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Stochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Convergence in law of the minimum of a branching random walk: The Minimum Centred at (3/2) ln n Converges to a Gumbel Law Shifted by the Derivative MartingaleResearch Paper

Motivation

A branching random walk is the simplest model of a population that both reproduces and moves: every particle dies and leaves a random cloud of children displaced relative to it. Its extreme particles control the speed of travelling waves in reaction–diffusion equations (the KPP/Fisher equation), the free energy of directed polymers on trees, the cover and hitting times of random walks on trees, and the maxima of log-correlated fields such as the two-dimensional Gaussian free field. The basic quantity is the position of the leftmost particle at time nnn.

Timeline.

  • 1974–1976: Hammersley, Kingman and Biggins prove the law of large numbers Mn/n→γM_n/n\to\gammaMn​/n→γ for the minimum.
  • 1978–1983: Bramson shows that for branching Brownian motion the maximum, centred at 2 t−322ln⁡t\sqrt2\,t-\frac{3}{2\sqrt2}\ln t2​t−22​3​lnt, converges in law (Bramson 1983). Lalley and Sellke (1987, Ann. Probab. 15) identify the limit as a Gumbel law randomly shifted by the limit of the derivative martingale.
  • 2004: Biggins and Kyprianou prove that the derivative martingale of a branching random walk converges to a limit that is non-trivial in the boundary case (Adv. Appl. Probab. 36).
  • 2009: Hu and Shi (arXiv:math/0702799) and Addario-Berry and Reed (Ann. Probab. 37) find the logarithmic correction: Mn−32ln⁡nM_n-\frac32\ln nMn​−23​lnn is tight. Bramson and Zeitouni (2009) obtain tightness around the median under tail assumptions.
  • 2013: Aïdékon proves convergence in law of Mn−32ln⁡nM_n-\frac32\ln nMn​−23​lnn for general non-lattice branching random walks, the result this mission formalizes (arXiv:1101.1810, Ann. Probab. 41 (2013)).

Setting

Let L\mathcal LL be a point process on R\mathbb RR: a random, possibly infinite, collection of points. Start one particle at 000. At time 111 it dies and leaves children at the points of L\mathcal LL; each particle of generation nnn then dies and leaves children at the points of an independent copy of L\mathcal LL, translated to its own position. Vertices of the genealogical tree T\mathbb TT (a Galton–Watson tree) are labelled by finite words u=(i0,…,ik−1)u=(i_0,\dots,i_{k-1})u=(i0​,…,ik−1​); ∣u∣=k|u|=k∣u∣=k is the generation, uju_juj​ the ancestor at generation jjj, and V(u)V(u)V(u) the position.

The paper works in the boundary case

E[∑∣x∣=11]>1,E[∑∣x∣=1e−V(x)]=1,E[∑∣x∣=1V(x)e−V(x)]=0,(1.1)\mathbf E\Big[\sum_{|x|=1}1\Big]>1,\qquad \mathbf E\Big[\sum_{|x|=1}e^{-V(x)}\Big]=1,\qquad \mathbf E\Big[\sum_{|x|=1}V(x)e^{-V(x)}\Big]=0,\tag{1.1}E[∣x∣=1∑​1]>1,E[∣x∣=1∑​e−V(x)]=1,E[∣x∣=1∑​V(x)e−V(x)]=0,(1.1)

and assumes throughout that L\mathcal LL is non-lattice and that

E[∑∣x∣=1V(x)2e−V(x)]<∞,E[X(ln⁡+X)2]<∞,E[X~ln⁡+X~]<∞,(1.3–1.4)\mathbf E\Big[\sum_{|x|=1}V(x)^2e^{-V(x)}\Big]<\infty,\qquad \mathbf E\big[X(\ln_+X)^2\big]<\infty,\qquad \mathbf E\big[\tilde X\ln_+\tilde X\big]<\infty,\tag{1.3–1.4}E[∣x∣=1∑​V(x)2e−V(x)]<∞,E[X(ln+​X)2]<∞,E[X~ln+​X~]<∞,(1.3–1.4)

with X=∑∣x∣=1e−V(x)X=\sum_{|x|=1}e^{-V(x)}X=∑∣x∣=1​e−V(x) and X~=∑∣x∣=1V(x)+e−V(x)\tilde X=\sum_{|x|=1}V(x)_+e^{-V(x)}X~=∑∣x∣=1​V(x)+​e−V(x). The objects of the main theorem are the minimum Mn=min⁡{V(x):∣x∣=n}M_n=\min\{V(x):|x|=n\}Mn​=min{V(x):∣x∣=n} (with min⁡∅=+∞\min\varnothing=+\inftymin∅=+∞) and the derivative martingale

Dn=∑∣x∣=nV(x)e−V(x),D_n=\sum_{|x|=n}V(x)e^{-V(x)},Dn​=∣x∣=n∑​V(x)e−V(x),

which converges almost surely to a limit D∞≥0D_\infty\ge0D∞​≥0, strictly positive on non-extinction. A standard example: two children with i.i.d. normal displacements of mean and variance 2ln⁡22\ln22ln2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

There is a constant C∗∈(0,∞)C^*\in(0,\infty)C∗∈(0,∞) such that for every real xxx,

lim⁡n→∞P(Mn≥32ln⁡n+x)=E[e−C∗exD∞].\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbf P\Big(M_n\ge\tfrac32\ln n+x\Big)=\mathbf E\Big[e^{-C^*e^xD_\infty}\Big].n→∞lim​P(Mn​≥23​lnn+x)=E[e−C∗exD∞​].

The constant is not specified numerically. It is the product C1c0C_1c_0C1​c0​ of the constants below.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Many-to-one lemma (2.1): Ea[∑∣x∣=ng(V(x1),…,V(xn))]=Ea[eSn−ag(S1,…,Sn)]\mathbf E_a[\sum_{|x|=n}g(V(x_1),\dots,V(x_n))]=\mathbf E_a[e^{S_n-a}g(S_1,\dots,S_n)]Ea​[∑∣x∣=n​g(V(x1​),…,V(xn​))]=Ea​[eSn​−ag(S1​,…,Sn​)] for a centred random walk SSS.
  2. Renewal function (2.13): the renewal function RRR of the strict descending ladder heights of SSS satisfies R(x)/x→c0>0R(x)/x\to c_0>0R(x)/x→c0​>0.
  3. Corollary 3.2 and Proposition 1.2: for the walk killed below 000, ez P(Mnkill<32ln⁡n−z)→C1e^z\,\mathbf P(M_n^{\rm kill}<\frac32\ln n-z)\to C_1ezP(Mnkill​<23​lnn−z)→C1​, uniformly for z∈[A,32ln⁡n−A]z\in[A,\frac32\ln n-A]z∈[A,23​lnn−A].
  4. Global minimum bound: P(∃u∈T:V(u)≤−y)≤e−y\mathbf P(\exists u\in\mathbb T: V(u)\le-y)\le e^{-y}P(∃u∈T:V(u)≤−y)≤e−y.
  5. Corollary 3.5: P(Mn≤32ln⁡n−y)≤(1+c10(1+y))e−y\mathbf P(M_n\le\frac32\ln n-y)\le(1+c_{10}(1+y))e^{-y}P(Mn​≤23​lnn−y)≤(1+c10​(1+y))e−y.
  6. Proposition 4.1: ezzP(Mn<32ln⁡n−z)→C1c0\frac{e^z}{z}\mathbf P(M_n<\frac32\ln n-z)\to C_1c_0zez​P(Mn​<23​lnn−z)→C1​c0​, uniformly on the same window.
  7. Derivative martingale: Dn→D∞D_n\to D_\inftyDn​→D∞​ a.s., D∞≥0D_\infty\ge0D∞​≥0, D∞>0D_\infty>0D∞​>0 a.s. on non-extinction.
  8. (5.2): ∑u∈Z[A]V(u)e−V(u)→D∞\sum_{u\in\mathcal Z[A]}V(u)e^{-V(u)}\to D_\infty∑u∈Z[A]​V(u)e−V(u)→D∞​ a.s. as A→∞A\to\inftyA→∞, where Z[A]\mathcal Z[A]Z[A] is the set of particles absorbed at level AAA.

Significance

The theorem identifies the limit law of the extreme particle: Mn−32ln⁡nM_n-\frac32\ln nMn​−23​lnn converges in law, on the event of survival, to a Gumbel variable shifted by −ln⁡(C∗D∞)-\ln(C^*D_\infty)−ln(C∗D∞​). It is the input for the study of the whole extremal process of the branching random walk seen from its leftmost particle (Madaule, J. Theoret. Probab., 2017), and it is the discrete-time counterpart of the Bramson and Lalley–Sellke results that later work on log-correlated fields takes as its template. The 32\frac3223​ correction and the role of the derivative martingale are the signature of the boundary case, and of log-correlated extremes generally.

The result is proved and published. It has not been formalized: Mathlib has no branching processes, no Galton–Watson trees with positions, no renewal theory, and no derivative martingale. This mission produces the first machine-checkable statement of the convergence-in-law theorem and of the intermediate results it rests on. A complete development would also give reusable formal versions of the many-to-one lemma and of renewal theory for ladder heights.

Difficulty

The first-moment computation through the many-to-one lemma gives the wrong centring. It predicts that the minimum sits near 12ln⁡n\frac12\ln n21​lnn, because the expected number of particles below a level is dominated by rare realisations. The true centring 32ln⁡n\frac32\ln n23​lnn only appears after restricting to particles whose ancestral path stays above a barrier, and this restriction requires random-walk estimates (ballot theorems and local limit theorems for walks conditioned to stay positive) that hold uniformly in a window of starting points. A second difficulty is that the limit must be identified, not only shown to exist. Tightness and subsequence arguments do not give the factor D∞D_\inftyD∞​; the identification needs the precise tail C1c0 z e−zC_1c_0\,z\,e^{-z}C1​c0​ze−z of Proposition 4.1, with a known constant, and the almost-sure behaviour of the sum over the stopping line Z[A]\mathcal Z[A]Z[A].

Formalization scope

  • Point process. The law LLL of L\mathcal LL is a probability measure on configurations (N,p)∈N∞×(N→R)(N,p)\in\mathbb N_\infty\times(\mathbb N\to\mathbb R)(N,p)∈N∞​×(N→R), where the points are pip_ipi​ for i<Ni<Ni<N.
  • Tree. Labels are List ℕ. The branching random walk is any family (ξu)u(\xi_u)_{u}(ξu​)u​ of independent measurable configurations of law LLL on a probability space. Every theorem holds for every such realisation, and a canonical realisation exists (product space).
  • Assumptions. Every expectation in (1.1), (1.3), (1.4) is a lower Lebesgue integral of a [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued sum. The signed condition in (1.1) is "the expectations of ∑V+e−V\sum V_+e^{-V}∑V+​e−V and ∑V−e−V\sum V_-e^{-V}∑V−​e−V are equal and finite". Non-lattice means: there are no a∈Ra\in\mathbb Ra∈R and d>0d>0d>0 with all points a.s. in a+dZa+d\mathbb Za+dZ.
  • Which assumptions where. The goal and §§3–5 assume all of them. The many-to-one lemma and the global minimum bound assume only (1.1), and the derivative-martingale milestone drops non-lattice, as in Appendix A.
  • Minima and limits. MnM_nMn​ and MnkillM_n^{\rm kill}Mnkill​ are extended reals, +∞+\infty+∞ on an empty generation, so extinction lies in {Mn≥32ln⁡n+x}\{M_n\ge\frac32\ln n+x\}{Mn​≥23​lnn+x}. DnD_nDn​ is a real sum over generation nnn, absolutely summable almost surely, and D∞D_\inftyD∞​ is its pointwise limit. The expectation in the goal is a lower integral of e−C∗exD∞∈(0,1]e^{-C^*e^xD_\infty}\in(0,1]e−C∗exD∞​∈(0,1].
  • Constants. C∗C^*C∗ is chosen before xxx. In Proposition 4.1, C1C_1C1​ and c0c_0c0​ are hypotheses tied to Proposition 1.2 and (2.13), not re-chosen. Corollaries 3.2 and 3.5 assert existence of their constants without Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.4.
  • Not trivial. A formalization with a real-valued MnM_nMn​ equal to 000 on extinction, a D∞D_\inftyD∞​ never shown to be the limit, or a C∗C^*C∗ depending on xxx would not be this theorem. The definitions above rule out each of these.

Out of scope: the spine-measure lemmas (Lemmas 2.3, 3.3, 3.8–3.10, 4.3), Propositions 2.1–2.2 cited from Lyons, and Appendices B–C. Contributions are welcome on all milestones. The many-to-one lemma and the renewal statement are independent of the rest and are natural first targets.

Selected references

  • E. Aïdékon, Convergence in law of the minimum of a branching random walk, Ann. Probab. 41(3A) (2013) 1362–1426. arXiv:1101.1810, doi:10.1214/12-AOP750
  • J. D. Biggins, A. E. Kyprianou, Measure change in multitype branching, Adv. Appl. Probab. 36 (2004) 544–581. Reference [7] of Aïdékon (2013), arXiv:1101.1810, p. 68
  • M. Bramson, Convergence of solutions of the Kolmogorov equation to travelling waves, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc. 44, no. 285 (1983). doi:10.1090/memo/0285
  • S. P. Lalley, T. Sellke, A conditional limit theorem for the frontier of a branching Brownian motion, Ann. Probab. 15 (1987) 1052–1061. Reference [21] of Aïdékon (2013), arXiv:1101.1810, p. 69
  • Y. Hu, Z. Shi, Minimal position and critical martingale convergence in branching random walks, and directed polymers on disordered trees, Ann. Probab. 37 (2009) 742–789. arXiv:math/0702799
  • L. Addario-Berry, B. Reed, Minima in branching random walks, Ann. Probab. 37 (2009) 1044–1079. Reference [1] of Aïdékon (2013), arXiv:1101.1810, p. 68
  • R. Lyons, A simple path to Biggins' martingale convergence for branching random walk, in Classical and Modern Branching Processes, IMA Vol. Math. Appl. 84 (1997) 217–221. Reference [22] of Aïdékon (2013), arXiv:1101.1810, p. 69
13 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchStatisticsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory VIII: Lindley's Integral Equation for the G/G/1 QueueTextbook

Why the G/G/1 queue

The single-server queue with general interarrival times and general service times, written G/G/1 in Kendall's notation, is the model left when every distributional assumption is removed from the classical single-server queue. Customers arrive one at a time, wait in line in first-come, first-served order, and are served one at a time. Almost nothing about it can be computed in closed form. What survives is a recursion for the waiting times of successive customers and the integral equation of its steady state, due to Lindley (Lindley, 1952). Every exact and approximate treatment of the G/G/1 waiting time, including the bounds of the next chapter of the book, starts from that equation.

This mission is the eighth of a series formalizing Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651). It covers Chapter 6, "General Models and Theoretical Topics". The chapter also treats the G/E_k/1 characteristic equation (§6.1), the M/D/c queue (§6.3) and maximum-likelihood estimation for M/M/1 (§6.7), which appear here as further milestones.

Timeline. Lindley (1952) derived the recursion and the integral equation and showed that a limiting waiting-time distribution exists when the mean service time is smaller than the mean interarrival time. Loynes (1962) gave the stationary solution as a supremum over the past of a random walk, for stationary rather than independent inputs. Clarke (1957) derived the maximum-likelihood estimators for M/M/1, and Crommelin (1932) the M/D/c generating function. Chaudhry, Harris and Marchal (1990) located the roots of the G/E_k/1 characteristic equation.

Setting

The interarrival times T(n)T^{(n)}T(n) are independent with common distribution AAA, the service times S(n)S^{(n)}S(n) are independent with common distribution BBB, and the two sequences are independent. Both AAA and BBB are lifetime laws: probability distributions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The means are E[T]=1/λ\mathrm E[T]=1/\lambdaE[T]=1/λ and E[S]=1/μ\mathrm E[S]=1/\muE[S]=1/μ, and the traffic intensity is ρ=λ/μ=E[S]/E[T]\rho=\lambda/\mu=\mathrm E[S]/\mathrm E[T]ρ=λ/μ=E[S]/E[T].

