Motivation
Manufacturers of computer hardware, software and automobiles routinely pay their retailers channel rebates: a payment per unit the retailer sells to end customers. A target rebate pays only for units sold beyond a target level. These industries also commonly offer returns: a credit for each unsold unit. Both instruments are used to change the retailer's behaviour, and the retailer controls two things that matter to the manufacturer: how much stock she orders, and how much sales effort she exerts to raise demand. Effort cannot be observed or written into a contract, but sales can.
T. A. Taylor's paper (Management Science 48(8), 2002) asks whether a contract built on sales and returns can make an independent retailer choose the effort level and the order quantity that maximize the profit of the whole supply chain, while splitting that profit in any desired proportion. Its Proposition 2 shows that returns alone, linear rebates alone, or target rebates alone cannot do this. Its Theorem 2, the goal of this mission, shows that a target rebate combined with returns can, when demand is uniform and effort cost is quadratic.
Setting
A manufacturer with unit production cost c sells to a retailer at wholesale price w; the retailer sells at the fixed retail price p, and unsold units have salvage value s. The standing assumption is 0<c<w<p and s<c (s may be negative). Before demand is seen, the retailer chooses an order quantity Q≥0 and an effort level e≥0. Demand is eξ, where ξ is uniform on [0,1], with distribution function Φ and Γ(x)=∫0xξdΦ(ξ). Effort costs V(e)=ae2/2, a>0.
The integrated channel, which owns both firms, earns
Π(Q,e)=−cQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+sE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).
Its optimum uses the critical fractile Qˉ0, defined by Φ(Qˉ0)=(p−c)/(p−s), the effort eˉ=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ0)/a and the order Qˉ=eˉQˉ0. Its optimal profit is Π=Λ(eˉ), where Λ(γ)=γV′(γ)−V(γ).
A target rebate and returns contract (w,u,b,T) pays the retailer u>0 for every unit sold beyond the target T, and credits her b∈[s,w) for every unsold unit. Her profit is
R(Q,e∣T)=−wQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+uE(min(Q,eξ)−T)++bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).
The manufacturer earns M(Q,e∣T)=(w−c)Q−uE(min(Q,eξ)−T)+−(b−s)E(Q−eξ)+. The other quantities the statements use are:
- the fractiles Q0 and Q1, with Φ(Q0)=(p−w)/(p−b) and Φ(Q1)=(p+u−w)/(p+u−b);
- the returns-only effort e=(p−b)Γ(Q0)/a;
- a threshold τ∈[Q0,Q1] that separates the retailer's low and high orders;
- the retailer's best profit at effort e, A(e∣T)=maxQ≥0R(Q,e∣T).
Contract terms of Theorem 2. Put ζ(T)=4a2(p−s)3T2 and
u(T)=(w−c)(p−c)5−ζ(T)(p−c)5,b(T)=s+(w−c)(p−c)6−(p−c)ζ(T)(p−c)6−(p−s)ζ(T),T3=2a(p−s)2(p−c)3.
T1 and T2 are the fixed points on [0,T3] of T↦eτ and T↦eˉτ, with e and τ evaluated at u(T), b(T). L(T,w) and Lˉ(T) are the retailer's profits at effort e and at effort eˉ.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1002)
For every κ∈(0,Π) there is ε0>0 such that for every ε∈(0,min(κ,ε0)) the following holds. Pairs (w∗,T∗) with
w∗∈(c,p),T∗∈(T1,T2),L(T∗,w∗)=κ−ε,Lˉ(T∗)=κ
exist. Every such pair gives u∗=u(T∗)>0, b∗=b(T∗)∈(s,w∗) and T∗>0. The pair (Qˉ,eˉ) is the retailer's unique optimum under (w∗,u∗,b∗,T∗), and
R(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=κ,M(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=Π−κ.
Milestones
- §4.1: (Qˉ,eˉ) is the unique maximizer of Π, with value Λ(eˉ).
- §4.2: under returns alone, (eQ0,e) is the retailer's unique optimum, with value Λ(e).
