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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

1094 missions

Missions

941–960 of 1094
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e 2: The Suggested Matching Algorithm Achieves 1 − 1/e with High Probability, and This Is Tight Even in ExpectationResearch Paper

Motivation

Online bipartite matching models decisions that must be made as requests arrive: an advertiser can be assigned to a compatible request once, and an assignment cannot be revised when later requests reveal a better alternative. Display advertising is the motivating example in Feldman, Mehta, Mirrokni, and Muthukrishnan's 2009 preprint: an ad server knows which advertisers accept each kind of impression and has estimates of how frequently those kinds will arrive. The question is how much this advance distributional information helps when decisions still have to be immediate.

This mission studies the paper's first offline-guided algorithm. It computes a maximum matching for the expected traffic and follows that matching during the actual random run. The paper shows that this natural policy reaches the familiar 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e performance level and that its own analysis cannot be improved for this policy, even if performance is averaged over runs. The result sets the baseline for the paper's later two-suggested-matchings algorithm, which improves on that level under its stated assumptions. Feldman et al., §§1 and 4.1

Setting

An instance consists of a finite advertiser set AAA, a finite impression-type set III, and allowed edges E⊆A×IE\subseteq A\times IE⊆A×I. For each type iii, the nonnegative integer eie_iei​ is its expected number of arrivals. There are n=∑i∈Iei>0n=\sum_{i\in I}e_i>0n=∑i∈I​ei​>0 arrivals. Each arrival independently has type iii with probability ei/ne_i/nei​/n. A type with ei=0e_i=0ei​=0 remains in the graph but has zero arrival probability. On an arrival of type iii, an online algorithm may assign it to an adjacent advertiser that has not been assigned before, or may leave it unassigned. The hindsight optimum, OPT(ω)\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)OPT(ω), is the largest matching in the realization graph with one vertex for every arrival position, including separate vertices for repeated types. Feldman et al., §2, pp. 3–4

The suggested matching algorithm first selects any maximum integral flow in the expected-instance network. Each advertiser has capacity one, and each type iii has capacity eie_iei​. Equivalently, the selected edges form a maximum degree-capped bipartite matching M⊆EM\subseteq EM⊆E. Let A∗A^*A∗ be the advertisers covered by MMM. When type iii arrives, the algorithm chooses each advertiser joined to iii by a selected edge with probability 1/ei1/e_i1/ei​; any remaining probability chooses no advertiser. It assigns the chosen advertiser if available and otherwise makes no assignment. Its number of assignments is ALG(ω)\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)ALG(ω). This rule includes the algorithm's random choice in addition to the random arrival types. Feldman et al., §4.1, p. 5

The canonical residual cut of MMM places each advertiser and impression type on the source side if it is reachable from the source by residual edges. Write ATA_TAT​ for advertisers on the sink side and ISI_SIS​ for types on the source side. These sets describe the comparison between the expected-instance matching and the optimum of a realized run. The mission also uses occupancy: after nnn independent uniform throws into nnn bins, count how many bins in a fixed subset receive at least one ball. Feldman et al., §§2.1 and 4.1

Formalization targets

Theorem 4's general-instance guarantee is expressed in the additive form established by its analysis. For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, there are δ>0\delta>0δ>0 and NNN, uniform across all finite instances, all maximum integral flows, and all valid ways of realizing the algorithm's random choice, such that n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N implies

Pr⁡ ⁣[ALG(ω)≥(1−e−1)OPT(ω)−εn]≥1−e−δn.\Pr\!\left[\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)\ge(1-e^{-1})\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)-\varepsilon n\right] \ge 1-e^{-\delta n}.Pr[ALG(ω)≥(1−e−1)OPT(ω)−εn]≥1−e−δn.

The complete bipartite family gives the tightness target. When A=I={0,…,n−1}A=I=\{0,\ldots,n-1\}A=I={0,…,n−1} and every ei=1e_i=1ei​=1, every maximum expected-instance matching is perfect. For every run, OPT=n\mathrm{OPT}=nOPT=n, and

E[ALG]=n(1−(1−1n)n),lim⁡n→∞E[ALG]n=1−e−1.\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}] =n\left(1-\left(1-\frac1n\right)^n\right), \qquad \lim_{n\to\infty}\frac{\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]}{n}=1-e^{-1}.E[ALG]=n(1−(1−n1​)n),n→∞lim​nE[ALG]​=1−e−1.

The milestone list follows the paper's Fact 1 and the named passages “Bounding ALG,” “Bounding OPT,” and “Tightness of the Analysis” in §4.1. The cut identity ∣A∗∣=∣AT∣+∑i∈ISei|A^*|=|A_T|+\sum_{i\in I_S}e_i∣A∗∣=∣AT​∣+∑i∈IS​​ei​ is a separate deterministic milestone. Feldman et al., Theorem 4 and §4.1, pp. 5–6

Significance

The result establishes exactly what this one-matching policy achieves under integer-frequency independent arrivals. It gives a guarantee for the actual number of assignments relative to the best assignment made with hindsight, and a family on which the limiting expected ratio equals the guarantee. That tight family explains why the paper introduces a second suggested matching rather than seeking a stronger bound for the same policy. Feldman et al., §4

The mathematical theorem is proved in the paper; the mission asks for its machine-checked formalization. The development would also provide reusable finite models of repeated-type realizations, integral degree-capped bipartite matchings, uniform occupancy, and residual reachability cuts. No machine-checked proof of these mission items is being claimed by this draft.

Difficulty

The expected-instance matching is selected before the arrivals, but the hindsight optimum can exploit the actual multiplicities of every type. Counting only the ads selected online does not compare the algorithm with that hindsight optimum. Also, a type may have several selected advertisers when ei>1e_i>1ei​>1, so replacing the algorithm's random choice by a deterministic designated ad would change its law. The cut and concentration statements have to apply uniformly to every maximum integral flow, including flows chosen by different tie-breaking rules. Feldman et al., §4.1, pp. 5–6

Formalization scope

Advertisers and types are finite Lean types. The edge relation is a finite set, and eie_iei​ and nnn are natural numbers with n=∑iei>0n=\sum_i e_i>0n=∑i​ei​>0. An integral maximum flow is represented by a maximum cardinality edge set with advertiser degree at most one and type-iii degree at most eie_iei​. The theorem quantifies over every such set. This is the unit-advertiser, integer-type-capacity flow used in §4.1, without a separate real-valued flow object. The canonical cut is defined through residual reachability. The hindsight optimum maximizes over matchings of the realized graph, with each arrival position distinct.

The run uses nnn independent uniform draws from ∑i{0,…,ei−1}\sum_i\{0,\ldots,e_i-1\}∑i​{0,…,ei​−1}. A valid labelling assigns each selected advertiser at type iii to a distinct copy. The drawn copy determines the type and, if labelled, the ad selected by the algorithm. This gives type probability ei/ne_i/nei​/n, conditional ad probability 1/ei1/e_i1/ei​ on selected edges, and the remaining “no ad” probability. Counts, probabilities, and expectations use finite sums, so there is no integrability convention. Since n>0n>0n>0, the run sample space is nonempty; no value of ALG/OPT\mathrm{ALG}/\mathrm{OPT}ALG/OPT at OPT=0\mathrm{OPT}=0OPT=0 is needed. The complete-graph family has n≥1n\ge1n≥1.

The paper writes 1−e−Ω(n)1-e^{-\Omega(n)}1−e−Ω(n) in both bounding passages. The Lean statements spell this out as ∀ε>0, ∃δ>0, ∃N, ∀\forall\varepsilon>0,\ \exists\delta>0,\ \exists N,\ \forall∀ε>0, ∃δ>0, ∃N, ∀ instances with n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N, with δ,N\delta,Nδ,N preceding the instance. Theorem 4's ratio language is represented by the additive estimate its proof yields; a vanishing ratio error requires a separate lower bound on OPT/n\mathrm{OPT}/nOPT/n. The exact finite-nnn expectation and its limit make “tight, even in expectation” precise. The printed Fact 1 exponent is εn/2\varepsilon n/2εn/2, while its Appendix A proof yields ε2n/2\varepsilon^2n/2ε2n/2; the formalized concentration statement uses the proved exponent and the milestone retains the printed wording. Neither a ratio with a zero denominator nor a labelling that changes the algorithm's choice law is accepted as a shortcut.

Contributions toward the occupancy bound, the residual cut identity, the realized matching bound, and the complete-graph expectation are welcome. The finite occupancy and matching interfaces are intended for reuse beyond this specific algorithm.

Selected references

  • Jon Feldman, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, and S. Muthukrishnan, Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e, arXiv:0905.4100v1, 2009; FOCS 2009. Preprint
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e 3: No Online Algorithm Beats Expected Approximation Factor 26/27 on a 6-Cycle, and None Reaches 1 − o(1) on Disjoint 6-CyclesResearch Paper

Motivation

Online bipartite matching asks an algorithm to assign arriving requests to resources it cannot reassign later. In display advertising, the requests are page views (impressions) and the resources are advertisers who have bought a fixed number of impressions in advance; each impression must be served immediately or lost. In the adversarial model, Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (STOC 1990) showed that the RANKING algorithm achieves a 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e fraction of the optimum in expectation, and that no online algorithm does better. Advertising systems, however, have historical traffic data, which motivates the i.i.d. model: the impression types are drawn independently from a distribution that is known in advance.

Feldman, Mehta, Mirrokni and Muthukrishnan (arXiv:0905.4100, FOCS 2009) were the first to beat 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e in this model, with an algorithm that achieves ≈0.67\approx 0.67≈0.67 with high probability. Their Section 3 asks the complementary question: how close to 111 can any online algorithm get when the distribution is known? Their Theorem 3 answers that the expected approximation factor of every online algorithm is bounded strictly away from 111, already on a graph with six vertices. Later work in the same model (Manshadi, Oveis Gharan and Saberi, SODA 2011, arXiv:1007.1673) sharpened both the algorithmic and the hardness side.

Setting

An instance consists of a bipartite graph G=(A,I,E)G = (A, I, E)G=(A,I,E) between a finite set AAA of advertisers and a finite set III of impression types, a distribution DDD on III, and a number nnn of arrivals. In this mission DDD is the uniform distribution on III. Online, nnn impressions arrive one at a time; their types ω(0),…,ω(n−1)\omega(0), \dots, \omega(n-1)ω(0),…,ω(n−1) are independent draws from DDD. When impression ttt arrives, the algorithm must immediately either assign it to an advertiser aaa with (a,ω(t))∈E(a, \omega(t)) \in E(a,ω(t))∈E that has not yet been used, or leave it unassigned. Each advertiser can be used at most once, and decisions are final.

A deterministic online algorithm decides what to do with arrival ttt from the types ω(0),…,ω(t)\omega(0), \dots, \omega(t)ω(0),…,ω(t) seen so far; it knows GGG, DDD and nnn, but not the future. A randomized online algorithm is a probability distribution over deterministic ones. ALG(ω)\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)ALG(ω) is the number of impressions the algorithm assigns on the arrival sequence ω\omegaω. OPT(ω)\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)OPT(ω) is the size of a maximum matching of the realization graph, which has one node per arrival ttt, joined to every advertiser adjacent to ω(t)\omega(t)ω(t): the most impressions that could have been assigned with hindsight. The expected approximation factor of an algorithm is

E ⁣[ALG(ω)OPT(ω)],\mathbb E\!\left[\frac{\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)}{\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)}\right],E[OPT(ω)ALG(ω)​],

the expectation taken over the algorithm's randomness and the arrivals.

The 6-cycle instance has A={a,b,c}A = \{a, b, c\}A={a,b,c}, I={x,y,z}I = \{x, y, z\}I={x,y,z} and E={(x,a),(y,a),(y,b),(z,b),(z,c),(x,c)}E = \{(x,a),(y,a),(y,b),(z,b),(z,c),(x,c)\}E={(x,a),(y,a),(y,b),(z,b),(z,c),(x,c)}, with the uniform distribution and n=3n = 3n=3. The family Γk\Gamma_kΓk​ consists of kkk disjoint copies of the 6-cycle, with the uniform distribution on its 3k3k3k impression types and n=3kn = 3kn=3k arrivals.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

On the 6-cycle, every randomized online algorithm satisfies

E ⁣[ALGOPT]≤2627,\mathbb E\!\left[\frac{\mathrm{ALG}}{\mathrm{OPT}}\right] \le \frac{26}{27},E[OPTALG​]≤2726​,

and there are a constant c<1c < 1c<1 and a threshold K0K_0K0​ such that for every k≥K0k \ge K_0k≥K0​ and every randomized online algorithm on Γk\Gamma_kΓk​,

E ⁣[ALGOPT]≤c.\mathbb E\!\left[\frac{\mathrm{ALG}}{\mathrm{OPT}}\right] \le c .E[OPTALG​]≤c.

The second part is the paper's "there exists a family of instances with n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ for which no algorithm can achieve an expected approximation of 1−o(1)1 - o(1)1−o(1)", stated on the paper's own family. It leaves ccc unspecified: Appendix B estimates c≈0.9898c \approx 0.9898c≈0.9898 through approximate counts, and a sharper constant would not invalidate the goal.

Milestones

  1. The (x,y,y)(x, y, y)(x,y,y) scenario (§3, p. 4). For every deterministic online algorithm on the 6-cycle and every type uuu of the first arrival there is a type vvv with ALG(u,v,v)≤2\mathrm{ALG}(u, v, v) \le 2ALG(u,v,v)≤2 and OPT(u,v,v)=3\mathrm{OPT}(u, v, v) = 3OPT(u,v,v)=3.
  2. Theorem 3, first sentence (p. 4). The bound 26/2726/2726/27 on the 6-cycle, for every randomized online algorithm.

Significance

Theorem 3 sets the ceiling against which algorithms in the i.i.d. model are measured. It rules out an online algorithm with expected factor arbitrarily close to 111, even though the distribution is known and the instance is tiny, so a constant-factor gap between online and offline matching is intrinsic to the model and not an artefact of adversarial arrivals. The paper's positive results (1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e for the Suggested Matching algorithm, ≈0.67\approx 0.67≈0.67 for Two Suggested Matchings) sit between 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e and this ceiling.

The single-instance bound has a short counting proof. The family statement is argued in the paper only in outline: Appendix B approximates the fractions of copies receiving 111, 222, 333 or more impressions, assumes the most favourable outcome on each, and reports the resulting ratio as approximately 0.98980.98980.9898. A machine-checked proof of the family statement would turn that sketch into a theorem with an explicit constant. To our knowledge neither part has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The single-cycle bound reduces to a finite check, but the paper's "without loss of generality (from the symmetry of the 6-cycle)" hides the cases the algorithm can choose: assigning the first impression to either neighbour, or not assigning it at all. Each case needs its own bad continuation. The passage from deterministic to randomized algorithms is an averaging step.

The family bound is harder. On Γk\Gamma_kΓk​ the algorithm sees all arrivals in all copies and may coordinate its decisions across copies, so the per-copy loss of the single cycle does not transfer by independence. Moreover the target is the expectation of a ratio, E[ALG/OPT]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}/\mathrm{OPT}]E[ALG/OPT], not a ratio of expectations: a bound on the expected loss must be combined with concentration of the number of copies that receive exactly three impressions, and with a lower bound on OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT that holds with high probability. The approximations "≃3/e3\simeq 3/e^3≃3/e3, 9/(2e3)9/(2e^3)9/(2e3), 27/(6e3)27/(6e^3)27/(6e3)" of Appendix B have unquantified errors and cannot be used as they stand.

Formalization scope

The model is formalized for general finite AAA and III with uniform arrivals. Arrival sequences are functions Fin n → I. A deterministic online algorithm is a function that receives the time ttt, the prefix of the first ttt types (Fin t → I) and the current type, and returns an advertiser or none; it cannot read later arrivals. A proposal of a non-adjacent or already used advertiser leaves the impression unassigned, so the encoding covers all online algorithms, including ones that skip an impression while a neighbour is free. A randomized online algorithm is a probability distribution (PMF) on the finite type of deterministic algorithms; by Kuhn's theorem this is equivalent to fresh random choices at each step. OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the maximum size of an injective, edge-respecting partial assignment of arrivals to advertisers. The expected approximation factor is a finite average over all ∣I∣n|I|^n∣I∣n arrival sequences, weighted by the algorithm distribution.

The explicit instantiations of the paper's asymptotic wording are as follows:

  • "no algorithm can achieve an expected approximation of 1−o(1)1 - o(1)1−o(1)" becomes ∃ c<1, ∃K0, ∀k≥K0, ∀P: E[ALG/OPT]≤c\exists\, c < 1,\ \exists K_0,\ \forall k \ge K_0,\ \forall P:\ \mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}/\mathrm{OPT}] \le c∃c<1, ∃K0​, ∀k≥K0​, ∀P: E[ALG/OPT]≤c on Γk\Gamma_kΓk​, with n=3kn = 3kn=3k tied to kkk, and with ccc and K0K_0K0​ chosen before kkk and before the algorithm.
  • The paper's constant 0.98980.98980.9898 is not part of the statement.

Lean's division sets x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0. A formalization of the form "there is an instance on which every algorithm has expected factor at most 26/2726/2726/27" would be satisfied trivially by a graph without edges, where OPT=0\mathrm{OPT} = 0OPT=0; the statements here are on the paper's explicit instances, where every impression type has an adjacent advertiser and OPT≥1\mathrm{OPT} \ge 1OPT≥1 on every arrival sequence.

A complete development needs finite case analysis on runs of online algorithms, averaging over mixed strategies, and, for the family, concentration inequalities for occupancy counts (Azuma or McDiarmid, both available on the platform) together with bounds on maximum matchings of disjoint unions. The online-algorithm model and the averaging lemmas are reusable for other lower bounds in the i.i.d. model. Proofs of either milestone, and independent proofs of the family statement with any explicit c<1c < 1c<1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Feldman, A. Mehta, V. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e, FOCS 2009; arXiv:0905.4100v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/0905.4100
  • R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, V. V. Vazirani, An optimal algorithm for on-line bipartite matching, STOC 1990. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100262
  • V. H. Manshadi, S. Oveis Gharan, A. Saberi, Online Stochastic Matching: Online Actions Based on Offline Statistics, SODA 2011; arXiv:1007.1673. https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.1673
5 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach 2: Empirical Likelihood Intervals for the Optimal Value inf_x E[ℓ(x;ξ)] Have Exact Coverage P(χ²₁ ≤ ρ)Research Paper

Why coverage of an optimal value matters

Many stochastic optimization problems choose a decision by minimizing an expected loss. The optimum depends on an unknown distribution, so a data-based optimum alone gives no measure of uncertainty about the best achievable expected loss. This mission concerns a confidence set for that optimal value, rather than a confidence set for the decision itself. The result of Duchi, Glynn, and Namkoong shows that a broad class of divergence neighborhoods of the empirical distribution yields a calibrated limit for this set. The same construction covers nonsmooth losses and constrained decisions when the regularity assumptions below hold.

The paper develops generalized empirical likelihood for smooth functionals of a distribution and then applies it to optimization. Its Theorem 3 states the exact asymptotic coverage result for the optimal value; Appendix C identifies the functional derivative, while Appendix B gives the uniform linearization and expansion on which calibration rests. The statistical result is proved in the paper. The mission asks for a machine-checked development of its statements and proof under an explicit nondegeneracy condition required by the paper's general coverage theorem.

Decisions, losses, and divergence neighborhoods

Let X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd be a nonempty compact decision set. An observation ξ\xiξ has population law P0P_0P0​, and ℓ(x;ξ)∈R\ell(x;\xi)\in\mathbb Rℓ(x;ξ)∈R is the loss at decision xxx. The quantity of interest is the optimal-value functional

Topt(P)=inf⁡x∈XEP[ℓ(x;ξ)].T_{\rm opt}(P)=\inf_{x\in\mathcal X}\mathbb E_P[\ell(x;\xi)].Topt​(P)=x∈Xinf​EP​[ℓ(x;ξ)].