The line delay Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ of the nnnth customer satisfies Lindley's recursion

Wq(n+1)=max⁡(0,  Wq(n)+S(n)−T(n)).W_q^{(n+1)}=\max\bigl(0,\;W_q^{(n)}+S^{(n)}-T^{(n)}\bigr).Wq(n+1)​=max(0,Wq(n)​+S(n)−T(n)).

Write UUU for the distribution of S−TS-TS−T with S∼BS\sim BS∼B and T∼AT\sim AT∼A independent. Since Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ is independent of (S(n),T(n))(S^{(n)},T^{(n)})(S(n),T(n)), one step of the recursion sends the distribution ν\nuν of Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ to the distribution of max⁡(0,W+U)\max(0,W+U)max(0,W+U) with W∼νW\sim\nuW∼ν independent of UUU. A stationary delay distribution is a probability distribution ν\nuν that this step maps to itself; its CDF is Wq(t)=ν((−∞,t])W_q(t)=\nu((-\infty,t])Wq​(t)=ν((−∞,t]).

Formalization targets

Goal: Lindley's equation (6.8)

If E[T]\mathrm E[T]E[T] and E[S]\mathrm E[S]E[S] are finite and ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1, then a stationary delay distribution exists, and the CDF of every stationary delay distribution satisfies

Wq(t)={∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)(0≤t<∞),0(t<0),U(x)=∫max⁡(0,x)∞B(y) dA(y−x).W_q(t)=\begin{cases}\displaystyle\int_{-\infty}^{t}W_q(t-x)\,dU(x) & (0\le t<\infty),\\ 0 & (t<0),\end{cases} \qquad U(x)=\int_{\max(0,x)}^{\infty}B(y)\,dA(y-x).Wq​(t)=⎩⎨⎧​∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x)0​(0≤t<∞),(t<0),​U(x)=∫max(0,x)∞​B(y)dA(y−x).

The goal consists of the existence statement and the equation together. The equation alone is close to unfolding one step of the recursion. Existence is what ties it to a queue in steady state.

Milestones

  • (6.9), the CDF of U=S−TU=S-TU=S−T as a convolution of BBB and AAA.
  • The one-step convolution (p.285): Wq(n+1)(t)=∫−∞tWq(n)(t−x) dU(x)W_q^{(n+1)}(t)=\int_{-\infty}^{t}W_q^{(n)}(t-x)\,dU(x)Wq(n+1)​(t)=∫−∞t​Wq(n)​(t−x)dU(x) for t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  • (6.10)–(6.12), the Wiener–Hopf form: Wq−(t)+Wq(t)=∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)W_q^-(t)+W_q(t)=\int_{-\infty}^t W_q(t-x)\,dU(x)Wq−​(t)+Wq​(t)=∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x) for all ttt, and Wˉq(s)=Wˉq−(s)/(A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1)\bar W_q(s)=\bar W_q^-(s)/(A^*(-s)B^*(s)-1)Wˉq​(s)=Wˉq−​(s)/(A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1) for two-sided Laplace transforms.
  • The G/E_k/1 root result (p.278): the characteristic equation zk=A∗[kμ(1−z)]z^k=A^*[k\mu(1-z)]zk=A∗[kμ(1−z)] has exactly one root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), one in (−1,0)(-1,0)(−1,0) exactly when kkk is even, and, when A∗=[A1∗]kA^*=[A_1^*]^kA∗=[A1∗​]k, exactly kkk distinct roots in the open unit disk.
  • (6.18)–(6.20), the M/D/c generating function and p0p_0p0​ in terms of the roots of zc=e−λ(1−z)z^c=e^{-\lambda(1-z)}zc=e−λ(1−z).
  • (6.33), the maximum-likelihood estimators λ^=na/t\hat\lambda=n_a/tλ^=na​/t, μ^=nc/tb\hat\mu=n_c/t_bμ^​=nc​/tb​ for M/M/1.

Significance

Lindley's equation characterizes the stationary G/G/1 waiting time without any distributional assumption. The M/M/1, M/G/1 and G/M/1 waiting-time distributions of earlier chapters are its special cases. The transform relation (6.12) reduces the G/G/1 delay to a factorization problem for A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1A^*(-s)B^*(s)-1A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1. The recursion and the equation are the starting point of Kingman's bound, of heavy-traffic approximations and of simulation of single-server systems.

All of these results are classical and proved. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of them is formalized. The platform's forward-coupling mission proves convergence to a stationary workload of a continuous-time queue that it assumes to exist. It proves neither the existence of a stationary law of Lindley's discrete recursion nor Lindley's equation. The mission therefore produces a machine-checked account of the G/G/1 recursion on distributions, a Loynes-type existence theorem for it, and the Wiener–Hopf transform identity. Its definitions (lifetime laws, the law of S−TS-TS−T, the law map of the recursion, two-sided transforms) are reusable for Kingman's bound in the next mission of the series.

Difficulty

The obvious route to existence is to iterate the recursion from Wq(0)=0W_q^{(0)}=0Wq(0)​=0 and take a limit. The distributions of Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ from zero increase stochastically, but a limit of CDFs need not be a probability distribution: mass can escape to infinity, and it does when ρ>1\rho>1ρ>1. Ruling this out under ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 is the whole content of the existence half. It is a statement about the entire past of the input sequences, not about one step of the recursion, and the book asserts it without argument ("In the steady state (ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1) …", p.285).

The transform identity (6.12) needs the right strip of convergence, which the book does not state. A∗(−s)A^*(-s)A∗(−s) is finite only where the interarrival time has an exponential moment.

Formalization scope

Distributions are Mathlib measures on R\mathbb RR. AAA and BBB are probability measures with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), with integrable identity where means are used. ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 is stated as E[S]/E[T]<1\mathrm E[S]/\mathrm E[T]<1E[S]/E[T]<1 with E[T]>0\mathrm E[T]>0E[T]>0. Independence is encoded by product measures: UUU is the image of B⊗AB\otimes AB⊗A under (s,t)↦s−t(s,t)\mapsto s-t(s,t)↦s−t, and one step of the recursion is the image of ν⊗U\nu\otimes Uν⊗U under (w,u)↦max⁡(0,w+u)(w,u)\mapsto\max(0,w+u)(w,u)↦max(0,w+u). Stieltjes integrals over (−∞,t](-\infty,t](−∞,t] are Lebesgue integrals over the closed half-line, so the atom Wq(0)=q0W_q(0)=q_0Wq​(0)=q0​ is counted. Transforms take complex arguments.

The closed forms carried by the statements are the following.

  • (6.8), in both of the book's forms, ∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)\int_{-\infty}^t W_q(t-x)\,dU(x)∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x) and −∫0∞Wq(y) dU(t−y)-\int_0^\infty W_q(y)\,dU(t-y)−∫0∞​Wq​(y)dU(t−y).
  • (6.9) as an integral against the law of T+xT+xT+x.
  • U∗(s)=A∗(−s)B∗(s)U^*(s)=A^*(-s)B^*(s)U∗(s)=A∗(−s)B∗(s) and (6.12), for 0<Re⁡s0<\operatorname{Re}s0<Res with ∫e(Re⁡s)x dA(x)<∞\int e^{(\operatorname{Re}s)x}\,dA(x)<\infty∫e(Res)xdA(x)<∞. The division is stated only where A∗(−s)B∗(s)≠1A^*(-s)B^*(s)\ne1A∗(−s)B∗(s)=1.
  • (6.18) and (6.19) with the denominator 1−zceλ(1−z)1-z^ce^{\lambda(1-z)}1−zceλ(1−z) cleared on ∣z∣≤1|z|\le1∣z∣≤1, and (6.20) for c≥2c\ge2c≥2. The roots z1,…,zc−1z_1,\dots,z_{c-1}z1​,…,zc−1​ are hypotheses: distinct, ≠1\ne1=1, and exhausting the roots in the closed disk.
  • (6.33) as the unique maximizer of −λt−μtb+naln⁡λ+ncln⁡μ-\lambda t-\mu t_b+n_a\ln\lambda+n_c\ln\mu−λt−μtb​+na​lnλ+nc​lnμ over λ,μ>0\lambda,\mu>0λ,μ>0.

A stationary delay distribution is a fixed point of the law map of the recursion, not an arbitrary CDF assumed to satisfy (6.8). A statement of (6.8) for "any CDF with Wq=Wq∗UW_q=W_q*UWq​=Wq​∗U on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)" would assume its own conclusion, and is excluded. The statement for M/D/c includes existence of a steady state under λ<c\lambda<cλ<c as well as the formula for every steady state.

Not formalized: §6.1.1–6.1.2 (G/PH_k/1, quasi-birth–death processes), §6.4 (semi-Markov processes, whose limit theorems the book quotes without hypotheses), §6.5 (random-order and last-come service, series representations), §6.6 (design and control), and the rest of §6.7.

Contributions are welcome on the random-walk representation of the recursion, on the existence theorem under ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1, and on the transform identities. The first two are reusable for any single-server or storage model driven by a reflected random walk.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • D. V. Lindley, "The theory of queues with a single server", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 48(2), 1952. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100027638
  • R. M. Loynes, "The stability of a queue with non-independent inter-arrival and service times", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 58(3), 1962. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100036094
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971.
  • A. B. Clarke, "Maximum likelihood estimates in a simple queue", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 28(4), 1957. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177706796
  • M. L. Chaudhry, C. M. Harris, W. G. Marchal, "Robustness of rootfinding in single-server queueing models", ORSA Journal on Computing 2(3), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2.3.273
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Fundamentals of Queueing Theory VII: The Geometric Arrival-Point Law of the G/M/1 QueueTextbook

Motivation

Most queueing models with a closed-form answer assume Poisson arrivals. In practice the times between arrivals are often far from exponential: scheduled appointments, batch releases from an upstream process, or arrivals timed by a machine cycle. The G/M/1 queue keeps the service side exponential and makes no assumption about the arrival stream beyond independent, identically distributed interarrival times. It is the standard counterpart of the M/G/1 queue, and its solution is the one used in teaching and in practice whenever the input is not Poisson (Gross, Shortle, Thompson & Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley 2008, §5.3.1, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651).

The answer has an unusually clean form. The number of customers that an arriving customer finds in the system is geometric, exactly as in the M/M/1 queue, with the traffic intensity ρ\rhoρ replaced by a number r0r_0r0​ that depends on the whole interarrival distribution through a single scalar equation. This mission is the seventh of a series formalizing the book chapter by chapter; it covers the G/M/1 half of §5.3 (printed pp.259–263).

Setting

Customers arrive at a single server. The interarrival times are independent with common law AAA, a probability distribution on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with CDF A(t)A(t)A(t) and finite mean E[T]=1/λE[T] = 1/\lambdaE[T]=1/λ, λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Service times are independent exponential random variables with rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, and the discipline is first come, first served.

Let XnX_nXn​ be the number of customers in the system just before the nnnth arrival. Between two arrivals the server completes a Poisson number of services (truncated by the number present), so {Xn}\{X_n\}{Xn​} is a Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…}. Its transition probabilities are built from

bk=∫0∞e−μt(μt)kk! dA(t)(k≥0),b_k = \int_0^\infty \frac{e^{-\mu t}(\mu t)^k}{k!}\,dA(t) \qquad (k \ge 0),bk​=∫0∞​k!e−μt(μt)k​dA(t)(k≥0),

the probability of exactly kkk completions during one interarrival time (Eq. (5.50)): pi0=1−∑k=0ibkp_{i0} = 1 - \sum_{k=0}^{i} b_kpi0​=1−∑k=0i​bk​, pij=bi+1−jp_{ij} = b_{i+1-j}pij​=bi+1−j​ for 1≤j≤i+11 \le j \le i+11≤j≤i+1, and pij=0p_{ij} = 0pij​=0 otherwise (Eq. (5.51)). A stationary arrival-point distribution is a probability vector q={qn}q = \{q_n\}q={qn​} with qP=qqP = qqP=q and qe=1qe = 1qe=1 (Eq. (5.52)); qnq_nqn​ is the long-run probability that an arrival finds nnn customers present.

The characteristic equation of the chain is

z=β(z),β(z)=∑n≥0bnzn,z = \beta(z), \qquad \beta(z) = \sum_{n \ge 0} b_n z^n ,z=β(z),β(z)=n≥0∑​bn​zn,

where β\betaβ is the probability generating function of {bn}\{b_n\}{bn​} (Eq. (5.55)). Equivalently z=A∗[μ(1−z)]z = A^*[\mu(1-z)]z=A∗[μ(1−z)] (Eq. (5.56)), where A∗(s)=∫0∞e−sx dA(x)A^*(s) = \int_0^\infty e^{-sx}\,dA(x)A∗(s)=∫0∞​e−sxdA(x) is the Laplace–Stieltjes transform of the interarrival law. The traffic intensity is ρ=λ/μ\rho = \lambda/\muρ=λ/μ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (5.60), the geometric arrival-point law

If ρ=λ/μ<1\rho = \lambda/\mu < 1ρ=λ/μ<1, there is a number r0r_0r0​ with 0<r0<10 < r_0 < 10<r0​<1 and r0=β(r0)r_0 = \beta(r_0)r0​=β(r0​), it is the only complex root of z=β(z)z = \beta(z)z=β(z) in the open unit disk, and

qn=(1−r0) r0 n(n≥0)q_n = (1 - r_0)\, r_0^{\,n} \qquad (n \ge 0)qn​=(1−r0​)r0n​(n≥0)

is a stationary arrival-point distribution and the only one. The root is part of the conclusion, not an assumption.

Milestones

  1. Eqs. (5.51)–(5.53): for a probability vector qqq, qP=qqP = qqP=q is equivalent to qi=∑k≥0qi+k−1bkq_i = \sum_{k\ge0} q_{i+k-1}b_kqi​=∑k≥0​qi+k−1​bk​ (i≥1i \ge 1i≥1) and q0=∑j≥0qj(1−∑k=0jbk)q_0 = \sum_{j\ge0} q_j\bigl(1 - \sum_{k=0}^{j} b_k\bigr)q0​=∑j≥0​qj​(1−∑k=0j​bk​).
  2. p.261: 0<b0<10 < b_0 < 10<b0​<1, bn>0b_n > 0bn​>0 for all nnn, β(1)=1\beta(1) = 1β(1)=1, and β′(1)=∑nnbn=μ/λ\beta'(1) = \sum_n n b_n = \mu/\lambdaβ′(1)=∑n​nbn​=μ/λ.
  3. Eq. (5.56): β(z)=A∗[μ(1−z)]\beta(z) = A^*[\mu(1-z)]β(z)=A∗[μ(1−z)] for ∣z∣≤1|z| \le 1∣z∣≤1.
  4. Eq. (5.58), Figure 5.2: z=β(z)z = \beta(z)z=β(z) has at most one root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and one exists if and only if λ/μ<1\lambda/\mu < 1λ/μ<1.
  5. p.262: when λ/μ<1\lambda/\mu < 1λ/μ<1, z=β(z)z = \beta(z)z=β(z) has exactly one root with ∣z∣<1|z| < 1∣z∣<1.
  6. Eq. (5.59): successive substitution z(k+1)=β(z(k))z^{(k+1)} = \beta(z^{(k)})z(k+1)=β(z(k)) from any 0<z(0)<10 < z^{(0)} < 10<z(0)<1 converges to r0r_0r0​.
  7. Eq. (5.61): L(A)=r0/(1−r0)L^{(A)} = r_0/(1-r_0)L(A)=r0​/(1−r0​) and Lq(A)=r02/(1−r0)L_q^{(A)} = r_0^2/(1-r_0)Lq(A)​=r02​/(1−r0​).
  8. Eq. (5.62): Wq(t)=1−r0e−μ(1−r0)tW_q(t) = 1 - r_0 e^{-\mu(1-r_0)t}Wq​(t)=1−r0​e−μ(1−r0​)t and W(t)=1−e−μ(1−r0)tW(t) = 1 - e^{-\mu(1-r_0)t}W(t)=1−e−μ(1−r0​)t for t≥0t \ge 0t≥0.
  9. Eq. (5.63): Wq=r0/(μ(1−r0))W_q = r_0/(\mu(1-r_0))Wq​=r0​/(μ(1−r0​)) and W=1/(μ(1−r0))W = 1/(\mu(1-r_0))W=1/(μ(1−r0​)).

