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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 1: If the State Map b Is Bounded and √c_z‖W‖ < 1, the Graphon Game Has at Least One Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Games with many interacting players appear in economics, epidemiology and network engineering: firms competing in a market, individuals deciding whether to vaccinate, agents in a social network choosing an effort level. When every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, mean field game theory replaces the finite game by a limit with a…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing I: The Offloading GNEP Has a SolutionResearch Paper

Mobile devices run applications whose computational load can exceed what the device itself can serve in reasonable time and with reasonable battery drain. Computation offloading sends part of that load elsewhere: to a cloudlet, a small cluster of servers one wireless hop away, or to a distant cloud reached through the wide-area network. The cloudlet is…

9 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 5: Every ϵ-Equilibrium of the Closest Potential Game Is an (ϵ + max_m 2α/√h_m)-Equilibrium of the Game, and ConverselyResearch Paper

Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the finite games whose unilateral payoff differences are all differences of a single function, the potential. They always have a pure Nash equilibrium, and many natural learning dynamics (best response, fictitious play, logit response) converge in them. Most games met in applications are not exactly potential…

19 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 2: Harmonic Games Generically Have No Pure Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of interaction between self-interested agents in economics, engineering and computer science. Among them, potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics such as…

9 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

How Bad is Selfish Routing? 1: A Nash Flow Costs No More Than Any Flow Feasible for Twice the Rates, for Continuous Nondecreasing LatenciesResearch Paper

In a road or communication network, traffic is routed by many independent users, each choosing a route that is fastest for itself given the congestion caused by everyone else. The resulting Nash flow (also called a Wardrop equilibrium, after Wardrop 1952) need not minimize the total delay experienced by all users: Braess's paradox shows that adding a road…

15 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Equilibria I: On Two Identical Parallel Links Every Mixed Nash Equilibrium Has Expected Makespan at Most 3/2 Times the OptimumResearch Paper

When many users share a network and each routes its own traffic selfishly, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium rather than a centrally optimized assignment. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, in Worst-case equilibria (STACS 1999; journal version 2009), proposed to measure the loss caused by this lack of coordination by the worst-case ratio between the social cost…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

On General Minimax Theorems 1: For a Minimal Finite Y with Every f(·, y) Quasi-Concave and u.s.c. on Convex M, One μ₀ ∈ M Has f(μ₀, y) < c for All y ∈ YResearch Paper

A minimax theorem asserts that, for a function f(μ,ν)f(\mu, \nu)f(μ,ν) of two variables,

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization VIII: Solving Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programs via Regret MinimizationTextbook

Two-player zero-sum games and linear programming are, on their surface, unrelated pieces of 20th-century mathematics: von Neumann's minimax theorem for games (1928) was proved with tools from topology, and linear programming duality (Dantzig, 1940s) with convexity and geometry. Yet the two are formally equivalent — Dantzig recounts von Neumann conjecturing…

8 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: One-Bit Feedback Achieves O(T3/5log⁡5T)O(T^{3/5}\log^{5}T)O(T3/5log5T) Regret for Independent Regular ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer. It posts a price to each, and the trade happens only if both accept. Posted prices are the standard mechanism when the parties cannot be asked to report their values: they are simple, strategy-proof and individually rational. When the trade repeats, the broker must learn profitable prices while observing only…

27 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: One-Bit Feedback Achieves O(Tlog⁡5/2T)O(\sqrt{T}\log^{5/2}T)O(T​log5/2T) Regret for Independent MHR ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller who owns one item and a buyer who may want it. In every round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T a fresh pair of private valuations (st,bt)∈[0,1]2(s_t,b_t)\in[0,1]^2(st​,bt​)∈[0,1]2 arrives, and the broker posts a price ptp_tpt​ to the seller and a price qtq_tqt​ to the buyer. Trade happens when both accept (st≤pts_t\le p_tst​≤pt​ and qt≤btq_t\le b_tqt​≤bt​), and the broker earns qt−ptq_t-p_tqt​−pt​. The broker sees only…

21 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large SupplyResearch Paper

Auctions that sell many identical units to many bidders, such as treasury bills, emission permits and advertising slots, are often run as multi-unit first-price auctions: the highest bids win and each winner pays its own bid. Bidders then shade their bids below their values. In equilibrium, a bidder with a higher value can lose to one with a lower value, so…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with different tastes is a basic problem of fair division, with applications from inheritance and course allocation to the sharing of computing resources. Exact envy-freeness (no agent prefers another agent's bundle to its own) cannot always be achieved with indivisible goods: a single good and two agents…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

A 2.81n2.81^n2.81n upper bound on the number of stable matchingsResearch Paper

A stable matching instance has nnn men and nnn women, each ranking the other side strictly. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable matching always exists (1962). How many there can be is a question Knuth posed in 1976, and it is listed among the open problems of Gusfield and Irving (1989), Manlove (2013) and Cechlárová, Cseh and Manlove (2019). The answer…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution: Simultaneous KS Wholesale Prices Equal the Nash Bargaining Prices at Retailer Power 0.6Research Paper