The observations ξ1,…,ξn\xi_1,\ldots,\xi_nξ1​,…,ξn​ are independent and identically distributed with law P0P_0P0​. Write P^n\widehat P_nPn​ for their empirical distribution. A candidate distribution supported on the indexed observations is represented by nonnegative weights pip_ipi​ with ∑ipi=1\sum_i p_i=1∑i​pi​=1. Indexed weights also cover samples with repeated observations. For a convex divergence generator fff normalized by f(1)=f′(1)=0f(1)=f'(1)=0f(1)=f′(1)=0 and f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2, its divergence from the empirical law is Df(p∥P^n)=n−1∑if(npi)D_f(p\|\widehat P_n)=n^{-1}\sum_i f(np_i)Df​(p∥Pn​)=n−1∑i​f(npi​). Assumption A further requires fff to be three times continuously differentiable near 111; it permits f(0)=+∞f(0)=+\inftyf(0)=+∞.

At radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n, the divergence ball consists of the weights with ∑if(npi)≤ρ\sum_i f(np_i)\le\rho∑i​f(npi​)≤ρ. The confidence set is its image under ToptT_{\rm opt}Topt​:

Cn,ρ={Topt(p):Df(p∥P^n)≤ρ/n}.C_{n,\rho}=\{T_{\rm opt}(p):D_f(p\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n\}.Cn,ρ​={Topt​(p):Df​(p∥Pn​)≤ρ/n}.

Assumption B makes X\mathcal XX compact and requires ℓ(⋅;ξ)\ell(\cdot;\xi)ℓ(⋅;ξ) to be Lipschitz on it with a measurable random coefficient M(ξ)M(\xi)M(ξ). The theorem adds finite second moments for MMM and for the loss at one feasible decision. These conditions control losses at every feasible decision. They also make the population and weighted empirical infima finite on the cases used in the limit.

Formalization targets

The goal is the exact asymptotic coverage of the population optimal value, with x⋆x^\starx⋆ the unique optimizer and Var⁡P0(ℓ(x⋆;ξ))>0\operatorname{Var}_{P_0}(\ell(x^\star;\xi))>0VarP0​​(ℓ(x⋆;ξ))>0:

P∗ ⁣(Topt(P0)∈Cn,ρ)⟶P(χ12≤ρ),ρ≥0.P^*\!\left(T_{\rm opt}(P_0)\in C_{n,\rho}\right)\longrightarrow P(\chi_1^2\le\rho),\qquad \rho\ge0.P∗(Topt​(P0​)∈Cn,ρ​)⟶P(χ12​≤ρ),ρ≥0.

Here P∗P^*P∗ denotes outer probability, and χ12\chi_1^2χ12​ is the square of a standard normal variable. The milestone statements follow the paper's path to this theorem. Lemma 17 gives the directional derivative of an optimal-value functional. Lemma 13 bounds feasible empirical weights relative to uniform weights. Lemma 16 makes the nonlinear remainder uniformly negligible on the divergence ball. The display after (37) then gives a first-order expansion of the upper endpoint of Cn,ρC_{n,\rho}Cn,ρ​; the next display gives its one-sided Gaussian coverage limit. The goal concerns membership in the image set Cn,ρC_{n,\rho}Cn,ρ​, including both sides of that interval.

What the result provides

The limit specifies a radius through a one degree of freedom chi square quantile. It applies to the value of a constrained stochastic optimization problem without requiring the optimizer or the loss to be differentiable. The positive variance condition ensures that the influence function supplies a genuine Gaussian scale. Without such a condition, a deterministic optimal loss can make coverage identically one, so the stated chi square limit would fail. The general theorem in the paper explicitly requires positive influence variance; this mission makes the condition visible in the specialized optimal-value statement.

A complete formalization would connect finite-sample divergence geometry to an asymptotic confidence claim about an optimization functional. The empirical mean and variance definitions, divergence ball, and normalized generator already exist as reusable declarations. This mission adds the optimal-value functional, its influence function, the nonlinear remainder, and the statistical limits. Those definitions can also support later confidence statements for other stochastic optimization models. The result is proved in the source paper; the Lean statements here are open targets awaiting proofs.

The mathematical obstacle

Pointwise control of each loss ℓ(x;ξ)\ell(x;\xi)ℓ(x;ξ) is insufficient for the optimal value: the decision minimizing an empirical weighted objective can move with the weights. A pointwise mean expansion therefore does not by itself control the infimum over xxx. The required limit combines uniform control over the loss class with sensitivity of the infimum functional near its population minimizer. The uniform remainder in Lemma 16 is stronger than a statement for the ordinary empirical distribution because it covers every distribution in the shrinking divergence ball. The final event is membership in the image of that ball; bounds on its upper endpoint alone do not establish two-sided coverage.

Formalization scope

Lean represents decisions by EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and assumes a nonempty compact feasible set. Assumption B uses its Euclidean norm. The paper allows any norm in finite dimension; norm equivalence permits this choice after rescaling the Lipschitz coefficient. The population law is the pushforward of the first measurable observation from a probability space. Samples are indexed from zero, so the first nnn observations are indices 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1. Independence and identical distribution are explicit hypotheses. Loss measurability is explicit so the population integrals have their intended values. Square integrability and compact Lipschitz control keep the real infima meaningful.

The generator takes values in EReal so a divergence infinite at zero is representable. The ball uses the published probability uncertainty set with radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n and includes nonnegativity and unit mass. Its weights represent distributions absolutely continuous with respect to the empirical law. With tied observations, equal splitting across copies preserves the induced distribution and does not increase a convex divergence. The upper endpoint is sup⁡pinf⁡x\sup_p\inf_xsupp​infx​; the different minimax expression inf⁡xsup⁡p\inf_x\sup_pinfx​supp​ is not substituted. The chi square target uses the standard Gaussian measure of {z:z2≤ρ}\{z:z^2\le\rho\}{z:z2≤ρ}.

Mathlib measures are outer measures on arbitrary sets, so the probability of a possibly nonmeasurable membership or supremum event is the paper's outer probability. The Lemma 17 milestone expresses a signed measure through its action H(x)H(x)H(x) on the losses, as Appendix C.2 does, and uses positive directional steps. Real suprema and infima are used only where the hypotheses provide nonempty bounded values. The variance hypothesis rules out the trivial deterministic-loss counterexample. Useful contributions include the compactness and continuity facts needed for those extrema, the action-level derivative, empirical process limits, and the final two-sided event argument.

Selected references

  • John C. Duchi, Peter W. Glynn, and Hongseok Namkoong, Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach, arXiv:1610.03425v3, 2018; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. arXiv preprint
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

MNL-Bandit: A Dynamic Learning Approach to Assortment Selection I: The Epoch-Based UCB Policy Has Regret at Most C₁√(NT log NT) + C₂N log² NT Under the No-Purchase AssumptionResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that decides which products to display, an online platform that decides which items to show in a recommendation slot, and an airline that decides which fare classes to open all face the same problem: the set of options offered changes what customers buy, and the substitution pattern is not known in advance. The multinomial logit (MNL) model is the standard model of this substitution in revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004), and optimizing the offered set under a known MNL model is a classical, efficiently solvable problem (e.g. Rusmevichientong, Shen and Shmoys 2010, for a capacity constraint).

The MNL-Bandit asks what happens when the MNL parameters are unknown and must be learned from the purchases themselves, while revenue is being earned. Earlier approaches (Rusmevichientong, Shen and Shmoys 2010; Sauré and Zeevi 2013) separate exploration from exploitation and need the gap between the best and the second-best assortment to be known. Agrawal, Avadhanula, Goyal and Zeevi (Oper. Res. 2019, arXiv:1706.03880) give a single upper-confidence-bound policy whose regret is of order NT\sqrt{NT}NT​ up to logarithmic factors, with no such knowledge. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 1 of the paper.

Setting

There are NNN products with known revenues ri∈[0,1]r_i\in[0,1]ri​∈[0,1]. At each time t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T the seller offers an assortment StS_tSt​ from a family S\mathcal SS of feasible subsets of {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, and one customer either buys a product ct∈Stc_t\in S_tct​∈St​ or buys nothing (ct=0c_t=0ct​=0). Given St=SS_t=SSt​=S, the choice follows the MNL model with attraction parameters v1,…,vN≥0v_1,\dots,v_N\ge0v1​,…,vN​≥0 and v0=1v_0=1v0​=1:

pi(S)=vi1+∑j∈Svj(i∈S∪{0}),pi(S)=0 otherwise,p_i(S)=\frac{v_i}{1+\sum_{j\in S}v_j}\quad(i\in S\cup\{0\}),\qquad p_i(S)=0\ \text{otherwise},pi​(S)=1+∑j∈S​vj​vi​​(i∈S∪{0}),pi​(S)=0 otherwise,

independently of the past. The expected revenue of SSS is R(S,v)=∑i∈Srivi/(1+∑j∈Svj)R(S,v)=\sum_{i\in S}r_iv_i\big/\big(1+\sum_{j\in S}v_j\big)R(S,v)=∑i∈S​ri​vi​/(1+∑j∈S​vj​). The family S\mathcal SS is described by totally unimodular constraints, S={S:A x(S)≤b}\mathcal S=\{S : A\,x(S)\le b\}S={S:Ax(S)≤b} with x(S)x(S)x(S) the incidence vector of SSS, AAA totally unimodular and bbb integral (cardinality constraints are the main example). A policy chooses StS_tSt​ from the past choices, and its regret is

Regπ(T,v)=T R(S∗,v)−Eπ[∑t=1TR(St,v)],R(S∗,v)=max⁡S∈SR(S,v).\mathrm{Reg}_\pi(T,v)=T\,R(S^*,v)-\mathbb E_\pi\Big[\sum_{t=1}^TR(S_t,v)\Big],\qquad R(S^*,v)=\max_{S\in\mathcal S}R(S,v).Regπ​(T,v)=TR(S∗,v)−Eπ​[t=1∑T​R(St​,v)],R(S∗,v)=S∈Smax​R(S,v).

The seller knows rrr and S\mathcal SS but not vvv.

Algorithm 1 works in epochs: epoch ℓ\ellℓ offers one assortment SℓS_\ellSℓ​ repeatedly until a customer buys nothing. Let v^i,ℓ\hat v_{i,\ell}v^i,ℓ​ be the number of purchases of iii in epoch ℓ\ellℓ, Ti(ℓ)T_i(\ell)Ti​(ℓ) the number of the first ℓ\ellℓ epochs that offered iii, and vˉi,ℓ\bar v_{i,\ell}vˉi,ℓ​ the average of v^i,τ\hat v_{i,\tau}v^i,τ​ over those epochs. The algorithm forms the upper confidence bounds

vi,ℓUCB=vˉi,ℓ+vˉi,ℓ 48log⁡(Nℓ+1)Ti(ℓ)+48log⁡(Nℓ+1)Ti(ℓ),v^{\mathrm{UCB}}_{i,\ell}=\bar v_{i,\ell}+\sqrt{\bar v_{i,\ell}\,\frac{48\log(\sqrt N\ell+1)}{T_i(\ell)}}+\frac{48\log(\sqrt N\ell+1)}{T_i(\ell)},vi,ℓUCB​=vˉi,ℓ​+vˉi,ℓ​Ti​(ℓ)48log(N​ℓ+1)​​+Ti​(ℓ)48log(N​ℓ+1)​,

starting from vi,0UCB=1v^{\mathrm{UCB}}_{i,0}=1vi,0UCB​=1, and offers next the assortment in S\mathcal SS that maximizes R(S,v⋅,ℓUCB)R(S,v^{\mathrm{UCB}}_{\cdot,\ell})R(S,v⋅,ℓUCB​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

Under Assumption 4.1 (every vi≤v0=1v_i\le v_0=1vi​≤v0​=1, and S\mathcal SS is closed under taking subsets) there are absolute constants C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​ such that for every instance and every horizon TTT,

Regπ(T,v)≤C1NTlog⁡NT+C2Nlog⁡2NT.\mathrm{Reg}_\pi(T,v)\le C_1\sqrt{NT\log NT}+C_2N\log^2NT .Regπ​(T,v)≤C1​NTlogNT​+C2​Nlog2NT.

The constants are not fixed: the goal asserts the order of the regret, which is what the paper claims.

Milestones

The milestones follow the proof in Appendix A of the paper:

  1. The law of an epoch's purchase count: Lemma A.1, its moment generating function given the offered assortment.
  2. Concentration: Theorem 5, Chernoff bounds for geometric variables; Corollary D.1; and Lemma A.2 for the averages vˉi,ℓ\bar v_{i,\ell}vˉi,ℓ​ along Algorithm 1.
  3. Lemma 4.1: vi,ℓUCB≥viv^{\mathrm{UCB}}_{i,\ell}\ge v_ivi,ℓUCB​≥vi​ with probability at least 1−6/(Nℓ)1-6/(N\ell)1−6/(Nℓ), and its rate of convergence.
  4. Optimism of the revenue estimate: Lemma A.3 (monotonicity of the optimal revenue in vvv) and Lemma 4.2.
  5. The per-epoch error: Lemma A.4 (a Lipschitz bound) and Lemma 4.3.
  6. The epoch decomposition of the regret, (A.14).

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that learning the choice model costs only O~(NT)\tilde O(\sqrt{NT})O~(NT​) revenue, with no dependence on how separated the instance is. The paper also proves a lower bound of order NT/K\sqrt{NT/K}NT/K​ under a KKK-cardinality constraint (its Theorem 2), so for small KKK the bound is optimal up to logarithmic factors. The epoch device used here reduces the analysis of a choice model with substitution to unbiased i.i.d. estimates of each viv_ivi​.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix A, with the concentration bounds in Appendix D). It has not been machine-checked. A formal proof would also settle several printed slips that the formalization had to repair (listed under Formalization scope). The concentration bounds for geometric variables, Theorem 5 and Corollary D.1, are useful outside this mission.

Difficulty

The estimates v^i,ℓ\hat v_{i,\ell}v^i,ℓ​ are counted in epochs whose assortments are chosen adaptively from earlier estimates, so they are not independent a priori. The paper's argument that they are i.i.d. geometric with mean viv_ivi​ has to be made rigorous for an adaptive policy. The variables are unbounded, so the standard Chernoff–Hoeffding bounds for bounded variables do not apply, and the number of samples Ti(ℓ)T_i(\ell)Ti​(ℓ) is random, which requires a union bound over all its possible values. Finally, the regret is a sum over customers while the analysis is per epoch, and the two are linked through the expected epoch length 1+∑j∈Sℓvj1+\sum_{j\in S_\ell}v_j1+∑j∈Sℓ​​vj​ under a random number of epochs and a horizon that cuts the last one.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Products are Fin N; a choice is none (no purchase) or some i. The parameter v0v_0v0​ is normalized to 111, as the paper allows. Algorithm 1 is deterministic, so a history of horizon TTT is a sequence of TTT choices with the product law ∏tpct(St)\prod_tp_{c_t}(S_t)∏t​pct​​(St​), and every expectation is a finite sum. The revenue R(S,v)R(S,v)R(S,v) is the published definition ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective v r 1 S.
  • Feasible family. S\mathcal SS is a finite family with the TU representation (2.3), closed under subsets, and nonempty (the paper presupposes nonemptiness when it writes S∗=arg⁡max⁡S^*=\arg\maxS∗=argmax).
  • Algorithm. Algorithm 1 is a policy defined by recursion on the history. It receives rrr and an argmax selector for S\mathcal SS, never vvv. Every statement quantifies over all selectors, that is, over every tie-breaking rule. While a product has never been offered, its vUCBv^{\mathrm{UCB}}vUCB stays at the initial value 111.
  • Epoch events. The lemmas about epoch ℓ\ellℓ are stated for every finite horizon TTT, on the event that epoch ℓ\ellℓ is completed by customer TTT; uniformity in TTT is the paper's infinite-horizon statement.
  • Repairs of the page, all disclosed in the items:
    1. Lemma A.2's misprinted log⁡(ℓ+1)\log(\ell+1)log(ℓ+1) is replaced by log⁡(Nℓ+1)\log(\sqrt N\ell+1)log(N​ℓ+1).
    2. Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 are indexed by the estimate built at the end of epoch ℓ\ellℓ.
    3. Lemma 4.3's free index iii becomes the sum over i∈Sℓ+1i\in S_{\ell+1}i∈Sℓ+1​.
    4. Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3 use the explicit constants C1=72+24C_1=\sqrt{72}+\sqrt{24}C1​=72​+24​ and C2=144C_2=144C2​=144 of the proof.
    5. Lemma A.3 and Lemma 4.2 require positive parameters on the optimal set; the printed versions are false otherwise.
    6. (A.14) is an inequality, since the horizon cuts the last epoch.
  • Not stated. Corollary A.1 (the epoch estimates are i.i.d. geometric across the epochs of the adaptive policy) is not posed as an item: a single-epoch law would be a weaker statement than the page's.
  • No trivialization. The policy cannot see vvv, the constants of the goal precede every other quantifier, and the regret is the paper's (2.6), so the goal cannot be met by a policy that offers S∗S^*S∗ or by constants that depend on the instance.
  • Welcome contributions. Infrastructure for adaptive sampling (the i.i.d. property of the epoch estimates), Chernoff bounds for geometric and sub-exponential variables, and a Wald-type identity for epochs.

The paper's own proofs are in its Appendices A and D.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal, V. Avadhanula, V. Goyal, A. Zeevi, MNL-Bandit: A Dynamic Learning Approach to Assortment Selection, Operations Research 67(5):1453–1485, 2019. arXiv:1706.03880v2, doi:10.1287/opre.2018.1832
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, D. B. Shmoys, Dynamic assortment optimization with a multinomial logit choice model and capacity constraint, Operations Research 58(6):1666–1680, 2010. doi:10.1287/opre.1100.0866
  • D. Sauré, A. Zeevi, Optimal dynamic assortment planning with demand learning, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(3):387–404, 2013. doi:10.1287/msom.2013.0429
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • M. Mitzenmacher, E. Upfal, Probability and Computing, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation II: For Real Costs, the Strongly Polynomial Loop Reaches a Minimum-Cost Circulation After at Most m⌈log₂(2n)⌉ RefinementsResearch Paper

Why minimum-cost circulation needs a real-cost iteration bound

A minimum-cost circulation is a way to send flow around a directed network while respecting capacities and paying a cost per unit on each arc. It is a basic form of network optimization: a minimum-cost flow with prescribed supplies and demands can be reduced to a circulation problem, and the circulation formulation exposes the residual arcs on which a flow can be improved. Goldberg and Tarjan's successive-approximation method relaxes exact optimality by an error parameter and repeatedly reduces that error. Its ordinary stopping rule for integer costs depends on the largest cost. For arbitrary real costs, including irrational costs, a decreasing positive error need never cross a fixed numerical cutoff. The strongly polynomial loop in their 1987 technical report, later published in Mathematics of Operations Research instead tests the smallest error parameter appropriate to the current circulation and stops when it is zero.

This mission formalizes the number of refinement calls made by that loop. It builds on the related Goldberg–Tarjan 1988 max-flow and 1989 minimum-mean cycle-canceling series: those develop different algorithms for network flow, while the published 1989 circulation and approximate-optimality definitions provide this mission's common network model. The result here concerns successive approximation and its fixed-arc progress measure.

