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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality I: Bayes Rationality at Every State Yields Exactly the Correlated Equilibrium DistributionsResearch Paper

Nash equilibrium is the standard solution concept for strategic games, but it is usually justified by appeal to what players "would" do once they somehow coordinate on a profile. Correlated equilibrium, introduced by Aumann (J. Math. Econ. 1, 1974), enlarges the set of outcomes by letting players condition their actions on correlated private signals. In Corr…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design XI: Optimal Sequential Screening by Option ContractsTextbook

Many sales are contracted before the buyer knows what the good is worth to her. An airline sells a ticket months before the trip, a hotel sells a refundable or non-refundable room before the traveller's plans are settled, and a supplier signs a capacity contract before demand is realised. At the time of contracting the buyer holds some private information…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design X: Robust Mechanism Design — Belief Revelation on Finite Type SpacesTextbook

Classical Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows the agents' beliefs about each other: typically a commonly known prior over independent private values. Wilson's critique (1987) observed that mechanisms tuned to such a prior can depend on details that no designer knows, and a literature on robust mechanism design replaced the fixed prior…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design IX: Monotone Direct Mechanisms Are Dictatorial (Gibbard–Satterthwaite)Textbook

Voting rules, committee procedures and any other method that turns individual rankings into one collective choice face the same question: can the rule be designed so that no participant ever gains by misreporting their ranking? The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) answers no. When at least three alternatives can be chosen…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VII: Crémer–McLean Full Surplus Extraction with Correlated TypesTextbook

Bayesian mechanism design asks which collective decisions and payments a designer can implement when every agent holds private information, the type, drawn from a commonly known prior. Most of the classical theory (Myerson's optimal auction, the Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility, the public goods results) assumes that types are independent. Once types are…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming VIII: Multi-Stage Games, Games of Survival and the Extended Min-Max TheoremTextbook

Chapter X of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) carries the functional-equation method of the earlier chapters from one-player decision processes to two-player zero-sum games that are played over many stages. At each stage the two players make simultaneous…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior II: Games with Perfect Information Are Strictly DeterminedTextbook

Chess, checkers, Go and Backgammon share a feature that card games such as Poker lack: whenever a player moves, the player knows everything that has happened so far. von Neumann and Morgenstern call this perfect information and devote §15 of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) to it. Their result is that such a game, viewed as a…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue: The Competitive Ratio of the Primal-Dual Allocation AlgorithmResearch Paper

Search engines sell advertisement slots next to their results through ad-auctions. Advertisers bid on keywords, and each advertiser also sets a daily budget: the most it is willing to pay in a day. Queries arrive one at a time and each must be assigned to an advertiser at once, with no knowledge of the queries still to come. The seller's revenue from an…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VI: With Verification, the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful Optimal ImplementationResearch Paper

Scheduling tasks on machines owned by self-interested parties is the running example of Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001), the paper that introduced the study of mechanisms whose allocation rule is an algorithm with a computational objective. Each machine (agent) privately knows how long it needs for each…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design IV: No Local Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) asks how well a computational task can be carried out when its inputs are held by self-interested agents who may lie about them. Their test case is scheduling on unrelated machines: tasks must be assigned to agents (machines), each agent privately knows how long it needs…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design II: A Lower Bound for Truthful Task SchedulingResearch Paper

Algorithms deployed on the Internet often take their inputs from parties who own them and who may lie when lying pays. Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) proposed studying optimization problems in this setting: the algorithm designer may hand out payments, and must guarantee that the intended output is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play II: Almost Sure Convergence in Zero-Sum Games and Symmetric Games with an Interior ESSResearch Paper

Fictitious play is the oldest model of learning in games: players repeatedly play a fixed normal form game, and each round every player best-responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play. Brown (1951) proposed it as an algorithm for computing the value of a zero-sum game, and Robinson (1951) proved that the empirical frequencies converge…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play I: Every Additive Random Utility Choice Function Has an Admissible Deterministic Perturbation RepresentationResearch Paper