Significance

The result. Equation (5.60) reduces the analysis of a queue with arbitrary renewal input to one scalar root. Every arrival-point performance measure of the M/M/1 queue then carries over with ρ\rhoρ replaced by r0r_0r0​: the mean number found by an arrival, the mean queue found by an arrival, and the full distributions of line delay and system time seen by arrivals (Eqs. (5.61)–(5.63)). The same root drives the multiserver G/M/c analysis later in §5.3 and the relation between arrival-point and time-average probabilities in §6.3. The result also illustrates a point the book stresses: qnq_nqn​ is the distribution seen by arrivals, and it equals the time-average distribution pnp_npn​ only when the input is Poisson.

Formalizing it. The mathematics is classical (the embedded-chain method goes back to Kendall, 1953) and fully proved in the textbook literature; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it has a machine-checked proof: the platform had no G/M/1, embedded-chain, or Rouché-type statement when this mission was drafted. The work is to formalize the known argument, which touches analytic facts about power series with nonnegative coefficients, a mixture-of-Poisson computation, a counting of roots in the unit disk, and the uniqueness of the stationary law of an irreducible countable chain.

Difficulty

Locating a real root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) is a one-variable question. The hard step is excluding every other complex root inside the unit disk: a real-variable argument says nothing about complex roots, and the book's route relies on Rouché's theorem, which Mathlib does not have. A second point is uniqueness of the stationary vector: showing that the geometric vector solves qP=qqP = qqP=q does not show that no other probability vector does, and the goal asserts both. Computing ∑nnbn=μ/λ\sum_n n b_n = \mu/\lambda∑n​nbn​=μ/λ requires interchanging a sum with the integral against AAA, which is where the finite mean of the interarrival law enters.

Formalization scope

The interarrival law is a measure A : Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure A, A (Set.Iio 0) = 0, integrable identity, and ∫ x ∂A = 1/λ (the structure IsInterarrivalLaw). Every theorem also assumes λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and μ>0\mu > 0μ>0. The integrals defining bkb_kbk​ and A∗A^*A∗ are over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), closed at 000. The generating function β\betaβ takes complex arguments; real roots are written with the real-to-complex coercion. A stationary vector is a function q : ℕ → ℝ with qn≥0q_n \ge 0qn​≥0, HasSum q 1, and HasSum (fun i => q i * p i j) (q j) for every jjj.

The explicit closed forms the statements carry are: the transition matrix (5.51); the equations (5.53); β(z)=A∗[μ(1−z)]\beta(z) = A^*[\mu(1-z)]β(z)=A∗[μ(1−z)] (5.56); β′(1)=μ/λ\beta'(1) = \mu/\lambdaβ′(1)=μ/λ; qn=(1−r0)r0nq_n = (1-r_0)r_0^nqn​=(1−r0​)r0n​ (5.60); r0/(1−r0)r_0/(1-r_0)r0​/(1−r0​) and r02/(1−r0)r_0^2/(1-r_0)r02​/(1−r0​) (5.61); 1−r0e−μ(1−r0)t1 - r_0e^{-\mu(1-r_0)t}1−r0​e−μ(1−r0​)t and 1−e−μ(1−r0)t1 - e^{-\mu(1-r_0)t}1−e−μ(1−r0​)t (5.62); r0/(μ(1−r0))r_0/(\mu(1-r_0))r0​/(μ(1−r0​)) and 1/(μ(1−r0))1/(\mu(1-r_0))1/(μ(1−r0​)) (5.63). The waiting-time CDFs are defined as in §2.2.5 of the book: Wq(t)=q0+∑n≥1qnPr⁡{n completions in≤t}W_q(t) = q_0 + \sum_{n\ge1} q_n \Pr\{n \text{ completions in} \le t\}Wq​(t)=q0​+∑n≥1​qn​Pr{n completions in≤t} with the Erlang type-nnn CDF, and W(t)W(t)W(t) likewise with n+1n+1n+1 completions. The means in (5.63) are ∫0∞[1−Wq(t)] dt\int_0^\infty [1 - W_q(t)]\,dt∫0∞​[1−Wq​(t)]dt and ∫0∞[1−W(t)] dt\int_0^\infty [1 - W(t)]\,dt∫0∞​[1−W(t)]dt.

A trivializing formalization would take "r0∈(0,1)r_0 \in (0,1)r0​∈(0,1) solves z=β(z)z = \beta(z)z=β(z)" as a hypothesis of the goal, which turns (5.60) into a geometric-series check; here existence, location and uniqueness of the root, and uniqueness of the stationary vector, are all conclusions.

Out of scope for this mission: the M/G/c and M/G/∞ results of §5.2 and the multiserver G/M/c analysis of §5.3.2. Reusable pieces include a Rouché-type or fixed-point counting lemma for power series with nonnegative coefficients summing to one, and the uniqueness of stationary laws for irreducible chains on N\mathbb NN. Contributions of either kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §5.3.1, pp.259–263. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • D. G. Kendall, "Stochastic processes occurring in the theory of queues and their analysis by the method of the imbedded Markov chain", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24(3), 1953, 338–354. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728975
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Fundamentals of Queueing Theory VI: The Pollaczek–Khintchine Transform for the M/G/1 QueueTextbook

Motivation

The M/G/1 queue is the single-server queue with Poisson arrivals and an arbitrary service-time distribution. It is the first queueing model beyond the birth–death family in which exact formulas survive. It is also the model a practitioner reaches for when service times are measured and visibly not exponential: repair times, transmission times of variable-length packets, machining times. Its central result is the Pollaczek–Khintchine formula, first obtained by Pollaczek (1930) and Khintchine (1932). It expresses the stationary queue in terms of the service distribution, and it shows that the mean wait grows linearly in the squared coefficient of variation of service. That makes variability, and not only load, a measurable driver of congestion.

The textbook treatment followed here is Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed. (Wiley 2008), §5.1. It derives the result through Kendall's (1953) imbedded Markov chain of system sizes at departure epochs. It then obtains the transforms of the waiting times and the busy-period functional equation of Takács (1962).

Setting

Customers arrive in a Poisson stream of rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Service times SSS are independent with distribution BBB, a probability distribution on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with mean E[S]\mathrm E[S]E[S], and the discipline is first-come first-served. The traffic intensity is ρ=λ E[S]\rho = \lambda\,\mathrm E[S]ρ=λE[S].

Let XnX_nXn​ be the number of customers the nnnth departing customer leaves behind. The number of arrivals during one service time equals iii with probability

ki=∫0∞e−λt(λt)ii! dB(t),k_i = \int_0^\infty \frac{e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^i}{i!}\,dB(t),ki​=∫0∞​i!e−λt(λt)i​dB(t),

and (Xn)(X_n)(Xn​) is a Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…} whose transition matrix PPP has first row (k0,k1,k2,… )(k_0,k_1,k_2,\dots)(k0​,k1​,k2​,…) and, for i≥1i \ge 1i≥1, entries pij=kj−i+1p_{ij} = k_{j-i+1}pij​=kj−i+1​ for j≥i−1j \ge i-1j≥i−1 and 000 otherwise. A stationary distribution is a probability vector π\piπ with πP=π\pi P = \piπP=π. Its generating function is Π(z)=∑iπizi\Pi(z) = \sum_i \pi_i z^iΠ(z)=∑i​πi​zi, and that of the arrivals per service is K(z)=∑ikiziK(z) = \sum_i k_i z^iK(z)=∑i​ki​zi, for complex ∣z∣≤1|z| \le 1∣z∣≤1. The Laplace–Stieltjes transform of a distribution FFF on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) is F∗(s)=∫0∞e−st dF(t)F^*(s) = \int_0^\infty e^{-st}\,dF(t)F∗(s)=∫0∞​e−stdF(t). In the Lean development these are arrivalProb, transitionMatrix, IsStationaryDist, pgf, utilization and lst in the namespace QueueingFundamentals.MG1.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Pollaczek–Khintchine transform formula (5.15)–(5.16)

If E[S]<∞\mathrm E[S] < \inftyE[S]<∞ and ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1, the chain has a stationary distribution, and every stationary distribution satisfies π0=1−ρ\pi_0 = 1-\rhoπ0​=1−ρ and

Π(z)=(1−ρ)(1−z)K(z)K(z)−z,∣z∣≤1, z≠1,\Pi(z) = \frac{(1-\rho)(1-z)K(z)}{K(z)-z}, \qquad |z| \le 1,\ z \ne 1,Π(z)=K(z)−z(1−ρ)(1−z)K(z)​,∣z∣≤1, z=1,

with K(z)≠zK(z) \ne zK(z)=z at each such zzz. It leaves the service distribution completely general.

Milestones

  1. The stationary equations (5.12): πi=π0ki+∑j=1i+1πjki−j+1\pi_i = \pi_0 k_i + \sum_{j=1}^{i+1}\pi_j k_{i-j+1}πi​=π0​ki​+∑j=1i+1​πj​ki−j+1​.
  2. The transform (5.14), Π(z)=π0(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z)\Pi(z) = \pi_0(1-z)K(z)/(K(z)-z)Π(z)=π0​(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z), with π0\pi_0π0​ free and no condition on ρ\rhoρ.
  3. Ergodicity (§5.1.4): a unique stationary distribution exists if and only if ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1.
  4. The departure-point mean (5.7): L(D)=ρ+(ρ2+λ2σB2)/(2(1−ρ))L^{(D)} = \rho + (\rho^2+\lambda^2\sigma_B^2)/(2(1-\rho))L(D)=ρ+(ρ2+λ2σB2​)/(2(1−ρ)).
  5. K(z)=B∗[λ(1−z)]K(z) = B^*[\lambda(1-z)]K(z)=B∗[λ(1−z)] (5.32).
  6. The system-wait transform (5.29), (5.33): Π(z)=W∗[λ(1−z)]\Pi(z) = W^*[\lambda(1-z)]Π(z)=W∗[λ(1−z)] and W∗(s)=(1−ρ)sB∗(s)/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)])W^*(s) = (1-\rho)sB^*(s)/(s-\lambda[1-B^*(s)])W∗(s)=(1−ρ)sB∗(s)/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)]).
  7. The line-wait transform (5.34): Wq∗(s)=(1−ρ)s/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)])W_q^*(s) = (1-\rho)s/(s-\lambda[1-B^*(s)])Wq∗​(s)=(1−ρ)s/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)]).
  8. The busy-period equation (5.37): G∗(s)=B∗[s+λ−λG∗(s)]G^*(s) = B^*[s+\lambda-\lambda G^*(s)]G∗(s)=B∗[s+λ−λG∗(s)].
  9. The mean busy period: E[X]=1/(μ−λ)\mathrm E[X] = 1/(\mu-\lambda)E[X]=1/(μ−λ) with μ=1/E[S]\mu = 1/\mathrm E[S]μ=1/E[S].

Significance

The transform formula determines the whole stationary departure-point distribution from the service distribution. Its derivatives at z=1z = 1z=1 give every moment of the system size, including the mean-value formula (5.7). Combined with the transform identity (5.32), it gives the waiting-time transforms (5.33)–(5.34). Those in turn give the classical geometric-series representation of the line-wait distribution through the residual service time. The busy-period equation is the starting point for busy-period moments and for the M/G/1 analysis of priority and vacation models later in the book.

All results here are classical and proved in the literature. As far as a search of the platform shows (2026-09-28), none is machine-checked: there is no M/G/1 queue, imbedded departure-point chain, Laplace–Stieltjes transform of a service distribution, or busy-period equation on Prove2Me. Mathlib has Poisson distributions and measure convolution but no generating-function theory for countable Markov chains, no Laplace–Stieltjes transform, and no identity theorem in the form these statements need. The mission produces a checked statement of the Pollaczek–Khintchine formulas that later queueing developments (vacations, priorities, M/G/1-type chains) can build on.

Difficulty

Turning the stationary equations into (5.14) is formal power-series algebra. The difficulties lie elsewhere. First, the formula must hold for complex zzz on the closed disk, which needs the non-vanishing of K(z)−zK(z)-zK(z)−z away from z=1z = 1z=1. That fact fails for ρ>1\rho > 1ρ>1, where KKK has a fixed point inside the disk. Second, (5.15) evaluates π0\pi_0π0​ from Π(1)=1\Pi(1) = 1Π(1)=1 by a limit at the point where the formula is 0/00/00/0, and this uses K′(1)=ρK'(1) = \rhoK′(1)=ρ, an interchange of sum and integral. Third, the existence half of the goal requires positive recurrence of a chain with unbounded jumps. The book obtains it from Foster's criterion, which is not in Mathlib. Fourth, the waiting-time and busy-period transforms are stated for all real s>0s > 0s>0, while the generating-function route reaches only s=λ(1−z)∈(0,2λ]s = \lambda(1-z) \in (0, 2\lambda]s=λ(1−z)∈(0,2λ]. Extending the identity requires either analyticity arguments or a direct derivation. A formal proof of (5.14) alone does not touch any of these.

Formalization scope

The service distribution is a Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure B and B (Set.Iio 0) = 0; no density is assumed. The arrival rate is lam : ℝ with 0 < lam. Stationarity is IsStationaryDist P π: nonnegative entries, HasSum π 1, and HasSum (fun i => π i * P i j) (π j) for every j. That is global balance on ℕ, as the book writes it. Generating functions take a complex argument with ‖z‖ ≤ 1; transforms take a complex argument, and the waiting-time and busy-period statements use real s. The mean and variance of B are Bochner integrals, and every statement that uses them assumes Integrable. The mean busy period assumes 0 < E[S], so that μ=1/E[S]\mu = 1/\mathrm E[S]μ=1/E[S] is the book's service rate.

Closed forms carried by the statements: π0=1−ρ\pi_0 = 1-\rhoπ0​=1−ρ (5.15); (1−ρ)(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z)(1-\rho)(1-z)K(z)/(K(z)-z)(1−ρ)(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z) (5.16); π0(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z)\pi_0(1-z)K(z)/(K(z)-z)π0​(1−z)K(z)/(K(z)−z) (5.14); ρ+(ρ2+λ2σB2)/(2(1−ρ))\rho + (\rho^2+\lambda^2\sigma_B^2)/(2(1-\rho))ρ+(ρ2+λ2σB2​)/(2(1−ρ)) (5.7); B∗[λ(1−z)]B^*[\lambda(1-z)]B∗[λ(1−z)] (5.32); (1−ρ)sB∗(s)/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)])(1-\rho)sB^*(s)/(s-\lambda[1-B^*(s)])(1−ρ)sB∗(s)/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)]) (5.33); (1−ρ)s/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)])(1-\rho)s/(s-\lambda[1-B^*(s)])(1−ρ)s/(s−λ[1−B∗(s)]) (5.34); B∗[s+λ−λG∗(s)]B^*[s+\lambda-\lambda G^*(s)]B∗[s+λ−λG∗(s)] (5.37); 1/(μ−λ)1/(\mu-\lambda)1/(μ−λ) for the mean busy period.

The waiting-time distribution WWW enters through the book's FCFS relation πn=1n!∫(λt)ne−λt dW(t)\pi_n = \frac1{n!}\int(\lambda t)^n e^{-\lambda t}\,dW(t)πn​=n!1​∫(λt)ne−λtdW(t), and WqW_qWq​ through W=Wq∗BW = W_q * BW=Wq​∗B; both are hypotheses, as in the book. The busy-period distribution GGG enters through the equation (5.36) in CDF form, with nnn-fold convolutions built from Mathlib's Measure.conv.

