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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items: For n Agents with Additive Utilities a Consensus Halving That Cuts at Most min{n, m} of the m Items Always ExistsResearch Paper

Consensus halving asks for a division of a resource into two parts that every one of nnn agents values equally, so that a group with heterogeneous preferences can agree that the two parts are of the same worth. The classical setting is a divisible interval (a cake or a necklace), where Simmons and Su (2003), building on Hobby and Rice (1965), showed that nnn cut…

24 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies: Giving the Public Signal to One Farmer or to None Maximizes Total Farmer WelfareResearch Paper

Farmers who sell the same crop can benefit from better forecasts of the market price, but their production decisions also affect one another through the price. A forecast sent to one farmer may improve that farmer’s decision; a forecast sent to many farmers can make their output responses move together. A planner choosing who receives a common forecast…

20 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint vs. Separate Crowdsourcing Contests: The Separate Contest Has the Higher Expected Best Random Factor, and the Joint Contest Induces Higher Equilibrium EffortResearch Paper

Firms increasingly outsource innovation to crowdsourcing contests: a firm posts a design or software problem, many independent solvers submit solutions, and the best one wins a prize. Platforms such as Topcoder, 99designs and Kaggle run thousands of such contests, and a recurring design question is whether a project with several attributes (say, a logo's…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

We Are on the Way: Analysis of On-Demand Ride-Hailing Systems: In the One-Direction Approximation, the No-Call Mechanism Never Has a Longer Average Waiting Time Than the Call MechanismResearch Paper

On-demand ride-hailing platforms replaced street-hailing on the promise that matching a passenger to a car at the moment of the request shortens the wait. Feng, Kong and Wang (SSRN 2960991, later published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0880) ask whether that is true in a stylized model and find that it need not be:…

14 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity II: With a Secondary Market, Liquid LPs Stay Out of the Primary Market Below a Threshold and Their Capital Share Pins Down the Discount to NAVResearch Paper

Private equity funds ask investors to commit capital before the timing of their own cash needs is known. If an investor needs liquidity before the fund pays out, selling a partnership claim can be more useful than holding it to maturity. The price at which such claims trade therefore affects both the return investors demand when a fund is raised and the way…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance I: Existence and KKT Characterization of the Competition EquilibriumResearch Paper

In the days after a sudden-onset disaster, several humanitarian organizations (HOs) appeal to the same pool of donors. Donors increasingly want to earmark their gifts (restrict them to a programme, region or item), and HOs can offer more or less of that control. Earmarked money is less useful in the response: renegotiating restrictions costs time and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity I: Debt Financing Has a Unique Break-Even Repayment Between the Set-Up Cost and the Maximal Monopoly Profit, and the Entrepreneur Earns the Venture's NPVResearch Paper

Since 2017, billions of dollars have been raised through the issuance of crypto-assets, many of them tokens: digital claims on a future product or service, issued before the product exists. Malinova and Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity (SSRN 3286825; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882), ask when such a pre-sale is a better way to…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies II: With Personalized Pricing by the Manufacturer, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Iff β > β_PZ(α), and β_PU(α) > β_PP(α)Research Paper

A manufacturer can sell directly to consumers and also supply an independent retailer. The retailer reaches consumers for whom its distribution service is more valuable, but its presence can also force the manufacturer to lower direct-channel prices. Jullien, Reisinger and Rey study when the additional sales justify dual distribution under different…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Social Media and News: Content Bundling and News Quality II: Negotiated Content Bundling Raises News Quality over the Benchmark iff c > β/Λ and over Unilateral Bundling iff c > c†Research Paper

Social platforms show news articles to their users without sending them to the publisher's site. Publishers argue that this diverts readers and advertising revenue, and so weakens their incentive to invest in journalism. Several regulators have responded by requiring dominant platforms to negotiate payments with news publishers: France transposed the EU…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Softening Competition Through Unilateral Sharing of Customer Data: For Every Monotone-Hazard-Rate Distribution, Sharing Data on [z^N, b′] Makes Both Firms Strictly Better OffResearch Paper

