A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.
Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 3: Selling k ≥ 2 Independent Goods Separately Guarantees a Fraction c/log² k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper
A seller who knows the distributions of a buyer's values for several goods can, in principle, design a mechanism that offers lotteries and prices conditional on the buyer's reported values. Finding the best such mechanism can be difficult even with two goods. Separate selling is much simpler: choose a one-good price for each item and let the buyer decide…
Cycle Lengths in Expanding Graphs 2: Every α-Expander on n Vertices Has Ω(α³/log(1/α))·n Distinct Cycle LengthsResearch Paper
An expander graph has many edges leaving each small vertex set. This condition is useful when a graph must remain connected after local losses, and it also constrains the cycles that can occur. Knowing that one long cycle exists leaves open how many different lengths its cycles can have. For example, a bipartite graph has no odd cycle, so expansion alone…
The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making VI: Posterior Sampling Bounds the Dual DEC of Tabular Reinforcement Learning by 26H²SA/γResearch Paper
In episodic reinforcement learning, an agent acts repeatedly in an unknown system and must learn which policy earns the largest expected reward. Even when states and actions are finite, the agent's choices change which data it observes. Foster, Kakade, Qian, and Rakhlin use the decision-estimation coefficient (DEC) to connect this information constraint to…
The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making IV: Log-Loss Regret Controls Hellinger Estimation Error, Est_H ≤ Reg_KL + 2 log(1/δ) with Probability 1−δResearch Paper
Interactive decision methods often need an estimate of an unknown outcome law after each round. A learner can be good at decisions only if its model of the observations is accurate where future decisions will sample. Foster, Kakade, Qian and Rakhlin measure this accuracy by a cumulative squared Hellinger distance and use it in their regret bounds for…
Finding Cliques in Social Networks: A New Distribution-Free Model 3: For Every c ≥ 2 and n ≥ c There Is a c-Closed Graph on n Vertices with Ω(c^(−3/2)·2^(c/2)·n^(3/2)) Maximal CliquesResearch Paper
Social networks exhibit triadic closure: two people with many common friends tend to be friends themselves. Fox, Roughgarden, Seshadhri, Wei and Wein (arXiv:1804.07431, SIAM J. Comput. 2020) turn this empirical regularity into a deterministic graph class, the c-closed graphs, and ask how hard a classical NP-hard problem, enumerating maximal cliques, becomes…
Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 1: Every Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Iff the Distribution Rules Are Generalized Weighted Shapley ValuesResearch Paper
In a cost sharing game (or, symmetrically, a revenue sharing game) self-interested players each pick a set of resources, every resource generates a welfare that depends on who uses it, and a distribution rule splits that welfare among the users. Network formation, atomic routing, coverage and distributed-control problems all fit this model (Anshelevich et…
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 1: For Independent Groups of Goods Y and Z, Rev(Y, Z) ≤ Rev(Y) + Rev(Z) + BRev(Y) + BRev(Z)Research Paper
A seller who offers several goods to a buyer with private values has to choose a selling mechanism. For one good the optimal mechanism is known: post the best take-it-or-leave-it price (Myerson 1981). For two or more goods the optimal mechanism can be complicated: it may use lotteries, its menu may be infinite, and it may not be computable in closed form…
Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 2: The Degree Relaxation of Matching Has a (b, e^(−2b))-Selectable Randomized Greedy OCRSResearch Paper
In online selection, candidate items reveal themselves one at a time and an algorithm must decide immediately whether to keep each one. When the kept items must form a matching, accepting one edge can prevent a later edge sharing an endpoint from being accepted. A fractional solution supplies useful marginal probabilities, but it does not by itself specify…
Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 5: A (b, c)-Selectable Greedy OCRS Rounds x ∈ bP to E[f(S)] ≥ c·F(x) for Monotone Submodular fResearch Paper
Many online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject items one at a time, irrevocably, while keeping the accepted set feasible: independent in a matroid, a matching in a graph, or within a knapsack budget. In Bayesian versions, such as prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms, a fractional point x of a relaxation of the feasible sets…
Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 3: A Knapsack Polytope Has a (b, (1−2b)/(2−2b))-Selectable Randomized Greedy OCRS for b ≤ 1/2Research Paper
In online selection, useful items arrive one at a time and must be accepted or rejected before the next arrival. A knapsack constraint limits the total size of accepted items to one unit. When the order may depend on all of the random outcomes, an algorithm needs a guarantee that survives every such order. Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen introduced online…
Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 1: Every Loopless Matroid Polytope Has a (b, 1−b)-Selectable Deterministic Greedy OCRSResearch Paper
In online selection, items reveal information one at a time, and each decision to accept an item is irrevocable. A matroid constraint permits some subsets and excludes others; it covers choices such as selecting linearly independent vectors or acyclic edges. A fractional solution can assign an acceptance probability to each item, but independent activations…
Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities: When the Second Phase of a Cost Scale Starts, at Most 3λ Excess Is Left for λ = √m and 36λ for λ = n^(2/3)Research Paper
Minimum-cost flow is a standard model for routing a quantity through a network while paying a cost on each arc. Unit capacities arise when each input arc can carry at most one unit; they include flow formulations of several matching and assignment problems. Goldberg, Kaplan, Hed and Tarjan analyze a cost-scaling algorithm for this setting. Their…
Input-to-State Stability of Nonlinear Impulsive Systems 2: An Exponential ISS-Lyapunov Function Makes an Impulsive System Uniformly ISS under the Generalized Average Dwell-Time ConditionResearch Paper
