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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 1: Revenue Sharing at w = φc Coordinates the Channel and Gives the Retailer the Share φ of Its Optimal ProfitResearch Paper

Why revenue sharing

A supplier who sells to an independent retailer through a plain per-unit wholesale price faces double marginalization: the retailer orders less than the quantity that maximizes the profit of the supply chain as a whole, because each unit costs him the wholesale price rather than the production cost. Supply chain contracting studies payment schemes under which the retailer's own optimum coincides with the system optimum. Such a scheme is said to coordinate the channel. The usual examples are buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), quantity-flexibility contracts (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987).

Cachon and Lariviere study revenue sharing, in which the retailer pays a low wholesale price and also hands over a fixed fraction of his revenue. The scheme was common in video-cassette rental in the late 1990s, where it let rental chains stock far more copies of new releases. This mission formalizes the paper's single-retailer result: revenue sharing coordinates the channel, and the supplier can choose any split of the channel's maximal profit. It also includes the three further results of the paper that use the same argument.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000. Its results are unnumbered, so every item cites a section, a displayed equation and a printed page. The 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material.

Setting

A supplier sells to one retailer, who orders q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 units before a selling season. The retailer's expected revenue is a function R(q)R(q)R(q) of the quantity alone. Leftover units have zero salvage value, and the supplier produces each unit at cost c>0c > 0c>0. The paper's standing assumptions (Sec. 1, p. 5) are:

  • RRR is strictly concave and differentiable for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, with marginal revenue R′(q)R'(q)R′(q);
  • the product is viable: R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c;
  • a finite quantity is optimal: R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c.

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} has two terms. The retailer pays the wholesale price w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 per unit, and he keeps the share ϕ\phiϕ of the revenue and transfers (1−ϕ)R(q)(1-\phi)R(q)(1−ϕ)R(q) to the supplier. The case ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the plain wholesale-price contract. The profits of the supply chain, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.\Pi(q) = R(q) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q) = \phi R(q) - qw,\qquad \pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)R(q) + qw - qc .Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr​(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.

The integrated channel quantity qIq_IqI​ is the maximizer of Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0. In Lean these objects are RevShareCoord.Single.Model (fields R, R', c and the three assumptions) and its functions Pi, retailerProfit and supplierProfit.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing coordinates the channel (Sec. 2.2, p. 6)

Let ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1] and w(ϕ)=ϕcw(\phi) = \phi cw(ϕ)=ϕc. Then

qI=arg max⁡q≥0 πr(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr(qI)=ϕ Π(qI),πs(qI)=(1−ϕ) Π(qI).q_I = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{q\ge 0}\ \pi_r(q) \ \text{(uniquely)},\qquad w(\phi)\le c,\qquad \pi_r(q_I) = \phi\,\Pi(q_I),\qquad \pi_s(q_I) = (1-\phi)\,\Pi(q_I).qI​=q≥0argmax​ πr​(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr​(qI​)=ϕΠ(qI​),πs​(qI​)=(1−ϕ)Π(qI​).

The statement fixes no revenue function and no share. It holds for every model and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], which is what "the supplier can take any share of the channel profit" means.

Milestones on the way

  1. Eq. (1), p. 6. qIq_IqI​ exists, is unique and positive, and is the only positive root of R′(qI)=cR'(q_I) = cR′(qI​)=c.
  2. Retailer's first-order condition, p. 6. If R′(0)>w/ϕR'(0) > w/\phiR′(0)>w/ϕ, an order q^≥0\hat q \ge 0q^​≥0 is optimal for the retailer exactly when q^>0\hat q > 0q^​>0 and ϕR′(q^)=w\phi R'(\hat q) = wϕR′(q^​)=w. The retailer has at most one optimal order.
  3. Profit identities, p. 6. Under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, πr(q)=ϕΠ(q)\pi_r(q) = \phi\Pi(q)πr​(q)=ϕΠ(q) and πs(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q)\pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)\Pi(q)πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q) at every qqq.
  4. Heterogeneous retailers, p. 7. Given ccc and ϕ\phiϕ, a single wholesale price, chosen before the revenue function, coordinates every retailer of the model.

Further results on the same argument

  1. Buy-back equivalence, Sec. 2.3, p. 9. Take the fixed-price newsvendor and the buy-back contract b∗=p(1−ϕ)b^* = p(1-\phi)b∗=p(1−ϕ), wb∗=p(1−ϕ)+ϕcw_b^* = p(1-\phi)+\phi cwb∗​=p(1−ϕ)+ϕc. It gives the retailer and the supplier the same realized profits as {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, for every order and every demand realization.
  2. Endogenous price, Sec. 3.1 and footnote 3, p. 11. Let revenue Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) be any function of quantity and price, with costs linear in quantity. Then πr(q,p)=ϕ Π(q,p)\pi_r(q,p) = \phi\,\Pi(q,p)πr​(q,p)=ϕΠ(q,p) under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi,\phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, and the integrated optimum (qI,pI)(q_I,p_I)(qI​,pI​), assumed unique, is the retailer's unique optimum.

Significance

The result separates coordination from profit division. A contract family coordinates for every value of a parameter, and that parameter then moves profit between the firms without changing the quantity, so the contract terms can be settled by bargaining power alone. The heterogeneous-retailer milestone gives the practical advantage over quantity discounts: the coordinating terms do not depend on the retailer's demand, so one price list serves retailers who face different markets. The Sec. 2.3 equivalence shows that, in the fixed-price newsvendor, buy-backs are a special case of revenue sharing. The Sec. 3.1 statement shows that revenue sharing still coordinates when the retailer also sets the price, a setting in which Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed buy-backs fail.

All of these results are proved in the paper, and none is open. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the single-retailer theory for a general strictly concave revenue function. A related newsvendor version is already formalized on the platform: SupplyChainTheory.revenue_sharing_coordinates, from Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Thm 14.6. That version has a newsvendor revenue with salvage values and goodwill costs, and it concludes the optimality of three profits, not the ϕ\phiϕ-split of this paper. It is a different statement, so it is not reused here.

Difficulty

The algebra is short. The identity πr=ϕΠ\pi_r = \phi\Piπr​=ϕΠ under w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc is a single line, and it is a milestone, not the goal. The work lies in the optimization claims over a half-line with only one-sided information at 000. The integrated optimum must be shown to exist. R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c gives only an eventual bound on the derivative, so the existence argument needs the continuity of a concave function and its supergradient inequality. It must also be shown positive, which uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c as a one-sided derivative. Its uniqueness rests on strict concavity. The retailer's first-order condition needs the same machinery for ϕR−wq\phi R - wqϕR−wq, including the observation that the boundary point 000 is never optimal. A stationary point of πr\pi_rπr​ is not enough. The goal asserts that qIq_IqI​ is the unique maximizer over all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Formalization scope

  • Quantities, prices and shares are real numbers. RRR and R′R'R′ are functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R, constrained only on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Differentiability is HasDerivWithinAt R (R' q) (Set.Ici 0) q for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, so it is one-sided at 000. Strict concavity is StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) R.
  • R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c is encoded as "R′(Q)<cR'(Q) < cR′(Q)<c for some Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0". For a decreasing R′R'R′ this is equivalent, and it allows R′→−∞R' \to -\inftyR′→−∞.
  • "Optimal" means IsMaxOn over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (over [0,∞)×P[0,\infty)\times P[0,∞)×P in Sec. 3.1), and "unique" means every other maximizer equals it.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is not displayed in the paper. It is read off the sequence of events of Sec. 1.
  • The goal and the first-order condition take ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1]. At ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer's profit is identically zero and qIq_IqI​ is not the unique optimum. The profit identities and the buy-back identities hold for all real parameters and are stated that way.
  • Corrected slips. (a) Eq. (1) is introduced with "R′(0)≥cR'(0) \ge cR′(0)≥c". This contradicts the standing assumption R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c: with equality, qI=0q_I = 0qI​=0 is not positive. The statement uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c. (b) The display πr(qI)=ϕR(qI)−qIc=ϕΠ(qI)\pi_r(q_I) = \phi R(q_I) - q_I c = \phi\Pi(q_I)πr​(qI​)=ϕR(qI​)−qI​c=ϕΠ(qI​) has a wrong middle term, which should read ϕR(qI)−qIϕc\phi R(q_I) - q_I\phi cϕR(qI​)−qI​ϕc. The outer equality is stated.
  • The first-order-condition milestone adds the converse direction and uniqueness to the paper's "must satisfy". It does not claim that an optimum exists, which may fail when w/ϕ<cw/\phi < cw/ϕ<c.
  • Sec. 3.1 is stated in the generality of footnote 3: an arbitrary revenue function Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) and a set PPP of admissible prices, with the integrated optimum's uniqueness as a hypothesis, as the paper assumes it. The paper's monotonicity of F(x,p)F(x,p)F(x,p) in ppp is unused and omitted.
  • Sec. 2.3 is formalized pathwise. The expected-profit equations (2)–(4) are not part of the mission.
  • A goal that only asserts πr(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕ Π(q)\pi_r(\phi, \phi c, q) = \phi\,\Pi(q)πr​(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕΠ(q) would be an unfolding of definitions. The goal therefore carries the argmax-and-uniqueness claim, which needs strict concavity and the model's assumptions.
  • Needed infrastructure: first-order conditions for concave functions on a closed half-line with one-sided derivatives, and existence of maximizers from an eventual derivative bound. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of that general kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • K. S. Moorthy, Managing channel profits: Comment, Marketing Science 6(4):375–379, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.6.4.375
  • A. A. Tsay, W. S. Lovejoy, Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1(2):89–111, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1.2.89
  • H. Emmons, S. M. Gilbert, Note: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science 44(2):276–283, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
10 thms3 active usersReviewed
AnalysisDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research+3·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case VI: Lower Semianalytic Functions — Analytically Measurable ε-Optimal Selectors (Jankov–von Neumann)Textbook

Motivation

Dynamic programming over uncountable state and control spaces needs two things at every stage: the optimal cost-to-go, obtained by minimizing over the control, must be a function that can be integrated against the next stage's transition probabilities, and a policy that nearly attains the minimum must be measurable, so that it defines a stochastic process. With Borel-measurable costs and Borel-measurable policies both requirements fail. Minimizing a Borel function of (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) over yyy produces a function whose level sets are projections of Borel sets, and such projections need not be Borel (Suslin, 1917). The repair, developed by Blackwell, Freedman and Orkin (1974), Shreve and Bertsekas, and set out in Chapter 7 of Bertsekas and Shreve's Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case (1978), is to enlarge the class of costs to the lower semianalytic functions and the class of policies to the analytically or universally measurable ones. Sections 7.6–7.7 of the book establish that this class is closed under partial minimization and admits measurable ε-optimal selectors. Chapters 8–10 of the book, and much of the later literature on Borel-space Markov decision processes (Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre; Feinberg and coauthors), build on these results.

Timeline:

  • 1917: Suslin shows that projections of Borel sets need not be Borel and introduces analytic sets; Lusin proves that analytic sets are universally measurable.
  • 1941–1949: Jankov and von Neumann independently prove that an analytic subset of a product admits a selector measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by analytic sets.
  • 1974: Blackwell, Freedman and Orkin use analytic sets to construct ε-optimal policies in Borel dynamic programming.
  • 1978: Bertsekas and Shreve give the treatment used here (§7.6–7.7), including the selection theorem for lower semianalytic functions, Proposition 7.50.

Setting

A Borel space is a topological space homeomorphic to a Borel subset of a complete separable metric space (Definition 7.7); its Borel σ-algebra is BX\mathscr B_XBX​. The Baire space is N=NN\mathscr N=\mathbb N^{\mathbb N}N=NN with the product topology. A set A⊆XA\subseteq XA⊆X is analytic if it is empty or the image of N\mathscr NN under a continuous map; by Proposition 7.41 this is the book's Definition 7.16 (the Suslin operation applied to closed sets). Every Borel set is analytic, and the converse fails when XXX is uncountable.

Three σ-algebras on XXX are in play. The analytic σ-algebra AX\mathscr A_XAX​ is generated by the analytic sets (Definition 7.19). The universal σ-algebra is UX=⋂pBX(p)\mathscr U_X=\bigcap_{p}\mathscr B_X(p)UX​=⋂p​BX​(p), the intersection over all probability measures ppp on (X,BX)(X,\mathscr B_X)(X,BX​) of the ppp-completions of BX\mathscr B_XBX​ (Definition 7.18). For a function fff from D⊆XD\subseteq XD⊆X into a Borel space YYY, fff is analytically measurable if D∈AXD\in\mathscr A_XD∈AX​ and f−1(B)∈AXf^{-1}(B)\in\mathscr A_Xf−1(B)∈AX​ for every B∈BYB\in\mathscr B_YB∈BY​, and universally measurable if the same holds with UX\mathscr U_XUX​ (Definition 7.20).

Let R∗=[−∞,∞]R^*=[-\infty,\infty]R∗=[−∞,∞]. A function f:D→R∗f:D\to R^*f:D→R∗ is lower semianalytic if DDD is analytic and {x∈D∣f(x)<c}\{x\in D\mid f(x)<c\}{x∈D∣f(x)<c} is analytic for every real ccc (Definition 7.21). For D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y write Dx={y∣(x,y)∈D}D_x=\{y\mid (x,y)\in D\}Dx​={y∣(x,y)∈D}, projX(D)={x∣Dx≠∅}\mathrm{proj}_X(D)=\{x\mid D_x\neq\emptyset\}projX​(D)={x∣Dx​=∅}, and define the partial infimum

f∗(x)=inf⁡y∈Dxf(x,y),x∈projX(D).f^*(x)=\inf_{y\in D_x}f(x,y),\qquad x\in\mathrm{proj}_X(D).f∗(x)=y∈Dx​inf​f(x,y),x∈projX​(D).

A selector is a function φ:projX(D)→Y\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(D)\to Yφ:projX​(D)→Y whose graph Gr(φ)\mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)Gr(φ) lies in DDD.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7.50

Let X,YX,YX,Y be Borel spaces, D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y analytic, and f:D→R∗f:D\to R^*f:D→R∗ lower semianalytic.

(a) For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is an analytically measurable selector φ\varphiφ with

f[x,φ(x)]≤{f∗(x)+εif f∗(x)>−∞,−1/εif f∗(x)=−∞.f[x,\varphi(x)]\le\begin{cases}f^*(x)+\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)>-\infty,\\-1/\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)=-\infty.\end{cases}f[x,φ(x)]≤{f∗(x)+ε−1/ε​if f∗(x)>−∞,if f∗(x)=−∞.​

(b) The set III of points where the infimum is attained is universally measurable, and for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a universally measurable selector φ\varphiφ with f[x,φ(x)]=f∗(x)f[x,\varphi(x)]=f^*(x)f[x,φ(x)]=f∗(x) on III and the bounds of (a) off III.

The goal fixes no constant beyond the book's ε\varepsilonε and −1/ε-1/\varepsilon−1/ε.

Milestones

In attack order: Proposition 7.40 (Borel images and preimages of analytic sets are analytic), Corollary 7.42.1 (AX⊆UX\mathscr A_X\subseteq\mathscr U_XAX​⊆UX​), Corollary 7.44.2 (composites of analytically measurable maps are universally measurable), and Proposition 7.49, the Jankov–von Neumann theorem:

A⊆X×Y analytic ⟹ ∃ φ:projX(A)→Y analytically measurable, Gr(φ)⊆A.A\subseteq X\times Y\text{ analytic}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(A)\to Y\ \text{analytically measurable},\ \mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)\subseteq A.A⊆X×Y analytic ⟹ ∃φ:projX​(A)→Y analytically measurable, Gr(φ)⊆A.

Further items of the mission, on the same definitions: Proposition 7.39 (projections of analytic sets are analytic, and every analytic set is a projection of a Borel set), Lemma 7.30(1) (strict and non-strict, real and extended level sets give the same class) and Proposition 7.47 (lower semianalytic functions are exactly partial infima of Borel functions).

Significance

Proposition 7.50 is the selection theorem behind the existence of ε-optimal policies in Borel-space dynamic programming. In the finite-horizon model of Chapter 8 the optimal cost-to-go at each stage is lower semianalytic, by Propositions 7.47 and 7.48. Proposition 7.50 then turns the one-stage minimization into a measurable policy, analytically measurable when only ε-optimality is required and universally measurable when the minimum is attained. Chapters 8–9 of the book (the finite-horizon recursion JK∗=TK(J0)J^*_K=T^K(J_0)JK∗​=TK(J0​) and the optimality equation under (P), (N), (D)) use it at every step. Downstream catalog papers on average-cost and stochastic shortest-path problems over Borel spaces cite these results.

All results here are proved in the book and in the descriptive set theory literature (Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory, §18 and §29). None is formalized on Prove2Me. Mathlib has analytic sets in Polish-type settings, the Lusin separation theorem and Suslin's theorem, but it has no universal σ-algebra, no analytic σ-algebra, no lower semianalytic functions and no Jankov–von Neumann uniformization. The definitions in this mission are reusable by the later missions of the series (Chapters 8–10), which restate them locally until these are published.

Difficulty

The obvious route to a selector is to choose, for each xxx, a minimizing or near-minimizing yyy. The axiom of choice provides such a function, but nothing makes it measurable, and the conclusion of the theorem is exactly that measurability. The Borel route fails too: the set {x∣f∗(x)<c}\{x\mid f^*(x)<c\}{x∣f∗(x)<c} is a projection of a Borel set, which is analytic but in general not Borel, so no Borel-measurable selector exists in general. The Jankov–von Neumann theorem needs a lexicographically least branch of a continuous parametrization of AAA by N\mathscr NN, and an argument that the resulting map is measurable with respect to AX\mathscr A_XAX​, which is generated by sets that are not closed under complementation. Part (b) adds a further obstacle: the composite of two analytically measurable maps need not be analytically measurable, so the exact selector is only universally measurable. Proving that requires Lusin's theorem that analytic sets are measurable for every completed probability measure.

Formalization scope

  • A Borel space is a type with a topology satisfying the class IsBorelSpace (Definition 7.7, the ambient complete separable metric space taken in the same universe), together with Mathlib's [MeasurableSpace X] [BorelSpace X], so measurable sets are exactly the Borel sets. On X×YX\times YX×Y the product σ-algebra is used; it coincides with BX×Y\mathscr B_{X\times Y}BX×Y​ for separable metrizable spaces (Proposition 7.13).
  • Analytic sets are Mathlib's MeasureTheory.AnalyticSet (empty or a continuous image of ℕ → ℕ).
  • R∗R^*R∗ is EReal. The book uses ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, and Mathlib's EReal uses ⊥+⊤=⊥\bot+\top=\bot⊥+⊤=⊥. No statement of this mission adds infinities of opposite sign; f∗(x)+εf^*(x)+\varepsilonf∗(x)+ε adds a real number.
  • Functions on DDD and on projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) are functions on subtypes. The graph condition Gr(φ)⊆D\mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)\subseteq DGr(φ)⊆D is part of every selector statement.
  • Universally measurable means NullMeasurableSet E p for every probability measure p.
  • "Analytically measurable" refers to the σ-algebra generated by analytic sets. Replacing it by the power set, dropping the graph condition, or dropping the −1/ε-1/\varepsilon−1/ε case would make the selection theorems a consequence of the axiom of choice. The statements rule all three out.

Not included: Lusin's theorem in Suslin-scheme form (Proposition 7.42, which needs the Suslin operation as a definition), Proposition 7.43 on P(X)P(X)P(X), the integration results of Propositions 7.46 and 7.48, and Lemma 7.30(2)–(4). None is used in the proof of the goal. Contributions welcome: the bridge between IsBorelSpace and Mathlib's StandardBorelSpace, the universal σ-algebra API, and the Jankov–von Neumann theorem itself.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996, §7.6–7.7. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. Blackwell, D. Freedman and M. Orkin, The optimal reward operator in dynamic programming, Annals of Probability 2 (1974) 926–941. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996558
  • A. S. Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory, Graduate Texts in Mathematics 156, Springer 1995, §18 (Jankov–von Neumann uniformization), §29 (measurability of analytic sets). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4190-4
  • S. E. Shreve and D. P. Bertsekas, Universally measurable policies in dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 4 (1979) 15–30. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.15
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Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 4: Subgaussian Martingale Noise with Σ exp(−c/γ_n) < ∞ for Every c > 0 Satisfies Assumption A1 Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion

xn+1−xn=γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}-x_n=\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​−xn​=γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​)

in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, where FFF is a vector field, γn\gamma_nγn​ are small step sizes and Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is noise. Such recursions go back to Robbins and Monro's root-finding scheme (Robbins–Monro 1951) and underlie stochastic gradient descent, temporal-difference learning, adaptive control and learning in games. The ODE method studies them by comparing the iterates with the trajectories of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x).

Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999) organize the ODE method in two steps. A deterministic step, Proposition 4.1, shows that whenever the noise satisfies a condition called A1 (together with a boundedness condition on the iterates), the interpolated process is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF. A probabilistic step then verifies A1 for concrete noise models. Proposition 4.2 does this for martingale difference noise with bounded qqq-th moments, at the price of step sizes with ∑nγn1+q/2<∞\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑n​γn1+q/2​<∞. This mission formalizes the second verification, Proposition 4.4: when the noise is subgaussian, A1 holds almost surely under the much weaker requirement that ∑ne−c/γn<∞\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑n​e−c/γn​<∞ for every c>0c>0c>0, which allows step sizes decaying only slightly faster than 1/log⁡n1/\log n1/logn. The notes attribute the result to Duflo (1997), see also Kushner and Yin (1997) and Benaïm and Hirsch (1996).

Setting

Let {γn}n≥1\{\gamma_n\}_{n\ge1}{γn​}n≥1​ be a deterministic sequence with γn≥0\gamma_n\ge0γn​≥0, ∑nγn=∞\sum_n\gamma_n=\infty∑n​γn​=∞ and γn→0\gamma_n\to0γn​→0 (a step sequence). Put τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0, τn=∑i=1nγi\tau_n=\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_iτn​=∑i=1n​γi​, and let

m(t)=sup⁡{k≥0: t≥τk}m(t)=\sup\{k\ge0:\ t\ge\tau_k\}m(t)=sup{k≥0: t≥τk​}

be the index of the step that contains time t≥0t\ge0t≥0. For a sequence {Un}n≥1\{U_n\}_{n\ge1}{Un​}n≥1​ define the piecewise constant processes Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1\bar U(t)=U_{m(t)+1}Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1​ and γˉ(t)=γm(t)+1\bar\gamma(t)=\gamma_{m(t)+1}γˉ​(t)=γm(t)+1​, so that step n+1n+1n+1 occupies the time interval [τn,τn+1)[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1})[τn​,τn+1​) of length γn+1\gamma_{n+1}γn+1​.

Assumption A1 asks that for every T>0T>0T>0

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡{∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥: k=n+1,…,m(τn+T)}=0,\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup\Big\{\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|:\ k=n+1,\dots,m(\tau_n+T)\Big\}=0,n→∞lim​sup{​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​: k=n+1,…,m(τn​+T)}=0,

or, in the form the notes call equivalent, lim⁡t→∞Δ(t,T)=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\Delta(t,T)=0limt→∞​Δ(t,T)=0 for every T>0T>0T>0, where

Δ(t,T)=sup⁡0≤h≤T∥∫tt+hUˉ(s) ds∥.\Delta(t,T)=\sup_{0\le h\le T}\Big\|\int_t^{t+h}\bar U(s)\,ds\Big\|.Δ(t,T)=0≤h≤Tsup​​∫tt+h​Uˉ(s)ds​.

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space with a nondecreasing sequence {Fn}\{\mathcal F_n\}{Fn​} of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras, and F:Rd→RdF:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dF:Rd→Rd continuous. A sequence {xn}\{x_n\}{xn​} given by the recursion above is a Robbins–Monro algorithm if γ\gammaγ is deterministic, UnU_nUn​ is Fn\mathcal F_nFn​-measurable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0. The noise is subgaussian if there is a number Γ>0\Gamma>0Γ>0 such that for all nnn and all θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd

E(exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩ ∣ Fn)≤exp⁡(Γ2∥θ∥2).E\big(\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangle\,\big|\,\mathcal F_n\big)\le\exp\Big(\frac\Gamma2\|\theta\|^2\Big).E(exp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩​Fn​)≤exp(2Γ​∥θ∥2).

Bounded noise, ∥Un∥≤Γ\|U_n\|\le\sqrt\Gamma∥Un​∥≤Γ​, is an example.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.4

For a Robbins–Monro algorithm with subgaussian noise and a deterministic step sequence such that

∑ne−c/γn<∞for each c>0,\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty\qquad\text{for each }c>0,n∑​e−c/γn​<∞for each c>0,

with probability one the realised noise sequence satisfies A1, in both of its forms, simultaneously for all T>0T>0T>0.

