Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 1: Revenue Sharing at w = φc Coordinates the Channel and Gives the Retailer the Share φ of Its Optimal ProfitResearch Paper
Why revenue sharing
A supplier who sells to an independent retailer through a plain per-unit wholesale price faces double marginalization: the retailer orders less than the quantity that maximizes the profit of the supply chain as a whole, because each unit costs him the wholesale price rather than the production cost. Supply chain contracting studies payment schemes under which the retailer's own optimum coincides with the system optimum. Such a scheme is said to coordinate the channel. The usual examples are buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), quantity-flexibility contracts (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987).
Cachon and Lariviere study revenue sharing, in which the retailer pays a low wholesale price and also hands over a fixed fraction of his revenue. The scheme was common in video-cassette rental in the late 1990s, where it let rental chains stock far more copies of new releases. This mission formalizes the paper's single-retailer result: revenue sharing coordinates the channel, and the supplier can choose any split of the channel's maximal profit. It also includes the three further results of the paper that use the same argument.
The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000. Its results are unnumbered, so every item cites a section, a displayed equation and a printed page. The 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material.
Setting
A supplier sells to one retailer, who orders units before a selling season. The retailer's expected revenue is a function of the quantity alone. Leftover units have zero salvage value, and the supplier produces each unit at cost . The paper's standing assumptions (Sec. 1, p. 5) are:
- is strictly concave and differentiable for , with marginal revenue ;
- the product is viable: ;
- a finite quantity is optimal: .
A revenue-sharing contract has two terms. The retailer pays the wholesale price per unit, and he keeps the share of the revenue and transfers to the supplier. The case is the plain wholesale-price contract. The profits of the supply chain, the retailer and the supplier are
The integrated channel quantity is the maximizer of over . In Lean these objects are RevShareCoord.Single.Model (fields R, R', c and the three assumptions) and its functions Pi, retailerProfit and supplierProfit.
Formalization targets
Goal: revenue sharing coordinates the channel (Sec. 2.2, p. 6)
Let and . Then
The statement fixes no revenue function and no share. It holds for every model and every , which is what "the supplier can take any share of the channel profit" means.
Milestones on the way
- Eq. (1), p. 6. exists, is unique and positive, and is the only positive root of .
- Retailer's first-order condition, p. 6. If , an order is optimal for the retailer exactly when and . The retailer has at most one optimal order.
- Profit identities, p. 6. Under , and at every .
- Heterogeneous retailers, p. 7. Given and , a single wholesale price, chosen before the revenue function, coordinates every retailer of the model.
Further results on the same argument
- Buy-back equivalence, Sec. 2.3, p. 9. Take the fixed-price newsvendor and the buy-back contract , . It gives the retailer and the supplier the same realized profits as , for every order and every demand realization.
- Endogenous price, Sec. 3.1 and footnote 3, p. 11. Let revenue be any function of quantity and price, with costs linear in quantity. Then under , and the integrated optimum , assumed unique, is the retailer's unique optimum.
Significance
The result separates coordination from profit division. A contract family coordinates for every value of a parameter, and that parameter then moves profit between the firms without changing the quantity, so the contract terms can be settled by bargaining power alone. The heterogeneous-retailer milestone gives the practical advantage over quantity discounts: the coordinating terms do not depend on the retailer's demand, so one price list serves retailers who face different markets. The Sec. 2.3 equivalence shows that, in the fixed-price newsvendor, buy-backs are a special case of revenue sharing. The Sec. 3.1 statement shows that revenue sharing still coordinates when the retailer also sets the price, a setting in which Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed buy-backs fail.
All of these results are proved in the paper, and none is open. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the single-retailer theory for a general strictly concave revenue function. A related newsvendor version is already formalized on the platform: SupplyChainTheory.revenue_sharing_coordinates, from Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Thm 14.6. That version has a newsvendor revenue with salvage values and goodwill costs, and it concludes the optimality of three profits, not the -split of this paper. It is a different statement, so it is not reused here.
Difficulty
The algebra is short. The identity under is a single line, and it is a milestone, not the goal. The work lies in the optimization claims over a half-line with only one-sided information at . The integrated optimum must be shown to exist. gives only an eventual bound on the derivative, so the existence argument needs the continuity of a concave function and its supergradient inequality. It must also be shown positive, which uses as a one-sided derivative. Its uniqueness rests on strict concavity. The retailer's first-order condition needs the same machinery for , including the observation that the boundary point is never optimal. A stationary point of is not enough. The goal asserts that is the unique maximizer over all of .
Formalization scope
- Quantities, prices and shares are real numbers. and are functions , constrained only on . Differentiability is
HasDerivWithinAt R (R' q) (Set.Ici 0) qfor , so it is one-sided at . Strict concavity isStrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) R. - is encoded as " for some ". For a decreasing this is equivalent, and it allows .
- "Optimal" means
IsMaxOnover (over in Sec. 3.1), and "unique" means every other maximizer equals it. - The supplier's profit is not displayed in the paper. It is read off the sequence of events of Sec. 1.
- The goal and the first-order condition take . At the retailer's profit is identically zero and is not the unique optimum. The profit identities and the buy-back identities hold for all real parameters and are stated that way.
- Corrected slips. (a) Eq. (1) is introduced with "". This contradicts the standing assumption : with equality, is not positive. The statement uses . (b) The display has a wrong middle term, which should read . The outer equality is stated.
- The first-order-condition milestone adds the converse direction and uniqueness to the paper's "must satisfy". It does not claim that an optimum exists, which may fail when .
- Sec. 3.1 is stated in the generality of footnote 3: an arbitrary revenue function and a set of admissible prices, with the integrated optimum's uniqueness as a hypothesis, as the paper assumes it. The paper's monotonicity of in is unused and omitted.
- Sec. 2.3 is formalized pathwise. The expected-profit equations (2)–(4) are not part of the mission.
- A goal that only asserts would be an unfolding of definitions. The goal therefore carries the argmax-and-uniqueness claim, which needs strict concavity and the model's assumptions.
- Needed infrastructure: first-order conditions for concave functions on a closed half-line with one-sided derivatives, and existence of maximizers from an eventual derivative bound. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of that general kind are welcome.
Selected references
- G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
- B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
- K. S. Moorthy, Managing channel profits: Comment, Marketing Science 6(4):375–379, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.6.4.375
- A. A. Tsay, W. S. Lovejoy, Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1(2):89–111, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1.2.89
- H. Emmons, S. M. Gilbert, Note: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science 44(2):276–283, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
- L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445