Wholesale prices between a supplier and a retailer are usually negotiated, not posted. Models of such negotiations almost always use the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950), often in the generalized form with a bargaining power θ\thetaθ (Binmore, Rubinstein, Wolinsky, 1986). The Nash solution satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination, and Incentives: For Any Valuation Class Containing All Additive Valuations, No Feasible Share Dominates Every Self-Maximizing Feasible ShareResearch Paper

When indivisible goods are divided among nnn agents without money, a standard way to say what each agent deserves is a share: a number s(v,n)s(v,n)s(v,n) computed from the agent's own valuation vvv alone, with the promise that she receives a bundle worth at least that much. The best-known share is the maximin share (MMS) of Budish (2011): the value an agent could guarantee…

23 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Investment Efforts Under Complementary Sourcing: The Role of Market Risk and Endogenous Pricing: market risk reverses the first-mover disadvantage when rµ ≥ 3ϵ0 + σ and σ/ϵ0 ≤ 3 − 2√2Research Paper

In complementary sourcing, a product's value depends on the efforts of both a supplier and a manufacturer, and each firm's effort raises the marginal value of the other's. Chip lithography is a standard example: an equipment maker and a chip maker each invest heavily, and neither investment pays without the other. When firms invest in sequence, the…

30 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programming Duality: Every Max-Min Strategy of Dantzig's Game with One Extra Row Yields Optimal LP Solutions or Certifies That No Optimal Solution ExistsResearch Paper

Linear programming duality and the minimax theorem for zero-sum games are two faces of the same convexity fact. The classical direction, from LP duality to the minimax theorem, is textbook material: the optimal strategies of a matrix game are the optimal solutions of a pair of dual LPs. The converse direction, solving an LP by solving a game, goes back to Da…

23 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage: Applicant optimality of deferred acceptanceResearch Paper

College admissions involves decisions on both sides of a capacity-constrained market. An applicant may prefer one college while that college prefers another applicant. An offer can be declined, and a waiting-list place can become available after another offer has already been accepted. Gale and Shapley formulate an assignment problem in which the inputs are…

5 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Computational ComplexityOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate?: Non-plurality positional scoring is NP-complete to manipulate with three candidatesResearch Paper

A voting rule aggregates submitted preferences into a collective choice. A coalition can sometimes change that choice by coordinating its submitted rankings. The computational question is whether it can efficiently determine how to make a particular candidate win. This matters in collective decision systems where an agent's voting weight can represent…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation and Convergence of Large Atomic Congestion Games: Equilibria of Bernoulli Congestion Games Converge to Poisson Flows Whose Means Are Wardrop Equilibria of a Limit GameResearch Paper

Traffic models in transportation and network design come in two kinds. Nonatomic congestion games, with Wardrop equilibria, treat traffic as a continuum of infinitesimal users. Atomic games have finitely many players, each with a non-negligible effect on congestion. The Wardrop model is the one used in practice, and the usual justification is that it is the…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multimarket Cournot Equilibria with Heterogeneous Resource-Constrained Firms: The Unique Equilibrium in Closed Form via Augmented and Cutoff BudgetsResearch Paper

Cournot competition is the standard model of firms that compete by choosing quantities: each firm picks an output, the total output sets the market price, and an equilibrium is a profile in which no firm can gain by changing its own output alone. In practice firms rarely compete in one market. A manufacturer allocates a limited production capacity across…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption, and Investment in Resilience Measures: Weakly Competing Firms Share Attack Signals When Impact Is High, Not When Low; Strongly Competing Firms Never ShareResearch Paper

Operational cyberattacks can interrupt production and raise the cost of serving customers. A firm can invest in resilience before an attack, but it must choose the investment while the likelihood of an attack is uncertain. Sharing a private warning signal may help a rival choose its investment. The rival's changed costs and subsequent prices may then affect…

5 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Shareholder Short-Termism, Corporate Control and Voluntary Disclosure: The Manager Discloses Good and Bad News Below a Short-Termism Threshold and Only Good News Above ItResearch Paper

A manager's voluntary report can change more than investors' estimate of a firm. It can change what a controlling shareholder does to the firm. Jia and Menon study a shareholder who privately knows the value of an alternative strategy and may replace the current strategy. Investors observe intervention but do not observe that private value. A shareholder…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Problem Specification in Crowdsourcing Contests for Design Problems: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis: Unique Symmetric Equilibrium and Participation Monotone in Disclosed ObjectivesResearch Paper

Firms increasingly source design work (logos, packaging, product sketches) through crowdsourcing contests: a seeker posts a problem statement and an award, independent designers submit entries, and the best entry wins. The problem statement is the seeker's main lever. It can list conceptual objectives (what the design should convey) and execution guidelines…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Better to Bend than to Break: Sharing Supply Risk Using the Supply-Flexibility Contract: With Log-Concave Demand, Both Supplier and Buyer Are Better Off than under the Price-Only ContractResearch Paper

A supplier whose regular production can be disrupted must decide who bears the risk of a shortfall. Under a price-only contract the supplier promises the full order and covers any shortfall from a costlier, reliable expedited source; the buyer bears no supply risk but pays for the supplier's insurance through the wholesale price. Farahani, Dawande, Gurnani…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
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