-Tracking rules of Track-and-Stop, the uniform rule, or a heuristic, inherits δ\deltaδ-correctness as soon as it is paired with Chernoff's stopping rule at this threshold. The asymptotic optimality result of the paper (Theorem 14) then only has to control the sample complexity. The threshold is explicit, with no unspecified constant, in contrast to the deviational threshold of Proposition 12.

The result is proved in the paper, in Appendix C.1, and rests on Lemma 11, which the paper quotes from the universal coding literature without proof. As far as the platform's catalog shows, none of these results is formalized. The platform holds a machine-checkable statement of the analogous result for Gaussian arms with the Lattimore–Szepesvári threshold (BanditAlgorithm.chernoff_stopping_rule_sound, Lemma 33.7 of Bandit Algorithms), which is a different model and a different threshold. Formalizing Theorem 10 adds a proof of Lemma 11 (the KT regret bound, reusable in information theory and universal prediction), the Bernoulli GLR statistic, and a change of measure from the true bandit law to a Bayesian mixture law on the trajectory space.

Difficulty

The obvious approach bounds, for each fixed ttt, the probability that Za,b(t)Z_{a,b}(t)Za,b​(t) exceeds β(t,δ)\beta(t,\delta)β(t,δ) by a concentration inequality and sums over ttt. This fails: the sampling strategy is arbitrary and adaptive, so Na(t)N_a(t)Na​(t) and Nb(t)N_b(t)Nb​(t) are random and depend on the past rewards, and a fixed-sample-size deviation bound does not apply; a union bound over the possible values of the counts loses more than the threshold allows. The maximum likelihood in the numerator of Za,bZ_{a,b}Za,b​ is also not a probability density, so the likelihood ratio cannot directly be read as a change of measure. The argument must control the whole trajectory law under an arbitrary randomized policy, and must handle empty samples (an arm never pulled contributes likelihood 111) and the boundary means 000 and 111.

Formalization scope

The formalization is in Lean 4 with Mathlib and reuses the platform's canonical bandit model: StochasticBandit, BanditPolicy (a Markov kernel per round from the observed history to the next arm, so randomized strategies are included), banditTrajMeasure (the law of the infinite trajectory, where coordinate sss is round s+1s+1s+1) and IsSoundBAI from BanditTrajectory; bernoulliBandit from bernoulliRelativeEntropy; and only the pull counts trajPullCount and empirical means trajEmpiricalMean from TrackAndStop. The Gaussian GLR and threshold of TrackAndStop are not used.

Conventions committed to:

  • Arms are Fin K. Bernoulli means range over [0,1][0,1][0,1], degenerate laws included; the paper's exponential-family mean space is (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), so the [0,1][0,1][0,1] statement implies the paper's.
  • Za,b(t)Z_{a,b}(t)Za,b​(t) is defined as the ratio of the two maxima over [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2, not by the closed form (7), which holds only when μ^a(t)≥μ^b(t)\hat\mu_a(t) \ge \hat\mu_b(t)μ^​a​(t)≥μ^​b​(t). Both maxima are attained and positive.
  • The stopping rule ranges over t≥1t \ge 1t≥1; at t=0t = 0t=0 there is no observation and the paper's β(0,δ)=log⁡0\beta(0,\delta) = \log 0β(0,δ)=log0 is undefined. τδ=∞\tau_\delta = \inftyτδ​=∞ when the rule never fires.
  • The decision rule is quantified: the goal holds for every recommendation that maximizes the empirical mean at τδ\tau_\deltaτδ​, whatever the tie-breaking.
  • Probabilities of events are outer measures under the trajectory law; no measurability is assumed.
  • K≥1K \ge 1K≥1 only. For K=1K = 1K=1 the statement is trivially true (no suboptimal arm).

Disclosed deviations from the page: Lemma 11's ratio bound is stated for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, since at n=0n = 0n=0 the printed bound reads 1≤01 \le 01≤0; the use of the lemma in Appendix C.1 is unaffected. Appendix C.1 calls the result "Proposition 10" (a slip for Theorem 10) and prints the KT density as 1/πu(1−u)1/\sqrt{\pi u(1-u)}1/πu(1−u)​ (a slip for 1/(πu(1−u))1/(\pi\sqrt{u(1-u)})1/(πu(1−u)​) of Lemma 11, which is the normalized one); the formalization follows Lemma 11.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: stating the result for Gaussian arms or with the Lattimore–Szepesvári threshold is the platform's existing Lemma 33.7 and is not Theorem 10, and a free decision rule without the argmax hypothesis would make the claim false rather than faithful.

