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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information III: Trade Probability and Expected Profits in the Uniform Linear EquilibriumResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over a single indivisible good. Each knows what the good is worth to them but not what it is worth to the other side, and each shades their offer to exploit the other's uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this as a one-shot game in which both…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns: A Coordinating Target Rebate Helps the Retailer, and the Manufacturer iff Coordinated Effort Is at Least Twice Decentralized EffortResearch Paper

A false failure return is a product returned by a consumer as defective although it has no functional or cosmetic defect; managers attribute such returns to installation difficulties, a mismatch with the consumer's preferences, and remorse. Ferguson, Guide and Souza report (pp. 376–377) that false failures account for up to 80% of Hewlett-Packard's inkjet…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information II: The Linear Equilibrium of the Sealed-Offer Rule for Uniform ValuesResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over one indivisible good. Each knows the good's worth to themselves but not to the other side, so each shades their offer to exploit the other's uncertainty, and some mutually profitable trades fail. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this as a one-shot…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 2: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Many US school districts assign children to public schools centrally. Each family ranks the schools. Each school ranks the children by priority, which is set by state or local law (siblings, walking distance, a lottery). A procedure then turns these rankings into an assignment. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003;…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Public school districts in many US cities let families rank schools and then assign seats by a centralized procedure. Each school has a limited number of seats, and state or local law gives some students priority at some schools, for example for a sibling already enrolled or for living within walking distance. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentives in Teams: The Own Profit Incentive Structure Is an Optimal Incentive Structure for a ConglomerateResearch Paper

An organization whose members hold private information faces two problems at once. The first is the team problem of Marschak and Radner: choose the rules by which members observe, communicate and decide so as to maximize the expected payoff of the organization as a whole (Marschak–Radner 1972). The second is the incentive problem: a member who is paid by…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XIII: AuctionsTextbook

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is the textbook mechanism for selling several objects at once: bidders report valuations for bundles, the auctioneer computes the welfare-maximizing allocation, and each winner pays the externality it imposes on the others. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy and the outcome is efficient. Yet Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Algorithmic Game Theory III: Arrow and Gibbard–SatterthwaiteTextbook

Before a mechanism can pay anyone, it must decide something — and the impossibility theorems of social choice say that deciding honestly is already hard. Arrow's theorem (1951) showed that any method of aggregating individual rankings into a social ranking that respects unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be a dictatorship; Gibbard…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
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