Milestones

  1. The exponential supermartingale. For every θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd,
Zn(θ)=exp⁡[∑i=1n⟨θ,γiUi⟩−Γ2∑i=1nγi2∥θ∥2]Z_n(\theta)=\exp\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n\langle\theta,\gamma_iU_i\rangle-\frac\Gamma2\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_i^2\|\theta\|^2\Big]Zn​(θ)=exp[i=1∑n​⟨θ,γi​Ui​⟩−2Γ​i=1∑n​γi2​∥θ∥2]

is a supermartingale. 2. Directional maximal tail bound. For every unit vector eee, α>0\alpha>0α>0, nnn and T>0T>0T>0,

P(sup⁡n<k≤m(τn+T)⟨e,∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1⟩≥α)≤exp⁡(−α22Γ∑i=nm(τn+T)−1γi+12).P\Big(\sup_{n<k\le m(\tau_n+T)}\Big\langle e,\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\rangle\ge\alpha\Big)\le\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{2\Gamma\sum_{i=n}^{m(\tau_n+T)-1}\gamma_{i+1}^2}\Big).P(n<k≤m(τn​+T)sup​⟨e,i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​⟩≥α)≤exp(2Γ∑i=nm(τn​+T)−1​γi+12​−α2​).
  1. Eq. (18). There are C,C′>0C,C'>0C,C′>0 depending only on ddd and Γ\GammaΓ with
P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp⁡(−α2C′∫tt+Tγˉ(s) ds)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).P(\Delta(t,T)\ge\alpha)\le C\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{C'\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma(s)\,ds}\Big)\qquad(t\ge0,\ T>0,\ \alpha>0).P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp(C′∫tt+T​γˉ​(s)ds−α2​)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).
  1. Block comparison. Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T)\Delta(t,T)\le2\Delta(kT,T)+\Delta((k+1)T,T)Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T) for kT≤t<(k+1)TkT\le t<(k+1)TkT≤t<(k+1)T.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 is the sufficient condition for the ODE method when the noise has Gaussian-type tails. Its step-size condition holds whenever γnlog⁡n→0\gamma_n\log n\to0γn​logn→0, so it admits steps that decrease far more slowly than the ∑γn2<∞\sum\gamma_n^2<\infty∑γn2​<∞ of the classical L2L^2L2 theory; slowly decreasing steps are what practitioners use to keep algorithms responsive. Combined with Proposition 4.1 it shows that the interpolated process of such an algorithm, with bounded iterates, is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF, and the limit set theorems of the notes then locate the limit points of the algorithm.

The result is proved in the notes and in the cited literature; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal proof would add reusable pieces: an exponential supermartingale and maximal inequality for vector-valued martingale differences with a conditional subgaussian bound (Mathlib's conditional subgaussian notion is scalar), a Borel–Cantelli argument along the grid kTkTkT, and the continuous-time bookkeeping of Uˉ\bar UUˉ, γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ and Δ\DeltaΔ shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

The moment method of Proposition 4.2 does not reach this regime: any fixed polynomial moment of the window sums decays only polynomially in the window's step sizes, and under ∑e−c/γn<∞\sum e^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑e−c/γn​<∞ alone polynomial bounds are not summable over windows. Exponential tail bounds are needed, and they must be maximal (uniform over the window) and must hold for the norm of a vector, not only for a scalar. The continuous-time deviation Δ(t,T)\Delta(t,T)Δ(t,T) involves partial steps at both ends of [t,t+h][t,t+h][t,t+h], so the bound must be stated in terms of ∫tt+Tγˉ\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma∫tt+T​γˉ​ rather than a sum over whole steps, with constants that do not depend on ttt, TTT or α\alphaα. Finally, A1 quantifies over all T>0T>0T>0: the almost-sure statement must hold on a single event of full probability for every TTT.

Formalization scope

The space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) (the paper writes Rm\mathbb R^mRm); time is real. The sequences γ\gammaγ and UUU are indexed by N\mathbb NN, and their values at 000 are unused, as the paper indexes them from 111. The filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ; Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is Fn+1\mathcal F_{n+1}Fn+1​-strongly measurable and integrable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0 almost surely. The subgaussian condition requires exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangleexp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩ to be integrable for every θ\thetaθ and nnn. The summand e−c/γne^{-c/\gamma_n}e−c/γn​ is taken to be 000 when γn=0\gamma_n=0γn​=0, its limiting value. The suprema in A1 and Δ\DeltaΔ are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the supremum over an empty range of kkk is 000. In Eq. (18) the constants are chosen before the probability space, the algorithm and t,T,αt,T,\alphat,T,α.

The following readings are excluded and are not acceptable formalizations: a subgaussian condition that holds vacuously because the exponential is not integrable (Lean's conditional expectation of a non-integrable function is 000); a summability condition made trivial or false by the convention c/0=0c/0=0c/0=0; and the conclusion "for each TTT, A1 holds almost surely" in place of "almost surely, A1 holds for all TTT". The second sentence of Proposition 4.4 (the asymptotic pseudotrajectory conclusion) is outside this mission.

All hypotheses are satisfiable: U=0U=0U=0, x=0x=0x=0, F=0F=0F=0, Γ=1\Gamma=1Γ=1 and γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n satisfy every one of them.

Contributions welcome: a maximal inequality for nonnegative supermartingales in the form needed here, vector subgaussian tail bounds for martingale transforms with deterministic weights (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas on the step processes and Δ\DeltaΔ (measurability, local integrability, additivity), and the proofs of the milestones.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Duflo, Random Iterative Models, Applications of Mathematics 34, Springer, 1997.
  • H. J. Kushner and G. G. Yin, Stochastic Approximation Algorithms and Applications, Springer, 1997.
  • M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951), 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization 2: Randomized Double Greedy Achieves 1/2 of the Optimum in ExpectationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many selection problems assign a value to each subset of a finite collection: the coverage supplied by chosen facilities, the influence reached by chosen seeds, or the value of a coalition. A submodular set function has diminishing returns in the precise sense that the combined value of two sets, counting their overlap once, does not exceed the sum of their separate values. When the function is also monotone, taking more elements never hurts. The unconstrained problem studied here permits nonmonotone functions, so both accepting and rejecting an element can matter. The question is what a single pass through the elements can guarantee when the function is available through value queries. Buchbinder et al., FOCS 2012

The randomized algorithm in this mission attains an expected one-half approximation for every nonnegative submodular function. The paper presents this as tight in the value-oracle setting: it recalls the earlier result of Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák that a fixed improvement beyond one-half requires exponentially many queries. The contribution here is therefore both the guarantee and a short adaptive rule that attains it in a linear number of iterations. The local proposal follows the FOCS 2012 version of the paper; its theorem numbering differs from the later SIAM Journal on Computing article. Buchbinder et al., §I.A and Theorem I.2

Setting

Let N\mathcal NN be a finite ground set, and let f:2N→R≥0f:2^{\mathcal N}\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}f:2N→R≥0​ assign a nonnegative real value to every subset. The unconstrained submodular maximization problem asks for the largest value f(S)f(S)f(S) among all S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N. Write OPTOPTOPT for that value when no confusion arises, and OOO for a set attaining it. Submodularity means

f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).f(A\cup B)+f(A\cap B)\le f(A)+f(B)\qquad(A,B\subseteq\mathcal N).f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).

There is no monotonicity or normalization assumption: f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) may both be positive. A value oracle returns f(S)f(S)f(S) for a requested subset SSS. The paper's complexity claim counts such queries, assuming a query takes constant time. Buchbinder et al., §I and footnotes 1–2

Algorithm 2 visits the elements once in an arbitrary order u1,…,unu_1,\ldots,u_nu1​,…,un​. It keeps two sets, starting at X0=∅X_0=\varnothingX0​=∅ and Y0=NY_0=\mathcal NY0​=N. At step iii, it measures the gain aia_iai​ from adding uiu_iui​ to Xi−1X_{i-1}Xi−1​ and the gain bib_ibi​ from removing uiu_iui​ from Yi−1Y_{i-1}Yi−1​. It clips each gain at zero, giving ai′=max⁡(ai,0)a'_i=\max(a_i,0)ai′​=max(ai​,0) and bi′=max⁡(bi,0)b'_i=\max(b_i,0)bi′​=max(bi​,0). It adds uiu_iui​ to XXX with probability ai′/(ai′+bi′)a'_i/(a'_i+b'_i)ai′​/(ai′​+bi′​) and otherwise removes it from YYY. When both clipped gains vanish, the paper defines the add probability as one. After all elements have been processed, the two sets coincide, and the algorithm returns their common value. The state law is adaptive: its probability at step iii depends on the actual pair of sets produced by earlier choices. Buchbinder et al., Algorithm 2

Formalization targets

The main target is Theorem I.2 for this exact algorithm and for every enumeration of the ground set:

max⁡S⊆Nf(S)≤2 E[f(Xn)].\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}f(S)\le 2\,\mathbb E[f(X_n)].S⊆Nmax​f(S)≤2E[f(Xn​)].

The milestone statements retain the paper's key local quantities. For a comparison optimum OOO, set OPTi=(O∪Xi)∩YiOPT_i=(O\cup X_i)\cap Y_iOPTi​=(O∪Xi​)∩Yi​. Lemma II.1 asserts ai+bi≥0a_i+b_i\ge0ai​+bi​≥0. The endpoint statement identifies OPT0=OOPT_0=OOPT0​=O and OPTn=Xn=YnOPT_n=X_n=Y_nOPTn​=Xn​=Yn​. Inequality (3) bounds the conditional loss in the positive-gain case; Lemma III.1 compares the expected change of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ with the expected combined change of XiX_iXi​ and YiY_iYi​. The telescoped display keeps the initial endpoint values f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) before using nonnegativity. Buchbinder et al., Lemmas II.1 and III.1, inequality (3), proof of Theorem I.2

A companion target is Theorem I.4 via its second proof. For two normalized monotone submodular utilities f1,f2f_1,f_2f1​,f2​, let g(S)=f1(S)+f2(N∖S)g(S)=f_1(S)+f_2(\mathcal N\setminus S)g(S)=f1​(S)+f2​(N∖S). The maximum of ggg is exactly the optimal welfare of a two-player partition. Algorithm 2 on ggg is asked to satisfy

3max⁡S⊆Ng(S)≤4 E[g(Xn)].3\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}g(S)\le4\,\mathbb E[g(X_n)].3S⊆Nmax​g(S)≤4E[g(Xn​)].

This is the paper's three-quarter guarantee in its welfare application. Buchbinder et al., Theorem I.4 and Proof (2)

Significance

The main theorem gives a specific randomized rule whose expected value is at least half the best subset value, even when accepting an element can lower the objective. It applies without restricting the cardinality or shape of the chosen subset. The welfare corollary shows that keeping the initial endpoint values in the analysis yields a stronger guarantee for the objective formed from two monotone players. Buchbinder et al., Theorems I.2 and I.4

This mission formalizes the statement of the algorithm, its intermediate state laws, its comparison set, and the paper's numbered proof targets. The algorithmic guarantee is proved in the source paper; the local Lean theorem files are open statements with sorry and do not yet give machine-checked proofs of these results. A completed development would supply a reusable formal model of an adaptive finite random process over pairs of subsets, as well as the specific submodular inequalities. The published Submodular and OPT definitions from the earlier Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák formalization are reused here.

Difficulty

The two possible updates cannot be assessed independently. The probability of each choice depends on the current state, and the comparison set OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ can gain or lose the processed element in a way that differs from the two algorithm sets. A bound on the expected value of XiX_iXi​ alone does not control the movement of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​. The proof must handle the clipped gains, including the case when both are zero, while preserving the exact joint law of (Xi,Yi)(X_i,Y_i)(Xi​,Yi​). Buchbinder et al., proof of Lemma III.1

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type; subsets are Finset X, and values are real numbers. An order is a list with no repeated elements that covers the type, including the empty type. The run is an explicit finite mass function on pairs of subsets after every prefix of the list. Expectation is a finite weighted sum, so it has no integrability exception. The transition clips the two real marginal gains and handles 0/00/00/0 by assigning probability one to the add branch, exactly as Algorithm 2 specifies. The optimum is the published maximum over all subsets. No ratio divides by a possibly zero optimum.

The theorem fixes Algorithm 2 itself; an arbitrary process with nested sets or a process defined by its desired approximation property does not satisfy this scope. The Lean goal states the value bound and leaves the paper's linear-time claim outside the formal theorem. The algorithm uses four value evaluations per processed element in its printed rule; the Lean development represents those evaluations, not an implementation cost model. The statement that its two final sets coincide is a separate milestone.

The source's main-text decreasing-returns definition has an overbroad quantifier on the added element. This development uses the equivalent lattice inequality given in the paper's footnote, which permits nonmonotone functions. The proof of Lemma II.1 also has a set-index slip, and the proof of Theorem I.2 prints FFF for fff in one display; neither slip is copied into a formal statement. The one-step inequality (3) is stated for any nested pair with the processed element in Y∖XY\setminus XY∖X, a generalization of the conditioned reachable states in the paper. Contributions proving the endpoint invariant, conditional inequality, one-step expected estimate, and final bound are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012. FOCS version used here.
  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5), 2015. DOI: 10.1137/130929205. The cited statement indices above refer to the FOCS version.
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Dimensioning Large Call Centers II: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Efficiency-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Why staffing large call centers is a mathematical question

A call center must choose enough servers to limit waiting while paying for every server it staffs. When arrivals are heavy, small changes in the number of servers can change the probability of delay substantially. Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman study how to make this choice when the arrival rate grows and the costs of staffing and waiting need not grow at the same rate. Their CWI report treats several regimes within one queueing model. This mission concerns the efficiency-driven regime, where the incremental staffing cost eventually dominates the conditional waiting cost at every fixed positive square-root staffing offset. The resulting rule chooses an offset by optimizing a simpler cost that treats the probability of waiting as one.

The result is useful when the staffing-cost and waiting-cost primitives change with system scale. It says that the simplified choice still attains the optimal total cost asymptotically, even though the actual staffing decision is an integer and the simplified problem uses a real variable. The report states this as Theorem 6.1 on printed page 19, with its interpretation of asymptotic optimality supplied by Corollary 3.3 on printed page 14.

The Erlang-C cost model

Customers arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and receive exponential service at rate μ>0\mu>0μ>0 per server. The service rate μ\muμ is fixed as λ\lambdaλ grows. For an integer number of servers N>λ/μN>\lambda/\muN>λ/μ, the Erlang-C delay probability π(N,λ/μ)\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)π(N,λ/μ) is the explicit finite-sum expression in Section 2 of the report. A customer who waits has an exponential waiting time with rate Nμ−λN\mu-\lambdaNμ−λ. Let Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) be the cost of a wait of length ttt. It is strictly increasing on t≥0t\ge0t≥0, satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0, and has finite exponential expectation at every positive rate. The resulting conditional waiting cost is

G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dt.G(N,\lambda)=(N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dt.G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt.

The staffing cost F(N)F(N)F(N) is one fixed, convex, strictly increasing function of the server count. Its continuous extension is evaluated at real N>0N>0N>0. Total cost per unit of time at a stable integer level is

C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).C(N,\lambda)=F(N)+\lambda\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)G(N,\lambda).C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).

Write Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ for any minimizing stable integer level. Ties are permitted. For a positive real offset xxx, define Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x)=\lambda/\mu+x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x)=F(N_\lambda(x))-F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), and Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x)=\lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ). The report extends Erlang-C continuously to πλ(x)\pi_\lambda(x)πλ​(x) and writes the incremental continuous objective as Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x)=F_\lambda(x)+\pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x). These definitions and the integer-extension identity are from Section 3, printed pages 11–12.

Formalization targets

The report defines the efficiency-driven regime by

for every κ>0,lim⁡λ→∞Fλ(κ)Gλ(κ)=+∞.\text{for every }\kappa>0,\qquad \lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{F_\lambda(\kappa)}{G_\lambda(\kappa)}=+\infty.for every κ>0,λ→∞lim​Gλ​(κ)Fλ​(κ)​=+∞.

For each λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, choose yλ∗>0y^*_\lambda>0yλ∗​>0 to minimize Fλ(y)+Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y)+G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Gλ​(y) over y>0y>0y>0. Let Sλ(y)S_\lambda(y)Sλ​(y) be the smaller cost of the stable integer levels immediately below and above Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y); if the lower one is unstable, use the upper one. The goal, Theorem 6.1 together with Corollary 3.3, is

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty} \frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)} {C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)}=1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The milestone path includes the convexity of the conditional waiting cost (Lemma C.1), the agreement of the continuous Erlang-C extension with its integer formula, the two approximation lemmas and their corollary (Lemmas 3.1–3.2 and Corollary 3.3), the convex staffing-cost comparison of equation (13), and all three clauses of the Halfin–Whitt limit in Lemma 4.1. This ordering follows the objects each later statement uses.

What the result gives

The theorem certifies a staffing rule defined by a one-variable surrogate rather than the exact Erlang-C probability in the objective. Its guarantee concerns the incremental total cost above the unavoidable baseline F(λ/μ)F(\lambda/\mu)F(λ/μ), which is the economically relevant quantity when comparing two near-minimal stable staffing levels. The ratio tends to one, so the theorem is stronger than a claim that the two costs merely have the same growth order. The source also presents other regimes with different surrogates; their conclusions are separate targets in this series.

The paper proves the mathematical theorem. This mission asks for a Lean proof of its closed-form model and the surrounding lemmas. The complete development would make the report's approximation framework reusable for later results that combine a continuous queueing approximation, a surrogate minimizer, and integer rounding. It would also expose the exact assumptions needed to pass between real and integer staffing levels. No machine-checked proof of this report's Theorem 6.1 is claimed here.

Where the difficulty lies

The simple objective replaces the delay probability πλ(y)\pi_\lambda(y)πλ​(y) by one. That replacement is accurate near zero offset, but the minimizing offset itself changes with λ\lambdaλ. Pointwise asymptotics at a fixed positive offset do not directly control the value of an objective at its moving minimizer. The proof therefore has to relate the regime assumption to the location of the relevant minimizers before using the Halfin–Whitt limit. Integer rounding introduces another boundary issue: when Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y) is just above λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, its floor need not be stable, so evaluating the ordinary Erlang-C formula there would compare the target against a meaningless cost. These difficulties are visible already in the statements of Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 3.2.

Formalization scope and conventions

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ, μ\muμ, offsets, and costs as real numbers; arrival-rate limits use the real filter at +∞+\infty+∞. Staffing counts are natural numbers. The service rate is positive and fixed. A WaitModel packages strict increase and normalization of DλD_\lambdaDλ​ on nonnegative waits together with integrability against every positive exponential rate. This integrability expresses the report's finiteness assumption for GGG and prevents a nonintegrable real integral from silently evaluating to zero. The hypotheses on FFF are convexity and strict increase on positive real staffing levels; FFF does not depend on λ\lambdaλ.

The report asserts that G(N,λ)G(N,\lambda)G(N,λ) diverges as NNN decreases to λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, although the stated assumptions permit bounded increasing waiting penalties for which that assertion fails. The goal therefore includes this explicit divergence hypothesis, which also supports existence of the continuous minimizer used in the report's argument. The integer optimum and the surrogate optimum are functions constrained to be minimizers at every positive arrival rate. They cannot be arbitrary choices that make the conclusion vacuous. The continuous optimum appears only in the framework milestones; it is not a hypothesis of Theorem 6.1.

All formulas are total Lean functions. Their values at λ≤0\lambda\le0λ≤0, unstable integer counts, nonpositive offsets, or invalid parameters to the continuous Erlang-C integral have no queueing interpretation. Every theorem using them constrains its relevant inputs. The definition of SλS_\lambdaSλ​ ignores an unstable floor and uses the stable ceiling. At a positive offset and arrival rate this ceiling is above offered load. The Gaussian density, its cumulative integral, the hazard rate, and the delay function use the explicit formulas of Section 4; the value of the delay function at zero is the continuous extension needed by Lemma 4.1.

The queue's stochastic construction is outside this mission. The formal objects are the report's cost formulas and asymptotic comparisons, not a continuous-time Markov chain. Useful contributions include proofs of the special-function limit, convexity of conditional waiting cost, the integer-extension identity, and the reusable approximation lemmas. The regime condition is the full limit in equation (23); weakening it to an unrelated boundedness condition would change the theorem.

Selected references

  • Sem Borst, Avi Mandelbaum, and Martin I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000. Report PDF. Theorem 6.1, printed p. 19; Corollary 3.3, printed p. 14; Lemma 4.1, printed p. 15; Lemma C.1, printed p. 40.
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case II: Contraction Models — the Optimal Cost Is the Unique Fixed Point of T in the Closed Set B̄Textbook

Motivation

Discounted dynamic programming with bounded cost per stage is the standard setting in which infinite-horizon sequential decision problems are well posed: the optimal cost exists, satisfies Bellman's equation, and can be computed by iterating the DP operator. Shapley proved this for stochastic games in 1953 (Shapley 1953), Blackwell for discounted Markov decision processes in 1965 (Blackwell 1965), and Denardo observed in 1967 that the arguments use only two properties of the DP operator: monotonicity and contraction in the supremum norm (Denardo 1967). Bertsekas (1975, 1977) and Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) turned this observation into an abstract dynamic programming framework, in which a single mapping HHH encodes stochastic, deterministic, minimax and multiplicative-cost problems at once (Bertsekas 1977).

Chapter 4 of Bertsekas and Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, is the contraction part of that framework. Its results are the abstract form of what every course on Markov decision processes proves for the discounted case, and they are what later work on abstract DP (Bertsekas, Abstract Dynamic Programming, 2022) and on robust and regularized MDPs builds on.

Setting

A model consists of a state space SSS, a control space CCC, a nonempty constraint set U(x)⊆CU(x)\subseteq CU(x)⊆C for each x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, a mapping H:S×C×F→[−∞,∞]H:S\times C\times F\to[-\infty,\infty]H:S×C×F→[−∞,∞], where FFF is the set of functions S→[−∞,∞]S\to[-\infty,\infty]S→[−∞,∞], and a function J0∈FJ_0\in FJ0​∈F with J0>−∞J_0>-\inftyJ0​>−∞. HHH is monotone: J≤J′J\le J'J≤J′ implies H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′)H(x,u,J)\le H(x,u,J')H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′).

A selector is a function μ:S→C\mu:S\to Cμ:S→C with μ(x)∈U(x)\mu(x)\in U(x)μ(x)∈U(x); MMM is the set of selectors, and a policy is a sequence π=(μ0,μ1,… )\pi=(\mu_0,\mu_1,\dots)π=(μ0​,μ1​,…) in MMM. The operators are

Tμ(J)(x)=H(x,μ(x),J),T(J)(x)=inf⁡u∈U(x)H(x,u,J).T_\mu(J)(x)=H(x,\mu(x),J),\qquad T(J)(x)=\inf_{u\in U(x)}H(x,u,J).Tμ​(J)(x)=H(x,μ(x),J),T(J)(x)=u∈U(x)inf​H(x,u,J).

The cost of π\piπ is Jπ(x)=lim⁡N→∞(Tμ0⋯TμN−1)(J0)(x)J_\pi(x)=\lim_{N\to\infty}(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J_0)(x)Jπ​(x)=limN→∞​(Tμ0​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J0​)(x), the optimal cost is J∗(x)=inf⁡πJπ(x)J^*(x)=\inf_{\pi}J_\pi(x)J∗(x)=infπ​Jπ​(x), and JμJ_\muJμ​ is the cost of the stationary policy (μ,μ,… )(\mu,\mu,\dots)(μ,μ,…).

