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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
Algorithmic Game TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Lipschitz Stable Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

Welfare-maximizing auctions are discontinuous. With two bidders and one item, the values (1+δ,1)(1+\delta,1)(1+δ,1) send the item to the first bidder and the values (1,1+δ)(1,1+\delta)(1,1+δ) send it to the second, however small δ\deltaδ is. Reports are often estimates, and sellers and buyers act on the probabilities of an allocation before it is realized, so such a jump makes plans…

57 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy of Draft AuctionsResearch Paper

The draft auction of Devanur, Morgenstern and Syrgkanis (arXiv:1311.2820) sells mmm items in rounds. In each round every bidder names one per-item price and a set of remaining items, and the highest bidder takes her set at her price. It sits between two simple formats: the single-bid auction of Devanur, Morgenstern, Syrgkanis and Weinberg (doi:10.1145/2764468.…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design, RevisitedResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction, mmm items are allocated among nnn bidders, each holding a private valuation of bundles, and the goal is high welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Two obstacles interact: the bidders must communicate for a good allocation to be found, and they may manipulate the protocol. A mechanism is truthful when following the prescribed strategy is an…

29 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sharp Bounds for Truthful-in-Expectation SchedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, each of mmm indivisible jobs takes a possibly different processing time on each of nnn machines, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest machine load. When the processing times are known, Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos give a polynomial-time 2-approximation. Nisan and Ronen (NR01) introduced the strategic version:…

48 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

Tight bounds for fractional and randomized truthful schedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, mmm tasks are assigned to nnn machines, machine iii needs time tijt_{ij}tij​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest total processing time of a machine. Nisan and Ronen proposed this as the canonical problem of algorithmic mechanism design (NR01): each machine privately knows its row tit_iti​ and is paid by the…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions: γ-Competitive Buyers in First-Price Auctions Get Liquid Welfare ≥ (LW* − O(n)(Reg+1))/(γ + 1/2 + O(1/γ))Research Paper

Most online advertising is sold through sequential auctions: one impression at a time, millions of times a day, and since 2019 increasingly by first-price rules (Won21). The advertisers who bid are budget-constrained, and they do not compute equilibria; their bids are set by learning algorithms that adjust a shading or pacing multiplier from round to round.…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification: Under Markov Ambiguity, a Type-(ii) Favored-Agent Mechanism with Threshold at Its Maximal Type Is Pareto Robustly OptimalResearch Paper

A principal has one indivisible good to give to one of several agents. Each agent would put the good to a use whose value to the principal is that agent's private type; money cannot change hands, but the principal can inspect an agent at a cost and so learn his true type. Allocation problems of this kind arise wherever a budget, a slot or a license is…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing up Your Home?: The Core Respects Improvement, and an Allocation Proving It Is Found in Linear TimeResearch Paper

In a housing market, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1974), every agent owns one indivisible good and the agents reallocate the goods among themselves. The model underlies kidney exchange programmes, where a patient–donor pair "owns" its donor and pairs exchange donors along cycles (Roth, Sönmez, Ünver, QJE 2004). A natural design…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation: The Logit Transaction Fee Mechanism Is U-BNIC and 1-SCP, and UIR, Budget Feasible and Sybil-Proof for n ≥ λ₀kResearch Paper

A blockchain confirms a limited number of transactions per block. Users attach fees (bids) to their transactions; the block producer (the miner) chooses which transactions to include and collects some of the fees. The rule that maps bids to confirmations, payments and miner revenue is a transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Because the miner is itself a…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products: The Prior-Independent Competitive Ratio of Truthful Deterministic Mechanisms Is 1/nResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba let sellers pay to have their products shown in sponsored slots. The platform decides which assortment of sellers to display to an arriving consumer, and the consumer then chooses among the displayed products. Unlike a standard ad auction, a seller's value from being shown depends on who else is shown:…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising: Auction-Adjusted Greedy Deals Earn a Third of the Optimal Revenue, a Half Under Independent Valuations, at Non-Increasing PricesResearch Paper

Online publishers sell display-ad impressions in two ways: by real-time auction, and by preferred deals, contracts that give a buyer first look at impressions at a fixed price. Google's Preferred Deals service (Google Ad Exchange) is the model: a buyer who joins a deal may buy an impression at the agreed price before it reaches the open auction, and is…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

An Equivalence Between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms: Allocation Mechanisms Are Exactly Weakly Budget-Balanced Wagering Mechanisms, with IC, Proportionality and Pareto Optimality PreservedResearch Paper

