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Control Theory

214 missions · 87 completed

Missions

Open127Completed87All214
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynkin Games with Incomplete and Asymmetric Information: With Linear Payoffs, a Threshold Stop and a Belief-Reflecting Randomised Stop Form a Saddle PointResearch Paper

An optimal stopping game asks two players to choose when to stop a shared process. The first player receives one payoff if they stop first and another if the second player stops first. Such a game changes when one player knows a parameter that the other can only infer from observations. The informed player can reveal information through the timing of a…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Self-Replicating Innovative Goods: Characterization of the Optimal Production and Sales Policies under Strong ReplicabilityResearch Paper

Some goods can only be made by copies of themselves. RepRap and Prusa 3D printers print the parts of new printers, seed stock is grown from seed, and livestock herds breed. For such a good the inventory is also the production capacity: a unit sold today is a unit that will not replicate tomorrow. A firm launching such a good has to decide, at every instant,…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games and Mean-Field Games with Impulse Controls: A Regular Solution of the N-Player Quasi-Variational Inequalities Gives a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

An impulse control changes a system's state at a chosen instant, rather than continuously adjusting its drift. When several decision makers can intervene in the same state process, an intervention changes both the acting player's future cost and every opponent's. This makes the equilibrium question different from separate single-player control problems.…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynkin Game on Assets with Incomplete Information on the Return: The Entry Times of the Two Stopping Regions Form a Saddle Point When k > 0Research Paper

A game option (or Israeli option, introduced by Kifer, Game options, 2000) is an American option whose seller may also cancel the contract at any time, paying the exercise payoff plus a penalty. Pricing it is a Dynkin game: a zero-sum optimal stopping game in which the buyer chooses an exercise time to maximise the discounted payoff and the seller chooses a…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Game of Variable Contributions to the Common Good Under Uncertainty: The Symmetric Game Has a Regular Control Markov Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Many shared assets deteriorate unless someone pays to maintain them: a public infrastructure stock, a jointly used ecosystem, a joint venture's capital, a common research base. When several parties benefit from the same stock and each pays for its own contributions, every party is tempted to wait for the others to pay. Kwon (arXiv:1904.00500, published in Op…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets: The Optimal Market Balance Depends Only on Market Size and Moves Monotonically Between the Output- and Durability-Maximizing BalancesResearch Paper

A two-sided platform (a ride-hailing service, a marketplace, a payment network) earns money only when its two sides transact, so its value depends on the stock of participants on both sides. A young platform has to decide not only how fast to grow but also which side to grow, and it does so through the prices it sets on each side. Whether to subsidize…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Mean-Variance Analysis for Log Returns: In a Complete Market, Holding the Constant Fraction (μ − r)/((1 + γ)σ²) of Wealth in Stock Is an Equilibrium StrategyResearch Paper

Mean-variance analysis, the trade-off between the expected value and the variance of a portfolio's outcome, is the most widely used criterion for portfolio choice in practice. In continuous time it has two well-known defects when applied to terminal wealth: the criterion is time-inconsistent (a strategy that is optimal today is no longer optimal tomorrow),…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Knowledge Accumulation, Privacy, and Growth in a Data Economy: The Decentralized Economy Grows at the Socially Optimal Rate on the Balanced Growth PathResearch Paper

Data have become an input to innovation: firms use consumer data, together with research labor, to develop new products. Data differ from labor and capital in two ways. They are a by-product of consumption, so their supply is endogenous, and selling them costs consumers privacy. Cong, Xie and Zhang (arXiv:2109.10028, published in Management Science) put…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dual Sourcing and Smoothing Under Nonstationary Demand Time Series: Reshoring with SpeedFactories: When the Break-Even Price Is Concave, Dual Sourcing with a SpeedFactory Beats Full Off-ShoringResearch Paper

Firms that moved production offshore for low unit costs pay for it in lead time: a slow global supplier forces large safety stocks, and the cost of those stocks grows with demand variability. A recurring question in operations management is when it pays to re-shore part of production to a fast, local, more expensive plant. Adidas's "SpeedFactories" are the…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait Time Based Pricing for Queues with Customer-Chosen Service Times: The Delay Differential Optimality Equations Have a Decreasing Concave SolutionResearch Paper

Service systems such as public fast-charging stations for electric vehicles let each customer choose how long to be served. Lin, Shang and Sun (SSRN 3709573, 2020; later in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4474) study a firm that announces to every arriving customer the current wait time www (the work already in the queue) and a price rate ppp per unit…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Approximate Analysis of Dynamic Pricing, Outsourcing, and Scheduling Policies for a Multiclass Make-to-Stock Queue in the Heavy Traffic Regime: The Two-Barrier Drift-Rate Control Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

A manufacturer that makes several products to stock for price-sensitive customers controls three levers at once: the prices it posts, which shape demand; outsourcing, which clears a large backlog at a cost; and scheduling, which decides which product the single server makes next. Ata and Barjesteh (Operations Research 71(1), 2023) study this multiclass…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Model for Managing Volunteer Engagement I: The Bellman Equation of the Drift-Rate Control Problem Has a SolutionResearch Paper

Non-profit organizations depend on volunteers whose availability they cannot schedule. They can only influence it, through recruiting drives, reminders and recognition events. Ata, Tongarlak, Lee and Field (arXiv:2312.02920) model a food-recovery non-profit's volunteer pool as a queueing network. Repeat volunteers rest between shifts, one-time volunteers…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Model for Managing Volunteer Engagement II: The Bellman Solution in Closed Form Between Consecutive Engagement ThresholdsResearch Paper