BBB is the Banach space of bounded real functions on SSS with ∥J∥=sup⁡x∣J(x)∣\|J\|=\sup_x|J(x)|∥J∥=supx​∣J(x)∣. Assumption C asks for a closed set Bˉ⊆B\bar B\subseteq BBˉ⊆B containing J0J_0J0​ and invariant under TTT and every TμT_\muTμ​; that every limit defining JπJ_\piJπ​ exist and be real; and that for some integer m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and scalars 0<ρ<10<\rho<10<ρ<1, α>0\alpha>0α>0,

∥Tμ(J)−Tμ(J′)∥≤α∥J−J′∥(J,J′∈B),∥(Tμ0⋯Tμm−1)(J)−(Tμ0⋯Tμm−1)(J′)∥≤ρ∥J−J′∥(J,J′∈Bˉ).\|T_\mu(J)-T_\mu(J')\|\le\alpha\|J-J'\|\quad(J,J'\in B),\qquad \|(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{m-1}})(J)-(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{m-1}})(J')\|\le\rho\|J-J'\|\quad(J,J'\in\bar B).∥Tμ​(J)−Tμ​(J′)∥≤α∥J−J′∥(J,J′∈B),∥(Tμ0​​⋯Tμm−1​​)(J)−(Tμ0​​⋯Tμm−1​​)(J′)∥≤ρ∥J−J′∥(J,J′∈Bˉ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2

Under Assumption C,

J∗∈Bˉ,J∗=T(J∗),J′∈Bˉ, J′=T(J′) ⇒ J′=J∗,J^*\in\bar B,\qquad J^*=T(J^*),\qquad J'\in\bar B,\ J'=T(J')\ \Rightarrow\ J'=J^*,J∗∈Bˉ,J∗=T(J∗),J′∈Bˉ, J′=T(J′) ⇒ J′=J∗,

T(J′)≤J′T(J')\le J'T(J′)≤J′ implies J∗≤J′J^*\le J'J∗≤J′ and J′≤T(J′)J'\le T(J')J′≤T(J′) implies J′≤J∗J'\le J^*J′≤J∗ for J′∈BˉJ'\in\bar BJ′∈Bˉ; each JμJ_\muJμ​ is the unique fixed point of TμT_\muTμ​ in Bˉ\bar BBˉ; and for every J∈BˉJ\in\bar BJ∈Bˉ

lim⁡N→∞∥TN(J)−J∗∥=0,lim⁡N→∞∥TμN(J)−Jμ∥=0.\lim_{N\to\infty}\|T^N(J)-J^*\|=0,\qquad\lim_{N\to\infty}\|T_\mu^N(J)-J_\mu\|=0.N→∞lim​∥TN(J)−J∗∥=0,N→∞lim​∥TμN​(J)−Jμ​∥=0.

The statement carries no constants beyond those of Assumption C.

Milestones

  • Fixed Point Theorem (p. 55): an mmm-step contraction of a nonempty closed subset of a Banach space has a unique fixed point, which attracts every orbit.
  • Proposition 4.1 (p. 53): JπJ_\piJπ​ does not depend on the terminal function in Bˉ\bar BBˉ; inf⁡π(Tμ0⋯TμN−1)(J)=TN(J)\inf_\pi(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J)=T^N(J)infπ​(Tμ0​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J)=TN(J); TmT^mTm and TμmT_\mu^mTμm​ are ρ\rhoρ-contractions on Bˉ\bar BBˉ.
  • Proposition 4.3 (p. 56): (μ∗,μ∗,… )(\mu^*,\mu^*,\dots)(μ∗,μ∗,…) is optimal iff Tμ∗(J∗)=T(J∗)T_{\mu^*}(J^*)=T(J^*)Tμ∗​(J∗)=T(J∗); pointwise optimal policies yield a stationary optimal one; stationary ε\varepsilonε-optimal policies exist.
  • Proposition 4.4 (p. 57): compactness of the sets {u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(Jˉ)]≤λ}\{u\in U(x)\mid H[x,u,T^k(\bar J)]\le\lambda\}{u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(Jˉ)]≤λ} gives policies attaining the DP infimum, and their accumulation points are optimal stationary policies.
  • Proposition 4.11 (p. 69): the discounted minimax model with 0≤g≤b0\le g\le b0≤g≤b and α<1\alpha<1α<1 satisfies Assumption C with Bˉ=B\bar B=BBˉ=B, m=1m=1m=1, ρ=α\rho=\alphaρ=α.

Further result

  • Proposition 4.5 (p. 59), a draft theorem of this mission that is not a milestone: the error bound J∗≤Jμ≤J∗+(2αε1+ε2)(1+α+⋯+αm−1)/(1−ρ)J^*\le J_\mu\le J^*+(2\alpha\varepsilon_1+\varepsilon_2)(1+\alpha+\cdots+\alpha^{m-1})/(1-\rho)J∗≤Jμ​≤J∗+(2αε1​+ε2​)(1+α+⋯+αm−1)/(1−ρ).

Significance

Proposition 4.2 is the existence-and-uniqueness theorem for Bellman's equation in the contraction regime, together with the convergence of value iteration from an arbitrary start in Bˉ\bar BBˉ. Propositions 4.3 to 4.5 turn it into statements about policies: when a stationary optimal policy exists, how one is found from the DP algorithm, and how much is lost when Bellman's equation is solved only approximately. Proposition 4.11 shows the assumption is met by a concrete class of problems, discounted minimax control, and so certifies that the abstract theorems are not vacuous.

The results are classical and have been proved in print since 1978; none of them is open. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version of the abstract theory itself, rather than of a single model. Mathlib has the Banach fixed point theorem for a contracting map of a complete space (ContractingWith) and a lemma for contracting iterates, but not the version on a closed subset with norm convergence of every orbit, and nothing on abstract DP. The platform has proved the finite-state discounted case for a concrete model (BertsekasDP.discounted_main_theorem); the abstract statements here cover infinite state spaces, minimax problems and mmm-step contractions, and are reused by the later missions of this series (generalized models, Chapter 6) and by papers that cite the book.

Difficulty

The first idea is to apply the contraction mapping principle to TTT and read off J∗J^*J∗ as its fixed point. That gives a fixed point of TTT but says nothing about J∗J^*J∗, which is defined as an infimum over all, generally nonstationary, policies of limits of compositions. The identification of the fixed point with J∗J^*J∗ is the content of the proposition, and it is where the Lipschitz condition (2) on all of BBB, not only on Bˉ\bar BBˉ, enters.

Two further features block a direct appeal to Mathlib. The contraction is only mmm-step, so neither TTT nor TμT_\muTμ​ need be a contraction. And HHH takes extended-real values, so every passage between FFF and the Banach space BBB must be justified by the invariance of Bˉ\bar BBˉ.

Formalization scope

The state and control spaces are arbitrary types. FFF is S → EReal; BBB is Mathlib's lp (fun _ : S => ℝ) ⊤, whose norm is the supremum norm, and toF embeds BBB into FFF. Bˉ\bar BBˉ is an arbitrary closed subset of BBB, not BBB itself, and uniqueness of fixed points is asserted within Bˉ\bar BBˉ. Policies are sequences ℕ → M; (Tμ0⋯TμN−1)(J)(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J)(Tμ0​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J) applies TμN−1T_{\mu_{N-1}}TμN−1​​ first. JπJ_\piJπ​ is the pointwise limit (limUnder), which exists and is real under Assumption C; J∗J^*J∗ is the infimum over all policies.

The book computes in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞] with ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, whereas Mathlib's EReal has ⊥+⊤=⊥\bot+\top=\bot⊥+⊤=⊥. No statement adds infinities of opposite sign. A norm bound ∥J−J′∥≤c\|J-J'\|\le c∥J−J′∥≤c between functions of FFF is the predicate SupDistLe: both functions are real at every point and differ by at most ccc, which is what the bound means under the book's arithmetic. Condition (2) is imposed on all of BBB, as on p. 53. The scalars m,ρ,αm,\rho,\alpham,ρ,α of Assumption C are explicit parameters, so the constant of Proposition 4.5 is the book's exact expression. The Fixed Point Theorem assumes Bˉ\bar BBˉ nonempty, which the page leaves implicit and without which the statement is false.

Defining J∗J^*J∗ as the fixed point of TTT, or replacing it by the infimum over stationary policies, would make the goal trivial. Neither is done here: J∗J^*J∗ is the infimum of the policy costs, exactly as in Eq. (8) of Chapter 2.

A complete development needs the mmm-step fixed point theorem on closed subsets of a Banach space, which can be reused well beyond dynamic programming; the elementary calculus of SupDistLe and of the embedding of BBB into S → EReal; and the monotone-operator inequalities of Section 2.1. Contributions of any of these, or alternative proofs of the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific reprint 1996, Chapter 4. http://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Monotone mappings with application in dynamic programming, SIAM J. Control Optim. 15 (1977) 438–464. https://doi.org/10.1137/0315031
  • E. V. Denardo, Contraction mappings in the theory underlying dynamic programming, SIAM Review 9 (1967) 165–177. https://doi.org/10.1137/1009030
  • D. Blackwell, Discounted dynamic programming, Ann. Math. Statist. 36 (1965) 226–235. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700285
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39 (1953) 1095–1100. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Abstract Dynamic Programming, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific 2022. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/abstractdp_MIT.html
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Relaxation Method of Finding the Common Point of Convex Sets and Its Application to the Solution of Problems in Convex Programming 3: A Convergent Relaxation from Z Solves the Equality ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

Many large convex programs have the form "minimize a strictly convex function fff subject to linear equations Ax=bAx=bAx=b". Examples are entropy maximization under moment constraints, the estimation of a matrix with prescribed row and column sums (the matrix-scaling or RAS problem of transportation and input–output analysis), and least-norm solutions of linear systems. When AAA is large and sparse, methods that touch one equation at a time are attractive: each step needs only one row of AAA.

L. M. Bregman's 1967 paper (doi:10.1016/0041-5553(67)90040-7) introduced such a method. §1 defines a "relaxation" for finding a common point of closed convex sets AiA_iAi​, in which each step replaces the current point by its DDD-projection onto one set: the minimizer of a distance-like function D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over that set. §2 chooses DDD from the objective fff itself, D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y)D(x,y)=f(x)-f(y)-(g(y),x-y)D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y) with ggg the gradient of fff; this function is now called the Bregman divergence. Theorem 3 of the paper, the target of this mission, shows that with this choice the relaxation does more than find a feasible point: started at a suitable point, its limit minimizes fff over the feasible set. The resulting row-action methods underlie later work on entropy optimization and matrix balancing (Censor and Zenios, Parallel Optimization, 1997) and the Bregman-projection techniques of modern optimization.

Setting

Work in the Euclidean space EpE^pEp with inner product (⋅,⋅)(\cdot,\cdot)(⋅,⋅). Let S⊂EpS\subset E^pS⊂Ep be a convex set with closure Sˉ\bar SSˉ and interior int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS. Let fff be strictly convex and continuously differentiable over SSS, with gradient g(x)g(x)g(x) at x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, and continuous over Sˉ\bar SSˉ. Let AAA be an m×pm\times pm×p matrix with nonzero rows A1,…,AmA_1,\dots,A_mA1​,…,Am​ and b∈Emb\in E^mb∈Em. The problem (2.1)–(2.3) is

minimize f(x)subject toAx=b, x∈Sˉ,\text{minimize } f(x)\quad\text{subject to}\quad Ax=b,\ x\in\bar S,minimize f(x)subject toAx=b, x∈Sˉ,

with feasible set R={x∈Ep∣Ax=b, x∈Sˉ}R=\{x\in E^p\mid Ax=b,\ x\in\bar S\}R={x∈Ep∣Ax=b, x∈Sˉ}, assumed nonempty. A point of RRR minimizing fff over RRR is a solution.

The function (1.4) is

D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y),D(x,y)=f(x)-f(y)-\bigl(g(y),x-y\bigr),D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y),

and AiA_iAi​ also denotes the hyperplane {x∣(Ai,x)=bi}\{x\mid (A_i,x)=b_i\}{x∣(Ai​,x)=bi​}. The paper assumes that DDD satisfies its conditions I–VI of §1 with respect to these hyperplanes; among them, condition II provides, for every y∈Sy\in Sy∈S, a DDD-projection Piy∈Ai∩SP_iy\in A_i\cap SPi​y∈Ai​∩S minimizing D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S. It also assumes condition (2): if yn∈Sy^n\in Syn∈S and yn→y∗∈Sˉy^n\to y^*\in\bar Syn→y∗∈Sˉ, then D(y∗,yn)→0D(y^*,y^n)\to 0D(y∗,yn)→0.

A relaxation sequence with control (in)n≥0(i_n)_{n\ge0}(in​)n≥0​ starts at x0∈Sx^0\in Sx0∈S and sets xn+1=Pinxnx^{n+1}=P_{i_n}x^nxn+1=Pin​​xn. The control is any sequence of row indices. Finally,

Z={x∈S∣g(x)=uA=∑iuiAi for some u∈Em}Z=\{x\in S\mid g(x)=uA=\textstyle\sum_i u_iA_i\ \text{for some } u\in E^m\}Z={x∈S∣g(x)=uA=∑i​ui​Ai​ for some u∈Em}

is the set of points of SSS at which the gradient lies in the row space of AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

Assume that the DDD-projection of every point of int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS onto every AiA_iAi​ lies in int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS. For every control and every relaxation sequence with x0∈Z∩int⁡Sx^0\in Z\cap\operatorname{int}Sx0∈Z∩intS that converges to a point x∗∈Rx^*\in Rx∗∈R,

f(x∗)≤f(y)for every y∈R.f(x^*)\le f(y)\qquad\text{for every } y\in R .f(x∗)≤f(y)for every y∈R.

Convergence of the sequence is a hypothesis; the theorem says what the limit is, whichever control produced it.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3. If y∗∈R∩Zˉy^*\in R\cap\bar Zy∗∈R∩Zˉ, then y∗y^*y∗ is a solution of (2.1)–(2.3).
  2. (2.7)–(2.8). For x∈int⁡Sx\in\operatorname{int}Sx∈intS there is λ∈R\lambda\in\mathbb Rλ∈R with g(Pix)=g(x)+λAig(P_ix)=g(x)+\lambda A_ig(Pi​x)=g(x)+λAi​ and (Ai,Pix)=bi(A_i,P_ix)=b_i(Ai​,Pi​x)=bi​.
  3. Invariance of ZZZ. PiP_iPi​ maps Z∩int⁡SZ\cap\operatorname{int}SZ∩intS into Z∩int⁡SZ\cap\operatorname{int}SZ∩intS.

An additional item states Note 2: the point and the multiplier in (2.7)–(2.8) are unique.

Significance

Theorem 3 converts a feasibility algorithm into an optimization algorithm for equality-constrained convex programs. Each step solves a one-dimensional problem (the multiplier λ\lambdaλ of a single equation), so the method scales to systems with very many equations, and with the controls of Theorems 1–2 of the same paper it gives a complete algorithm. Specializations include iterative proportional fitting for entropy objectives and Kaczmarz-type projections for f(x)=12∥x∥2f(x)=\tfrac12\|x\|^2f(x)=21​∥x∥2.

The theorem and its proof are classical and have been reproved many times, but no machine-checked proof is known to exist. A formalization produces a verified bridge between three standard pieces of convex analysis: first-order optimality on an affine set, the supporting-hyperplane inequality for a differentiable convex function extended to the closure of its domain, and the passage of a Lagrange condition to a limit. Each is reusable in other row-action and mirror-descent developments.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: the limit is feasible, and the gradient at every iterate lies in the row space of AAA, so the limit satisfies the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. Two steps of this argument fail as stated. First, the gradient is only known on SSS, the limit may lie on the boundary of SSS (or outside SSS, in Sˉ\bar SSˉ), and ggg need not extend continuously there, so the multipliers unu^nun need not converge and no Lagrange condition holds at the limit. Lemma 3 must therefore reach optimality without a gradient at y∗y^*y∗. Second, the Lagrange condition (2.7) at an iterate requires the projection to be an interior minimizer, which is why the theorem carries the hypothesis that PiP_iPi​ preserves int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS; on the boundary of SSS a minimizer over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S need not satisfy (2.7).

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p), rows are vectors a i, and (Ai,x)(A_i,x)(Ai​,x) is the real inner product. The gradient ggg is explicit data tied to fff by HasGradientWithinAt f (g x) S x for x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and continuous on SSS; SSS is not assumed open, and Mathlib's gradient is not used. The relevant explicit choices are:

  • The DDD-projection is a fixed map PPP; condition II says PiyP_iyPi​y minimizes D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S, and condition III is stated for that map.
  • Condition IV is assumed in its one-sided directional form (implied by the paper's), so theorems under it are at least as strong as the paper's.
  • "Compact" in conditions V and VI is sequential compactness. Condition V is assumed for the points of R∩SR\cap SR∩S.
  • Condition (2) is assumed for limits y∗∈Sˉy^*\in\bar Sy∗∈Sˉ; the page prints y∗∈Sy^*\in Sy∗∈S, but its use at a feasible point needs Sˉ\bar SSˉ.
  • Translation slips are corrected in the statements and recorded: condition II's "D(z,x)D(z,x)D(z,x)" and "i∈Ti\in Ti∈T", (2.7)'s "g(xn−1)g(x^{n-1})g(xn−1)" (read g(xn+1)g(x^{n+1})g(xn+1)), and "Theorems 1 − 3" (read Theorems 1–2).
  • The control is an arbitrary sequence of indices in {0,…,m−1}\{0,\dots,m-1\}{0,…,m−1}; λ is named lam.
  • Note 2 is stated for candidate points y,z∈Sy,z\in Sy,z∈S, where ggg is meaningful.

The goal does not conclude that the relaxation converges; a statement asserting convergence is a different, unproved theorem. Equally, it must not be weakened to a fixed control, to an open SSS, or to a limit assumed to lie in ZZZ: any of these would trivialize the passage to the limit that the theorem is about.

A complete development needs the first-order condition for a local minimum on an affine hyperplane, the gradient inequality f(x)≥f(y)+(g(y),x−y)f(x)\ge f(y)+(g(y),x-y)f(x)≥f(y)+(g(y),x−y) for x∈Sˉx\in\bar Sx∈Sˉ, y∈Sy\in Sy∈S, and an induction along the relaxation sequence. Proofs of the milestones and of Note 2 are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • L. M. Bregman, The relaxation method of finding the common point of convex sets and its application to the solution of problems in convex programming, USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 7(3) (1967) 200–217. doi:10.1016/0041-5553(67)90040-7
  • Y. Censor, S. A. Zenios, Parallel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications, Oxford University Press, 1997. doi:10.1093/oso/9780195100624.001.0001
  • Y. Censor, A. Lent, An iterative row-action method for interval convex programming, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 34 (1981) 321–353. doi:10.1007/BF00934676
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under which a retailer pays a per-unit wholesale price and keeps only a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of its revenue, the rest going to the supplier. The contracts were made prominent by the video rental industry around 1998, where studios lowered tape prices in exchange for a share of rental income.

With a single retailer, revenue sharing at the wholesale price ϕc\phi cϕc coordinates the channel and splits its profit in the proportion ϕ\phiϕ. This mission formalizes the extension in Section 3.2 of the paper to competing retailers: several locations whose revenues depend on each other's stock, so that one retailer's order lowers the others' revenue. Competition creates externalities the single-retailer argument does not have, and the question is whether revenue sharing still coordinates, and at what prices. Section 4.1.2 then works out a Cournot example in closed form, measuring how far the supplier's own optimal wholesale price leaves the channel from the integrated profit.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000; the published version (Management Science 51(1), 2005) renumbers and revises the results. The working paper numbers no theorem, so results are cited by section, displayed equation and page.

Setting

A single supplier sells one product through nnn locations i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, each run by an independent retailer. A stocking profile is qˉ=(q1,…,qn)\bar q = (q_1,\dots,q_n)qˉ​=(q1​,…,qn​), and the revenue at location iii is Ri(qˉ)R_i(\bar q)Ri​(qˉ​), which may depend on every location's quantity. The system revenue is R(qˉ)=∑iRi(qˉ)R(\bar q) = \sum_i R_i(\bar q)R(qˉ​)=∑i​Ri​(qˉ​), every unit costs the supplier c>0c > 0c>0, and the integrated system profit is

Π(qˉ)=R(qˉ)−c∑i=1nqi.\Pi(\bar q) = R(\bar q) - c\sum_{i=1}^n q_i .Π(qˉ​)=R(qˉ​)−ci=1∑n​qi​.

Write Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj(qˉ)/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j(\bar q)/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​(qˉ​)/∂qi​: the superscript is the variable differentiated, the subscript the revenue function. The paper assumes that each RiR_iRi​ is continuous, that ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0 for j≠ij \ne ij=i (locations are substitutes), and that RiR_iRi​ is unimodal in qiq_iqi​. The system-optimal profile qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I has positive entries and solves the first-order system

Rii(qˉI)+∑j≠iRji(qˉI)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)R_i^i(\bar q^I) + \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I) = c, \qquad i = 1,\dots,n. \tag{6}Rii​(qˉ​I)+j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)

Under a revenue-sharing contract (ϕ,wi)(\phi, w_i)(ϕ,wi​) retailer iii earns πri(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi(qˉ)−wiqi\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \phi R_i(\bar q) - w_i q_iπri​​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi​(qˉ​)−wi​qi​ and the supplier earns πs(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i((1−ϕ)Ri(qˉ)+wiqi)−c∑iqi\pi_s(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \sum_i\big((1-\phi)R_i(\bar q) + w_i q_i\big) - c\sum_i q_iπs​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i​((1−ϕ)Ri​(qˉ​)+wi​qi​)−c∑i​qi​; the wholesale-price contract is ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, with profits written πri(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\bar w)πri​​(qˉ​,wˉ) and πs(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_s(\bar q,\bar w)πs​(qˉ​,wˉ). A Nash equilibrium in order quantities is a profile qˉ≥0\bar q \ge 0qˉ​≥0 from which no retailer gains by changing its own quantity to any x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The coordinating wholesale prices are

wiI=c−∑j≠iRji(qˉI).w_i^I = c - \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I).wiI​=c−j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I).

The Cournot example (7) is Ri(qˉ)=qi(1−qi−β∑j≠iqj)R_i(\bar q) = q_i\big(1 - q_i - \beta\sum_{j\ne i} q_j\big)Ri​(qˉ​)=qi​(1−qi​−β∑j=i​qj​) with 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing supports qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

For ϕ∈[0,1]\phi\in[0,1]ϕ∈[0,1] and wi(ϕ)=ϕwiIw_i(\phi) = \phi w_i^Iwi​(ϕ)=ϕwiI​:

qˉI is a Nash equilibrium,πri(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕ πri(qˉI,wˉI),πs(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉI)+ϕ πs(qˉI,wˉI).\bar q^I \text{ is a Nash equilibrium},\quad \pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = \phi\,\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I),\quad \pi_s(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = (1-\phi)\Pi(\bar q^I) + \phi\,\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I).qˉ​I is a Nash equilibrium,πri​​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕπri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI),πs​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉ​I)+ϕπs​(qˉ​I,wˉI).

Wholesale-price contracts (Sec. 3.2, pp. 13–14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies Rii(qˉN)=wiR_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_iRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​ (Eq. (8)), so marginal-cost pricing does not support qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I when a location imposes a negative externality; the prices wˉI\bar w^IwˉI make qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I an equilibrium; wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c when cross-effects are nonpositive; and wˉI\bar w^IwˉI supports exactly the split πs(qˉI,wˉI)=∑iqiI∑j≠i(−Rji(qˉI))\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) = \sum_i q_i^I\sum_{j\ne i}(-R_j^i(\bar q^I))πs​(qˉ​I,wˉI)=∑i​qiI​∑j=i​(−Rji​(qˉ​I)).

Revenue sharing (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies ϕRii(qˉN)=wi(ϕ)\phi R_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_i(\phi)ϕRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​(ϕ); the two profit identities hold for every ϕ\phiϕ; and πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0.

The Cournot example (Sec. 4.1.2, pp. 19–20)

At a common price w<1w<1w<1 the unique equilibrium is qiN=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1))q_i^N = (1-w)/(2+\beta(n-1))qiN​=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1)); the integrated optimum is qiI=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))q_i^I = (1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))qiI​=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)); the coordinating price wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))w^I = c + \beta(n-1)(1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)) increases in β\betaβ and nnn; the supplier's optimal price is w∗=(1+c)/2w^* = (1+c)/2w∗=(1+c)/2; and the efficiency at w∗w^*w∗ is

Π(qˉN(w∗))Π(qˉI)=1−1(2+β(n−1))2.\frac{\Pi(\bar q^N(w^*))}{\Pi(\bar q^I)} = 1 - \frac{1}{(2+\beta(n-1))^2}.Π(qˉ​I)Π(qˉ​N(w∗))​=1−(2+β(n−1))21​.

Significance

The goal shows that the single-retailer coordination result survives competition, with one change: the coordinating price must charge each retailer for the externality it imposes on the others, so it depends on every location's revenue function, and wiIw^I_iwiI​ exceeds the production cost. The supplier's profit then moves along a line between what wholesale prices alone give her and the whole system profit, which is how revenue sharing provides a profit split that linear prices cannot. The Cournot results make the comparison quantitative: when retailers compete intensely, the supplier's own optimal wholesale price already achieves most of the integrated profit, so revenue sharing, which has administrative costs, is less attractive.