Contributions welcome: a proof of Lemma 11; a change-of-measure lemma for banditTrajMeasure under a mixture of environments; and the union-bound reduction from the goal to the pairwise claim.

Selected references

  • A. Garivier, E. Kaufmann, Optimal Best Arm Identification with Fixed Confidence, COLT 2016 (JMLR W&CP 49), arXiv:1602.04589v2, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04589
  • F. M. J. Willems, Y. M. Shtarkov, T. J. Tjalkens, The context-tree weighting method: basic properties, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 41(3), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1109/18.382012
  • R. Krichevsky, V. Trofimov, The performance of universal encoding, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 27(2), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1981.1056331
  • H. Chernoff, Sequential design of experiments, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30(3), 1959. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177706205
  • T. Lattimore, C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020, Chapter 33. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571401
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders IV: A Truthful Value-Query Mechanism for Subadditive BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers several indivisible items at once, and bidders value bundles of items rather than items one at a time. Allocating the items to maximize total value is the central optimization problem of the area, and it arises in spectrum licensing, procurement and transport contracting (Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg, Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006). Two obstacles meet. Computationally, a valuation has 2m2^m2m numbers, so an algorithm can only query it, and even then optimization is hard. Strategically, the valuations are private: a bidder reports whatever maximizes its own utility, so an algorithm that is a good approximation on true inputs may be useless on reported ones.

The classical answer to the strategic obstacle is the VCG payment scheme, which makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy but requires the exact optimum. Nisan and Ronen (2007) showed that an approximation algorithm becomes truthful under VCG payments essentially only when it is maximal in range: it fixes a restricted set of allocations in advance and optimizes exactly over that set. Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010, §5) give such an algorithm for complement-free (subadditive) bidders that uses only value queries and loses a factor of order m\sqrt mm​. For general valuations in the value-query model the paper cites a lower bound of order m/log⁡mm/\log mm/logm (Dobzinski and Schapira, working paper 2005; Blumrosen and Nisan, Hebrew University Discussion Paper 381, 2005; see the paper's references [7] and [2]), and the same paper (Theorem 6.1) shows that even XOS bidders cannot be approximated within m1/2−ϵm^{1/2-\epsilon}m1/2−ϵ with polynomially many value queries.

Setting

A set M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} of items is sold to nnn bidders. Bidder iii has a valuation viv_ivi​ that assigns a real number vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) to every bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. Throughout, valuations are normalized, vi(∅)=0v_i(\emptyset)=0vi​(∅)=0, and monotone, S⊆T⇒vi(S)≤vi(T)S\subseteq T\Rightarrow v_i(S)\le v_i(T)S⊆T⇒vi​(S)≤vi​(T). A valuation is complement free (CF) if v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T)v(S\cup T)\le v(S)+v(T)v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T) for all bundles S,TS,TS,T. An allocation A=(A1,…,An)A=(A_1,\dots,A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​) gives the bidders pairwise disjoint bundles (items may stay unallocated), and its social welfare is ∑ivi(Ai)\sum_i v_i(A_i)∑i​vi​(Ai​).

The mechanism receives reports b=(b1,…,bn)b=(b_1,\dots,b_n)b=(b1​,…,bn​) and runs the following algorithm ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG:

  1. query bi(M)b_i(M)bi​(M) and bi({j})b_i(\{j\})bi​({j}) for every bidder iii and item jjj;
  2. compute a maximum-weight matching PPP in the complete bipartite graph between items and bidders, where the edge between item jjj and bidder iii costs bi({j})b_i(\{j\})bi​({j});
  3. if the bidder ttt maximizing bi(M)b_i(M)bi​(M) has bt(M)b_t(M)bt​(M) strictly larger than the weight ∣P∣|P|∣P∣, give all items to ttt; otherwise give every item matched by PPP to its matched bidder.

