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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 3: With a Uniform Private Benefit on [0, B], the Acquirer Acquihires Exactly When v_a > v_s + (7 − 3√5)B/2 and Otherwise Hires DirectlyResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups mainly to hire their staff, a practice known as acquihiring. Antitrust authorities review acquisitions that may reduce competition in product markets, but an acquihire can instead reduce competition in the labour market: a firm that buys the employer of a scarce worker no longer has to outbid that employer for…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 1: In the Baseline Model the Acquirer Hires the Employee Only Through Acquihiring, Exactly When v_a > v_s, and the Employee Prefers Direct HiringResearch Paper

Technology firms often buy small startups mainly to obtain their staff, a practice known as acquihiring; Chatterji and Patro (2014) identify 98 such deals between 2009 and 2013. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, 2024, www.crctr224.de; published in Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604) study the labour-market…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry II: In the Protective Regime the Seller Underinvests to Deter Entry for Intermediate Product Base ValuesResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon are both the storefront of third-party sellers and a retailer in their own right. A platform that observes how well a seller's product sells can later launch a competing product in the same space, and empirical work finds that it does so selectively: Zhu and Liu (2018, Strategic Management Journal) report that Amazon is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers III: At Low Uncertainty the Platform's Optimal Loan Rate Is Below the Risk-Free Rate Exactly When Production Cost Is HighResearch Paper

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces often lack working capital to buy inventory. Two financing channels compete for them. Under trade credit, the supplier ships now and is paid after sales, bearing the seller's default risk. Under platform financing, the marketplace itself (Amazon Lending, Alibaba's microloans, JD's supply-chain finance)…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms II: The Core of the Streaming Game Is the Set of Allocations Splitting Each User's Payment Among the Artists That User PlayedResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and have to pass the revenue on to the artists whose content was played. The two rules used in practice are pro-rata (each artist is paid in proportion to their total number of streams, over all users) and user-centric (each user's fee is split among the artists that user played, in…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry I: The Seller Prefers Entry Exactly Above Thresholds in Spillover and Referral Rate and Outside a Band of Competition IntensityResearch Paper

Large online marketplaces such as Amazon, JD.com and Walmart.com act both as a sales channel for third-party sellers and as a retailer of their own. A platform watches which third-party products sell well and may start selling the same product itself, a move called platform entry. Over ten months of 2013–2014, Amazon entered about 3% of the products first…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 2: For Submodular Valuations the Bluff Profile Is a Tight 1/2-Approximate Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-RobinResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents without money is a basic problem of fair division. The most widely used procedure is Round-Robin: the agents take turns, in a fixed order, picking their favourite remaining good. For agents with additive valuations, Round-Robin run on the agents' true preferences produces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management III: With Overlapping Supports, the Optimal Policy Goes from Partial to No to Full Disclosure as the Critical Ratio RisesResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who must produce for her. In a decentralized supply chain the supplier sets a production quantity before demand is realized, and an under-informed supplier produces too little or too much. The retailer can shape what the supplier believes by committing in advance to a disclosure policy, a…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms I: Homogeneity and Additivity Characterize Weighted Indices; Adding Equal Individual or Global Impact of Users Gives Pro-Rata or User-CentricResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pay part of the revenue to the artists whose content was played. The industry standard is the pro-rata method: the revenue pool is divided in proportion to each artist's total number of streams across all users. A competing method, the user-centric method, divides each user's own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure I: Retention-Focused Disclosure Thresholds and Higher Second-Period Profits under Behavior-Based DisclosureResearch Paper

Firms that hold purchase-history data can treat past customers and a rival's customers differently. The economics of behavior-based pricing (BBP), charging different prices to the two groups, is well developed: in a symmetric duopoly, poaching the rival's customers with discounts intensifies competition and usually lowers profits (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; …

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 1: For Cancelable Valuations the Bluff Profile Is an Exact Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-RobinResearch Paper

Round-Robin is the simplest allocation procedure for indivisible goods: agents take turns, in a fixed order, and at each turn the active agent takes her favourite good among those still available. Run on truthful preferences with additive valuations it returns an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which is why it is the default baseline of…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms I: Under a Low Commission, Search Neutrality Strictly Reduces Consumer Surplus When the Two Products Are Similarly PopularResearch Paper

Large retail platforms both host independent sellers and sell their own products, and they control the order in which products appear in search results. When the platform ranks its own product first regardless of relevance, it engages in self-preferencing. Regulators have treated this as a competition problem: the European Commission opened a second…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms II: At Equal Popularity, a Commission Below ρL/ρH Makes Search Neutrality Lower Consumer Surplus and Raise the Third-Party ProfitResearch Paper