No machine-checked proof of these results is known. The mission produces a reusable formal description of an nnn-player quantity game under per-retailer linear contracts, equilibrium conditions for it, and a fully worked Cournot instance, including a uniqueness claim for equilibria among all (not only symmetric) profiles.

Difficulty

The equilibrium claims are global: a retailer must not gain from any nonnegative deviation, not only from small ones. A first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I does not give this by itself. The page assumes RiR_iRi​ unimodal in qiq_iqi​, but unimodality does not survive subtracting the linear purchase cost, so the first-order condition is not sufficient under that assumption alone; the formalization uses concavity in the own quantity, under which it is. The participation claim πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 is stated on the page without proof and needs a bound on the revenue of a location that stocks nothing.

In the Cournot example, uniqueness of the equilibrium must exclude asymmetric profiles and profiles where some retailers stock nothing, and the supplier's optimal price must be compared against every equilibrium at every price, including prices at which the retailers order nothing.

Formalization scope

Locations are Fin n; a profile is Fin n → ℝ; revenues are R : Fin n → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ, and dR i j q is Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​/∂qi​, given as a partial derivative at every profile with all entries positive. A deviation of retailer iii to xxx is Function.update q i x, and Nash equilibria quantify over all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The standing assumptions of Section 3.2 are fields of the structure Model: c>0c > 0c>0; continuity of RiR_iRi​ on the nonnegative orthant; the partial derivatives; ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0, encoded as "RiiR_i^iRii​ does not increase in qjq_jqj​"; and concavity of RiR_iRi​ in qiq_iqi​, which is the formalization's reading of "unimodal in qiq_iqi​". The paper's assumption that marginal revenue eventually falls below every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 is used only for existence of an equilibrium, which is not formalized, and is omitted.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I is taken as any positive solution of (6); its optimality for Π\PiΠ is not used.
  • "qˉ∗\bar q^*qˉ​∗ is a Nash equilibrium" (p. 13) is read as qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I.
  • In ϕ(Ri(qˉI)−qiIwi)\phi(R_i(\bar q^I) - q_i^I w_i)ϕ(Ri​(qˉ​I)−qiI​wi​) (p. 14), wiw_iwi​ is read as wiIw_i^IwiI​.
  • "Rii(qˉI)>cR_i^i(\bar q^I) > cRii​(qˉ​I)>c" needs a negative externality ∑j≠iRji(qˉI)<0\sum_{j\ne i}R_j^i(\bar q^I) < 0∑j=i​Rji​(qˉ​I)<0, which is assumed.
  • "Rji(qˉ)≤0R_j^i(\bar q) \le 0Rji​(qˉ​)≤0" is not a standing assumption, so it is a hypothesis of wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c, and strictness needs some strictly negative cross-effect.
  • πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 assumes nonnegative revenue at a location that stocks nothing.
  • In the Cournot example the implicit w<1w < 1w<1 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 are hypotheses; all retailers pay a common price; "increasing" is strict exactly where it holds (n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 for β\betaβ, β>0\beta > 0β>0 for nnn).

A formalization that defines "the prices coordinate" as "the prices satisfy the first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I" restates (6) and is ruled out: every equilibrium claim here is the game-theoretic statement about unilateral deviations. Contributions welcome: proofs of the equilibrium lemmas from concavity and the derivative, the Cournot uniqueness argument, and a general existence theorem for the quantity game.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991 (Theorem 1.2, existence of pure-strategy equilibria).
  • F. Bernstein, A. Federgruen, Pricing and Replenishment Strategies in a Distribution System with Competing Retailers, Operations Research 51(3):409–426, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.3.409.14957
  • J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
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Dimensioning Large Call Centers III: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Quality-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Motivation

How many agents should a call center staff? Telephone call centers employ millions of people, and staffing is their largest cost, so the question is asked every half hour of every day (Gans, Koole & Mandelbaum, 2003). The classical model is the M/M/N (Erlang-C) queue: calls arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ, service times are exponential with mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, and NNN agents serve in parallel. Practitioners use the square-root safety staffing rule N≈λ/μ+yλ/μN \approx \lambda/\mu + y\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}N≈λ/μ+yλ/μ​, which Halfin and Whitt (1981) justified in the regime where the probability of waiting stays bounded away from 000 and 111.

Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; published as Operations Research 52(1), 2004) asked when such a rule is actually optimal: given a staffing cost and a waiting cost, which staffing level minimizes total cost as the arrival rate grows? They identified three regimes according to how the two costs compare. This mission formalizes their third case, the quality-driven regime, in which waiting is so expensive relative to staffing that the optimal number of agents exceeds the offered load by more than any fixed multiple of its square root.

Setting

Fix a service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0. For every arrival rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 a waiting-cost function DλD_\lambdaDλ​ assigns cost Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) to a wait of ttt time units; it satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0) = 0Dλ​(0)=0, is strictly increasing, and t↦Dλ(t)e−θtt \mapsto D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}t↦Dλ​(t)e−θt is integrable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0. A staffing cost FFF, defined for real N>0N > 0N>0, is convex and strictly increasing.

For an integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ the probability of waiting is the Erlang-C formula

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−ν/N)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,ν=λ/μ,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigl\{(1-\nu/N)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!} + \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigr\}^{-1},\qquad \nu = \lambda/\mu,π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−ν/N)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,ν=λ/μ,

the expected waiting cost of a delayed customer is G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt, and the total cost per unit time is C(N,λ)=F(N)+λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ)C(N,\lambda) = F(N) + \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda)C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ). An optimal staffing level Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ minimizes C(⋅,λ)C(\cdot,\lambda)C(⋅,λ) over the integers N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ.

Write Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, and for x>0x > 0x>0 put Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x) = F(N_\lambda(x)) - F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), and πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ), where H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1H(M,\alpha) = \{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt\}^{-1}H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1 extends the Erlang-C formula to real MMM. The normalized cost is Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x) = F_\lambda(x) + \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x), and a surrogate cost is C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z)C[z;\hat F,\hat\pi,\hat G] = \hat F(z) + \hat\pi(z)\hat G(z)C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z). Rounding is measured by Sλ(x)=min⁡{C(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)}S_\lambda(x) = \min\{C(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda), C(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda)\}Sλ​(x)=min{C(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)}.

Two special functions appear. The Halfin–Whitt delay function is P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x))P(x) = 1/(1 + x/h(-x))P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x)) with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate. The Stirling-type approximation is

Qλ(x)=exp⁡{Nλ(x)[1−rλ(x)+log⁡rλ(x)]}2πNλ(x) (1−rλ(x)),rλ(x)=λ/μNλ(x).Q_\lambda(x) = \frac{\exp\{N_\lambda(x)[1 - r_\lambda(x) + \log r_\lambda(x)]\}}{\sqrt{2\pi N_\lambda(x)}\,(1-r_\lambda(x))},\qquad r_\lambda(x) = \frac{\lambda/\mu}{N_\lambda(x)}.Qλ​(x)=2πNλ​(x)​(1−rλ​(x))exp{Nλ​(x)[1−rλ​(x)+logrλ​(x)]}​,rλ​(x)=Nλ​(x)λ/μ​.

Asymptotic relations are limits of ratios as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞: aλ≈∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} b_\lambdaaλ​≈∞bλ​ means aλ/bλ→1a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 1aλ​/bλ​→1, and aλ≪∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} b_\lambdaaλ​≪∞​bλ​ means aλ/bλ→0a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 0aλ​/bλ​→0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

Assume the regime is quality-driven, display (27): Fλ(κ)≪∞Gλ(κ)F_\lambda(\kappa) \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} G_\lambda(\kappa)Fλ​(κ)≪∞​Gλ​(κ) for every κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0. Let yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ minimize Fλ(y)+Qλ(y)Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y) + Q_\lambda(y)G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Qλ​(y)Gλ​(y) over y>0y > 0y>0. Then

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)}{C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)} = 1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The statement fixes no constants and no rate; it asserts only that rounding the surrogate optimum loses a vanishing fraction of the excess cost.

Milestones

In attack order: Lemma C.1 (GλG_\lambdaGλ​ strictly convex decreasing); the identity H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integer NNN (Section 3, p. 12); Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2; Corollary 3.3 (the asymptotic optimality criterion); Lemma B.1 (PPP strictly convex decreasing); display (15); Lemma 4.1 (Halfin and Whitt); and the first statement of Lemma 4.2, πλ(xλ)≈∞Qλ(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda) \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} Q_\lambda(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈∞Qλ​(xλ​) whenever xλ→∞x_\lambda\to\inftyxλ​→∞.

Significance

Theorem 7.1 completes the paper's picture of optimal staffing. In the rationalized regime the square-root rule with the Halfin–Whitt function PPP is optimal; in the efficiency-driven regime staffing barely exceeds the load; in the quality-driven regime the staffing excess outgrows λ/μ\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}λ/μ​ and PPP must be replaced by the Stirling-type expression QλQ_\lambdaQλ​. The theorem gives a one-dimensional minimization whose solution is asymptotically optimal, which turns a discrete optimization over NNN into a smooth problem, and it marks the boundary of validity of square-root staffing.

The result is proved in the paper; it is not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. A complete development formalizes the Section 3 framework (shared with the other regimes of the same paper), the convexity of GλG_\lambdaGλ​ and of PPP, the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, and the Stirling-type asymptotics of the Erlang-C formula. Each of these is a reusable piece of queueing theory in Lean.

Difficulty

The regime theorem itself is short once the framework is in place; the weight lies in the analytic lemmas. Lemma 4.2 requires uniform asymptotics of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at a staffing excess xλx_\lambdaxλ​ that may grow at any rate, from barely faster than a constant to faster than λ\sqrt{\lambda}λ​, where neither the central-limit picture of Halfin and Whitt nor a single Stirling expansion covers all cases. Lemma 4.1 concerns the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at non-integer server counts, whereas Halfin and Whitt's theorem is about integer ones. The natural first idea, that the goal follows from Corollary 3.3 by plugging in Lemma 4.2, does not apply directly: Lemma 4.2 only covers staffing excesses that tend to infinity, and nothing in the definition of the true optimum xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ or the surrogate optimum yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ says that they do.

Formalization scope

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ as a positive real, and λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞ is the filter atTop on R\mathbb{R}R with μ\muμ fixed. The standing assumptions on μ\muμ and DλD_\lambdaDλ​ are the structure WaitModel; FFF is a function argument with hypotheses ConvexOn and StrictMonoOn on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Staffing levels NNN are natural numbers. Minimizers (Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​, zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are function arguments with minimality hypotheses at every λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, so every statement holds for every choice among ties. Liminf and limsup relations are stated through Filter.Frequently, avoiding boundedness side conditions.

The queue itself (Poisson arrivals, waiting-time law) is not formalized: the paper's analysis and all its theorems concern the closed-form cost C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ) with the Erlang-C formula.

Conventions committed to: (i) the goal adds the hypothesis G(N,λ)→∞G(N,\lambda)\to\inftyG(N,λ)→∞ as N↓λ/μN\downarrow\lambda/\muN↓λ/μ, which the paper asserts on p. 12 to show the continuous optimum exists but which does not follow from its standing assumptions (it holds exactly when DλD_\lambdaDλ​ is unbounded); (ii) in SλS_\lambdaSλ​ the floor term is omitted when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ, since the cost is undefined at unstable levels; (iii) the integrability of Dλ(t)e−θtD_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}Dλ​(t)e−θt is explicit, because a Lean integral of a non-integrable function is 000; (iv) P(0)=1P(0) = 1P(0)=1, the value of formula (11) at 000; (v) display (15) is stated for b>0b > 0b>0, since the ratio aλ/ba_\lambda/baλ​/b is undefined at b=0b = 0b=0. The instance μ=1\mu = 1μ=1, F(N)=cNF(N) = cNF(N)=cN, Dλ(t)=aλ tD_\lambda(t) = a\sqrt{\lambda}\,tDλ​(t)=aλ​t (Section 9) satisfies every hypothesis of the goal, so the goal is not vacuous; taking πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ or GλG_\lambdaGλ​ at Lean default values is ruled out by these explicit domain conditions.

Only the first statement of Lemma 4.2 is a milestone: the second, πλ(xλ)≈Q(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)\approx Q(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈Q(xλ​) under xλ≤sup⁡λ1/6x_\lambda \stackrel{\sup}{\le} \lambda^{1/6}xλ​≤sup​λ1/6, fails as printed at xλ=λ1/6x_\lambda = \lambda^{1/6}xλ​=λ1/6. Contributions on the Erlang-C asymptotics, the normal hazard rate, and Laplace transforms of increasing functions are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000 (the version formalized here; every index and page cited in this mission is the report's).
  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • N. Gans, G. Koole, A. Mandelbaum, Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(2):79–141, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case I: Finite-Horizon Abstract Dynamic Programming — the DP Algorithm Yields the N-Stage Optimal CostTextbook

Motivation

Dynamic programming (DP) solves sequential decision problems by backward recursion: compute the optimal cost of the last stage, then of the last two stages, and so on. For problems with finitely many states and controls and real-valued costs, the recursion obviously gives the optimal cost. Applications are rarely like that. Control spaces are continuous, costs can be unbounded or infinite, the criterion can be multiplicative (risk-sensitive exponential cost) or worst-case (minimax), and the set of policies is an infinite product of function spaces. In this setting the DP recursion can fail to produce the optimal cost.

Bertsekas and Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case (Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996), Part I, separates the order-theoretic content of DP from the measure theory. It works with an abstract monotone mapping HHH that covers deterministic, stochastic, multiplicative-cost and minimax problems at once, following Bertsekas, Monotone mappings with application in dynamic programming, SIAM J. Control Optim. 15 (1977). Chapter 3 answers the finite-horizon questions: when does the DP algorithm give the NNN-stage optimal cost, and when do optimal or nearly optimal policies exist? This mission is the first of a series formalizing the book. Later chapters (contraction models, monotone increase and decrease models, the Borel models of Part II) are built on the model fixed here.

Setting

Let SSS (states) and CCC (controls) be sets, and for each x∈Sx\in Sx∈S let U(x)⊆CU(x)\subseteq CU(x)⊆C be a nonempty control constraint set. Write R∗=[−∞,∞]R^*=[-\infty,\infty]R∗=[−∞,∞] and let FFF be the set of all functions J:S→R∗J:S\to R^*J:S→R∗, ordered pointwise. A mapping H:S×C×F→R∗H:S\times C\times F\to R^*H:S×C×F→R∗ is given, subject to the Monotonicity Assumption: J≤J′J\le J'J≤J′ implies H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′)H(x,u,J)\le H(x,u,J')H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′) for all x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, u∈U(x)u\in U(x)u∈U(x).

A selector is a function μ:S→C\mu:S\to Cμ:S→C with μ(x)∈U(x)\mu(x)\in U(x)μ(x)∈U(x) for all xxx. A policy is a sequence π=(μ0,μ1,… )\pi=(\mu_0,\mu_1,\dots)π=(μ0​,μ1​,…) of selectors. Define

Tμ(J)(x)=H[x,μ(x),J],T(J)(x)=inf⁡u∈U(x)H(x,u,J),T_\mu(J)(x)=H[x,\mu(x),J],\qquad T(J)(x)=\inf_{u\in U(x)}H(x,u,J),Tμ​(J)(x)=H[x,μ(x),J],T(J)(x)=u∈U(x)inf​H(x,u,J),

and let TkT^kTk be the kkk-fold composition of TTT. A terminal function J0∈FJ_0\in FJ0​∈F with J0(x)>−∞J_0(x)>-\inftyJ0​(x)>−∞ for all xxx is fixed. The NNN-stage cost of π\piπ and the NNN-stage optimal cost are

JN,π=(Tμ0Tμ1⋯TμN−1)(J0),JN∗(x)=inf⁡πJN,π(x).J_{N,\pi}=(T_{\mu_0}T_{\mu_1}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J_0),\qquad J^*_N(x)=\inf_{\pi}J_{N,\pi}(x).JN,π​=(Tμ0​​Tμ1​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J0​),JN∗​(x)=πinf​JN,π​(x).

A policy is uniformly NNN-stage optimal if each tail (μi,μi+1,… )(\mu_i,\mu_{i+1},\dots)(μi​,μi+1​,…) is (N−i)(N-i)(N−i)-stage optimal, and NNN-stage ε\varepsilonε-optimal if JN,π(x)≤JN∗(x)+εJ_{N,\pi}(x)\le J^*_N(x)+\varepsilonJN,π​(x)≤JN∗​(x)+ε where JN∗(x)>−∞J^*_N(x)>-\inftyJN∗​(x)>−∞ and JN,π(x)≤−1/εJ_{N,\pi}(x)\le-1/\varepsilonJN,π​(x)≤−1/ε where JN∗(x)=−∞J^*_N(x)=-\inftyJN∗​(x)=−∞.

The three conditions on HHH used in the chapter are F.1 (continuity of HHH along nonincreasing sequences JkJ_kJk​ with H(x,u,J1)<∞H(x,u,J_1)<\inftyH(x,u,J1​)<∞), F.2 (there is α>0\alpha>0α>0 with H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J+r)≤H(x,u,J)+αrH(x,u,J)\le H(x,u,J+r)\le H(x,u,J)+\alpha rH(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J+r)≤H(x,u,J)+αr for all r>0r>0r>0), and F.3 (a quantitative selection property with a constant β>0\beta>0β>0).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1

Under F.1, if Jk,π(x)<∞J_{k,\pi}(x)<\inftyJk,π​(x)<∞ for all x,πx,\pix,π and k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N; or under F.2, if Jk∗(x)>−∞J^*_k(x)>-\inftyJk∗​(x)>−∞ for all xxx and k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N:

JN∗=TN(J0),J^*_N=T^N(J_0),JN∗​=TN(J0​),

and under F.2, for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is πε\pi_\varepsilonπε​ with JN∗≤JN,πε≤JN∗+εJ^*_N\le J_{N,\pi_\varepsilon}\le J^*_N+\varepsilonJN∗​≤JN,πε​​≤JN∗​+ε.

Milestones

  • Proposition 3.3: π∗\pi^*π∗ is uniformly NNN-stage optimal iff (Tμk∗TN−k−1)(J0)=TN−k(J0)(T_{\mu^*_k}T^{N-k-1})(J_0)=T^{N-k}(J_0)(Tμk∗​​TN−k−1)(J0​)=TN−k(J0​) for k<Nk<Nk<N. Needs monotonicity only.
  • Corollary 3.3.1: a uniformly NNN-stage optimal policy exists iff every infimum Tk+1(J0)(x)=inf⁡uH[x,u,Tk(J0)]T^{k+1}(J_0)(x)=\inf_{u}H[x,u,T^k(J_0)]Tk+1(J0​)(x)=infu​H[x,u,Tk(J0​)] is attained, and then JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​).
  • Proposition 3.4: if CCC is Hausdorff and every sublevel set {u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(J0)]≤λ}\{u\in U(x)\mid H[x,u,T^k(J_0)]\le\lambda\}{u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(J0​)]≤λ} is compact, then JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) and a uniformly NNN-stage optimal policy exists.
  • Proposition 3.7: the minimax mapping H(x,u,J)=sup⁡w∈W(x,u){g+αJ[f]}H(x,u,J)=\sup_{w\in W(x,u)}\{g+\alpha J[f]\}H(x,u,J)=supw∈W(x,u)​{g+αJ[f]} satisfies F.2 with constant α\alphaα.
  • Proposition 3.6: the multiplicative mapping H(x,u,J)=E{g J[f]∣x,u}H(x,u,J)=E\{g\,J[f]\mid x,u\}H(x,u,J)=E{gJ[f]∣x,u} over a countable disturbance set satisfies F.1, and F.2 with constant bbb when 0≤g≤b0\le g\le b0≤g≤b.
  • Proposition 3.2: under F.3 and the finiteness of Jk,πJ_{k,\pi}Jk,π​, JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) and, for εn↓0\varepsilon_n\downarrow0εn​↓0, policies with {εn}\{\varepsilon_n\}{εn​}-dominated convergence to optimality exist.
  • Corollary 3.7.1(a): for minimax control with J0=0J_0=0J0​=0 and Jk∗>−∞J^*_k>-\inftyJk∗​>−∞, the DP algorithm gives JN∗J^*_NJN∗​ and NNN-stage ε\varepsilonε-optimal policies exist.

Significance

The identity JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) says that an infimum over an infinite-dimensional policy space equals NNN nested one-dimensional infima. Every numerical use of finite-horizon DP depends on it, and so do the infinite-horizon results of later chapters, which pass to the limit in TN(J0)T^N(J_0)TN(J0​). Corollary 3.3.1 and Proposition 3.4 give the existence of optimal policies, and Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 verify the abstract hypotheses for two models outside standard expected additive cost.

These results are proved in the book; none of them is formalized. Mathlib has no abstract DP model, and the platform's finite-horizon results (Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Prop. 1.3.1 and the minimax DP algorithm) assume finite disturbance and constraint sets and real costs. They are special cases, not this theory. The finite-horizon results of the 1977 paper (Lemma 3.1 here, on compact sublevel sets, and Corollary 3.1.1, the F.1′ case) are already posed on the platform and are not posed again.

Difficulty

The obvious argument interchanges the infimum over policies with the composition of operators: inf⁡πTμ0(⋯ )=T(inf⁡π′⋯ )\inf_\pi T_{\mu_0}(\cdots)=T(\inf_{\pi'}\cdots)infπ​Tμ0​​(⋯)=T(infπ′​⋯). The inequality TN(J0)≤JN∗T^N(J_0)\le J^*_NTN(J0​)≤JN∗​ follows from monotonicity alone. The reverse inequality is the content. Taking a near-minimizing selector at each stage requires either passing a limit inside HHH (F.1) or bounding how errors at later stages propagate through HHH (F.2, F.3). Both steps break at infinite values. With Jk∗(x)=−∞J^*_k(x)=-\inftyJk∗​(x)=−∞ there may be no ε\varepsilonε-optimal policy at all (Counterexample 4 of the book). Without F.1 or F.2 the identity itself fails (Counterexamples 1–3). A proof must therefore track separately the states where the optimal cost is −∞-\infty−∞, which is why F.3 and the definition of ε\varepsilonε-optimality have two cases.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure Model S C with fields U, U_nonempty, H : S → C → (S → EReal) → EReal and the monotonicity proof. Policies are ℕ → Selector, with selectors as a subtype of S → C. TNT^NTN is m.T^[N], and (Tμ0⋯TμN−1)(J)(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J)(Tμ0​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J) is a recursion that applies TμN−1T_{\mu_{N-1}}TμN−1​​ first. All values lie in EReal. The book's convention ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞ never arises in Propositions 3.1–3.4, which only add real numbers to extended reals. The minimax and multiplicative mappings implement it explicitly (badd, and an expectation that returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part diverges). Every theorem assumes J0>−∞J_0>-\inftyJ0​>−∞ and N≥1N\ge1N≥1. Assumptions F.1–F.3 are predicates on the model. F.2 is also available with a named constant (F2With) so that Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 can carry the book's constants bbb and α\alphaα.

JN∗J^*_NJN∗​ is defined as an infimum over policies of the composed operators, never through TTT, so the goal is not true by definition. A formalization in which JN,πJ_{N,\pi}JN,π​ already contains an infimum over controls would make Proposition 3.1 hold by rfl, and this one rules that out.

Proving the goal needs elementary EReal order arithmetic, iterated infima over subtypes, and pointwise selection of near-minimizers via choice. Proposition 3.6 additionally needs monotone and dominated convergence for countable sums in ℝ≥0∞. The model and operator definitions are reusable by the later missions of the series (contraction, monotone increase and decrease models). Proofs of any milestone, and reusable EReal lemmas about shifting by real constants, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996, Chapters 2–3. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Monotone mappings with application in dynamic programming, SIAM J. Control Optim. 15(3) (1977) 438–464. https://doi.org/10.1137/0315031
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control, Academic Press 1976.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Abstract Dynamic Programming, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific 2022. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/abstractdp_MIT.html
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation II: Two Players with a Common Terminal in an Undirected Graph Have Price of Stability at Most 4/3, and This Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

In network design games, selfish users build a shared network and split the cost of every edge among the users of that edge. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), DOI 10.1137/070680096) studied the fair connection game, in which the cost of an edge is shared equally (the Shapley value) among its users. In this game the worst equilibrium can cost kkk times the optimum, so the relevant measure is the price of stability: the ratio between the cheapest pure Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized design. Their Theorem 2.1 bounds it by the harmonic number H(k)=1+12+⋯+1kH(k)=1+\frac12+\dots+\frac1kH(k)=1+21​+⋯+k1​ in every directed graph, and that bound is tight for directed graphs.