Its range RRR is the set of allocations that give all of MMM to one bidder, together with the allocations in which every bidder receives at most one item. Under VCG payments bidder iii receives ∑k≠ibk(ALG(b)k)\sum_{k\ne i}b_k(\mathrm{ALG}(b)_k)∑k=i​bk​(ALG(b)k​), so its utility is vi(ALG(b)i)+∑k≠ibk(ALG(b)k)v_i(\mathrm{ALG}(b)_i)+\sum_{k\ne i}b_k(\mathrm{ALG}(b)_k)vi​(ALG(b)i​)+∑k=i​bk​(ALG(b)k​). The mechanism is incentive compatible on a class of valuations if no bidder can raise its utility by misreporting within that class, whatever the others report.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 11)

For every choice of the maximum-weight matching and of the top bidder as functions of the reports, for every profile vvv of normalized, monotone, CF valuations and every allocation OOO,

∑i=1nvi(Oi)  ≤  2m ∑i=1nvi(ALG(v)i),\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(O_i)\;\le\;2\sqrt m\,\sum_{i=1}^n v_i\big(\mathrm{ALG}(v)_i\big),i=1∑n​vi​(Oi​)≤2m​i=1∑n​vi​(ALG(v)i​),

and the mechanism (ALG,VCG payments)(\mathrm{ALG},\text{VCG payments})(ALG,VCG payments) is incentive compatible on the CF valuations.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. §5.1, VCG. Welfare maximization with Groves payments is incentive compatible (a published platform theorem, AGT.vcg_incentive_compatible).
  2. §5.1, maximal in range. Any allocation rule that optimizes reported welfare exactly over a fixed range is incentive compatible under VCG payments on the same domain.
  3. ALG is maximal in range with range RRR on normalized reports.
  4. The CF single-item bound. For a CF valuation and c∈Tc\in Tc∈T maximizing v({j})v(\{j\})v({j}) over TTT: v(T)≤∑j∈Tv({j})≤∣T∣ v({c})v(T)\le\sum_{j\in T}v(\{j\})\le|T|\,v(\{c\})v(T)≤∑j∈T​v({j})≤∣T∣v({c}).
  5. First case. If bidders with ∣Oi∣≥m|O_i|\ge\sqrt m∣Oi​∣≥m​ carry at least half the welfare of OOO, then ∑ivi(Oi)≤2m vt(M)\sum_i v_i(O_i)\le 2\sqrt m\,v_t(M)∑i​vi​(Oi​)≤2m​vt​(M) for the top bidder ttt.
  6. Second case. Otherwise some allocation in which every bidder gets at most one item has welfare at least ∑ivi(Oi)/(2m)\sum_i v_i(O_i)/(2\sqrt m)∑i​vi​(Oi​)/(2m​).

Significance

The theorem shows that, for subadditive bidders, the m\sqrt mm​ barrier known for general valuations can be matched by a truthful mechanism that asks each bidder only m+1m+1m+1 value queries. It is one of the early examples of maximal-in-range mechanism design, a template later used for many truthful approximation mechanisms in combinatorial auctions, and it sits against Theorem 6.1 of the same paper, which shows that for XOS bidders no value-query algorithm with polynomially many queries does better than m1/2−ϵm^{1/2-\epsilon}m1/2−ϵ.

The result is proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof: a formal model of VCG-based mechanisms over a restricted range, a proof that the §5.2 algorithm is maximal in range for every tie-breaking of its two optimization steps, and the explicit constant 222 in the O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​) bound. To our knowledge neither half of Theorem 5.1 is formalized elsewhere; the general VCG theorem exists on the platform in the setting of arbitrary outcome sets.

Difficulty

The approximation argument partitions the bidders of a reference allocation by whether their bundles have at least m\sqrt mm​ items, and the two cases need different facts: disjointness bounds the number of large bundles by m\sqrt mm​, and subadditivity bounds each small bundle by its size times its best item. A naive transcription breaks at degenerate inputs: the page divides by ∣Ti∣|T_i|∣Ti​∣ and writes strict inequalities, both of which fail when a bundle is empty or all values are zero, so the formal statement must be organized around non-strict bounds.

