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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 1: Every Loopless Matroid Polytope Has a (b, 1−b)-Selectable Deterministic Greedy OCRSResearch Paper

In online selection, items reveal information one at a time, and each decision to accept an item is irrevocable. A matroid constraint permits some subsets and excludes others; it covers choices such as selecting linearly independent vectors or acyclic edges. A fractional solution can assign an acceptance probability to each item, but independent activations…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs II: Posted Expected Weakly (α, β₁, β₂)-Balanced Prices Earn 1/(α(2β₁ + 4β₂)) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random inputs one at a time and must commit irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all inputs in advance. The classic single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) says that a well-chosen fixed threshold earns at least half of the expected maximum. In mechanism design the same statement…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs I: Expected (α, β)-Balanced Prices Scaled by α/(1 + αβ) Earn 1/(1 + αβ) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random values one at a time and must decide irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all values in advance. The classic result of Krengel, Sucheston and Garling (1977) and Samuel-Cahn (1984) says that for a single item and independent values a single threshold earns at least half of the expected…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals III: Even for I.I.D. Variables, No Nonadaptive Threshold Rule Beats the Factor 1 − 1/eResearch Paper

In a prophet inequality, a decision maker observes random rewards one at a time and must choose without seeing future realizations. The benchmark is a prophet who sees all rewards and selects their maximum. A nonadaptive threshold rule chooses a threshold for each reward before observations begin, then accepts the first arriving reward that crosses its…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness II: With Additive Valuations Such an Allocation Gives Every Agent Her Maximin Share Divided by 2 − |P|/nResearch Paper

A set of nnn agents must share a set MMM of mmm indivisible goods, each agent valuing bundles of goods by her own valuation. Two fairness notions dominate the literature. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), introduced by Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah and Wang (EC 2016), asks that no agent prefer another's bundle once any single good is removed…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing III: Variational Solutions Are the Nash Equilibria of the Extended Cloudlet-Pricing GameResearch Paper

Mobile devices can divide work between local execution, a nearby shared cloudlet, and a remote cloud. A cloudlet has limited capacity, so one user's choice changes the delay faced by the others. Cardellini and coauthors model this as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem, in which each user's feasible choices depend on the aggregate cloudlet load. The…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 4: The Fixed Points of the Division-Free Map G_I(x)ij = max(x_ij + u_i((i:j); x−i) − t_i, 0) Are Exactly the Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Nash's existence theorem for finite games is a fixed-point theorem: one writes down a continuous map from the set of mixed strategy profiles to itself whose fixed points are exactly the Nash equilibria, and applies Brouwer's theorem. Nash's own map (Nash 1951) divides by 1+∑jmax⁡(0,⋅)1+\sum_j \max(0,\cdot)1+∑j​max(0,⋅), and the choice of map matters as soon as the question is…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 2: Block Matching Pennies Gives Every Block the Same Probability and the Matching Player Full Support in Every Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Reductions that prove hardness for Nash equilibrium computation encode a computation (a circuit, a fixed-point problem) into the probabilities that players put on their strategies in every equilibrium. For the encoding to be meaningful, the designer has to control how each player distributes probability across groups of strategies, independently of the…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 1: ε-Nash Equilibria Are Weak (n+1)ε-Fixed Points of Nash's Function, and Weak ε²/(4c²n³)-Fixed Points Are ε-Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Nash proved that every finite game has an equilibrium by exhibiting a continuous map of the set of mixed profiles into itself whose fixed points are exactly the equilibria, and applying Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Nash, 1951). Computationally, the same map is the bridge between games and fixed-point problems: complexity classes for total search problems…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games III: The Price of Anarchy of the Maximum Social Cost Is Theta(sqrt N)Research Paper

In a congestion game, several users choose facilities and each facility becomes more costly as more users choose it. Such games model settings in which each participant chooses a route or collection of resources for personal use while the resulting load is shared. A pure Nash equilibrium is a stable choice of routes: no single participant can lower their…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 3: Two Agents with Identical Additive Preferences and Generic Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Truncated SharesResearch Paper

How should a set of indivisible items (courses, shifts, inherited objects) be divided among people who have different entitlements but no money to transfer? A classical answer for divisible goods is the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI): give every agent a budget of artificial currency, find prices at which every agent can afford her…

13 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially Responsible Supply Chains II: A Stable Joint-Auditing Coalition Audits the Common Supplier and Shares Costs FairlyResearch Paper

Brands that sell consumer goods are held responsible by the public for the labour and safety practices of their suppliers. After the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, about 200 clothing brands and retailers signed the Accord on Fire and Building Safety and inspect roughly 1,600 factories jointly; pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer and GSK audit…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially Responsible Supply Chains I: Under Downstream Competition No Buyer Audits the Common Supplier in Any EquilibriumResearch Paper

Brands are routinely held responsible for the labour and environmental practices of their suppliers. A brand that is linked in public to a non-compliant supplier loses consumer willingness to pay, and firms answer this risk by auditing their suppliers. Supply networks are not trees, however: one supplier often serves several competing brands. Chen, Qi and…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment I: With Endogenous Uniform Quality, an Encroaching Manufacturer Gains and the Retailer Always LosesResearch Paper

