A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.
Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.
Robustifying Conditional Portfolio Decisions via Optimal Transport 3: For a Fiber of Radius γ > 0 and a Budget ρ > ρ_max, the Worst-Case Conditional Expected Loss Collapses to sup_y ℓ(y)Research Paper
A portfolio manager who observes a covariate today, say a vector of macroeconomic indicators x0, wants an allocation that performs well on the returns Y that follow such a covariate. With finitely many historical pairs (x^i,y^i) the conditional law of Y given X=x0 is poorly estimated: usually no sample has covariate exactly x0, and few have…
Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing II: With Store-Wise Homogeneous Discounts, Some Optimal Sequential Assortments Are Nested and Revenue-OrderedResearch Paper
A retailer that operates several physical stores can show a customer who finds nothing she likes in her store the products that other stores carry, for example on an in-store screen or a magic mirror, and ship the chosen product from the other store. The customer then buys at a utility discount: shipping takes time and the product cannot be tried on. Liu,…
Human in the Loop Automation: Ride-Hailing with Remote (Tele-)Drivers 1: With Scarce Vehicles, Service Level Rises Then Falls in the Number of Drivers Exactly When Condition (5) HoldsResearch Paper
Remote driving, or tele-driving, separates the driver from the vehicle: a human sitting in a control centre drives a car over a network link and can switch to another car as soon as a trip ends. Commercial pilots of this model exist for car delivery and ride-hailing, and it gives a platform a new design choice. A conventional ride-hailing fleet has one…
Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory 1: A Source Is Uniform If and Only If It Is Equally Preferred to Itself and Equally Insensitive to Itself with a Regular RegionResearch Paper
Decision theory under uncertainty distinguishes risk, where probabilities are known, from ambiguity, where they are not. Ellsberg's (1961) urn experiments showed that people's choices between bets on the same kind of event depend on where the uncertainty comes from: a bet on a known urn is preferred to the matching bet on an unknown urn. Tversky and Fox…
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design I: For I.I.D. Valuations a Second-Price Auction with Random Reserve Φ*ₙ Is Minimax-Regret Optimal over DSIC MechanismsResearch Paper
Optimal auction theory in the tradition of Myerson (1981) assumes that the seller knows the distribution of the buyers' valuations. In practice that distribution is estimated, misspecified, or simply unknown. Prior-independent mechanism design asks for a mechanism that performs well across a whole class of distributions, without being tuned to any one of…
Consumer Privacy in Online Retail Supply Chains I: For a Single Firm the GDPR Raises Profit and Social Welfare, and Raises Consumer Surplus Exactly When v < 2M√(1−δ)/(Z√F)Research Paper
The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, in force since 2018) shifted control over personal data from firms to consumers: data may be collected and processed only with the consumer's consent, and consent may be given for some uses and withheld for others. Online retailers use consumer data in two opposite ways. Saved shopping carts,…
Equilibrium Portfolio Selection for Smooth Ambiguity Preferences: The Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategy under a Gaussian PriorResearch Paper
An investor who does not know the expected return of a stock faces two kinds of uncertainty: risk (the randomness of returns given the model) and ambiguity (uncertainty about which model is true). The smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (Econometrica 2005) separates the two: the investor first computes the expected utility …
Retailer-Led Marketplaces 1: Below a Capacity Threshold the Monopolist Competes Only in the Top Marketplace Products (Mode I); Above It He Also Monopolizes Unsupplied Products (Mode II)Research Paper
Large online retailers such as Amazon run two businesses on one storefront. They sell products themselves, and they host a marketplace on which third-party sellers sell, paying the platform a percentage of their revenue. A retailer that also runs the marketplace can decide which products to sell itself, and it controls which offer most consumers see.…
Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 1: Without Gain-Seeking Products the Myopic Price Path Converges to a Steady State; with One the Myopic Policy Has NoneResearch Paper
Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal benchmark formed from the prices they have seen before. A price above the reference is perceived as a loss and depresses demand; a price below it is perceived as a gain and stimulates it. Because today's prices shape tomorrow's reference prices, a seller facing reference effects solves a dynamic…
Telehealth in Acute Care: Pay Parity and Patient Access: Under Pay Parity, for Duplicate-Visit Probability q in (q†, q*), Telehealth Maximizes Provider Revenue but Office-Only Maximizes AccessResearch Paper
During the COVID-19 pandemic most U.S. payers began reimbursing a telehealth consultation at the same rate as the corresponding office visit, a policy called pay parity. Many states have since made it permanent, on the stated ground that it improves patients' access to care. In acute care (primary and urgent care) a telehealth visit sometimes cannot resolve…
Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 3: With a Uniform Private Benefit on [0, B], the Acquirer Acquihires Exactly When v_a > v_s + (7 − 3√5)B/2 and Otherwise Hires DirectlyResearch Paper
Large technology firms often buy small startups mainly to hire their staff, a practice known as acquihiring. Antitrust authorities review acquisitions that may reduce competition in product markets, but an acquihire can instead reduce competition in the labour market: a firm that buys the employer of a scarce worker no longer has to outbid that employer for…
Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 1: In the Baseline Model the Acquirer Hires the Employee Only Through Acquihiring, Exactly When v_a > v_s, and the Employee Prefers Direct HiringResearch Paper
Technology firms often buy small startups mainly to obtain their staff, a practice known as acquihiring; Chatterji and Patro (2014) identify 98 such deals between 2009 and 2013. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, 2024, www.crctr224.de; published in Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604) study the labour-market…
Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes in High-Dimensional State Space with Finite-Time Guarantees: Single-Loop ML-IRL Policy and Reward Iterates Converge at Explicit Finite-Time RatesResearch Paper
