Theory of Games and Economic Behavior II: Games with Perfect Information Are Strictly DeterminedTextbook
Motivation
Chess, checkers, Go and Backgammon share a feature that card games such as Poker lack: whenever a player moves, the player knows everything that has happened so far. von Neumann and Morgenstern call this perfect information and devote §15 of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) to it. Their result is that such a game, viewed as a zero-sum two-person game, is strictly determined: it has a value that each player can secure with a pure strategy, without any randomization. For Chess this means that exactly one of three statements is true: White can force a win, Black can force a win, or both can force at least a draw ((15:D:a)–(15:D:c)).
Timeline. Zermelo (1913, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels) showed for Chess that either one side can force a win or both can avoid losing; his argument is not phrased in terms of strategies and a value, and was later corrected and completed by König (1927) and Kalmár (1928/29). von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, §15) proved strict determinateness for every finite zero-sum two-person game with perfect information, including chance moves (15.7.1), and gave the explicit formula (15:12) for the value. Kuhn (1953, Extensive games and the problem of information, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28) recast games in tree form and extended the pure-strategy existence result to general-sum games with perfect information (subgame-perfect equilibria by backward induction).
Setting
A game tree is a finite rooted tree. Each leaf is a finished play and carries the payoff to player 1; player 2 receives . Each internal node is a move of one of three kinds , with alternatives leading to subtrees :
- , a chance move, where alternative occurs with probability , ;
- , a personal move of player 1, with ;
- , a personal move of player 2, with .
A pure strategy of player 1 is a complete plan choosing an alternative at every node of kind 1; does the same at every node of kind 2. The normalized form is the expected payoff to player 1, the expectation being over the chance moves. With the maxima and minima taken over the finitely many pure strategies,
Always ; the game is strictly determined when (14.4.2).
For a function of the alternatives of the first move , of kind , the operation of (15:8) is , or for . Applying these operations from the leaves back to the root gives the backward-induction value .
Formalization targets
Goal: 15.6.1 with (15:12)
For every finite game tree ,
Both the equality and the value formula are part of the goal.
Milestones
- (13:E): for finite nonempty domains and ranging over all functions of , ; and (13:G): .
- (15:2)–(15:7): for , one milestone for each kind of first move, without assuming that any game is strictly determined.
- (15:C:a): a game of length is strictly determined with value ; (15:C:b): if every is strictly determined, so is .
- (15:13), (15:D:a)–(15:D:c): for games without chance moves whose plays end in , the value is one of these three numbers, and it decides which player can force a win or whether both can force a tie.
Significance
The theorem is the first existence result for the value of a class of games in pure strategies. It shows that the whole difficulty of the general zero-sum two-person game, the need for mixed strategies (§17), comes from imperfect information. It gives a construction as well as an existence proof: the value and optimal strategies are computed by backward induction, the procedure behind retrograde analysis of endgames, minimax search in game-playing programs, and the dynamic programming recursions of sequential decision problems with an adversary. The Chess trichotomy (15:D) is its best-known consequence.
Formalizing it adds a checked account of the passage from the extensive to the normalized form for a whole class of games, which the book carries out informally (15.4.2, 15.5.1: "the reader may verify it from the formalistic point of view"). The result is classical and fully proved in the book; the work is to formalize that proof on a tree model. Mathlib has saddle points (Order/SaddlePoint) and the minimax theorem for continuous functions (Topology/Sion), but no game trees, strategies of extensive games, or backward induction. No machine-checked version of this theorem with chance moves and the normalized form over complete plans is known to the mission.
Difficulty
The recursions (15:2)–(15:7) are not formal consequences of the definitions: and are extrema over whole plans of , while the right-hand sides are extrema over plans of the separate games . At a personal move of player 1, requires interchanging a Min over player 2's plans, which are functions of player 1's first choice, with a Max over that choice: this is exactly (13:E), a max-min equality that fails for general functions of two variables and holds here because the minimizing variable is a function of the maximizing one. A proof that treats the Max over and the Min over as interchangeable without this step is circular.
A second difficulty is the strategy spaces themselves. A complete plan chooses at nodes the plan itself excludes, so the pure strategies of are not simply pairs of a first choice and one strategy of the chosen subgame; the identification the book uses in 15.5.1 has to be justified by showing that the extra coordinates do not change .
Formalization scope
A game is an inductive type GameTree with constructors leaf w, chance α p next hp hsum, move1 α hα next, move2 α hα next; alternatives are Fin α (numbered from ). The conditions , and at personal moves are constructor fields, so every tree is a legitimate game. Pure strategies are dependent types Strategy1 t, Strategy2 t defined by recursion on the tree (complete plans), with Fintype and Nonempty instances; is payoff t τ₁ τ₂, the expected leaf payoff; v1, v2 are Finset.sup'/Finset.inf' over all strategies, so every Max and Min is attained.
Standing hypotheses and conventions taken from the book:
- finite strategy sets and attained extrema (13.2.1, 14.1.1): finite trees with finitely many alternatives at every move;
- perfect information, i.e. preliminarity equals anteriority (6.4.1, (15:B)): built into the tree model, which is the sequence of games (15:1);
- zero-sum two-person (15.3.1): one payoff , player 2 receives and minimizes ;
- chance probabilities nonnegative and summing to one (15.4.2, 10.1.1); at every move;
- (15:D) additionally assumes no chance moves and outcomes (15.7.1).
The book's formal model is the set-theoretic one of §§9–10, with partitions of the set of plays; the tree restates it for the perfect-information case and does not formalize §§9–10. The book fixes one length for all plays; trees with plays of different lengths contain the book's games as a special case, so the goal is at least as strong as the book's theorem.
Strategies are plans, never responses: a strategy of player 1 is fixed before play and cannot depend on player 2's strategy, which would make trivial. Chance moves are part of the goal; a version without them proves only the Chess case and is weaker than the book.
Reusable beyond this mission: the tree model, its strategy types and the normalized form, which later chapters on extensive games can import. Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, and a lemma identifying the strategies of with the book's recursive description (15.4.2, 15.5.1).
Selected references
- J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §§6, 11, 13–15. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
- E. Zermelo, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, Proc. Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, vol. II, 1913, pp. 501–504.
- U. Schwalbe, P. Walker, Zermelo and the early history of game theory, Games and Economic Behavior 34 (2001), 123–137. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0794
- H. W. Kuhn, Extensive games and the problem of information, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton, 1953, 193–216. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012