Incentive compatibility has a different obstacle. It holds only if the allocation rule depends on the reports alone and optimizes exactly over its range, including at ties between the grand bundle and the matching. The matching and the top bidder are not unique, so the proof must work for an arbitrary but fixed tie-breaking, and the welfare of the matching allocation must be identified with the matching weight, which uses normalization of every bidder who receives nothing.

Formalization scope

Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), valuations Finset (Fin m) → ℝ. Normalization and monotonicity (the paper's standing assumptions, p. 1) and complement freedom are hypotheses; IsCFValuation bundles all three. An allocation is a family of pairwise disjoint bundles; unallocated items are allowed. A matching is a partial map Fin m → Option (Fin n) with no bidder matched twice.

Conventions the formalization commits to:

  • Explicit constant. The paper writes O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​); its proof yields 2m2\sqrt m2m​ (both cases end with ∣OPT∣/(2m)|OPT|/(2\sqrt m)∣OPT∣/(2m​)), and the goal states 2m2\sqrt m2m​ with Real.sqrt m.
  • Oracles and ties. The maximum-weight matching and the top bidder enter as functions mat, top of the report profile, each with a specification hypothesis; the goal is stated for every such pair. The algorithm reads only the reports; the tie between bt(M)b_t(M)bt​(M) and ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ goes to the matching, as on the page.
  • Payments. The mechanism pays each bidder ∑k≠ibk(⋅)\sum_{k\ne i}b_k(\cdot)∑k=i​bk​(⋅), the paper's convention (footnote 2, p. 11); incentive compatibility is stated on the CF domain, the paper's. The local definition mirrors AGT.MechIncentiveCompatible on outcomes a↦vi(ai)a\mapsto v_i(a_i)a↦vi​(ai​).
  • Reference allocation. The approximation is stated against every allocation OOO, not only an optimal one; this is equivalent and avoids a junk maximum.
  • Printed slips. The strict inequalities and the division by ∣Ti∣|T_i|∣Ti​∣ in the second case are replaced by non-strict, multiplied forms; the first case concludes for a bidder maximizing vi(M)v_i(M)vi​(M) rather than vi(Oi)v_i(O_i)vi​(Oi​).
  • Degenerate sizes. At m=0m=0m=0 everything is zero and the bound holds trivially; with n=0n=0n=0 no top-bidder rule exists.
  • Out of scope. "In polynomial time" is a running-time claim and is not modelled.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the ratio is the explicit 2m2\sqrt m2m​ rather than an existential constant, incentive compatibility is over the full CF domain (not additive reports only) for a rule that cannot see true valuations, and the rules mat, top are satisfiable (a maximum over the finitely many matchings exists; a top bidder exists when n≥1n\ge1n≥1).

Useful infrastructure: finite maximum-weight matchings on complete bipartite graphs, subadditivity bounds over Finset sums, and a reusable lemma that maximal-in-range rules with VCG payments are truthful. Contributions of any milestone are welcome; milestones 2 and 4 are self-contained.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 29:19–47, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2046
  • S. Dobzinski, M. Schapira, Optimal Upper and Lower Approximation Bounds for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions, working paper, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2005 (reference [7] of the paper).
  • L. Blumrosen, N. Nisan, On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries, Discussion Paper 381, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2005 (reference [2] of the paper).
  • N. Nisan, Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists), in N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 209–242.
  • P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006.
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices 2: The Robust Bellman Recursion for Discounted Infinite-Horizon MDPsResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) is solved by dynamic programming only when its transition probabilities are known. In practice they are estimated from data, and the optimal policy of the estimated model can perform badly on the true one. Nilim and El Ghaoui (Oper. Res. 53(5), 2005) showed that, when the uncertainty on the transition matrices has a product ("rectangular") structure, the robust problem, in which the controller minimises the worst expected cost over all admissible transition matrices, keeps the structure of dynamic programming. The robust Bellman operator replaces the expectation of the next-stage value by a support function of the uncertainty set. That operator is the basis of later work on robust MDPs and robust reinforcement learning.

