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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Preference Elicitation for Participatory Budgeting: Randomized Threshold Approval Votes Achieve Distortion O(log² m)Research Paper

In participatory budgeting, residents of a city vote on how to spend part of a public budget on a list of proposed projects, each with a known cost. The practice has been adopted by cities in North America and Europe, including New York City, Chicago, Madrid and Paris, the last two each spending more than 100 million euros through participatory budgets in…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design for Managing Hidden Rebates and Inflated Quotes of a Procurement Service Provider: Paying a Fee Equal to the Hidden Rebate Is the Optimal Truthful Contract for Small RebatesResearch Paper

Retailers that source apparel and other consumer goods from contract manufacturers in developing countries often work through a procurement service provider, an intermediary that solicits quotes, negotiates and manages production on the retailer's behalf. A documented problem in this industry is the hidden rebate: some manufacturers pay the intermediary a…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies: Full Transfers to Immediate Predecessors Form the Unique Decentralized Socially Optimal Allocation SchemeResearch Paper

Some organizations grow by asking each member to recruit a successor. The incentive facing a member depends on where the revenue generated by later members goes. A transfer rule may reward the recruiter, keep the revenue with the entrant, or divide it among several predecessors. Hougaard, Moreno-Ternero, and Østerdal ask which fixed rule gives the greatest…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks: The Proportional Rule Is the Unique Bankruptcy Rule Satisfying the Five Basic Axioms and Invariance to MitosisResearch Paper

When a bank or firm in a network of mutual obligations cannot meet its liabilities, some rule must decide how much each debtor pays each creditor. The rule used almost universally in the systemic-risk literature is the proportional rule of Eisenberg and Noe (2001): every agent pays its liabilities in full if it can, and otherwise distributes its whole asset…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-stage Intermediation in Display Advertising: In Symmetric Tree Networks, Bidding the Projected Virtual Value of the Highest Downstream Report Is a Subgame Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

An online display impression often reaches an advertiser through a chain of ad exchanges and networks instead of through a direct sale. Each intermediary runs its own auction among its downstream bidders and decides what to report to the auction above it. Its profit depends on whether it wins upstream and on what it can charge downstream. Even when every…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives: Issues and Remedies: Under HRRP-I a Symmetric Equilibrium Exists and Every One Over-Invests in Readmission ReductionResearch Paper

The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), created by the US Affordable Care Act and run by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services since 2012, cuts the Medicare payments of hospitals whose 30-day readmission rates exceed a benchmark computed from other hospitals. It is a form of yardstick competition in the sense of Shleifer (1985): a…

14 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis: With Identical Marginal Costs, Optimal Bundle-Size Pricing Asymptotically Achieves Perfect Price DiscriminationResearch Paper

Firms that sell large catalogues of digital goods (streaming titles, cable channels, software features) rarely price every subset of products separately: with NNN products there are 2N2^N2N bundles. A common simplification is bundle-size pricing (BSP), where the price depends only on how many items the customer takes and the customer picks which items go into the…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products: In the Hotelling Model, Decentralized Linear Pricing Achieves the Optimal Centralized Consumer SurplusResearch Paper

Public buyers of medicines, school meals, computers and similar goods often run a framework agreement. A central agency selects an assortment of products through an auction and fixes their unit prices. Public offices then buy from that menu as needed, each choosing what suits it. The European Union awarded €80 billion through framework agreements in 2010,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing: For Exchangeable Valuations, Opaque Selling Dominates Discriminatory Pricing When All Customers Are Pessimistic or Valuations Take Two ValuesResearch Paper

Sellers sometimes offer a customer a choice among individual products and a product whose final item is revealed only after purchase. Airlines, for example, can sell a fixed itinerary alongside a discounted option that leaves one feature unspecified. The seller must decide whether this opaque product earns enough to justify limiting how much individual item…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms: In a Single-Unit Setting Some Sequential Posted-Price Mechanism Earns at Least 0.6543 of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with one item and several buyers whose values are private but drawn from known, independent distributions can maximize expected revenue with Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson, 1981). That auction depends on every distribution through virtual values, asks buyers to report their values, and allocates through a computation that buyers must trust. A se…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization I: Under A-Learning, Truthful Cheap-Talk Communication Is an Equilibrium If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΔResearch Paper

Sellers often ask customers what they want before designing a product or service. The answer can affect both the quality delivered and the price paid. Because a customer can send a costless, unverifiable message, the seller cannot assume that a stated preference is true. Guo's customization model asks when the customer's own incentives make truthful…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 3: Pacing-Based Equilibria Have Liquid Welfare Price of Anarchy at Least 1/2Research Paper

