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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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CombinatoricsInformation Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Switching and Entropy Bounds for Stable MatchingsResearch Paper

A market can have several stable outcomes even when every participant has a strict preference list. Finding one outcome answers a different question from counting all of them. The extremal stable-matching count asks how many stable outcomes one market can admit in the worst case. It measures the possible size of the entire solution set, without selecting an…

34 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational Complexity·Captain: Shuze Chen

Complexity of Autobidding Equilibria in GSP Sponsored ShoppingResearch Paper

Most advertising auctions are no longer bid in by hand: an autobidder chooses one multiplier per advertiser and bids that multiple of the value of every ad, subject to a budget or to a return-on-investment (ROI) target. In sponsored shopping, one advertiser can place many products in a single ranked list, so one multiplier moves several items at once, and…

36 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Price of Ignorance in Pairwise-Independent Prophet InequalitiesResearch Paper

In the prophet inequality a gambler observes nonnegative values V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ one at a time, where ViV_iVi​ has a known law DiD_iDi​. After seeing each value the gambler must decide irrevocably whether to stop and keep it, or discard it and continue. The gambler is compared with a prophet who sees all values in advance and takes max⁡iVi\max_i V_imaxi​Vi​. When the values are…

24 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large SupplyResearch Paper

Auctions that sell many identical units to many bidders, such as treasury bills, emission permits and advertising slots, are often run as multi-unit first-price auctions: the highest bids win and each winner pays its own bid. Bidders then shade their bids below their values. In equilibrium, a bidder with a higher value can lose to one with a lower value, so…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer UtilityResearch Paper

In many allocation problems the designer cares about the welfare of the participants, not revenue: public housing, school seats, medical resources, or platforms that screen users through effort or waiting rather than money. Payments in these settings are "burned": they screen buyers but reach nobody. The designer then maximizes consumer utility, also called …

17 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Sub-3n3^n3n Upper Bound on the Number of Stable MatchingsResearch Paper

A stable matching instance has nnn men and nnn women, and each person strictly ranks every member of the other side. A perfect matching is stable if no man and woman both prefer each other to their partners. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable matching always exists (GS62). An instance can have many stable matchings, however, and Knuth asked how many it can…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with different tastes is a basic problem of fair division, with applications from inheritance and course allocation to the sharing of computing resources. Exact envy-freeness (no agent prefers another agent's bundle to its own) cannot always be achieved with indivisible goods: a single good and two agents…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityMachine Learning·Captain: iris

On the Complexity of Infinite Zero-Sum GamesResearch Paper

Zero-sum games whose players choose among infinitely many strategies arise when the strategies are learning machines: each player may train any model, and the natural way to access such a game is through best responses, computed by training against a mixture of the opponent's models (empirical risk minimization), as in the double-oracle method of McMahan,…

46 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: iris

Sources of Complexity in Multi-Agent Combinatorial ContractsResearch Paper

In multi-agent contract design, a principal delegates a project to a team of agents whose actions she cannot observe, and pays each agent a share of the reward on success. The multi-agent combinatorial-action model of Dütting, Ezra, Feldman and Kesselheim (Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts, SODA 2025, pp.1857–1891), building on their Multi-Agent Contracts…

39 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bayesian Optimal Stopping: Invincible Prophets and Achievable PhilosophersResearch Paper

In a prophet inequality a decision-maker sees rewards X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time, must accept or reject each on arrival, and may accept only one. The classical theory assumes the distributions are known and compares an online rule with the offline maximum OFF=E[max⁡tXt]\mathrm{OFF}=\mathbb E[\max_tX_t]OFF=E[maxt​Xt​] (Samuel-Cahn 1984, Correa et al. 2017). In many applications the…

19 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium in Network Congestion and Coordination GamesResearch Paper

Algorithmic game theory studies how to find stable outcomes when several decision makers interact. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of independent randomized choices in which no player can improve by changing their own choice. Network congestion games model players selecting routes whose costs increase with traffic. Network coordination games describe…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational Complexity·Captain: mikedeng1

PPAD-Completeness of Contiguous Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing land, a time interval, or another ordered resource can require each recipient's share to be connected. Envy-freeness asks that every agent value its own share at least as highly as anyone else's. Requiring connected shares makes the computational question different from unconstrained cake division: both the cuts and the assignment of the resulting…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated PriorsResearch Paper

A first-price auction awards a single item to a highest bidder and charges that bidder her own bid. Choosing a bid therefore involves predicting competitors' behavior. Researchers studying auction computation ask whether an equilibrium can be found efficiently from the publicly available description of bidders' information. The setting here allows their…