- Lemma 2: at effort e the retailer orders eQ0 if e<T/τ, eQ1 if e>T/τ, and either if e=T/τ.
- The two-branch formula for A(e∣T). Its derivative jumps up at T/τ, so T/τ is never optimal.
- Lemma 3: A(⋅∣T) is concave on [0,T/τ), and either convex then concave, or concave, on (T/τ,∞).
- Lemma 4: a unique threshold Υ decides whether the optimal effort lies above T/τ (at e^) or equals e.
- Lemma 5: the retailer's optimal (Q,e) in the three cases T<Υ, T>Υ, T=Υ.
- Lemma 6: T1 and T2 exist, are unique, and 0<T1<T2<T3.
Significance
The result. Theorem 2 shows that two contractible instruments can align two decisions, one of them not contractible. The rebate pushes effort and quantity up when sales are high, and the return credit raises both when demand is low. Together they reproduce the integrated channel's optimum (Qˉ,eˉ), and the free parameter κ allocates the profit Π between the firms in any proportion. Proposition 2 of the same paper rules out each instrument alone. This makes Theorem 2 the basis for the paper's recommendation that rebates and returns be used together. The uniform instance is the only one in which the paper proves this; for normal demand it gives only numerical evidence.
Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; it has not been formalized. The printed proof treats the wholesale price as fixed while it varies: u(T) and b(T) contain w, so T1, T2 and Lˉ move with w∗. A machine-checked proof therefore has to repair the argument, not only transcribe it. A numerical check (p = 10, c = 4, s = 1, a = 1; for example κ = 1.2, ε = 0.012 gives w* ≈ 4.889, T* ≈ 1.095) found the statement itself consistent.
Difficulty
The retailer's problem is not concave. For fixed effort, R(⋅,e∣T) has a kink at Q=T, and the optimal order jumps from eQ0 to eQ1 at e=T/τ. After the order is optimized out, the profit in effort, A(⋅∣T), has an upward kink at T/τ and can be convex and then concave beyond it. Checking the first-order condition at eˉ is therefore not enough. Coordination is a statement about the global maximum of a kinked, non-concave function, and comparing the two local candidates is what the threshold Υ and the profits L, Lˉ do. The contract is then pinned down by two equations in (w,T) whose coefficients themselves depend on w through u(T) and b(T).
Formalization scope
Everything is stated for ξ∼Uniform(0,1), taken as Lebesgue measure on [0,1], and for V(e)=ae2/2, as in all of Lemmas 3–6 and Theorem 2. Lemma 2 and the §4.1–4.2 solutions, which the paper states for general demand, are specialised to this instance. The uniform law has bounded support, so the paper's Assumption A4 (positive density on [0,∞)) is not imposed; the paper allows that relaxation on p. 995.
The expectations use the published expSales and expLeftover (Cachon's newsvendor definitions) of the image law of ξ under x↦ex. Φ and Γ are integrals of the uniform density, not hard-coded closed forms. Every inverse (Qˉ0, Q0, Q1), the threshold τ, the function j and its root Υ, the fixed points T1, T2 and the profits L, Lˉ are stated by their defining equations, never by a choice function. "Optimal" means a maximizer over Q≥0, e≥0. Channel coordination means that the retailer's set of maximizers is exactly {(Qˉ,eˉ)}. The manufacturer's profit M, which the paper does not display, is written from the contract's cash flows: units bought back at b are salvaged at s.
A trivializing formalization is ruled out: coordination is global optimality of (Qˉ,eˉ), not a first-order condition at eˉ. ε0 may depend on κ but not on ε. T1 and T2 are tied to their fixed-point equations and are not free variables.
A complete development needs:
- the closed forms of Φ, Γ and the three expectations under the uniform law;
- scaling identities in e;
- maximization of piecewise concave functions with a kink;
- one-dimensional intermediate value arguments, with the monotonicity needed to repair the proof of Theorem 2.
The uniform newsvendor identities and the kinked-maximization lemmas are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, and alternative proofs of the existence part of Theorem 2, are welcome.
Selected references
- T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8):992–1007, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
- G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
- B. A. Pasternack, Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166