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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? I: With Costless Personalized Pricing Both Firms Adopt It and Locate at 1/4 and 3/4, Each Earning t/8Research Paper

Firms that collect data on individual consumers can price each one separately. This is personalized pricing (PP): targeted coupons, individualized offers, prices that depend on a customer's browsing or purchase history. Whether competing firms gain from this ability is a long-standing question in industrial organization. When firm positions are fixed, the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power II: Prosumer Participation Raises Welfare and Shrinks the Welfare Loss from Generators' Strategic BiddingResearch Paper

Households and small firms increasingly own distributed energy resources (DERs): rooftop solar, batteries, small generators. A household that owns a DER is a prosumer: it consumes electricity and can also sell its surplus. Whether prosumers should be allowed to sell into the wholesale market, directly or through an aggregator that pools many small units, is…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 2: For Linear Valuations on [0,1] the Feasible Utility Set Is a Projection of Linear and Parabolic ConstraintsResearch Paper

A Fisher market divides a supply of goods among buyers with different values and budgets. In many fair division models, the goods form a continuum: pieces of time, land, or a divisible resource can be allocated in arbitrarily small amounts. A direct description of all possible buyer utilities then appears to require one allocation function for every buyer.…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 1: Committing to a Matching Capacity, Then Competing in Price and Wage, Yields the Quantity-Competition OutcomeResearch Paper

A service platform makes decisions on two sides of a market. It charges consumers a price and pays independent providers a wage, then earns a margin only when it can match a consumer with a provider. Capacity is another decision available to the platform: it can limit how many matches it will carry, for example by limiting the active provider pool. Hu and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing II: With Price Commitment and a Small Quality Gap, the Unique Refined Separating Equilibrium Lowers the Funding Price and Raises the Regular PriceResearch Paper

In reward-based crowdfunding, a seller asks customers to pay before the product's quality is known to them. A high-quality seller can try to communicate private quality through the prices he posts. That signal is costly because a price that deters imitation may also reduce the seller's own expected revenue. Bolandifar, Chen, Kouvelis and Zhou study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Network Externalities and Market Dominance: Under In/Out Demand the Impulse Selects the Introspective Equilibrium by Its Position Relative to the Middle EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets with network externalities can support several levels of adoption at the same price. A consumer's willingness to buy may rise when many other consumers buy, while the ordinary price effect still works in the opposite direction. A price and an aggregate demand curve can therefore identify several self-consistent quantities without identifying which…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing I: Without Price Commitment, a Low Enough Funding Price Is the Unique Separating Equilibrium That Survives the Intuitive CriterionResearch Paper

In reward based crowdfunding, customers must decide whether to back a product before its quality is known to them. The entrepreneur knows that quality and chooses a funding price. A high quality entrepreneur may therefore use price to convey information, but the same price is available to a low quality entrepreneur. The choice also changes the chance that…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization V: The Seller Earns More Under A-Learning, Buyers Earn More Under O-Learning, and Small Fixed Costs Reverse Both When Selling Is CheapResearch Paper

A firm can learn a customer's preference before choosing a customized product, or it can let the customer choose a requested design. The two approaches assign the design decision to different parties. That matters when design changes both the value of a sale and a cost the seller must incur before the price is negotiated. Guo's study of customer voice in…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization I: Under A-Learning, Truthful Cheap-Talk Communication Is an Equilibrium If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΔResearch Paper

Sellers often ask customers what they want before designing a product or service. The answer can affect both the quality delivered and the price paid. Because a customer can send a costless, unverifiable message, the seller cannot assume that a stated preference is true. Guo's customization model asks when the customer's own incentives make truthful…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 4: Colinear Paced Buyers with Equal Budgets Are Paced Down to the Same Weight VectorResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell billions of ad impressions a day, mostly by auction, to advertisers who care about the features of the impression (the user, the page, the time) and who spend under a budget fixed in advance. To keep spending within budget, platforms and advertisers use pacing: every value is multiplied by a factor smaller than one, so that…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 4: The k-SS Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (2 log k + 4)-Approximation to Welfare for Strong-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In auctions with interdependent values, the value an agent assigns to an outcome depends not only on her own private information but on the information of the others: a bidder for drilling rights values a tract according to every bidder's geological survey, and a buyer of a used asset values it according to every inspector's report. Each agent observes only…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 2: Every Set of Assortments Has a Unique Profile of Thresholds Equal to Expected UtilitiesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms for dating, freelancing or ride sharing do not match agents themselves. They decide whom each agent gets to see and how often, and the agents then accept or reject. Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search. The platform designs assortments, which are rates at…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 3: The k-HL Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (k+3)-Approximation to Welfare with k Signal ValuesResearch Paper