Network and approximate optimality

The vertex set VVV is finite, with n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣, and EEE is a symmetric set of directed arcs, with m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣. Symmetry means that (v,w)∈E(v,w)\in E(v,w)∈E brings (w,v)∈E(w,v)\in E(w,v)∈E too. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and a real cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w); costs obey c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A circulation fff obeys f(v,w)≤u(v,w)f(v,w)\le u(v,w)f(v,w)≤u(v,w), f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v), and conservation of flow at every vertex. Its total cost is half the sum of c(v,w)f(v,w)c(v,w)f(v,w)c(v,w)f(v,w) over directed arcs, since each unordered edge appears twice. A minimum-cost circulation costs no more than any other circulation of the network.

The residual capacity is uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). For a price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R, the report writes the reduced cost as cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A circulation is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. It is ε\varepsilonε-optimal if some price function works, where ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0. The tight error ε(f)\varepsilon(f)ε(f) is the least such error. A circulation is ε\varepsilonε-tight when it is ε\varepsilonε-optimal but fails to be ε′\varepsilon'ε′-optimal at every ε′<ε\varepsilon'<\varepsilonε′<ε. This includes attainment at ε\varepsilonε.

An arc is ε\varepsilonε-fixed if all ε\varepsilonε-optimal circulations carry the same flow through it. Write FεF_\varepsilonFε​ for the set of these arcs. Theorem 4.2 supplies an arc-fixing criterion from a large absolute reduced cost. Lemma 4.4 says that when a positive tight error falls by a factor of 2n2n2n, FεF_\varepsilonFε​ becomes strictly larger. Both are numbered results on printed pages 16–17 of the source report's journal counterpart.

Formalization targets

The goal is the circulation-level form of Theorem 4.5. Begin with a circulation f0f_0f0​ and a sequence f0,f1,…f_0,f_1,\ldotsf0​,f1​,… whose positive-error steps satisfy the contract of Figure 3: if ε(fk)>0\varepsilon(f_k)>0ε(fk​)>0, the next circulation is ε(fk)/2\varepsilon(f_k)/2ε(fk​)/2-optimal. With the report's standing n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and m≥n−1m\ge n-1m≥n−1, the target is

∃k≤m⌈log⁡2(2n)⌉:ε(fk)=0andfk is minimum-cost.\exists k\le m\left\lceil\log_2(2n)\right\rceil:\quad \varepsilon(f_k)=0\quad\text{and}\quad f_k\text{ is minimum-cost}.∃k≤m⌈log2​(2n)⌉:ε(fk​)=0andfk​ is minimum-cost.

The milestone list contains the already proved complementary-slackness characterization of minimum cost (Theorem 2.2), the cross-parameter arc-fixing result (Theorem 4.2), and strict growth of fixed arcs (Lemma 4.4). The report states Theorem 4.5 as O(mlog⁡n)O(m\log n)O(mlogn) iterations when each refinement decreases error by a constant factor. The target makes explicit the factor two used by the paper's refinements and the resulting finite count.

What the result establishes

The theorem gives a bound on the number of refinement calls that depends on the number of vertices and arcs, not on the magnitude, precision, or integrality of the costs. It gives an exact minimum-cost circulation rather than an arbitrary small-error approximation. This distinguishes the real-cost loop from an integer-cost stopping rule based on 1/n1/n1/n. The bound counts refinement calls only; the report analyzes the work within particular implementations separately.

The published 1989 definitions and the complementary-slackness theorem already have machine-checked status on the platform. Theorem 4.2, Lemma 4.4, and this iteration theorem are the open formalization targets. A complete development will connect the tight error to residual-cycle structure, establish that its infimum is attained for circulations, and prove that zero tight error implies minimum cost. The mission thereby makes the fixed-arc argument reusable for other circulation algorithms that lower an approximate-optimality parameter.

Why the bound needs more than repeated halving

Repeatedly dividing a positive real error by two gives errors approaching zero, but it does not by itself produce a finite step with zero error. The missing finite progress is structural: an arc must become fixed after enough reductions, and only finitely many arcs exist. Proving that fixedness is strict is delicate because it compares all circulations at two different error levels, not just two consecutive flows. Theorem 4.2 is the quantitative bridge between a price certificate for one flow and agreement of an arc across every sufficiently accurate flow. At the boundary ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0, the printed wording of Lemma 4.4 would require F0F_0F0​ to be a proper subset of itself, so its positive-error regime must be made explicit.

Formalization scope

The Lean network uses CycleCanceling.MinMean.CircNetwork with a finite vertex type, a finite symmetric arc set, and real-valued capacities, costs, and flows. Off-arc values of these functions are irrelevant. The report assumes m≥n−1≥1m\ge n-1\ge1m≥n−1≥1 on printed page 5; the theorem binders express it as n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and m≥n−1m\ge n-1m≥n−1. The arc count is for ordered arcs, exactly as the report defines mmm. No integrality, rounding, or bounded-cost hypothesis is imposed. A feasible initial circulation is required because Figure 3 starts from one; infeasibility detection is outside this target.

The reused 1989 definitions write reduced cost as c(v,w)+p(v)−p(w)c(v,w)+p(v)-p(w)c(v,w)+p(v)−p(w). Substituting −p-p−p for ppp gives the report's c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w), so existential price certificates, ε\varepsilonε-optimality, and absolute reduced-cost conditions agree. The tight error is represented by a real infimum; proving that it is attained is part of the work. The set FεF_\varepsilonFε​ is filtered from EEE and includes only arcs whose flow is shared by all ε\varepsilonε-optimal circulations. The halving run computes its error from the current circulation; it does not take an unrelated error sequence. Once that error is zero, the loop has returned and later sequence entries are unconstrained. These choices exclude a vacuous or artificially fixed error parameter and a preselected optimal flow.

The explicit reading of the report's asymptotic count is t=⌈log⁡2(2n)⌉t=\lceil\log_2(2n)\rceilt=⌈log2​(2n)⌉ halvings per factor-2n2n2n reduction and at most mmm such blocks, giving mtm tmt refinements. This is a statement about refinement count, not a RAM-operation bound. Contributions on Theorem 4.2, the residual-cycle characterization of positive tight error, the fixed-arc strictness lemma, and the final finite counting argument all support the goal. The circulation, price, and fixed-arc infrastructure can be reused beyond this particular implementation.

Selected references

  • A. V. Goldberg and R. E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987; journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI: 10.1287/moor.15.3.430. The mission's page and theorem indices refer to the 1987 report.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem: An Upper Semi-Continuous Map with Nonempty Closed Convex Values on a Bounded Closed Convex Set in Euclidean Space Has a Fixed PointResearch Paper

Motivation

Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that a continuous map of a closed simplex into itself has a fixed point. Many existence questions in game theory and mathematical economics produce instead a point-to-set mapping: to each point xxx it assigns a whole set Φ(x)\Phi(x)Φ(x) of admissible responses, for instance the set of best replies of a player to the others' strategies. Such a set need not be a single point, and no continuous single-valued selection need exist. Kakutani's 1941 note, A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem, gives the fixed point theorem for this setting, and shows on the same three pages that it implies two results of J. von Neumann: an intersection theorem for two closed subsets of a product of convex sets, and the minimax theorem.

Timeline, as the paper records it:

  • 1912–1929: Brouwer's theorem; the paper cites the proof of Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz (Fund. Math. 14, 1929).
  • 1928: von Neumann proves the minimax theorem for matrix games (Math. Ann. 100).
  • 1937: von Neumann proves the intersection theorem (Kakutani's Theorem 2) in his paper on an economic equilibrium system, "by using a notion of integral in Euclidean spaces".
  • 1941: Kakutani proves Theorem 1 (simplex), the Corollary (bounded closed convex sets), and derives Theorems 2 and 3 from it.
  • 1950: Nash's existence proof for equilibrium points of nnn-person games applies Kakutani's theorem (PNAS 36).

Setting

Let E=RmE=\mathbb R^mE=Rm with its Euclidean norm, and let S⊆ES\subseteq ES⊆E. Kakutani writes R(S)\mathfrak R(S)R(S) for the family of all closed convex subsets of SSS; as printed, it contains the empty set. A point-to-set mapping of SSS into R(S)\mathfrak R(S)R(S) assigns to each x∈Sx\in Sx∈S a closed convex set Φ(x)⊆S\Phi(x)\subseteq SΦ(x)⊆S.

Φ\PhiΦ is upper semi-continuous (in the paper's sense) when

xn∈S,xn→x0∈S,yn∈Φ(xn),yn→y0⟹y0∈Φ(x0).x_n\in S,\quad x_n\to x_0\in S,\quad y_n\in\Phi(x_n),\quad y_n\to y_0\quad\Longrightarrow\quad y_0\in\Phi(x_0).xn​∈S,xn​→x0​∈S,yn​∈Φ(xn​),yn​→y0​⟹y0​∈Φ(x0​).

This is a sequential closed-graph condition. The paper remarks that for a closed SSS it is equivalent to the graph {(x,y):x∈S, y∈Φ(x)}\{(x,y):x\in S,\ y\in\Phi(x)\}{(x,y):x∈S, y∈Φ(x)} being closed in S×SS\times SS×S.

An rrr-dimensional closed simplex is the convex hull of r+1r+1r+1 affinely independent points of EEE. A fixed point of Φ\PhiΦ is a point x0∈Sx_0\in Sx0​∈S with x0∈Φ(x0)x_0\in\Phi(x_0)x0​∈Φ(x0​).

Formalization targets

Goal: the Corollary (p. 458)

Let S⊆RmS\subseteq\mathbb R^mS⊆Rm be nonempty, bounded, closed and convex, and let Φ\PhiΦ be upper semi-continuous on SSS with every value Φ(x)\Phi(x)Φ(x), x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, a nonempty closed convex subset of SSS. Then

∃ x0∈S:x0∈Φ(x0).\exists\,x_0\in S:\qquad x_0\in\Phi(x_0).∃x0​∈S:x0​∈Φ(x0​).

Milestones

  1. Brouwer's fixed point theorem (§1, p. 457) — a published, proved platform theorem, referenced.
  2. Approximation step of the proof of Theorem 1 (pp. 457–458): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are a point xxx of the simplex, points x0,…,xrx_0,\dots,x_rx0​,…,xr​ within ε\varepsilonε of xxx, selections yi∈Φ(xi)y_i\in\Phi(x_i)yi​∈Φ(xi​) and weights λ∈Δr\lambda\in\Delta_rλ∈Δr​ with x=∑iλixi=∑iλiyix=\sum_i\lambda_ix_i=\sum_i\lambda_iy_ix=∑i​λi​xi​=∑i​λi​yi​.
  3. Limit step of the proof of Theorem 1 (p. 458): such data for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, on a compact SSS, force a fixed point.
  4. Theorem 1 (p. 457): the fixed point statement for an rrr-dimensional closed simplex.
  5. Enclosing simplex (proof of the Corollary, p. 458): every bounded subset of Rm\mathbb R^mRm lies in an mmm-dimensional closed simplex S′S'S′.
  6. Retraction (proof of the Corollary, p. 458): a continuous map of S′S'S′ into SSS fixing SSS.
  7. Composition (proof of the Corollary, p. 458): x↦Φ(ψ(x))x\mapsto\Phi(\psi(x))x↦Φ(ψ(x)) is upper semi-continuous on S′S'S′ with values in R(S)⊆R(S′)\mathfrak R(S)\subseteq\mathfrak R(S')R(S)⊆R(S′).
  8. Closed-graph equivalence (§1, p. 457), for closed SSS and Φ(x)⊆S\Phi(x)\subseteq SΦ(x)⊆S.
  9. Theorem 2 (p. 458, von Neumann's intersection theorem): if K⊆RmK\subseteq\mathbb R^mK⊆Rm, L⊆RnL\subseteq\mathbb R^nL⊆Rn are bounded closed convex, K≠∅K\neq\emptysetK=∅, and U,V⊆K×LU,V\subseteq K\times LU,V⊆K×L are closed with all sections Ux0⊆LU_{x_0}\subseteq LUx0​​⊆L, Vy0⊆KV_{y_0}\subseteq KVy0​​⊆K nonempty, closed and convex, then U∩V≠∅U\cap V\neq\emptysetU∩V=∅.

Milestones 8 and 9 stand off the goal's proof path: the paper proves Theorem 2 from the Corollary, using milestone 8 to check upper semi-continuity.

Significance

The Corollary is the form in which Kakutani's theorem is used: existence of equilibrium points in nnn-person games (Nash), of competitive equilibria (Arrow–Debreu), and of solutions of generalized games and variational inequalities all reduce to a fixed point of a point-to-set mapping with nonempty closed convex values on a compact convex set. Theorem 2 in turn gives the minimax theorem (the paper's Theorem 3) in a few lines.

The results are classical and their proofs are known; what is missing is a machine-checked version. Mathlib does not contain Kakutani's theorem, and on Prove2Me the theorem is not posed. Brouwer's theorem is proved on the platform (AGT.brouwer_fixed_point) and enters as a reference milestone. Theorem 3 is already proved on the platform as a special case of Sion's minimax theorem (FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem, Mathlib's Sion.minimax) and is therefore not posed here. A related open platform statement, Debreu's 1952 fixed point lemma for a contractible polyhedron with contractible values and a closed graph (SocialEquilibrium.Existence.fixed_point_of_contractible_polyhedron), generalizes Theorem 1 on polyhedra but not the Corollary, since a bounded closed convex set need not be a polyhedron. Once proved, the goal is the standard entry point for formalized equilibrium existence results.

Difficulty

Brouwer's theorem needs a continuous single-valued map, and a point-to-set mapping with closed convex values need not admit a continuous selection: the mapping on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] equal to {1}\{1\}{1} for x<0x<0x<0, [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] at 000 and {−1}\{-1\}{−1} for x>0x>0x>0 is upper semi-continuous and has none. So the obvious route, select and apply Brouwer, fails; any proof must pass through approximations and a limit in which the graph condition and the convexity of the limiting value both enter. The approximation step needs a family of triangulations of the simplex with mesh tending to zero, which Mathlib does not provide. The transfer from a simplex to a general convex set needs a continuous retraction, which uses convexity and closedness of SSS in Euclidean space.

Formalization scope

  • The ambient space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m), m=0m=0m=0 included. A point-to-set mapping is a total function Φ : E → Set E; only its values on SSS are constrained.
  • IsClosedConvexSubset S A is the paper's A∈R(S)A\in\mathfrak R(S)A∈R(S) (A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S, closed, convex) and admits A=∅A=\emptysetA=∅ as printed. Nonemptiness of the values (and of SSS, and of KKK in Theorem 2) is a separate, labelled hypothesis: with Φ≡∅\Phi\equiv\emptysetΦ≡∅, or S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅, the printed hypotheses hold and there is no fixed point, while the paper's proof picks "an arbitrary point yny^nyn from Φ(xn)\Phi(x^n)Φ(xn)".
  • IsUpperSemicontinuous S Φ is the paper's sequential condition, with sequences in SSS and limit x0∈Sx_0\in Sx0​∈S. It is not Berge's open-neighbourhood upper hemicontinuity.
  • Explicit readings of loose phrases: "the nnn-th barycentric simplicial subdivision" becomes "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0" with the selected vertices within ε\varepsilonε of the point (no subdivision is built into the statement); "it is clear that … converges" becomes compactness of SSS in the limit step; "take a closed simplex S′S'S′ which contains SSS" becomes an mmm-dimensional affinely independent hull; "a continuous retracting point-to-point mapping" becomes ContinuousOn ψ S', MapsTo ψ S' S and ψ x = x on SSS; "clearly an upper semi-continuous point-to-set mapping of S′S'S′ into R(S)⊆R(S′)\mathfrak R(S)\subseteq\mathfrak R(S')R(S)⊆R(S′)" is stated as three conclusions; "closed subset of S×SS\times SS×S" is closedness in E×EE\times EE×E (the same for closed SSS); U⋅VU\cdot VU⋅V is U∩VU\cap VU∩V; "K×LK\times LK×L in Rm+nR^{m+n}Rm+n" is the product Rm×Rn\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^nRm×Rn.
  • A trivializing formalization would allow empty values, an empty domain, a degenerate simplex, or approximation data for a single coarse ε\varepsilonε; each is excluded by the statements as written.
  • Infrastructure a complete development needs: barycentric subdivisions or another construction of approximate fixed points; nearest-point projection onto closed convex sets in Euclidean space; transport of the Corollary to Rm×Rn\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^nRm×Rn for Theorem 2. The two definitions are generic and reusable for any later set-valued existence result. Proofs by any faithful route are welcome, including a route through Brouwer's theorem and a continuous approximate selection.

Selected references

  • S. Kakutani, A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem, Duke Math. J. 8 (1941), 457–459. https://doi.org/10.1215/s0012-7094-41-00838-4
  • B. Knaster, C. Kuratowski, S. Mazurkiewicz, Ein Beweis des Fixpunktsatzes für n-dimensionale Simplexe, Fund. Math. 14 (1929), 132–137. https://doi.org/10.4064/fm-14-1-132-137
  • J. von Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Math. Ann. 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • J. von Neumann, Über ein ökonomisches Gleichungssystem und eine Verallgemeinerung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes, Ergebnisse eines Math. Kolloquiums 8 (1937), 73–83.
  • J. F. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), 48–49. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
  • M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific J. Math. 8 (1958), 171–176. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts I: The Newsvendor Quantity-Flexibility Contract (w_q(δ), δ) Gives the Retailer at Least Π(q°) at δ = 0, the Supplier at Least Π(q°) at δ = 1Textbook

Why contracts in a newsvendor supply chain

A supplier sells to a retailer who must order before a single selling season with random demand. Each firm maximizes its own expected profit, and with the simplest contract, a fixed wholesale price per unit, the retailer orders too little: he bears all the risk of unsold stock but earns only part of the margin on each sale. The supply chain as a whole then earns less than it could. A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the chain-optimal actions are an equilibrium of the two firms' game. Which contracts coordinate, and how they divide the chain's profit, is the subject of a large literature in operations management. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter in the Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Cachon 2003) gives its standard account. This mission formalizes §6.2 of that chapter, Coordinating the newsvendor, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003).

Timeline of the contracts treated in §6.2:

  • Pasternack (1985) shows that buy-back (returns) contracts coordinate the newsvendor.
  • Tsay (1999) and Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility contracts, in which the supplier refunds unsold units up to a fraction δ of the order.
  • Cachon and Lariviere (2005, working paper 2000) analyze revenue sharing and show it is equivalent to buy back in the newsvendor.
  • Taylor (2002) studies sales rebates. Moorthy (1987) and Kolay and Shaffer (2002) treat quantity discounts.

Setting

Demand D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 has distribution function FFF, with Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F and mean μ=E[D]\mu = E[D]μ=E[D]. The retail price is ppp. The supplier's unit production cost is csc_scs​ and the retailer's unit cost is crc_rcr​, with c=cs+cr<pc = c_s + c_r < pc=cs​+cr​<p. Unmet demand costs the retailer a goodwill penalty grg_rgr​ per unit and the supplier gsg_sgs​, with g=gs+grg = g_s + g_rg=gs​+gr​. Each unsold unit is worth v<cv < cv<c to the retailer.

Expected sales are S(q)=E[min⁡(q,D)]S(q) = E[\min(q, D)]S(q)=E[min(q,D)], leftover inventory is I(q)=E[(q−D)+]I(q) = E[(q - D)^+]I(q)=E[(q−D)+] and lost sales are L(q)=E[(D−q)+]L(q) = E[(D - q)^+]L(q)=E[(D−q)+]. If TTT is the expected payment from the retailer to the supplier, the firms earn

πr(q)=(p−v+gr)S(q)−(cr−v)q−grμ−T,πs(q)=gsS(q)−csq−gsμ+T,\pi_r(q) = (p - v + g_r)S(q) - (c_r - v)q - g_r\mu - T, \qquad \pi_s(q) = g_sS(q) - c_sq - g_s\mu + T,πr​(q)=(p−v+gr​)S(q)−(cr​−v)q−gr​μ−T,πs​(q)=gs​S(q)−cs​q−gs​μ+T,

and the chain earns Π(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ\Pi(q) = (p - v + g)S(q) - (c - v)q - g\muΠ(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ. Let qoq^oqo be a maximizer of Π\PiΠ, with Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0.

