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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Cores and Indivisibility 2: Gale's Top Trading Cycles Give a Core Allocation Supported by Competitive PricesResearch Paper

Markets for indivisible goods, in which each participant owns one unit and wants one unit (houses, kidneys in paired donation, dormitory rooms, school seats), cannot be analysed with the convexity assumptions of classical general equilibrium theory. Shapley and Scarf (1974) introduced the housing market to ask whether the two central solution concepts of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games 1: Closed-Form Values of Interior Oceanic GamesResearch Paper

Weighted voting bodies often combine a few large blocs with a mass of small, unorganized voters: shareholders' meetings with a handful of large holders and a dispersed float, legislatures with party blocs and independents. The Shapley value measures each participant's voting power as the probability of being pivotal — the one whose arrival first turns a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 1: Under Gross Substitutes the Salary-Adjustment Process Reaches a Discrete Core Allocation in Finitely Many RoundsResearch Paper

Labor markets match workers to firms, and the terms of each match (the salary) are negotiated along with the match itself. A firm's output depends on the whole team it hires, so a firm cares about sets of workers, not individual workers one at a time. Kelso and Crawford (1982) asked when such a market has a stable outcome, the core, in which no firm and…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of Correlated Equilibria III: A Game with Compact Hausdorff Strategy Spaces and Continuous Payoffs Has a Countably Additive Correlated EquilibriumResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) describes play in a game where a mediator draws a profile of recommended actions from a joint distribution and tells each player only that player's own recommendation; the distribution is an equilibrium when no player gains, on average, by departing from the recommendation. Correlated equilibria are the natural outcome…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Polynomial Hierarchy and a Simple Model for Competitive Analysis: Every Optimum of the (p+1)-Level Linear Game J'(F) Is Binary, with x(F) = 1 iff the Σ_p Sentence (3.3) HoldsResearch Paper

Multi-level programs model a hierarchy of decision makers: a leader commits to a decision, a follower optimises given it, a follower of the follower optimises given both, and so on. Bilevel programs are the standard model of Stackelberg competition, toll setting, network interdiction and many other leader–follower problems in operations research (Candler…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cooperative Fuzzy Games 1: A Balanced Game without Side Payments Has a Nonempty Core Containing the Core of Its Fuzzy ExtensionResearch Paper

A game without side payments (an NTU game) describes cooperation in which utility cannot be transferred between players: each coalition AAA of players is assigned the set V(A)V(A)V(A) of payoff vectors it can secure on its own. The core is the set of payoffs to the grand coalition that no coalition can improve upon. Whether the core is nonempty is the basic stability…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model: The Perfect Equilibrium Partitions Are the Nonempty Closed Intervals A = Δ₁ and B = Δ₂ = A − εResearch Paper

Alternating-offer bargaining asks how an agreement is selected when two people can keep making proposals until one accepts. A prediction based only on behavior at the start may rely on threats that would no longer be sensible after a rejection. Ariel Rubinstein's 1982 paper studies strategies after every possible sequence of offers and gives a…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Auction Design: Giving the Object to a Bidder with the Highest Priority Level c̄ᵢ(tᵢ) ≥ t₀ and Charging (6.8) Is an Optimal Auction MechanismResearch Paper

A seller with one indivisible object must decide whether to keep it or transfer it to one of several bidders whose values she does not observe. The allocation and the payment rule affect what bidders choose to report. Myerson's 1981 paper identifies a revenue-maximizing rule when bidders' private value estimates are independent, their densities are…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bargaining Problem: The Nash Product Maximizer Is the Unique Solution Satisfying Invariance, Symmetry, IIA and Pareto EfficiencyResearch Paper

Two parties who can cooperate for mutual benefit must still agree on how to share the benefit. In The Bargaining Problem (Econometrica, 1950) John Nash asked which agreement two rational bargainers of equal skill should reach. His answer is not a model of haggling: it is a list of conditions any reasonable rule should satisfy, together with a proof that…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation I: The Price of Stability of Fair Cost Sharing Is at Most H(k), and This Is TightResearch Paper

Many networks are built and paid for by the users they serve: multicast trees, virtual overlays, shared subnetworks of the Internet. A protocol proposes a design and a rule for splitting its cost, and each participant is free to accept the proposal or defect to a cheaper alternative. The designer therefore cannot impose the global optimum; the best it can…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 2: The Three-Colorable Addition-Multiplication Gadget Has Error Amplification 81Research Paper

Nash's theorem guarantees that every finite game has a mixed equilibrium, but says nothing about how hard one is to find. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009) showed that computing a Nash equilibrium is complete for the class PPAD of total search problems whose solutions are guaranteed by a parity argument on a directed graph…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method: Equilibrium Track Probabilities Exist and Are UniqueResearch Paper

