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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: naimengye

Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits XI: Bandits and Agents, Incentivized Exploration via Hidden ExplorationTextbook

A recommendation system learns from the users it serves: the diner who tries a restaurant produces the review the next diner reads. Each user would rather exploit what is already known than explore for the benefit of those who come later, so a population of self-interested agents under-explores, and an alternative that looks bad on sparse early evidence may…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VI: Maximizing Ad-Auctions RevenueTextbook

Search-engine ad-auctions sell items (ad slots) to buyers who arrive with per-item bids and a fixed daily budget, online: each item must be allocated the moment it appears, with no ability to revisit past allocations, and no buyer may ever be charged more than its budget. Buchbinder and Naor's survey [1] models this as a generalization of online bipartite…

8 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: naimengye

Stochastic Networks IV: Decentralized Optimization and Wardrop EquilibriaTextbook

A network of resistors solves an optimization problem. Nobody tells the electrons what to do; each one moves under a purely local rule, and the current distribution that emerges minimizes energy dissipation over all distributions satisfying Kirchhoff's node law. Add a wire and the network can only become easier to traverse. This is the encouraging case, and…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: LG

Drug-Market Repression and Violence in a Vertically Related Network (Nogueira Júnior 2019)Research Paper

Illegal drug markets are a leading source of violent crime, and governments spend heavily on repression — interdiction, arrests, and seizures — expecting it to shrink the market and its violence. A systematic review by Werb et al. (2011) finds, on the contrary, that drug-law enforcement is frequently associated with more violence, and Reuter (2009) argues…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Computational GeometryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Condorcet-Winning Sets and Peer Selection in Planar Metric ElectionsResearch Paper

A committee can satisfy a majority guarantee that no single candidate satisfies: no outside alternative is preferred to every committee member by more than half the electorate. Such a committee is a Condorcet-winning set, extending the single-candidate majority criterion studied in social choice. Elkind, Lang, and Saffidine introduced this set-valued…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Second-Best Trade Is Half Efficient in Multidimensional MarketsResearch Paper

A trading platform may know which transactions are feasible without knowing which ones create value. Buyers privately know their willingness to pay, while sellers privately know their costs. The gains from trade are the buyers' total value minus the sellers' total cost. A mechanism must elicit these numbers while giving participants a reason to report…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Pareto Inefficiency of EFXResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods asks for a complete assignment of objects to people whose preferences may differ. A fair assignment should limit envy, while an efficient assignment should avoid a redistribution that benefits someone without harming anyone else. These requirements address different concerns. A participant can regard an allocation as unfair even…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: iris

Compensation DesignResearch Paper

Platforms that aggregate content or data, such as generative-AI answer engines, recommendation services and data marketplaces, depend on independent contributors who decide for themselves whether to take part. Each contributor bears a private cost of participating, and the platform has a fixed budget to distribute. The platform knows how much value any set…

41 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric DistortionResearch Paper

An election asks a group to choose one candidate from rankings alone. The metric distortion framework of Anshelevich, Bhardwaj and Postl (2015) measures how much those rankings cost: voters and candidates are points of an unknown metric space, each voter ranks closer candidates higher, and a voting rule's distortion is its worst-case ratio between the…

53 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: iris

Calibeating Bandit AdviceResearch Paper

Many sequential decision systems already run a recommendation algorithm: a pricing heuristic, a statistical model trained on private data, a Q-learning agent. A downstream learner who receives its advice in each round may want two things at once. First, the learner should never regret having followed the advice blindly: whatever consistent re-mapping of the…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimal Alternating Regret for Online Learning and GamesResearch Paper

In a repeated two-player game, the players can update simultaneously (both see only the past) or alternately (the second player sees the first player's current move before choosing). Alternating updates are known to speed up learning dynamics in zero-sum games (Wibisono, Tao, Piliouras, NeurIPS 2022; Cevher et al., NeurIPS 2023; Katona, Wang, Wibisono, JMLR…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games: with a convex potential, coarse correlated and correlated Wardrop equilibria are the mixtures of Wardrop equilibria, all with equal costsResearch Paper

In large populations of anonymous agents (commuters choosing routes, users choosing servers, customers choosing a bar), each individual has a negligible effect on the others, and the natural equilibrium notion is the Wardrop equilibrium (WE): only cheapest actions carry mass. A mediator such as a navigation app may instead recommend actions at random,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: iris

Tight Approximation for Unconstrained XOS Maximization: Algorithm 4 Finds a (k−1)(k-1)(k−1)-Maximizer of Every kkk-XOS Function in O(k2n)O(k^2 n)O(k2n) Time, Exactly When k=2k=2k=2Research Paper

Maximizing a set function is a basic task in combinatorial optimization and algorithmic game theory. Computing an agent's demand under prices ppp amounts to maximizing v(X)−∑x∈Xpxv(X)-\sum_{x\in X}p_xv(X)−∑x∈X​px​, which need not be monotone even when the valuation vvv is. XOS functions generalize submodular functions, and they are studied in combinatorial auctions, where they are…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Auctions of Auctions: exchanges' double bid-shading lowers both publisher revenue and advertiser profit below the direct benchmarkResearch Paper

