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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

Open972Completed2642All3614
🏆Completed
Markov ChainProbabilityReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds I: An Extended MDP with δ-Optimistic Samples for Hitting Times Has Diameter at Most D/(1−δ)Research Paper

Regret bounds for reinforcement learning in a single, non-episodic Markov decision process (MDP) are stated in terms of the diameter DDD of the MDP: the worst expected time needed to travel between two states when the travel policy is chosen well. UCRL2 (Jaksch, Ortner and Auer, 2010) achieves regret O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​), against a lower bound of …

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 1: With Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Four Breach-Cost Regimes Separated by c = δσ/2, δσ/√2 and δσResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers privacy rights over the personal data that firms collect: data may be collected only with explicit consent (opt-in), consent is separated from the purchase itself, and a consumer may later have her data deleted (erasure, the "right to…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model II: Interoperability Mitigates Dominance, as Lower Interoperability Admits a Duopoly Equilibrium with an Even Larger Dominant PlatformResearch Paper

Digital markets with strong network effects (messaging, social networks, app stores) tend to concentrate: a platform with more users is worth more to each user. Interoperability, the ability of a platform's users to interact with the users of rival platforms, is a central remedy in current competition policy; the EU Digital Markets Act (2022) mandates it…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Scores for Multivariate Distributions and Level Sets II: The Level Set Score (S′)^Γ Is Consistent for the α Level Set {f_Y ∗ w ≥ α}Research Paper

A forecaster who issues a probability distribution for a multivariate quantity, such as the joint demand at several locations or the joint returns of several assets, is often judged not on the whole distribution but on a region it implies: the set of outcomes whose cumulative probability, or smoothed density, exceeds a threshold. Such level sets are the…

14 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model I: Adding a Third Platform Can Produce an Equilibrium Whose Dominant Platform Outsizes Every Platform of Every Duopoly EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets organized by platforms (social networks, marketplaces, messaging services) exhibit network effects: a user values a platform more when more users join it. A standing concern in competition policy is that such markets "tip" towards one dominant platform, and the usual remedy proposed is to foster entry. Ekmekci, White and Wu (Platform Competition and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? III: Under Partial Multihoming, the Equilibrium Price and Profit Are Hump-Shaped in the Network EffectResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services and messaging apps share two features: users value a platform more when more people use it (network effects), and some users buy access to more than one platform (multihoming). In the standard Hotelling model where every consumer buys exactly one good, network effects intensify competition: a stronger network effect…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 2: On a Nonempty Open Set of Distributions Some Nonintersectional Policy Achieves Representation along Every Identity DimensionResearch Paper

Admissions offices and employers that run affirmative action usually measure representation one identity dimension at a time: the share of women among those admitted, the share of Black applicants, and so on. Applicants, however, belong to intersectional groups (Black women, white men, …), and a policy that looks balanced along every dimension can still…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 3: The Explore-First Greedy Procedure Is Consistent with a Budget Linear in kResearch Paper

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks which of kkk simulated systems has the largest mean performance when every observation is costly. It is a basic tool of simulation optimization: choosing a staffing level, an inventory policy or a network design from a large catalogue of candidates that can only be evaluated by noisy simulation. In the fixed-budget formulation…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 2: Under the Slippage Configuration with a Common Variance the Greedy PCS Lower Bound Is TightResearch Paper

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks how to spend a fixed budget of simulation runs on kkk competing system designs so that the design with the largest mean performance is identified with high probability. When kkk runs into the thousands or millions, the relevant question is how the total budget must grow with kkk. Li, Fan and Hong (arXiv:2303.02951v3, published in M…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 2: The High-Quality Influencer's Defensive Fake-Account Purchase Falls in Antifake Effort If Condition (22) Holds, and Otherwise Rises Then FallsResearch Paper

Fake follower accounts are sold openly to social media influencers, who buy them because advertisers and new followers read a large follower count as a sign of quality. Platforms respond with antifake effort: detection, removal and registration hurdles that make fake accounts more expensive to operate, but that also impose a nuisance cost on legitimate…

13 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Opinion Dynamics on Directed Complex Networks 1: On Graph Sequences Admitting a Strong Coupling, the Typical Stationary Opinion Converges to the Root Opinion R* of the Local Weak LimitResearch Paper

Linear models of opinion formation go back to DeGroot (DeGroot 1974), in which every individual repeatedly replaces their opinion by a weighted average of the opinions of the people they listen to, and to Friedkin and Johnsen (Friedkin–Johnsen 1990), who added a persistent internal opinion. Fraiman, Lin and Olvera-Cravioto (arXiv:2209.00969v2, Mathematics…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 1: For Generic Score Distributions No Nonintersectional Policy Yields a Representative Outcome but an Intersectional One DoesResearch Paper

