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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 3: The Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of the Liability GameResearch Paper

When one breached contract forces the next party to breach its own contract, a single failure travels down a loss chain: agent 1 (the initiator) causes a loss ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ to agent 2, which can then no longer honour its agreement with agent 3 and causes it a loss ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​, and so on until agent nnn causes a loss ℓn\ell_nℓn​ to a final victim. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper

Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper

In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε\varepsilonε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε\varepsilonε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 2: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Local Consistency Characterize Single-Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Tournaments, races, poker finals and sports leagues end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to be split among them. The split is usually fixed by a published schedule, and different events use very different schedules: some pay almost everything to the winner, some pay many places, some decay geometrically from one place to the next.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 3: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Top Consistency Characterize Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Rank-order competitions — sports tournaments, poker final tables, golf tours, crowdsourcing contests, sales leagues — end with a ranking of the participants and a pot of prize money that has to be split according to that ranking. Organisers publish prize tables that change with the number of entrants and with the size of the purse, and these tables are…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusivity Draws Consumers and Complementors to the Favored Platform and Raises Complementors' Total SurplusResearch Paper

Platform markets often feature a Superstar: a single complement whose presence moves consumers, such as a blockbuster game on a console or a star streamer on a video platform. Whether such a Superstar signs an exclusive deal with one platform or stays available on both is a recurring question for competition authorities and for platform managers. Empirical…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 1: A Prize Allocation Rule Satisfies Order Preservation, Endowment Monotonicity and Consistency iff It Is an Interval RuleResearch Paper

Sports leagues, tournaments, esports events and research competitions all end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to divide among them. How the money is split according to the ranking is a design choice with visible consequences: Winner-Takes-All schemes reward only the top, equal division ignores the ranking, and most real prize…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach II: In Binary Persuasion with a Convex Non-Adoption Region the Convex Program Reduces to a Linear Program over Ω ∪ K₀₁Research Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes the state of the world commits to a signaling scheme, a receiver updates her belief by Bayes' rule and acts, and the sender chooses the scheme that maximizes her own expected payoff (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). The classical theory assumes the receiver maximizes expected utility, so her payoff is linear in her…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 2: Without Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Three Breach-Cost Regimes and No Trade Once c ≥ 1 + δμ/(1 + δ)Research Paper

Personal data lets a firm tailor its product to each customer, and the same data exposes the customer to the risk of a breach. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers rights over that data. Data collection must be opted into separately from the purchase, and stored data must be erased…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model III: Stronger Interoperability Lowers the Symmetric Equilibrium Net Fee, Except in Duopoly Without an Outside OptionResearch Paper

A recurring proposal in the policy debate on dominant digital platforms is to make competing platforms interoperable, so that users of one service can interact with users of another; the EU Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Article 7) imposes such an obligation on gatekeepers' messaging services. The economic case is that users then enjoy…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 2: The ML-IS-UCB Bidding Policy Achieves Expected Regret at Most C√T log³ T for Every Oblivious Private-Value SequenceResearch Paper

Display advertising has been moving from second-price to first-price auctions: several exchanges began rolling them out in 2017, and Google Ad Manager completed its move at the end of 2019 (Davies 2019). In a second-price auction bidding one's value is a dominant strategy; in a first-price auction the optimal bid depends on the distribution of the competing…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions I: Iterative-Pruning Is a Budget-Feasible 4.75-Approximation for Monotone Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In a budget-feasible procurement auction a buyer with a hard budget BBB acquires services from strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost cic_ici​, and the buyer values a set SSS of hired sellers at v(S)v(S)v(S). The auction must keep total payments within BBB and make truthful behaviour optimal for every seller, while hiring a set whose value is close to the best…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design II: Against Exchangeable Affiliated Valuations the Minimax Regret Equals the I.I.D. ValueResearch Paper

A seller offers one indivisible item to nnn buyers but does not know the joint distribution of their valuations. The seller knows only that every valuation lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Prior-independent mechanism design asks for a selling mechanism that performs well against every distribution in a class. One measure of performance is the regret: the expected gap between…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 1: With IID Private Values a Bidding Policy Achieves Expected Regret at Most C√T log^2.5 TResearch Paper

Most display advertising is sold in first-price auctions: the highest bidder wins and pays its own bid. Since the industry's move away from second-price formats around 2019, a bidder can no longer bid its value and must instead learn how much to shade its bid, from data about how the other bidders behave. A demand-side platform faces this problem millions…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions III: A Deterministic Clock Auction Achieves an O(log n / log log n)-Approximation for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A budget-feasible procurement auction buys services from strategic sellers under a hard budget. Each of nnn bidders can provide a service at a private cost; the auctioneer values each set of acquired services through a set function vvv and must keep total payments within a budget BBB. The question, introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010), is how much of the optimal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 2: With Nash Bargaining and Poaching After a Failed Bid, the Acquirer Hires Directly Above v̄_a, Acquihires Between v̲_a and v̄_a, and Does Not Hire Below v̲_aResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups less for their products than for their staff: the product is shut down and the employees move to the acquirer. This practice, called acquihiring, has drawn the attention of competition authorities because it can be a way to buy labour-market power rather than to create value. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC…

9 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design I: For I.I.D. Valuations a Second-Price Auction with Random Reserve Φ*ₙ Is Minimax-Regret Optimal over DSIC MechanismsResearch Paper

Optimal auction theory in the tradition of Myerson (1981) assumes that the seller knows the distribution of the buyers' valuations. In practice that distribution is estimated, misspecified, or simply unknown. Prior-independent mechanism design asks for a mechanism that performs well across a whole class of distributions, without being tuned to any one of…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Telehealth in Acute Care: Pay Parity and Patient Access: Under Pay Parity, for Duplicate-Visit Probability q in (q†, q*), Telehealth Maximizes Provider Revenue but Office-Only Maximizes AccessResearch Paper

During the COVID-19 pandemic most U.S. payers began reimbursing a telehealth consultation at the same rate as the corresponding office visit, a policy called pay parity. Many states have since made it permanent, on the stated ground that it improves patients' access to care. In acute care (primary and urgent care) a telehealth visit sometimes cannot resolve…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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