Timeline:

  • Bagnell, Ng and Schneider (2001) considered the max–min value ψ∞(Π,T)\psi_\infty(\Pi, \mathcal T)ψ∞​(Π,T) and stated without proof that it is computed by the recursion below.
  • Iyengar (Math. Oper. Res. 30(2), 2005; technical report 2003) independently proved the robust Bellman recursion for the discounted infinite-horizon case.
  • Nilim and El Ghaoui (2005), Theorem 3, prove the recursion and perfect duality of the stationary discounted game. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

The state space is X={1,…,n}\mathcal X = \{1,\dots,n\}X={1,…,n} and the action set A\mathcal AA is finite and nonempty. Each state–action pair has a cost c(i,a)≥0c(i,a) \ge 0c(i,a)≥0, and costs are discounted by a factor ν∈[0,1)\nu \in [0,1)ν∈[0,1): the cost at stage ttt is νtc(i,a)\nu^t c(i,a)νtc(i,a).

Write Δn={p∈R+n:pT1=1}\Delta_n = \{p \in \mathbb R^n_+ : p^T\mathbf 1 = 1\}Δn​={p∈R+n​:pT1=1} for the probability simplex. For each action aaa and state iii a nonempty set Pia⊆Δn\mathcal P_i^a \subseteq \Delta_nPia​⊆Δn​ is given. It is the set of distributions of the next state that nature may use from state iii under action aaa. No convexity or closedness is assumed. Uncertainty is rectangular: the admissible transition matrices for action aaa form the product Pa=P1a×⋯×Pna\mathcal P^a = \mathcal P_1^a \times \cdots \times \mathcal P_n^aPa=P1a​×⋯×Pna​, so every row is chosen independently.

A stationary control policy π=(a,a,… )\pi = (\mathbf a, \mathbf a, \dots)π=(a,a,…) applies one decision rule a:X→A\mathbf a : \mathcal X \to \mathcal Aa:X→A at every stage; Πs\Pi_sΠs​ is the set of them. A stationary policy of nature τ∈Ts\tau \in \mathcal T_sτ∈Ts​ fixes one matrix Pa∈PaP^a \in \mathcal P^aPa∈Pa for each action and uses it forever. Nature chooses after the controller.

From an initial state i0i_0i0​, the state distribution evolves as μ0=ei0\mu_0 = e_{i_0}μ0​=ei0​​, μt+1(j)=∑iμt(i)Pa(i)(i,j)\mu_{t+1}(j) = \sum_i \mu_t(i) P^{\mathbf a(i)}(i,j)μt+1​(j)=∑i​μt​(i)Pa(i)(i,j). The discounted cost is

C∞(π,τ)=∑t≥0νt∑iμt(i) c(i,a(i)).C_\infty(\pi,\tau) = \sum_{t\ge 0} \nu^t \sum_i \mu_t(i)\, c(i,\mathbf a(i)).C∞​(π,τ)=t≥0∑​νti∑​μt​(i)c(i,a(i)).

The support function of a set P\mathcal PP is σP(v)=sup⁡{pTv:p∈P}\sigma_{\mathcal P}(v) = \sup\{p^T v : p \in \mathcal P\}σP​(v)=sup{pTv:p∈P}. The robust Bellman operator ggg and, for a stationary policy π\piπ, the robust evaluation operator gπg_\pigπ​ act on v∈Rnv \in \mathbb R^nv∈Rn by

g(v)i=min⁡a∈A(c(i,a)+ν σPia(v)),gπ(v)i=c(i,a(i))+ν σPia(i)(v).g(v)_i = \min_{a\in\mathcal A}\big(c(i,a) + \nu\,\sigma_{\mathcal P_i^a}(v)\big), \qquad g_\pi(v)_i = c(i,\mathbf a(i)) + \nu\,\sigma_{\mathcal P_i^{\mathbf a(i)}}(v).g(v)i​=a∈Amin​(c(i,a)+νσPia​​(v)),gπ​(v)i​=c(i,a(i))+νσPia(i)​​(v).

