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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue: The Competitive Ratio of the Primal-Dual Allocation AlgorithmResearch Paper

Search engines sell advertisement slots next to their results through ad-auctions. Advertisers bid on keywords, and each advertiser also sets a daily budget: the most it is willing to pay in a day. Queries arrive one at a time and each must be assigned to an advertiser at once, with no knowledge of the queries still to come. The seller's revenue from an…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VIII: A Truthful Approximation Scheme for Bounded Scheduling with VerificationResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design asks for algorithms whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: the designer can pay the agents, and must choose payments so that each agent's own interest leads it to reveal what the algorithm needs. Nisan and Ronen introduced the framework with task scheduling on unrelated machines as the running example (Nisan–Ronen 2001)…

16 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VI: With Verification, the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful Optimal ImplementationResearch Paper

Scheduling tasks on machines owned by self-interested parties is the running example of Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001), the paper that introduced the study of mechanisms whose allocation rule is an algorithm with a computational objective. Each machine (agent) privately knows how long it needs for each…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design IV: No Local Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) asks how well a computational task can be carried out when its inputs are held by self-interested agents who may lie about them. Their test case is scheduling on unrelated machines: tasks must be assigned to agents (machines), each agent privately knows how long it needs…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design II: A Lower Bound for Truthful Task SchedulingResearch Paper

Algorithms deployed on the Internet often take their inputs from parties who own them and who may lie when lying pays. Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) proposed studying optimization problems in this setting: the algorithm designer may hand out payments, and must guarantee that the intended output is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play II: Almost Sure Convergence in Zero-Sum Games and Symmetric Games with an Interior ESSResearch Paper

Fictitious play is the oldest model of learning in games: players repeatedly play a fixed normal form game, and each round every player best-responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play. Brown (1951) proposed it as an algorithm for computing the value of a zero-sum game, and Robinson (1951) proved that the empirical frequencies converge…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play I: Every Additive Random Utility Choice Function Has an Admissible Deterministic Perturbation RepresentationResearch Paper

Models of learning in games, and discrete choice models in econometrics, describe an agent who does not always pick the best alternative. Two descriptions of such an agent are standard. In the additive random utility model (McFadden 1981; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992) the agent maximizes payoffs perturbed by random shocks. In the deterministic…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium II: For Almost Every Game, Limits of Calibrated Learning Are Exactly the Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is a joint distribution over the players' strategy profiles from which no player gains by deviating from a recommended strategy. A central question of learning in games is which equilibria repeated play of simple, myopic rules can reach. Foster and Vohra (1997) answered it for calibrated forecasting: if each player…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy II: Equilibrium Exists When Every Consumer Can Supply Productive LaborResearch Paper

A competitive equilibrium is a list of production plans, consumption plans and prices at which every firm maximizes profit, every consumer maximizes utility within the budget, and no market has excess demand. Whether such prices exist at all is the consistency question behind general equilibrium theory, the welfare theorems, and applied equilibrium models…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games 1: For Five or More Players No Core Allocation Rule Is Coalitionally MonotonicResearch Paper

Cooperative games model the division of a jointly produced surplus, or a jointly incurred cost, among the participants of an enterprise: towns sharing a water supply system, divisions of a firm sharing overhead, members of a consortium sharing the savings of joint investment. In such applications allocations are rarely fixed once and for all. Costs and…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Assignment Game I: The Core 1: The Core Is the Set of Optimal Solutions of the Dual Assignment LPResearch Paper

A two-sided market in which each participant trades with at most one partner on the other side — houses and buyers, workers and firms, producers and consumers under exclusive bilateral contracts — is the setting of L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik's assignment game (Int. J. Game Theory 1 (1971) 111–130). Money is transferable, so the natural solution concept is…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring 2: The Retailer's Optimal Reverse Factoring Payment ExtensionResearch Paper

Large retailers pay their suppliers weeks or months after delivery, and small suppliers fill the gap with short-term finance. In factoring the supplier sells the receivable to a factor for immediate cash; in reverse factoring the retailer arranges the program with a bank, which pays the supplier early at a rate priced on the retailer's credit rating.…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analog of the Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs: A Closed Convex Set Is Approachable If and Only If It Meets Every T(q), and Is Otherwise ExcludableResearch Paper

