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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Structural Complexity of Matching with IndifferencesResearch Paper

Centralized school choice and other two-sided assignment systems are run by clearinghouses that announce a single outcome. When preferences contain ties (a student may be indifferent between several schools), the classical notion of stability splits into weak, strong and super stability (Irving 1994), and a deterministic rule must also say which stable…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityLinear algebraTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Finding a Positive Index Nash Equilibrium is PPADS-CompleteResearch Paper

Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, but equilibria are not all alike. In a nondegenerate two-player game, each equilibrium carries a Shapley index of +1+1+1 or −1-1−1, a local orientation that sums to +1+1+1 over all equilibria. The index is an established selection criterion: an isolated equilibrium is sustainable exactly when it has index +1+1+1 (Govindan et al.,…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power and Limits of Money Burning in Bilateral TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one indivisible good and a buyer may want it. Each trader privately knows their own value. A mechanism asks both for reports and decides whether to trade and what each trader pays or receives. A mechanism is strongly budget-balanced (SBB) when the buyer's payment always equals the seller's receipt. It is weakly…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Tight Bounds on the Menu-Size Complexity of Approximately Optimal Auctions with Two ItemsResearch Paper

A seller offering two items to one buyer can offer lotteries as well as deterministic purchases. Describing a lottery requires two allocation probabilities and a price, and an auction may offer many such alternatives. Menu size measures how many distinct nonnull alternatives are required. The resulting question concerns the complexity of implementing a…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Private Signaling in Nonatomic Routing GamesResearch Paper

A traffic principal can know more about road conditions than individual drivers. Sending every driver the same report is one option; sending different private route recommendations is another. The computational question is whether a principal can find private recommendations with low expected total latency while keeping each recommendation approximately…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Multi-Item Auctions with I.I.D. ValuesResearch Paper

A seller with several items and several buyers who wants the largest expected revenue faces the multi-item version of Myerson's problem. For one item, Myerson (1981) gives the answer in closed form for every prior. For several items, explicit optimal mechanisms are known only in special cases: two items under analytic conditions, a few uniform or…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The No-Menu Complexity of Revenue-Maximizing AuctionsResearch Paper

A revenue guarantee for an auction does not by itself say how much the seller and buyer must communicate. A familiar way to describe a deterministic auction is to give its menu of bundles and prices. That description treats the menu as already available to the buyer. When the seller chooses the menu using information unavailable to the buyer, learning…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: mikedeng1

Draw, Then Draw: The Metric Distortion of Random-Size Stable LotteriesResearch Paper

A voting rule often receives rankings even when the quality of its decision depends on numerical costs. In metric social choice, voters and candidates occupy a common distance space. Each voter ranks closer candidates ahead of farther candidates, but the rule sees only those rankings. Its task is to choose a candidate, possibly at random, whose average…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Computational GeometryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Condorcet-Winning Sets and Peer Selection in Planar Metric ElectionsResearch Paper

A committee can satisfy a majority guarantee that no single candidate satisfies: no outside alternative is preferred to every committee member by more than half the electorate. Such a committee is a Condorcet-winning set, extending the single-candidate majority criterion studied in social choice. Elkind, Lang, and Saffidine introduced this set-valued…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Computation of Sparse Equilibria in Normal-Form GamesResearch Paper

Correlated equilibria (CE) and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) of a normal-form game are computable in polynomial time by linear programming, and no-regret dynamics converge to them. The price is the representation: an equilibrium found this way may correlate the players arbitrarily, through a joint distribution over action profiles whose support grows…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Power and Limitations of Multiple Intermediaries for Single-Item AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller may be unable to receive buyers' bids directly. Intermediaries can control access to its auction and charge bidders for the right to participate. Competition between those intermediaries might reduce exclusion, but it need not transfer their revenue back to the seller. These are different questions: whether the item reaches the buyer who values it…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

As Easy as Rank One: Optimal Algorithms for Matroid Secretary and Single-Sample Matroid ProphetResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem (Dynkin 1963; Lindley 1961) nnn distinct values arrive in uniformly random order and the decision maker must accept or reject each one immediately and irrevocably. The aim is to select the largest. Rejecting about the first n/en/en/e values and then taking the first value larger than all earlier ones succeeds with probability…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Harmonic AnalysisMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

