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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 2: Under Gross Substitutes Every Job-Matching Market with Continuous Salaries Has a Strict Core AllocationResearch Paper

Labour markets match workers to firms that hire teams: a firm's output depends on the whole set of workers it employs, while each worker holds one job. A salary agreement is stable when no firm and group of workers can renegotiate among themselves to the benefit of all of them. Shapley and Shubik (1971) showed that such stable outcomes exist when each firm…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cooperative Fuzzy Games 2: A Game with Side Payments Has a Nonempty Core Iff It Is Balanced, and Then Its Core Is the Core of Its Concave Fuzzy ExtensionResearch Paper

A cooperative game with side payments assigns to each coalition of players the total payoff it can secure on its own and share freely among its members. The core is the set of ways of dividing the payoff of the grand coalition that no coalition can improve upon. It is the basic stability notion of cooperative game theory and of its applications in…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cooperative Fuzzy Games 4: The Fuzzy Core of an Exchange Economy Coincides with Its Set of Walras EquilibriaResearch Paper

The core of an exchange economy is the set of allocations that no group of consumers can improve upon by trading only among themselves. The Walras equilibria (competitive equilibria) are the allocations supported by a price system at which every consumer maximizes preference on a budget set. Every Walras equilibrium is in the core, but for a fixed finite…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments IV: Uniform Pricing Earns OPT/(1 + ln(v_m/v_1)) in Unit-Demand Min-PricingResearch Paper

A seller with nnn distinct items faces mmm consumers, each of whom wants at most one item. Choosing item prices to maximise revenue in this setting is the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, introduced by Rusmevichientong and studied in algorithmic game theory and revenue management since the mid-2000s. Optimal prices are hard to compute in general, so the…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Markov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Evolution of Conventions I: In a Weakly Acyclic Game, Adaptive Play with k ≤ m/(L_Γ + 2) Converges Almost Surely to a ConventionResearch Paper

A convention is a pattern of behaviour that is customary because everyone expects everyone else to follow it: driving on the right, or which party yields at a narrow bridge. Peyton Young's The Evolution of Conventions (Econometrica 61 (1993) 57–84) asks how such a pattern can emerge from decentralized play. The players have limited memory and limited…

22 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On General Minimax Theorems 2: Kneser–Fan — If f Is Concave-Convexlike and u.s.c. in μ on Compact M, Then sup inf f = inf sup fResearch Paper

A minimax theorem asserts that for a real function f(μ,ν)f(\mu,\nu)f(μ,ν) of two variables the order of optimization does not matter:

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Cores and Indivisibility 1: The Housing Market's Game Without Side Payments Is BalancedResearch Paper

A market in which each trader owns one indivisible good has a basic coordination question: can all goods be reassigned so that no group of traders can withdraw its own goods and improve every member's outcome? Houses are the paper's running example. Monetary transfers and fractional houses are absent, so ordinary convex allocation arguments do not describe…

11 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research II: Equal Journey Times on Alternative Routes — Exactly the Routes with bᵢ < t Are Used, qᵢ = pᵢ(1 − bᵢ/t)Research Paper

Planning a road improvement requires an estimate of how traffic will redistribute over the routes affected. Because speed falls as flow rises, sending every vehicle along the route that is quickest today changes which route is quickest. J. G. Wardrop posed the question in its simplest setting in 1952: a given flow QQQ chooses among DDD alternative routes…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Cores and Indivisibility 2: Gale's Top Trading Cycles Give a Core Allocation Supported by Competitive PricesResearch Paper

Markets for indivisible goods, in which each participant owns one unit and wants one unit (houses, kidneys in paired donation, dormitory rooms, school seats), cannot be analysed with the convexity assumptions of classical general equilibrium theory. Shapley and Scarf (1974) introduced the housing market to ask whether the two central solution concepts of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games 1: Closed-Form Values of Interior Oceanic GamesResearch Paper

Weighted voting bodies often combine a few large blocs with a mass of small, unorganized voters: shareholders' meetings with a handful of large holders and a dispersed float, legislatures with party blocs and independents. The Shapley value measures each participant's voting power as the probability of being pivotal — the one whose arrival first turns a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 1: Under Gross Substitutes the Salary-Adjustment Process Reaches a Discrete Core Allocation in Finitely Many RoundsResearch Paper

Labor markets match workers to firms, and the terms of each match (the salary) are negotiated along with the match itself. A firm's output depends on the whole team it hires, so a firm cares about sets of workers, not individual workers one at a time. Kelso and Crawford (1982) asked when such a market has a stable outcome, the core, in which no firm and…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of Correlated Equilibria III: A Game with Compact Hausdorff Strategy Spaces and Continuous Payoffs Has a Countably Additive Correlated EquilibriumResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) describes play in a game where a mediator draws a profile of recommended actions from a joint distribution and tells each player only that player's own recommendation; the distribution is an equilibrium when no player gains, on average, by departing from the recommendation. Correlated equilibria are the natural outcome…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Polynomial Hierarchy and a Simple Model for Competitive Analysis: Every Optimum of the (p+1)-Level Linear Game J'(F) Is Binary, with x(F) = 1 iff the Σ_p Sentence (3.3) HoldsResearch Paper