For undirected graphs the paper notes that H(k)H(k)H(k) is not tight and calls the correct bound "an interesting open problem". Its Section 4 settles the smallest case: two players with a common terminal. The general theorem gives H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2 there; Claim 4.1 improves this to 4/34/34/3, and a three-node example shows that 4/34/34/3 is the right value.

Timeline. Rosenthal (1973) showed that congestion games have pure Nash equilibria through a potential function. Anshelevich et al. (FOCS 2004; journal version 2008) introduced the price of stability for the fair connection game, proved the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound and the two-player undirected bound 4/34/34/3 treated here. Subsequent work studied the undirected multi-player case, which remains without a matching upper and lower bound in general.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite undirected simple graph, with a cost ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0 on every edge eee. There are two players, a common terminal s∈Vs\in Vs∈V and personal terminals t1,t2∈Vt_1,t_2\in Vt1​,t2​∈V. A strategy of player iii is a set of edges Si⊆ES_i\subseteq ESi​⊆E that connects tit_iti​ with sss: in the graph (V,Si)(V,S_i)(V,Si​), tit_iti​ and sss lie in the same connected component. A profile is a pair S=(S1,S2)S=(S_1,S_2)S=(S1​,S2​) of strategies.

Under fair cost sharing each edge is paid for equally by the players using it. With xe∈{1,2}x_e\in\{1,2\}xe​∈{1,2} the number of players whose strategy contains eee, player iii pays

Ci(S)=∑e∈Sicexe.C_i(S)=\sum_{e\in S_i}\frac{c_e}{x_e}.Ci​(S)=e∈Si​∑​xe​ce​​.

A pure Nash equilibrium is a profile in which no player can lower its payment by switching to another strategy while the other player's strategy stays fixed. The total cost of a profile is the cost of the network it builds,

cost(S)=∑e∈S1∪S2ce.\mathrm{cost}(S)=\sum_{e\in S_1\cup S_2}c_e .cost(S)=e∈S1​∪S2​∑​ce​.

For a set FFF of edges write cost(F)=∑e∈Fce\mathrm{cost}(F)=\sum_{e\in F}c_ecost(F)=∑e∈F​ce​. For a profile (S1,S2)(S_1,S_2)(S1​,S2​), the quantities x1=cost(S1∖S2)x_1=\mathrm{cost}(S_1\setminus S_2)x1​=cost(S1​∖S2​), x2=cost(S2∖S1)x_2=\mathrm{cost}(S_2\setminus S_1)x2​=cost(S2​∖S1​) and x3=cost(S1∩S2)x_3=\mathrm{cost}(S_1\cap S_2)x3​=cost(S1​∩S2​) split the total cost into the private and the shared parts.

The game is an instance of a congestion game, with per-user latency ce/xc_e/xce​/x on edge eee; the mission builds on the published congestion-game layer CongestionPoA.AsymSum.Model.

Formalization targets

Goal: Claim 4.1 and its tightness

If the game has a profile, then some pure Nash equilibrium SSS satisfies

cost(S) ≤ 43 cost(P)for every profile P.\mathrm{cost}(S)\ \le\ \tfrac43\,\mathrm{cost}(P)\qquad\text{for every profile }P.cost(S) ≤ 34​cost(P)for every profile P.

Moreover, in the three-node example (nodes s,t1,t2s,t_1,t_2s,t1​,t2​, edges (s,t1),(s,t2)(s,t_1),(s,t_2)(s,t1​),(s,t2​) of cost 222, edge (t1,t2)(t_1,t_2)(t1​,t2​) of cost 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε, with 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1) the cheapest pure Nash equilibrium costs exactly 444 and the optimum costs exactly 3+ε3+\varepsilon3+ε, so the ratio 4/(3+ε)4/(3+\varepsilon)4/(3+ε) approaches 4/34/34/3.

Milestones

  1. (4.1). From every profile (S1,S2)(S_1,S_2)(S1​,S2​), some pure Nash equilibrium (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​) has y1+y2+32y3≤x1+x2+32x3y_1+y_2+\frac32y_3\le x_1+x_2+\frac32x_3y1​+y2​+23​y3​≤x1​+x2​+23​x3​, where yiy_iyi​ are the quantities of (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​).
  2. Deviation inequalities. If (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​) is a Nash equilibrium and each SiS_iSi​ is an inclusion-minimal strategy, then y1+y32≤x1+x2+y22+y32y_1+\frac{y_3}2\le x_1+x_2+\frac{y_2}2+\frac{y_3}2y1​+2y3​​≤x1​+x2​+2y2​​+2y3​​ and symmetrically for player 2.
  3. (4.2). Under the same hypotheses, y12+y22≤2x1+2x2\frac{y_1}2+\frac{y_2}2\le 2x_1+2x_22y1​​+2y2​​≤2x1​+2x2​.
  4. The three-node example, as in the second half of the goal.

Significance

The result shows that the price of stability of fair cost sharing depends on the network: the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound, tight for directed graphs, is not tight for undirected ones even with two players. It is the first undirected bound below H(k)H(k)H(k) and the starting point for the later study of undirected fair network design, where the question for many players is still open.

The theorem is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes it. A search of the Prove2Me library found no formalization of the price of stability of fair connection games. Beyond the theorem itself, the mission produces a reusable undirected layer over the congestion-game library: connectivity strategies stated with Mathlib's graph reachability, fair cost sharing as a congestion game, and the total-cost functional. A checked proof of the potential inequality (4.1) is the two-player case of the potential argument behind Theorem 2.1.

Difficulty

The obvious argument starts from an optimal solution, follows improving moves to an equilibrium and compares potentials. For two players this only yields the factor H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2: the potential counts shared edges with weight 3/23/23/2, so a potential inequality alone cannot rule out an equilibrium in which both players share expensive edges. The improvement to 4/34/34/3 needs a second inequality, (4.2), obtained from a specific deviation of each player in the equilibrium, and that deviation is valid only because of the undirected structure: the private parts of the two optimal paths together connect t1t_1t1​ with t2t_2t2​, and the deviating player can then follow the other player's equilibrium route to sss. Making this connectivity claim precise for edge sets rather than drawn paths is where the formal work lies. It holds when the optimal strategies are inclusion-minimal, which is why the deviation milestones carry that hypothesis.

Formalization scope

  • Vertices form a Fintype with decidable equality; edges are unordered pairs Sym2 V; the graph is a SimpleGraph V. Edge costs are a real function c with 0 ≤ c e for every e.
  • A strategy of player i : Fin 2 (the paper's players 1 and 2 are 0 and 1) is a Finset of edges contained in G.edgeSet such that t i and s are Reachable in SimpleGraph.fromEdgeSet. Strategies are not restricted to paths.
  • The game is a CongestionGame from CongestionPoA.AsymSum.Model with latency ce/xc_e/xce​/x; profiles, player costs and pure Nash equilibria are that library's IsProfile, cost and IsPureNash.
  • "Price of stability at most 4/34/34/3" is stated in existence form: some pure Nash equilibrium costs at most 43\frac4334​ times every profile. A formalization quantifying over all equilibria would be false (the price of anarchy is 222), and one dropping the Nash condition would be trivial; neither is acceptable. The tightness half fixes a concrete instance and asserts both that an equilibrium of cost 444 exists and that every equilibrium costs at least 444.
  • The deviation inequalities and (4.2) assume inclusion-minimal reference strategies; this hypothesis is implicit in the paper and does not appear in the goal, which quantifies over all profiles.

Contributions welcome: a proof of the potential inequality (finite improvement paths in the two-player fair game), the graph-theoretic lemma that the symmetric difference of two simple paths with a common endpoint connects their other endpoints, and a computation of the three-node example.

Selected references

  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM Journal on Computing 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680096
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2:65–67, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1):124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, The price of anarchy of finite congestion games, STOC 2005, 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Discounted Dynamic Programming: An Optimal Stationary Plan Exists When the Action Set Is Essentially FiniteResearch Paper

Motivation

Sequential decisions often change the distribution of future states. A planner choosing an action today must account for both its immediate reward and the later rewards made possible by the resulting state. The mathematical question is whether an optimal rule can be chosen once and reused at every stage, even when a competing plan may randomize and use the entire observed history. In Discounted Dynamic Programming, Blackwell studies this question on general Borel state and action spaces, beyond the finite models in which a direct comparison of actions is available.

The paper distinguishes several strengths of optimality. For each distribution of the initial state, an approximately optimal stationary plan exists, but a single plan that is approximately optimal at every initial state need not exist in a general Borel problem. Essential countability of the actions restores uniform approximate stationary optimality; essential finiteness yields exact stationary optimality. These are different mathematical claims, and the mission keeps their different quantifiers visible. Blackwell 1965, pp. 227, 229, 232–234.

Setting

A state is an element sss of a nonempty standard Borel space SSS, and an action is an element aaa of a nonempty standard Borel space AAA. The transition kernel q(⋅∣s,a)q(\cdot\mid s,a)q(⋅∣s,a) gives a probability distribution for the next state after action aaa in state sss. The reward r(s,a,s′)∈Rr(s,a,s')\in\mathbb Rr(s,a,s′)∈R may depend on that next state s′s's′; it is bounded and Borel measurable. Future rewards are discounted by β\betaβ with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1. These are the objects of Blackwell’s Sections 2–3. Blackwell 1965, pp. 227–228.

A plan π=(π1,π2,…)\pi=(\pi_1,\pi_2,\ldots)π=(π1​,π2​,…) assigns a probability distribution of actions to each possible history before a decision. At stage nnn, that history contains n−1n-1n−1 completed state-action pairs and the current state. Thus plans may randomize and depend on earlier states and actions. A Markov plan instead uses a Borel function fn:S→Af_n:S\to Afn​:S→A at each stage; a stationary plan uses the same function fff at every stage and is denoted f(∞)f^{(\infty)}f(∞). Starting from state sss, the plan has discounted expected return

I(π)(s)=∑n=1∞βn−1 Esπ[r(σn,αn,σn+1)].I(\pi)(s)=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\beta^{n-1}\,\mathbb E_s^\pi\bigl[r(\sigma_n,\alpha_n,\sigma_{n+1})\bigr].I(π)(s)=n=1∑∞​βn−1Esπ​[r(σn​,αn​,σn+1​)].

Here σn\sigma_nσn​ and αn\alpha_nαn​ are the state and action at stage nnn. The comparison class for an optimal plan is all such plans, including randomized and history-dependent ones. Blackwell 1965, pp. 228–229.

Two actions are equivalent at state sss when they have the same reward r(s,a,s′)r(s,a,s')r(s,a,s′) for every next state s′s's′ and the same transition measure q(⋅∣s,a)q(\cdot\mid s,a)q(⋅∣s,a). An action set is essentially countable by a Markov plan (f1,f2,…)(f_1,f_2,\ldots)(f1​,f2​,…) if, for every (s,a)(s,a)(s,a), one of the actions fn(s)f_n(s)fn​(s) is equivalent to aaa at sss. It is essentially finite by that plan if SSS has a countable Borel partition (Sn)(S_n)(Sn​) such that, for s∈Sns\in S_ns∈Sn​, one of f1(s),…,fn(s)f_1(s),\ldots,f_n(s)f1​(s),…,fn​(s) is equivalent to every action aaa at sss. A finite action set is a special case. Blackwell 1965, pp. 233–234.

Formalization targets

For a probability distribution ppp on SSS and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, (p,ε)(p,\varepsilon)(p,ε)-optimality asks for a stationary fff with

p{s:I(π)(s)>I(f(∞))(s)+ε}=0for every plan π.p\{s:I(\pi)(s)>I(f^{(\infty)})(s)+\varepsilon\}=0\qquad\text{for every plan }\pi.p{s:I(π)(s)>I(f(∞))(s)+ε}=0for every plan π.

Theorem 6(b) asserts that such an fff always exists. Under essential countability, Theorem 7(a) obtains a stronger, uniform ε\varepsilonε-optimality statement: for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a stationary fff with I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)+εI(\pi)(s)\le I(f^{(\infty)})(s)+\varepsilonI(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)+ε for all π,s\pi,sπ,s. Its other targets identify the optimal return with the fixed point of the operator Uπu=sup⁡nTfnuU_\pi u=\sup_nT_{f_n}uUπ​u=supn​Tfn​​u and with the unique bounded solution of the optimality equation u=sup⁡a∈ATauu=\sup_{a\in A}T_auu=supa∈A​Ta​u. Blackwell 1965, pp. 232–234.

The mission’s goal is Theorem 7(b). Under essential finiteness, it asks for a stationary fff with exact optimality:

I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)for every plan π and state s.I(\pi)(s)\le I(f^{(\infty)})(s)\qquad\text{for every plan }\pi\text{ and state }s.I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)for every plan π and state s.

The milestone list also includes the paper’s operator identity, approximate selection result, contraction criterion, generated-plan comparison, and upper-bound criterion. Each has its own source index and statement. Blackwell 1965, pp. 231–234.

Significance

The exact result says that, under a condition weaker than a globally finite action set, repeated use of one measurable state-based rule matches or exceeds the return of every adaptive randomized plan. It is a structural result about what information and randomization can add to discounted control. The preceding approximate results specify what can still be guaranteed when that condition is relaxed; Blackwell’s examples show that the distinctions cannot simply be ignored. Blackwell 1965, pp. 229–230, 234.

Blackwell proved these statements in 1965. The formalization work here is to give machine-checked proofs for the Borel-space model and its full comparison class, together with reusable definitions of history-dependent kernels, returns, stationary rules, and Bellman operators. The draft theorem statements compile as Lean declarations, but their proofs remain open. The milestone results are intended to make both the final theorem and its supporting measure-theoretic objects independently usable.

Difficulty

On an uncountable Borel action space, the pointwise supremum of available action values does not automatically come with a Borel action selector. Choosing a maximizing action separately at each state may fail to define a measurable rule, and a supremum need not be attained. Also, a Markov or stationary comparison cannot by itself certify optimality against plans that depend on full histories. These issues are real in the paper’s examples: general Borel problems may lack an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan, and a given plan need not be uniformly approximated by a Markov plan. Blackwell 1965, pp. 229–230.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses nonempty StandardBorelSpace types for SSS and AAA. “Baire function” is read as Borel measurable on these metrizable spaces. The problem stores a Markov transition kernel, a bounded measurable real reward on S×A×SS\times A\times SS×A×S, and 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; β=0\beta=0β=0 is included. A plan contains a probability kernel on each finite history, and the return is the actual absolutely convergent series of expected one-stage rewards. The first decision is indexed by 000 in Lean, corresponding to the paper’s index 111. The finite history law is assembled through kernel composition products, and a stationary rule is represented by deterministic kernels. The integrals and series therefore express the paper’s expected return, including the cases where the reward depends on the next state.

For the operator results, M(S)M(S)M(S) means bounded and measurable real functions. The suprema defining UπU_\piUπ​ and the optimal return are real suprema over nonempty families bounded by the reward and discount; they are used only in that setting. The abstract operator in Theorem 5 maps M(S)M(S)M(S) into itself. The action equivalence predicate uses the paper’s explicit equality of reward functions and transition laws; the later “i.e.” phrasing on p. 234 is weaker when interpreted as equality of operators alone. A partition piece may be empty, and Lean’s piece nnn corresponds to the paper’s Sn+1S_{n+1}Sn+1​, with rules f1,…,fn+1f_1,\ldots,f_{n+1}f1​,…,fn+1​.

An optimality claim here always compares with every randomized history-dependent plan. Restricting that quantifier to Markov or stationary plans would trivialize the target. A complete development needs measure-theoretic facts about history laws and their bounded integrals, the discounted series, measurable partitions and selections, and the sup-norm contraction of bounded Borel functions. The history-law and bounded-function infrastructure can be reused outside this mission. Contributions to those foundations and to the numbered milestone theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • David Blackwell, Discounted Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36(1), 226–235, 1965. DOI: 10.1214/aoms/1177700285.
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Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 2: An Explicit Family of Nash Equilibria for the Linear Impulse GameResearch Paper

Motivation

Impulse control models an agent who acts on a random system through discrete interventions, each with a fixed cost: inventory replenishment, cash management, exchange-rate interventions by a central bank. With two agents whose objectives conflict, the problem becomes a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with impulse controls. Before the work of Aïd, Basei, Callegaro, Campi and Vargiolu (Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), 2020; preprint arXiv:1605.00039), such games had no general verification theorem and few explicit equilibria; the paper supplies both. Its main application, formalized in this mission, is a game between two central banks with different targets for an exchange rate, a two-player version of the exchange-rate control models of Bertola, Runggaldier and Yasuda and of Cadenillas and Zapatero (references [10], [12] of the paper). The paper proves that this game has an explicit one-parameter family of Nash equilibria of threshold type, with closed-form payoffs.

Setting

The state is a real process. Without interventions it is x+σWsx+\sigma W_sx+σWs​, where WWW is a standard real Brownian motion and σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. Player 1 may shift it up by impulses δ∈Z1=[0,∞[\delta\in Z_1=[0,\infty[δ∈Z1​=[0,∞[, player 2 down by impulses δ∈Z2=]−∞,0]\delta\in Z_2=]-\infty,0]δ∈Z2​=]−∞,0]:

Xs=x+σWs+∑k:τ1,k≤sδ1,k+∑k:τ2,k≤sδ2,k.X_s=x+\sigma W_s+\sum_{k:\tau_{1,k}\le s}\delta_{1,k}+\sum_{k:\tau_{2,k}\le s}\delta_{2,k}.Xs​=x+σWs​+k:τ1,k​≤s∑​δ1,k​+k:τ2,k​≤s∑​δ2,k​.

Player 1 earns the running payoff f1(Xs)=Xs−s1f_1(X_s)=X_s-s_1f1​(Xs​)=Xs​−s1​, player 2 earns f2(Xs)=s2−Xsf_2(X_s)=s_2-X_sf2​(Xs​)=s2​−Xs​, with s1<s2s_1<s_2s1​<s2​. An impulse δ\deltaδ costs its author c+λ∣δ∣c+\lambda|\delta|c+λ∣δ∣ and pays the opponent c~+λ~∣δ∣\tilde c+\tilde\lambda|\delta|c~+λ~∣δ∣. Payoffs are discounted at rate ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. The standing assumptions are c≥c~≥0c\ge\tilde c\ge0c≥c~≥0, λ≥λ~≥0\lambda\ge\tilde\lambda\ge0λ≥λ~≥0, (c,λ)≠(c~,λ~)(c,\lambda)\ne(\tilde c,\tilde\lambda)(c,λ)=(c~,λ~) and 1−λρ>01-\lambda\rho>01−λρ>0.

A strategy of player iii is a pair φi=(Ci,ξi)\varphi_i=(\mathcal C_i,\xi_i)φi​=(Ci​,ξi​): an open continuation region Ci⊆R\mathcal C_i\subseteq\mathbb RCi​⊆R and a continuous impulse map ξi:R→Zi\xi_i:\mathbb R\to Z_iξi​:R→Zi​. Player iii intervenes when the state leaves Ci\mathcal C_iCi​, applying the impulse ξi(state)\xi_i(\text{state})ξi​(state); player 1 has priority when both want to act. This rule defines the controlled process Xx;φ1,φ2X^{x;\varphi_1,\varphi_2}Xx;φ1​,φ2​ and the interventions (τi,k,δi,k)(\tau_{i,k},\delta_{i,k})(τi,k​,δi,k​) inductively. Player iii's payoff is

Ji(x;φ1,φ2)=Ex[∫0∞e−ρsfi(Xs) ds−∑ke−ρτi,k(c+λ∣δi,k∣)+∑ke−ρτj,k(c~+λ~∣δj,k∣)].J^i(x;\varphi_1,\varphi_2)=\mathbb E_x\Big[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho s}f_i(X_s)\,ds-\sum_{k}e^{-\rho\tau_{i,k}}(c+\lambda|\delta_{i,k}|)+\sum_{k}e^{-\rho\tau_{j,k}}(\tilde c+\tilde\lambda|\delta_{j,k}|)\Big].Ji(x;φ1​,φ2​)=Ex​[∫0∞​e−ρsfi​(Xs​)ds−k∑​e−ρτi,k​(c+λ∣δi,k​∣)+k∑​e−ρτj,k​(c~+λ~∣δj,k​∣)].

A pair is xxx-admissible, (φ1,φ2)∈Φx(\varphi_1,\varphi_2)\in\Phi_x(φ1​,φ2​)∈Φx​, when these random variables are integrable, sup⁡t∣Xt∣\sup_t|X_t|supt​∣Xt​∣ has all moments, and neither player's interventions accumulate in finite time. A Nash equilibrium is an admissible pair from which no player gains by deviating to any strategy that keeps the pair admissible.

The explicit objects are θ=2ρ/σ2\theta=\sqrt{2\rho/\sigma^2}θ=2ρ/σ2​, η=(1−λρ)/ρ\eta=(1-\lambda\rho)/\rhoη=(1−λρ)/ρ and

F(y)=2y+θc−ηlog⁡η+yη−y,0<y<η.F(y)=2y+\theta c-\eta\log\frac{\eta+y}{\eta-y},\qquad 0<y<\eta .F(y)=2y+θc−ηlogη−yη+y​,0<y<η.

From the zero ξ\xiξ of FFF and a free parameter s~∈R\tilde s\in\mathbb Rs~∈R, the formulas (4.20)–(4.21) give thresholds xˉ1<xˉ2\bar x_1<\bar x_2xˉ1​<xˉ2​, targets x1∗,x2∗∈]xˉ1,xˉ2[x_1^*,x_2^*\in]\bar x_1,\bar x_2[x1∗​,x2∗​∈]xˉ1​,xˉ2​[, coefficients AijA_{ij}Aij​, the functions φi(y)=Ai1eθy+Ai2e−θy±(y−si)/ρ\varphi_i(y)=A_{i1}e^{\theta y}+A_{i2}e^{-\theta y}\pm(y-s_i)/\rhoφi​(y)=Ai1​eθy+Ai2​e−θy±(y−si​)/ρ and the piecewise candidates V~1,V~2\tilde V_1,\tilde V_2V~1​,V~2​ of (4.6). These are linear outside ]xˉ1,xˉ2[]\bar x_1,\bar x_2[]xˉ1​,xˉ2​[ and equal φi\varphi_iφi​ inside.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.7

For every s~∈R\tilde s\in\mathbb Rs~∈R and every initial state x∈Rx\in\mathbb Rx∈R, the threshold strategies

φ1∗=(]xˉ1,+∞[, y↦max⁡(x1∗−y,0)),φ2∗=(]−∞,xˉ2[, y↦min⁡(x2∗−y,0))\varphi_1^*=\big(]\bar x_1,+\infty[,\ y\mapsto\max(x_1^*-y,0)\big),\qquad \varphi_2^*=\big(]-\infty,\bar x_2[,\ y\mapsto\min(x_2^*-y,0)\big)φ1∗​=(]xˉ1​,+∞[, y↦max(x1∗​−y,0)),φ2∗​=(]−∞,xˉ2​[, y↦min(x2∗​−y,0))

form an xxx-admissible Nash equilibrium, and

J1(x;φ1∗,φ2∗)=V~1(x),J2(x;φ1∗,φ2∗)=V~2(x).J^1(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)=\tilde V_1(x),\qquad J^2(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)=\tilde V_2(x).J1(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​)=V~1​(x),J2(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​)=V~2​(x).

Milestones

  1. (4.17). FFF has a unique zero ξ∈(0,η)\xi\in(0,\eta)ξ∈(0,η).
  2. Proposition 4.2. For every s~\tilde ss~, the explicit 8-uple (4.20) satisfies the order conditions (4.7) and the optimality and pasting conditions (4.8)–(4.9). Moreover, φ2′′\varphi_2''φ2′′​ changes sign exactly once in ]x2∗,xˉ2[]x_2^*,\bar x_2[]x2∗​,xˉ2​[.
  3. Lemma 4.6. The impulses (4.23) maximise δ↦V~i(x+δ)−c−λ∣δ∣\delta\mapsto\tilde V_i(x+\delta)-c-\lambda|\delta|δ↦V~i​(x+δ)−c−λ∣δ∣, and the intervention operators satisfy (4.24): {M1V~1−V~1<0}=]xˉ1,∞[\{\mathcal M_1\tilde V_1-\tilde V_1<0\}=]\bar x_1,\infty[{M1​V~1​−V~1​<0}=]xˉ1​,∞[ and {M2V~2−V~2<0}=]−∞,xˉ2[\{\mathcal M_2\tilde V_2-\tilde V_2<0\}=]-\infty,\bar x_2[{M2​V~2​−V~2​<0}=]−∞,xˉ2​[.
  4. Condition (v). The equilibrium pair is xxx-admissible for every xxx. This includes the integrability (4.26) of the discounted intervention costs.