Two literatures study how to split a resource among agents who report private information. Fair division of divisible goods asks for allocations that are proportional, efficient and resistant to misreporting (Steinhaus 1948; Cole, Gkatzelis and Goel 2013). Wagering mechanisms let bettors with subjective beliefs about a future event bet against each other,…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities: A Strongly Budget-Balanced, Truthful, Individually Rational 1/3-Approximation for Matroid Double AuctionsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has sellers who hold goods and buyers who want them, each with a private value. A mechanism that reallocates the goods should be truthful (no agent gains by misreporting her value), individually rational (no agent is worse off for participating) and budget-balanced (the mechanism neither injects nor keeps money). Myerson and Satterthwaite…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes: Some Posted Price Mechanism Has Regret O(T^{(1+CW/(CW+1))/2}·√log|Γ|) on Every DRACC InstanceResearch Paper

A seller who allocates resources that appear and expire over time (machine slots in a cloud, rooms on given nights, edges of a matching market that change from round to round) often cannot run an auction for every user. A posted price mechanism announces prices before the user arrives and lets the user buy her preferred bundle; it is truthful for myopic…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round: Oblivious Rounding Turns a (λ,μ)(\lambda, \mu)(λ,μ)-Smooth Exact Relaxation into a (λ/(2α),μ)(\lambda/(2\alpha), \mu)(λ/(2α),μ)-Smooth MechanismResearch Paper

Many welfare-maximization problems in mechanism design are NP-hard: combinatorial auctions, packing integer programs, unsplittable flow, maximum traveling salesman. The standard algorithmic answer is relax-and-round: solve a fractional relaxation exactly, then round the fractional solution to a feasible one. Turning such an algorithm into a mechanism is the…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance: The Rai Algorithm Has O(√(T log T)) Regret with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes a random state commits to a rule that maps states to recommendations, and a receiver who knows the state distribution follows a recommendation only when it is optimal given what it reveals (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Bergemann and Morris 2019). When the distribution is known, the sender's best rule solves a…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities: Under Perfect Evasion, Cyclic Cost Sharing with Exponential Random Audits Is the Optimal Audit PolicyResearch Paper

Regulators and large buyers must discover violations that firms prefer to hide: an emissions defeat device, a supplier's noncompliance, an environmental spill. They can audit, which is costly, or pay for voluntary disclosure through reduced penalties or remediation assistance, as in the U.S. EPA's audit policy. The question is how to combine the two when…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: iris

A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality: Strategy-Proofness for Schools Implies the First-Choice Design Extracts a Random AssignmentResearch Paper

Many school districts assign seats through a centralized mechanism that breaks priority ties with lotteries, and a large empirical literature uses that randomness to estimate the effect of attending a school on test scores, college attendance and earnings. The first-choice research design has been applied to data from the Charlotte mechanism and from DA…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Auctions of Auctions: exchanges' double bid-shading lowers both publisher revenue and advertiser profit below the direct benchmarkResearch Paper

Display advertising is sold impression by impression in real-time auctions. A publisher rarely sells to advertisers directly: advertisers delegate bidding to intermediaries, ad exchanges, which collect their clients' bids in an internal auction and then bid on the winner's behalf in the publisher's header auction. Since the industry's move to first-price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Allocating Inventory Risk in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity: when the pre-order menu out-orders the consignment contractResearch Paper

A manufacturer selling through a retailer has to decide who carries the inventory risk. Under a push (pre-order) contract the retailer buys before demand is known and bears the risk of unsold units. Under a pull (consignment) contract the manufacturer keeps ownership and bears it. The operations literature generally finds that pull contracts lead to larger…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts: Guaranteed Allocation and Price with Programmatic Efficiency: The Market-Maker Contract Strictly Raises Revenue and Welfare at Unchanged Utilities and EfficiencyResearch Paper

Display advertising is sold in two ways. Reservation contracts guarantee an advertiser a volume of impressions at a fixed price, negotiated in advance. Programmatic auctions (ad exchanges) sell impressions one at a time, efficiently, but at a price and with an allocation that the advertiser does not know in advance. Advertisers with fixed campaign budgets…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification: The α-GSP Mechanism Has an Efficient Nash Equilibrium Whenever the α-VCG Mechanism DoesResearch Paper

Search engines sell the ad slots next to their results in position auctions: advertisers bid, the highest bidder gets the top slot, the second highest the next one, and so on. A slot higher on the page is clicked more often, and the ratio of click rates between slots is described by a vector of relative position values. The textbook truthful mechanism,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pick-an-Object Mechanisms: an individually rational rule is pick-an-object implementable in perfect ex-post equilibrium iff it is strategy-proof and monotonically discoverableResearch Paper

Many allocation procedures used in practice — school choice, university admissions, course allocation — are run as one-shot direct mechanisms: every participant submits a full ranking, and an algorithm such as deferred acceptance or top trading cycles computes the assignment. Sequential alternatives, in which participants repeatedly pick one option from a…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings: the unique legal set of assignments is the set of stable assignments of a subinstanceResearch Paper

Stable assignments are the standard output of centralized school choice, but insisting on stability can leave many students worse off than necessary (Faenza–Zhang, §1). Morrill (2016) proposed legality as a relaxation motivated by legal standing: a student who forms a blocking pair has a complaint only if the remedy, the assignment of that student to that…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
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