The goal is not the algebraic consequence of (5.12) for an arbitrary sequence: π\piπ must be a probability vector, π0\pi_0π0​ is determined as 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ, and the existence of a stationary distribution is part of the conclusion, so the statement cannot hold vacuously. The departure-point/time-average equality (§5.1.3, via PASTA) is not formalized.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: generating functions of stationary distributions on ℕ, Poisson mixtures, Laplace–Stieltjes transforms of measures on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and a Foster-type drift criterion for countable chains. Contributions proving any milestone, or those tools, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §5.1. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • D. G. Kendall, Stochastic processes occurring in the theory of queues and their analysis by the method of the imbedded Markov chain, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24 (1953) 338–354. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728975
  • F. G. Foster, On the stochastic matrices associated with certain queuing processes, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24 (1953) 355–360. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728976
  • L. Takács, Introduction to the Theory of Queues, Oxford University Press, 1962.
  • F. Pollaczek, Über eine Aufgabe der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Mathematische Zeitschrift 32 (1930) 64–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01194620
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory V: Closed Jackson Networks and the Mean-Value RecursionTextbook

Motivation

Networks of queues model systems in which a job visits several service stations in turn: jobs in a computer system alternating between CPU and disks, machines cycling between operation and repair, parts routed through a job shop. In a closed network no job enters or leaves; a fixed population of NNN customers circulates among kkk nodes. Closed networks are the standard model of multiprogrammed computer systems and of machine-repair and finite-source systems, and they are the setting of chapter 4 of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, doi:10.1002/9781118625651).

The chapter's results form a short line of computational ideas:

  • Jackson (1957, 1963) showed that open networks of exponential servers with Markovian routing have a product-form steady state; Gordon and Newell (1967) gave the closed-network version, (4.15)–(4.18) of the book.
  • Buzen (1973) gave a convolution recursion for the normalizing constant G(N)G(N)G(N) and for marginal distributions, (4.19)–(4.22).
  • Reiser and Lavenberg (1980) introduced mean-value analysis (MVA), which computes mean queue lengths, waiting times and throughputs population by population without ever forming G(N)G(N)G(N), (4.23)–(4.25); the book presents it following Bruell and Balbo (1980).
  • The book closes the section with a recursion for the full marginal distributions, (4.26), which it proves from the product form (pp.207–209).

This mission formalizes that line, ending at (4.26).

Setting

A closed Jackson network has nodes i=1,…,ki = 1, \dots, ki=1,…,k, each with a single server whose service times are exponential with rate μi>0\mu_i > 0μi​>0. A customer finishing service at node iii moves to node jjj with probability rijr_{ij}rij​; the routing matrix R=(rij)R = (r_{ij})R=(rij​) has nonnegative entries and rows summing to one, and it is irreducible: every node can be reached from every other. The state is nˉ=(n1,…,nk)\bar n = (n_1, \dots, n_k)nˉ=(n1​,…,nk​), the number of customers at each node, with n1+⋯+nk=Nn_1 + \cdots + n_k = Nn1​+⋯+nk​=N; this state space is finite.

The steady-state distribution pnˉp_{\bar n}pnˉ​ is the probability vector on the state space that solves the flow-balance equations (4.14),

∑j=1k∑i=1i≠jkμirij pnˉ;i+j−=∑i=1kμi(1−rii) pnˉ,\sum_{j=1}^{k}\sum_{\substack{i=1\\ i\ne j}}^{k} \mu_i r_{ij}\, p_{\bar n;i^+j^-} = \sum_{i=1}^{k}\mu_i(1-r_{ii})\,p_{\bar n},j=1∑k​i=1i=j​∑k​μi​rij​pnˉ;i+j−​=i=1∑k​μi​(1−rii​)pnˉ​,

where nˉ;i+j−\bar n;i^+j^-nˉ;i+j− has one more customer at iii and one fewer at jjj, and terms with a negative subscript or with μi\mu_iμi​ at an empty node vanish. The traffic equations (4.16) are μiρi=∑jμjrjiρj\mu_i\rho_i = \sum_j \mu_j r_{ji}\rho_jμi​ρi​=∑j​μj​rji​ρj​; they determine ρ=(ρ1,…,ρk)\rho = (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_k)ρ=(ρ1​,…,ρk​) up to a positive factor. The normalizing constant is

G(N)=∑n1+⋯+nk=Nρ1n1⋯ρknk,G(N) = \sum_{n_1+\cdots+n_k=N}\rho_1^{n_1}\cdots\rho_k^{n_k},G(N)=n1​+⋯+nk​=N∑​ρ1n1​​⋯ρknk​​,

and more generally, with fi(n)=ρi n/ai(n)f_i(n) = \rho_i^{\,n}/a_i(n)fi​(n)=ρin​/ai​(n) for cic_ici​-server nodes ((4.13)), G(N)=∑∏ifi(ni)G(N) = \sum \prod_i f_i(n_i)G(N)=∑∏i​fi​(ni​) and Buzen's function gm(n)=∑n1+⋯+nm=n∏i≤mfi(ni)g_m(n) = \sum_{n_1+\cdots+n_m=n}\prod_{i\le m} f_i(n_i)gm​(n)=∑n1​+⋯+nm​=n​∏i≤m​fi​(ni​).

For each population NNN write pi(n,N)=Pr⁡{Ni=n}p_i(n, N) = \Pr\{N_i = n\}pi​(n,N)=Pr{Ni​=n} for the marginal distribution at node iii, Pˉi(n;N)=Pr⁡{Ni≥n}\bar P_i(n; N) = \Pr\{N_i \ge n\}Pˉi​(n;N)=Pr{Ni​≥n}, Li(N)L_i(N)Li​(N) for the mean number at node iii, and

λi(N)=Pr⁡{server busy at node i}⋅μi\lambda_i(N) = \Pr\{\text{server busy at node } i\}\cdot\mu_iλi​(N)=Pr{server busy at node i}⋅μi​

for the throughput of node iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: the marginal recursion (4.26)

For every node iii,

pi(0,0)=1,pi(n,N)=λi(N)μi pi(n−1,N−1)(n,N≥1).p_i(0,0) = 1, \qquad p_i(n, N) = \frac{\lambda_i(N)}{\mu_i}\,p_i(n-1, N-1) \quad (n, N \ge 1).pi​(0,0)=1,pi​(n,N)=μi​λi​(N)​pi​(n−1,N−1)(n,N≥1).

It involves only the steady-state distributions and quantities computed from them; it holds for every irreducible routing matrix and every choice of rates.

Milestones

  1. Product form (4.14)–(4.16). For any positive solution ρ\rhoρ of (4.16), a probability distribution solves (4.14) if and only if pnˉ=G(N)−1ρ1n1⋯ρknkp_{\bar n} = G(N)^{-1}\rho_1^{n_1}\cdots\rho_k^{n_k}pnˉ​=G(N)−1ρ1n1​​⋯ρknk​​.
  2. Buzen's algorithm (4.19)–(4.21). G(N)=gk(N)G(N) = g_k(N)G(N)=gk​(N), gm(n)=∑i=0nfm(i) gm−1(n−i)g_m(n) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} f_m(i)\,g_{m-1}(n-i)gm​(n)=∑i=0n​fm​(i)gm−1​(n−i), g1=f1g_1 = f_1g1​=f1​, gm(0)=1g_m(0) = 1gm​(0)=1.
  3. Marginal at the last node (4.22). pk(n)=fk(n) gk−1(N−n)/G(N)p_k(n) = f_k(n)\,g_{k-1}(N-n)/G(N)pk​(n)=fk​(n)gk−1​(N−n)/G(N) for 0≤n≤N0 \le n \le N0≤n≤N.
  4. Complementary marginal (p.208). Pˉi(ni;N)=ρi niG(N−ni)/G(N)\bar P_i(n_i; N) = \rho_i^{\,n_i}G(N-n_i)/G(N)Pˉi​(ni​;N)=ρini​​G(N−ni​)/G(N).
  5. Mean-value analysis (4.23)–(4.25). Li(0)=0L_i(0) = 0Li​(0)=0; Li(N)=λi(N)Wi(N)L_i(N) = \lambda_i(N)W_i(N)Li​(N)=λi​(N)Wi​(N) with Wi(N)=(1+Li(N−1))/μiW_i(N) = (1 + L_i(N-1))/\mu_iWi​(N)=(1+Li​(N−1))/μi​; and for vvv solving vi=∑jvjrjiv_i = \sum_j v_j r_{ji}vi​=∑j​vj​rji​ with vl=1v_l = 1vl​=1, λl(N)=N/∑iviWi(N)\lambda_l(N) = N/\sum_i v_iW_i(N)λl​(N)=N/∑i​vi​Wi​(N) and λi(N)=λl(N)vi\lambda_i(N) = \lambda_l(N)v_iλi​(N)=λl​(N)vi​.

Significance

The product form reduces a (N+k−1N)\binom{N+k-1}{N}(NN+k−1​)-state Markov chain to the constants G(0),…,G(N)G(0), \dots, G(N)G(0),…,G(N), and Buzen's recursion computes them in O(kN2)O(kN^2)O(kN2) operations. Mean-value analysis goes further and avoids G(N)G(N)G(N), whose magnitude can overflow or underflow for large populations; it is the method used in capacity planning of computer systems. The recursion (4.26) extends MVA from means to full marginal distributions, so a single pass over NNN yields every nodal distribution.

All of these results are classical and proved in the literature; the book proves (4.26) itself. What the mission adds is a machine-checked development of them from the global balance equations: the product form with its uniqueness, the convolution identities, the marginal formulas, and the correctness of the MVA iteration as stated by the book, all over one shared definition layer. A search of the platform on 2026-09-28 found no formal statement of Buzen's algorithm or of MVA. The platform has Kelly's closed migration process theorem (KellyStochasticNetworks.closed_migration_equilibrium), which shows that the unnormalized product form satisfies the equilibrium equations under Kelly's conventions; the normalization, uniqueness and everything downstream of the product form are new here.

Difficulty

The combinatorial identities (Buzen's recursion, the tail marginal) are reindexings of finite sums over compositions of NNN; in Lean the work is in bijections between the state spaces {n1+⋯+nk=N}\{n_1+\cdots+n_k = N\}{n1​+⋯+nk​=N} for different kkk and NNN. The substantive step is uniqueness in the product-form theorem: the global balance equations have a one-dimensional solution space only because the chain on the NNN-customer states is irreducible on the population level, which is a property of the network chain and not of the routing matrix alone. The goal and MVA also need a positive solution of the traffic equations, which is not among the hypotheses and has to come from irreducibility of RRR. The book's own intuitive derivation of MVA via the arrival theorem is not the route the statements require; they are stated in terms of the steady-state distributions alone.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin k (book node iii is index i−1i-1i−1); states are n : Fin k → ℕ with ∑ i, n i = N, collected in a Finset, and all sums are finite. A distribution is a real function on Nk\mathbb N^kNk that is nonnegative, vanishes off the NNN-customer states and sums to one there. The balance equations are (4.14) verbatim with the book's boundary convention (p.188), not detailed balance. All results except Buzen's algorithm and (4.22) are for single-server nodes, as in the book; (4.13)'s multiserver factor ai(n)a_i(n)ai​(n) enters only (4.19)–(4.22).

Closed forms instantiated in the statements: the product form G(N)−1∏iρiniG(N)^{-1}\prod_i\rho_i^{n_i}G(N)−1∏i​ρini​​ ((4.15)); G(N)G(N)G(N) as the explicit sum (4.18)/(4.19); ai(n)a_i(n)ai​(n) from (4.13); gmg_mgm​ from (4.20); pk(n)=fk(n)gk−1(N−n)/G(N)p_k(n) = f_k(n)g_{k-1}(N-n)/G(N)pk​(n)=fk​(n)gk−1​(N−n)/G(N) ((4.22)); Pˉi(n;N)=ρinG(N−n)/G(N)\bar P_i(n;N) = \rho_i^nG(N-n)/G(N)Pˉi​(n;N)=ρin​G(N−n)/G(N) (p.208); Wi(N)=(1+Li(N−1))/μiW_i(N) = (1+L_i(N-1))/\mu_iWi​(N)=(1+Li​(N−1))/μi​ ((4.23)); λl(N)=N/∑iviWi(N)\lambda_l(N) = N/\sum_i v_iW_i(N)λl​(N)=N/∑i​vi​Wi​(N) (MVA step (iii)(b)).

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out: λi(N)\lambda_i(N)λi​(N) in (4.26) and (4.24) is the throughput computed from the steady-state distribution, not a free constant (which would make (4.26) a definition); and gmg_mgm​ is defined by the sum (4.20), so the recursion (4.21) is a theorem rather than rfl. The product-form statement is an equivalence, so it asserts both that the product form is a steady state and that it is the only one.

Needed infrastructure: bijections between compositions of NNN into kkk and k−1k-1k−1 parts, uniqueness of stationary distributions of irreducible finite continuous-time chains (stated directly via the balance equations), and existence of positive solutions of v=vRv = vRv=vR for irreducible stochastic RRR. The last two are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, and helper lemmas on these three points.

Not formalized: open Jackson networks (4.11) and Burke's theorem (4.5)–(4.6), multiclass networks (§4.2.1), the multiserver recursion (4.27) and cyclic queues (§4.4).

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §4.3, pp.195–209. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • J. R. Jackson, "Jobshop-like queueing systems", Management Science 10(1), 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.1.131
  • W. J. Gordon, G. F. Newell, "Closed queuing systems with exponential servers", Operations Research 15(2), 1967. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.15.2.254
  • J. P. Buzen, "Computational algorithms for closed queueing networks with exponential servers", Communications of the ACM 16(9), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1145/362342.362345
  • M. Reiser, S. S. Lavenberg, "Mean-value analysis of closed multichain queuing networks", Journal of the ACM 27(2), 1980. https://doi.org/10.1145/322186.322195
  • S. C. Bruell, G. Balbo, Computational Algorithms for Closed Queueing Networks, North-Holland, 1980.
7 thms1 active userReviewed
Markov ChainOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory IV: The Stationary Distribution of the M/M/1 Retrial QueueTextbook

Motivation

In many service systems a customer who finds every server busy does not join a queue. A caller who hears a busy signal hangs up and redials later; a request rejected by a saturated server is resent after a timeout; an aircraft that cannot land circles and tries again. These retrial queues are the subject of a substantial literature in telephone traffic engineering, computer networks and call-centre design, surveyed in the monograph of Falin and Templeton (1997) and the bibliography of Artalejo (1999). Their analysis is harder than that of ordinary queues: the blocked customers form an orbit whose size is part of the state, so even the simplest model is a two-dimensional Markov chain, and explicit stationary distributions are rare.

This mission is the fourth of a series formalizing Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008). Its goal is the explicit stationary distribution of the single-server retrial queue, Eq. (3.57) of §3.5.1, one of the few retrial models solvable in closed form. Chapter 3 of the book treats Markovian queues that are not birth–death processes: bulk arrivals, bulk service, Erlang phases, priority disciplines and retrials. The milestones also collect three capstone formulas from the chapter's other sections: the bulk-input queue, the partial-batch bulk-service queue, and Cobham's formula for nonpreemptive priorities (Cobham, 1954).