Large retail platforms such as Amazon both host independent sellers and sell their own products in competition with them. The platform also controls the search ranking, the order in which products are shown to a consumer. The European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission have examined whether platforms rank their own products ahead of rivals' (self…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies 2: No Stopping Strategy Can Guarantee More Than √3 − 1 of the Prophet's Expected Maximum in Random OrderResearch Paper

In a prophet inequality a gambler sees the realizations of independent nonnegative random variables one at a time and must decide irrevocably, at each step, whether to stop and keep the current value. Her performance is compared with that of a prophet who sees everything in advance and takes the maximum. The ratio between the two is the standard benchmark…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Product Price, Quality and Service Decisions under Consumer Choice Models II: The Oligopoly Has a Unique Nash Equilibrium, with Monopoly Qualities and Service Durations and Lower PricesResearch Paper

Firms that sell durable goods set three things at once: a price, a quality level, and the length of an ancillary service that comes free with the product, such as a warranty. Wang, Ke and Cui (SSRN 3766191; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0947) study these joint decisions under multinomial logit (MNL) demand. For a…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 3: With Social Learning, Responsive Pricing Beats Pre-Announced Pricing When Consumers Are ImpatientResearch Paper

A recurring question in revenue management with strategic consumers is whether a seller gains from price commitment. When customers are forward-looking, a seller who announces its whole price path in advance (pre-announced pricing) removes the customers' incentive to wait for a markdown the seller would otherwise be tempted to give; a seller who keeps the…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 2: Under Responsive Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

A firm launching a new experience good does not know how good the product is, and neither do its customers. Early buyers post reviews, and customers who wait learn from them: this is social learning (SL). Forward-looking customers anticipate this and may delay their purchase until reviews are available, which cuts into the firm's early sales. Papanastasiou…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy II: Outcome Sequences with Vanishing Average Regret Have Average Cost at Most the Robust Price of Anarchy Times OptimalResearch Paper

In a game, each participant chooses a strategy while the cost of that choice depends on what everyone else does. A network user may choose a route, for example, but its travel time depends on the routes chosen by other users. The price of anarchy compares the cost of self-interested outcomes with the best joint outcome. A guarantee restricted to a Nash…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Modern Introduction to Online Learning XIV: Optimistic FTRL Self-Play on a Smooth Convex-Concave Function Has Duality Gap at Most a Constant over TTextbook

A saddle-point problem asks one player to choose a decision that keeps a payoff small while another chooses a decision that makes it large. Such problems include two-player zero-sum games and constrained optimization written through a Lagrangian. Online convex optimization supplies a way to construct approximate saddle points from repeated play: each player…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy III: For Every Set of Cost Functions, Congestion Games Are Tight — the Worst-Case Pure Price of Anarchy Equals the Best Smoothness BoundResearch Paper

In a congestion game, each player chooses resources and pays a cost that depends on how many players use each chosen resource. Such games model shared facilities and network use, where independently chosen strategies can cost more in total than a coordinated choice. The price of anarchy measures this inefficiency by comparing the social cost of an…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 4: Bundling k ≥ 2 I.I.D. Goods Guarantees a Fraction c/log k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with several goods and a single buyer is the smallest setting in which multi-dimensional mechanism design differs from the one-good theory. For one good, Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) says the optimal mechanism posts a price. For two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be non-monotone in the buyer's values, and is in…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 3: Selling k ≥ 2 Independent Goods Separately Guarantees a Fraction c/log² k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller who knows the distributions of a buyer's values for several goods can, in principle, design a mechanism that offers lotteries and prices conditional on the buyer's reported values. Finding the best such mechanism can be difficult even with two goods. Separate selling is much simpler: choose a one-good price for each item and let the buyer decide…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 1: Every Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Iff the Distribution Rules Are Generalized Weighted Shapley ValuesResearch Paper

In a cost sharing game (or, symmetrically, a revenue sharing game) self-interested players each pick a set of resources, every resource generates a welfare that depends on who uses it, and a distribution rule splits that welfare among the users. Network formation, atomic routing, coverage and distributed-control problems all fit this model (Anshelevich et…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 1: For Independent Groups of Goods Y and Z, Rev(Y, Z) ≤ Rev(Y) + Rev(Z) + BRev(Y) + BRev(Z)Research Paper

A seller who offers several goods to a buyer with private values has to choose a selling mechanism. For one good the optimal mechanism is known: post the best take-it-or-leave-it price (Myerson 1981). For two or more goods the optimal mechanism can be complicated: it may use lotteries, its menu may be infinite, and it may not be computable in closed form…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 5: A (b, c)-Selectable Greedy OCRS Rounds x ∈ bP to E[f(S)] ≥ c·F(x) for Monotone Submodular fResearch Paper

Many online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject items one at a time, irrevocably, while keeping the accepted set feasible: independent in a matroid, a matching in a graph, or within a knapsack budget. In Bayesian versions, such as prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms, a fractional point xxx of a relaxation of the feasible sets…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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