In many auctions a bidder's value for what she wins depends on information held by others. The value of an oil lease, a spectrum licence or a piece of art to one bidder depends on survey data, market forecasts or expert opinions that other bidders hold privately. The model of interdependent values (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) captures this: each agent iii holds…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games 2: The Value of a Zero-Sum Game, Known to Error ε/(6R(r+1)), Decides Whether an LP Has OPT < α or OPT ≥ α − εResearch Paper

Linear programming and two-player zero-sum matrix games are two faces of one theory. Von Neumann's minimax theorem is a statement of LP duality, and conversely, since Dantzig's 1951 note, every linear program can be rewritten as a zero-sum game. The equivalence matters in practice whenever an algorithm is much better at one of the two problems. Game solvers…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 2: For Equal Losses the Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is Equidistant from All Ideal AllocationsResearch Paper

When a contract breach propagates along a supply chain, one failure triggers the next: a supplier delivers late, the manufacturer misses its own delivery, the distributor misses its, and so on. Each link suffers a loss caused by its predecessor, and the question is who should be liable for what. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024)…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 2: Random-Sampling VCG Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 4-Approximation to Welfare for Separable SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In many auctions a bidder's value for what is sold depends on information held by other bidders: the value of an oil-drilling lease depends on every bidder's geological survey, the value of a piece of art on what other experts know about its provenance. This is the interdependent values model of Milgrom and Weber (1982). With interdependent values the…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 3: Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates to Mining Capacity and Reward, and Shares Shift to Smaller MinersResearch Paper

Bitcoin and other proof-of-work cryptocurrencies rely on miners, who spend computing power ("hash rate") to win the right to append a block and collect a reward. The security argument for such systems assumes that no single miner, or small coalition, controls a large share of the total hash rate. Whether the economics of mining push the system towards or…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 4: Randomized Perturbed Delayed Mechanisms Gain Ω(ε^(α/(2α−1))) Revenue Under Local α-Power EnvelopesResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu of lotteries picks the one that maximizes expected utility, and an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism makes truth-telling optimal. Buyers that are only approximately rational, or that face small costs of computing or reporting, need only be made to prefer the truth up to…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 2: For Monotone Preferences the Moving Knife Guarantee Lies Between minMax and Maxmin and the Bid & Choose Guarantee Is at Most MaxminResearch Paper

Fair division asks how to split a divisible resource among nnn agents whose preferences differ. In the non-atomic ("cake-cutting") model the resource is a region of Euclidean space and an agent values each measurable piece. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (arXiv:1911.10009, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study fair guarantees: utility levels that a division…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins I: With Total Capacity μ ≤ √(λC_D/(2R)), the Observable Scheduling Setting Costs No More Than the Unobservable OneResearch Paper

Outpatient clinics serve two kinds of patients: those who book an appointment and those who walk in on the day. Many providers now run open-access or hybrid schedules, which reserve part of the day for walk-ins. Whether patients book or walk in depends on what they know about the appointment delay. Some clinics publish the next available slot in real time…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 4: The Marketplace Prefers Not to Impose a Price-Parity Clause If and Only If q < 1/2 and μ > (v − c)/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces (Amazon, Booking.com, Airbnb, Upwork) charge sellers a fee on every transaction they intermediate. Once a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This is leakage (also called disintermediation or showrooming), and it limits the fees a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 1: Additive, Zero-Truncating, Merging-Proof, Population-Monotonic Rules Are the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

Contract breaches in supply chains rarely stay isolated. A supplier that delivers late forces its customer to breach its own downstream contract, which in turn harms the next firm, and so on. Each firm in such a chain both suffers a loss and causes one, and a court, an arbitrator or a self-executing smart contract has to decide who pays for what.…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 2: Optimal Investment in Transaction Benefits Decreases in Its Cost and Is First Constant, Then Decreasing, Then Increasing in Switching CostsResearch Paper

Online marketplaces for services (home repair, tutoring, beauty appointments, freelancing) earn a fee on each transaction they intermediate. After a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both sides can often complete the transaction, or the next one, off the platform and avoid the fee. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets I: Over Revealed Edges, the Prices of an F-Equilibrium Support a Market EquilibriumResearch Paper

The linear exchange market (the linear Arrow–Debreu model) is the basic model of general equilibrium with linear utilities: each agent brings goods to the market, sells them at the going prices, and spends the proceeds on the goods that give the most utility per unit of money. Computing its equilibrium is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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