Under the quantity flexibility contract (wq,δ)(w_q, \delta)(wq​,δ) the retailer pays wqw_qwq​ per unit ordered and is refunded wq+cr−vw_q + c_r - vwq​+cr​−v for each unsold unit, up to δq\delta qδq units:

Tq(q,wq,δ)=wqq−(wq+cr−v)∫(1−δ)qqF(y) dy.T_q(q, w_q, \delta) = w_qq - (w_q + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F(y)\,dy.Tq​(q,wq​,δ)=wq​q−(wq​+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)qq​F(y)dy.

The wholesale price that makes qoq^oqo satisfy the retailer's first-order condition is

wq(δ)=(p−v+gr) Fˉ(qo)Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)−cr+v.w_q(\delta) = \frac{(p - v + g_r)\,\bar F(q^o)}{\bar F(q^o) + (1-\delta)F((1-\delta)q^o)} - c_r + v.wq​(δ)=Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)​−cr​+v.

Formalization targets

Goal: the quantity flexibility contract can split the profit in any way

With πr(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_r(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πr​(q,wq​(δ),δ) and πs(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_s(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πs​(q,wq​(δ),δ) the firms' profits under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ):

πr(qo,wq(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo),\pi_r(q^o, w_q(0), 0) = \Pi(q^o) + g_s\big(\mu - S(q^o) + \bar F(q^o)q^o\big) \ge \Pi(q^o),πr​(qo,wq​(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs​(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo), πs(qo,wq(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr≥Π(qo),\pi_s(q^o, w_q(1), 1) = \Pi(q^o) + \mu g_r \ge \Pi(q^o),πs​(qo,wq​(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr​≥Π(qo),

and for every a∈[0,Π(qo)]a \in [0, \Pi(q^o)]a∈[0,Π(qo)] some δ∈[0,1]\delta \in [0,1]δ∈[0,1] gives the retailer aaa and the supplier Π(qo)−a\Pi(q^o) - aΠ(qo)−a (§6.2.5, p. 25).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F, I(q)=q−S(q)I(q) = q - S(q)I(q)=q−S(q), L(q)=μ−S(q)L(q) = \mu - S(q)L(q)=μ−S(q) (p. 10).
  2. The unique maximizer qoq^oqo of Π\PiΠ satisfies Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g)\bar F(q^o) = (c - v)/(p - v + g)Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g) (Eq. (2), p. 11).
  3. wq(0)=(p−v+gr)Fˉ(qo)+v−crw_q(0) = (p - v + g_r)\bar F(q^o) + v - c_rwq​(0)=(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)+v−cr​ and wq(1)=p+gr−crw_q(1) = p + g_r - c_rwq​(1)=p+gr​−cr​. Also, wqw_qwq​ is increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1], which gives v−cr≤wq(δ)≤p+gr−crv - c_r \le w_q(\delta) \le p + g_r - c_rv−cr​≤wq​(δ)≤p+gr​−cr​ (p. 24).
  4. qoq^oqo maximizes the retailer's profit under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ) (Eq. (11), p. 24).
  5. The supplier's first-order condition holds at qoq^oqo (p. 25).
  6. The δ = 0 identity and the δ = 1 identity (p. 25).

Companion results of §6.2

  • Revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r,\phi\}{wr​,ϕ} equals the buy back wb=wr+(1−ϕ)pw_b = w_r + (1-\phi)pwb​=wr​+(1−ϕ)p, b=(1−ϕ)(p−v)b = (1-\phi)(p - v)b=(1−ϕ)(p−v) for every demand realization (p. 22).
  • The sales rebate contract: first-order condition (12), price (13), the retailer's profit and its monotonicity in the threshold (p. 27), and failure under voluntary compliance (p. 28).
  • The quantity discount gives the retailer πr=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−grμ\pi_r = \lambda(\Pi(q) + g\mu) - g_r\muπr​=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−gr​μ, so qoq^oqo is optimal for both firms (p. 29).
  • Under the wholesale price contract, the retailer's profit increases in the induced quantity (p. 14).

Significance

The goal is what makes quantity flexibility a complete coordinating family. Retailer optimality (milestone 4) says qoq^oqo can be implemented. The allocation statement says that bargaining power can then be expressed through the single parameter δ without losing efficiency. Together with the supplier's first-order condition, these are the facts that matter in practice: forced compliance suffices for coordination, and the choice of δ is purely distributional. The companions put §6.2's other contracts on the same footing. Revenue sharing and buy back are equivalent. Sales rebates coordinate only with forced compliance. Quantity discounts coordinate with a bounded retailer share.

All of these results are stated in the source. Related results are Proved on the platform in Snyder and Shen's chapter (SupplyChainTheory.*), including the chain-optimal fractile and retailer optimality under quantity flexibility. This mission states them locally because Snyder and Shen's contract data impose stronger restrictions on salvage value than Cachon's model. The efficiency formula (k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2)(k+1)^{-(1+1/k)}(k+2)(k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2) for the power distribution on p. 14 is already posed as the Open item RevShareCoord.Wholesale.alpha_family_efficiency and is not posed again.

Difficulty

Each identity is elementary algebra once SSS, its derivative and the integrals of FFF are under control. That is where the work lies. Expected sales are defined as an expectation, so S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F is a theorem to prove, not a definition to unfold.

Differentiating ∫(1−δ)qqF\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F∫(1−δ)qq​F needs continuity of FFF at two points. The sales rebate transfer is piecewise and has a kink at the threshold, so derivatives must be taken on the right side of it.

The allocation clause rests on continuity of δ ↦ π_r(q^o, w_q(δ), δ). The obvious argument, "the profits are continuous in δ", hides two facts. First, the denominator of wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) stays positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Second, F((1−δ)qo)F((1-\delta)q^o)F((1−δ)qo) moves continuously, which fails for a demand law with atoms. Both must be derived from the model, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The local ContractData follows Cachon's v<cs+crv<c_s+c_rv<cs​+cr​ and cs+cr<pc_s+c_r<pcs​+cr​<p. Its rrr is Cachon's price ppp, and its ps,prp_s,p_rps​,pr​ are the goodwill penalties gs,grg_s,g_rgs​,gr​. The penalties are nonnegative costs. Net salvage may be negative and may exceed crc_rcr​; both possibilities were excluded by the related published model.

A demand law is a probability measure on ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty, 0)(−∞,0), finite mean and no atoms (so FFF is continuous). FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) as long as F<1F < 1F<1. Its derivative is specified on the positive interior of that active support. This reading admits the bounded-support power law the chapter itself uses on p. 14, whose cdf has a corner at the support endpoint. Derivative conclusions use HasDerivAt.

Optimality is IsMaxOn … Set.univ over real quantities; the optimum is positive under the model assumptions. Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0 is a hypothesis wherever an optimum is named, following p. 11.

Cachon's sales rebate rrr is rebate in Lean.

Three printed slips are corrected, and the milestone quotes keep the print:

  • p. 24 writes www for wqw_qwq​ in TqT_qTq​.
  • p. 25 mixes qqq and qoq^oqo in the δ = 0 and δ = 1 displays.
  • p. 28 has a spurious −v-v−v in ws(r)−rw_s(r) - rws​(r)−r.

Two encodings are ruled out. wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) is the explicit formula, never "the solution of (11)". The supplier's profit is the model's own function, not Π\PiΠ minus the retailer's profit, so no clause holds by definition.

The local definition file CachonCoord.Newsvendor.Contracts contains the model, its expected profits, the contract transfers, the sales rebate price ws(r)w_s(r)ws​(r), the quantity discount schedule, and realized profits and payments. Lemmas about SSS, ∫F\int F∫F and continuity of contract prices are reusable across the series. The sales rebate existence-of-threshold argument and the normal-distribution counterexample of p. 25 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in OR & MS Vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003 (3rd draft, Jan. 2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • A. A. Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier–customer incentives, Management Science 45(10), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Graph TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows I: A Minimum-Cost Flow Exists iff Every Simple Circulation Has Nonnegative Cost, and Then an Extreme One Exists (Theorem 1)Research Paper

Why minimum-concave-cost flows

Many network design and production–distribution problems have economies of scale: shipping twice as much along an arc costs less than twice as much, because of fixed charges, set-up costs or volume discounts. Modelled as network flows, such problems ask for a flow of least cost when each arc cost is a concave function of the flow on the arc. Classical instances include the uncapacitated lot-sizing problem, the fixed-charge transportation problem, and the Steiner tree problem in graphs. Unlike linear costs, concave costs make the problem NP-hard in general, and the usual linear-programming arguments do not apply directly.

Erickson, Monma and Veinott (Math. Oper. Res. 12 (1987) 634–664) give the send-and-split method, a dynamic program that solves such problems in time exponential only in the number of demand nodes. Before the method can run, two questions must be settled: when does a minimum-cost flow exist at all, and can the arc costs be shifted so that they are nonnegative on flows? Theorem 1 of the paper answers both. This mission formalizes Theorem 1.

Timeline. Hirsch and Hoffman (1961) showed that a concave function bounded below on a polyhedron's extreme rays attains its minimum at a vertex; Rockafellar's Convex Analysis (1970, pp. 61, 343) gives the polyhedral form. Edmonds and Karp (1972) showed how to choose node potentials making linear arc costs nonnegative. Theorem 1 (1987) extends both to additive concave costs on uncapacitated networks.

Setting

A graph G=(N,A)G = (N, A)G=(N,A) has nnn nodes and a set AAA of ordered pairs of distinct nodes, the arcs. A demand vector r∈Rnr \in \mathbb{R}^nr∈Rn assigns a demand rir_iri​ to each node (negative demands are supplies). A preflow is a nonnegative matrix x=(xij)x = (x_{ij})x=(xij​) carried by the arcs, and a flow for rrr is a preflow with

∑(j,i)∈Axji−∑(i,k)∈Axik=ri(i∈N),\sum_{(j,i)\in A} x_{ji} - \sum_{(i,k)\in A} x_{ik} = r_i \qquad (i \in N),(j,i)∈A∑​xji​−(i,k)∈A∑​xik​=ri​(i∈N),

inflow minus outflow equal to demand. A circulation is a flow for r=0r = 0r=0.

The flow cost is c(x)=∑(i,j)∈Acij(xij)c(x) = \sum_{(i,j)\in A} c_{ij}(x_{ij})c(x)=∑(i,j)∈A​cij​(xij​), where each cijc_{ij}cij​ is concave on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0. A minimum-cost flow for rrr is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for rrr.

A preflow induces the subgraph of arcs with nonzero flow. An extreme flow is a flow whose induced subgraph is a forest (in the undirected sense; two antiparallel arcs form a cycle). A simple circuit is a directed cycle through at least two distinct nodes, with arc set CCC; a simple circulation is a circulation whose induced subgraph is a simple circuit. The slope at infinity c˙ij(∞)∈[−∞,∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty) \in [-\infty, \infty)c˙ij​(∞)∈[−∞,∞) is the limit of the right derivative of cijc_{ij}cij​.

Two nodes are in the same strong component if chains (directed walks) join them both ways; a component is a sink if no chain leaves it. The augmented graph G‾\underline{G}G​ appends a node ν\nuν and an arc (i,ν)(i,\nu)(i,ν) for exactly one node iii of each sink component. Its arc costs c‾\underline{c}c​ are c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) on arcs inside strong components and arbitrary real numbers elsewhere; π‾i\underline{\pi}_iπ​i​ is the infimum of the costs of chains from iii to ν\nuν. For π∈Rn\pi \in \mathbb{R}^nπ∈Rn, the altered costs are cijπ(y)=cij(y)−(πi−πj)yc^\pi_{ij}(y) = c_{ij}(y) - (\pi_i - \pi_j) ycijπ​(y)=cij​(y)−(πi​−πj​)y.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

The following are equivalent:

1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈Cc˙ij(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G‾ to ν under c‾.\begin{aligned} &1^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;}\\ &2^\circ\ \text{the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;}\\ &3^\circ\ \text{for every } r \text{ with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for } r \text{ is extreme;}\\ &4^\circ\ c(y) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circulation } y;\\ &5^\circ\ \textstyle\sum_{(i,j)\in C} \dot c_{ij}(\infty) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circuit with arc set } C;\\ &6^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of } \underline{G} \text{ to } \nu \text{ under } \underline{c}. \end{aligned}​1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈C​c˙ij​(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G​ to ν under c​.​

If moreover rrr admits a flow and c‾ijz≤cij(z)\underline{c}_{ij} z \le c_{ij}(z)c​ij​z≤cij​(z) on arcs joining distinct strong components, where z=∑iri+z = \sum_i r_i^+z=∑i​ri+​, they are equivalent to

7∘∃π  cijπ(xij)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,7^\circ\quad \exists \pi\ \ c^\pi_{ij}(x_{ij}) \ge 0 \text{ for all arcs } (i,j) \text{ and all flows } x \text{ for } r,7∘∃π  cijπ​(xij​)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,

and π=π‾\pi = \underline{\pi}π=π​ is real and satisfies 7∘7^\circ7∘.

Milestones

The milestones are the statements the paper's proof rests on: the Hirsch–Hoffman extension (p. 638), cπ(x)=c(x)+∑iπiric^\pi(x) = c(x) + \sum_i \pi_i r_icπ(x)=c(x)+∑i​πi​ri​, the bounds 12c(2x)+12c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy)\tfrac12 c(2x) + \tfrac12 c(2\theta y) \le c(x+\theta y) \le c(x) + c(\theta y)21​c(2x)+21​c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy), the circuit-wise form of 4° ⇔ 5°, uniqueness of the extreme circulation, xij≤zx_{ij} \le zxij​≤z between strong components, and the two inequalities giving 7∘7^\circ7∘ (all p. 639).

Significance

Theorem 1 decides existence of an optimum from the costs alone: conditions 4° and 5° do not mention the demand vector, so one test settles every demand pattern at once, and 3° guarantees the optimum may be sought among extreme (forest) flows, which is what the send-and-split recursion enumerates. Condition 6° is checkable by a shortest-chain computation, and 7° supplies node potentials that convert the instance into an equivalent one with nonnegative arc costs, the standing assumption of the paper's Theorem 2 and of its running-time analysis. For linear costs the theorem reduces to the familiar statement that a minimum-cost flow exists iff no simple circuit has negative cost.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been machine-checked. The formalization adds a precise model of extreme flows over arcs (so that antiparallel arcs form a cycle), a treatment of slopes that may equal −∞-\infty−∞, and the Hirsch–Hoffman extension specialized to network polyhedra, which the paper cites rather than proves. Related platform items cover the linear, capacitated case: CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_no_negative_cycle and CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_exists_price (Goldberg–Tarjan), and LinearOptimization.positive_directed_cycle_of_circulation and LinearOptimization.network_basic_iff_tree on a different arc encoding.

Difficulty

The first idea, to argue as for linear costs by cancelling negative cycles, fails because concave costs are not additive along cycle decompositions: the cost of a flow is not the sum of the costs of its cycle and path components, and a circuit can be harmless at small flow and arbitrarily negative at large flow. Existence therefore depends on the asymptotic slopes c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞), which may be −∞-\infty−∞, rather than on any finite cost evaluation. The implication from bounded rays to an attained minimum (Hirsch–Hoffman) requires identifying the vertices of the flow polyhedron with forest flows and its extreme rays with simple circulations. The potential step 6° ⇒ 7° needs a cost bound on arcs between strong components, where the concave cost is only controlled up to the total positive demand zzz.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; a graph is ArcGraph n, a Finset (Fin n × Fin n) of arcs without loops. Preflows are real matrices vanishing off the arcs; arc costs are functions R→R\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R→R, concave on Set.Ici 0 with value 000 at 000 (the paper's "without further mention" assumption, made a hypothesis). The augmented graph has nodes Option (Fin n), with none the node ν\nuν; chain costs, c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) and π‾\underline{\pi}π​ are EReal-valued.

The explicit readings of loose phrases are:

  • "minimum-cost flow" is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for the same demands (attained, never an infimum);
  • "bounded below on each half-line" is ∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy)\exists M\ \forall \theta \ge 0,\ M \le c(x+\theta y)∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy);
  • c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) is the infimum over t>0t > 0t>0 of the right derivative at ttt, equal to the limit by concavity;
  • "chain" is a directed walk; "minimum-cost chain" is a chain of real cost at most every chain's cost;
  • 6° quantifies over every admissible choice of the appended arcs and of the finite costs c‾\underline{c}c​;
  • in the 7° part, "flows xxx" are flows for the given rrr, and the existence of such a flow is an added hypothesis: without it 7° is vacuous while 4° can fail;
  • "π‾\underline{\pi}π​ satisfies 7°" uses the real values of π‾\underline{\pi}π​, which the theorem asserts are real.

A formalization in which extreme flows are forests of a simple graph built from the support, in which chains are simple paths, or in which a chain of cost −∞-\infty−∞ counts as a minimum would make 3°, 6° or the equivalence trivially or falsely true; all three are ruled out by the definitions. The running-time remarks, the computation paragraph and the linear-cost remark after the proof are not formalized. Contributions are welcome on the polyhedral side (vertices and extreme rays of {x≥0:conservation}\{x \ge 0 : \text{conservation}\}{x≥0:conservation}), on right derivatives of concave functions at infinity, and on walk costs with negative cycles; all are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. E. Erickson, C. L. Monma, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(4), 1987, 634–664. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.4.634
  • W. M. Hirsch, A. J. Hoffman, Extreme varieties, concave functions, and the fixed charge problem, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 14, 1961, 355–369. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160140312
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • J. Edmonds, R. M. Karp, Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems, Journal of the ACM 19(2), 1972, 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Numerically Stable Dual Method for Solving Strictly Convex Quadratic Programs: The Dual Algorithm Solves the QP or Detects Its Infeasibility in Finitely Many StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Strictly convex quadratic programs — minimize a positive definite quadratic subject to linear inequalities — are the subproblems solved at every iteration of successive quadratic programming (SQP) methods for nonlinear optimization, and they arise directly in least-squares estimation with constraints, portfolio selection and model predictive control. In SQP the unconstrained minimizer of the quadratic model is available at no cost, while a feasible point is not.

D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani (Math. Programming 27 (1983) 1–33) proposed a dual active-set method that exploits this asymmetry. It starts at the unconstrained minimizer, which is optimal for the problem with all constraints removed, and adds violated constraints one at a time while keeping the current point optimal for the subproblem defined by the current active set. No phase 1 is needed. The method, usually called the Goldfarb–Idnani algorithm, is the basis of widely used solvers (for example the quadprog package in R and QuadProg++), and the paper proves that it terminates finitely with a correct answer.

Earlier dual methods for quadratic programming include the modified-simplex methods of Lemke (Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453) and of Van de Panne and Whinston (1964), which the paper compares with its own in Section 7.

Setting

Fix n,m∈Nn, m \in \mathbb Nn,m∈N, a vector a∈Rna \in \mathbb R^na∈Rn, a symmetric positive definite n×nn\times nn×n matrix GGG, an n×mn\times mn×m matrix CCC with columns n1,…,nmn_1,\dots,n_mn1​,…,nm​, and b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The quadratic program (1.1) is

min⁡x f(x)=aTx+12xTGxsubject tosi(x)=niTx−bi≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.\min_x\ f(x) = a^{\mathsf T}x + \tfrac12 x^{\mathsf T}Gx \quad\text{subject to}\quad s_i(x) = n_i^{\mathsf T}x - b_i \ge 0,\quad i \in K = \{1,\dots,m\}.xmin​ f(x)=aTx+21​xTGxsubject tosi​(x)=niT​x−bi​≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.