Large platforms that also sell their own products (Amazon, JD.com, app stores) hold detailed data on consumers and sometimes share part of it with the independent sellers they compete with. The usual view in the personalized-pricing literature is that information is a competitive weapon: a firm that knows more about consumers can price discriminate and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low VI: A BIC-Type Choice of the Model Size Yields Oracle Inequalities for the Expected Prediction ErrorResearch Paper

Best subset selection fits a linear model using at most kkk of ppp available predictors: it minimizes the residual sum of squares ∥y−Xβ∥2\|y-X\beta\|^2∥y−Xβ∥2 over all β\betaβ with at most kkk nonzero coordinates. It is the classical benchmark for sparse regression, and mixed-integer optimization has made it computable at scales that used to be out of reach (Bertsimas, King &…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On-Demand Delivery from Stores: Dynamic Dispatching and Routing with Random Demand II: A Route Whose Reduced Cost Exceeds ub − φ(RF1) Is in No Optimal Solution of the Routing Subproblem SF1Research Paper

Grocery chains and restaurants that promise delivery within an hour or less must decide, at each dispatch epoch, which drivers to send out and along which routes. Liu and Luo (arXiv:2107.13058v3; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023) model this as a finite-horizon dynamic program and solve its per-period approximation with a logic-based…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization IV: The A-Learning Threshold Δ Exceeds the O-Learning Threshold Λ If and Only If γ < max{2s/(2s+k), (√(s²+4sk) − s)/(2k)}Research Paper

A seller who customizes products for buyers must learn what each buyer wants, and buyers have private information about how much they value quality. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025; author copy SSRN 3994319) compares two ways of learning those preferences. Under A-Learning ("asking")…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? IV: When Pricing Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

Production in agriculture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and many other industries suffers from random yield: only a random fraction of a planned production run turns out usable. When a retailer buys from such a supplier, someone in the chain bears the risk that less arrives than was ordered. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang (SSRN 3546872; Manufacturing & Service…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 4: The Price of Anarchy Is Not Uniformly Hölder Continuous and No Game Has the Whole Space as a Hölder NeighborhoodResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game measures how much total cost is lost when a continuum of selfish users routes traffic instead of a central planner. Worst-case bounds on the PoA over classes of cost functions are classical: 4/34/34/3 for affine costs and Θ(β/ln⁡β)\Theta(\beta/\ln\beta)Θ(β/lnβ) for polynomial costs of degree at most β\betaβ (Roughgarden and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 5: For Small Total Demand the Price of Anarchy Exceeds 1 by at Most an Explicit Multiple of the Total DemandResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio between the total travel cost at a Wardrop equilibrium, where every traveller uses a cheapest route, and the minimum total cost a central planner could achieve. Worst-case bounds on the PoA are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002), but traffic studies observe that the empirical PoA…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Number TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 3: M Has a Divisor in [L, U] iff an Explicit Two-Item Periodic JRP Instance Has a Plan of Cost at Most L + U + 2M²(M + 1)Research Paper

The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is the multi-item extension of the economic order quantity (EOQ) model. Each item is reordered periodically and pays its own ordering and holding costs, and a joint ordering cost is shared by items ordered at the same time. Before this work no hardness result was known for the periodic JRP (p. 10), even though no exact…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information I: ProxyLabel with a Width Estimate ω′ ≥ ω/c Is e^c(ω′+1)/(1−1/k)^{k−1}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem, candidates arrive one at a time in uniformly random order, and a decision maker must accept or reject each one irrevocably. The decision maker sees exact scores, or at least a total ranking of the candidates seen so far. In hiring, admissions and procurement the observed scores are often biased: evaluations of candidates…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Achieving High Individual Service Levels Without Safety Stock? Optimal Rationing Policy of Pooled Resources II: The Max-Weighted-Service Policy Is Almost Surely Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Firms that serve several customers from shared capacity, such as a warehouse supplying several retailers, a flexible production line building several products, or an assemble-to-order system, often sign contracts that guarantee each customer an individual service level. Typical targets are the probability of filling a customer's whole demand (Type-I), the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper

Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's…

16 thms4 active users
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