Display advertising is sold impression by impression in real-time auctions. A publisher rarely sells to advertisers directly: advertisers delegate bidding to intermediaries, ad exchanges, which collect their clients' bids in an internal auction and then bid on the winner's behalf in the publisher's header auction. Since the industry's move to first-price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

A Unifying Framework for Submodular Mean Field Games: Abstract Submodular MFGs Have Least and Greatest Equilibria, Reached by Iterating the Best-Response MapResearch Paper

Mean field games (MFGs), introduced by Lasry and Lions and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines in 2006–2007, describe the limit of symmetric stochastic games with many small players. A representative player optimizes against the distribution of the population, and an equilibrium is a distribution that reproduces itself when every player best responds to it.…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts: Guaranteed Allocation and Price with Programmatic Efficiency: The Market-Maker Contract Strictly Raises Revenue and Welfare at Unchanged Utilities and EfficiencyResearch Paper

Display advertising is sold in two ways. Reservation contracts guarantee an advertiser a volume of impressions at a fixed price, negotiated in advance. Programmatic auctions (ad exchanges) sell impressions one at a time, efficiently, but at a price and with an allocation that the advertiser does not know in advance. Advertisers with fixed campaign budgets…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Matchmaking Strategy in Two-Sided Marketplaces: Lower bounds on communication for stable matchmakingResearch Paper

A platform may know the services its users seek and offer while still lacking the preferences that determine whether a particular match is worthwhile. Learning those preferences requires communication. A lower bound on that communication would distinguish a limitation of one search algorithm from a limitation shared by every platform design. Peng Shi's Optim…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets: Every Pacing Game Admits a Second Price Pacing EquilibriumResearch Paper

Internet advertising markets sell impressions, clicks and conversions one auction at a time, and most advertisers attach a budget to a whole campaign. Bidding one's full value until the budget runs out is suboptimal: the buyer drops out early and misses later auctions that may offer the same value at a lower price. A widely used remedy is multiplicative…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects: Surge Pricing Lowers Customer and Raises Driver Utility, and Near the Base Market Size Beats Fixed Prices for BothResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft raise prices when demand spikes, a practice known as surge pricing. The practice is controversial: customers see higher fares, and it is not obvious that anyone but the platform gains. Bernstein, DeCroix and Keskin (MSOM 2020; author version SSRN 3250224) study two competing platforms whose customers dislike…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Max-Min Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Greedy Round-Robin Gives Every Agent at Least (2 − 1/N) Times Her Max-Min Share, and the Factor Cannot Be ImprovedResearch Paper

Many allocation problems distribute work rather than benefits: household and office tasks, teaching loads, shifts, maintenance duties, or jobs assigned to parallel machines. Each item is a chore, which every agent would rather not receive, and chores cannot be split. Under indivisibility an exactly fair split usually does not exist, so the fair-division…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment: House-Monotone and Quota-Compliant Apportionments Are the Seat Counts of Extreme Points of a Network Flow LP with Lookahead Φ(p, H)Research Paper

An apportionment method distributes the HHH seats of a house among nnn states in proportion to their populations. Exact proportionality is impossible with integer seats, so methods are judged by axioms. Two axioms date back to the debates over the seats of the US House of Representatives. Quota compliance asks that each state receive its exact proportional…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations: Duplicating a Strategy Commutes with the (μ,γ)-Decomposition into Potential, Harmonic and Nonstrategic ComponentsResearch Paper

A finite game can be split into simpler pieces. Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (Math. Oper. Res. 36 (2011)) showed that the space of finite games is the direct sum of potential, harmonic and nonstrategic games: potential games have pure equilibria and well-behaved learning dynamics, harmonic games generalize matching pennies, and nonstrategic games…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Search for an Immobile Hider on a Binary Tree with Unreliable Locational Information: The Value Is 2qμ + (p − q)D, Attained by the Recursive Hider Distribution and the Favoring-Bias SearcherResearch Paper

Search games model a Searcher looking for an object or a person whose location is chosen adversarially: a lost hiker, a mine, a hidden explosive device, a fugitive. In the classic search game on a tree, a Hider stands still at a point of a tree network, and a Searcher starts from the root and moves at unit speed. The payoff is the time to find the Hider. Gal…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency: When a Multi-Divisional Firm Beats Two Stand-Alone FirmsResearch Paper

Conglomerates and stand-alone firms finance projects differently. A multi-divisional firm runs an internal capital market: headquarters raises funds externally and then decides which division gets them. A stand-alone firm must raise capital project by project. A long line of work in corporate finance asks when the internal market is more efficient: Stein (19…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Exact Penalization of Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems: Under a Slater-Type Condition, Every Equilibrium of the ℓq-Penalized Nash Game Solves the Generalized Game for All Large PenaltiesResearch Paper

In a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) each player's feasible set depends on the strategies of the other players. Such coupled constraints arise wherever players share a resource: transmission capacity in electricity and telecommunication markets, emission caps in environmental games, track time in railway pricing, road capacity in transportation…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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