Multi-level programs model a hierarchy of decision makers: a leader commits to a decision, a follower optimises given it, a follower of the follower optimises given both, and so on. Bilevel programs are the standard model of Stackelberg competition, toll setting, network interdiction and many other leader–follower problems in operations research (Candler…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model: The Perfect Equilibrium Partitions Are the Nonempty Closed Intervals A = Δ₁ and B = Δ₂ = A − εResearch Paper

Alternating-offer bargaining asks how an agreement is selected when two people can keep making proposals until one accepts. A prediction based only on behavior at the start may rely on threats that would no longer be sensible after a rejection. Ariel Rubinstein's 1982 paper studies strategies after every possible sequence of offers and gives a…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Auction Design: Giving the Object to a Bidder with the Highest Priority Level c̄ᵢ(tᵢ) ≥ t₀ and Charging (6.8) Is an Optimal Auction MechanismResearch Paper

A seller with one indivisible object must decide whether to keep it or transfer it to one of several bidders whose values she does not observe. The allocation and the payment rule affect what bidders choose to report. Myerson's 1981 paper identifies a revenue-maximizing rule when bidders' private value estimates are independent, their densities are…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bargaining Problem: The Nash Product Maximizer Is the Unique Solution Satisfying Invariance, Symmetry, IIA and Pareto EfficiencyResearch Paper

Two parties who can cooperate for mutual benefit must still agree on how to share the benefit. In The Bargaining Problem (Econometrica, 1950) John Nash asked which agreement two rational bargainers of equal skill should reach. His answer is not a model of haggling: it is a list of conditions any reasonable rule should satisfy, together with a proof that…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation I: The Price of Stability of Fair Cost Sharing Is at Most H(k), and This Is TightResearch Paper

Many networks are built and paid for by the users they serve: multicast trees, virtual overlays, shared subnetworks of the Internet. A protocol proposes a design and a rule for splitting its cost, and each participant is free to accept the proposal or defect to a cheaper alternative. The designer therefore cannot impose the global optimum; the best it can…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 2: The Three-Colorable Addition-Multiplication Gadget Has Error Amplification 81Research Paper

Nash's theorem guarantees that every finite game has a mixed equilibrium, but says nothing about how hard one is to find. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009) showed that computing a Nash equilibrium is complete for the class PPAD of total search problems whose solutions are guaranteed by a parity argument on a directed graph…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method: Equilibrium Track Probabilities Exist and Are UniqueResearch Paper

A group of mmm individuals each hold a subjective probability distribution over the same nnn outcomes, and one wants a single distribution representing their consensus. Averaging and convolution are the obvious candidates. Eisenberg and Gale (Ann. Math. Statist. 30(1), 1959) observe that a real institution already performs such an aggregation: the pari-mutuel…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games II: For Symmetric Games the Average Social Cost Price of Anarchy Is (5N-2)/(2N+1)Research Paper

Selfish routing and resource sharing are modelled by congestion games: each player picks a set of shared resources, and the cost of a resource grows with the number of players using it. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures how much worse the social cost of a worst Nash equilibrium is than the optimum. For…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 3: Order-Oblivious Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Uniform Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) maximizes a seller's expected revenue when buyers have independent private values, but it is a sealed-bid mechanism: every buyer reports a value, and the allocation and payments are computed from all reports at once. Real sellers more often post prices: buyers arrive, each sees a take-it-or-leave-it price, and buys…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games IV: For Symmetric Games the Maximum Social Cost Price of Anarchy Is at Most 5/2Research Paper

The price of anarchy measures how much a system of selfish agents loses compared with a centrally optimized one: it is the worst ratio, over all Nash equilibria, between the social cost of the equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou introduced it in 1999 (Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999), and bounding it for routing and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games I: The Pure Price of Anarchy of the Average Social Cost Is 5/2Research Paper

When many independent users share a resource whose cost grows with use (links of a network, servers, machines), each user chooses for itself, and the outcome is a Nash equilibrium rather than a socially optimal allocation. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures the cost of this decentralisation: the worst…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

How Much Data Is Sufficient to Learn High-Performing Algorithms? Generalization Guarantees for Data-Driven Algorithm Design 2: Neutral Affine Maximizers Have Pseudo-Dimension at Least ⌊n/2⌋Research Paper

In data-driven algorithm design, an algorithm or mechanism comes with a vector of tunable parameters ρ\rhoρ, and the parameters are chosen by optimizing average performance over sample instances drawn from an unknown distribution. How many samples suffice for the empirical optimum to be near-optimal in expectation is governed by the pseudo-dimension of the…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
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