The gradient is g(x)=Gx+ag(x) = Gx + ag(x)=Gx+a. For J⊆KJ \subseteq KJ⊆K, the subproblem P(J)P(J)P(J) keeps only the constraints indexed by JJJ; P(∅)P(\emptyset)P(∅) is solved by x0=−G−1ax^0 = -G^{-1}ax0=−G−1a. A set A⊆KA \subseteq KA⊆K is linearly independent if the normals nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, are.

For an independent AAA, let NNN be the matrix with columns nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, and define

N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.N^* = (N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1},\qquad H = G^{-1} - G^{-1}N(N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}.N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.

The multipliers are u(x)=N∗g(x)u(x) = N^*g(x)u(x)=N∗g(x); for a constraint p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A with normal n+=npn^+ = n_pn+=np​ the infeasibility multipliers are r=N∗n+r = N^*n^+r=N∗n+; a superscript +++ denotes the same objects for A+=A∪{p}A^+ = A\cup\{p\}A+=A∪{p}.

An S-pair (x,A)(x, A)(x,A) is an independent active set AAA with si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai\in Ai∈A and xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A). A V-triple (x,A,p)(x, A, p)(x,A,p) has p∉Ap\notin Ap∈/A, A+A^+A+ independent, sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0, si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai \in Ai∈A, H+g(x)=0H^+g(x) = 0H+g(x)=0 and u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0u^+(x) = (N^+)^*g(x) \ge 0u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0.

The dual algorithm starts from (x0,∅)(x^0, \emptyset)(x0,∅). In Step 1 it stops if xxx is feasible; otherwise it picks any violated constraint ppp. In Step 2 it moves along the primal direction z=Hn+z = Hn^+z=Hn+ and the dual direction (−r;1)(-r; 1)(−r;1) with step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1, t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​}, where t1t_1t1​ is the largest step that keeps the multipliers nonnegative and t2=−sp(x)/zTn+t_2 = -s_p(x)/z^{\mathsf T}n^+t2​=−sp​(x)/zTn+ makes constraint ppp active. If both are infinite it reports infeasibility. A full step (t=t2t = t_2t=t2​) adds ppp and returns to Step 1. A partial step (t=t1<t2t = t_1 < t_2t=t1​<t2​), or a dual step (z=0z = 0z=0), drops a constraint kkk attaining t1t_1t1​ and repeats Step 2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every choice of the violated constraint ppp and of the dropped constraint kkk:

no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.\text{no run from } (x^0,\emptyset) \text{ is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in } \begin{cases}\text{STOP at an optimal } x \text{ of (1.1)}, \text{ or}\\ \text{STOP with } \{x : C^{\mathsf T}x \ge b\} = \emptyset.\end{cases}no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.​

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Properties (2.6)–(2.9) (p. 5): Hw=0  ⟺  w∈range⁡NHw = 0 \iff w \in \operatorname{range} NHw=0⟺w∈rangeN; H⪰0H \succeq 0H⪰0; HGH=HHGH = HHGH=H; N∗GH=0N^*GH = 0N∗GH=0.
  2. Optimality conditions (2.3)–(2.4) (p. 5): on the manifold of AAA, xxx solves P(A)P(A)P(A) iff N∗g(x)≥0N^*g(x) \ge 0N∗g(x)≥0 and Hg(x)=0Hg(x) = 0Hg(x)=0.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 8): along xˉ=x+tHn+\bar x = x + tHn^+xˉ=x+tHn+ from a V-triple, H+g(xˉ)=0H^+g(\bar x) = 0H+g(xˉ)=0, the constraints of AAA stay active, u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1)u^+(\bar x) = u^+(x) + t(-r;1)u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1) and sp(xˉ)=sp(x)+t zTn+s_p(\bar x) = s_p(x) + t\,z^{\mathsf T}n^+sp​(xˉ)=sp​(x)+tzTn+.
  4. Theorem 1 (pp. 8–9): the step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1,t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​} increases sps_psp​ and fff; a partial step yields a V-triple, a full step an S-pair.
  5. Theorem 2 (p. 10): if np=Nrn_p = Nrnp​=Nr and sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0 at an S-pair, then r≤0r \le 0r≤0 means P(A∪{p})P(A\cup\{p\})P(A∪{p}) is infeasible; otherwise dropping a minimizing kkk gives a V-triple.
  6. One round of Step 2 (p. 11): from an S-pair and a violated ppp, at most ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ partial or dual steps and one final step end either in infeasibility of (1.1) or in a new S-pair (xˉ,Aˉ∪{p})(\bar x, \bar A \cup\{p\})(xˉ,Aˉ∪{p}) with Aˉ⊆A\bar A\subseteq AAˉ⊆A and f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3 is the correctness certificate of the Goldfarb–Idnani method: whatever rule an implementation uses to choose the entering and leaving constraints, it cannot cycle and its answer is right. In particular the infeasibility verdict is a proof that (1.1) has no feasible point, which matters in SQP where infeasible subproblems trigger a different branch of the outer method. The intermediate results (the operator identities, Lemma 1, Theorems 1–2) are the standard analysis of dual active-set methods for quadratic programming.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces verified projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, a verified KKT characterization for equality-active subproblems, and a verified finite-termination proof for a nondeterministic algorithm with an explicit step relation. The platform already has a proved KKT sufficiency theorem for general convex programs (ConvexOptimization.kkt_sufficient_for_convex), stated over EuclideanSpace with general convex functions and gradient fields; it can serve as background for the sufficiency half of milestone 2, but it is not stated in this mission's matrix objects.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that fff increases strictly at every iteration and there are finitely many active sets. It fails as stated: partial steps may leave xxx unchanged (the dual steps of Step 2(c)(ii)), so fff is only nondecreasing between consecutive states. A termination proof therefore needs a measure that also decreases along steps that do not move xxx. Any such argument relies on invariants (independence of A+A^+A+, nonnegativity of the multipliers, sp<0s_p < 0sp​<0 along partial steps) that hold only on reachable states, and the operators N∗N^*N∗ and HHH are meaningful only while those invariants hold. Correctness of the infeasibility verdict requires the dependent case (Theorem 2), not only Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, GGG is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with G.PosDef, CCC is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, and active sets are Finset (Fin m). Multiplier vectors are indexed by constraint index (Fin m → ℝ, zero off the active set), not by position in AAA. Lean's matrix inverse returns 000 for singular matrices, so every statement about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH assumes G≻0G \succ 0G≻0 and an independent active set (directly, or through an S-pair or V-triple).

The algorithm is the inductive relation Step on states step1 x A u, step2 x A p u⁺, stopOptimal x, stopInfeasible, with one transition per admissible choice of ppp and kkk. Infinite step lengths are separate transitions; a tie t1=t2t_1 = t_2t1​=t2​ takes the full step, as the paper tests t=t2t = t_2t=t2​ first. The running value of fff and the factorizations of Section 4 are not part of the state.

Explicit readings of the paper's words:

  • "solves the QPP or indicates infeasibility in a finite number of steps" is: no infinite sequence of Step transitions from the Step-0 state, and every reachable state without a successor is a STOP whose verdict is correct (optimal for (1.1), or (1.1) infeasible);
  • "S-pair" is: AAA independent and active at xxx, with xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A) (the reading every use in the paper needs);
  • in Theorem 1 the partial-step clause carries t<t2t < t_2t<t2​ (as in its proof), and the multiplier printed uj+1+u^+_{j+1}uj+1+​ in (3.16) is uq+1+u^+_{q+1}uq+1+​, the entry belonging to ppp;
  • "an S-pair can never reoccur" is expressed as the strict increase f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x) in milestone 6.

Property (2.10), printed HH+=H+HH^+ = H^+HH+=H+, is false unless G=IG = IG=I and is not formalized. Equality constraints (1.2), Section 4 (numerically stable implementation), Sections 5–6 (computations), Section 7 (comparisons) and the Appendix example are out of scope.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every run of the relation (not one selection rule, not "some run terminates"), the infeasibility verdict is about (1.1) itself, and the algorithm is a relation that always has a successor until a STOP, so correctness cannot hold because a run gets stuck.

Needed infrastructure: Schur-complement and projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH; first-order optimality for convex quadratics on affine subspaces with inequality multipliers; well-foundedness arguments for a nondeterministic relation. The operator identities and the KKT characterization are reusable for other active-set and SQP analyses. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of reusable lemmas about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani, A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs, Mathematical Programming 27 (1983) 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591962
  • C. E. Lemke, A method of solution for quadratic programs, Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.8.4.442
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006, Chapter 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Complexity TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems I: A Small Facial Description in NP Puts the Decision Problem in co-NPResearch Paper

Motivation

Polyhedral combinatorics attacks a combinatorial optimization problem by replacing its finite set of feasible solutions with the convex hull of that set and describing the hull by linear inequalities. Once such a description is known, the problem becomes a linear program, and linear programming duality supplies optimality certificates. For matchings, matroids and network flows this programme succeeded completely (Edmonds' matching polytope is the classical example). For the traveling salesman problem, set covering and integer programming, decades of work produced large families of valid and facet-defining inequalities but never a complete list.

R. M. Karp and C. H. Papadimitriou asked whether the failure is accidental. Their answer, in the MIT technical report On linear characterizations of combinatorial optimization problems (MIT/LCS/TM-154, February 1980; journal version SIAM J. Comput. 11 (1982) 620–632), is that for NP-complete problems a usable complete description cannot exist unless NP = co-NP. This mission formalizes the first of their two complexity results, Theorem 1, together with the steps of its proof and its Corollary 1.

Setting

A combinatorial optimization problem (c.o.p.) CCC consists of a set L⊆{0,1}∗L\subseteq\{0,1\}^*L⊆{0,1}∗ of inputs, a function nnn assigning to each input z∈Lz\in Lz∈L a number of variables n(z)≥0n(z)\ge 0n(z)≥0, and for each z∈Lz\in Lz∈L a set S(z)⊆(Z+)n(z)S(z)\subseteq(\mathbb Z^+)^{n(z)}S(z)⊆(Z+)n(z) of nonnegative integer vectors, the feasible solutions. The three languages LLL, {⟨z,y⟩:∣y∣=n(z)}\{\langle z,y\rangle : |y|=n(z)\}{⟨z,y⟩:∣y∣=n(z)} and {⟨z,x⟩:x∈S(z)}\{\langle z,x\rangle : x\in S(z)\}{⟨z,x⟩:x∈S(z)} must be recognizable in polynomial time. An instance is a pair ⟨z,c⟩\langle z,c\rangle⟨z,c⟩ with z∈Lz\in Lz∈L and c∈Zn(z)c\in\mathbb Z^{n(z)}c∈Zn(z), and the decision problem of CCC is

D(C)={⟨z,c,k⟩:z∈L, c∈Zn(z), k∈Z, ∃x∈S(z)  c⋅x≥k}.D(C)=\{\langle z,c,k\rangle : z\in L,\ c\in\mathbb Z^{n(z)},\ k\in\mathbb Z,\ \exists x\in S(z)\ \ c\cdot x\ge k\}.D(C)={⟨z,c,k⟩:z∈L, c∈Zn(z), k∈Z, ∃x∈S(z)  c⋅x≥k}.

Write CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z)\mathrm{CH}(S(z))\subseteq\mathbb Q^{n(z)}CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z) for the convex hull of S(z)S(z)S(z) over the rationals. A facial description of CCC is a set F(C)F(C)F(C) of triples ⟨z,f,g⟩\langle z,f,g\rangle⟨z,f,g⟩, with z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, f∈Zn(z)f\in\mathbb Z^{n(z)}f∈Zn(z) and g∈Zg\in\mathbb Zg∈Z, such that for every z∈Lz\in Lz∈L and every x∈Qn(z)x\in\mathbb Q^{n(z)}x∈Qn(z)

x∈CH(S(z))  ⟺  f⋅x≤g  for all ⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C).x\in\mathrm{CH}(S(z))\iff f\cdot x\le g\ \text{ for all }\langle z,f,g\rangle\in F(C).x∈CH(S(z))⟺f⋅x≤g  for all ⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C).

It is small if for some polynomial ppp every component of every triple ⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C)\langle z,f,g\rangle\in F(C)⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C) has absolute value at most 2p(∣z∣+n(z))2^{p(|z|+n(z))}2p(∣z∣+n(z)), so that each coefficient has polynomially many bits. The statement F(C)∈NPF(C)\in\mathrm{NP}F(C)∈NP means that the language of the triples of F(C)F(C)F(C) is in NP: membership of a listed inequality has short, checkable proofs.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 7)

F(C) a small facial description of C,F(C)∈NP ⟹ D(C)∈co-NP.F(C)\ \text{a small facial description of }C,\quad F(C)\in\mathrm{NP}\ \Longrightarrow\ D(C)\in\text{co-NP}.F(C) a small facial description of C,F(C)∈NP ⟹ D(C)∈co-NP.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. (p. 5) For a small facial description and every z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, only finitely many triples have first entry zzz, and CH(S(z))\mathrm{CH}(S(z))CH(S(z)) is the intersection of finitely many half-spaces.
  2. (pp. 7–8, (i)⇔(ii)) ⟨z,c,k⟩∉D(C)\langle z,c,k\rangle\notin D(C)⟨z,c,k⟩∈/D(C) iff c⋅x<kc\cdot x<kc⋅x<k for every x∈CH(S(z))x\in\mathrm{CH}(S(z))x∈CH(S(z)).
  3. (p. 8, (ii)⇔(iii)) For a facial description, the same holds with CH(S(z))\mathrm{CH}(S(z))CH(S(z)) replaced by the system f⋅x≤gf\cdot x\le gf⋅x≤g, ⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C)\langle z,f,g\rangle\in F(C)⟨z,f,g⟩∈F(C).
  4. (p. 8, (iii)⇔(vi)) For a small facial description and S(z)≠∅S(z)\neq\emptysetS(z)=∅: c⋅x<kc\cdot x<kc⋅x<k on that system iff there are n(z)n(z)n(z) triples ⟨z,fi,gi⟩∈F(C)\langle z,f_i,g_i\rangle\in F(C)⟨z,fi​,gi​⟩∈F(C) whose matrix F\mathbf FF is nonsingular and the solution yyy of yTF=cy^T\mathbf F=cyTF=c satisfies y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 and yTg<ky^Tg<kyTg<k.

After the goal: Corollary 1 (p. 8)

D(C) NP-complete, F(C) small facial, F(C)∈NP ⟹ NP=co-NP.D(C)\ \text{NP-complete},\ F(C)\ \text{small facial},\ F(C)\in\mathrm{NP}\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathrm{NP}=\text{co-NP}.D(C) NP-complete, F(C) small facial, F(C)∈NP ⟹ NP=co-NP.

Significance

Theorem 1 converts a question of polyhedral combinatorics into one of complexity theory. Corollary 1 then says that for the traveling salesman problem, Hamiltonian circuit, set covering, integer programming and every other c.o.p. with an NP-complete decision problem, no complete linear description of the hulls has both polynomially sized coefficients and polynomially verifiable membership, unless NP = co-NP. This explains why the search for complete descriptions of such polytopes has not succeeded and why research on them turned to partial descriptions and separation. The companion result of the same paper (Theorem 2, the subject of the second mission in this series) treats separation routines and P instead of facial descriptions and co-NP.

The result itself is proved, by a short argument in the paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires connecting three things that the platform holds only separately: Cook's Turing-machine classes P, NP and co-NP (published as CookPvsNP_defs), linear programming duality over the rationals (Farkas' lemma is published, e.g. LinearOptimization.farkas_inequality_form_fintype, for real matrices), and polynomial-time arithmetic on binary-encoded rational data, such as solving a nonsingular integer linear system. The last ingredient, a polynomial-time verifier built from a polynomial-time recognizer, is reusable for every co-NP or NP membership proof on the platform.

Difficulty

The mathematical content of Theorem 1 is the duality chain (i)⇔(vi): the "no" answer is certified by n(z)n(z)n(z) inequalities of F(C)F(C)F(C) and a basic dual solution. Two points make the formal proof harder than the paper's page suggests.

First, the duality chain needs care at its edges. When S(z)S(z)S(z) is empty the chain (iii)⇔(vi) can fail, so the verifier must also accept a different certificate (an infeasibility certificate from at most n(z)+1n(z)+1n(z)+1 triples), while milestone 4 carries the hypothesis S(z)≠∅S(z)\neq\emptysetS(z)=∅. Pointedness of the hull, which follows from S(z)⊆(Z+)n(z)S(z)\subseteq(\mathbb Z^+)^{n(z)}S(z)⊆(Z+)n(z), is what guarantees n(z)n(z)n(z) linearly independent rows.

Second, "Algorithm B clearly runs in polynomial time" hides a complete complexity argument on Cook's one-tape machines: parsing the input, testing z∈Lz\in Lz∈L and ∣c∣=n(z)|c|=n(z)∣c∣=n(z) with the recognizers of Definition 1, guessing the matrix within the size bound given by smallness, invoking the NP verifier of F(C)F(C)F(C) n(z)n(z)n(z) times, and solving yTF=cy^T\mathbf F=cyTF=c exactly over Q\mathbb QQ with polynomially bounded bit sizes (Cramer's rule bounds the numerators and denominators of yyy). The certificate must be of length polynomial in the input, which uses the uniform polynomial in the definition of "small". The naive certificate, a single optimal vertex of the hull, does not work: it proves a "yes" answer, not a "no".

Formalization scope

All definitions live in the namespace KarpPapadimitriou.Facial. Strings are List Bool; S(z)S(z)S(z) is a set of Fin (n z) → ℤ with nonnegative entries; CH(S(z))\mathrm{CH}(S(z))CH(S(z)) is convexHull ℚ of its image in Fin (n z) → ℚ, because the paper's "R" denotes the rationals (footnote, p. 3). Tuples are coded over the four-letter alphabet {0,1,−,#}\{0,1,-,\#\}{0,1,−,#} of the published ProjSchedTW_Complexity_Encoding, integers in binary, vectors prefixed by their length so that codes are uniquely decodable. P, NP, co-NP and NP-completeness are the published CookPvsNP_defs; D(C)D(C)D(C) and the triple language of F(C)F(C)F(C) are sets of codes, so strings encoding no triple lie in the complement of D(C)D(C)D(C), as in Algorithm B's step (i). The three polynomial-time conditions of Definition 1 are fields of the structure COP.

Explicit readings of the paper's loose phrases:

  • "polynomial ppp" in "small" is m↦mk+km\mapsto m^k+km↦mk+k with one kkk for all triples;
  • "has optimal value <k<k<k" for (ii) and (iii) is "every feasible point has value <k<k<k", meaningful for infeasible and unbounded programs;
  • "the system yTF=cy^T\mathbf F=cyTF=c has a unique nonnegative solution yyy with yTg<ky^Tg<kyTg<k" is "det⁡F≠0\det\mathbf F\neq0detF=0 and the solution satisfies y≥0y\ge 0y≥0, yTg<ky^Tg<kyTg<k";
  • (iii)⇔(vi) carries the hypothesis S(z)≠∅S(z)\neq\emptysetS(z)=∅, tacit in the paper; Theorem 1 does not;
  • "NP = co-NP" in Corollary 1 holds for every finite nonempty alphabet, since Cook's classes are indexed by the alphabet.

Printed slips: display (3) reads "min" while D(C)D(C)D(C) and the proof maximize; Algorithm B's step (v) reads "yTb>ky^Tb>kyTb>k" for yTg<ky^Tg<kyTg<k. Both are formalized in the corrected sense.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every c.o.p. and every small facial description, with complements taken over all strings, and no hypothesis restricts S(z)S(z)S(z) or F(C)F(C)F(C) beyond Definition 1 and the definitions of p. 4–5. Claim 1 (p. 9), announced without proof, is not part of the mission.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the four milestones (milestone 4 is an exercise in rational LP duality on finite systems), a reusable library of polynomial-time integer and rational arithmetic on Cook's machines, and the closure of NP under polynomial-time reductions across alphabets that Corollary 1 needs.