Milestones 1–3 are deterministic real analysis; milestone 4 and the goal are probabilistic.

Significance

The result gives explicit equilibria, with explicit thresholds and payoffs, for a nonzero-sum stochastic game with impulse controls. Such games rarely have closed-form solutions. The equilibria form a continuum indexed by s~\tilde ss~: equilibrium payoffs are not unique, and every equilibrium in the family is a translate of a fixed interval policy. The explicit formulas also support the comparative statics of Section 4.4, where the continuation region widens as the fixed cost grows.

Proposition 4.7 is proved in the paper by applying its verification theorem (Theorem 3.3) to V~1,V~2\tilde V_1,\tilde V_2V~1​,V~2​. The admissibility estimate (4.26) is written out only for initial states x∈{x1∗,x2∗}x\in\{x_1^*,x_2^*\}x∈{x1∗​,x2∗​}; the general case is said to be similar. As far as is known, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formal proof would check every regularity, pasting and admissibility condition. It would also yield a reusable pathwise construction of impulse-controlled Brownian motion.

Difficulty

The deterministic milestones need careful algebra with nested logarithms and square roots. Proving Lemma 4.6 requires the global shape of V~i(y)±λy\tilde V_i(y)\pm\lambda yV~i​(y)±λy, which needs the sign pattern of φ2′′\varphi_2''φ2′′​ from Proposition 4.2, not only local conditions at the thresholds.

The goal is harder. The Nash inequality must hold against every admissible deviation: any open continuation region and any continuous impulse map, not only threshold strategies. Comparing payoffs therefore needs a verification argument, namely Itô's formula for a function that is C2C^2C2 only piecewise and C1C^1C1 across the thresholds, applied along a process with an unbounded number of jumps, plus a localisation that uses the moment condition (2.8). Admissibility needs a renewal-type bound on the discounted number of interventions, built from i.i.d. exit times of Brownian motion from an interval.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace ImpulseGames.LinearGame.

  • The constants and standing assumptions are a structure Model with the proposition Model.Standing. The added hypothesis c>0c>0c>0 appears in every statement that uses ξ\xiξ: with c=0c=0c=0, which the standing assumptions allow, FFF has no zero in (0,η)(0,\eta)(0,η) and the family (4.20) does not exist.
  • The zero ξ\xiξ is a parameter, constrained by ξ∈(0,η)\xi\in(0,\eta)ξ∈(0,η) and F(ξ)=0F(\xi)=0F(ξ)=0. Milestone 1 shows that exactly one such ξ\xiξ exists.
  • The Brownian motion is Mathlib's IsBrownianReal W P on a probability space, with time in R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. Definition 2.2 is formalized pathwise: exit times inf⁡{s>τ~k−1:X~sk−1∉Ci}\inf\{s>\tilde\tau_{k-1}:\tilde X^{k-1}_s\notin\mathcal C_i\}inf{s>τ~k−1​:X~sk−1​∈/Ci​} in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with inf⁡∅=∞\inf\emptyset=\inftyinf∅=∞, the tie rule favouring player 1, and e−ρ⋅∞=0e^{-\rho\cdot\infty}=0e−ρ⋅∞=0 for the tail of each impulse control. No SDE or stochastic integral appears in any statement; the uncontrolled dynamics are ζ+σ(Ws−Wt)\zeta+\sigma(W_s-W_t)ζ+σ(Ws​−Wt​).
  • Payoffs are Bochner expectations. Φx\Phi_xΦx​ requires every random variable of (2.7) to be integrable, so no deviation can obtain the default value 000 of a non-integrable expectation. The moment condition (2.8) is stated with an extended-real supremum, and (2.9) is read almost surely.
  • The Nash condition quantifies over all strategies of Definition 2.1. A formalization that restricts deviations to threshold strategies would be a different, weaker theorem and is excluded. Likewise, the equilibrium payoffs V~i\tilde V_iV~i​ are the explicit formulas (4.6), never defined as "the equilibrium value".

Two slips of the page are corrected. First, the paper's impulse maps ξi∗(y)=xi∗−y\xi_i^*(y)=x_i^*-yξi∗​(y)=xi∗​−y are not ZiZ_iZi​-valued on all of R\mathbb RR; they are replaced by max⁡(x1∗−y,0)\max(x_1^*-y,0)max(x1∗​−y,0) and min⁡(x2∗−y,0)\min(x_2^*-y,0)min(x2∗​−y,0), which agree with them wherever each player acts. Second, in Lemma 4.6 the maximiser (4.23) is not unique when λ=λ~\lambda=\tilde\lambdaλ=λ~, in the opponent's intervention region (all impulses tie there). The statement asserts maximality everywhere and uniqueness outside that region.

A complete development needs: elementary real analysis for milestones 1–3; a pathwise theory of piecewise-defined processes; an Itô formula for Brownian motion with C1C^1C1, piecewise-C2C^2C2 functions; and exit-time estimates for Brownian motion. The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of the deterministic milestones are welcome independently of the stochastic part.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, M. Basei, G. Callegaro, L. Campi, T. Vargiolu, Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls: a verification theorem with applications, Mathematics of Operations Research 45(1), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0989 (accepted manuscript: arXiv:1605.00039v4, https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.00039)
  • G. Bertola, W. J. Runggaldier, K. Yasuda, On classical and restricted impulse stochastic control for the exchange rate, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 74(2), 423–454, 2016.
  • A. Cadenillas, F. Zapatero, Classical and impulse stochastic control of the exchange rate using interest rates and reserves, Mathematical Finance 10(2), 141–156, 2000.
  • B. Øksendal, A. Sulem, Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions, 2nd ed., Springer, 2007.
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Dimensioning Large Call Centers IV: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing under a Waiting-Cost ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

A call center has to decide how many agents to staff. In practice the decision is often posed as a service-level constraint rather than a cost trade-off: use the fewest agents for which the expected waiting cost, or the fraction of customers who wait, stays below a target. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; journal version in Operations Research 52(1), 2004, doi:10.1287/opre.1030.0081) treat this constraint problem in Section 8 of their paper, alongside the cost-minimization problem of Sections 5–7, and show that a simple square-root staffing rule solves it asymptotically as the arrival rate grows.

The rule matters because it is what practitioners use. Under the classical Erlang-C model, the exact optimum requires evaluating the Erlang-C formula over many staffing levels. The asymptotic rule replaces this with a single equation in the Halfin–Whitt function PPP: when the target is a delay probability ε\varepsilonε (Example 8.5 of the paper), it reduces to staffing λ/μ+P−1(ε)λ/μ\lambda/\mu + P^{-1}(\varepsilon)\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}λ/μ+P−1(ε)λ/μ​ servers.

Timeline. Erlang's formula for the M/M/N delay probability dates from 1917. Halfin and Whitt (Operations Research 29, 1981) identified the limit P(x)P(x)P(x) of the delay probability under square-root staffing N=λ/μ+xλ/μN = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}N=λ/μ+xλ/μ​ with integer NNN. Jagers and Van Doorn (Operations Research Letters 5, 1986; SIAM Review 33, 1991) studied the continued Erlang loss and delay functions at non-integer numbers of servers, including their convexity, which is what lets the staffing problem be relaxed to a continuous one. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (2000/2004) used these to prove asymptotic optimality of square-root rules for both the cost and the constraint formulations.

Setting

Customers arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ to NNN identical servers, each with service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0; μ\muμ is fixed while λ→∞\lambda \to \inftyλ→∞. Stability requires N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ. A customer who waits ttt time units costs Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t), where Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0) = 0Dλ​(0)=0, DλD_\lambdaDλ​ is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and ∫0∞Dλ(t)e−θt dt<∞\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}\,dt < \infty∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−θtdt<∞ for all θ>0\theta > 0θ>0.

The Erlang-C probability of waiting is

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−ν/N)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\{(1-\nu/N)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!} + \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\}^{-1},π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−ν/N)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,

and the conditional waiting cost is G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt. The waiting cost per unit time with NNN servers is

K(N,λ)=λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ).K(N,\lambda) = \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda).K(N,λ)=λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).

Given a target Mλ>0M_\lambda > 0Mλ​>0, the optimal staffing level is the least integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ with K(N,λ)≤MλK(N,\lambda) \le M_\lambdaK(N,λ)≤Mλ​; call it Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​.

In the continuous parametrization Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, define Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), the continuous Erlang-C function πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ) with H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1H(M,\alpha) = \{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt\}^{-1}H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1, and Kλ(x)=πλ(x)Gλ(x)K_\lambda(x) = \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Kλ​(x)=πλ​(x)Gλ​(x). The Halfin–Whitt function is P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x))P(x) = 1/(1 + x/h(-x))P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x)) with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate. A staffing function xλ>0x_\lambda > 0xλ​>0 is judged by the rounding gap

Tλ(x)=min⁡{∣K(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ)−Mλ∣, ∣K(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)−Mλ∣, ∣K(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)−K(Nλ∗,λ)∣}.T_\lambda(x) = \min\big\{|K(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda) - M_\lambda|,\ |K(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda) - M_\lambda|,\ |K(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda) - K(N^*_\lambda,\lambda)|\big\}.Tλ​(x)=min{∣K(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ)−Mλ​∣, ∣K(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)−Mλ​∣, ∣K(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)−K(Nλ∗​,λ)∣}.

It is asymptotically optimal when Tλ(xλ)/Mλ→0T_\lambda(x_\lambda)/M_\lambda \to 0Tλ​(xλ​)/Mλ​→0 as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.2 (rationalized regime)

Suppose that for some κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0 and γ∈(0,∞)\gamma \in (0,\infty)γ∈(0,∞), Gλ(κ)/Mλ→γG_\lambda(\kappa)/M_\lambda \to \gammaGλ​(κ)/Mλ​→γ, i.e. the waiting cost is comparable to the target. Let yλ∗>0y^*_\lambda > 0yλ∗​>0 solve P(y)Gλ(y)=MλP(y)G_\lambda(y) = M_\lambdaP(y)Gλ​(y)=Mλ​. Then

lim⁡λ→∞Tλ(yλ∗)Mλ=0.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{T_\lambda(y^*_\lambda)}{M_\lambda} = 0.λ→∞lim​Mλ​Tλ​(yλ∗​)​=0.

Supporting milestones

  • Lemma C.1: GλG_\lambdaGλ​ is strictly convex and decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  • Section 3: πλ(x)=π(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = \pi(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=π(Nλ​(x),λ/μ) when Nλ(x)N_\lambda(x)Nλ​(x) is an integer.
  • Lemma 8.1: if zλ∗>0z^*_\lambda > 0zλ∗​>0 solves π^λ(z)G^λ(z)=Mλ\hat\pi_\lambda(z)\hat G_\lambda(z) = M_\lambdaπ^λ​(z)G^λ​(z)=Mλ​ and Kλ(zλ∗)/(π^λG^λ)(zλ∗)→1K_\lambda(z^*_\lambda)/(\hat\pi_\lambda\hat G_\lambda)(z^*_\lambda) \to 1Kλ​(zλ∗​)/(π^λ​G^λ​)(zλ∗​)→1, then Tλ(zλ∗)/Mλ→0T_\lambda(z^*_\lambda)/M_\lambda \to 0Tλ​(zλ∗​)/Mλ​→0.
  • Lemma B.1: PPP is strictly convex and decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  • Eq. (17): lim sup⁡aλ/b=∞\limsup a_\lambda/b = \inftylimsupaλ​/b=∞ implies lim inf⁡P(aλ)/P(b)=0\liminf P(a_\lambda)/P(b) = 0liminfP(aλ​)/P(b)=0 and lim inf⁡πλ(aλ)/πλ(b)=0\liminf \pi_\lambda(a_\lambda)/\pi_\lambda(b) = 0liminfπλ​(aλ​)/πλ​(b)=0.
  • Lemma 4.1 (Halfin–Whitt): for bounded xλ>0x_\lambda > 0xλ​>0, πλ(xλ)/P(xλ)→1\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)/P(x_\lambda) \to 1πλ​(xλ​)/P(xλ​)→1; with xλ→xx_\lambda \to xxλ​→x, πλ(xλ)/P(x)→1\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)/P(x)\to 1πλ​(xλ​)/P(x)→1.

Further target: Theorem 8.6 (efficiency-driven regime)

If Gλ(κ)/Mλ→0G_\lambda(\kappa)/M_\lambda \to 0Gλ​(κ)/Mλ​→0 for every κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0 and yλ∗>0y^*_\lambda > 0yλ∗​>0 solves Gλ(y)=MλG_\lambda(y) = M_\lambdaGλ​(y)=Mλ​, then Tλ(yλ∗)/Mλ→0T_\lambda(y^*_\lambda)/M_\lambda \to 0Tλ​(yλ∗​)/Mλ​→0.

Significance

The theorem certifies the staffing rule used in workforce-management practice: the excess staffing is determined by one scalar equation involving the Gaussian function PPP and the scaled waiting cost, and rounding the resulting staffing level misses the constraint by a vanishing fraction of the target. Lemma 8.1 is a reusable framework: any approximation π^λG^λ\hat\pi_\lambda\hat G_\lambdaπ^λ​G^λ​ that is asymptotically exact at the proposed staffing level yields an asymptotically optimal rule, and the paper instantiates it in three regimes (Theorems 8.2, 8.6, 8.9).

The results are proved on paper. To the best of current knowledge none of them, nor the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous Erlang-C extension, has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would produce the first verified heavy-traffic limit of the Erlang-C delay probability, a verified continuous Erlang-C extension with its integer identity, and the convexity facts about PPP and GλG_\lambdaGλ​ that many staffing papers cite without proof.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to quote Halfin and Whitt: the delay probability converges to P(x)P(x)P(x) under square-root staffing, so PPP can replace the Erlang-C formula. That limit, as published in 1981, is about integer server counts along sequences with a convergent excess-staffing parameter. The paper needs it for the continuous function HHH at non-integer server counts and for staffing functions that are merely bounded, and it also needs the identity H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integers and the monotonicity of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ in xxx, both cited from Jagers and Van Doorn rather than proved. None of these is in Mathlib. A second obstacle is that the staffing function yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ is defined only implicitly by an equation involving GλG_\lambdaGλ​, which depends on the arbitrary cost functions DλD_\lambdaDλ​; nothing a priori prevents it from escaping to infinity, outside the range where the Halfin–Whitt approximation applies. Finally, TλT_\lambdaTλ​ compares integer-level costs given by the Erlang-C formula with a continuous approximation, so both representations of the delay probability are in play at once.

Formalization scope

The queue itself is not formalized: there is no Markov chain and no waiting-time distribution. Every statement is about the closed-form waiting cost K(N,λ)K(N,\lambda)K(N,λ) with π\piπ given by the Erlang-C formula, exactly as the paper's analysis is. Conventions, all in the namespace DimCallCenters.Constraint:

  • lam : ℝ is the arrival rate (λ is a Lean keyword); limits are Filter.atTop in lam, with μ fixed. Objects indexed by λ (MλM_\lambdaMλ​, Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are functions of lam constrained only for lam > 0.
  • WaitModel packages μ > 0 and DλD_\lambdaDλ​ with Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0) = 0Dλ​(0)=0, strict monotonicity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and integrability of Dλ(t)e−θtD_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}Dλ​(t)e−θt on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for θ > 0 (the paper's finiteness of GGG; integrability is required because Lean's integral of a non-integrable function is 0).
  • Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ is a function Nstar : ℝ → ℕ given with its two defining properties (feasible; below every feasible integer level above λ/μ). yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ and zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​ are any positive solutions of their equations; existence and uniqueness are not hypotheses.
  • In TλT_\lambdaTλ​ the round-down term is dropped when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ (an unstable level where KKK is undefined). This can only enlarge TλT_\lambdaTλ​.
  • Asymptotic relations are limits of ratios. lim sup⁡=∞\limsup = \inftylimsup=∞ and lim inf⁡=0\liminf = 0liminf=0 are stated with ∃ᶠ ("frequently"), lim sup⁡<∞\limsup < \inftylimsup<∞ as eventual boundedness.
  • PPP is defined through explicit ϕ\phiϕ, Φ\PhiΦ, hhh; the formula also gives P(0)=1P(0) = 1P(0)=1, used in Lemma 4.1(2) at x=0x = 0x=0.
  • No hypothesis lim⁡N↓λ/μG(N,λ)=∞\lim_{N\downarrow\lambda/\mu}G(N,\lambda) = \inftylimN↓λ/μ​G(N,λ)=∞ is added: it is not needed for the statements here.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: TλT_\lambdaTλ​ keeps all of the paper's terms and is never replaced by a smaller quantity, and the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable — Dλ(t)=aλ/μ tD_\lambda(t) = a\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}\,tDλ​(t)=aλ/μ​t with Mλ=MλM_\lambda = M\lambdaMλ​=Mλ satisfies (33) for every κ\kappaκ with γ=a/(μκM)\gamma = a/(\mu\kappa M)γ=a/(μκM).

Infrastructure needed: the continuous Erlang-C function and its integer identity; the Halfin–Whitt limit (a Gaussian approximation of Poisson/gamma tails); calculus facts about the normal hazard rate. These are reusable beyond this mission, notably by the sibling missions on the cost-minimization problem. Example 8.5 (delay-probability target with Dλ=1t>0D_\lambda = 1_{t>0}Dλ​=1t>0​) motivates the rule but violates the strict monotonicity of DλD_\lambdaDλ​, so it is not an instance of the theorem as stated. Contributions on any milestone, and on Theorem 8.9 (quality-driven regime, which needs Lemma 4.2), are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • A. A. Jagers, E. A. Van Doorn, On the Continued Erlang Loss Function, Operations Research Letters 5:43–46, 1986.
  • A. A. Jagers, E. A. Van Doorn, Convexity of Functions which are Generalizations of the Erlang Loss Function and the Erlang Delay Function, SIAM Review 33:281–282, 1991.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 4: With Retailer Effort, the Supplier Prefers the Wholesale-Price Contract Exactly When τ > 1/√2Research Paper

Motivation

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} lets a supplier charge a retailer a wholesale price www per unit and, in addition, collect the share 1−ϕ1 - \phi1−ϕ of the retailer's revenue. The video-rental industry adopted such contracts at scale in the late 1990s, and Cachon and Lariviere showed that in a broad class of models they coordinate the supply chain: the retailer's privately optimal decisions coincide with those that maximize total channel profit, and the profit can be split arbitrarily between the firms (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

The same authors also studied where revenue sharing breaks down. The most practically relevant limitation is retailer effort: shelf space, service, store cleanliness and promotion raise demand, cost the retailer money, and cannot be written into a contract. Once the retailer gives away part of its revenue, it earns only a share of the return on its effort while still paying the whole cost. This mission formalizes Section 4.2 of the authors' working paper, which shows that revenue sharing then cannot coordinate the channel while leaving the supplier any profit, and, in an explicit linear-demand example, determines exactly when the supplier is better off with the plain wholesale-price contract.

The source is the June 2000 working paper (Cachon and Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations), whose results are displayed claims inside numbered sections rather than numbered theorems; the milestones cite section, printed page and display. The published version appeared in Management Science 51(1), 2005.

Setting

General model (Sec. 4.2.1). A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0. The retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 after observing the contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w}. Expected revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e) is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in eee and concave in qqq; effort costs the retailer g(e)g(e)g(e), where ggg is continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0. The profits of the integrated channel, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).\Pi(q, e) = R(q, e) - g(e) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q, e) = \phi R(q, e) - g(e) - qw,\qquad (1-\phi)R(q, e) + q(w - c).Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr​(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).

The integrated solution (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) maximizes Π\PiΠ over q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0.

Linear example (Sec. 4.2.2). Inverse demand is P(q,e)=1−q+2τeP(q, e) = 1 - q + 2\tau eP(q,e)=1−q+2τe with an effort-impact parameter τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, revenue is R(q,e)=qP(q,e)R(q, e) = qP(q, e)R(q,e)=qP(q,e) and effort costs g(e)=e2g(e) = e^2g(e)=e2. For a share ϕ\phiϕ the supplier's profit when the retailer responds optimally to {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} is πs(w,ϕ)\pi_s(w, \phi)πs​(w,ϕ), and the supplier's optimal profit is

V(ϕ)=sup⁡w≥0πs(w,ϕ).V(\phi) = \sup_{w \ge 0} \pi_s(w, \phi).V(ϕ)=w≥0sup​πs​(w,ϕ).

The share ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the wholesale-price contract.

Formalization targets

Goal: the supplier's choice of contract

For 0≤τ<10 \le \tau < 10≤τ<1, 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], the supremum defining V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is attained at the price w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))w(\phi) = \phi\big((1-\tau^2)\phi + c(1-\phi\tau^2)\big)/\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)), and

V(ϕ)=(1−c)24(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)).V(\phi) = \frac{(1 - c)^2}{4\big(1 + \phi(1 - 2\tau^2)\big)} .V(ϕ)=4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))(1−c)2​.

Consequently VVV is strictly increasing on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​ (the wholesale-price contract is the supplier's unique best share), constant if τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, and strictly decreasing if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​, with V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4V(\phi) \to (1-c)^2/4V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4 as ϕ→0+\phi \to 0^+ϕ→0+.

Milestones

  1. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: with w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc and ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1 the retailer's optimal effort at qIq_IqI​ is below eIe_IeI​.
  2. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: if (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) is optimal for the retailer, then ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, w=cw = cw=c, and the supplier earns nothing.
  3. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 23: the retailer's unique optimal effort at quantity qqq is e(q)=ϕτqe(q) = \phi\tau qe(q)=ϕτq.
  4. Sec. 4.2.2, pp. 23–24: the retailer's reduced profit q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w]q[\phi - q(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2) - w]q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w], its unique joint optimum (q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ)))\big(q(w,\phi), e(q(w,\phi))\big)(q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ))) with q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))q(w, \phi) = (\phi - w)/(2(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)) for w<ϕw < \phiw<ϕ and 000 otherwise, and the optimal profit (ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))(\phi - w)^2/(4(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))(ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)).
  5. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: the integrated retail price pI=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2))p_I = (1 + c(1-2\tau^2))/(2(1-\tau^2))pI​=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2)), increasing in ccc if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ and decreasing if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​.
  6. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(⋅,ϕ)\pi_s(\cdot, \phi)πs​(⋅,ϕ) is strictly concave where the retailer orders, and w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) is its unique maximizer over w≥0w \ge 0w≥0.
  7. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)))\pi_s(w(\phi), \phi) = (1-c)^2/\big(4(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2))\big)πs​(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))).

Significance

The general result (milestones 1–2) is a clean impossibility statement: with non-contractible effort, the only contract in the revenue-sharing family that coordinates the channel is the wholesale-price contract at marginal cost, which leaves the supplier zero profit. It marks the boundary of the coordination results of the earlier sections, and contrasts with the price-dependent newsvendor, where revenue sharing does coordinate price and quantity because the cost of expanding demand is captured in the revenue function and shared by both firms.

The example turns the impossibility into a design rule. Because coordination is out of reach, the supplier compares contracts by her own profit, and the threshold τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​ separates two regimes: when effort matters a lot she should leave the retailer all revenue and charge only a wholesale price ("a smaller share of a larger pie"); when it matters little she should take as much revenue as possible. The same threshold governs the counterintuitive comparative static that the integrated channel's retail price falls as production cost rises.

All results are proved on paper in the source. None has a machine-checked proof; this mission produces the first. The example is a fully explicit two-stage optimization problem, so the formal development also yields a verified computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium with moral hazard that other contract-design missions can reuse.