Setting

In the M/M/1M/M/1M/M/1 retrial queue customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ\lambdaλ and are served one at a time by a single server, with exponential service times of mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ. An arrival that finds the server busy enters the orbit and stays there for an exponential time with mean 1/γ1/\gamma1/γ, after which it tries again; each customer in orbit retries independently. No customer leaves because of impatience. With Ns(t)∈{0,1}N_s(t) \in \{0,1\}Ns​(t)∈{0,1} the number in service and No(t)N_o(t)No​(t) the number in orbit, the pair is a continuous-time Markov chain on states {i,n}\{i, n\}{i,n}, i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1}, n∈{0,1,2,… }n \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}n∈{0,1,2,…}. Writing pi,np_{i,n}pi,n​ for the steady-state probability of {i,n}\{i,n\}{i,n}, the rate-balance equations are

(λ+nγ)p0,n=μp1,n,n≥0,(3.47)(λ+μ)p1,n=λp0,n+(n+1)γp0,n+1+λp1,n−1,n≥1,(3.48)(λ+μ)p1,0=λp0,0+γp0,1.(3.49)\begin{aligned} (\lambda + n\gamma)p_{0,n} &= \mu p_{1,n}, && n \ge 0, && (3.47)\\ (\lambda+\mu)p_{1,n} &= \lambda p_{0,n} + (n+1)\gamma p_{0,n+1} + \lambda p_{1,n-1}, && n \ge 1, && (3.48)\\ (\lambda+\mu)p_{1,0} &= \lambda p_{0,0} + \gamma p_{0,1}. && && (3.49) \end{aligned}(λ+nγ)p0,n​(λ+μ)p1,n​(λ+μ)p1,0​​=μp1,n​,=λp0,n​+(n+1)γp0,n+1​+λp1,n−1​,=λp0,0​+γp0,1​.​​n≥0,n≥1,​​(3.47)(3.48)(3.49)​

Following the book's convention (§1.9, and the footnote on p.118), a steady-state solution is a nonnegative solution of these equations whose total mass ∑n(p0,n+p1,n)\sum_n (p_{0,n} + p_{1,n})∑n​(p0,n​+p1,n​) equals 111. The traffic intensity is ρ=λ/μ\rho = \lambda/\muρ=λ/μ, and the partial generating functions are P0(z)=∑nznp0,nP_0(z) = \sum_n z^n p_{0,n}P0​(z)=∑n​znp0,n​ and P1(z)=∑nznp1,nP_1(z) = \sum_n z^n p_{1,n}P1​(z)=∑n​znp1,n​.

The other models of the mission use the same convention. In the bulk-input queue M[X]/M/1M^{[X]}/M/1M[X]/M/1, batches arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ with batch-size probabilities cn=Pr⁡{X=n}c_n = \Pr\{X = n\}cn​=Pr{X=n}, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, and batch-size generating function C(z)=∑ncnznC(z) = \sum_n c_n z^nC(z)=∑n​cn​zn. In the partial-batch bulk-service queue M/M[K]/1M/M^{[K]}/1M/M[K]/1, single arrivals come at rate λ\lambdaλ and the server serves up to KKK customers together in an exponential time of mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ. In the nonpreemptive priority queue there are rrr classes with rates λk\lambda_kλk​ and μk\mu_kμk​, loads ρk=λk/μk\rho_k = \lambda_k/\mu_kρk​=λk​/μk​ and cumulative loads σk=ρ1+⋯+ρk\sigma_k = \rho_1 + \cdots + \rho_kσk​=ρ1​+⋯+ρk​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the stationary distribution (3.57)

For λ,μ,γ>0\lambda, \mu, \gamma > 0λ,μ,γ>0 and ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1, the numbers

p0,n=(1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1ρnn! γn∏i=0n−1(λ+iγ),p1,n=(1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1ρn+1n! γn∏i=1n(λ+iγ)p_{0,n} = (1-\rho)^{(\lambda/\gamma)+1}\frac{\rho^n}{n!\,\gamma^n}\prod_{i=0}^{n-1}(\lambda+i\gamma), \qquad p_{1,n} = (1-\rho)^{(\lambda/\gamma)+1}\frac{\rho^{n+1}}{n!\,\gamma^n}\prod_{i=1}^{n}(\lambda+i\gamma)p0,n​=(1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1n!γnρn​i=0∏n−1​(λ+iγ),p1,n​=(1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1n!γnρn+1​i=1∏n​(λ+iγ)

form a steady-state solution of (3.47)–(3.49), and every steady-state solution equals them.

Milestones on the retrial queue

The generating functions satisfy (3.50)–(3.52) on (−1,1)(-1,1)(−1,1), including the separable equation

P0′(z)=λργ(1−ρz)P0(z),P_0'(z) = \frac{\lambda\rho}{\gamma(1-\rho z)}P_0(z),P0′​(z)=γ(1−ρz)λρ​P0​(z),

their closed form is (3.55),

P0(z)=(1−ρz)(1−ρ1−ρz)(λ/γ)+1,P1(z)=ρ(1−ρ1−ρz)(λ/γ)+1,P_0(z) = (1-\rho z)\left(\frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho z}\right)^{(\lambda/\gamma)+1}, \qquad P_1(z) = \rho\left(\frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho z}\right)^{(\lambda/\gamma)+1},P0​(z)=(1−ρz)(1−ρz1−ρ​)(λ/γ)+1,P1​(z)=ρ(1−ρz1−ρ​)(λ/γ)+1,

and the mean orbit size is (3.58), Lo=ρ21−ρ⋅μ+γγL_o = \frac{\rho^2}{1-\rho}\cdot\frac{\mu+\gamma}{\gamma}Lo​=1−ρρ2​⋅γμ+γ​.

Milestones from the rest of Chapter 3

The bulk-input generating function (3.3), p0=1−ρp_0 = 1 - \rhop0​=1−ρ with ρ=λE[X]/μ\rho = \lambda\mathrm E[X]/\muρ=λE[X]/μ, and the mean (3.4); the unique root r0∈(0,1)r_0 \in (0,1)r0​∈(0,1) of μrK+1−(λ+μ)r+λ=0\mu r^{K+1} - (\lambda+\mu)r + \lambda = 0μrK+1−(λ+μ)r+λ=0 and the geometric law pn=(1−r0)r0np_n = (1-r_0)r_0^npn​=(1−r0​)r0n​ (3.9); and Cobham's formula (3.41)/(3.43), the unique solution of the linear system (3.40).

Significance

The closed form (3.57) makes every performance measure of the M/M/1M/M/1M/M/1 retrial queue explicit. The server is busy a fraction ρ\rhoρ of the time, exactly as without retrials. The mean orbit size (3.58) is the M/M/1M/M/1M/M/1 mean queue length multiplied by (μ+γ)/γ(\mu+\gamma)/\gamma(μ+γ)/γ, and the mean time in orbit (3.59) follows from Little's law. These formulas quantify the cost of retrials against an ordinary queue and are the reference case against which approximations for multi-server retrial systems are checked.

The results are classical and proved in the book, partly through exercises (Problems 3.39–3.41). None of them is formalized in any proof assistant, as far as the platform's catalogue shows: there is no retrial, bulk or priority queue on Prove2Me. The mission produces machine-checked statements and, once solved, proofs of the chapter's main closed forms. It also produces a small reusable layer: generating functions of probability sequences on the closed unit disc, and the "probability solution of the balance equations" pattern for chains with countable state spaces.

Difficulty

The derivation in the book is formal. It differentiates power series term by term, divides by 1−z1 - z1−z, integrates ln⁡P0\ln P_0lnP0​, and fixes the constant by setting z=1z = 1z=1, without justifying any of these steps. A formal proof has to show that the series converge and are differentiable on (−1,1)(-1,1)(−1,1), that the differential equation determines P0P_0P0​ up to a constant, and that the values at z=1z = 1z=1 are the limits of the values inside the disc (Abel's theorem). The uniqueness half of the goal is the hardest part. The book never proves it; it follows from the ODE argument only once every step is shown to hold for an arbitrary probability solution. Verifying that (3.57) solves (3.47)–(3.49) is only the easy half. The same pattern recurs in the bulk-input queue, where z=1z = 1z=1 is a removable singularity of (3.3). In the bulk-service queue the root r0r_0r0​ is only characterized as the unique root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), so existence and uniqueness of the root are part of the claim.

Formalization scope

A steady-state solution is a pair p0 p1 : ℕ → ℝ (resp. one sequence p : ℕ → ℝ) that is pointwise nonnegative, has total mass 111 as a HasSum, and solves the book's balance equations exactly as printed, global balance and not detailed balance. Every "the steady-state solution is X" is stated with both halves: X is a steady-state solution, and every steady-state solution equals X. Stating only that (3.57) solves (3.47)–(3.49), without normalization or uniqueness, would be a trivializing formalization. So would taking r0r_0r0​ as a given root in (3.9), or taking the Wq(i)W_q^{(i)}Wq(i)​ in (3.41) as numbers assumed to satisfy it. None of these is used. The closed forms instantiated are (3.52), (3.55), (3.57), (3.58), (3.3), (3.4), (3.9), (3.41) and (3.43), each written out in full, with the real power (1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1(1-\rho)^{(\lambda/\gamma)+1}(1−ρ)(λ/γ)+1 as Real.rpow.

The conventions are as follows. The retrial generating functions take real arguments, on (−1,1)(-1,1)(−1,1) for the differential equations and on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] for the closed form. The bulk-input generating function takes complex arguments with ∣z∣≤1|z| \le 1∣z∣≤1, z≠1z \ne 1z=1, because (3.3) is 0/00/00/0 at z=1z = 1z=1. The condition ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1 is a hypothesis of every retrial statement. For the bulk-service queue the book's unnamed condition is stated as λ<Kμ\lambda < K\muλ<Kμ. For bulk input, E[X]<∞\mathrm E[X] < \inftyE[X]<∞ is assumed throughout, and the mean (3.4) is asserted under the further condition E[X2]<∞\mathrm E[X^2] < \inftyE[X2]<∞, which it requires. For Cobham's formula only the algebraic content is formalized; the mean-value argument that yields (3.40) and (3.42) is not.

Needed infrastructure: power series of summable nonnegative sequences on the closed unit disc (convergence, term-by-term differentiation, Abel continuity), the binomial series (1−x)−a=∑na(a+1)⋯(a+n−1)n!xn(1 - x)^{-a} = \sum_n \frac{a(a+1)\cdots(a+n-1)}{n!}x^n(1−x)−a=∑n​n!a(a+1)⋯(a+n−1)​xn for real aaa, and uniqueness of invariant probability vectors for irreducible chains. All of this is reusable beyond the mission. Proofs of any milestone, of the easy half of the goal, or of the needed series facts are welcome contributions.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §§3.1, 3.2.0.1, 3.4.2, 3.5.1. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • G. I. Falin, J. G. C. Templeton, Retrial Queues, Chapman & Hall, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-2977-8
  • J. R. Artalejo, Accessible bibliography on retrial queues, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 30 (1999) 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0895-7177(99)00128-4
  • A. Cobham, Priority assignment in waiting line problems, Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2 (1954) 70–76. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2.1.70
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Fundamentals of Queueing Theory III: The Transient M/M/1 Queue via Modified Bessel FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

Steady-state formulas describe a queue that has been running forever. Many practical questions are about a queue that has not: a call centre just after opening, a server just after a reset, a system under a burst of load. For these, the relevant quantity is the transient distribution pn(t)=Pr⁡{N(t)=n}p_n(t) = \Pr\{N(t) = n\}pn​(t)=Pr{N(t)=n} of the number N(t)N(t)N(t) in the system at a finite time ttt. It is also what determines how fast the steady state is approached, and it is needed for the busy period: the length of time a server stays busy once a customer arrives at an idle server.

For the single-server Markovian queue M/M/1 the transient distribution has an explicit closed form in modified Bessel functions. Its history is short and well documented. Ledermann and Reuter (1954) obtained it by spectral analysis of the birth–death process. Bailey (1954) found it by generating functions and Laplace transforms, and Champernowne (1956) by combinatorial methods. Bailey's route is the standard textbook derivation, and it is the one Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris outline in §2.11 of Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., 2008). Abate and Whitt (1989) showed that computing with the resulting series is numerically delicate, which is one reason for having the formula pinned down exactly.

This mission formalizes §§2.11–2.12 of that book: the transient laws of M/M/1/1, M/M/1 and M/M/∞, and the M/M/1 busy period.

Setting

Customers arrive in a Poisson stream of rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Each service takes an exponential time of rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, and ρ=λ/μ\rho = \lambda/\muρ=λ/μ. The number in the system is a continuous-time Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…}, and its state probabilities pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t) satisfy the forward (differential–difference) equations. For M/M/1 started with N(0)=iN(0) = iN(0)=i they are, for t≥0t \ge 0t≥0,

pn′(t)=−(λ+μ)pn(t)+λpn−1(t)+μpn+1(t) (n>0),p0′(t)=−λp0(t)+μp1(t),(2.72)p_n'(t) = -(\lambda+\mu)p_n(t) + \lambda p_{n-1}(t) + \mu p_{n+1}(t)\ (n > 0), \qquad p_0'(t) = -\lambda p_0(t) + \mu p_1(t), \tag{2.72}pn′​(t)=−(λ+μ)pn​(t)+λpn−1​(t)+μpn+1​(t) (n>0),p0′​(t)=−λp0​(t)+μp1​(t),(2.72)

with pn(0)=1p_n(0) = 1pn​(0)=1 if n=in = in=i and 000 otherwise. The other systems are variants:

  • M/M/1/1, no waiting room: two states and equations (2.70).
  • M/M/∞, ample service: the death rate in state nnn is nμn\munμ, giving (2.76).
  • The busy-period system: (2.72) with 000 made absorbing (λ0=0\lambda_0 = 0λ0​=0) and N(0)=1N(0) = 1N(0)=1. Its p0(t)p_0(t)p0​(t) is the distribution function of the busy period TbpT_{bp}Tbp​.

A family (pn)(p_n)(pn​) solves a system on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) when each pnp_npn​ has, at every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0, the prescribed derivative (a right derivative at t=0t = 0t=0). It is a probability solution when pn(t)≥0p_n(t) \ge 0pn​(t)≥0 and ∑npn(t)=1\sum_n p_n(t) = 1∑n​pn​(t)=1 for every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0. The modified Bessel function of the first kind is

In(y)=∑k=0∞(y/2)n+2kk! (n+k)!,I−n=In,I_n(y) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{(y/2)^{n+2k}}{k!\,(n+k)!}, \qquad I_{-n} = I_n,In​(y)=k=0∑∞​k!(n+k)!(y/2)n+2k​,I−n​=In​,

and the Laplace transform of fff is fˉ(s)=∫0∞e−stf(t) dt\bar f(s) = \int_0^\infty e^{-st} f(t)\,dtfˉ​(s)=∫0∞​e−stf(t)dt for Re⁡s>0\operatorname{Re} s > 0Res>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the transient M/M/1 law, (2.75)

With y=2tλμy = 2t\sqrt{\lambda\mu}y=2tλμ​,

pn(t)=e−(λ+μ)t[ρ(n−i)/2In−i(y)+ρ(n−i−1)/2In+i+1(y)+(1−ρ)ρn∑j=n+i+2∞ρ−j/2Ij(y)].p_n(t) = e^{-(\lambda+\mu)t}\Big[\rho^{(n-i)/2} I_{n-i}(y) + \rho^{(n-i-1)/2} I_{n+i+1}(y) + (1-\rho)\rho^n \sum_{j=n+i+2}^{\infty} \rho^{-j/2} I_j(y)\Big].pn​(t)=e−(λ+μ)t[ρ(n−i)/2In−i​(y)+ρ(n−i−1)/2In+i+1​(y)+(1−ρ)ρnj=n+i+2∑∞​ρ−j/2Ij​(y)].

The goal asserts five things for every λ,μ>0\lambda, \mu > 0λ,μ>0 and every iii, with no restriction on ρ\rhoρ:

  1. the series converges;
  2. these functions solve (2.72);
  3. they meet the initial condition;
  4. they form a probability distribution at every ttt;
  5. they are the only probability solution.