Models of learning in games, and discrete choice models in econometrics, describe an agent who does not always pick the best alternative. Two descriptions of such an agent are standard. In the additive random utility model (McFadden 1981; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992) the agent maximizes payoffs perturbed by random shocks. In the deterministic…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium II: For Almost Every Game, Limits of Calibrated Learning Are Exactly the Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is a joint distribution over the players' strategy profiles from which no player gains by deviating from a recommended strategy. A central question of learning in games is which equilibria repeated play of simple, myopic rules can reach. Foster and Vohra (1997) answered it for calibrated forecasting: if each player…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy II: Equilibrium Exists When Every Consumer Can Supply Productive LaborResearch Paper

A competitive equilibrium is a list of production plans, consumption plans and prices at which every firm maximizes profit, every consumer maximizes utility within the budget, and no market has excess demand. Whether such prices exist at all is the consistency question behind general equilibrium theory, the welfare theorems, and applied equilibrium models…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games 1: For Five or More Players No Core Allocation Rule Is Coalitionally MonotonicResearch Paper

Cooperative games model the division of a jointly produced surplus, or a jointly incurred cost, among the participants of an enterprise: towns sharing a water supply system, divisions of a firm sharing overhead, members of a consortium sharing the savings of joint investment. In such applications allocations are rarely fixed once and for all. Costs and…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Assignment Game I: The Core 1: The Core Is the Set of Optimal Solutions of the Dual Assignment LPResearch Paper

A two-sided market in which each participant trades with at most one partner on the other side — houses and buyers, workers and firms, producers and consumers under exclusive bilateral contracts — is the setting of L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik's assignment game (Int. J. Game Theory 1 (1971) 111–130). Money is transferable, so the natural solution concept is…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring 2: The Retailer's Optimal Reverse Factoring Payment ExtensionResearch Paper

Large retailers pay their suppliers weeks or months after delivery, and small suppliers fill the gap with short-term finance. In factoring the supplier sells the receivable to a factor for immediate cash; in reverse factoring the retailer arranges the program with a bank, which pays the supplier early at a rate priced on the retailer's credit rating.…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analog of the Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs: A Closed Convex Set Is Approachable If and Only If It Meets Every T(q), and Is Otherwise ExcludableResearch Paper

Von Neumann's minimax theorem says that in a zero-sum game with real payoffs, Player I can guarantee an expected gain of at least the value vvv and Player II can hold it to at most vvv. In a long series of plays, the law of large numbers turns this into a statement about the average payoff: I can make it exceed v−εv-\varepsilonv−ε, II can keep it below v+εv+\varepsilonv+ε,…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 2: A Threshold Nash Equilibrium under Announced Fixed-Discount PricingResearch Paper

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them wait, and the seller's pricing problem becomes a game between the seller and a population of forward-looking (strategic) customers. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 10(3), 2008) study this game in a model with…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem: Equilibrium Points Exist When Actions Are Contractible Polyhedra and Constrained Best Responses Are ContractibleResearch Paper

Nash's equilibrium existence theorem assumes that each player's set of available strategies is fixed. Many social and economic systems do not work that way: a consumer's budget set depends on prices, which are the choices of another agent, and a firm's feasible production may depend on what other firms do. Gerard Debreu's A Social Equilibrium Existence…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 3: Advance-Purchase Discounts Pareto-Improve Pull Contracts under At-Once Shipping CostsResearch Paper

A supplier and a retailer who trade a seasonal product must decide who carries the inventory risk: the stock left unsold, or the demand left unserved, when the season ends. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before the season and bears the risk; with a pull contract he orders during the season from the supplier's stock at a single wholesale…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 2: Advance-Purchase Discounts Coordinate the Supply ChainResearch Paper

A supplier who must produce before a selling season, and a retailer who sells into uncertain demand, have to decide who holds the inventory that may go unsold. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies this allocation of inventory risk using nothing but wholesale prices. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before production and bears…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
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