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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions IV: No Deterministic Posted-Price Mechanism Beats a √n/2-Approximation for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a budget BBB wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost ci≥0c_i\ge0ci​≥0, the auctioneer has a public valuation vvv over sets of sellers, and the mechanism must choose whom to pay and how much, so that sellers have no reason to misreport and the total payment never exceeds BBB. The…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 3: Under the Rotation Order, Marketing Lists Serve Low-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Over- (Under-) Supply High-Cost Ones Below (Above) the Rotation PointResearch Paper

Data brokers sell two kinds of products to marketers. A marketing list supplies the contacts a marketer needs in order to act at all; a data append enriches a list the marketer already holds. In both cases the broker can also choose how informative its accompanying analytics are, and it can price a menu of plans of different informativeness to marketers…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 3: For Submodular Valuations Every α-Approximate Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-Robin Is α/3-EF1Research Paper

Round-Robin is the simplest allocation rule for indivisible goods: agents take turns, in a fixed order, picking their favourite remaining good. When agents have additive valuations and report them truthfully, the outcome is envy-free up to one good (EF1) — every agent values its own bundle at least as much as any other bundle with one good removed, a notion…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 4: Under the Rotation Order, Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean Serve High-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Under- (Over-) Supply Low-Cost Ones Below (Above) v⁺Research Paper

Data brokers sell consumer data to firms that use it to decide whom to target, whom to lend to, or where to open a store. Two kinds of products are common: a marketing list, which supplies contact information without which the buyer cannot act at all, and a data append, which enriches information about consumers the buyer can already reach (Federal Trade…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach: The Robust Optimal Mechanism Is Incentive Compatible, Budget Feasible and Individually RationalResearch Paper

Designing a revenue-maximizing auction for several items is hard once buyers have budgets. Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) solves the single-item problem without budgets, under a known prior on the buyers' values. With several items, correlated values or budget constraints, no comparable characterization is known, and the Bayesian formulation…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 3: Every Incentive-Compatible Two-Sided Dynamic Mechanism Earns at Most the Expected Virtual-Surplus Assignment ValueResearch Paper

Ride-hailing, freelancing and delivery platforms are intermediaries that post a price to buyers and a price to sellers and then match the two sides. Both sides are forward-looking: an agent who arrives can wait before requesting, and an agent who requests waits until she is matched, at a cost per unit of time. Chen and Hu, Pricing and Matching with…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 1: Waiting-Adjusted Fixed Prices with Greedy Matching Earn at Least 1 − (1 + 2(b+h)T/(3(p*−w*)))/√µ* of the Fluid Profit BoundResearch Paper

An intermediary such as a ride platform must attract buyers and sellers who arrive at different times. A buyer may wait for a seller; a seller may wait for a buyer. Both sides can choose when to request a match, so an ask price and a bid price affect participation as well as the intermediary's margin. Chen and Hu study whether a simple posted-price policy…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 7: Without Gross Substitutes a Market with Two Firms and Three Workers Has No Core AllocationResearch Paper

In a labor market where firms hire sets of workers and salaries are negotiated pair by pair, the natural stability notion is the core: an assignment of workers to firms, with salaries, that no firm and group of workers can improve upon by agreeing among themselves. Kelso and Crawford (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1483–1504) proved that the core is nonempty, and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 5: An Entering Firm Leaves Every Worker at Least as Well Off, and a Departing Worker Leaves Every Firm No Better OffResearch Paper

Adding a firm changes the offers available to workers; removing a worker changes the pool from which firms hire. In markets with salary bargaining, those changes can alter both assignments and pay. Kelso and Crawford asked whether the direction of the change can nevertheless be predicted at the outcome selected by their salary-adjustment process. Their 1982…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 3: With Indifference Allowed, a Strategy-Proof Voting Procedure with at Least Three Possible Outcomes Is DictatorialResearch Paper

A committee that chooses one alternative by voting would like a procedure under which nobody gains by misreporting their preferences. Gibbard (Econometrica 41, 1973) and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 10, 1975) showed that, once at least three outcomes are possible, the only voting procedures with this property are dictatorial. The theorem is the starting…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem II: Every Equilibrium of Every Choice Mechanism Yields an Incentive-Feasible Allocation, F** = F*Research Paper

An arbitrator who must choose among collective options for a group of players usually does not know the players' private characteristics. The arbitrator can only ask, and a player who expects to profit from a false answer may give one. Before designing any procedure, the arbitrator therefore needs to know which expected-payoff allocations can be reached at…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 6: When Workers Are Alike in Production, Gross Substitutes Is Equivalent to Nonincreasing Returns to WorkersResearch Paper