Milestones

  1. (2.71): the M/M/1/1 solution p1(t)=λλ+μ(1−e−(λ+μ)t)+p1(0)e−(λ+μ)tp_1(t) = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda+\mu}(1-e^{-(\lambda+\mu)t}) + p_1(0)e^{-(\lambda+\mu)t}p1​(t)=λ+μλ​(1−e−(λ+μ)t)+p1​(0)e−(λ+μ)t, and the matching formula for p0p_0p0​.
  2. (2.74) and Rouché's theorem: for Re⁡s>0\operatorname{Re} s > 0Res>0, the quadratic (λ+μ+s)z−μ−λz2(\lambda+\mu+s)z - \mu - \lambda z^2(λ+μ+s)z−μ−λz2 has exactly one zero in ∣z∣<1|z| < 1∣z∣<1, namely z1=(λ+μ+s−(λ+μ+s)2−4λμ)/(2λ)z_1 = (\lambda+\mu+s-\sqrt{(\lambda+\mu+s)^2-4\lambda\mu})/(2\lambda)z1​=(λ+μ+s−(λ+μ+s)2−4λμ​)/(2λ).
  3. The transform of p0p_0p0​: pˉ0(s)=z1i+1/(μ(1−z1))\bar p_0(s) = z_1^{i+1}/(\mu(1-z_1))pˉ​0​(s)=z1i+1​/(μ(1−z1​)).
  4. The limit of (2.75): pn(t)→(1−ρ)ρnp_n(t) \to (1-\rho)\rho^npn​(t)→(1−ρ)ρn if ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1, and pn(t)→0p_n(t) \to 0pn​(t)→0 if ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1.
  5. (2.77), M/M/∞: started empty, pn(t)=a(t)ne−a(t)/n!p_n(t) = a(t)^n e^{-a(t)}/n!pn​(t)=a(t)ne−a(t)/n! with a(t)=(1−e−μt)λ/μa(t) = (1-e^{-\mu t})\lambda/\mua(t)=(1−e−μt)λ/μ. The statement says that this family solves (2.76), is the unique probability solution, and has generating function exp⁡((z−1)a(t))\exp((z-1)a(t))exp((z−1)a(t)).
  6. The busy-period transform: pˉ0(s)=2μ/(s[λ+μ+s+(λ+μ+s)2−4λμ])\bar p_0(s) = 2\mu/(s[\lambda+\mu+s+\sqrt{(\lambda+\mu+s)^2-4\lambda\mu}])pˉ​0​(s)=2μ/(s[λ+μ+s+(λ+μ+s)2−4λμ​]).
  7. The busy-period density: p0′(t)=μ/λ e−(λ+μ)tI1(2λμ t)/tp_0'(t) = \sqrt{\mu/\lambda}\,e^{-(\lambda+\mu)t} I_1(2\sqrt{\lambda\mu}\,t)/tp0′​(t)=μ/λ​e−(λ+μ)tI1​(2λμ​t)/t.
  8. (2.79): for λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ, E[Tbp]=1/(μ−λ)E[T_{bp}] = 1/(\mu-\lambda)E[Tbp​]=1/(μ−λ) and E[Tbc]=1/λ+1/(μ−λ)E[T_{bc}] = 1/\lambda + 1/(\mu-\lambda)E[Tbc​]=1/λ+1/(μ−λ).

Significance

The formula (2.75) is the exact finite-time law of the most basic queue. It gives the rate at which M/M/1 approaches equilibrium, and it gives the distribution of the queue under overload (ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1), where no steady state exists. It is the reference against which numerical transient methods, such as the uniformization of Chapter 8 of the same book, are checked. The busy-period density and its mean (2.79) enter server-utilisation and vacation models, and the Laplace-transform method used here recurs in the M/G/1 analysis of Chapter 5.

All of these results are classical and proved in the literature. None of them is machine-checked, as far as the platform's catalogue and Mathlib show. The chain from a countable system of linear ODEs, through generating functions and a root-location argument, to a Bessel series is a standard pattern in applied probability, and a formal version of it is what this mission adds. The formal statements also make explicit what the book leaves implicit: the sense in which the equations hold at t=0t = 0t=0, and the class in which the solution is unique.

Difficulty

The forward equations (2.72) form an infinite linear system. The obvious approach is to treat it like a finite system of ODEs, whose solution is a matrix exponential, and read off (2.75). That fails for two reasons. The generator is an infinite matrix, so its exponential needs a functional-analytic setting. And uniqueness is not automatic for infinite systems: it needs a class, such as probability solutions, and an argument that works in that class.

The Bessel form is a second, independent difficulty. The transform pˉ0(s)\bar p_0(s)pˉ​0​(s) is fixed by a root-location argument in the complex plane. Inverting the transform, or verifying (2.75) directly, requires manipulating the three-term Bessel recurrence and exchanging infinite sums. The tail sum ∑jρ−j/2Ij\sum_{j} \rho^{-j/2} I_j∑j​ρ−j/2Ij​ has to be controlled uniformly enough to be differentiated term by term. For ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 the factor (1−ρ)(1-\rho)(1−ρ) is non-positive, so the nonnegativity of pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t) is not visible from the formula.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to:

  • Parameters. Rates are real with λ,μ>0\lambda, \mu > 0λ,μ>0, and ρ=λ/μ\rho = \lambda/\muρ=λ/μ. States are ℕ (Fin 2 for M/M/1/1).
  • Solutions. "Solves on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)" is HasDerivWithinAt on Set.Ici 0 at every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0. Uniqueness is asserted among solutions that are probability distributions at every time.
  • Special functions. Half-integer powers of ρ\rhoρ are real powers, and I−m=ImI_{-m} = I_mI−m​=Im​ is part of the definition. Laplace transforms are complex Bochner integrals over (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and each statement also asserts the integrability it needs. Square roots with positive real part are hypotheses r2=(λ+μ+s)2−4λμr^2 = (\lambda+\mu+s)^2 - 4\lambda\mur2=(λ+μ+s)2−4λμ, Re⁡r>0\operatorname{Re} r > 0Rer>0.

The closed forms stated exactly as in the book are:

  • (2.71);
  • z1z_1z1​ and z2z_2z2​ of (2.74);
  • pˉ0(s)=z1i+1/(μ(1−z1))\bar p_0(s) = z_1^{i+1}/(\mu(1-z_1))pˉ​0​(s)=z1i+1​/(μ(1−z1​));
  • (2.75), with the Bessel series of p.101;
  • the M/M/∞ law and (2.77);
  • the busy-period transform and density of p.102;
  • (2.79).

The book derives (2.79) by a steady-state ratio argument valid for M/G/1. Here it is stated for M/M/1, as the mean of the explicit density.

A statement of (2.75) that only asserts the right-hand side is well defined, or checks only n=0n = 0n=0, is ruled out: the goal requires the ODE system, the initial condition, the probability property and uniqueness. For the same reason, the M/M/∞ law is tied to the system (2.76) and does not reduce to a Taylor expansion.

Needed infrastructure that Mathlib lacks:

  • modified Bessel functions of integer order;
  • Laplace transforms;
  • a Rouché-type zero count or a direct root-location lemma;
  • uniqueness for countable linear ODE systems with bounded or linearly growing rates.

The Bessel and Laplace definitions, and the uniqueness lemma for birth–death forward equations, are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of those as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §§2.11–2.12, pp.97–103. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • N. T. J. Bailey, "A continuous time treatment of a simple queue using generating functions", J. Royal Statistical Society B 16 (1954) 288–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1954.tb00172.x
  • W. Ledermann, G. E. H. Reuter, "Spectral theory for the differential equations of simple birth and death processes", Phil. Trans. Royal Society A 246 (1954) 321–369. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.1954.0001
  • D. G. Champernowne, "An elementary method of solution of the queueing problem with a single server and constant parameters", J. Royal Statistical Society B 18 (1956) 125–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1956.tb00217.x
  • J. Abate, W. Whitt, "Calculating time-dependent performance measures for the M/M/1 queue", IEEE Trans. Communications 37 (1989) 1102–1104. https://doi.org/10.1109/26.41165
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Fundamentals of Queueing Theory I: Foster's Criterion for Positive RecurrenceTextbook

Motivation

Almost every model in queueing theory is analysed through a Markov chain. The number of customers in an M/M/c queue is a continuous-time birth–death chain; the number left behind by departing customers of an M/G/1 queue is a discrete-parameter chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…} (the imbedded Markov chain); networks of queues are chains on vectors of queue lengths. Before any steady-state formula (Erlang's formulas, the Pollaczek–Khintchine formula, product forms) can be used, one has to know that the chain has a steady state at all: that it is positive recurrent, so that a stationary distribution exists and equals the limiting distribution.

Chapter 1 of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651), collects the two ingredients the rest of the book stands on: the Poisson process with its exponential interarrival times (§§1.7–1.8), and the classification theory of discrete-parameter Markov chains (§1.9), ending with Foster's criterion (Theorem 1.2), a sufficient condition for positive recurrence in terms of a drift inequality. The criterion goes back to F. G. Foster, On the stochastic matrices associated with certain queuing processes, Ann. Math. Statist. 24 (1953) (DOI 10.1214/aoms/1177728976), and is the ancestor of the Foster–Lyapunov method used for stability of queueing networks and stochastic systems.

This mission is the first of a series formalizing the book chapter by chapter.

Setting

A homogeneous discrete-parameter Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…} is given by a transition matrix P={pij}P=\{p_{ij}\}P={pij​} with pij≥0p_{ij}\ge0pij​≥0 and ∑jpij=1\sum_j p_{ij}=1∑j​pij​=1 for every iii. The mmm-step transition probabilities pij(m)p_{ij}^{(m)}pij(m)​ are the entries of PmP^mPm.

The first-passage probability fij(n)f_{ij}^{(n)}fij(n)​ is the probability that the chain started in iii enters jjj for the first time at step n≥1n\ge1n≥1; for i=ji=ji=j it is the probability of first return at step nnn. The return probability is fjj=∑n≥1fjj(n)f_{jj}=\sum_{n\ge1}f_{jj}^{(n)}fjj​=∑n≥1​fjj(n)​ and the mean recurrence time is mjj=∑n≥1nfjj(n)∈[0,∞]m_{jj}=\sum_{n\ge1}n f_{jj}^{(n)}\in[0,\infty]mjj​=∑n≥1​nfjj(n)​∈[0,∞]. A state is positive recurrent if fjj=1f_{jj}=1fjj​=1 and mjj<∞m_{jj}<\inftymjj​<∞; the chain is positive recurrent if every state is.

The chain is irreducible if for every pair of states (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) some pij(n)p_{ij}^{(n)}pij(n)​ is positive, and aperiodic if for every state kkk the greatest common divisor of {n≥1:pkk(n)>0}\{n\ge1:p_{kk}^{(n)}>0\}{n≥1:pkk(n)​>0} is 111. A stationary distribution is a probability vector π\piπ with π=πP\pi=\pi Pπ=πP, i.e. πj=∑iπipij\pi_j=\sum_i\pi_i p_{ij}πj​=∑i​πi​pij​ for every jjj.

For the Poisson part, T0,T1,…T_0,T_1,\dotsT0​,T1​,… are independent interarrival times, each exponentially distributed with rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; the arrival epochs are Sn=T0+⋯+Tn−1S_n=T_0+\dots+T_{n-1}Sn​=T0​+⋯+Tn−1​, and N(t)=#{n≥1:Sn≤t}N(t)=\#\{n\ge1:S_n\le t\}N(t)=#{n≥1:Sn​≤t} counts the arrivals in [0,t][0,t][0,t].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.2 (Foster's criterion)

An irreducible, aperiodic chain is positive recurrent if there exist xj≥0x_j\ge0xj​≥0 with

∑j=0∞pijxj≤xi−1(i≠0),∑j=0∞p0jxj<∞.\sum_{j=0}^\infty p_{ij}x_j\le x_i-1\quad(i\ne0),\qquad\sum_{j=0}^\infty p_{0j}x_j<\infty .j=0∑∞​pij​xj​≤xi​−1(i=0),j=0∑∞​p0j​xj​<∞.

Milestones: the Markov chain theorems

  • Theorem 1.1(a). In an irreducible, positive recurrent chain, πj=1/mjj\pi_j=1/m_{jj}πj​=1/mjj​ is a stationary distribution, and it is the only one.
  • Theorem 1.1(c). If moreover the chain is aperiodic and all moments of π\piπ are finite, then lim⁡m→∞pij(m)=πj\lim_{m\to\infty}p_{ij}^{(m)}=\pi_jlimm→∞​pij(m)​=πj​ for all i,ji,ji,j.

Milestones: the Poisson process and the exponential distribution

  • Eqs. (1.11)–(1.14). The unique solution of p0′=−λp0p_0'=-\lambda p_0p0′​=−λp0​, pn′=−λpn+λpn−1p_n'=-\lambda p_n+\lambda p_{n-1}pn′​=−λpn​+λpn−1​ with p0(0)=1p_0(0)=1p0​(0)=1, pn(0)=0p_n(0)=0pn​(0)=0 is pn(t)=(λt)ne−λt/n!p_n(t)=(\lambda t)^n e^{-\lambda t}/n!pn​(t)=(λt)ne−λt/n!.
  • Eq. (1.15). With exponential interarrival times,
Pr⁡{N(t)≤n}=∫t∞λ(λx)nn!e−λxdx=∑i=0n(λt)ie−λti!.\Pr\{N(t)\le n\}=\int_t^\infty\frac{\lambda(\lambda x)^n}{n!}e^{-\lambda x}dx=\sum_{i=0}^n\frac{(\lambda t)^ie^{-\lambda t}}{i!}.Pr{N(t)≤n}=∫t∞​n!λ(λx)n​e−λxdx=i=0∑n​i!(λt)ie−λt​.
  • Eq. (1.16). Given N(L)=kN(L)=kN(L)=k, the arrival epochs have density k!/Lkk!/L^kk!/Lk on {0<t1<⋯<tk<L}\{0<t_1<\dots<t_k<L\}{0<t1​<⋯<tk​<L}.
  • Eq. (1.17) and its converse (p.21). The exponential law satisfies Pr⁡{T≤t1∣T≥t0}=Pr⁡{0≤T≤t1−t0}\Pr\{T\le t_1\mid T\ge t_0\}=\Pr\{0\le T\le t_1-t_0\}Pr{T≤t1​∣T≥t0​}=Pr{0≤T≤t1​−t0​}, and it is the only continuous distribution on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) that does.
  • Nonhomogeneous Poisson law (p.22). With a continuous rate λ(t)\lambda(t)λ(t) the forward equations have the unique solution pn(t)=e−m(t)m(t)n/n!p_n(t)=e^{-m(t)}m(t)^n/n!pn​(t)=e−m(t)m(t)n/n!, m(t)=∫0tλ(s) dsm(t)=\int_0^t\lambda(s)\,dsm(t)=∫0t​λ(s)ds.

Significance

Foster's criterion reduces positive recurrence, a statement about return times, to exhibiting one test function xxx with negative drift outside a single state. In the book it is the tool that establishes the existence of steady state for imbedded chains of the M/G/1 and G/M/1 queues (Chapter 5); its generalizations are the standard stability proofs for queueing networks. Theorem 1.1 then supplies what positive recurrence buys: the stationary distribution exists, is unique, equals 1/mjj1/m_{jj}1/mjj​, and is the limit of the transition probabilities. The Poisson results justify the "Markovian" arrivals and services of Chapters 2–4.

All of these results are classical and proved in the literature; the book states Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 without proof. The Prove2Me platform already holds machine-checked versions of related Markov chain theorems in other missions (Levin–Peres–Wilmer's and Durrett's countable-chain convergence theorems), stated with different definitions and hypotheses. What this mission adds is a formal development in the book's own terms — first-passage probabilities fjj(n)f_{jj}^{(n)}fjj(n)​, mean recurrence times mjjm_{jj}mjj​, gcd periodicity — on which the later missions of the series (imbedded chains, birth–death processes) can build, together with a formal proof of Foster's criterion, which is not on the platform.

Difficulty

For Foster's criterion the natural first step, taking expectations of the drift inequality along the chain, only shows that the expected value of xxx decreases while the chain stays away from 000. Turning that into a bound on the expected return time to 000 requires an optional-stopping or telescoping argument over a random time, with the value xxx possibly unbounded, and a separate argument that positive recurrence of state 000 propagates to all states of an irreducible chain. The book's hypotheses include aperiodicity, which the argument does not use.