Difficulty

The individual calculations are elementary, and the work lies in getting the optimization statements right. The page solves the retailer's problem sequentially (effort first, then quantity) and writes the supplier's objective by substituting closed forms. A faithful proof must instead show that these closed forms are global optima over the constrained domains: the retailer optimizes jointly over the quadrant q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0, the corner q=0q = 0q=0 is optimal whenever w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, and the supplier's objective is a quadratic on w≤ϕw \le \phiw≤ϕ glued to the zero function on w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, which is not concave on all of w≥0w \ge 0w≥0. The first-order-condition argument of the general model similarly needs an interior integrated optimum and a strictly positive marginal effect of effort, which "strictly increasing in eee" alone does not provide.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The general model is a structure RevShareCoord.Effort.Model carrying RRR, its partial derivatives, ggg, g′g'g′ and ccc; derivatives are one-sided within [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and joint differentiability of RRR is replaced by its partial derivatives and joint continuity. The example lives in RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over the whole admissible set (q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0 for the retailer, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 for the supplier), and the supplier's value V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is defined as the supremum of her attainable profits, not by the printed formula.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • τ<1\tau < 1τ<1 instead of τ∈[0,1]\tau \in [0, 1]τ∈[0,1]: at τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 the integrated problem is unbounded and pIp_IpI​ divides by zero. The page's "jointly concave in qqq and τ\tauτ" is read as qqq and eee.
  • 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1: c>0c > 0c>0 is the standing assumption of Sec. 1, and c<1c < 1c<1 is needed for a positive integrated quantity.
  • ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1] in the example: at ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer keeps no revenue and q(w,ϕ)q(w, \phi)q(w,ϕ) divides by zero. The page's optimal share "ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0" for τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ is stated as strict decrease on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] with the limit at 0+0^+0+.
  • The printed second derivative −(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 - \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2) has a sign slip in the numerator; the Lean states −(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2).
  • "Otherwise decreasing" fails at τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, where VVV and pIp_IpI​ are constant; the trichotomy is stated.
  • In the general model, the integrated optimum is interior, ∂R/∂e>0\partial R/\partial e > 0∂R/∂e>0 at it, and, for milestone 1, πr(qI,⋅)\pi_r(q_I, \cdot)πr​(qI​,⋅) is strictly concave in eee (the page asserts this but it does not follow from the assumptions).

Plugging the printed w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) into πs\pi_sπs​ and comparing across ϕ\phiϕ would turn the dichotomy into a statement about an arbitrary price schedule; the goal instead asserts that w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) attains the supremum over all w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, with the retailer best-responding jointly in (q,e)(q, e)(q,e).

No external library beyond Mathlib's real analysis and convexity is needed. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, reusable lemmas on maximizing strictly concave quadratics over orthants, and a generalization of milestone 2 to non-interior optima.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • S. Desiraju, S. Moorthy, Managing a Distribution Channel under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements, Management Science 43(12), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1628
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 3: The Optimal Wholesale-Price Contract with R′(q) = 1 − q^α Has Efficiency (2+α)/(1+α)^((1+α)/α)Research Paper

Motivation

A supplier who sells to a retailer at a per-unit wholesale price above her own production cost induces the retailer to order less than an integrated firm would. This effect, double marginalization, goes back to Spengler (1950) and is the standard benchmark against which supply chain contracts are judged: a contract coordinates the channel if it makes the decentralized decisions coincide with the integrated optimum. Revenue-sharing contracts, as used in the video-rental industry, coordinate the channel; the plain wholesale-price contract does not. Whether a supplier should bother with the administrative cost of revenue sharing depends on how much the wholesale-price contract actually loses and how much of the remaining profit the supplier keeps.

Cachon and Lariviere answer that question for a retailer whose revenue depends only on the quantity ordered, in Section 4.1.1 of their working paper Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations (June 2000; the 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material). They show that the answer is governed by the curvature of the marginal revenue curve, and they compute it exactly for a one-parameter family. The source is the June 2000 working paper, whose results are unnumbered; every item cites its section, page and display.

Setting

A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0 and sells to a single retailer. The retailer's expected revenue from qqq units is R(q)R(q)R(q), where R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0, RRR is strictly concave and differentiable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with derivative R′R'R′ (the marginal revenue), R′R'R′ is differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with derivative R′′R''R′′, the product is viable (R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c), and a finite quantity is optimal (R′(q)<cR'(q) < cR′(q)<c for some qqq). The supply chain profit is Π(q)=R(q)−qc\Pi(q) = R(q) - qcΠ(q)=R(q)−qc; the integrated quantity qIq_IqI​ maximizes Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0.

Under a wholesale-price contract with price www, the retailer orders qqq to maximize R(q)−wqR(q) - wqR(q)−wq. Each order q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is induced by exactly one price, w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q), so the supplier can be thought of as choosing qqq. Her profit, the retailer's profit, and their sum are then

πs(q)=q (R′(q)−c),πr(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs(q)+πr(q)=Π(q).\pi_s(q) = q\,(R'(q) - c), \qquad \pi_r(q) = R(q) - qR'(q), \qquad \pi_s(q) + \pi_r(q) = \Pi(q).πs​(q)=q(R′(q)−c),πr​(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs​(q)+πr​(q)=Π(q).

Following the paper, q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q)q \mapsto R'(q) + qR''(q)q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q) is assumed decreasing, which makes πs\pi_sπs​ unimodal. The supplier's optimal quantity to induce q∗q^*q∗ maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, and w(q∗)w(q^*)w(q∗) is her optimal wholesale price. The efficiency of the contract and the supplier's profit share are

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)andπs(q∗)Π(q∗).\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \frac{\pi_s(q^*)}{\Pi(q^*)} .Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​andΠ(q∗)πs​(q∗)​.

In the α-family, R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1)R(q) = q - q^{\alpha+1}/(\alpha+1)R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1) for α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], so R′(q)=1−qαR'(q) = 1 - q^\alphaR′(q)=1−qα: marginal revenue is convex for α<1\alpha < 1α<1, linear for α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and concave for α>1\alpha > 1α>1.

Formalization targets

Goal: the α-family

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1, the quantities q∗=(1−c1+α)1/αq^* = \left(\frac{1-c}{1+\alpha}\right)^{1/\alpha}q∗=(1+α1−c​)1/α and qI=(1−c)1/αq_I = (1-c)^{1/\alpha}qI​=(1−c)1/α are the unique maximizers of πs\pi_sπs​ and Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the profit share is (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α), and

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)=2+α(1+α)1+αα,\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} = \frac{2+\alpha}{(1+\alpha)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}}},Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​=(1+α)α1+α​2+α​,

a quantity that does not depend on ccc, is strictly increasing in α\alphaα, tends to 2/e2/e2/e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ and to 111 as α→∞\alpha \to \inftyα→∞.

Milestones for a general revenue function

  1. The price w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q) makes qqq the retailer's unique optimum (Eq. (9)).
  2. 0<q∗<qI0 < q^* < q_I0<q∗<qI​.
  3. w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗)w(q^*) = c - q^*R''(q^*)w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗), and w(q∗)>cw(q^*) > cw(q∗)>c.
  4. The profit share is at most (at least) 2/32/32/3 when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  5. 2q∗≤qI2q^* \le q_I2q∗≤qI​ (≥qI\ge q_I≥qI​) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  6. Π(qI)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI(R′(z)−c) dz\Pi(q_I) - \Pi(q^*) = \int_{q^*}^{q_I}(R'(z) - c)\,dzΠ(qI​)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI​​(R′(z)−c)dz is at least (at most) 12πs(q∗)\tfrac12\pi_s(q^*)21​πs​(q∗) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).

Milestones for the α-family

  1. The closed forms of q∗q^*q∗, qIq_IqI​, πr(q∗)\pi_r(q^*)πr​(q∗), πs(q∗)\pi_s(q^*)πs​(q∗) and Π(qI)\Pi(q_I)Π(qI​).
  2. E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/αE(\alpha) = (2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with limits 2/e2/e2/e and 111.

Significance

The general milestones turn the paper's area argument (the triangle under the tangent to marginal revenue at q∗q^*q∗) into three comparisons: convex marginal revenue makes the wholesale-price contract worse for the chain and leaves the supplier at most two thirds of a smaller pie, concave marginal revenue the opposite. The α-family makes the trade-off exact: efficiency never falls below 2/e≈0.7362/e \approx 0.7362/e≈0.736, while the supplier's share (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α) moves much faster than efficiency, which is the paper's argument for why revenue sharing is most attractive when marginal revenue is convex.

These results are proved on paper but, to our knowledge, not machine-checked anywhere; Mathlib has no supply chain contract theory. The formalization provides a reusable single-retailer wholesale-price model, a checked version of the convex/concave tangent comparisons, and a corrected statement of the α-family's monotonicity (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The general comparisons are short on paper but rest on a picture: they need the first-order condition at an interior maximizer, the tangent-line inequality for a convex or concave derivative, and the fundamental theorem of calculus for a function whose derivative is known only on a half-line and one-sided at 000. Strictness needs a strictly positive integrand on a nondegenerate interval.

The α-family is where the analysis is not routine. The closed forms involve real powers with exponents 1/α1/\alpha1/α and (1+α)/α(1+\alpha)/\alpha(1+α)/α, which must be combined carefully. The limit (1+α)1/α→e(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha} \to e(1+α)1/α→e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ is classical, but the monotonicity of log⁡(2+α)−1+ααlog⁡(1+α)\log(2+\alpha) - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}\log(1+\alpha)log(2+α)−α1+α​log(1+α) on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is not a one-line derivative sign check: the derivative mixes log⁡(1+α)/α2\log(1+\alpha)/\alpha^2log(1+α)/α2 with rational terms, and its sign has to be established uniformly near 000 and near ∞\infty∞.

Formalization scope

Quantities and prices are real numbers. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over all admissible quantities (IsMaxOn on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), or on [0,1][0,1][0,1] in the α-family, as the page restricts), never a root of a first-order condition. The derivative R′R'R′ of the general model is linked to RRR by a one-sided derivative hypothesis on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); R′′R''R′′ is required only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), since for α<1\alpha < 1α<1 it blows up at 000. In the α-family the marginal revenue is deriv of RRR, not a separate function, and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 is assumed (implicit on the page: c>0c > 0c>0 and R′(0)=1>cR'(0) = 1 > cR′(0)=1>c). Efficiency and profit share are real divisions; their denominators are positive at the optimal quantities.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0 is added to the model. It is implicit in the paper's area reading of the retailer's profit, and the 2/32/32/3 comparison fails without it.
  • The paper states the curvature comparisons strictly ("less (more) than 2/3rds", "q∗>qI/2q^* > q_I/2q∗>qI​/2 (<qI/2< q_I/2<qI​/2)", "more (less) than 50%") under convexity (concavity). Linear marginal revenue is both and gives equality, so each item states the weak inequality under convexity or concavity and the strict one under strict convexity or concavity.
  • Printed slip. The page says "Efficiency is a decreasing function of α, i.e., efficiency improves as the marginal revenue curve becomes more concave". EEE is in fact strictly increasing (E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358E(0^+) = 2/e \approx 0.7358E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358, E(1)=0.75E(1) = 0.75E(1)=0.75, E(10)≈0.858E(10) \approx 0.858E(10)≈0.858), as the second half of the sentence and the two limits say. The Lean states the increasing form; the milestone text is kept verbatim. The numerical gloss "2/e≈0.732/e \approx 0.732/e≈0.73" is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the efficiency in the goal is the ratio of profits computed from RRR at the maximizers, not a definition equal to (2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α(2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α, and the maximizers are characterized as unique argmaxes rather than assumed.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the general tangent comparisons, which are reusable for any concave revenue model; the real-analysis lemmas on (1+α)1/α(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha}(1+α)1/α; and the α-family closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4):347–352, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Stochastic Matrices Associated with Certain Queuing Processes 1: The M/G/1 Imbedded Chain Is Ergodic iff ρ < 1 and Recurrent iff ρ ≤ 1Research Paper

Motivation

Many queues observed at well-chosen instants are Markov chains on the nonnegative integers. For the single-server queue with Poisson arrivals and general service times (M/G/1), D. G. Kendall showed in 1951 that the number of customers left behind at successive departure epochs is such a chain, the imbedded Markov chain (Kendall 1951; Kendall 1953). Whether the queue settles into a steady state, keeps returning to empty without settling, or grows without bound is then a question about this chain: is it ergodic, null recurrent, or transient?

F. G. Foster's 1953 paper (doi:10.1214/aoms/1177728976) answers this question by first proving general criteria for an irreducible chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…}, stated as solvability conditions for linear inequalities in the transition matrix, and then applying them to the M/G/1 and GI/M/1 chains. Theorem 2 of the paper is the drift condition now known as Foster's criterion, the starting point of the Lyapunov-function method for the stability of queues and stochastic networks (Meyn and Tweedie 2009). This mission is the M/G/1 half of the paper.

Timeline:

  • 1951–1953, Kendall. Introduces the imbedded chains of M/G/1 and GI/M/1 and obtains most of their classification by direct methods.
  • 1953, Foster. Derives the classification from general criteria: Theorem 2 (ergodicity), Theorems 4–6 (transience and recurrence).
  • 1950s onward. The criteria become the standard tools (Feller's text; later the drift conditions of Meyn and Tweedie).

Setting

A Markov chain on the states {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…} is given by a transition matrix P=[pij]P=[p_{ij}]P=[pij​]: pij≥0p_{ij}\ge0pij​≥0 and ∑jpij=1\sum_j p_{ij}=1∑j​pij​=1 for every row iii. Write fij(n)f_{ij}^{(n)}fij(n)​ for the probability that the chain started in iii first reaches jjj (for i=ji=ji=j, first returns to jjj) at step n≥1n\ge1n≥1. The chain is irreducible if every state can be reached from every other, and aperiodic if for every state the return times have greatest common divisor 111. A state jjj is recurrent if fjj=∑nfjj(n)=1f_{jj}=\sum_n f_{jj}^{(n)}=1fjj​=∑n​fjj(n)​=1 and transient if fjj<1f_{jj}<1fjj​<1; a recurrent state is ergodic (positive recurrent, "recurrent-nonnull") if in addition its mean recurrence time ∑nnfjj(n)\sum_n n f_{jj}^{(n)}∑n​nfjj(n)​ is finite. The mean first-passage time from iii to jjj is μij=∑n≥1nfij(n)∈[0,∞]\mu_{ij}=\sum_{n\ge1} n f_{ij}^{(n)}\in[0,\infty]μij​=∑n≥1​nfij(n)​∈[0,∞].

The M/G/1 matrix is built from a sequence k0,k1,…k_0,k_1,\dotsk0​,k1​,… of positive numbers summing to one (knk_nkn​ is the probability of nnn arrivals during one service):

[pij]=[k0k1k2⋯k0k1k2⋯0k0k1⋯00k0⋯⋮⋮⋮],[p_{ij}] = \begin{bmatrix} k_0 & k_1 & k_2 & \cdots \\ k_0 & k_1 & k_2 & \cdots \\ 0 & k_0 & k_1 & \cdots \\ 0 & 0 & k_0 & \cdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \end{bmatrix},[pij​]=​k0​k0​00⋮​k1​k1​k0​0⋮​k2​k2​k1​k0​⋮​⋯⋯⋯⋯​​,

that is, p0j=kjp_{0j}=k_jp0j​=kj​ and, for i≥1i\ge1i≥1, pij=kj−i+1p_{ij}=k_{j-i+1}pij​=kj−i+1​ when j≥i−1j\ge i-1j≥i−1 and 000 otherwise. The traffic intensity is

ρ=∑n=1∞n kn∈[0,∞],\rho=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}n\,k_n\in[0,\infty],ρ=n=1∑∞​nkn​∈[0,∞],

the mean number of arrivals per service.

Formalization targets

Goal: the M/G/1 classification (§3, p. 358)

the chain is ergodic  ⟺  ρ<1,the chain is recurrent  ⟺  ρ≤1.\text{the chain is ergodic}\iff\rho<1,\qquad\text{the chain is recurrent}\iff\rho\le1 .the chain is ergodic⟺ρ<1,the chain is recurrent⟺ρ≤1.

The goal leaves kkk arbitrary apart from positivity and normalization; in particular ρ=∞\rho=\inftyρ=∞ is allowed and falls in the transient case.

Milestones (the paper's general theorems and the step of §3 they feed)

  1. Theorem 2 (drift criterion): a nonnegative solution of ∑jpijyj≤yi−1\sum_j p_{ij}y_j\le y_i-1∑j​pij​yj​≤yi​−1 (i≠0i\ne0i=0) with ∑jp0jyj<∞\sum_j p_{0j}y_j<\infty∑j​p0j​yj​<∞ makes the system ergodic. Already posed on the platform and referenced here.
  2. Theorem 3: in an ergodic system the mean first-passage times dj=μj0d_j=\mu_{j0}dj​=μj0​ are finite and satisfy ∑j≥1pijdj=di−1\sum_{j\ge1}p_{ij}d_j=d_i-1∑j≥1​pij​dj​=di​−1 (i≠0i\ne0i=0), ∑j≥1p0jdj<∞\sum_{j\ge1}p_{0j}d_j<\infty∑j≥1​p0j​dj​<∞.
  3. §3 display: for the ergodic M/G/1 chain, μi,i−1=μ10\mu_{i,i-1}=\mu_{10}μi,i−1​=μ10​ and μi0=iμ10\mu_{i0}=i\mu_{10}μi0​=iμ10​ (i≠0i\ne0i=0).
  4. Theorem 5: a solution of ∑jpijyj≤yi\sum_j p_{ij}y_j\le y_i∑j​pij​yj​≤yi​ (i≠0i\ne0i=0) with yi→∞y_i\to\inftyyi​→∞ makes the system recurrent.
  5. Theorem 7: for a probability distribution {pn}\{p_n\}{pn​} with p0>0p_0>0p0​>0, ∑nznpn=z\sum_n z^np_n=z∑n​znpn​=z has a root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) iff ∑n≥1npn>1\sum_{n\ge1}np_n>1∑n≥1​npn​>1.
  6. Theorem 4: the system is transient iff ∑jpijyj=yi\sum_j p_{ij}y_j=y_i∑j​pij​yj​=yi​ (i≠0i\ne0i=0) has a bounded nonconstant solution.

Significance

The result. The classification is the stability theorem for the M/G/1 queue: for ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 the departure-epoch queue length has a stationary distribution, which is what the Pollaczek–Khinchine formula describes; for ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 the queue empties infinitely often but has no steady state; for ρ>1\rho>1ρ>1 it grows without bound. The general criteria behind it (Theorems 2, 4, 5) apply to any chain on the nonnegative integers and are reused in the companion GI/M/1 mission and throughout queueing and Markov-chain stability theory.

Formalizing it. All results here are proved on paper (Kendall and Foster, 1951–1953, with Theorems 3 and 7 classical lemmas from Feller). None of them is known to have a machine-checked proof against a Lean development of countable-state Markov chains. The mission produces such proofs on the published discrete-chain vocabulary (transition matrices, first-passage probabilities, return probabilities, positive recurrence), together with the general Foster criteria as reusable theorems. Theorem 2 is already posed as an open platform theorem and is reused here.

Difficulty

The queue-specific part of the argument is short once the general criteria are available; the weight of the mission is in those criteria. They relate qualitative properties of an infinite chain (ergodicity, recurrence, transience) to solvability of infinite systems of linear inequalities, and this needs limit behaviour of the nnn-step probabilities pij(n)p_{ij}^{(n)}pij(n)​ and of hitting probabilities of state 000, none of which follows from finite-state arguments. Two further points resist the naive approach. The converse directions (ergodic ⇒ρ<1\Rightarrow\rho<1⇒ρ<1, recurrent ⇒ρ≤1\Rightarrow\rho\le1⇒ρ≤1) need exact identities for mean first-passage times, not just bounds, and these must be handled in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] because the means may be infinite. And the boundary case ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 (null recurrence) separates the two equivalences: an argument that only compares the mean drift ρ−1\rho-1ρ−1 with 000, such as a law of large numbers for the increments, cannot tell recurrence from transience there.

Formalization scope

  • The chain is the published QueueingFundamentals.Foundations.TransitionMatrix (entries P.p i j, rows summing to 111 as a HasSum), with its firstPassage, returnProb, Irreducible, Aperiodic and PositiveRecurrent. "Ergodic" is P.PositiveRecurrent; aperiodicity is the paper's standing assumption and is not folded into it a second time.
  • States are indexed from 000, as in the paper; "i≠0i\ne0i=0" is i ≠ 0.
  • The M/G/1 matrix is a function mg1Matrix k : ℕ → ℕ → ℝ; the goal and the §3 display quantify over every TransitionMatrix P with P.p = mg1Matrix k. Such a P exists for every admissible k (checked in a sorry-free local file for ki=2−(i+1)k_i=2^{-(i+1)}ki​=2−(i+1)).
  • ∑nkn=1\sum_n k_n=1∑n​kn​=1 is added as the meaning of "stochastic matrix"; §3 writes only ki>0k_i>0ki​>0.
  • ρ\rhoρ and all mean first-passage times are extended nonnegative reals ([0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]), so divergent means are ∞\infty∞, never 000. Theorem 7's mean is also taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Recurrent means fjj=1f_{jj}=1fjj​=1 for every state jjj; transient means fjj<1f_{jj}<1fjj​<1 for every state. For irreducible chains these are complementary, which is a theorem, not a definition.
  • The general Theorems 3, 4 and 5 assume irreducibility and aperiodicity, the paper's standing assumption of §1. The goal does not assume them: they follow from ki>0k_i>0ki​>0.
  • Every series in a hypothesis carries its convergence (Summable or HasSum); Theorem 3's equation (6) is written as di=1+∑j≥1pijdjd_i=1+\sum_{j\ge1}p_{ij}d_jdi​=1+∑j≥1​pij​dj​ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] together with finiteness of the djd_jdj​, j≠0j\ne0j=0.
  • Theorem 7's distribution is renamed qqq in Lean to avoid a clash with pijp_{ij}pij​. Theorem 1 of the paper (§2) and Theorem 6 are not targets of this mission.

Ruled out: ρ\rhoρ as a real tsum (which is 000 for a divergent series and would call a heavy-tailed chain ergodic); defining "ergodic" or "recurrent" through the existence of Lyapunov or drift functions (which would make the criteria tautological); a goal over a matrix PPP that need not exist.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the general criteria (Theorems 2–5) on the published chain vocabulary, the limit theorem pij(n)→πjp_{ij}^{(n)}\to\pi_jpij(n)​→πj​ for irreducible aperiodic chains, first-step analysis for hitting times, and Theorem 7 as a lemma on probability generating functions; all of these are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • F. G. Foster, On the stochastic matrices associated with certain queuing processes, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24(3), 355–360, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728976
  • D. G. Kendall, Some problems in the theory of queues, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 13(2), 151–185, 1951. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1951.tb00093.x
  • D. G. Kendall, Stochastic processes occurring in the theory of queues and their analysis by the method of the imbedded Markov chain, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24(3), 338–354, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728975
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. I, Wiley, 1950.
  • S. Meyn and R. L. Tweedie, Markov Chains and Stochastic Stability, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626630
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities: Under Nondegeneracy the Simplex Technique Ends in Infeasibility, Unboundedness, or a Maximum Feasible SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Linear programming asks for the best value of a linear objective under linear constraints. In the form studied by George B. Dantzig in 1951, all variables are nonnegative and the constraints are equalities. The simplex technique moves between small sets of columns, seeking a feasible vector first and then improving its objective. Its basic promise is operational: a run should end with a valid answer, whether that answer is a maximum, infeasibility, or an objective that can grow without bound. Dantzig's chapter sets out both phases and the tests that distinguish these outcomes.

The formulation matters to readers of optimization because it separates the algebraic claim about a linear program from a particular rule for selecting the next column. The chapter permits any entering column satisfying the stated improvement test. This mission captures the correctness claim for every sequence of admissible choices under the chapter's nondegeneracy assumption, with one additional general-position condition needed for the Phase I argument.

Setting

Fix integers 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n. Let P0∈RmP_0\in\mathbb R^mP0​∈Rm be a right-hand side, P1,…,Pn∈RmP_1,\ldots,P_n\in\mathbb R^mP1​,…,Pn​∈Rm be columns, and c1,…,cn∈Rc_1,\ldots,c_n\in\mathbb Rc1​,…,cn​∈R be objective coefficients. A feasible solution is a weight vector λ∈Rn\lambda\in\mathbb R^nλ∈Rn with λj≥0\lambda_j\ge0λj​≥0 and ∑jλjPj=P0\sum_j\lambda_jP_j=P_0∑j​λj​Pj​=P0​. Its objective value is z(λ)=∑jλjcjz(\lambda)=\sum_j\lambda_jc_jz(λ)=∑j​λj​cj​. It is maximum feasible when z(μ)≤z(λ)z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ\muμ. Unboundedness means that feasible objective values exceed every real threshold.

Dantzig assumes nondegeneracy: every indexed selection of mmm points among P0,P1,…,PnP_0,P_1,\ldots,P_nP0​,P1​,…,Pn​ is linearly independent. A Phase II state uses exactly mmm basic columns BBB, each with a positive weight, and represents P0P_0P0​ with them. Every column has unique coordinates Pj=∑i∈BxijPiP_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}P_iPj​=∑i∈B​xij​Pi​, and zj=∑i∈Bxijciz_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}c_izj​=∑i∈B​xij​ci​ is the corresponding objective value. A column with cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ can improve the objective. When some xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0, the step uses the smallest ratio λi/xij\lambda_i/x_{ij}λi​/xij​ over those positive coordinates and replaces a minimizing basic column.