Affirmative action policies are usually designed reductively: one adjustment for women, another for a racial minority, a third for applicants from low-income families. An applicant who belongs to several categories gets the combined adjustments. A long literature in sociology and law, beginning with Crenshaw's account of intersectionality (1989), argues…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts, and Lack of Investment I: With Unregulated Leverage the Optimal Date-0 Rate Is at Most R and Date-0 Investment Falls Strictly Short of the First-BestResearch Paper

Low policy rates are meant to stimulate corporate investment. Acharya and Plantin document that in the low-rate decade after the 2008 crisis, U.S. firms used much of their new borrowing for share buybacks and dividends rather than for investment: leveraged payouts. Their paper (SSRN 3484935; Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01440) builds a…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions V: A Posted-Price Mechanism Achieves an O(log n)-Approximation for Symmetric Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a fixed budget BBB wants to buy services from strategic sellers whose costs are private. The auctioneer values sets of services through a valuation function vvv, and wants a mechanism that pays the sellers at most BBB in total while acquiring a set of nearly maximal value. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS…

9 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms III: When No User Plays Every Artist, Homogeneity, Additivity and Core Selection Characterize the User-Centric IndexResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pass a large share of the revenue to the artists. How that money is divided has become a policy question. Most platforms use the pro-rata rule: all fees are pooled and each artist is paid in proportion to their share of all streams. The main alternative is the user-centric rule: each…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 1: On a Budget Linear in k the Greedy Procedure Keeps the PCS Bounded Away from ZeroResearch Paper

Ranking and selection (R&S) is the problem of identifying, by simulation, the alternative with the largest mean performance among kkk candidates, when each alternative can only be observed with noise. It is a basic tool of simulation optimization, with roots in Bechhofer's indifference-zone formulation (Bechhofer 1954). Cloud and parallel computing have made…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 1: A Purely Profit-Driven Platform Optimally Chooses Zero Antifake EffortResearch Paper

Fake accounts (purchased followers, likes and engagement) are a large part of influencer marketing on social media, and platforms say they invest in detecting and removing them. Huang and Liu (Management Science 71(10), 2025) model this market as a signaling game. An influencer of unknown quality buys fake followers to look popular, consumers decide whether…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? I: Under Partial Multihoming, Weak Network Effects Raise Each Firm's Demand, Price and ProfitResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services, ride-hailing apps and payment systems are sold in markets where the value of a product grows with the number of people who use it. In the classical analysis of such markets every consumer buys exactly one of the competing products (singlehoming). Under that assumption, a stronger network effect intensifies price…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Experimental DesignProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective 1: With T^η Uniform Pigeonholes on [0,1] the Expected Discrepancy Is O(T^(1/2−η/2) + T^(η/2)(log T)^(1/2))Research Paper

Online platforms run controlled experiments in which subjects (users, sessions, sellers) arrive one at a time and must be assigned to control or treatment on arrival, before later subjects are seen. A good design makes the two groups look alike in their observed covariates, because covariate imbalance inflates the variance of treatment-effect estimates.…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 1: A Pure Human-Driver Market Has a Unique Maximal Stable Equilibrium, Increasing in Market SizeResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers who choose for themselves whether to work. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) would replace part of this self-scheduling labor with capital whose fleet size the platform chooses. Lian and van Ryzin study when, and under which market configuration, the cost savings of AVs reach riders. Their comparison needs a…

18 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management II: A Firm with Small Data-Based Revenue Earns More Profit After the GDPRResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) requires a firm to obtain a consumer's explicit consent before it collects personal data. The common expectation, in policy debate and in much of the empirical literature, is that consent requirements cost firms money: they shrink the pool of consumer data that can be monetized through…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management I: The Equilibrium Price Is Higher After the GDPR for Every Opt-in Benefit and Data RevenueResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, in force since 2018) requires a firm to obtain a consumer's explicit opt-in consent before it collects her personal data. Most of the economic literature reads such consent rules as a cost to data-driven firms. Choe, Matsushima and Shekhar (ISER Discussion Paper No. 1246, Osaka University, June…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 2: With One Risky Asset the Equilibrium Shorting Cost and Lending Yield Are Explicit, Increasing and Convex in the Belief GapResearch Paper

Short selling is never free. To sell a share short, an investor borrows it from a holder and pays that holder a lending fee, and the size of these fees has been documented empirically for decades (D'Avolio 2002; Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen 2002). Most equilibrium models of asset pricing either forbid short sales or take the fee as exogenous. Evgeniou,…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
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