Kelso and Crawford's 1982 Econometrica paper studies a labor market in which firms hire sets of heterogeneous workers at individually negotiated salaries. Their existence results for the core and for competitive equilibrium, and the convergence of their salary-adjustment process, all rest on one hypothesis about each firm's technology, the gross-substitutes…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 2: Strategy-Proof Voting Procedures Correspond One-to-One to Social Welfare Functions Satisfying CS, NNR and IIAResearch Paper

Two impossibility theorems frame the theory of collective choice. Arrow's theorem (1951) says that a rule aggregating individual preference orderings into a social ordering, subject to a short list of reasonable conditions, must be dictatorial. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) says that a voting procedure selecting a…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 4: With Indifference Allowed, a Social Welfare Function Satisfying CS, NNR and IIA Is DictatorialResearch Paper

A social welfare function turns the rankings of the members of a committee into one ranking for the committee. Arrow's general possibility theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963) shows that, once there are at least three alternatives, no such rule satisfies a short list of conditions that each look harmless unless it follows a single member's ranking. The theorem is the…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Calculus of VariationsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Monopoly and Product Quality: The Monopolist Sells Every Type Served Under Competition a Strictly Lower Quality, Except the Top TypeResearch Paper

A firm that sells a product line of different qualities cannot see how much each customer values quality. It can only post a price for every quality and let customers choose. Mussa and Rosen's 1978 paper solves the monopolist's problem in this setting and compares the result with the competitive outcome. Their model is, together with Mirrlees' optimal…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 4: A 6.75-Approximate Truthful Posted-Price Menu for Unit-Demand Buyers of Multiple ItemsResearch Paper

A hotel sells rooms of several types, in limited numbers, to guests who each want one room. The revenue-optimal way to sell is known only in special cases: for buyers with several private values, optimal mechanisms can be randomized, involve lotteries, and lack a closed form (Manelli–Vincent 2007; Chawla, Hartline, Kleinberg 2007). In practice sellers post…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VIII: Dominant-Strategy Implementation of Efficient Decision Rules Is VCGTextbook

A group of agents must choose one alternative from a set AAA (whether to build a public project, who receives an object, which of several policies to adopt). Each agent privately knows how much each alternative is worth to them, and money can be transferred. A designer who wants the welfare-maximizing alternative must ask the agents for their valuations, and…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VI: Rochet's Theorem — Implementability Is Cyclical MonotonicityTextbook

Almost every screening, auction and regulation model asks the same preliminary question: which allocation rules can be made incentive-compatible by some choice of payments? In the one-dimensional models of auction theory and nonlinear pricing the answer is monotonicity: higher types must receive higher allocations. Many applications are not one-dimensional,…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design V: Dominant-Strategy Public Goods Mechanisms for Two Agents Are Fixed Cost SharesTextbook

Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows a common prior from which every agent's beliefs about the others are derived. Chapter 4 of Börgers' An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001) drops that assumption. The designer is unwilling to rely on anything…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design IV: The Myerson–Satterthwaite TheoremTextbook

Stock exchanges, commodity markets and trading platforms are institutions for trade between parties who each know something the other does not. The simplest version is bilateral trade: one seller, one buyer, one indivisible good, and each side privately knows its own value. The question is whether any trading institution can make the two trade exactly when…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design III: Impossibility of First-Best Public Goods ProvisionTextbook

Whether a community can finance a shared project out of voluntary contributions, when each member knows only her own benefit from it, is one of the founding questions of mechanism design. Bayesian mechanism design began with mechanisms for the provision of public goods: d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) showed that the efficient decision…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design II: Myerson's Optimal Single-Unit AuctionTextbook

A seller with one indivisible good and several potential buyers, each of whom privately knows how much the good is worth to them, has to choose a selling procedure: a posted price, an English auction, a sealed-bid auction with a reserve price, or something more elaborate. Which procedure raises the most expected revenue? Myerson's answer (Myerson 1981) is…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design I: Screening and the Optimality of a Posted PriceTextbook

A seller with one good and one buyer whose valuation she does not know faces the simplest problem of mechanism design: choose a selling procedure, anticipating that the buyer will act in his own interest given what he knows. The textbook answer, "post the monopoly price", is usually derived by optimizing over prices alone. The question that opens Börgers' An…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VII: Compensation-and-Bonus Based on a Non-Optimal Approximation Algorithm Is Not TruthfulResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design studies optimization problems whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: the algorithm must compute a good solution and, through payments, make it in each agent's interest to report its input honestly. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field with the problem of scheduling tasks on unrelated machines, where each machine is an…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design III: No Additive Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design studies optimization problems whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: an algorithm must not only compute a good solution but also pay the agents so that reporting their data truthfully is in their own interest. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001) with task…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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