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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items: For n Agents with Additive Utilities a Consensus Halving That Cuts at Most min{n, m} of the m Items Always ExistsResearch Paper

Consensus halving asks for a division of a resource into two parts that every one of nnn agents values equally, so that a group with heterogeneous preferences can agree that the two parts are of the same worth. The classical setting is a divisible interval (a cake or a necklace), where Simmons and Su (2003), building on Hobby and Rice (1965), showed that nnn cut…

24 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies: Giving the Public Signal to One Farmer or to None Maximizes Total Farmer WelfareResearch Paper

Farmers who sell the same crop can benefit from better forecasts of the market price, but their production decisions also affect one another through the price. A forecast sent to one farmer may improve that farmer’s decision; a forecast sent to many farmers can make their output responses move together. A planner choosing who receives a common forecast…

20 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint vs. Separate Crowdsourcing Contests: The Separate Contest Has the Higher Expected Best Random Factor, and the Joint Contest Induces Higher Equilibrium EffortResearch Paper

Firms increasingly outsource innovation to crowdsourcing contests: a firm posts a design or software problem, many independent solvers submit solutions, and the best one wins a prize. Platforms such as Topcoder, 99designs and Kaggle run thousands of such contests, and a recurring design question is whether a project with several attributes (say, a logo's…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance I: Existence and KKT Characterization of the Competition EquilibriumResearch Paper

In the days after a sudden-onset disaster, several humanitarian organizations (HOs) appeal to the same pool of donors. Donors increasingly want to earmark their gifts (restrict them to a programme, region or item), and HOs can offer more or less of that control. Earmarked money is less useful in the response: renegotiating restrictions costs time and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies II: With Personalized Pricing by the Manufacturer, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Iff β > β_PZ(α), and β_PU(α) > β_PP(α)Research Paper

A manufacturer can sell directly to consumers and also supply an independent retailer. The retailer reaches consumers for whom its distribution service is more valuable, but its presence can also force the manufacturer to lower direct-channel prices. Jullien, Reisinger and Rey study when the additional sales justify dual distribution under different…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Softening Competition Through Unilateral Sharing of Customer Data: For Every Monotone-Hazard-Rate Distribution, Sharing Data on [z^N, b′] Makes Both Firms Strictly Better OffResearch Paper

Large platforms that also sell their own products (Amazon, JD.com, app stores) hold detailed data on consumers and sometimes share part of it with the independent sellers they compete with. The usual view in the personalized-pricing literature is that information is a competitive weapon: a firm that knows more about consumers can price discriminate and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization IV: The A-Learning Threshold Δ Exceeds the O-Learning Threshold Λ If and Only If γ < max{2s/(2s+k), (√(s²+4sk) − s)/(2k)}Research Paper

A seller who customizes products for buyers must learn what each buyer wants, and buyers have private information about how much they value quality. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025; author copy SSRN 3994319) compares two ways of learning those preferences. Under A-Learning ("asking")…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 4: The Price of Anarchy Is Not Uniformly Hölder Continuous and No Game Has the Whole Space as a Hölder NeighborhoodResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game measures how much total cost is lost when a continuum of selfish users routes traffic instead of a central planner. Worst-case bounds on the PoA over classes of cost functions are classical: 4/34/34/3 for affine costs and Θ(β/ln⁡β)\Theta(\beta/\ln\beta)Θ(β/lnβ) for polynomial costs of degree at most β\betaβ (Roughgarden and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 5: For Small Total Demand the Price of Anarchy Exceeds 1 by at Most an Explicit Multiple of the Total DemandResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio between the total travel cost at a Wardrop equilibrium, where every traveller uses a cheapest route, and the minimum total cost a central planner could achieve. Worst-case bounds on the PoA are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002), but traffic studies observe that the empirical PoA…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 3: Mod-Cut&Choose Always Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium and Every One Is MMS and EFXResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different tastes so that nobody has a strong reason to complain. Fairness notions such as envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and the maximin share (MMS) have been studied extensively as algorithmic targets: given the agents' valuations, compute an allocation satisfying the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 1: With Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Four Breach-Cost Regimes Separated by c = δσ/2, δσ/√2 and δσResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers privacy rights over the personal data that firms collect: data may be collected only with explicit consent (opt-in), consent is separated from the purchase itself, and a consumer may later have her data deleted (erasure, the "right to…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model II: Interoperability Mitigates Dominance, as Lower Interoperability Admits a Duopoly Equilibrium with an Even Larger Dominant PlatformResearch Paper

Digital markets with strong network effects (messaging, social networks, app stores) tend to concentrate: a platform with more users is worth more to each user. Interoperability, the ability of a platform's users to interact with the users of rival platforms, is a central remedy in current competition policy; the EU Digital Markets Act (2022) mandates it…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model I: Adding a Third Platform Can Produce an Equilibrium Whose Dominant Platform Outsizes Every Platform of Every Duopoly EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets organized by platforms (social networks, marketplaces, messaging services) exhibit network effects: a user values a platform more when more users join it. A standing concern in competition policy is that such markets "tip" towards one dominant platform, and the usual remedy proposed is to foster entry. Ekmekci, White and Wu (Platform Competition and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 2: The High-Quality Influencer's Defensive Fake-Account Purchase Falls in Antifake Effort If Condition (22) Holds, and Otherwise Rises Then FallsResearch Paper

Fake follower accounts are sold openly to social media influencers, who buy them because advertisers and new followers read a large follower count as a sign of quality. Platforms respond with antifake effort: detection, removal and registration hurdles that make fake accounts more expensive to operate, but that also impose a nuisance cost on legitimate…

13 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions V: A Posted-Price Mechanism Achieves an O(log n)-Approximation for Symmetric Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a fixed budget BBB wants to buy services from strategic sellers whose costs are private. The auctioneer values sets of services through a valuation function vvv, and wants a mechanism that pays the sellers at most BBB in total while acquiring a set of nearly maximal value. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS…

9 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms III: When No User Plays Every Artist, Homogeneity, Additivity and Core Selection Characterize the User-Centric IndexResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pass a large share of the revenue to the artists. How that money is divided has become a policy question. Most platforms use the pro-rata rule: all fees are pooled and each artist is paid in proportion to their share of all streams. The main alternative is the user-centric rule: each…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 1: A Purely Profit-Driven Platform Optimally Chooses Zero Antifake EffortResearch Paper

Fake accounts (purchased followers, likes and engagement) are a large part of influencer marketing on social media, and platforms say they invest in detecting and removing them. Huang and Liu (Management Science 71(10), 2025) model this market as a signaling game. An influencer of unknown quality buys fake followers to look popular, consumers decide whether…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 1: Under Regularized Reinforcement Learning, Every Iteratively Dominated Strategy Becomes ExtinctResearch Paper

A basic test of any model of learning in games is whether it respects strict dominance: a strategy that does worse than another against every behaviour of the opponents should eventually be abandoned, and, after it is gone, so should every strategy that becomes dominated in what remains. For the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory this is…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
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