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The OR Formalization Drive

A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.

Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.

4812 missions

Missions

1826–1850 of 4812
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 6: With n Buyers and Dominant-Strategy Implementation, Selling Two Independent Goods Separately Earns at Least Half the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller who owns several goods and faces buyers with private values must decide how to sell them. The revenue-maximizing mechanism is known in closed form only for one good: for a single buyer it is a posted price, and for several buyers it is Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981). With two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 3: Selling k ≥ 2 Independent Goods Separately Guarantees a Fraction c/log² k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller who knows the distributions of a buyer's values for several goods can, in principle, design a mechanism that offers lotteries and prices conditional on the buyer's reported values. Finding the best such mechanism can be difficult even with two goods. Separate selling is much simpler: choose a one-good price for each item and let the buyer decide…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Cycle Lengths in Expanding Graphs 2: Every α-Expander on n Vertices Has Ω(α³/log(1/α))·n Distinct Cycle LengthsResearch Paper

An expander graph has many edges leaving each small vertex set. This condition is useful when a graph must remain connected after local losses, and it also constrains the cycles that can occur. Knowing that one long cycle exists leaves open how many different lengths its cycles can have. For example, a bipartite graph has no odd cycle, so expansion alone…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making VI: Posterior Sampling Bounds the Dual DEC of Tabular Reinforcement Learning by 26H²SA/γResearch Paper

In episodic reinforcement learning, an agent acts repeatedly in an unknown system and must learn which policy earns the largest expected reward. Even when states and actions are finite, the agent's choices change which data it observes. Foster, Kakade, Qian, and Rakhlin use the decision-estimation coefficient (DEC) to connect this information constraint to…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making IV: Log-Loss Regret Controls Hellinger Estimation Error, Est_H ≤ Reg_KL + 2 log(1/δ) with Probability 1−δResearch Paper

Interactive decision methods often need an estimate of an unknown outcome law after each round. A learner can be good at decisions only if its model of the observations is accurate where future decisions will sample. Foster, Kakade, Qian and Rakhlin measure this accuracy by a cumulative squared Hellinger distance and use it in their regret bounds for…

12 thms3 active users
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making IX: Posterior Sampling Bounds the Square-Loss DEC by 2Δ + 24·θ·log²(γ)/γ, θ the Disagreement CoefficientResearch Paper

In a structured bandit problem a learner repeatedly chooses a decision π\piπ from a set Π\PiΠ and observes a noisy reward whose mean fM(π)f^M(\pi)fM(π) is an unknown function from a known class FM\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{M}}FM​. Classical analyses of such problems measure the complexity of FM\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{M}}FM​ by the eluder dimension (Russo and Van Roy, 2013; 2014) or the st…

13 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Cliques in Social Networks: A New Distribution-Free Model 3: For Every c ≥ 2 and n ≥ c There Is a c-Closed Graph on n Vertices with Ω(c^(−3/2)·2^(c/2)·n^(3/2)) Maximal CliquesResearch Paper

Social networks exhibit triadic closure: two people with many common friends tend to be friends themselves. Fox, Roughgarden, Seshadhri, Wei and Wein (arXiv:1804.07431, SIAM J. Comput. 2020) turn this empirical regularity into a deterministic graph class, the ccc-closed graphs, and ask how hard a classical NP-hard problem, enumerating maximal cliques, becomes…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making VIII: Linear Bandits on the Unit Ball Have Localized DEC at Least d/(12γ)Research Paper

In a linear bandit a learner repeatedly chooses a decision π\piπ from a set Π⊆Rd\Pi \subseteq \mathbb{R}^dΠ⊆Rd and observes a noisy reward whose mean is ⟨θ⋆,π⟩\langle \theta^\star, \pi\rangle⟨θ⋆,π⟩ for an unknown parameter θ⋆\theta^\starθ⋆. It is the standard model for sequential decisions with many correlated actions, such as ad placement, routing and recommendation, and its…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 1: Every Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Iff the Distribution Rules Are Generalized Weighted Shapley ValuesResearch Paper