Selected references

  • R. M. Karp and C. H. Papadimitriou, On linear characterizations of combinatorial optimization problems, MIT/LCS/TM-154, February 1980. https://dspace.mit.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/eb122126-c312-4445-a8d2-153e3e7d285f/content ; journal version SIAM J. Comput. 11 (1982) 620–632, https://doi.org/10.1137/0211053
  • S. A. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute Millennium Problem description, 2000. https://www.claymath.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/pvsnp.pdf
  • J. Edmonds, Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965) 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069B.013
  • A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming, Wiley, 1986 (LP duality, basic solutions, sizes of solutions of linear systems). ISBN 978-0-471-98232-6
  • M. Grötschel and M. W. Padberg, On the symmetric travelling salesman problem I: Inequalities, Math. Programming 16 (1979) 265–280. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582116
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts II: With Price-Dependent Demand the Price-Contingent Buy-Back Gives the Retailer λΠ(q, p), as Revenue Sharing Does, and Coordinates Price and QuantityTextbook

Motivation

A retailer who controls both inventory and price can respond to a supply contract in two ways. A contract that induces the right order quantity at a fixed price may change the retailer's incentive to raise or lower that price. For a one-season supply chain, Cachon's chapter compares familiar contracts under price-dependent demand and identifies a price-contingent buy-back, also called a price-discount contract, that aligns both decisions. The mission concerns §6.3 of the author's January 2003 third draft, on printed pages 33–38. Those page and equation numbers belong to the draft and may differ from the typeset chapter.

Setting

One risk-neutral supplier and one risk-neutral retailer have full information before a single selling season. The retailer chooses a nonnegative stocking quantity qqq and a retail price ppp from an admissible price set PPP; the price stays fixed during the season. Demand has a probability law DpD_pDp​ that depends on ppp. Write F(y∣p)F(y\mid p)F(y∣p) for its distribution function, S(q,p)=Ep[min⁡(q,D)]S(q,p)=\mathbb E_p[\min(q,D)]S(q,p)=Ep​[min(q,D)] for expected sales, and μ(p)=Ep[D]\mu(p)=\mathbb E_p[D]μ(p)=Ep​[D] for mean demand. Demand is nonnegative, has a finite mean and, in the chapter's regular setting, its distribution function increases with demand level and has a positive price derivative at positive demand levels. Higher prices thus lower demand in the stochastic order used by the chapter. The price set is nonempty and open so an admissible price optimum has an interior first-order condition.

The supplier's unit cost is csc_scs​, the retailer's unit procurement cost is crc_rcr​, and c=cs+crc=c_s+c_rc=cs​+cr​ is total unit cost. Their goodwill penalties for unmet demand are gsg_sgs​ and grg_rgr​, with g=gs+grg=g_s+g_rg=gs​+gr​. An unsold unit has salvage value vvv at the retailer. The integrated channel's expected profit is

Π(q,p)=(p−v+g)S(q,p)−(c−v)q−gμ(p).\Pi(q,p)=(p-v+g)S(q,p)-(c-v)q-g\mu(p).Π(q,p)=(p−v+g)S(q,p)−(c−v)q−gμ(p).

A buy-back contract charges a wholesale price wbw_bwb​ for each ordered unit and pays the retailer bbb for each unsold unit. A revenue-sharing contract charges a wholesale price wrw_rwr​ and gives the retailer a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of sales and salvage revenue. In this section the supplier offers the terms and the retailer chooses (q,p)(q,p)(q,p). The profit formulas use the chapter's convention that a positive transfer goes from retailer to supplier.

Formalization targets

The goal is the price-contingent buy-back on p. 35, with λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1]:

b(p)=(1−λ)(p−v+g)−gs,wb(p)=λcs+(1−λ)(p+g−cr)−gs.b(p)=(1-\lambda)(p-v+g)-g_s,\qquad w_b(p)=\lambda c_s+(1-\lambda)(p+g-c_r)-g_s.b(p)=(1−λ)(p−v+g)−gs​,wb​(p)=λcs​+(1−λ)(p+g−cr​)−gs​.

In the chapter's zero-goodwill case, gr=gs=0g_r=g_s=0gr​=gs​=0, every feasible (q,p)(q,p)(q,p) then gives the retailer λΠ(q,p)\lambda\Pi(q,p)λΠ(q,p) and the supplier (1−λ)Π(q,p)(1-\lambda)\Pi(q,p)(1−λ)Π(q,p). The same retailer profit is obtained from revenue sharing with ϕ=λ\phi=\lambdaϕ=λ and wr=λ(c−v)−cr+λvw_r=\lambda(c-v)-c_r+\lambda vwr​=λ(c−v)−cr​+λv. Thus every existing maximizer (q∘,p∘)(q^\circ,p^\circ)(q∘,p∘) of the integrated profit maximizes each firm's profit under the contingent buy-back. At λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 the retailer is indifferent; at λ=1\lambda=1λ=1 the supplier is indifferent.

The milestones follow the chapter's printed claims in attack order:

  1. the integrated price condition (14), p. 34;
  2. the quantity-flexibility condition (15), p. 34: price coordination forces wq=v−crw_q=v-c_rwq​=v−cr​ or δ=0\delta=0δ=0;
  3. the fixed buy-back condition (16), p. 35: price coordination forces b=−gsb=-g_sb=−gs​ and then wb=cs−gsw_b=c_s-g_swb​=cs​−gs​;
  4. the linear price-contingent terms derived from (5)–(6), p. 35;
  5. the p. 36 profit split πr=λ(Π+gμ)−grμ\pi_r=\lambda(\Pi+g\mu)-g_r\muπr​=λ(Π+gμ)−gr​μ, πs=(1−λ)Π−(λg−gr)μ\pi_s=(1-\lambda)\Pi-(\lambda g-g_r)\muπs​=(1−λ)Π−(λg−gr​)μ, valid for all goodwill penalties as an identity;
  6. the zero-goodwill revenue-sharing price claim following (17), p. 36 (the milestone quotes its restatement in §6.3.2, p. 38);
  7. the price-contingent revenue-sharing parameters, p. 37;
  8. the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q), pp. 37–38: with gs=0g_s=0gs​=0 it does not distort the price, and given p∘p^\circp∘ it makes q∘q^\circq∘ optimal for both firms.

Significance

The result identifies a contract schedule under which the same quantity-price pair is best for the integrated channel and for the two firms' reported profit functions. It also explains the relation between a buy-back whose terms vary with the chosen price and a revenue-sharing arrangement. In the zero-goodwill setting, both allocate every realized choice's expected channel profit in fixed shares. The general-goodwill identity shows the additional mean-demand terms that matter when the retailer controls price.

The source presents these results analytically; this mission asks for Lean proofs of the stated price and profit relationships. A published Prove2Me definition already supplies expected sales and mean demand for a single demand law, and the model here applies those functions to each price's law. The earlier open theorem RevShareCoord.Single.price_quantity_coordination (from Cachon and Lariviere's revenue-sharing paper) treats deterministic revenue and a simpler cost convention. It is an overlap in theme, but its statement does not include price-indexed demand, salvage value, retailer cost or the contingent buy-back terms, so it is not posed again here. The new model can support further price-dependent contract comparisons in the chapter.

Difficulty

The obstacle is that matching the retailer's quantity incentive at a fixed price can change the retailer's price incentive. The buy-back rate required by the fixed-price coordination equations depends on ppp; a fixed buy-back contract therefore does not generally align both choices. Revenue sharing with goodwill penalties has a similar price dependence. The integrated profit need not be concave or unimodal in (q,p)(q,p)(q,p), so a price first-order condition by itself does not establish coordination. The chapter assumes a finite integrated optimum exists and treats the price condition as necessary, not sufficient.

Formalization scope

Lean represents price-dependent demand as a family of probability measures on R\mathbb RR, one for each price in PPP. Each admissible law is supported on nonnegative demand, has no atom at zero and has an integrable identity function, so μ(p)\mu(p)μ(p) is a genuine finite expectation. Sales are defined by Ep[min⁡(q,D)]\mathbb E_p[\min(q,D)]Ep​[min(q,D)], using the published SupplyChainTheory_contracts definition; they are not defined by the equivalent CDF integral. The admissible decisions are exactly q≥0q\ge0q≥0 and p∈Pp\in Pp∈P. Unit costs and goodwill penalties are nonnegative, each admissible price exceeds c=cs+crc=c_s+c_rc=cs​+cr​, and v<cv<cv<c, as in the model of §6.2. The chapter's standing risk-neutrality and full-information conventions appear in the use of expected profit with the same demand laws available to both firms.

There is a material qualification. With price-dependent demand, μ(p)\mu(p)μ(p) may change with ppp. The printed first-order condition (14) and the p. 36 inference from πr=λ(Π+gμ)−grμ\pi_r=\lambda(\Pi+g\mu)-g_r\muπr​=λ(Π+gμ)−gr​μ to a joint optimum omit that effect when goodwill penalties are positive. Price first-order and optimality statements here therefore use gr=gs=0g_r=g_s=0gr​=gs​=0, a case explicitly discussed in the chapter; general-goodwill claims are limited to algebraic identities. The printed p. 36 equality of price derivatives under revenue sharing also misses its factor ϕ\phiϕ, which the formal statement restores. The contingent buy-back terms are defined by the chapter's linear formulas, not by a property that hard-codes coordination. The algebraic statement permits parameter values that may violate economic buy-back bounds such as 0≤b≤wb0\le b\le w_b0≤b≤wb​; those bounds need separate checks when selecting a contract.

Two first-order statements, (15) and (16), compare price derivatives; they take the derivative of expected sales in price as a hypothesis, and (15) also takes differentiation under the integral sign of ∫(1−δ)qqF(y∣p) dy\int_{(1-\delta)q}^{q}F(y\mid p)\,dy∫(1−δ)qq​F(y∣p)dy as a disclosed regularity hypothesis. For the quantity discount, the statement claims what the page shows, undistorted prices for each qqq and optimality of q∘q^\circq∘ given p∘p^\circp∘, not joint optimality of (q∘,p∘)(q^\circ,p^\circ)(q∘,p∘) for the retailer. The page's claim that revenue sharing with goodwill coordinates only with ϕ=gr/g\phi=g_r/gϕ=gr​/g is not stated, for the mean-demand reason above.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: no contract term is defined by the profit identity it should satisfy, the demand family cannot be replaced by a single law, and the optimal pair is a hypothesis about the integrated profit, not a chosen witness.

Reusable contributions include the price-indexed demand family, the expected-profit model with five contract types, and the price-maximizer statements. Proofs of the first-order milestones need Fermat's interior-extremum theorem on the open price set and, for (15), positivity of an interval integral; the identities need the expectation algebra of SSS and μ\muμ, including S(0,p)=0S(0,p)=0S(0,p)=0.

Selected references

  • Gérard P. Cachon, “Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts,” in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7. Formalization source: author's third draft, January 2003, §6.3, pp. 33–38.
  • Fernando Bernstein and Awi Federgruen, “Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty,” Management Science 51(1), 2005 (the price-discount sharing contract; cited in the draft as a 2000 working paper). DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0230
  • Nicholas C. Petruzzi and Maqbool Dada, “Pricing and the newsvendor problem: a review with extensions,” Operations Research 47(2), 1999, 183–194. DOI 10.1287/opre.47.2.183
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments V: Stackelberg Matroid Pricing Is an Assortment Problem Under a Regular Choice ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

In Stackelberg network pricing a leader sets prices on some resources, and a follower then buys the cheapest structure available to them, paying the leader for the priced resources they use. The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem, introduced by Cardinal, Demaine, Fiorini, Joret, Langerman, Newman and Weimann (Algorithmica 2011), is the version in which the follower buys a minimum spanning tree. The best known approximation factors for it are those of uniform pricing, which gives every priced edge the same price (Berbeglia–Joret, p. 21).

Independently, revenue management studies assortment optimisation: a seller chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among the offered products according to a discrete choice model. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371, Algorithmica 2020) analyse the revenue-ordered heuristic (offer every product whose revenue is at least some threshold) under any regular choice model, and prove tight approximation bounds.

§4.6 of that paper shows that the two problems are the same problem: a Stackelberg Matroid pricing instance is an assortment problem under a regular choice model, and uniform pricing is the revenue-ordered heuristic on that model. The bounds of Cardinal et al. on uniform pricing thus become special cases of the general bounds on revenue-ordered assortments. This mission formalizes that correspondence (Theorem 4.16).

Setting

Choice model. Let C\mathcal CC be a finite set of products. A system of choice probabilities assigns to each offered set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx a probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S), with no-purchase probability P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). It is regular if (i) all probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}. With revenues r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​, rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S)r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x) and OPT=max⁡Srev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_S\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS​rev(S). The revenue-ordered assortment generated by yyy is {y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)}\{y'\in\mathcal C:r(y')\ge r(y)\}{y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)}.

Greedy algorithm. Given a family of independent sets, a linear ordering LLL and a set FFF, greedy(F,L)\mathrm{greedy}(F,L)greedy(F,L) scans FFF in the order induced by LLL, starting from ∅\emptyset∅, and adds each element that keeps the current set independent.

Stackelberg Matroid problem. An instance is a matroid M=(E,X)M=(E,\mathcal X)M=(E,X), a bipartition E=R⊔BE=R\sqcup BE=R⊔B into red and blue elements, and red costs c:R→R>0c:R\to\mathbb R_{>0}c:R→R>0​; some base of MMM lies inside RRR. The leader chooses prices p:B→R>0p:B\to\mathbb R_{>0}p:B→R>0​. The customer buys a minimum-weight base by running greedy on R∪BR\cup BR∪B with an ordering L∗L^*L∗ that is non-decreasing in weight (ccc on RRR, ppp on BBB) and puts blue elements first on ties. The leader earns revStack(p,L∗)=∑e∈B∩greedyM(R∪B,L∗)p(e)\mathrm{rev}_{\mathrm{Stack}}(p,L^*)=\sum_{e\in B\cap\mathrm{greedy}_M(R\cup B,L^*)}p(e)revStack​(p,L∗)=∑e∈B∩greedyM​(R∪B,L∗)​p(e).

The assortment instance. Let c1<⋯<ckc_1<\dots<c_kc1​<⋯<ck​ be the distinct red costs. Products are C=B×{c1,…,ck}\mathcal C=B\times\{c_1,\dots,c_k\}C=B×{c1​,…,ck​} with r((e,q))=∣B∣ qr((e,q))=|B|\,qr((e,q))=∣B∣q. The auxiliary matroid M′M'M′ on R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C declares XXX independent when it holds at most one pair (e,q)(e,q)(e,q) per blue eee and (R∩X)∪{e:(e,q)∈X}(R\cap X)\cup\{e:(e,q)\in X\}(R∩X)∪{e:(e,q)∈X} is independent in MMM. With an ordering LLL of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C that is non-decreasing in cost and puts products before red elements on ties, P((e,q),S)=1/∣B∣\mathcal P((e,q),S)=1/|B|P((e,q),S)=1/∣B∣ if (e,q)∈greedyM′(R∪S,L)(e,q)\in\mathrm{greedy}_{M'}(R\cup S,L)(e,q)∈greedyM′​(R∪S,L) and 000 otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.16 (p. 24)

For the instance above, with B≠∅B\ne\emptysetB=∅ and every admissible LLL:

P is regular,r>0,max⁡S⊆Crev(S)=max⁡p>0, L∗revStack(p,L∗),\mathcal P\ \text{is regular},\quad r>0,\qquad \max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)=\max_{p>0,\ L^*}\mathrm{rev}_{\mathrm{Stack}}(p,L^*),P is regular,r>0,S⊆Cmax​rev(S)=p>0, L∗max​revStack​(p,L∗),

and uniform pricing corresponds to revenue-ordered assortments: for each cic_ici​ some revenue-ordered assortment earns the revenue of the uniform price cic_ici​, and every revenue-ordered assortment earns the revenue of some uniform price cic_ici​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.14 (p. 23): for F⊆F′F\subseteq F'F⊆F′, ∣greedyM(F′,L)∣≥∣greedyM(F,L)∣|\mathrm{greedy}_M(F',L)|\ge|\mathrm{greedy}_M(F,L)|∣greedyM​(F′,L)∣≥∣greedyM​(F,L)∣ and F∩greedyM(F′,L)⊆greedyM(F,L)F\cap\mathrm{greedy}_M(F',L)\subseteq\mathrm{greedy}_M(F,L)F∩greedyM​(F′,L)⊆greedyM​(F,L).
  2. Property (14) (p. 31): orderings agreeing on a block partition make greedy pick the same number of elements per block.
  3. Lemma 4.15 (p. 23): the Stackelberg revenue does not depend on the compatible ordering.
  4. M′M'M′ is a matroid (p. 32).
  5. Regularity of P\mathcal PP (pp. 32–33).
  6. rev(S)\mathrm{rev}(S)rev(S) equals the Stackelberg revenue of pS(e)=min⁡{q:(e,q)∈S}p_S(e)=\min\{q:(e,q)\in S\}pS​(e)=min{q:(e,q)∈S} (pp. 33–34).
  7. Rounding prices up to the cost levels does not decrease revenue (p. 34).
  8. For prices in {c1,…,ck}∪{+∞}\{c_1,\dots,c_k\}\cup\{+\infty\}{c1​,…,ck​}∪{+∞}, rev(Sp)\mathrm{rev}(S_p)rev(Sp​) equals the Stackelberg revenue of ppp (pp. 34–35).

Significance

Theorem 4.16 transfers every guarantee for revenue-ordered assortments under regular models to uniform pricing in Stackelberg Matroid pricing. Specialising Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the paper through it gives exactly the three bounds on uniform pricing proved by Cardinal et al. for Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree (Theorem 3 of their paper), which those authors showed to be tight (p. 24). It also places uniform pricing inside a general picture: it is a threshold policy for a regular choice model whose purchase probabilities come from a matroid greedy algorithm, and the paper notes that the argument extends to polymatroids.

The result is proved in the paper, with two steps left to the reader (M′M'M′ is a matroid) or justified briefly (rounding prices). No machine-checked proof exists. A formalization also produces a reusable greedy algorithm on finite matroids with its monotonicity properties (Lemma 4.14, (14)), which Mathlib at the pinned revision does not have.

Difficulty

The obvious argument identifies the customer's run of greedy on (M,R∪B)(M,R\cup B)(M,R∪B) with the run of greedy on (M′,R∪S)(M',R\cup S)(M′,R∪S) step by step. That identification fails as stated: the choice probabilities are defined with one fixed ordering LLL of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C, while the customer's ordering L∗L^*L∗ is any ordering compatible with the prices, and ties among blue elements of equal price, or between a product and a red element of equal cost, may be broken differently. Equality of revenues therefore needs the tie-independence property (14) applied to M′M'M′ as well as to MMM, which in turn needs M′M'M′ to be a matroid. A second gap is axiom (iv) for the no-purchase option: it requires that offering more products never decreases the number of products greedy selects, which is Lemma 4.14 (i)–(ii) for M′M'M′ combined, not a pointwise statement. Finally, the paper's "+∞+\infty+∞" price must be handled with the red base: without a base inside RRR, a blue element priced above all costs can still be bought and the optimum is unbounded.