The two values of the game are

ϕ∞(Πs,Ts)=min⁡π∈Πssup⁡τ∈TsC∞(π,τ),ψ∞(Πs,Ts)=sup⁡τ∈Tsmin⁡π∈ΠsC∞(π,τ).\phi_\infty(\Pi_s,\mathcal T_s) = \min_{\pi\in\Pi_s}\sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_s} C_\infty(\pi,\tau), \qquad \psi_\infty(\Pi_s,\mathcal T_s) = \sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_s}\min_{\pi\in\Pi_s} C_\infty(\pi,\tau).ϕ∞​(Πs​,Ts​)=π∈Πs​min​τ∈Ts​sup​C∞​(π,τ),ψ∞​(Πs​,Ts​)=τ∈Ts​sup​π∈Πs​min​C∞​(π,τ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (Robust Bellman Recursion)

There is a unique v∈Rnv \in \mathbb R^nv∈Rn with v=g(v)v = g(v)v=g(v), i.e.

v(i)=min⁡a∈A(c(i,a)+ν σPia(v)),i∈X,(19)v(i) = \min_{a\in\mathcal A}\big(c(i,a) + \nu\,\sigma_{\mathcal P_i^a}(v)\big), \quad i \in \mathcal X, \tag{19}v(i)=a∈Amin​(c(i,a)+νσPia​​(v)),i∈X,(19)

value iteration vk+1=g(vk)v_{k+1} = g(v_k)vk+1​=g(vk​) converges to vvv from every starting vector (20), and

ϕ∞(Πs,Ts)=v(i0)=ψ∞(Πs,Ts).\phi_\infty(\Pi_s,\mathcal T_s) = v(i_0) = \psi_\infty(\Pi_s,\mathcal T_s).ϕ∞​(Πs​,Ts​)=v(i0​)=ψ∞​(Πs​,Ts​).

In addition, every policy that picks a minimising action in (19) is optimal (21), every nature policy whose rows attain σPia(v)\sigma_{\mathcal P_i^a}(v)σPia​​(v) is optimal for nature (22), and for each stationary π\piπ the worst-case cost sup⁡τC∞(π,τ)\sup_\tau C_\infty(\pi,\tau)supτ​C∞​(π,τ) is vπ(i0)v^\pi(i_0)vπ(i0​), where vπv^\pivπ is the unique fixed point of gπg_\pigπ​ (23).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (corrected): for a nondecreasing sup-norm contraction ggg and q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, the program max⁡qTv\max q^T vmaxqTv s.t. v≤g(v)v \le g(v)v≤g(v) has value qTv∞q^T v_\inftyqTv∞​ at the fixed point v∞v_\inftyv∞​, every feasible vvv satisfies v≤v∞v \le v_\inftyv≤v∞​, and v∞v_\inftyv∞​ is the unique optimizer when q>0q > 0q>0.
  2. The operators ggg of (29) and gπg_\pigπ​ of (30) are nondecreasing and ν\nuν-Lipschitz in ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​.
  3. (26): C∞(π,τ)=max⁡{v(i0):v(i)≤c(i,a(i))+ν∑jPa(i)(i,j)v(j)}C_\infty(\pi,\tau) = \max\{v(i_0) : v(i) \le c(i,\mathbf a(i)) + \nu \sum_j P^{\mathbf a(i)}(i,j) v(j)\}C∞​(π,τ)=max{v(i0​):v(i)≤c(i,a(i))+ν∑j​Pa(i)(i,j)v(j)}.
  4. (28) ⇒ (23): sup⁡τ∈TsC∞(π,τ)=vπ(i0)\sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_s} C_\infty(\pi,\tau) = v^\pi(i_0)supτ∈Ts​​C∞​(π,τ)=vπ(i0​).
  5. (27) ⇒ (19): ψ∞(Πs,Ts)=v(i0)\psi_\infty(\Pi_s,\mathcal T_s) = v(i_0)ψ∞​(Πs​,Ts​)=v(i0​).

Significance

The theorem makes the robust discounted problem as tractable as the nominal one. The optimal robust policy is stationary, deterministic and computed by value iteration. Each iteration evaluates one support function per state–action pair, and the paper computes these efficiently for likelihood and entropy uncertainty sets (§§5–6). Perfect duality means that the order of play does not change the value: announcing the policy to an adversarial nature costs nothing. The sequel in this series (Theorem 4) uses Theorem 3 to show that restricting to stationary policies loses nothing.