An impulsive system evolves continuously most of the time and changes state instantaneously at specified impulse times. Reset controllers, sampled interventions, and hybrid models have this shape. A stability estimate for the continuous dynamics alone can fail after many jumps: a jump may enlarge the state, and even a contracting jump can be too sparse to…
Certifying Some Distributional Robustness with Principled Adversarial Training 1: SGD on the Wasserstein Penalty Surrogate Finds an Approximate Stationary Point at Rate 4σ√(L_φΔ_F/T)Research Paper
Neural networks trained by empirical risk minimization are sensitive to small, deliberately chosen perturbations of their inputs ("adversarial examples"). A standard defence is adversarial training: at each step, perturb the training example to increase the loss, then take a gradient step at the perturbed point. Sinha, Namkoong, Volpi and Duchi (arXiv:1710.1…
Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization II: Under Bandit Feedback Every Strategy Has Minimax Regret at Least 0.02 m√(dn) on Some Set of Actions with m OnesResearch Paper
An online player repeatedly chooses a subset of coordinates and pays the sum of their losses. In many applications the player sees only that sum, not the losses of the selected coordinates. This bandit feedback makes it harder to identify which coordinate within each chosen subset is responsible for a favorable or unfavorable outcome. Audibert, Bubeck and…
Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 3: On a Finite Support the Empirical DRO Equals the Burg-Divergence DRO with χ²₁ RadiusResearch Paper
Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) evaluates a decision against a collection of probability distributions near an empirical one. In a finite scenario model, the familiar construction puts a divergence ball around the histogram of observed scenarios. Lam's empirical construction instead gives one weight to each observation, even when several…
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs II: Posted Expected Weakly (α, β₁, β₂)-Balanced Prices Earn 1/(α(2β₁ + 4β₂)) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper
A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random inputs one at a time and must commit irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all inputs in advance. The classic single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) says that a well-chosen fixed threshold earns at least half of the expected maximum. In mechanism design the same statement…
Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes 2: Any Policy with at Most m Price Changes Has Regret at Least KT^(1/(m+1)) on a Bernoulli InstanceResearch Paper
A seller learning a demand curve normally adjusts prices as new observations arrive. A price-change limit prevents that continual adjustment: a price may have to be chosen before the seller knows which demand curve it faces, then held through a block of sales. This matters when repricing is operationally costly, constrained by contracts, or visible to…
Optimization-Based Scenario Reduction for Data-Driven Two-Stage Stochastic Optimization II: Under a Symmetric Uncertainty Law the Mean Solves the Convex Upper-Bound Scenario ProblemResearch Paper
A two-stage stochastic programme chooses a decision z before an uncertain parameter ξ is revealed and pays a cost c(z;ξ). When ξ is known only through n data points, or through a law with many atoms, the expected cost is expensive to optimize, and practitioners replace the law by a small set of mreduced scenarios. Classical scenario reduction chooses…
Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers: Over Horizon T the Simple Robust Pricing Policy Earns at Least V*_β(x₀)/(1 + e^{−βT}/(βT))Research Paper
A seller with a fixed stock must choose prices before knowing when customers will arrive or what they will be willing to pay. If customers can wait for a later price, the seller must also account for how today's price changes their purchasing decisions. Chen and Farias study this problem with strategic customers and identify a simple inventory-based policy…
Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming 1: The Randomized Stochastic Gradient Method Has (1/L)E‖∇f(x_R)‖² ≤ (D_f² + σ²Σγ_k²)/Σ(2γ_k − Lγ_k²)Research Paper
Stochastic gradient methods are the standard tool for minimizing an objective that can only be accessed through noisy gradient samples. Training a machine-learning model on sampled data, simulation-based optimization, and stochastic programs with endogenous uncertainty are all of this kind. In many of these applications the objective is nonconvex: the loss…
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs I: Expected (α, β)-Balanced Prices Scaled by α/(1 + αβ) Earn 1/(1 + αβ) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper
A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random values one at a time and must decide irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all values in advance. The classic result of Krengel, Sucheston and Garling (1977) and Samuel-Cahn (1984) says that for a single item and independent values a single threshold earns at least half of the expected…
Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization and Variation Regularization II: The ∞-Wasserstein Regularizer Equals ρ Times the Mean Local Slope up to ρ²‖H‖ Plus a Boundary TermResearch Paper
In distributionally robust optimization, a decision is judged against probability laws near a nominal law rather than against the nominal law alone. The nominal law is often the empirical distribution of observed data. For a loss function, this produces a worst-case expected loss that depends on the size and geometry of the permitted changes to the data.…
Robust Sample Average Approximation 2: Pearson's χ² Test and the G-Test on a Known Finite Support, with Thresholds √(Q/N), Are Uniformly ConsistentResearch Paper
A decision made from sampled data can be sensitive to the distribution chosen to represent future uncertainty. Robust sample average approximation addresses this by optimizing against every distribution that passes a goodness of fit test, rather than against one fitted distribution. The resulting set of plausible laws is a data driven uncertainty set. Its…
On the Heavy-Tail Behavior of the Distributionally Robust Newsvendor 1: Worst-Case Expected Shortage under Known First and αth Moments Equals That of a Regularly Varying Demand of Tail Index αResearch Paper
A newsvendor chooses an order quantity before seeing demand. Unsold units have no salvage value, while demand above the order quantity cannot be filled. If the demand law is unknown but a few moments are known, the decision maker may minimize cost against the worst distribution consistent with those moments. Das, Dhara and Natarajan study this…