31 thms4 active usersReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Continuous Contract Design over PolymatroidsResearch Paper

In a principal–agent problem, a principal delegates work to an agent whose effort is not observed and pays the agent according to the outcome. Linear contracts, which pay the agent a fixed share α\alphaα of the reward, are the simplest and most widely used class; for binary outcomes they are without loss of generality. Algorithmic contract theory asks when…

49 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A buyer with budget B>0B>0B>0 wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers, each holding a private cost, so as to maximize a value function of the set it buys. This is budget-feasible mechanism design, introduced by Singer (2010). It models procurement in data markets, crowdsourcing and content ecosystems, and it departs from the classical setting because VCG…

58 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Exploring the Tractability Frontier of Hylland–Zeckhauser ModelsResearch Paper

The Hylland–Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism allocates indivisible goods without money, for instance dormitory rooms to students: each of NNN buyers receives one unit of artificial money and buys probability shares of NNN goods, each available in one copy, and equilibrium prices clear the market. The resulting doubly stochastic allocation is a lottery over assignments…

47 thms4 active usersReviewed
Statistics·Captain: iris

Robust Forecast Aggregation via Additional QueriesResearch Paper

A principal wants to combine the forecasts of nnn experts into one forecast, with a guarantee that holds without knowing how the experts' information is correlated. This is the robust forecast aggregation problem of Arieli, Babichenko and Smorodinsky (2018). The standard benchmark is pessimistic: Neyman and Roughgarden (2022) show that, even under natural…

65 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price AuctionsResearch Paper

Fixed-point theorems guarantee that equilibria exist without saying how to find them. Two-player Nash equilibria have rational solutions of polynomial encoding length, and computing them is PPAD-complete (Chen, Deng, Teng 2009). Games with three or more players may have only irrational equilibria, so exact computation does not fit a discrete class. FIXP,…

33 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

On Existence and Computational Complexity of Quasi-strict EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game may leave some best responses unplayed: a player is indifferent between several pure strategies and puts weight on only some of them. Harsanyi (1973) introduced quasi-strict equilibria, the refinement in which every pure best response is played with positive probability, and proved that in almost all finite games…

80 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Finite-Memory Search: Rational Compilation and Arithmetic Lower BoundsResearch Paper

A searcher repeatedly examines two locations, AAA and BBB, until it finds a stationary target. A search at the correct location fails with a known probability; a search at the wrong location always fails, and before success the searcher observes nothing but failure. The unrestricted problem is classical: greedy index rules go back to Blackwell and to Matula (Mat…

28 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

A 2.81n2.81^n2.81n upper bound on the number of stable matchingsResearch Paper

A stable matching instance has nnn men and nnn women, each ranking the other side strictly. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable matching always exists (1962). How many there can be is a question Knuth posed in 1976, and it is listed among the open problems of Gusfield and Irving (1989), Manlove (2013) and Cechlárová, Cseh and Manlove (2019). The answer…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Supply-Sensitive Revenue Recovery under Unknown Buyer OrderResearch Paper

A seller with one copy of each of mmm items posts personalized item prices to independent buyers. Revenue benchmarks for this setting usually give every buyer full stock and bound expected allocations; the ex ante capped benchmark of Chawla, Rezvan, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:2204.01962) and the buy-many benchmark of Chawla, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:1902.10315) are…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimal Learning in Games with Arbitrary Delays: Best-of-Both-Worlds for Self-Play and Adversarial OpponentsResearch Paper

Two players repeatedly playing a zero-sum game with no-regret learning algorithms approach a Nash equilibrium: a social regret of RTR_TRT​ makes the averaged strategies an (RT/T)(R_T/T)(RT​/T)-approximate equilibrium (Freund–Schapire 1999). Standard algorithms have regret O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​), but optimistic algorithms, which predict the next gradient, reach constant regret, and hence…

53 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbability·Captain: iris

Non-manipulability and Approachability Beyond Two-Player GamesResearch Paper

Online learning algorithms are routinely deployed against a single strategic party that sees how they behave: buyers bidding through autobidders on an ad platform, sellers pricing against a marketplace's matching rule, agents trained by self-play. The learners are usually asked for a worst-case guarantee, no regret, which protects each of them whatever the…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games: Deciding Whether a Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Is NP-Complete, Even for Graphical Games with 3-Bounded Neighborhood and Three ActionsResearch Paper

A pure Nash equilibrium is a choice of one action per player from which no player can gain by changing only her own action. Unlike mixed equilibria, which exist in every finite game by Nash's theorem, pure equilibria may fail to exist, so deciding whether one exists is a basic algorithmic question about any game model. It matters most for games with many…

30 thms4 active usersReviewed
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