A Phase I state begins from m−1m-1m−1 basic columns SSS and a fixed reference point GGG. Positive weights wiw_iwi​ and ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 satisfy G+ρP0=∑i∈SwiPiG+\rho P_0=\sum_{i\in S}w_iP_iG+ρP0​=∑i∈S​wi​Pi​. Write Pj=y0jP0+∑i∈SyijPiP_j=y_{0j}P_0+\sum_{i\in S}y_{ij}P_iPj​=y0j​P0​+∑i∈S​yij​Pi​. A column with y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0 either gives a new Phase I basis through the positive-ratio test or supplies the nonnegative weights in equation (39), which start Phase II.

Formalization targets

The goal is the correctness of the complete two-phase transition system. There is no infinite admissible run. Every state with no outgoing transition has one of three outcomes:

Phase I:y0j≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;Phase II:∃j (cj>zj ∧ xij≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;Phase II:cj≤zj (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.\begin{array}{ll} \text{Phase I:}& y_{0j}\le0\ (\forall j),\quad \text{no feasible solution};\\ \text{Phase II:}& \exists j\ (c_j>z_j\ \land\ x_{ij}\le0\ (\forall i\in B)),\quad \forall M\in\mathbb R\ \exists\lambda\text{ feasible}: z(\lambda)>M;\\ \text{Phase II:}& c_j\le z_j\ (\forall j),\quad z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)\text{ for every feasible }\mu. \end{array}Phase I:Phase II:Phase II:​y0j​≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;∃j (cj​>zj​ ∧ xij​≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;cj​≤zj​ (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.​

The five milestones follow the chapter's own statements: Theorem 3's infeasibility certificate, Section 2's termination and hand-off, Theorem 1's improving family and two cases, Section 1's termination alternatives, and Theorem 2's optimality test. The goal includes the hand-off from the first phase to the second; the milestones make each outcome separately auditable.

Significance

The result gives a complete outcome guarantee for the chapter's procedure under its stated nondegeneracy regime. A terminal basis satisfying cj≤zjc_j\le z_jcj​≤zj​ is certified optimal against every feasible solution, not just against nearby bases. The other terminal tests certify properties of the original problem: nonexistence of feasible weights or arbitrarily large feasible objective values. This is the distinction needed to use the procedure as an algorithm for an LP rather than merely a local improvement rule.

The chapter's Theorems A and B assert existence of a basic feasible solution, and existence of a basic optimal one when the objective is bounded above. A proved platform theorem on basic optimal solutions covers these structural results after changing minimization cost qqq to −c-c−c; it is included by reference. Existing simplex results in the platform's minimization convention do not state Dantzig's Phase I reference-point process or his xijx_{ij}xij​ and zjz_jzj​ tests. Formalizing this mission adds that two-phase interface and a machine-checkable statement of its outcomes.

Difficulty

An improving column alone does not say whether another basis exists. In Phase II, the signs of its basis coordinates determine whether the positive weights meet a finite ratio limit or instead continue along an unbounded feasible family. In Phase I, the analogous limit must preserve strictly positive weights on exactly m−1m-1m−1 columns. The printed argument says that a coefficient vanishes at the limit, but does not exclude two coefficients vanishing together. That gap matters because the next state in the paper's recurrence must again have strictly positive basic weights. The mission states a general-position condition on GGG that rules out this simultaneous-vanishing case. It is an explicit addition to the printed assumptions and should be reviewed as such.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n → (Fin m → ℝ) for the columns, Fin m → ℝ for P0P_0P0​ and GGG, Fin n → ℝ for weights and costs, and finite sets for bases. Its zero-based Fin n labels correspond to the paper's 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. Each state carries its basis cardinality, independence, coordinate equations, and strictly positive basic weights. This keeps the coordinate functions defined on genuine bases and prevents a zero-weight intermediate state from counting as a valid pivot. The transition relation records every admissible entering column and minimizing leaving index; the pivot-selection heuristics (20) and (21) are outside the claim.

The phrases “upper bound of zzz is infinite” and “process terminates” are read as, respectively, objective values above every real threshold on the original feasible set and absence of an infinite sequence of admissible steps. “A feasible solution has been obtained” is the explicit vector of equation (39), not an unnamed existence assertion. Maximum feasible means feasible plus comparison with every feasible vector, avoiding a real supremum's empty-set default. The dimensions 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n make both kinds of basis possible and prevent a vacuous nondegeneracy condition. General position asks every family containing GGG, P0P_0P0​, and m−2m-2m−2 distinct PjP_jPj​ to be independent. The paper does not write this condition, so its inclusion is a substantive qualification of the target.

The printed indices in (30), (45), and a sentence following (18) do not match their defining ranges. The Lean statements use all nnn columns for jjj and the current m−1m-1m−1 Phase I columns for iii. The indices in (17) and (45) also carry the entering conditions cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ and y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0, respectively. These corrections preserve the paper's described procedure and prevent a terminal test from becoming trivial through a basic column. Contributions may address the finite-state termination argument, the ratio-test lemmas, coordinate uniqueness, and the translation from terminal signs to the three global LP outcomes. The operation counts and geometric interpretation on the last pages are outside the formalization.

Selected references

  • George B. Dantzig, “Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities,” in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, Chapter XXI, pp. 339–347. Book catalog search.
  • Hartmann_Psi, “A bounded feasible standard-form LP attains its minimum at a basic feasible solution,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem. Theorem record.
  • Shuze Chen, “Finite termination of the simplex method under nondegeneracy,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem in a minimization convention. Theorem record.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems I: Pseudo-Regret of (α, ψ)-UCBTextbook

Motivation

The stochastic multi-armed bandit is the basic model of sequential decisions under uncertainty with partial feedback: a forecaster repeatedly picks one of KKK options and observes only the reward of the option it picked. It models clinical trials, ad placement, routing and dynamic pricing, and is the building block of many reinforcement-learning algorithms. The question is how much reward is lost, compared with always playing the best option, through having to learn which option is best.

Chapter 2 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph (arXiv:1204.5721v2) answers this for upper confidence bound (UCB) strategies.

  • Lai and Robbins (1985) introduced upper confidence bounds and proved that the number of pulls of a suboptimal arm must grow at least logarithmically, with an explicit constant, for consistent strategies (doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8).
  • Agrawal (1995) gave simpler sample-mean-based index policies with logarithmic regret (doi:10.2307/1427934).
  • Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer (2002) gave the finite-time analysis of UCB1 for bounded rewards (doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352).
  • Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) present the (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB family, whose analysis needs only a bound ψ\psiψ on the cumulant generating function of the rewards, and the Lai–Robbins lower bound for Bernoulli rewards.

Setting

There are K≥2K\ge2K≥2 arms. Arm iii has an unknown reward distribution νi\nu_iνi​ with mean μi\mu_iμi​. At each round t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… the forecaster selects an arm ItI_tIt​ based on the past and receives a reward drawn from νIt\nu_{I_t}νIt​​, independently of the past. Write μ∗=max⁡iμi\mu^*=\max_i\mu_iμ∗=maxi​μi​, Δi=μ∗−μi\Delta_i=\mu^*-\mu_iΔi​=μ∗−μi​ for the gap of arm iii, and Ti(n)T_i(n)Ti​(n) for the number of times arm iii is selected in rounds 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n. The pseudo-regret is

R‾n=nμ∗−E∑t=1nμIt=∑i=1KΔi E Ti(n).\overline R_n=n\mu^*-\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\mu_{I_t}=\sum_{i=1}^K\Delta_i\,\mathbb E\,T_i(n).Rn​=nμ∗−Et=1∑n​μIt​​=i=1∑K​Δi​ETi​(n).

Moment condition (2.2). There is a convex ψ:R→R\psi:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rψ:R→R with ln⁡E eλ(X−EX)≤ψ(λ)\ln\mathbb E\,e^{\lambda(X-\mathbb EX)}\le\psi(\lambda)lnEeλ(X−EX)≤ψ(λ) and ln⁡E eλ(EX−X)≤ψ(λ)\ln\mathbb E\,e^{\lambda(\mathbb EX-X)}\le\psi(\lambda)lnEeλ(EX−X)≤ψ(λ) for all λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 and every arm's reward XXX. Its Legendre–Fenchel transform is ψ∗(ε)=sup⁡λ∈R(λε−ψ(λ))\psi^*(\varepsilon)=\sup_{\lambda\in\mathbb R}(\lambda\varepsilon-\psi(\lambda))ψ∗(ε)=supλ∈R​(λε−ψ(λ)). For [0,1][0,1][0,1] rewards one may take ψ(λ)=λ2/8\psi(\lambda)=\lambda^2/8ψ(λ)=λ2/8, for which ψ∗(ε)=2ε2\psi^*(\varepsilon)=2\varepsilon^2ψ∗(ε)=2ε2.

(α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB. With μ^i,s\hat\mu_{i,s}μ^​i,s​ the mean of the first sss rewards of arm iii, at round ttt select

It∈argmax⁡i[μ^i,Ti(t−1)+(ψ∗)−1(αln⁡tTi(t−1))].I_t\in\operatorname*{argmax}_{i}\Big[\hat\mu_{i,T_i(t-1)}+(\psi^*)^{-1}\Big(\frac{\alpha\ln t}{T_i(t-1)}\Big)\Big].It​∈iargmax​[μ^​i,Ti​(t−1)​+(ψ∗)−1(Ti​(t−1)αlnt​)].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 11)

If the rewards satisfy (2.2), then (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB with α>2\alpha>2α>2 satisfies, for every nnn,

R‾n≤∑i:Δi>0Δi(αln⁡nψ∗(Δi/2)+αα−2).\overline R_n\le\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\Delta_i\Big(\frac{\alpha\ln n}{\psi^*(\Delta_i/2)}+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-2}\Big).Rn​≤i:Δi​>0∑​Δi​(ψ∗(Δi​/2)αlnn​+α−2α​).

This is the bound the book's proof establishes. The printed statement has α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2) in place of Δi α/(α−2)\Delta_i\,\alpha/(\alpha-2)Δi​α/(α−2); see Formalization scope.

Milestones

  • The decomposition R‾n=∑iΔi E Ti(n)\overline R_n=\sum_i\Delta_i\,\mathbb E\,T_i(n)Rn​=∑i​Δi​ETi​(n) (p. 9).
  • The Cramér–Chernoff bound (2.3): P(μi−μ^i,s>ε)≤e−sψ∗(ε)\mathbb P(\mu_i-\hat\mu_{i,s}>\varepsilon)\le e^{-s\psi^*(\varepsilon)}P(μi​−μ^​i,s​>ε)≤e−sψ∗(ε).
  • The three-event lemma (2.5)–(2.7) from the proof of Theorem 2.1.
  • The bounded-reward bound (2.4): R‾n≤∑i:Δi>0(2αΔiln⁡n+αα−2)\overline R_n\le\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\big(\frac{2\alpha}{\Delta_i}\ln n+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-2}\big)Rn​≤∑i:Δi​>0​(Δi​2α​lnn+α−2α​).
  • The comparison (2.8): 2(p−q)2≤kl(p,q)≤(p−q)2/(q(1−q))2(p-q)^2\le\mathrm{kl}(p,q)\le(p-q)^2/(q(1-q))2(p−q)2≤kl(p,q)≤(p−q)2/(q(1−q)).
  • Theorem 2.2: for every strategy with E Ti(n)=o(na)\mathbb E\,T_i(n)=o(n^a)ETi​(n)=o(na) on all Bernoulli instances, lim inf⁡nR‾n/ln⁡n≥∑i:Δi>0Δi/kl(μi,μ∗)\liminf_n\overline R_n/\ln n\ge\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\Delta_i/\mathrm{kl}(\mu_i,\mu^*)liminfn​Rn​/lnn≥∑i:Δi​>0​Δi​/kl(μi​,μ∗).

Significance

Theorem 2.1 says that the cost of learning grows only logarithmically in the horizon, with a constant set by how well each suboptimal arm can be told apart from the best one. Theorem 2.2 shows that, up to constants, this cannot be improved: for Bernoulli rewards any strategy that is good on every instance must pay ln⁡n\ln nlnn per suboptimal arm, with constant Δi/kl(μi,μ∗)\Delta_i/\mathrm{kl}(\mu_i,\mu^*)Δi​/kl(μi​,μ∗). By (2.8) this constant is at least of order 1/Δi1/\Delta_i1/Δi​, matching (2.4). Together they are the template for the analysis of most optimistic algorithms: KL-UCB, linear and contextual UCB, and UCB-style reinforcement learning.

All results of the chapter are classical and proved on paper. This mission makes them machine-checked in a common model. That model has an explicit pseudo-regret, an explicit (generalized) inverse of ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗, an explicit initialization rule for the algorithm, and a randomized-strategy model for the lower bound. Later chapters of the series and later papers on optimistic algorithms can build on it.

Difficulty

The deterministic part of the upper bound is short, so the main difficulty is probabilistic. The sample mean μ^i,Ti(t−1)\hat\mu_{i,T_i(t-1)}μ^​i,Ti​(t−1)​ is taken over a random number of samples that depends on the algorithm's past. A Chernoff bound for a fixed sample size does not apply to it directly. The proof needs a union bound over all possible sample sizes, together with the representation in which the sss-th reward of each arm is a fixed random variable. Summing the resulting tail t1−αt^{1-\alpha}t1−α over rounds is where α>2\alpha>2α>2 enters.

The lower bound needs a change-of-measure argument between two Bernoulli instances, applied to a forecaster that may be randomized and never knows the horizon. Expressing "the forecaster cannot distinguish the instances" requires the law of the whole interaction under two environments.

Formalization scope

Model. Arms are Fin K with 2≤K2\le K2≤K, rounds are 1,2,…1,2,\dots1,2,…, and the natural logarithm is used. Rewards are a stack: Xi,kX_{i,k}Xi,k​ is the reward of the (k+1)(k+1)(k+1)-st pull of arm iii, all mutually independent, identically distributed per arm. For every strategy this gives the same law of arms and rewards as the book's protocol. μ∗\mu^*μ∗, Δi\Delta_iΔi​ and Ti(t)T_i(t)Ti​(t) are the published definitions of ImprovedLinBandits.UCBDelta.armModel. The pseudo-regret is (2.1), nμ∗−E∑tμItn\mu^*-\mathbb E\sum_t\mu_{I_t}nμ∗−E∑t​μIt​​, not the expected regret. The arms played are measurable random variables, so that every expectation is genuine.

ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ and its inverse. ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ takes values in the extended reals. (ψ∗)−1(y)=inf⁡{ε≥0:ψ∗(ε)≥y}(\psi^*)^{-1}(y)=\inf\{\varepsilon\ge0:\psi^*(\varepsilon)\ge y\}(ψ∗)−1(y)=inf{ε≥0:ψ∗(ε)≥y}.

Algorithm. The index is undefined while Ti(t−1)=0T_i(t-1)=0Ti​(t−1)=0. Unplayed arms are therefore played first, so each arm is played once in rounds 1,…,K1,\dots,K1,…,K. Ties are broken arbitrarily.

Corrected misprint. The book prints Theorem 2.1 with constant term α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2). Its proof yields Δi α/(α−2)\Delta_i\,\alpha/(\alpha-2)Δi​α/(α−2) (bound on E Ti(n)\mathbb E\,T_i(n)ETi​(n) times Δi\Delta_iΔi​). The printed form is false for Gaussian rewards with large gaps. The goal states the proof's version. (2.4) is correct as printed because Δi≤1\Delta_i\le1Δi​≤1.

Constants. No O(·) appears in the chapter's statements. The constants are the book's: α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2) in Theorem 2.1 and (2.4), and the factor 222 in (2.4) and (2.8).

Conventions made explicit.

  1. ψ(λ)≥ψ(0)\psi(\lambda)\ge\psi(0)ψ(λ)≥ψ(0) for λ≤0\lambda\le0λ≤0. Condition (2.2) constrains ψ\psiψ only on λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, while ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ takes the supremum over all of R\mathbb RR. Without this convention, (2.3) and Theorem 2.1 are false (for example ψ(λ)=cλ+λ2/8\psi(\lambda)=c\lambda+\lambda^2/8ψ(λ)=cλ+λ2/8 with large ccc).
  2. ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ is finite on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
  3. ψ∗(Δi/2)>0\psi^*(\Delta_i/2)>0ψ∗(Δi​/2)>0 for suboptimal arms.
  4. ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0 in (2.3).
  5. q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1) in (2.8).

Conventions 1–3 hold for every ψ\psiψ the book uses.

Theorem 2.2. The forecaster is a measurable rule from the history and a fresh uniform seed to an arm. It does not depend on the horizon. Consistency is required on every Bernoulli instance, every suboptimal arm and every a>0a>0a>0. A term with μ∗=1\mu^*=1μ∗=1 (kl=+∞\mathrm{kl}=+\inftykl=+∞) is 000, and the lim inf⁡\liminfliminf is taken in the extended reals. The book proves only K=2K=2K=2.

Ruled out. The algorithm cannot see unplayed rewards (its index uses only the sample means of rewards already received). Non-measurable arm choices, which would make the expectations vanish in Lean, are excluded. Consistency cannot be assumed only on the instance of the conclusion.

Needed infrastructure. Cramér–Chernoff bounds for sums of i.i.d. variables, Hoeffding's lemma, the stack representation of bandit interactions, and the divergence decomposition for randomized strategies. All are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2, doi:10.1561/2200000024
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6, 1985. doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • R. Agrawal, Sample mean based index policies with O(log n) regret for the multi-armed bandit problem, Advances in Applied Probability 27, 1995. doi:10.2307/1427934
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem, Machine Learning 47, 2002. doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 2: Without Shared Demand Information the Bullwhip Bound Is MultiplicativeResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders grows as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer to the wholesaler, the distributor and the factory, even when customer demand is stable. It was documented in industry practice by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (Management Science, 1997), who identified demand forecasting as one of its main causes. Amplified order variability raises the safety stock, capacity and transportation costs of every upstream firm, so the question of how large the effect is, and what reduces it, is central to supply chain management.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (Management Science 46(3), 2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and follows an order-up-to policy. Their §3 asks whether sharing customer demand information with every stage removes the effect. Theorem 3.1 (the companion mission of this series) shows that it does not; Theorem 3.2, the goal of this mission, gives the lower bound for the chain in which no demand information is shared.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers t∈Zt \in \mathbb Zt∈Z. The retailer faces i.i.d. demand

Dt=μ+ϵt,D_t = \mu + \epsilon_t,Dt​=μ+ϵt​,

where the error terms ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0.

Single-stage policy (§2). With p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 observations, a lead time LLL, a safety factor zzz and a constant CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​, the retailer forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,et=Dt−D^t1,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t,D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,

raises its inventory position to the order-up-to point yt=D^tL+zσ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​, and so orders qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. Orders may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

Decentralized chain (§3). Stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… form a serial chain; stage 1 is the retailer, and LkL_kLk​ is the lead time between stages kkk and k+1k+1k+1. No stage sees customer demand except the retailer. Stage kkk forecasts from the orders it receives,

D^t(1)=∑i=1pDt−ip,D^t(k)=∑j=0p−1qt−jk−1p(k≥2),\hat D^{(1)}_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad \hat D^{(k)}_t = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{p-1} q^{k-1}_{t-j}}{p} \quad (k \ge 2),D^t(1)​=p∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,D^t(k)​=p∑j=0p−1​qt−jk−1​​(k≥2),

uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t(k)y^k_t = L_k\hat D^{(k)}_tytk​=Lk​D^t(k)​, and orders

qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1,qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1(k≥2).q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}, \qquad q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_t \quad (k \ge 2).qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​,qtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​(k≥2).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (Eq. (7))

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var⁡(qtk)Var⁡(Dt)  ≥  ∏i=1k(1+2Lip+2Li2p2).\frac{\operatorname{Var}(q^k_t)}{\operatorname{Var}(D_t)} \;\ge\; \prod_{i=1}^{k}\left(1 + \frac{2L_i}{p} + \frac{2L_i^2}{p^2}\right).Var(Dt​)Var(qtk​)​≥i=1∏k​(1+p2Li​​+p22Li2​​).

The bound is the paper's, with its explicit constants. The paper asserts no tightness for this theorem, and none is claimed.

Milestone: Eq. (6)

For the single-stage policy with any safety factor zzz and any constant CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​,

Var⁡(qt)Var⁡(Dt)  ≥  1+2Lp+2L2p2.\frac{\operatorname{Var}(q_t)}{\operatorname{Var}(D_t)} \;\ge\; 1 + \frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}.Var(Dt​)Var(qt​)​≥1+p2L​+p22L2​.

This is the i.i.d. case ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 of the paper's Theorem 2.2. With z=0z = 0z=0 and L=L1L = L_1L=L1​ the single-stage orders are the stage-1 orders of the chain, so Eq. (6) contains the case k=1k = 1k=1 of the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 is half of the paper's comparison between centralized and decentralized information. When demand information is shared, the amplification from the retailer to stage kkk in the i.i.d. case equals 1+2(∑i≤kLi)/p+2(∑i≤kLi)2/p21 + 2(\sum_{i\le k}L_i)/p + 2(\sum_{i\le k}L_i)^2/p^21+2(∑i≤k​Li​)/p+2(∑i≤k​Li​)2/p2 (Eq. (8)), which grows additively in the lead times. Without sharing, the lower bound (7) is a product over stages and grows multiplicatively. The paper concludes that centralizing demand information "can significantly reduce the bullwhip effect", and that the gap widens as one moves up the chain. Eq. (6) is the single-stage statement that forecasting with a moving average alone already amplifies variability, by a factor depending only on the ratio L/pL/pL/p.

Formalizing it. The paper gives no proof of Theorem 3.2; it refers to Ryan (1997, PhD thesis) and to Chen et al. (1998). A machine-checked proof would therefore supply the first self-contained, verified argument for the multiplicative bound. The Gaussian special case of Eq. (6) is already formalized on Prove2Me, in the Snyder–Shen chapter on the bullwhip effect (SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing at ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0); that statement assumes Gaussian errors, whereas this mission assumes only symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. Neither the multistage bound nor the symmetric-error version of Eq. (6) has a formal proof.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is induction on the stage: treat the orders of stage k−1k-1k−1 as the demand of stage kkk and apply the single-stage bound. That step fails, because the single-stage bound is a statement about i.i.d. demand, and the orders reaching stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 are not i.i.d.: they are autocorrelated, and stage kkk's moving average of those orders interacts with the correlation in a way that can raise or lower the variance. Whether the product bound survives depends on controlling that interaction at every stage. For Eq. (6), the safety-stock term zσ^etLz\hat\sigma^L_{et}zσ^etL​ is a nonlinear function of the demands, and only symmetry of the errors, not normality, is available to control its interaction with the linear part of the order.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ChenBullwhip.Decentralized.

  • IIDDemand P is the demand model on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): a constant mu, sigma > 0, and errors eps : ℤ → Ω → ℝ that are measurable, mutually independent (iIndepFun), identically distributed, symmetric (eps t and -eps t have the same law), in L2L^2L2, with mean 000 and variance sigma ^ 2. Demand is D t = mu + eps t. Variances are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance.
  • SingleStage defines D^tL\hat D^L_tD^tL​, ete_tet​, σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​, yty_tyt​ and qtq_tqt​ of §2; CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a free real parameter, as the paper does not fix it.
  • Chain defines the forecasts D^t(k)\hat D^{(k)}_tD^t(k)​ and the orders qtkq^k_tqtk​ by recursion on the stage, with the convention qt0=Dt−1q^0_t = D_{t-1}qt0​=Dt−1​, so that stage 1 orders yt1−yt−11+Dt−1y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​. The recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is not printed in the paper; it is the §2.2 order identity applied to a stage whose incoming demand is qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, as the sequence of events on p. 440 describes.

Disclosed hypotheses not on the page: p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 (a moving average needs an observation), σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0 (the paper divides by Var⁡(D)=σ2\operatorname{Var}(D) = \sigma^2Var(D)=σ2), and square-integrable errors (Mathlib's variance is 000 off L2L^2L2). The paper's model (1) asks μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0; since μ\muμ affects no variance, no sign condition is imposed. Lead times are natural numbers. The statements hold in every period ttt, with no stationarity hypothesis.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: the orders are computed from the demands, not posited processes with a given covariance; the variances are genuine because every random variable involved is square integrable; and the ratio's denominator is σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0.

A complete development needs variance and covariance calculus for finite linear combinations of independent L2L^2L2 variables, and, for Eq. (6), the vanishing of the covariance between an odd and an even function of a symmetric random vector. Both are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of either target, and general lemmas on variances of linear filters of i.i.d. sequences, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13 (formalized on Prove2Me as SupplyChainTheory.*).
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