The result is proved in the paper and, independently, by Iyengar (2005). No machine-checked proof of it is known to exist. Mathlib provides the Banach fixed-point theorem, but it has no MDP library, no discounted cost along a Markov chain and no robust Bellman operator. The mission produces that layer.

Difficulty

The fixed-point half is a direct application of the Banach fixed-point theorem once the ν\nuν-contraction is established. The substance is the link between the fixed point and the probabilistic cost, and the duality.

  • C∞(π,τ)C_\infty(\pi,\tau)C∞​(π,τ) is an infinite series along a Markov chain. Identifying it with the solution of a linear system requires summing a matrix geometric series.
  • Nature's sets are neither closed nor convex, so its maxima are suprema that need not be attained. The worst case over Ts\mathcal T_sTs​ must be approached by rows that nearly attain the support function, with an error controlled through the contraction.
  • The min–max and max–min values are taken over different information structures. Equality has to come from the fixed point, not from a minimax theorem: the policy set is finite and discrete and nature's set is not convex, so no convexity argument applies.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is Fin n → ℝ, with the componentwise order and Mathlib's sup metric, which is ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​.
  • The model (RobustMDP.Discounted.Model) carries the costs, the discount ν∈[0,1)\nu \in [0,1)ν∈[0,1) (the range printed in Theorem 3; §4 prints (0,1)(0,1)(0,1)) and the row sets. The row sets are assumed nonempty and contained in Δn\Delta_nΔn​ and nothing else. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper.
  • Πs\Pi_sΠs​ is Fin n → A. Ts\mathcal T_sTs​ is the subtype of A → Fin n → Fin n → ℝ whose rows lie in the row sets, which encodes rectangularity.
  • C∞C_\inftyC∞​ is a tsum of the discounted stage costs along the forward state distribution. The terms are nonnegative and at most νtmax⁡c\nu^t\max cνtmaxc, so the series is summable and the tsum is the limit of the NNN-stage costs, the paper's definition.
  • σP\sigma_{\mathcal P}σP​ is a real sSup. It is the genuine supremum because every set it is applied to is nonempty and inside Δn\Delta_nΔn​.
  • Every "max" over nature is a supremum: IsLUB, or ⨆ inside min⁡πsup⁡τ\min_\pi\sup_\tauminπ​supτ​, whose inner sets are shown bounded by conclusion (23). Minima over the finite Πs\Pi_sΠs​ and over A\mathcal AA are ⨅ and Finset.inf'. The argmax rows of (22) appear only as a hypothesis on a given nature policy that attains them.
  • Corrected statements:
    • Lemma 2 is false as printed for qqq with zero entries, so uniqueness of the optimizer is stated only for q>0q > 0q>0.
    • In (30), σ(vπ)\sigma(v^\pi)σ(vπ) is read as σ(v)\sigma(v)σ(v).
    • The proof's references to "Lemma 1", "(15) and (16)" and "(14)" are read as Lemma 2, (27)–(28) and (26).
  • Defining C∞(π,τ)C_\infty(\pi,\tau)C∞​(π,τ) as the fixed point of w=cπ+νPπww = c_\pi + \nu P_\pi ww=cπ​+νPπ​w would make milestone (26) a tautology and conclusion (23) nearly so. The cost here is the probabilistic series, and the fixed-point characterizations must be proved.
  • Welcome contributions include a reusable library of discounted Markov chain costs on finite state spaces (the geometric-series identity behind (26)) and support-function lemmas on the simplex (monotonicity, the bound σP(u)−σP(v)≤∥u−v∥∞\sigma_{\mathcal P}(u) - \sigma_{\mathcal P}(v) \le \|u-v\|_\inftyσP​(u)−σP​(v)≤∥u−v∥∞​). Both are needed by the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • A. Nilim, L. El Ghaoui, Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices, Operations Research 53(5):780–798, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2):257–280, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • J. A. Bagnell, A. Y. Ng, J. Schneider, Solving Uncertain Markov Decision Processes, Technical Report CMU-RI-TR-01-25, Carnegie Mellon University, 2001. https://www.ri.cmu.edu/publications/solving-uncertain-markov-decision-processes/
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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