Structural estimation of Markov decision processes recovers the parameters of an agent's reward from observed behavior, under the hypothesis that the agent acts optimally in a known dynamic environment. In econometrics this is the dynamic discrete choice model of Rust (Rust 1987); in artificial intelligence it is maximum-likelihood inverse reinforcement…
Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 2: On Independent Platforms, AV-HV Coexistence Raises the Price When Labor Is Elastic EnoughResearch Paper
Ride-hailing platforms are expected to add autonomous vehicles (AVs) to fleets of human-driven vehicles (HVs). A common expectation is that AVs, by removing the driver's wage, will make rides cheaper. Lian and van Ryzin (SSRN 3716491; published in Management Science, 2025, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.03112) show that the answer depends on the market configuration.…
Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry II: In the Protective Regime the Seller Underinvests to Deter Entry for Intermediate Product Base ValuesResearch Paper
Online marketplaces such as Amazon are both the storefront of third-party sellers and a retailer in their own right. A platform that observes how well a seller's product sells can later launch a competing product in the same space, and empirical work finds that it does so selectively: Zhu and Liu (2018, Strategic Management Journal) report that Amazon is…
Robustifying Conditional Portfolio Decisions via Optimal Transport 1: With a Singleton Fiber and Only Positive Fiber Mass Required, the Worst-Case Conditional Expected Loss Collapses to sup_y ℓ(y)Research Paper
A portfolio manager who observes side information (a covariateX, such as a market indicator) before choosing a portfolio wants to control the loss of the asset returns Yconditional on the observed covariate value x0. The conditional law of Y given X=x0 is unknown and must be learned from N historical pairs (xi,yi). When x0 itself…
Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 3: A Monopoly AV Supplier on a Common Platform Chooses a Newsvendor-Fractile CapacityResearch Paper
Ride-hailing platforms are expected to add autonomous vehicles (AVs) to fleets that today consist of human drivers. AVs have a cost advantage: a human driver must earn a reservation wage for every hour on the platform, while an AV owner pays a fixed capital cost per calendar hour and a smaller variable cost per operating hour. Whether that advantage reaches…
Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing I: Under Simultaneous Recommendation, Offering the Single-Store Optimal Assortment in Every Store Is OptimalResearch Paper
Retail chains increasingly run their physical stores and online channels as one network. A customer who walks into a store and finds nothing she wants can be shown products stocked in other stores of the chain, to be shipped or picked up later. This raises a basic assortment question: when every store can point its customers to the rest of the network,…
Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers III: At Low Uncertainty the Platform's Optimal Loan Rate Is Below the Risk-Free Rate Exactly When Production Cost Is HighResearch Paper
Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces often lack working capital to buy inventory. Two financing channels compete for them. Under trade credit, the supplier ships now and is paid after sales, bearing the seller's default risk. Under platform financing, the marketplace itself (Amazon Lending, Alibaba's microloans, JD's supply-chain finance)…
Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance: Equilibrium Common Ownership Decreases in Managers' Ability to Divert Profits and Increases in the Cost of MonitoringResearch Paper
Large asset managers now hold significant stakes in many competing firms at once. When the same investor owns shares in rival firms, managers who weigh that investor's interests have an incentive to compete less hard, which raises industry profits at consumers' expense. This "softening of competition" effect is the subject of a large empirical and antitrust…
Selling Data to Marketers 2: In Selling Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean, the High-Cost Plan Is Efficient and the Low-Cost Plan Carries Less Information If φ < 1/2 and More If φ > 1/2Research Paper
Data brokers sell information about consumers to firms that decide whom to target: a lender deciding whom to offer credit, a retailer deciding whom to mail. Two products dominate this market. A marketing list sells contact information together with an analysis, so that a firm cannot reach the consumer at all without buying. A data append adds information…
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets: Seller-Side Discrimination Raises Platform Profit, Buyer and Low-Type Seller Surplus and Total Welfare; High-Type Sellers Gain iff b > b̂Research Paper
Third-degree price discrimination means charging different prices to identifiable groups of customers. Its welfare effects are a classical question in industrial organization. With linear demands and every market served under uniform pricing, discrimination leaves total output unchanged and lowers total welfare (Pigou 1920). More generally, welfare can rise…
Flow Allocation Games 1: Every Unit-Ranking Game Has a Strong Equilibrium That Maximizes the Total FlowResearch Paper
Financial firms owe each other money. When some firms cannot meet their obligations, the payments that actually clear in the network are a fixed point: what a firm can pay depends on what it receives, which depends on what others can pay. Eisenberg and Noe (Management Science, 2001) introduced this clearing model under a fixed pro-rata payment rule. Later…
Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices 2: In Expectation the Shadow-Price Estimator Equals the Derivative of the Finite-Sample Partial-Treatment Value FunctionResearch Paper
Two-sided platforms (ride hailing, delivery, freight, cloud capacity) test product changes with user-split experiments: each arriving demand unit is assigned to treatment with probability ρ and to control otherwise. Treated and control units then compete for the same supply, so the outcome of one group depends on the size of the other. This interference b…
Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms II: The Core of the Streaming Game Is the Set of Allocations Splitting Each User's Payment Among the Artists That User PlayedResearch Paper
Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and have to pass the revenue on to the artists whose content was played. The two rules used in practice are pro-rata (each artist is paid in proportion to their total number of streams, over all users) and user-centric (each user's fee is split among the artists that user played, in…