Von Neumann's minimax theorem says that in a zero-sum game with real payoffs, Player I can guarantee an expected gain of at least the value vvv and Player II can hold it to at most vvv. In a long series of plays, the law of large numbers turns this into a statement about the average payoff: I can make it exceed v−εv-\varepsilonv−ε, II can keep it below v+εv+\varepsilonv+ε,…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 2: A Threshold Nash Equilibrium under Announced Fixed-Discount PricingResearch Paper

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them wait, and the seller's pricing problem becomes a game between the seller and a population of forward-looking (strategic) customers. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 10(3), 2008) study this game in a model with…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems: A Core Allocation Rule Whose Nash Equilibrium Is First-BestResearch Paper

Retailers that sell the same product can raise their joint profit by pooling: stock left over at one location is shipped to meet unmet demand at another, and stock can be held in shared warehouses until demand is known (Eppen 1979; Eppen and Schrage 1981). When the retailers are independent firms, pooling creates two questions at once. After demand is…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem: Equilibrium Points Exist When Actions Are Contractible Polyhedra and Constrained Best Responses Are ContractibleResearch Paper

Nash's equilibrium existence theorem assumes that each player's set of available strategies is fixed. Many social and economic systems do not work that way: a consumer's budget set depends on prices, which are the choices of another agent, and a firm's feasible production may depend on what other firms do. Gerard Debreu's A Social Equilibrium Existence…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 3: Advance-Purchase Discounts Pareto-Improve Pull Contracts under At-Once Shipping CostsResearch Paper

A supplier and a retailer who trade a seasonal product must decide who carries the inventory risk: the stock left unsold, or the demand left unserved, when the season ends. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before the season and bears the risk; with a pull contract he orders during the season from the supplier's stock at a single wholesale…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 2: Advance-Purchase Discounts Coordinate the Supply ChainResearch Paper

A supplier who must produce before a selling season, and a retailer who sells into uncertain demand, have to decide who holds the inventory that may go unsold. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies this allocation of inventory risk using nothing but wholesale prices. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before production and bears…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: naimengye

Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits XI: Bandits and Agents, Incentivized Exploration via Hidden ExplorationTextbook

A recommendation system learns from the users it serves: the diner who tries a restaurant produces the review the next diner reads. Each user would rather exploit what is already known than explore for the benefit of those who come later, so a population of self-interested agents under-explores, and an alternative that looks bad on sparse early evidence may…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VI: Maximizing Ad-Auctions RevenueTextbook

Search-engine ad-auctions sell items (ad slots) to buyers who arrive with per-item bids and a fixed daily budget, online: each item must be allocated the moment it appears, with no ability to revisit past allocations, and no buyer may ever be charged more than its budget. Buchbinder and Naor's survey [1] models this as a generalization of online bipartite…

8 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks IV: Decentralized Optimization and Wardrop EquilibriaTextbook

A network of resistors solves an optimization problem. Nobody tells the electrons what to do; each one moves under a purely local rule, and the current distribution that emerges minimizes energy dissipation over all distributions satisfying Kirchhoff's node law. Add a wire and the network can only become easier to traverse. This is the encouraging case, and…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: LG

Drug-Market Repression and Violence in a Vertically Related Network (Nogueira Júnior 2019)Research Paper

Illegal drug markets are a leading source of violent crime, and governments spend heavily on repression — interdiction, arrests, and seizures — expecting it to shrink the market and its violence. A systematic review by Werb et al. (2011) finds, on the contrary, that drug-law enforcement is frequently associated with more violence, and Reuter (2009) argues…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Transparency in Team ContractsResearch Paper

A principal who delegates a project often knows more about its prospects than the people whose effort makes it succeed. Revealing that information changes agents’ incentives and therefore changes the payments needed to obtain their effort. The question is whether a principal can lose substantially by disclosing everything, even when she remains free to…

26 thms2 active usersReviewed
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