A group of mmm individuals each hold a subjective probability distribution over the same nnn outcomes, and one wants a single distribution representing their consensus. Averaging and convolution are the obvious candidates. Eisenberg and Gale (Ann. Math. Statist. 30(1), 1959) observe that a real institution already performs such an aggregation: the pari-mutuel…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games II: For Symmetric Games the Average Social Cost Price of Anarchy Is (5N-2)/(2N+1)Research Paper

Selfish routing and resource sharing are modelled by congestion games: each player picks a set of shared resources, and the cost of a resource grows with the number of players using it. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures how much worse the social cost of a worst Nash equilibrium is than the optimum. For…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 3: Order-Oblivious Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Uniform Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) maximizes a seller's expected revenue when buyers have independent private values, but it is a sealed-bid mechanism: every buyer reports a value, and the allocation and payments are computed from all reports at once. Real sellers more often post prices: buyers arrive, each sees a take-it-or-leave-it price, and buys…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games IV: For Symmetric Games the Maximum Social Cost Price of Anarchy Is at Most 5/2Research Paper

The price of anarchy measures how much a system of selfish agents loses compared with a centrally optimized one: it is the worst ratio, over all Nash equilibria, between the social cost of the equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou introduced it in 1999 (Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999), and bounding it for routing and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games I: The Pure Price of Anarchy of the Average Social Cost Is 5/2Research Paper

When many independent users share a resource whose cost grows with use (links of a network, servers, machines), each user chooses for itself, and the outcome is a Nash equilibrium rather than a socially optimal allocation. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures the cost of this decentralisation: the worst…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

How Much Data Is Sufficient to Learn High-Performing Algorithms? Generalization Guarantees for Data-Driven Algorithm Design 2: Neutral Affine Maximizers Have Pseudo-Dimension at Least ⌊n/2⌋Research Paper

In data-driven algorithm design, an algorithm or mechanism comes with a vector of tunable parameters ρ\rhoρ, and the parameters are chosen by optimizing average performance over sample instances drawn from an unknown distribution. How many samples suffice for the empirical optimum to be near-optimal in expectation is governed by the pseudo-dimension of the…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality I: Bayes Rationality at Every State Yields Exactly the Correlated Equilibrium DistributionsResearch Paper

Nash equilibrium is the standard solution concept for strategic games, but it is usually justified by appeal to what players "would" do once they somehow coordinate on a profile. Correlated equilibrium, introduced by Aumann (J. Math. Econ. 1, 1974), enlarges the set of outcomes by letting players condition their actions on correlated private signals. In Corr…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design XI: Optimal Sequential Screening by Option ContractsTextbook

Many sales are contracted before the buyer knows what the good is worth to her. An airline sells a ticket months before the trip, a hotel sells a refundable or non-refundable room before the traveller's plans are settled, and a supplier signs a capacity contract before demand is realised. At the time of contracting the buyer holds some private information…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design X: Robust Mechanism Design — Belief Revelation on Finite Type SpacesTextbook

Classical Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows the agents' beliefs about each other: typically a commonly known prior over independent private values. Wilson's critique (1987) observed that mechanisms tuned to such a prior can depend on details that no designer knows, and a literature on robust mechanism design replaced the fixed prior…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design IX: Monotone Direct Mechanisms Are Dictatorial (Gibbard–Satterthwaite)Textbook

Voting rules, committee procedures and any other method that turns individual rankings into one collective choice face the same question: can the rule be designed so that no participant ever gains by misreporting their ranking? The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) answers no. When at least three alternatives can be chosen…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VII: Crémer–McLean Full Surplus Extraction with Correlated TypesTextbook

Bayesian mechanism design asks which collective decisions and payments a designer can implement when every agent holds private information, the type, drawn from a commonly known prior. Most of the classical theory (Myerson's optimal auction, the Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility, the public goods results) assumes that types are independent. Once types are…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming VIII: Multi-Stage Games, Games of Survival and the Extended Min-Max TheoremTextbook

Chapter X of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) carries the functional-equation method of the earlier chapters from one-player decision processes to two-player zero-sum games that are played over many stages. At each stage the two players make simultaneous…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior II: Games with Perfect Information Are Strictly DeterminedTextbook

Chess, checkers, Go and Backgammon share a feature that card games such as Poker lack: whenever a player moves, the player knows everything that has happened so far. von Neumann and Morgenstern call this perfect information and devote §15 of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) to it. Their result is that such a game, viewed as a…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
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