In a cost sharing game (or, symmetrically, a revenue sharing game) self-interested players each pick a set of resources, every resource generates a welfare that depends on who uses it, and a distribution rule splits that welfare among the users. Network formation, atomic routing, coverage and distributed-control problems all fit this model (Anshelevich et…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 1: For Independent Groups of Goods Y and Z, Rev(Y, Z) ≤ Rev(Y) + Rev(Z) + BRev(Y) + BRev(Z)Research Paper

A seller who offers several goods to a buyer with private values has to choose a selling mechanism. For one good the optimal mechanism is known: post the best take-it-or-leave-it price (Myerson 1981). For two or more goods the optimal mechanism can be complicated: it may use lotteries, its menu may be infinite, and it may not be computable in closed form…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 2: The Degree Relaxation of Matching Has a (b, e^(−2b))-Selectable Randomized Greedy OCRSResearch Paper

In online selection, candidate items reveal themselves one at a time and an algorithm must decide immediately whether to keep each one. When the kept items must form a matching, accepting one edge can prevent a later edge sharing an endpoint from being accepted. A fractional solution supplies useful marginal probabilities, but it does not by itself specify…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 5: A (b, c)-Selectable Greedy OCRS Rounds x ∈ bP to E[f(S)] ≥ c·F(x) for Monotone Submodular fResearch Paper

Many online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject items one at a time, irrevocably, while keeping the accepted set feasible: independent in a matroid, a matching in a graph, or within a knapsack budget. In Bayesian versions, such as prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms, a fractional point xxx of a relaxation of the feasible sets…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 3: A Knapsack Polytope Has a (b, (1−2b)/(2−2b))-Selectable Randomized Greedy OCRS for b ≤ 1/2Research Paper

In online selection, useful items arrive one at a time and must be accepted or rejected before the next arrival. A knapsack constraint limits the total size of accepted items to one unit. When the order may depend on all of the random outcomes, an algorithm needs a guarantee that survives every such order. Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen introduced online…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Generalized Turán Problems for Even Cycles 6: The Maximum Number of (2l+1)-Cycles in a Graph with No Cycle of Length 3, …, 2l or 2k+1 Is Ω(n^{1+1/(2k+2)}) and O(n²)Research Paper

Generalized Turán problems ask for the maximum number of copies of a fixed graph HHH in an nnn-vertex graph that avoids a family F\mathcal FF of forbidden subgraphs. The ordinary Turán number counts edges (H=K2H = K_2H=K2​); Alon and Shikhelman (arXiv:1506.03397) started the systematic study of the general function ex(n,H,F)\mathrm{ex}(n, H, \mathcal F)ex(n,H,F), building on earlier…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 1: Every Loopless Matroid Polytope Has a (b, 1−b)-Selectable Deterministic Greedy OCRSResearch Paper

In online selection, items reveal information one at a time, and each decision to accept an item is irrevocable. A matroid constraint permits some subsets and excludes others; it covers choices such as selecting linearly independent vectors or acyclic edges. A fractional solution can assign an acceptance probability to each item, but independent activations…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Exact Solution of the Hypergraph Turán Problem for k-Uniform Linear Paths: For k ≥ 4 and Large n, the Turán Numbers of P_{2t+1} and P_{2t+2} and Their Unique Extremal FamiliesResearch Paper

Hypergraph Turán problems ask how many edges a kkk-uniform hypergraph on nnn vertices can have without containing a fixed sub-hypergraph. For graphs (k=2k=2k=2) the theory is well developed; for k≥3k\ge 3k≥3 exact answers are rare and are known mostly for small, dense configurations such as the Fano plane or expanded triangles. Paths are the natural sparse test case. For…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities: When the Second Phase of a Cost Scale Starts, at Most 3λ Excess Is Left for λ = √m and 36λ for λ = n^(2/3)Research Paper