Advertising platforms repeatedly sell opportunities to show an advertisement. The opportunity's features, such as audience and placement, affect each advertiser differently, while advertisers limit their average spending. This makes the efficiency of an auction a question about both heterogeneous values and budgets. The paper by Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar st…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 4: Colinear Paced Buyers with Equal Budgets Are Paced Down to the Same Weight VectorResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell billions of ad impressions a day, mostly by auction, to advertisers who care about the features of the impression (the user, the page, the time) and who spend under a budget fixed in advance. To keep spending within budget, platforms and advertisers use pacing: every value is multiplied by a factor smaller than one, so that…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 4: The k-SS Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (2 log k + 4)-Approximation to Welfare for Strong-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In auctions with interdependent values, the value an agent assigns to an outcome depends not only on her own private information but on the information of the others: a bidder for drilling rights values a tract according to every bidder's geological survey, and a buyer of a used asset values it according to every inspector's report. Each agent observes only…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 3: The k-HL Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (k+3)-Approximation to Welfare with k Signal ValuesResearch Paper

In many auctions a bidder's value for what she wins depends on information held by others. The value of an oil lease, a spectrum licence or a piece of art to one bidder depends on survey data, market forecasts or expert opinions that other bidders hold privately. The model of interdependent values (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) captures this: each agent iii holds…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 2: Random-Sampling VCG Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 4-Approximation to Welfare for Separable SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In many auctions a bidder's value for what is sold depends on information held by other bidders: the value of an oil-drilling lease depends on every bidder's geological survey, the value of a piece of art on what other experts know about its provenance. This is the interdependent values model of Milgrom and Weber (1982). With interdependent values the…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 4: Randomized Perturbed Delayed Mechanisms Gain Ω(ε^(α/(2α−1))) Revenue Under Local α-Power EnvelopesResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu of lotteries picks the one that maximizes expected utility, and an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism makes truth-telling optimal. Buyers that are only approximately rational, or that face small costs of computing or reporting, need only be made to prefer the truth up to…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 2: For Monotone Preferences the Moving Knife Guarantee Lies Between minMax and Maxmin and the Bid & Choose Guarantee Is at Most MaxminResearch Paper

Fair division asks how to split a divisible resource among nnn agents whose preferences differ. In the non-atomic ("cake-cutting") model the resource is a region of Euclidean space and an agent values each measurable piece. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (arXiv:1911.10009, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study fair guarantees: utility levels that a division…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intertemporal Price Discrimination via Randomized Promotions: A Two-Point Price Distribution Is Optimal for Randomized Pricing with Two Customer SegmentsResearch Paper

Retailers that run predictable promotions teach their customers to wait for them. A customer who knows that a discount will come next week has no reason to buy at the list price today. Firms therefore lose margin on exactly the customers who would have paid in full. One response, documented in practice by Moon, Bimpikis and Mendelson (2017), is to randomize…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 1: Kuhn's Divide & Choose Rule Guarantees Every Agent Her minMax Utility for Continuous Non-Atomic PreferencesResearch Paper

Fair division asks how to share a resource among nnn agents with different preferences so that each agent can be promised a minimum level of welfare, whatever the preferences of the others. Classical cake cutting treats a good cake, valued additively or at least monotonically. Many real problems mix goods and bads: a plot of land with both fertile and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail I: Under Centralized Dispute Resolution the Equilibrium Ransom Is Not Monotonically Decreasing in Efficiency γδResearch Paper

Online marketplaces depend on consumer reviews, and a single negative review can move a seller's future sales. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys a product, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it in exchange for a payment. Platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao and TripAdvisor respond with dispute resolution mechanisms that let…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail II: Under Semi-Decentralized Dispute Resolution with Penalty b the Equilibrium Ransom Has a Two-Regime Closed FormResearch Paper

Online marketplaces rely on consumer reviews, and a negative review lowers what future buyers believe about a product. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it for a ransom. Platforms counter with dispute-resolution mechanisms. Papanastasiou, Yang and Zhang (Management Science 69(10), 2023) compare…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions II: Simultaneous-Iterative-Pruning Is a Budget-Feasible 64-Approximation for Non-Monotone Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In a budget-feasible procurement auction an auctioneer with a budget BBB buys services from strategic sellers. Each seller knows privately what providing the service costs, and the auctioneer wants a set of services of maximum value without paying more than BBB in total. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010) and is used to study crowdsourcing, data…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design III: Against Exchangeable or Arbitrary Joint Valuations the Minimax Regret Is 1/e for Every nResearch Paper

A seller with one item faces nnn buyers whose valuations she does not know, not even in distribution. Prior-independent mechanism design asks which selling mechanism performs well against every distribution in a given class, rather than against one known prior. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478v5, Operations Research 2025) measure performance…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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