For Theorem 1.1, identifying the stationary distribution with 1/mjj1/m_{jj}1/mjj​ requires relating the matrix powers PnP^nPn to the first-passage probabilities (a renewal decomposition), and uniqueness over countably many states needs care with infinite sums. For the Poisson results, the difficulty is measure-theoretic: the distribution of the sum of n+1n+1n+1 exponential variables, and conditioning on the event {N(L)=k}\{N(L)=k\}{N(L)=k} for the order-statistics property.

Formalization scope

States are natural numbers; the transition matrix is a real function p:N×N→Rp:\mathbb N\times\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rp:N×N→R with nonnegative entries and rows summing to one (as a convergent series). The return probability and the mean recurrence time are valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so null recurrence (mjj=∞m_{jj}=\inftymjj​=∞) is representable. Irreducibility is the per-pair notion. Stationary equations are stated componentwise with convergent series.

In Foster's criterion the series ∑jpijxj\sum_j p_{ij}x_j∑j​pij​xj​ are required to converge for every iii, which is the book's condition ∑jp0jxj<∞\sum_j p_{0j}x_j<\infty∑j​p0j​xj​<∞ together with the finiteness implicit in the inequalities for i≠0i\ne0i=0; xxx is real-valued and nonnegative. Dropping the convergence requirement would let a divergent row series (whose Lean sum is 000) satisfy the inequality vacuously; allowing xj=∞x_j=\inftyxj​=∞ would make the hypothesis trivially satisfiable. Neither is permitted.

The closed forms stated explicitly are: πj=1/mjj\pi_j=1/m_{jj}πj​=1/mjj​ (Theorem 1.1(a), with both existence and uniqueness), the Poisson probabilities (λt)ne−λt/n!(\lambda t)^ne^{-\lambda t}/n!(λt)ne−λt/n! (1.14), the Erlang tail integral and the Poisson CDF (1.15), the density k!/Lkk!/L^kk!/Lk (1.16), and e−m(t)m(t)n/n!e^{-m(t)}m(t)^n/n!e−m(t)m(t)n/n! for the nonhomogeneous law. Equations (1.14) and the nonhomogeneous law are stated as "solves the equations with the initial conditions if and only if equals the closed form", so both existence and uniqueness are asserted.

The Poisson results use random variables on a probability space, with Mathlib's expMeasure for the exponential law and cond for conditional probability. The derivation of the forward equations from the o(Δt)o(\Delta t)o(Δt) axioms of §1.7 is not formalized; the Poisson law is reached from the equations and, separately, from exponential interarrival times.

Not formalized: Theorem 1.1(b) and the word "ergodic" in 1.1(c), which rest on the book's informal notion of ergodicity; Theorem 1.3, whose phrase "for Theorem 1.1 to be valid" for a continuous-time chain is not pinned down.

The Markov chain definitions are reusable by every later mission that studies an imbedded chain. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and supporting lemmas (Chapman–Kolmogorov, renewal decomposition of pjj(n)p_{jj}^{(n)}pjj(n)​, class properties of recurrence).

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • F. G. Foster, On the stochastic matrices associated with certain queuing processes, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24 (1953), 355–360. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728976
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design XI: Optimal Sequential Screening by Option ContractsTextbook

Motivation

Many sales are contracted before the buyer knows what the good is worth to her. An airline sells a ticket months before the trip, a hotel sells a refundable or non-refundable room before the traveller's plans are settled, and a supplier signs a capacity contract before demand is realised. At the time of contracting the buyer holds some private information about her future valuation (how likely she is to travel), and after contracting she learns more (whether she actually travels). Sequential screening is the mechanism design problem of a seller facing such a buyer.

The chapter formalized here, Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz's Dynamic Mechanism Design (Chapter 11 of Börgers' textbook), develops the problem along two lines. The first is dynamic private information: one sale, two rounds of private information. The second is dynamic allocations: repeated sales, one fixed valuation.

Timeline:

  • Baron and Besanko (1984) show that dynamic allocations with static information produce no real dynamics in the optimal mechanism.
  • Courty and Li (2000, Review of Economic Studies) solve the sequential screening problem and show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts.
  • Esö and Szentes (2007) decompose the buyer's information into initial and additional information, show that the seller can extract the additional information at no cost, and derive the optimal multi-buyer mechanism, the handicap auction.
  • Krähmer and Strausz (2011, 2014), cited in the chapter's problems (notes 2–3, p.237), show that the conclusions depend on the model's assumptions; with discrete ex ante types the privacy of the additional information can cost the seller (Problem 11.5(c), p.233).

Setting

A seller sells one indivisible good. Before contracting, the buyer privately observes her ex ante type τ∈[τ‾,τˉ]\tau\in[\underline\tau,\bar\tau]τ∈[τ​,τˉ], with distribution function GGG and density g>0g>0g>0. After accepting the mechanism she privately observes her ex post type θ∈[θ‾,θˉ]\theta\in[\underline\theta,\bar\theta]θ∈[θ​,θˉ], 0≤θ‾<θˉ0\le\underline\theta<\bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ, which is her valuation. Conditionally on τ\tauτ it has distribution function F(θ∣τ)F(\theta\mid\tau)F(θ∣τ) and density f(θ∣τ)>0f(\theta\mid\tau)>0f(θ∣τ)>0. Both FFF and fff are continuously differentiable in τ\tauτ, ∣∂F/∂τ∣<K|\partial F/\partial\tau|<K∣∂F/∂τ∣<K, and higher τ\tauτ is good news in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance: ∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ<0\partial F(\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau<0∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ<0 for θ∈(θ‾,θˉ)\theta\in(\underline\theta,\bar\theta)θ∈(θ​,θˉ).

A direct mechanism is a pair q(τ,θ)∈[0,1]q(\tau,\theta)\in[0,1]q(τ,θ)∈[0,1], t(τ,θ)∈Rt(\tau,\theta)\in\mathbb Rt(τ,θ)∈R. The buyer first reports τ\tauτ, then θ\thetaθ. Write u(τ,θ)=θq(τ,θ)−t(τ,θ)u(\tau,\theta)=\theta q(\tau,\theta)-t(\tau,\theta)u(τ,θ)=θq(τ,θ)−t(τ,θ), U^(τ′∣τ)=∫u(τ′,θ^)f(θ^∣τ) dθ^\hat U(\tau'\mid\tau)=\int u(\tau',\hat\theta)f(\hat\theta\mid\tau)\,d\hat\thetaU^(τ′∣τ)=∫u(τ′,θ^)f(θ^∣τ)dθ^ and U(τ)=U^(τ∣τ)U(\tau)=\hat U(\tau\mid\tau)U(τ)=U^(τ∣τ). The mechanism is incentive-compatible if truth about θ\thetaθ is optimal after every report of τ\tauτ, and truth about τ\tauτ is optimal against every subsequent reporting function θr\theta_rθr​. It is individually rational if U(τ)≥0U(\tau)\ge0U(τ)≥0 for all τ\tauτ. The seller maximizes expected revenue ∫ ⁣ ⁣∫t f g\int\!\!\int t\,f\,g∫∫tfg. The virtual valuation is

ψ(τ,θ)=θ+1−G(τ)g(τ) ∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τf(θ∣τ),\psi(\tau,\theta)=\theta+\frac{1-G(\tau)}{g(\tau)}\,\frac{\partial F(\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau}{f(\theta\mid\tau)} ,ψ(τ,θ)=θ+g(τ)1−G(τ)​f(θ∣τ)∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ​,

and Assumption 11.1 requires ψ\psiψ to be increasing in τ\tauτ and θ\thetaθ. The exercise price is p(τ)=min⁡{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}p(\tau)=\min\{\hat\theta\mid\psi(\tau,\hat\theta)\ge0\}p(τ)=min{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 11.8 (optimal sequential screening)

Under Assumption 11.1 the optimal mechanism is

q∗(τ,θ)=1[θ≥p(τ)],t∗(τ,θ)=t0(τ)+p(τ) 1[θ≥p(τ)],q^*(\tau,\theta)=\mathbf 1[\theta\ge p(\tau)],\qquad t^*(\tau,\theta)=t_0(\tau)+p(\tau)\,\mathbf 1[\theta\ge p(\tau)],q∗(τ,θ)=1[θ≥p(τ)],t∗(τ,θ)=t0​(τ)+p(τ)1[θ≥p(τ)],

where t0t_0t0​ is the expression of Proposition 11.5 for q∗q^*q∗, and the lowest type pays

t(τ‾,θ‾)=∫p(τ‾)θˉθ^f(θ^∣τ‾) dθ^−p(τ‾)[1−F(p(τ‾)∣τ‾)]+θ‾q∗(τ‾,θ‾).t(\underline\tau,\underline\theta)=\int_{p(\underline\tau)}^{\bar\theta}\hat\theta f(\hat\theta\mid\underline\tau)\,d\hat\theta-p(\underline\tau)\bigl[1-F(p(\underline\tau)\mid\underline\tau)\bigr]+\underline\theta q^*(\underline\tau,\underline\theta).t(τ​,θ​)=∫p(τ​)θˉ​θ^f(θ^∣τ​)dθ^−p(τ​)[1−F(p(τ​)∣τ​)]+θ​q∗(τ​,θ​).

The goal asserts that this mechanism is incentive-compatible, individually rational and optimal. It also characterizes all optimal mechanisms: an incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism is optimal if and only if q=q∗q=q^*q=q∗ almost everywhere off {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0} and U(τ‾)=0U(\underline\tau)=0U(τ​)=0. When {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0} is null, this becomes q=q∗q=q^*q=q∗ and t=t∗t=t^*t=t∗ almost everywhere.

Milestones

The path to the goal, in the book's order:

  • the dynamic revelation principle (Proposition 11.1);
  • the reduction of incentive compatibility to two families of inequalities (Proposition 11.2);
  • the ex post characterization (Proposition 11.3);
  • monotonicity and absolute continuity of UUU (Lemma 11.1);
  • the envelope formula U′(τ)=−∫q(τ,θ^) ∂F(θ^∣τ)/∂τ dθ^U'(\tau)=-\int q(\tau,\hat\theta)\,\partial F(\hat\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau\,d\hat\thetaU′(τ)=−∫q(τ,θ^)∂F(θ^∣τ)/∂τdθ^ (Proposition 11.4);
  • the transfer formula (Proposition 11.5);
  • sufficiency of monotone allocation rules (Proposition 11.6);
  • individual rationality at τ‾\underline\tauτ​ (Proposition 11.7).

Three extensions follow. Propositions 11.9 and 11.10 show that the privacy of the additional information γ=F(θ∣τ)\gamma=F(\theta\mid\tau)γ=F(θ∣τ) costs the seller nothing. Proposition 11.11 gives the optimal mechanism with several buyers. Proposition 11.12 shows that with dynamic allocations and a fixed valuation, repeating the static posted price is optimal.

Significance

The result gives a practical rule: sell an option. Ex ante type τ\tauτ pays a fee t0(τ)t_0(\tau)t0​(τ) for the right to buy later at the exercise price p(τ)p(\tau)p(τ), and ppp decreases in τ\tauτ. This explains refund and cancellation menus in advance-purchase markets. Proposition 11.10 adds that information the buyer receives after contracting generates no rents under Assumption 11.1. A seller therefore gains from contracting early and from disclosing information after contracting. Proposition 11.12 shows that, under full commitment, a monopolist gains nothing from responding to past purchases.

On the formal side, the results are proved in the literature and in the book, but none of them is machine-checked. The mission produces a verified envelope theorem in a two-dimensional type space where incentive compatibility does not imply monotonicity. It also produces a verified revenue-equivalence formula for sequential mechanisms, and the first verified optimal-mechanism results with dynamic information.

Difficulty

The static argument of Chapter 2 does not carry over directly. Incentive compatibility with respect to τ\tauτ does not make qqq increasing in τ\tauτ. The buyer's first-period utility is an expectation over a whole schedule q(τ′,⋅)q(\tau',\cdot)q(τ′,⋅), so single crossing has no bite. The characterization therefore splits into necessary conditions (the envelope formula in τ\tauτ, which needs Lipschitz continuity of UUU from the bound KKK) and a sufficient condition (monotonicity in both arguments, via first-order stochastic dominance), and the two meet only under Assumption 11.1.

Definition 11.2(ii) quantifies over all off-path reporting functions. The revelation principle does not remove them, so Proposition 11.2 is needed before any envelope argument applies.

Pointwise maximization of the virtual surplus pins down qqq only where ψ≠0\psi\ne0ψ=0 and only almost everywhere. The optimal mechanism is therefore not unique in the pointwise sense the page states.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. F(θ∣τ)F(\theta\mid\tau)F(θ∣τ) is F θ τ and q(τ,θ)q(\tau,\theta)q(τ,θ) is q τ θ. Functions are total on R\mathbb RR or R2\mathbb R^2R2, and conditions quantify over the type intervals only. ∂F/∂τ\partial F/\partial\tau∂F/∂τ and ∂f/∂τ\partial f/\partial\tau∂f/∂τ are fields pinned by HasDerivWithinAt on [τ‾,τˉ][\underline\tau,\bar\tau][τ​,τˉ].
  • Measurability. The book omits all measurability. Here the densities are jointly measurable, mechanisms are admissible (measurable on the type rectangle, q∈[0,1]q\in[0,1]q∈[0,1]), and reporting functions are measurable. In the observable-γ\gammaγ model each t~(τ,⋅)\tilde t(\tau,\cdot)t~(τ,⋅) is integrable on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and in the several-buyer model each payment tit_iti​ is integrable against the distribution of the type profile, so that expected utilities and expected revenue are genuine integrals.
  • Revenue and a.e. Revenue is the integral of ttt against the joint law with density g(τ)f(θ∣τ)g(\tau)f(\theta\mid\tau)g(τ)f(θ∣τ), and "almost everywhere" refers to that law.
  • Corrected necessity. The page's pointwise "if and only if" in Propositions 11.8 and 11.11 is corrected. The explicit optimal mechanism is kept, with the formulas (11.10), (11.11), (11.12) and t0t_0t0​ of Proposition 11.5. Necessity is stated almost everywhere and off {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0}, and, for several buyers, off ties between virtual valuations.
  • Regularity. Propositions 11.9 and 11.10 assume fff and ∂F/∂τ\partial F/\partial\tau∂F/∂τ continuous in (τ,θ)(\tau,\theta)(τ,θ), the regularity the book invokes on p.217 to differentiate F−1(γ∣τ)F^{-1}(\gamma\mid\tau)F−1(γ∣τ).
  • Exercise price. p(τ)p(\tau)p(τ) is the infimum of {θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}\{\hat\theta\mid\psi(\tau,\hat\theta)\ge0\}{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}.

Ruled out. Stating only that the cutoff mechanism is incentive-compatible and individually rational, or only that it beats posted prices, would trivialize the goal. The goal asserts optimality among all admissible incentive-compatible, individually rational sequential mechanisms with randomized allocations, together with the explicit fee t0t_0t0​ and (11.12).

Infrastructure. A complete development needs envelope theorems for suprema of equi-differentiable families, integration by parts with absolutely continuous functions, differentiation under the integral sign, and change of variables γ=F(θ∣τ)\gamma=F(\theta\mid\tau)γ=F(θ∣τ). The single-buyer lemmas (Propositions 11.2–11.7) are reusable for the multi-buyer case through the interim mechanism (Qi,Ti)(Q_i,T_i)(Qi​,Ti​). Proofs of any milestone, and sorry-free lemmas on the definitions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Krähmer and R. Strausz, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Chapter 11 in T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • P. Courty and H. Li, Sequential Screening, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000) 697–717. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00150
  • P. Eső and B. Szentes, Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction, Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007) 705–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x
  • D. P. Baron and D. Besanko, Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship, Information Economics and Policy 1 (1984) 267–302.
18 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design X: Robust Mechanism Design — Belief Revelation on Finite Type SpacesTextbook

Motivation

Classical Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows the agents' beliefs about each other: typically a commonly known prior over independent private values. Wilson's critique (1987) observed that mechanisms tuned to such a prior can depend on details that no designer knows, and a literature on robust mechanism design replaced the fixed prior by a large family of possible beliefs. Chapter 10 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (OUP 2015), develops this programme in the framework of Bergemann and Morris (2001, 2005): agents' information is described by a type space, the designer is uncertain which beliefs agents hold, and mechanisms are compared across all type profiles at once.