Manufacturers increasingly sell directly to consumers through their own stores and websites, alongside the independent retailers that carry their products. This practice is called supply chain encroachment. Retailers routinely resent it, and examples range from beer brewers to personal computers. Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (Marketing Science, 2007)…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: carlok

WorstCaseEq I: Theorem 3Research Paper

Load balancing on identical parallel links is the example Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou used to define the price of anarchy: the ratio of the social cost of a Nash equilibrium to the social optimum (Koutsoupias–Papadimitriou 2009). Theorem 3 of the journal version is the two-link case. It is the first sharp bound in that paper, and the later two-speed bound…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: marwahaha

Randomized quasipolynomial-time mean-payoff gamesOpen Problem

Mean-payoff games ask which starting positions allow a player to guarantee a nonnegative long-run average reward. Binary-encoded weights make the bit cost of solving the complete winning set a central part of the question. The source manuscript presents the surrounding research claim.

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 4: Changing Only the Nonstrategic Component Makes the Pure Nash Equilibria Coincide with the Pareto Optimal ProfilesResearch Paper

A finite strategic game can be changed in ways that no player can detect strategically. Adding to player mmm's utility any function that does not depend on player mmm's own strategy leaves every unilateral comparison "is strategy aaa better for me than strategy bbb, given what the others do?" unchanged, so it leaves every best response and every pure Nash…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Multiple-Choice Secretary Algorithm with Applications to Online Auctions: The Recursive k-Choice Secretary Algorithm Earns at Least (1 − 5/√k) Times the Sum of the k Largest ValuesResearch Paper

The secretary problem asks how well an online decision maker can do when items arrive one at a time in random order and each must be accepted or rejected on the spot. With a single selection, the classical rule (observe a 1/e1/e1/e fraction, then take the first item better than everything seen) selects the best item with probability about 1/e1/e1/e, and no rule does…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

How Bad is Selfish Routing? 4: With Polynomial Latencies of Degree p and Nonnegative Coefficients the Cost of a Nash Flow Is at Most p + 1 Times the Optimal CostResearch Paper

In a road or communication network carrying a large population of users, each user picks a route that is fastest for itself given the congestion caused by everyone else. The resulting traffic pattern, a Wardrop or Nash equilibrium, need not minimize the total travel time: Braess's paradox shows that adding a road can make every user slower. Transportation…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology: For a Standard Latency Class Containing the Constants, Two-Link Networks Attain the Worst Nash/Optimal Cost Ratio α(L)Research Paper

In a road or communication network where each unit of traffic picks its own route, the outcome is a Nash flow (Wardrop equilibrium): no traffic can lower its own latency by switching paths. It is well known since Pigou (1920) that such selfish routing can be inefficient: the total latency of a Nash flow may exceed that of the best centrally planned flow.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games 3: A Finite Game Has the Finite Improvement Property If and Only If It Has a Generalized Ordinal PotentialResearch Paper

In a strategic game, players may repeatedly change their own choices when a change raises their payoff. This gives a simple model of decentralized adjustment: each move uses the current profile and one player's immediate incentive. The central question is whether such adjustment can continue forever. Monderer and Shapley introduced the finite improvement…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games 2: Every Finite Potential Game Is Isomorphic to a Congestion GameResearch Paper

Congestion games model situations in which agents choose sets of shared resources and the payoff of each resource depends only on how many agents use it: drivers choosing routes through road segments, jobs choosing machines, flows choosing links in a network. Rosenthal (A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, Int. J. Game Theory 2, 1973)…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cooperative Fuzzy Games 3: The Diagonal Formula Is the Unique Continuous Linear Pareto-Optimal, Symmetric and Atomic Value of Smooth Fuzzy GamesResearch Paper

A value for cooperative games assigns to every game a payoff vector, chosen by axioms rather than by bargaining. Shapley's value (1953) does this for finite games with side payments, and Aumann and Shapley (Values of Non-Atomic Games, 1974) extended it to games with a continuum of players, where it is given by a diagonal formula: a player's value is the…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 3: A Coalition Technology Satisfying Gross Substitutes for m + 1 Identical Firms Has a Strict Core AllocationResearch Paper

Workers can form groups and produce an output that they divide through salaries. A group may object to a proposed allocation when it can pay all of its members at least as much and one member more. The central question is whether any allocation survives every such objection. Kelso and Crawford's 1982 paper gives a sufficient condition based on how an…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 4: Without Ties the Salary-Adjustment Process Reaches the Firm-Optimal Discrete Strict Core AllocationResearch Paper

Labor markets match heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous firms, and the terms of each match — the salary — are negotiated. Kelso and Crawford (Econometrica 50 (1982)) studied such a market in which a firm may hire many workers, its output depends on the whole set it hires, and salaries are set worker by worker. Their model contains the marriage problem of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
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