High-Dimensional Online Calibration from Harmonic WeightsResearch Paper

A calibrated forecaster is one whose forecasts can be taken at face value: among the rounds on which it announced a forecast ppp, the outcomes average to ppp. Calibration is what a downstream decision maker needs in order to best-respond to forecasts with vanishing regret, and in the vector-valued case it drives Blackwell approachability and swap-regret…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: Shuze Chen

On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms: Impossibility of truthful proportional cake cuttingResearch Paper

Cake cutting is the model of fair division of a single divisible, heterogeneous resource, the interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], among agents whose preferences over its parts differ. The classical fairness notions are proportionality (each of nnn agents receives at least 1/n1/n1/n of the whole by her own measure) and envy-freeness (no agent prefers another agent's share). Protocols…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Strongly Polynomial-Time 7/9-Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Share AllocationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents with additive valuations is a central problem of fair division. Proportionality and envy-freeness can fail for indivisible goods, so the standard benchmark is the maximin share (MMS), introduced by Budish (Budish 2011): the largest value an agent can guarantee by splitting all goods into as many bundles as…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robustly Obedient Data Driven Persuasion under State-dependent Sender PayoffsResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590), a Sender commits to a signaling policy that maps the state of the world to recommendations, and a Receiver who knows the prior updates on the recommendation and acts. The standard analysis assumes the Sender knows the prior. In many applications the Sender instead…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Nearly Tight Bounds for Proportional Group Fair Divisions and One-Sided DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly is a basic problem of computational social choice (survey: Amanatidis et al., 2023). In group fair division the agents are organized into kkk groups, every group receives one common bundle, and the members of a group may value the goods very differently, as with families sharing an inheritance or departments sharing…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Second-Best Trade Is Half Efficient in Multidimensional MarketsResearch Paper

A trading platform may know which transactions are feasible without knowing which ones create value. Buyers privately know their willingness to pay, while sellers privately know their costs. The gains from trade are the buyers' total value minus the sellers' total cost. A mechanism must elicit these numbers while giving participants a reason to report…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: mikedeng1

How Much Can Approximate Equilibria Change the Social Cost of Selfish Routing?Research Paper

Routing models compare what individual users prefer with the total delay experienced by all users. Exact optimization of a user's route is a strong behavioral requirement: users may accept alternatives whose delay is only slightly worse than the best available. The resulting relaxation raises a quantitative question even when demands, available routes, and…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Tarski Fixed Points in Quasi-FPT QueriesResearch Paper

Tarski's fixed point theorem says that every monotone map on a complete lattice has a fixed point. On the finite grid [n]k={1,…,n}k[n]^k=\{1,\dots,n\}^k[n]k={1,…,n}k with the coordinatewise order, finding such a fixed point captures several problems whose complexity is open: pure Nash equilibria of supermodular games, and the reductions of parity games, mean-payoff games, Condon's…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Pareto Inefficiency of EFXResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods asks for a complete assignment of objects to people whose preferences may differ. A fair assignment should limit envy, while an efficient assignment should avoid a redistribution that benefits someone without harming anyone else. These requirements address different concerns. A participant can regard an allocation as unfair even…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Weakly Stable Roommates with Two Master Lists: Tractable Existence and Hard OptimizationResearch Paper

A roommates matching partitions a population into pairs. Each person ranks possible partners, and a proposed arrangement is stable when no two people both strictly prefer one another to their assigned partners. Preferences may contain ties. A person who is indifferent does not participate in a blocking pair on that comparison. This distinction matters when…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Truthful Approximation for House Allocation and Rank-Maximal Matchings with TiesResearch Paper

In house allocation, agents rank objects and each agent can receive at most one object. A rule that chooses an allocation from reported rankings must account for the possibility that agents misreport. The mathematical question is how much allocation quality an incentive requirement necessarily costs. Zhang, Zhao, Xu, Xi and Zhao study this question both for…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Hardness Amplification of Approximate Nash Equilibrium with Constantly Many PlayersResearch Paper

Computing a Nash equilibrium asks for a probability distribution over each player's actions such that no player benefits from changing its own distribution. An approximate equilibrium permits a specified additive improvement. The approximation parameter matters: when payoffs lie between zero and one, allowing improvement one makes every profile acceptable.…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Convergent Dynamics in Second Price Autobidding GamesResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions in which advertisers do not bid by hand: an autobidder scales each value by a pacing multiplier αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i\in[0,1]αi​∈[0,1] so that the advertiser's spending stays within its budget. When every advertiser paces at once, the multipliers interact, and the natural steady state is a second-price…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
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