Non-profit organizations such as food banks run on volunteer labour. Volunteers sign up for shifts, wait on a sign-up list, work, rest, and may or may not return; the organization can spend money on engagement activities (reminders, recognition events, recruitment drives) that raise the rate at which volunteers come back or arrive. Spending too little…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost IV: Low Switching Cost, Control-Band Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships are dynamic contracts in which the principal cannot observe the agent's effort, only its noisy consequences. Cao, Sun and Tian (Management Science, 2024) study such a relationship when the principal can suspend the agent and must pay a fixed switching cost to restart work. Suspension is a punishment that does not end the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost III: Condition 2, Medium Switching Cost, Always-Work Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships pay an agent per unit of output whose arrival is random: a salesperson closing deals, a call-centre worker resolving tickets, a contractor delivering jobs. When effort is unobservable, the classical tool for keeping an agent motivated is the threat of termination after poor performance. In practice firms often use a milder…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize 2: Under High Follower Turnover the Optimal Policy Is to Stay Authentic ForeverResearch Paper

Social-media influencers earn money by endorsing products to their followers. An endorsement of a product that does not fit the audience brings in money today but costs followers, and followers are also what spreads awareness of the influencer to new people. Nistor, Selove and Villas-Boas (Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize, Management Science,…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Model of Irreversible Investment in a Two-Regime Economy: A Unique Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Exists and Invests at Regime-Dependent BarriersResearch Paper

Industries in which capacity can be built but not sold back (energy generation, manufacturing, mining) are studied through irreversible investment models: a firm controls a nondecreasing investment process and trades the cost of capacity against uncertain future revenues. When many small firms compete, each firm's revenue depends on aggregate production…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize 1: The Optimal Endorsement Policy Is Authentic Until a Threshold Awareness, Then Permanently InauthenticResearch Paper

Social media influencers earn money by endorsing products to their followers. An influencer who endorses only products that fit her organic content keeps her audience; one who accepts every sponsorship offer earns more per follower today but loses part of her audience and grows more slowly. Practitioners describe this as the choice between growing and…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling in the High-Uncertainty Heavy Traffic Regime: The Value of the Scheduling Game Converges to the HJB Solution at ZeroResearch Paper

Heavy-traffic analysis is the standard tool for scheduling queues whose servers are almost always busy: after diffusion scaling, a multiclass queue is approximated by a reflected Brownian motion, and asymptotically optimal policies are read off a limiting control problem. Classical results of this kind, such as the asymptotic optimality of the cµ rule (serve…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 2: Under Pseudo-Exponential Discounting, a Two-State Generator Is a Weak but Not a Strong EquilibriumResearch Paper

An agent whose preferences change over time cannot simply optimize once: a plan that is optimal today may be abandoned tomorrow by the agent's own "future selves". This is time inconsistency, and its standard source is non-exponential discounting, studied since Strotz (1955). The usual response, going back to Strotz and made rigorous in continuous time by…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quadratic Matrix Inequalities with Applications to Data-Based Control V: A Reduced LMI in P Alone and an Explicit Data-Based Stabilizing GainResearch Paper

Data-driven control asks for a controller computed directly from measured trajectories of an unknown system, without first identifying a model. When the measurements are corrupted by noise, many systems explain the same data, and a controller is acceptable only if it works for all of them. Van Waarde, Camlibel, Eising and Trentelman (arXiv:2203.12959) model…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamical SystemsGraph TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Sub/Super-Stochastic Matrix with Applications to Bipartite Tracking Control over Signed Networks 3: ψ < 1/(τd_M), Structural Balance and Leader Reachability Give Asynchronous Bipartite TrackingResearch Paper

Networks of agents that interact both cooperatively and competitively are modelled by signed graphs: a positive edge weight means that one agent moves towards another, a negative weight means that it moves towards the other's opposite. Since Altafini's work on consensus over antagonistic networks (IEEE TAC 2013), the standard target on such networks has…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationGraph TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Achieving Geometric Convergence for Distributed Optimization Over Time-Varying Graphs 2: Push-DIGing Converges R-Linearly over Time-Varying Directed Graphs for Every Step Size Below 1.5(1−δ)²/(μ̄J₂)Research Paper

In distributed optimization, nnn agents cooperatively minimize the average f(x)=1n∑i=1nfi(x)f(x)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n f_i(x)f(x)=n1​∑i=1n​fi​(x) of private cost functions fi:Rp→Rf_i:\mathbb R^p\to\mathbb Rfi​:Rp→R, exchanging information only with their current neighbours in a communication network. The model covers sensor networks, multi-robot coordination and machine learning with data split across machines,…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Solvabilities for Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems 4: A Problem Open-Loop Solvable at Every (t, x) but Closed-Loop Solvable on No [t, 1]Research Paper

In a stochastic linear–quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem a controller steers a linear stochastic differential equation and pays a quadratic cost. When the cost weights are allowed to be indefinite — as in mean–variance portfolio selection, where the control weight is zero — the problem can still be well posed, and two different notions of solution…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Solvabilities for Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems 3: Open-Loop Solvability Is Equivalent to Convergence of the Riccati Minimizing SequenceResearch Paper

Linear–quadratic (LQ) optimal control is the basic test case of stochastic control: a linear stochastic differential equation, a quadratic cost, and an optimal control that one expects to be a linear feedback of the state computed from a Riccati equation. In the indefinite stochastic case the weighting matrices GGG, QQQ, RRR carry no sign condition. The cost can…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
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