Formalization scope

  • Elements and orderings. The matroid is a Mathlib Matroid α; RRR, BBB are Finset α with R∪BR\cup BR∪B equal to the ground set; costs and prices are functions α → ℝ, used only on RRR and BBB. A linear ordering is a duplicate-free List covering the set; greedy on FFF scans the whole list and skips elements outside FFF, so FFF is never re-sorted.
  • Greedy is defined for an arbitrary independence predicate on finite sets, so that it applies to M′M'M′ before M′M'M′ is shown to be a matroid.
  • Customer model. Compatibility (15a)–(15b), including blue priority on ties, is part of the definition of an admissible customer ordering. The red base is a field of every instance.
  • Assortment instance. Elements of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C live in α ⊕ (α × ℝ). The paper's conditions (1)–(2) for M′M'M′ contain two typos (a missing "∈X\in X∈X" and X\mathcal XX for XXX); the intended conditions are formalized. The price +∞+\infty+∞ is the real number 1+∑f∈Rc(f)1+\sum_{f\in R}c(f)1+∑f∈R​c(f), strictly above every red cost.
  • Goal shape. The theorem is stated for the explicit instance of the proof, for every admissible LLL. The optimum of the Stackelberg side is a maximum (IsGreatest) over positive real prices and all compatible customer orderings. Cost levels are quantified as elements of the set of red costs rather than by index.
  • Ruled out. An existential statement ("some regular instance has the same optimum") is met by a single product with revenue OPTStack\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{Stack}}OPTStack​ and is not this theorem; so is a customer model without tie-breaking, a formalization without the red base, or Lemma 4.14 only for F=F′F=F'F=F′.

Contributions welcome: proofs of Lemma 4.14 and (14) for Mathlib matroids (reusable beyond this mission), the matroid property of parallel extensions such as M′M'M′, and the three revenue identities.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019 (Algorithmica, 2020). https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • J. Cardinal, E. D. Demaine, S. Fiorini, G. Joret, S. Langerman, I. Newman and O. Weimann, The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game, Algorithmica 59(2):129–144, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9299-y
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Vol. B, Algorithms and Combinatorics 24, Springer, 2003 (matroids and the greedy algorithm). https://link.springer.com/book/9783540443896
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Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments VI: Revenue-Ordered Offer Sets Grow with Capacity Left and Shrink with Time LeftResearch Paper

Motivation

In airline and hotel revenue management a firm sells a fixed stock of a perishable resource (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and in each period decides which fare classes to open. Customers do not buy a fixed fare: they choose among the fares on offer, or leave. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science, 2004) formulated this single-leg, choice-based problem as a dynamic program over the time remaining and the units remaining.

Practical revenue management systems rarely offer arbitrary sets of fares. They use nested controls: fares are opened from the most expensive downwards, so the open set is always "every fare above some threshold". Whether restricting to such revenue-ordered offer sets is natural depends on how the optimal threshold moves as the state changes. For mixtures of multinomial logit models, Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (Production and Operations Management, 2014, Theorem 6) showed that the best revenue-ordered threshold moves monotonically in both the remaining capacity and the remaining time.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, §5, Theorem 5.1) extend these two monotonicity properties to every regular discrete choice model, the class that contains essentially every model used in revenue management, including all random utility models. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

A finite nonempty set C\mathcal CC of products is sold. For a choice set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and a product xxx, P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) is the probability that a customer offered SSS buys xxx; the no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The system P\mathcal PP is regular when (i) all these probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le 1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′, for every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and for the no-purchase option x=0x=0x=0.

Each product xxx has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Let r1<r2<⋯<rkr_1<r_2<\cdots<r_kr1​<r2​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues. For ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k}\ell\in[k]=\{1,\dots,k\}ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k} the revenue-ordered assortment is Sℓ={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ}S_\ell=\{x\in\mathcal C:r(x)\ge r_\ell\}Sℓ​={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ​}; a larger index ℓ\ellℓ gives a smaller set, S1=CS_1=\mathcal CS1​=C.

In the multi-period model one customer arrives per period. With ttt periods remaining and qqq units left, the firm offers some SℓS_\ellSℓ​. The values of the revenue-ordered dynamic program are

Jt(q,ℓ)=∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+Jt−1(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ) Jt−1(q)(t,q>0),\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)\bigl(r(x)+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q-1)\bigr)+\mathcal P(0,S_\ell)\,\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)\qquad(t,q>0),Jt​(q,ℓ)=x∈Sℓ​∑​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+Jt−1​(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ​)Jt−1​(q)(t,q>0),

Jt(q,ℓ)=0\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=0Jt​(q,ℓ)=0 when t=0t=0t=0 or q=0q=0q=0, and Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∈[k]Jt(q,ℓ)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell\in[k]}\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)Jt​(q)=maxℓ∈[k]​Jt​(q,ℓ). The optimal revenue-ordered index is the smallest maximiser,

ℓt∗(q)=min⁡{ℓ∈[k]:Jt(q,ℓ)=Jt(q)},\ell^*_t(q)=\min\{\ell\in[k]:\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\mathcal J_t(q)\},ℓt∗​(q)=min{ℓ∈[k]:Jt​(q,ℓ)=Jt​(q)},

and ΔJt(q)=Jt(q)−Jt(q−1)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)=\mathcal J_t(q)-\mathcal J_t(q-1)ΔJt​(q)=Jt​(q)−Jt​(q−1) is the marginal value of capacity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For every t≥1t\ge 1t≥1 and q≥1q\ge 1q≥1,

ℓt∗(q)≤ℓt∗(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗(q)≥ℓt−1∗(q)  if t≥2.\ell^*_t(q)\le\ell^*_t(q-1)\ \text{ if } q\ge 2,\qquad \ell^*_t(q)\ge\ell^*_{t-1}(q)\ \text{ if } t\ge 2 .ℓt∗​(q)≤ℓt∗​(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗​(q)≥ℓt−1∗​(q)  if t≥2.

More units left give a weakly larger optimal offer set; more periods left give a weakly smaller one. The paper states the theorem for t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T], q∈[Q]q\in[Q]q∈[Q]; the horizon and the capacity only bound ttt and qqq, so the goal is stated for all t,q≥1t,q\ge 1t,q≥1.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  2. Lemma .1 (p. 35): with L∗(δ)\mathcal L^*(\delta)L∗(δ) the set of indices ℓ\ellℓ maximising ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+δ)\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)+\delta)∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+δ), if δ1+rk≥0\delta_1+r_k\ge 0δ1​+rk​≥0 and δ1≤δ2\delta_1\le\delta_2δ1​≤δ2​ then min⁡L∗(δ2)≤min⁡L∗(δ1)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_2)\le\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_1)minL∗(δ2​)≤minL∗(δ1​).
  3. Equation (16) (p. 36): Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)−ΔJt−1(q))+Jt−1(q)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell}\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)Jt​(q)=maxℓ​∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)−ΔJt−1​(q))+Jt−1​(q).
  4. Equations (17)–(18) (p. 36): ℓt∗(q)=min⁡L∗(−ΔJt−1(q))\ell^*_t(q)=\min\mathcal L^*(-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))ℓt∗​(q)=minL∗(−ΔJt−1​(q)).
  5. Marginal value at most rkr_krk​ (p. 36): ΔJt(q)≤rk\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le r_kΔJt​(q)≤rk​.
  6. Marginal value non-increasing in capacity (p. 36, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 4): ΔJt(q+1)≤ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q+1)\le\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q+1)≤ΔJt​(q).
  7. Marginal value non-decreasing in time (p. 37, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 5): ΔJt(q)≤ΔJt+1(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le\Delta\mathcal J_{t+1}(q)ΔJt​(q)≤ΔJt+1​(q).

Milestones 5–7 are asserted or cited in the paper, not proved there; milestones 6–7 are stated for this restricted dynamic program, which is the one the paper applies them to.

Significance

The theorem says that a firm restricted to revenue-ordered offer sets can implement its policy as a nested booking control: as seats sell out, the threshold fare can only rise, and as departure approaches with seats in hand, it can only fall. This is the structure that standard revenue management systems already assume, and Rusmevichientong et al. point out that such monotonicity can be used to implement them. The paper's contribution is that the property depends only on regularity of the choice model, not on its multinomial-logit form.

Formalizing it adds a machine-checked statement of the single-leg choice-based dynamic program over a general choice model, a precise account of the tie-breaking rule (the smallest maximiser), and machine-checked versions of the two marginal-value monotonicity facts that the paper cites from Talluri and van Ryzin rather than proves. To our knowledge none of these statements has been formalized in any proof assistant; the paper's proofs are informal.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is short, but two of its steps are not proved there. The marginal-value inequalities are imported from Talluri and van Ryzin, whose dynamic program optimises over all offer sets; here only the kkk revenue-ordered sets are available and the empty set is not, so those proofs have to be redone for this program, and the bound ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ is needed to keep each stage's shifted problem well behaved. The claim ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ itself is justified on the page only by an informal sentence.

The second subtlety is tie-breaking. The monotonicity is about the smallest optimal index. Several indices can be optimal at once, and the comparison of Lemma .1 transfers optimality of one index from one shift to another only through Lemma 2.1, that is, through the no-purchase case of the regularity axiom. Without that case the statement fails.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite nonempty type C; choice probabilities are P : C → Finset C → ℝ, defined on all pairs. The no-purchase option is not a product: its probability is the derived quantity noPurchase P S = 1 − ∑_{x∈S} P x S.
  • IsChoiceSystem P is axioms (i)–(iii); IsRegular P adds axiom (iv) for products and for the no-purchase option. Milestones 5–7 assume only axioms (i)–(iii), as the paper says suffices; Lemma .1, (16), (18) and the goal assume regularity and r>0r>0r>0.
  • Revenue levels use the paper's 1-based index: level r ℓ is rℓr_\ellrℓ​ for 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, topRevenue r is rkr_krk​, and roSet r ℓ is SℓS_\ellSℓ​ as a Finset. The paper's sorting of products (Sℓ={1,…,j(ℓ)}S_\ell=\{1,\dots,j(\ell)\}Sℓ​={1,…,j(ℓ)}) is notation only and is not used.
  • The dynamic program is defined by structural recursion on ttt; there is no stochastic process. Maxima over [k][k][k] are Finset.sup', and the minima defining ℓt∗(q)\ell^*_t(q)ℓt∗​(q) and min⁡L∗(δ)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta)minL∗(δ) are Finset.min' over sets proved nonempty.
  • ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q) is used only for q≥1q\ge 1q≥1; milestones are stated with t+1t+1t+1, q+1q+1q+1 in place of the paper's t−1t-1t−1, q−1q-1q−1 to avoid natural-number subtraction, which the goal keeps under its hypotheses q≥2q\ge 2q≥2, t≥2t\ge 2t≥2.

Formalizations that would trivialize the statement are ruled out: the dynamic program maximises over the kkk revenue-ordered sets only, never over all subsets (that is Talluri and van Ryzin's program); ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗ is the smallest maximiser, never the largest; and TTT, QQQ, kkk and the choice model are arbitrary, never fixed.

The definitions (regular choice model, revenue-ordered assortments, the restricted dynamic program) are reusable for other results on nested policies. Proofs of the cited Talluri–van Ryzin lemmas for this program are especially welcome, as they are the part the paper leaves to the literature.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Dynamic ProgrammingGraph TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows II: Subproblem Minimum Costs Are the Greatest Solution of the Send-and-Split Equations, Unique if Circulations Cost Positively (Theorem 2)Research Paper

Motivation

Many network-design and production-planning problems ask for a cheapest way to route a commodity from supply points to demand points when the cost of an arc grows less than proportionally with the amount sent: setup charges, economies of scale, and fixed-plus-linear costs all give concave arc costs. Minimizing a concave function over the flow polytope is NP-hard in general, and the classical linear-cost machinery (potentials, negative-cycle tests) no longer applies. Erickson, Monma and Veinott (Math. Oper. Res. 12 (1987)) gave the send-and-split method, a dynamic program over subsets of the demand nodes that solves the uncapacitated problem in time polynomial in the number of nodes and arcs and exponential only in the number of demand nodes. It contains as special cases the Dreyfus–Wagner recursion for Steiner trees in graphs (Networks 1 (1971)), and the paper applies it to concave-cost production, inventory and network-design problems (§6).

Timeline. Zangwill (1968) solved minimum-concave-cost flows on special networks by dynamic programming. Dreyfus and Wagner (1971) gave the subset recursion for Steiner trees with positive arc lengths. Erickson, Monma and Veinott (1987) extended the subset recursion to arbitrary uncapacitated networks with additive concave arc costs and arbitrary real demands, proved that the minimum costs of the subproblems form the greatest solution of the resulting equations (Theorem 2), and showed it is the only solution when every simple circulation has positive cost.

Setting

A network consists of a directed graph G=(N,A)G = (N, A)G=(N,A) with nodes N={0,…,n−1}N = \{0, \dots, n-1\}N={0,…,n−1} and arcs AAA, ordered pairs of distinct nodes, together with a real demand vector r=(ri)r = (r_i)r=(ri​). A preflow is a nonnegative matrix x=(xij)x = (x_{ij})x=(xij​) supported on AAA; a flow for rrr is a preflow with inflow minus outflow equal to rir_iri​ at every node. Each arc has a cost function cijc_{ij}cij​, concave on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0, and the cost of a preflow is c(x)=∑(i,j)∈Acij(xij)c(x) = \sum_{(i,j)\in A} c_{ij}(x_{ij})c(x)=∑(i,j)∈A​cij​(xij​). A minimum-cost flow is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow. A simple circulation is a circulation equal to some θ>0\theta > 0θ>0 on the arcs of a simple directed circuit and 000 elsewhere.

The demand nodes are D={i:ri≠0}D = \{ i : r_i \neq 0 \}D={i:ri​=0}. For ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D let rI=∑j∈Irjr_I = \sum_{j \in I} r_jrI​=∑j∈I​rj​. The subproblem i→Ii \to Ii→I keeps the demands of the nodes in III, sets all others to zero, and subtracts rIr_IrI​ at node iii; CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is its minimum cost, +∞+\infty+∞ when it has no flow. Let AI=AA_I = AAI​=A if rI>0r_I > 0rI​>0 and the reversed arcs if rI<0r_I < 0rI​<0, with sending cost cij(rI)c_{ij}(r_I)cij​(rI​), read as cji(−rI)c_{ji}(-r_I)cji​(−rI​) when rI<0r_I < 0rI​<0. The send-and-split equations for an array C′C'C′ are

CiI′=Cj,I∖{j}′ (j∈I)if rI=0,(1)C'_{iI} = C'_{j, I\setminus\{j\}} \ (j \in I) \quad \text{if } r_I = 0, \qquad (1)CiI′​=Cj,I∖{j}′​ (j∈I)if rI​=0,(1) CiI′=min⁡(i,j)∈AI[cij(rI)+CjI′]∧BiI′if rI≠0,(2)C'_{iI} = \min_{(i,j)\in A_I} \bigl[ c_{ij}(r_I) + C'_{jI} \bigr] \wedge B'_{iI} \quad \text{if } r_I \neq 0, \qquad (2)CiI′​=(i,j)∈AI​min​[cij​(rI​)+CjI′​]∧BiI′​if rI​=0,(2)

with BiI′=min⁡∅⊂J⊂I[CiJ′+Ci,I∖J′]B'_{iI} = \min_{\emptyset\subset J\subset I} [C'_{iJ} + C'_{i,I\setminus J}]BiI′​=min∅⊂J⊂I​[CiJ′​+Ci,I∖J′​] for ∣I∣>1|I| > 1∣I∣>1, and BiI′=0B'_{iI} = 0BiI′​=0 if I={i}I = \{i\}I={i}, +∞+\infty+∞ otherwise, for ∣I∣=1|I| = 1∣I∣=1 (3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (Dynamic-Programming Equations)

If there is a minimum-cost flow for rrr, then

C solves (1)–(3),CjI′≤CjI  for every +∞-or-real solution C′,C \text{ solves (1)–(3)}, \qquad C'_{jI} \le C_{jI} \ \text{ for every } +\infty\text{-or-real solution } C',C solves (1)–(3),CjI′​≤CjI​  for every +∞-or-real solution C′,

for all j∈Nj \in Nj∈N and ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D. If moreover every simple circulation has positive cost, then every +∞+\infty+∞-or-real solution equals CCC.

Milestones

In attack order: the subproblem alternative (a minimum-cost flow or no flow, p. 640); equation (1); inequalities (4), (5), (6) (p. 641); CiI=BiIC_{iI} = B_{iI}CiI​=BiI​ for i∈Ii \in Ii∈I (p. 641); CCC satisfies (1) and (2) (p. 642); and two generic statements about Bellman's equations (2)′ for minimum-cost chains in a graph with nonnegative, respectively positive, simple circuits: the minimum chain costs form the greatest solution and are nondecreasing in the arc costs, and with positive circuits the solution is unique (p. 642).

Significance

Theorem 2 is the correctness theorem of the send-and-split method: it says that solving equations (1)–(3) by increasing ∣I∣|I|∣I∣, with a shortest-chain computation for each III, yields the true subproblem minimum costs, in particular the optimum CiDC_{iD}CiD​ of the original problem. Its uniqueness clause identifies when the equations alone determine the answer, and the counterexample on p. 641 (zero costs on a strongly connected graph) shows that the positivity hypothesis cannot simply be dropped. The same structure underlies the Steiner-tree recursion.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it is formalized. This mission supplies Lean definitions of uncapacitated concave-cost flows with extended-real minimum costs and the send-and-split equations, and poses the correctness theorem as a proof goal. The two Bellman milestones are general facts about minimum-cost chains with +∞+\infty+∞-or-real values and are reusable well beyond this paper. Related items on the platform are credited, not reused: the Dreyfus–Wagner Steiner recursion DreyfusWagner.Steiner.steinerLength_recurrence and DreyfusWagner.Steiner.optimal_decomposition (the special case of undirected positive lengths), and BellmanRouting.PolicySpace.routing_equation_unique (uniqueness of the routing equation on a complete graph with positive real times).

Difficulty

The equations (2) mix two minima: sending the whole demand rIr_IrI​ across one arc, and splitting III at the current node. Showing that CCC satisfies them requires that some optimal flow of every subproblem has a tree-like structure, which in turn rests on the existence theory for concave-cost flows (an optimum is attained at an extreme flow whose support is a forest). Showing that CCC is the greatest solution requires an induction on ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ in which, for fixed III, equation (2) is a shortest-chain system whose arc costs to an auxiliary node depend on the solution at smaller sets; comparison then needs monotonicity of minimum chain costs in the arc costs, including arcs whose cost drops from +∞+\infty+∞. The naive attempt to prove uniqueness by iterating (2) fails without the positivity hypothesis, because zero-cost circuits admit spurious solutions.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; arcs are a Finset (Fin n × Fin n) with no loops; arc costs are functions R→R\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R→R assumed concave on Set.Ici 0 with cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0 at arcs (the paper's standing assumption, stated as a hypothesis). Minimum costs, sending costs, splitting terms and solutions take values in EReal; the empty infimum is +∞+\infty+∞, as on the page.

Explicit readings of the paper's phrases:

  • "there is a minimum-cost flow" means a flow for rrr whose cost is at most that of every flow for rrr;
  • "+∞+\infty+∞ or real-valued" means ≠−∞\neq -\infty=−∞, required on every ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D;
  • "greatest solution" is two claims: CCC is a solution, and every solution is ≤C\le C≤C entrywise;
  • "each simple circulation has positive cost" quantifies over every simple circuit and every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0;
  • "CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is finite" is rendered as CiI=c(x)C_{iI} = c(x)CiI​=c(x) for a minimum-cost flow xxx of the subproblem;
  • "minimum-cost chain" is the infimum of walk costs, attained or +∞+\infty+∞; arc costs of +∞+\infty+∞ in (2)′ are missing arcs.

