Algorithmic Game Theory V: Stable Matching and Trading without MoneyTextbook
Algorithmic Game Theory V: Stable Matching and Trading without Money
Motivation
When money is off the table and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Mission III of this series) blocks general strategyproof choice, restricted preference domains reopen the door. The two great examples both come from allocation: Shapley–Scarf's housing market (1974), where Gale's Top Trading Cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation and Roth (1982) showed the mechanism is strategy-proof; and the Gale–Shapley marriage market (1962), where deferred acceptance produces a stable matching, the men-optimal one, which Dubins–Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) showed cannot be manipulated by any man. This machinery runs the US medical residency match and school choice systems worldwide, and the 2012 Nobel memorial prize to Roth and Shapley cites exactly the results of this mission. Chapter 10 (Schummer–Vohra, "Mechanism Design without Money") of Nisan–Roughgarden–Tardos–Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory (Cambridge, 2007) is the source text; its single-peaked §10.2 is left to a possible later mission, since it needs its own preference-domain machinery.
Setting
Marriage market (§10.4): finite sets of men and of women, each agent holding a strict preference ordering over the opposite side (the preference-profile vocabulary of Mission III; reads " strictly prefers to "). Following the book's dummy-partner convention, and a matching is a bijection . A pair blocks if each prefers the other to their assigned partner; is stable if no pair blocks it. A stable is male-optimal if every man weakly prefers it to every stable alternative. A coalition dominates if it can rematch within itself with every member strictly better off; the core is the set of undominated matchings.
Housing market (§10.3): a finite set of agents, agent owning house , each with a strict preference over all houses; an allocation is a permutation of . A coalition blocks an allocation if it can redistribute the houses its members own so that all are weakly and someone strictly better off.
Formalization targets
Goal (capstone) — Theorem 10.13
Any mechanism selecting the male-optimal stable matching is strategy-proof for the men: no man can misreport his ordering and obtain a wife he truly prefers.
Theorem 10.10 — existence
Every marriage market has a stable matching.
Theorem 10.11 / Gale–Shapley 1962 — male-optimality
Some stable matching is weakly best for every man simultaneously. This man-by-man form is Gale–Shapley's optimal assignment (1962, Theorem 2); the book's Theorem 10.11 phrases male-optimality as the absence of a stable alternative making every man weakly and some man strictly better off, which is equivalent for finite strict markets — the equivalence being a (short) theorem, the attribution follows Gale–Shapley.
Theorem 10.12 — the core
A matching is stable iff it is in the core of the matching game.
Theorems 10.6 and 10.7 — housing
The core of the housing market is a single allocation, and the mechanism selecting it is strategy-proof.
Significance
These are the foundational theorems of market design — the branch of mechanism design with the strongest record of deployed systems — and none of them exists in Lean. The mission also settles a methodological point for the series: algorithm-defined objects (deferred acceptance, top trading cycles) enter through the properties that characterize their outputs — male-optimality, core membership — so the theorems are statements about all mechanisms with the given property, and any construction of the algorithm proves the existence milestones. The matching vocabulary (bijections as matchings, blocking, stability, domination) is reusable for the college-admissions and roommates variants beyond this mission.
Difficulty
Existence (10.10) is the real formalization work: whether by formalizing deferred acceptance and its termination or by another route (e.g. Adachi's fixed-point formulation, which the book sketches as Theorem 10.14 via Tarski), the solver must build the proposal machinery. Male-optimality (10.11) rides on the same construction with the "no man is ever rejected by an achievable wife" invariant. The core equivalence (10.12) is deliberately light — a transposition embeds a blocking pair as a two-agent coalition. Housing uniqueness (10.6) needs the cycle-peeling induction of TTC. The two strategyproofness results are the subtle ones: both known proof routes (Dubins–Freedman's combinatorial argument, or Roth's via the blocking lemma) require careful bookkeeping of which coalitions can improve under a misreport, and the mechanism is pinned only by its defining property, so proofs must use optimality/core facts rather than algorithm internals.
Formalization scope
Preferences are strict total orders as in Mission III (IsPrefProfile), oriented "first argument preferred". Matchings are Equivs; the book's convention enters the existence statements as the hypothesis Nonempty (M ≃ W) and nothing else about cardinalities is assumed. Domination and house-blocking quantify a rematching Equiv together with the improving coalition, coalitions being sets closed under the rematching — single-agent and pair coalitions are special cases, so no separate pair-blocking clause is needed in the core theorems. Mechanisms in the strategyproofness results are arbitrary functions constrained only by their defining property (male-optimal selection; core selection), quantified before the misreport — nothing may be chosen with hindsight. Both sides keep finiteness only where used: the core equivalence (10.12) holds for arbitrary types and carries no Fintype.
Selected references
- D. Gale, L. S. Shapley, College admissions and the stability of marriage, Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962), 9–15. DOI
- L. Shapley, H. Scarf, On cores and indivisibility, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974), 23–37. DOI
- L. E. Dubins, D. A. Freedman, Machiavelli and the Gale–Shapley algorithm, Amer. Math. Monthly 88 (1981), 485–494. DOI
- A. E. Roth, The economics of matching: stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982), 617–628. DOI
- A. E. Roth, Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods, Econ. Letters 9 (1982), 127–132. DOI
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Chapter 10. DOI