Minimum-cost flow is a standard model for routing a quantity through a network while paying a cost on each arc. Unit capacities arise when each input arc can carry at most one unit; they include flow formulations of several matching and assignment problems. Goldberg, Kaplan, Hed and Tarjan analyze a cost-scaling algorithm for this setting. Their…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Certifying Some Distributional Robustness with Principled Adversarial Training 2: The Empirical Robustness Level E_P̂ₙ[c(T_γ(θ;Z),Z)] Concentrates Uniformly over ΘResearch Paper

Neural networks trained by empirical risk minimization are sensitive to small adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Distributionally robust optimization addresses this by training against the worst distribution in a neighbourhood of the data distribution. Sinha, Namkoong, Volpi and Duchi (arXiv:1710.10571v5, ICLR 2018) take the neighbourhood to be a…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Input-to-State Stability of Nonlinear Impulsive Systems 2: An Exponential ISS-Lyapunov Function Makes an Impulsive System Uniformly ISS under the Generalized Average Dwell-Time ConditionResearch Paper

An impulsive system evolves continuously most of the time and changes state instantaneously at specified impulse times. Reset controllers, sampled interventions, and hybrid models have this shape. A stability estimate for the continuous dynamics alone can fail after many jumps: a jump may enlarge the state, and even a contracting jump can be too sparse to…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Certifying Some Distributional Robustness with Principled Adversarial Training 1: SGD on the Wasserstein Penalty Surrogate Finds an Approximate Stationary Point at Rate 4σ√(L_φΔ_F/T)Research Paper

Neural networks trained by empirical risk minimization are sensitive to small, deliberately chosen perturbations of their inputs ("adversarial examples"). A standard defence is adversarial training: at each step, perturb the training example to increase the loss, then take a gradient step at the perturbed point. Sinha, Namkoong, Volpi and Duchi (arXiv:1710.1…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Input-to-State Stability of Nonlinear Impulsive Systems 1: An ISS-Lyapunov Function Makes an Impulsive System ISS for Every Impulse Sequence Satisfying the Nonlinear Fixed Dwell-Time ConditionResearch Paper

Impulsive systems evolve continuously most of the time and change their state abruptly at isolated instants. They model sampled-data and networked control loops, where a controller acts at transmission times; population and epidemic models with periodic harvesting or vaccination; and mechanical systems with impacts. Their inputs are disturbances,…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Input-to-State Stability of Nonlinear Impulsive Systems 3: Small-Gain Theorem: max_i σ_i⁻¹(V_i(x_i)) Is an ISS-Lyapunov Function for an Interconnection of Impulsive SystemsResearch Paper

Large control systems are rarely analysed as a whole. A power grid, a logistics network or a chemical plant is a network of subsystems, each with its own model, coupled through their states. Input-to-state stability (ISS) is the standard notion of robustness for such systems: the state is bounded by a decaying function of the initial state plus a gain of…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsInformation TheoryMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization II: Under Bandit Feedback Every Strategy Has Minimax Regret at Least 0.02 m√(dn) on Some Set of Actions with m OnesResearch Paper

An online player repeatedly chooses a subset of coordinates and pays the sum of their losses. In many applications the player sees only that sum, not the losses of the selected coordinates. This bandit feedback makes it harder to identify which coordinate within each chosen subset is responsible for a favorable or unfavorable outcome. Audibert, Bubeck and…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 3: On a Finite Support the Empirical DRO Equals the Burg-Divergence DRO with χ²₁ RadiusResearch Paper

Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) evaluates a decision against a collection of probability distributions near an empirical one. In a finite scenario model, the familiar construction puts a divergence ball around the histogram of observed scenarios. Lam's empirical construction instead gives one weight to each observation, even when several…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs II: Posted Expected Weakly (α, β₁, β₂)-Balanced Prices Earn 1/(α(2β₁ + 4β₂)) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random inputs one at a time and must commit irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all inputs in advance. The classic single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) says that a well-chosen fixed threshold earns at least half of the expected maximum. In mechanism design the same statement…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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