The definition of CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is the infimum over flows, never the equations themselves; a formalization defining CCC by (1)–(3), or omitting the ≠−∞\neq -\infty=−∞ condition on solutions, or dropping the clause that CCC is itself a solution, would make the theorem trivial or false and is ruled out. Arrays are compared only on admissible sets. The graph structure of (2)′ is the platform definition BertsekasSPGraph. Running-time bounds, the planar refinements of §4 (Theorem 3) and the capacitated reduction of §5 are out of scope. Proofs of any milestone, and a formalization of the paper's Theorem 1 that the proofs rely on, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. E. Erickson, C. L. Monma, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(4), 1987, 634–664. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.4.634
  • S. E. Dreyfus, R. A. Wagner, The Steiner Problem in Graphs, Networks 1(3), 1971, 195–207. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230010302
  • R. Bellman, On a Routing Problem, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 16(1), 1958, 87–90. https://doi.org/10.1090/qam/102435
  • W. M. Hirsch, A. J. Hoffman, Extreme Varieties, Concave Functions, and the Fixed Charge Problem, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 14(3), 1961, 355–369. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160140312
  • W. I. Zangwill, Minimum Concave Cost Flows in Certain Networks, Management Science 14(7), 1968, 429–450. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.7.429
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Complexity TheoryOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Complexity of Machine Scheduling Problems 1: PARTITION Reduces to Makespan and to Weighted Completion Time on Two Identical MachinesResearch Paper

Motivation

Deterministic machine scheduling asks how to process a set of jobs on a set of machines so that an overall criterion, such as the time at which the last job finishes, is as small as possible. In the early 1970s many such problems had efficient algorithms (Johnson's rule for the two-machine flow shop, Smith's ratio rule for a single machine, Lawler's rule under precedence constraints), while others resisted every attempt. The report of Brucker, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (Mathematisch Centrum, 1975; journal version in Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1, 1977) drew the line between the two groups systematically. It fixed the four-field notation n∣m∣ℓ,λ∣kn|m|\ell,\lambda|kn∣m∣ℓ,λ∣k that the scheduling literature still uses, and it proved NP-completeness of the "easiest" hard problems by explicit reductions in the sense of Karp.

The first family of reductions in the report, Theorem 3, concerns the simplest machine environment beyond a single machine: two identical machines. It shows that already there, minimizing the makespan and minimizing the total weighted completion time are as hard as PARTITION. These two reductions are simplified versions of reductions given by Bruno, Coffman and Sethi (1974), reference [3] of the report.

Setting

PARTITION. Given positive integers a1,…,ata_1,\dots,a_ta1​,…,at​, decide whether there is a subset SSS of T={1,…,t}T=\{1,\dots,t\}T={1,…,t} with

∑j∈Saj=∑j∈T−Saj.\sum_{j\in S}a_j=\sum_{j\in T-S}a_j .j∈S∑​aj​=j∈T−S∑​aj​.

Write A=∑j∈TajA=\sum_{j\in T}a_jA=∑j∈T​aj​ for the total.

Two identical machines. There are nnn jobs J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ and two machines M1,M2M_1,M_2M1​,M2​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj∈Np_j\in\mathbb Npj​∈N and a weight wj∈Nw_j\in\mathbb Nwj​∈N, and must be processed without interruption on one machine of its choice; all jobs are available at time 000. A schedule assigns to every job a machine and a starting time Bj∈NB_j\in\mathbb NBj​∈N; its completion time is Cj=Bj+pjC_j=B_j+p_jCj​=Bj​+pj​. A schedule is feasible if no two jobs on the same machine are processed at the same time, i.e. the intervals [Bj,Bj+pj)[B_j,B_j+p_j)[Bj​,Bj​+pj​) on each machine are pairwise disjoint. Idle time is allowed. Two criteria are considered:

Cmax⁡=max⁡jCj,∑jwjCj.C_{\max}=\max_j C_j,\qquad \sum_j w_jC_j .Cmax​=jmax​Cj​,j∑​wj​Cj​.

The problems n∣2∣I∣Cmax⁡n|2|I|C_{\max}n∣2∣I∣Cmax​ and n∣2∣I∣∑wjCjn|2|I|\sum w_jC_jn∣2∣I∣∑wj​Cj​ ask for a feasible schedule minimizing the respective criterion.

Reducibility. Following Section 2 of the report, each problem is replaced by its recognition version: given an instance and a threshold yyy, is there a feasible schedule with value ≤y\le y≤y? A problem P′P'P′ is reducible to PPP, written P′∝PP'\propto PP′∝P, if every instance of P′P'P′ can be transformed in polynomial time into an instance of PPP with the same answer. Instances are written as words over a finite alphabet, with every number in binary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

PARTITION∝n∣2∣I∣Cmax⁡andPARTITION∝n∣2∣I∣∑wjCj.\text{PARTITION}\propto n|2|I|C_{\max}\qquad\text{and}\qquad \text{PARTITION}\propto n|2|I|\textstyle\sum w_jC_j .PARTITION∝n∣2∣I∣Cmax​andPARTITION∝n∣2∣I∣∑wj​Cj​.

Both reductions use the same instance shape: n=tn=tn=t jobs with pj=ajp_j=a_jpj​=aj​.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3(a), equivalence. With pj=ajp_j=a_jpj​=aj​ and y=12Ay=\tfrac12Ay=21​A: PARTITION has a solution iff some feasible schedule has Cmax⁡≤yC_{\max}\le yCmax​≤y.
  2. Ordering independence. With pj=wj=ajp_j=w_j=a_jpj​=wj​=aj​, if SSS is the set of jobs on M1M_1M1​ and each machine works without idle time from 000, then ∑wjCj=k(S)\sum w_jC_j=k(S)∑wj​Cj​=k(S) for every order of the jobs, where
k(S)=∑j,k∈S, j≤kajak+∑j,k∈T−S, j≤kajak;k(S)=\sum_{j,k\in S,\,j\le k}a_ja_k+\sum_{j,k\in T-S,\,j\le k}a_ja_k ;k(S)=j,k∈S,j≤k∑​aj​ak​+j,k∈T−S,j≤k∑​aj​ak​;

every feasible schedule with this assignment has value at least k(S)k(S)k(S). 3. The identity for k(S)k(S)k(S). With c=∑j∈Saj−12Ac=\sum_{j\in S}a_j-\tfrac12Ac=∑j∈S​aj​−21​A,

k(S)=k(T)−(∑j∈Saj)(∑j∈T−Saj)=∑j,k∈T, j≤kajak−(12A+c)(12A−c)=y+c2.k(S)=k(T)-\Big(\sum_{j\in S}a_j\Big)\Big(\sum_{j\in T-S}a_j\Big)=\sum_{j,k\in T,\,j\le k}a_ja_k-\big(\tfrac12A+c\big)\big(\tfrac12A-c\big)=y+c^2 .k(S)=k(T)−(j∈S∑​aj​)(j∈T−S∑​aj​)=j,k∈T,j≤k∑​aj​ak​−(21​A+c)(21​A−c)=y+c2.
  1. Theorem 3(b), equivalence. With pj=wj=ajp_j=w_j=a_jpj​=wj​=aj​ and y=∑j,k∈T, j≤kajak−14A2y=\sum_{j,k\in T,\,j\le k}a_ja_k-\tfrac14A^2y=∑j,k∈T,j≤k​aj​ak​−41​A2: PARTITION has a solution iff some feasible schedule has ∑wjCj≤y\sum w_jC_j\le y∑wj​Cj​≤y.

Significance

The result. Since PARTITION is NP-complete (Karp 1972), Theorem 3 shows that both problems are NP-hard with only two machines and a single operation per job; their recognition versions are NP-complete. Together with the single-machine and shop results in the rest of the report, it places the boundary of tractability in deterministic scheduling. The makespan problem P2∥Cmax⁡P2\|C_{\max}P2∥Cmax​ became a standard source problem for later hardness proofs and a standard target for pseudo-polynomial algorithms and approximation schemes. The weighted completion time result contrasts with the single-machine case, which Smith's ratio rule solves in polynomial time.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and fully proved on paper; the report prints the constructions and, for (b), a short calculation. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. The mission produces (i) a precise model of nonpreemptive schedules on two identical machines with integer start times and idle time allowed, (ii) the two yes-instance equivalences with the paper's rational thresholds, (iii) the ordering-independence statement for pj=wjp_j=w_jpj​=wj​ behind part (b), and (iv) the polynomial-time computability of the reductions in a Turing machine model. Part (iv) is the formal content of "reducible" and is missing from the paper.

Difficulty

For part (a) the mathematics is short. The paper treats it as evident; a formal proof must still handle schedules with idle time and the case of odd AAA, where 12A\tfrac12A21​A is not an integer.

Part (b) rests on the claim that, when pj=wjp_j=w_jpj​=wj​, the value ∑wjCj\sum w_jC_j∑wj​Cj​ does not depend on the order of the jobs on a machine. For a single machine without idle time this is a symmetric double sum. A recognition-problem proof also needs the converse direction: no schedule with idle time beats the non-idle one, so every feasible schedule with assignment SSS has value at least k(S)k(S)k(S). The paper cites this rather than proving it.

The step the paper leaves out entirely is polynomiality. The constructions copy the input and compute 12A\tfrac12A21​A or ∑j≤kajak−14A2\sum_{j\le k}a_ja_k-\tfrac14A^2∑j≤k​aj​ak​−41​A2, and in a one-tape Turing machine model with an explicit polynomial time bound this needs binary arithmetic (sums, products, a floor) carried out on the tape. It also needs a decoder that rejects malformed words and lists containing a zero. This is routine in principle but long in practice.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs are Fin n and machines Fin 2 (machine 0 is M1M_1M1​). Starting times are natural numbers. Section 3 of the report computes them from processing orders on nonnegative integer data, and both criteria are regular, so real starting times would give the same yes-instances. Processing times may be zero; a zero-length job occupies the empty interval. Schedules may contain idle time.
  • Criteria. "Cmax⁡≤yC_{\max}\le yCmax​≤y" is stated as Cj≤yC_j\le yCj​≤y for every job, which equals max⁡jCj≤y\max_jC_j\le ymaxj​Cj​≤y for n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and avoids a supremum. ∑wjCj\sum w_jC_j∑wj​Cj​ is a finite sum in N\mathbb NN.
  • Languages. PARTITION is the set of binary codes of lists of positive integers that admit a partition; a code of a list with a zero entry is not in the language. A target word codes nnn, the processing times (and weights, job by job), and a threshold y∈Ny\in\mathbb Ny∈N. The number of machines is fixed by the class and not coded. Every coded instance is in the class, so the language admits nothing outside it.
  • Reducibility is CookPvsNP.PolyReducible from the published definition CookPvsNP_defs (Cook's one-tape Turing machines, polynomial-time many-one reductions). The alphabet BSym and the binary code encNats are reused from the published ProjSchedTW.Complexity.Encoding (Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann). Its PARTITION language is not reused, because it allows zero sizes.
  • Thresholds. The milestones state the paper's thresholds 12A\tfrac12A21​A and ∑j≤kajak−14A2\sum_{j\le k}a_ja_k-\tfrac14A^2∑j≤k​aj​ak​−41​A2 as real numbers, exactly as printed. The goal's reduction must write a natural-number threshold; all schedule values are integers, so the floor of the printed threshold gives the same yes-instances.
  • Explicit readings. The equivalence of (a) is not printed; the report says on p. 14 that such equivalences are "trivial or clear" where not proved. "Only depends on the choice of SSS" is stated as two facts: equality for non-idle schedules and a lower bound for all feasible schedules. "It is easily seen (cf. Figure 1)" is the three-step identity, one equality per printed step. k(S)k(S)k(S) is defined by its closed form, and its link to schedules is a milestone.
  • Ruled out. A target language whose yes-instances are defined through PARTITION, an equivalence for some instance rather than the paper's construction, and a goal that drops polynomial-time computability would all make the goal vacuous or different. The statements here use the constructions as printed and Cook's reducibility.
  • Welcome contributions. Proofs of the four milestones; a library of polynomial-time Turing machine programs for binary arithmetic and list decoding over BSym, which every mission of this series needs and which is reusable for other reductions on the platform.

Selected references

  • P. Brucker, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Complexity of Machine Scheduling Problems, Mathematisch Centrum Report BW 43/75, Amsterdam, 1975. https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/9725/9725D.pdf
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, P. Brucker, Complexity of machine scheduling problems, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1 (1977) 343–362. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70743-X
  • J. Bruno, E. G. Coffman Jr., R. Sethi, Scheduling independent tasks to reduce mean finishing time, Communications of the ACM 17 (1974) 382–387. https://doi.org/10.1145/361011.361064
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum, 1972, 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • S. A. Cook, The complexity of theorem-proving procedures, STOC 1971, 151–158. https://doi.org/10.1145/800157.805047
  • W. E. Smith, Various optimizers for single-stage production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3 (1956) 59–66. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
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Discrete GeometryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems III: Zero-One and Integer-Programming-Type Problems Have Small Facial DescriptionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many discrete optimization problems can be described by linear inequalities, even when their feasible solutions are integer vectors. A linear description lets one study the geometry of the feasible set and connect combinatorial methods with linear programming. The number of inequalities may be large, so a more basic question is whether each inequality needs coefficients of manageable size. Karp and Papadimitriou separated this coefficient-size issue from the number and computational recognizability of the inequalities in their study of facial descriptions Karp and Papadimitriou, MIT/LCS/TM-154, pp. 3–7.

Their Lemma 1 identifies two common families for which small coefficients suffice: zero-one problems and problems given by an integer linear system. This result establishes a geometric premise used by the paper's later complexity discussion. It says nothing by itself about finding the inequalities efficiently or recognizing whether a proposed inequality belongs to a description. Those computational conditions belong to the paper's subsequent theorems Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–8.

Setting

A combinatorial optimization problem here consists of a set LLL of binary strings, a dimension n(z)n(z)n(z) for each z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, and a set S(z)S(z)S(z) of feasible nonnegative integer vectors of that dimension. The geometric object is the rational convex hull CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z)\mathrm{CH}(S(z))\subseteq\mathbb Q^{n(z)}CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z). The paper calls the rationals RRR in its notation. The values of nnn and SSS outside LLL carry no meaning. A feasible set may be empty; its convex hull is then empty as well Karp and Papadimitriou, Definition 1 and footnote, p. 3.

A facial description FFF is a collection of triples ⟨z,f,g⟩\langle z,f,g\rangle⟨z,f,g⟩, where z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, f∈Zn(z)f\in\mathbb Z^{n(z)}f∈Zn(z), and g∈Zg\in\mathbb Zg∈Z. For every rational vector xxx and every z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, membership in CH(S(z))\mathrm{CH}(S(z))CH(S(z)) must be equivalent to satisfying all inequalities f⋅x≤gf\cdot x\le gf⋅x≤g indexed by triples of FFF with first component zzz. A facial description is small when one polynomial in ∣z∣+n(z)|z|+n(z)∣z∣+n(z) bounds the binary size of every coefficient of every triple in the collection. The collection itself need not be small Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 4–5.

A zero-one problem has only vectors with entries zero or one in each S(z)S(z)S(z). An integer-programming-type problem gives an integral matrix A(z)A(z)A(z) and right-hand side b(z)b(z)b(z) and takes S(z)S(z)S(z) to be all nonnegative integer vectors satisfying A(z)x≤b(z)A(z)x\le b(z)A(z)x≤b(z). The dimensions of these data depend on zzz. Their total binary coefficient size is controlled by the length of the encoded input Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–6.

Formalization targets

Lemma 1

The mission goal is the complete statement for both classes:

∀C,(ZeroOne⁡(C)∨IPType⁡(C))⟹∃F,FacialDescription⁡(C,F)∧Small⁡(C,F).\forall C,\quad \bigl(\operatorname{ZeroOne}(C)\lor\operatorname{IPType}(C)\bigr) \Longrightarrow \exists F,\quad \operatorname{FacialDescription}(C,F)\land\operatorname{Small}(C,F).∀C,(ZeroOne(C)∨IPType(C))⟹∃F,FacialDescription(C,F)∧Small(C,F).

The milestone list records three claims used in the paper's proof. In a zero-one hull, every vertex is a zero-one vector and there are no nonzero rays. For integer hulls, the cited vertex-size result gives a uniform polynomial bound on the coordinates of vertices. Finally, the Cramer's-rule calculation bounds an integral normal fff and intercept ggg by (2nx)n(2nx)^n(2nx)n when the geometric data have coordinates bounded by xxx Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–7.

Significance

Lemma 1 permits descriptions of the whole hull, including lower-dimensional hulls that require equations and unbounded integer hulls that have recession directions. It gives a coefficient bound for every input with one polynomial, rather than a polynomial chosen separately for each instance. This is the premise needed when the paper treats a facial description as a language of short encodable inequalities. The later assertion that an NP-recognizable small facial description places the decision problem in co-NP has a distinct hypothesis and is handled by the first mission of this series Karp and Papadimitriou, Theorem 1, pp. 7–8.

The mathematical result is known; the mission asks for a Lean proof of its precise rational, input-indexed version. The local declarations are proof obligations and do not yet carry verified proofs. Existing platform work includes a rational integer-hull definition reused here, a related open theorem of Cook–Gerards–Schrijver–Tardos that bounds normal coefficients under different hypotheses, and proved real-carrier versions of Meyer's polyhedrality and finite-generation results. The related open theorem does not supply Lemma 1: it has neither this zero-one case nor the bound on the intercept ggg. The real-carrier theorems supply neither the input-size bound nor the paper's rational convention.

Difficulty

The zero-one case has bounded coordinates, but a complete description must also handle an empty hull and a hull contained in a proper affine subspace. Bounding only the facet inequalities of a full-dimensional nonempty polytope does not describe those cases. The integer-programming case adds unbounded directions, and the paper's printed identification of extreme rays with rows of AAA is false. A faithful treatment must bound suitable recession directions and then obtain a uniform coefficient bound for the inequalities describing the hull Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–7.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses List Bool for inputs, Fin (n z) → ℤ for feasible vectors, and Fin (n z) → ℚ for the convex hull. The published CookSensitivity.ChvatalRank.polyhedron and integerHull definitions provide the general rational integer-programming substrate. This mission adds only the paper's input-indexed problem, facial description, smallness condition, and two named problem classes. The three language-recognition requirements in the paper's Definition 1 are omitted because Lemma 1 never uses them; the resulting theorem applies to every such geometric problem, including every c.o.p. in the paper's narrower definition.

The polynomial bound is represented by (∣z∣+n(z))k+k(|z|+n(z))^k+k(∣z∣+n(z))k+k with a single natural exponent kkk chosen before every input and inequality. For an integer-programming-type input, the sum s(A,b)=∑a⌈log⁡2(1+∣a∣)⌉s(A,b)=\sum_a\lceil\log_2(1+|a|)\rceils(A,b)=∑a​⌈log2​(1+∣a∣)⌉ over all entries of AAA and bbb must be at most ∣z∣|z|∣z∣. This makes the paper's phrase “zzz specifies AAA and bbb” an explicit binary-size condition. The cited vertex milestone bounds coordinates in terms of sss alone, as the page states: a zero column gives a line direction rather than a vertex. Its statement follows the paper's unrestricted Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b formulation; the IP-type goal additionally imposes x≥0x\ge0x≥0. The paper calls bbb an nnn-vector, but it has one entry per row of AAA and is an mmm-vector here. The Cramer's-rule milestone allows rows of size 2x2x2x, as vertex differences can reach that size.

Empty feasible sets, dimension zero, lower-dimensional hulls, and unbounded IP hulls remain in the goal. A description restricted to full-dimensional facets, or a smallness exponent chosen separately for each input, would not meet it. A complete development needs rational convex hulls, integer-hull geometry, finite descriptions of rational polyhedra, bounds on vertices and recession generators, and finite-dimensional determinant estimates. The rational integer-hull definitions and the coefficient estimates are reusable beyond this mission; contributions that establish the three listed milestones or the remaining geometric steps are in scope.

Selected references

  • Richard M. Karp and Christos H. Papadimitriou, On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems, MIT/LCS/TM-154, February 1980, pp. 3–7. Report scan. Later published in SIAM Journal on Computing 11 (1982), 620–632, DOI.
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