Timeline of the results formalized here:

  • 1980: Hylland shows that strategy-proof random mechanisms satisfying unanimity conditions are random dictatorships; Dutta, Peters and Sen (2007, 2008) give and correct the cardinal version used in the chapter.
  • 1985: Mertens and Zamir construct the universal type space of belief hierarchies; the space of finite types is emphasized by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006).
  • 1988: Crémer and McLean show that with correlated types satisfying a spanning condition, beliefs can be elicited at no cost (Proposition 6.4 of the book).
  • 2001–2005: Bergemann and Morris introduce payoff and belief types and prove that on finite type spaces only incentive constraints between types with the same beliefs matter (their Proposition 4.5, the goal of this mission).
  • 2010–2014: Smith, Börgers and Smith study the ranking of mechanisms without a common prior; random dictatorship with compromise comes from Börgers and Smith (2012, 2014).

Setting

There are finitely many agents i∈Ii \in Ii∈I, and agent iii has a set Θi\Theta_iΘi​ of payoff types. An outcome xxx gives agent iii the utility ui(x,θ)u_i(x,\theta)ui​(x,θ), which may depend on all payoff types. A type space T=(Ti,θ^i,β^i)i∈I\mathcal T = (T_i,\hat\theta_i,\hat\beta_i)_{i\in I}T=(Ti​,θ^i​,β^​i​)i∈I​ consists of nonempty sets TiT_iTi​ of types, a payoff type map θ^i:Ti→Θi\hat\theta_i : T_i \to \Theta_iθ^i​:Ti​→Θi​ and a belief map β^i:Ti→Δ(T−i)\hat\beta_i : T_i \to \Delta(T_{-i})β^​i​:Ti​→Δ(T−i​), where T−i=∏j≠iTjT_{-i} = \prod_{j\ne i}T_jT−i​=∏j=i​Tj​. Different types may share a payoff type and differ only in their beliefs, and vice versa. A common prior is a distribution μ\muμ on TTT from which every type's belief is obtained by conditioning. A type space has a large variety of certainties if for every θi\theta_iθi​ and θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​ some type with payoff type θi\theta_iθi​ is certain that the others' payoff types are θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​. The space of finite types T+\mathcal T^+T+ collects every infinite hierarchy of beliefs ("I believe that you believe that …") that is generated by a type of some finite type space.

A mechanism (S1,…,SN,g)(S_1,\dots,S_N,g)(S1​,…,SN​,g) has strategy sets SiS_iSi​ and an outcome rule g:S→Δ(X)g : S \to \Delta(X)g:S→Δ(X). Strategies σi:Ti→Δ(Si)\sigma_i : T_i \to \Delta(S_i)σi​:Ti​→Δ(Si​) form a Bayesian equilibrium if each type maximizes expected utility under its own belief; it is belief-independent if types with equal payoff types play alike, and ex post if each type's choice stays optimal when it becomes certain of the others' types. A direct mechanism asks agents for their types, a reduced direct mechanism only for their payoff types. In the quasi-linear case outcomes are (a,t1,…,tN)(a,t_1,\dots,t_N)(a,t1​,…,tN​) and ui=vi(a,θ)−tiu_i = v_i(a,\theta) - t_iui​=vi​(a,θ)−ti​, with tit_iti​ paid by agent iii; a direct mechanism is (q,t)(q,t)(q,t).

Formalization targets

Goal: belief revelation on finite type spaces (Proposition 10.6)

On a finite type space with quasi-linear utilities, suppose that for every agent no belief in {β^i(τi):τi∈Ti}\{\hat\beta_i(\tau_i) : \tau_i\in T_i\}{β^​i​(τi​):τi​∈Ti​} is a convex combination of the others, and that in the direct mechanism (q,t)(q,t)(q,t) no type wants to imitate another type with the same belief. Then there is a direct mechanism (q~,t~)(\tilde q,\tilde t)(q~​,t~) in which truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium, with

q~(τ)=q(τ)  ∀τ∈T,∑τ−iβ^i(τi)(τ−i) t~i(τ)=∑τ−iβ^i(τi)(τ−i) ti(τ)  ∀i,τi.\tilde q(\tau) = q(\tau)\ \ \forall \tau\in T,\qquad \sum_{\tau_{-i}}\hat\beta_i(\tau_i)(\tau_{-i})\,\tilde t_i(\tau) = \sum_{\tau_{-i}}\hat\beta_i(\tau_i)(\tau_{-i})\, t_i(\tau)\ \ \forall i,\tau_i.q~​(τ)=q(τ)  ∀τ∈T,τ−i​∑​β^​i​(τi​)(τ−i​)t~i​(τ)=τ−i​∑​β^​i​(τi​)(τ−i​)ti​(τ)  ∀i,τi​.

The goal fixes neither the transfers t~\tilde tt~ nor any bound on them; it asserts the existence of a truthful mechanism with the same alternatives and the same interim payments.

Milestones

The other fourteen numbered results of the chapter: conditional independence of payoff types under a full-support common prior (10.1); three revelation principles (10.2–10.4); existence of Bayesian equilibria of finite mechanisms on T+\mathcal T^+T+ (10.5); betting between agents with inconsistent beliefs (10.7); ex post implementation of unique equilibrium outcomes and alternatives (10.8, 10.9); emptiness of the set of undominated auctions under interim Pareto welfare and under ex post revenue (10.10, 10.11); Hylland's characterization of random dictatorship (10.12); and three comparisons of random dictatorship with random dictatorship with compromise (10.13–10.15).

Significance

Proposition 10.6 reduces the design problem on a finite type space to incentive constraints among types with the same beliefs: belief types can always be elicited by side payments that leave interim utilities unchanged. With a common prior and Proposition 10.1 this yields optimal mechanisms by solving an independent-types problem for each profile of belief types (§10.8; Farinha Luz 2013 carries this out for auctions). Proposition 10.7 and its consequences 10.10–10.11 show why the same construction cannot be used without a common prior: inconsistent beliefs allow unbounded bets, so interim or revenue criteria admit no undominated mechanism. Propositions 10.12–10.15 show that relaxing belief independence escapes Hylland's impossibility result in the voting problem.

None of these results is formalized elsewhere to our knowledge. The book proves only some of them (10.1, 10.5, 10.8, 10.9, 10.13–10.15 are proved or outlined; 10.6 is sketched; the proofs of 10.2–10.4 are omitted as standard; 10.7 and 10.10–10.12 are stated without proof), so formalization also produces complete proofs of results the book leaves informal. Two printed statements are corrected (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious approach to Proposition 10.6 applies the Crémer–McLean construction type by type. This fails because several types may share a belief: a side payment that depends on the reported belief cannot separate them, and the convex-independence condition concerns the set of distinct beliefs rather than the indexed family of types.

For the results on T+\mathcal T^+T+, a type is an infinite belief hierarchy, and a strategy must be one function on all finite types simultaneously. Existence (10.5) cannot be obtained by applying Nash's theorem to a single finite type space, because a type belongs to many finite type spaces and must play the same strategy in all of them. Hylland's theorem (10.12) requires a full characterization of strategy-proof random rules on a cardinal preference domain.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions Δ(X)\Delta(X)Δ(X) are countably supported (PMF X); expected utilities are sums. The book leaves the measure structure of type spaces unspecified (p.179, note 3); finite type spaces, T+\mathcal T^+T+ and point beliefs are covered exactly. A Bayesian equilibrium requires every type's expected utility to exist (absolute summability) under every mixed strategy.
  • A type's belief is a distribution on ∏j≠iTj\prod_{j\ne i}T_j∏j=i​Tj​. Beliefs in Proposition 10.6 are vectors in RT−i\mathbb R^{T_{-i}}RT−i​, and condition (i) is stated with the convex hull of the other distinct beliefs.
  • Quasi-linear direct mechanisms are deterministic, q:T→Aq : T\to Aq:T→A, ti:T→Rt_i : T\to\mathbb Rti​:T→R. Mixed misreports are allowed in every equilibrium notion.
  • T+\mathcal T^+T+ is built from belief hierarchies encoded level by level (L0=ΘiL_0 = \Theta_iL0​=Θi​, Ln+1=Θi×Δ(∏j≠iLn,j)L_{n+1} = \Theta_i\times\Delta(\prod_{j\ne i}L_{n,j})Ln+1​=Θi​×Δ(∏j=i​Ln,j​)) and the finite type spaces generating them. The universal type space (Definition 10.5) is not needed and not formalized.
  • §10.11: two agents Fin 2, candidates {a,b,c}\{a,b,c\}{a,b,c}, strict private vNM utilities with every strict utility attained; mechanisms map to lotteries over candidates; rankings are bijections C ≃ Fin 3.
  • Corrections of the page: in Proposition 10.7 the signs of the transfers in (v) are reversed on the page relative to the bet described on p.186 and are stated as described; Proposition 10.9 is false under a large variety of certainties alone and is stated under the common-certainty condition that its proof uses, on type spaces whose beliefs have finite support (with countably supported beliefs the reduced mechanism's expected utilities need not exist). Both are explained in the item notes.
  • The goal is not trivialized by taking (q~,t~)=(q,t)(\tilde q,\tilde t) = (q,t)(q~​,t~)=(q,t): condition (ii) constrains only types with the same belief, so the original mechanism is in general not incentive-compatible, and the conclusion demands full Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Welcome contributions: a finite Farkas/separation lemma in the form needed for 10.6 (the platform has Polyhedral.farkas_lemma), basic API for PMF-valued type spaces (products of mixed strategies, conditioning), and the hierarchy map of finite type spaces, which all T+\mathcal T^+T+ milestones share.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Ch. 10. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • D. Bergemann, S. Morris, Robust Mechanism Design, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1421, 2001; Econometrica 73 (2005) 1771–1813. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x
  • J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096
  • J.-F. Mertens, S. Zamir, Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1985) 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770224
  • B. Dutta, H. Peters, A. Sen, Strategy-Proof Cardinal Decision Schemes, Social Choice and Welfare 28 (2007) 163–179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0152-4
  • T. Börgers, D. Smith, Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules, Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 339–360. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1100
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design IV: The Myerson–Satterthwaite TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Stock exchanges, commodity markets and trading platforms are institutions for trade between parties who each know something the other does not. The simplest version is bilateral trade: one seller, one buyer, one indivisible good, and each side privately knows its own value. The question is whether any trading institution can make the two trade exactly when trade is efficient, with both taking part voluntarily and without a subsidy from outside. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that, apart from trivial cases, none can. The result is one of the basic impossibility theorems of economic theory. It explains why bargaining under private information is inefficient, and it is the benchmark every later analysis of double auctions and market design compares against.

This mission formalizes Section 3.4 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015): the impossibility theorem, the pivot-mechanism argument that proves it, the second-best and profit-maximizing trading mechanisms, and the uniform example.

Timeline. Vickrey (1961) noted the tension between efficiency and budget balance in markets with private values. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) studied the sealed-offer double auction and its linear equilibrium for uniform values. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proved the impossibility for general independent distributions with overlapping supports, and computed the second-best mechanism; for uniform values it coincides with the Chatterjee–Samuelson linear equilibrium. Börgers (2015) gives the pivot-mechanism proof formalized here.

Setting

A seller SSS owns one indivisible good; a buyer BBB may buy it. The seller's value θS\theta_SθS​ has distribution FSF_SFS​ with density fS>0f_S > 0fS​>0 on [θ‾S,θ‾S][\underline\theta_S, \overline\theta_S][θ​S​,θS​]; the buyer's value θB\theta_BθB​ has distribution FBF_BFB​ with density fB>0f_B > 0fB​>0 on [θ‾B,θ‾B][\underline\theta_B, \overline\theta_B][θ​B​,θB​]. The two intervals are nondegenerate and may differ, and the values are independent. The seller's utility is ttt if she sells for ttt and θS+t\theta_S + tθS​+t if she keeps the good and receives ttt; the buyer's is θB−t\theta_B - tθB​−t if he buys and pays ttt, and −t-t−t otherwise.

A direct mechanism is a trading rule q:Θ→{0,1}q : \Theta \to \{0,1\}q:Θ→{0,1} on Θ=[θ‾S,θ‾S]×[θ‾B,θ‾B]\Theta = [\underline\theta_S, \overline\theta_S] \times [\underline\theta_B, \overline\theta_B]Θ=[θ​S​,θS​]×[θ​B​,θB​] and transfers tSt_StS​ (received by the seller) and tBt_BtB​ (paid by the buyer). Conditioning on one agent's type gives the interim trade probabilities QS,QBQ_S, Q_BQS​,QB​, the interim transfers TS,TBT_S, T_BTS​,TB​, and the interim utilities US(θS)=TS(θS)+(1−QS(θS))θSU_S(\theta_S) = T_S(\theta_S) + (1 - Q_S(\theta_S))\theta_SUS​(θS​)=TS​(θS​)+(1−QS​(θS​))θS​ and UB(θB)=QB(θB)θB−TB(θB)U_B(\theta_B) = Q_B(\theta_B)\theta_B - T_B(\theta_B)UB​(θB​)=QB​(θB​)θB​−TB​(θB​). The mechanism is incentive-compatible if truthful reporting is a Bayesian equilibrium, individually rational if US(θS)≥θSU_S(\theta_S) \ge \theta_SUS​(θS​)≥θS​ and UB(θB)≥0U_B(\theta_B) \ge 0UB​(θB​)≥0 for all types, ex post budget balanced if tS(θ)=tB(θ)t_S(\theta) = t_B(\theta)tS​(θ)=tB​(θ) for every θ\thetaθ, and ex ante budget balanced if E[tS]=E[tB]\mathbb E[t_S] = \mathbb E[t_B]E[tS​]=E[tB​]. A first-best trading rule trades when θB>θS\theta_B > \theta_SθB​>θS​ and not when θB<θS\theta_B < \theta_SθB​<θS​, with any choice at ties. The seller's virtual cost is ψS=θS+FS/fS\psi_S = \theta_S + F_S/f_SψS​=θS​+FS​/fS​ and the buyer's virtual valuation is ψB=θB−(1−FB)/fB\psi_B = \theta_B - (1 - F_B)/f_BψB​=θB​−(1−FB​)/fB​; the distributions are regular if both are increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.12 (Myerson–Satterthwaite)

An incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex post budget balanced direct mechanism with a first-best trading rule exists if and only if

θ‾B≥θ‾Sorθ‾S≥θ‾B.\underline\theta_B \ge \overline\theta_S \quad\text{or}\quad \underline\theta_S \ge \overline\theta_B .θ​B​≥θS​orθ​S​≥θB​.

Milestones

  • Lemmas 3.9–3.11. The pivot mechanism is incentive-compatible and individually rational. Among all such mechanisms that implement a first-best rule, it maximizes E[tB−tS]\mathbb E[t_B - t_S]E[tB​−tS​]. That quantity is negative whenever θ‾B<θ‾S\underline\theta_B < \overline\theta_Sθ​B​<θS​ and θ‾B>θ‾S\overline\theta_B > \underline\theta_SθB​>θ​S​.
  • Proposition 3.13 (second best). With overlapping supports and regular distributions, the welfare-maximizing incentive-compatible, individually rational, ex ante budget balanced mechanisms are characterized by the trading rule
q(θ)=1  ⟺  θB−λ1+λ1−FB(θB)fB(θB)≥θS+λ1+λFS(θS)fS(θS)q(\theta) = 1 \iff \theta_B - \tfrac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}\tfrac{1 - F_B(\theta_B)}{f_B(\theta_B)} \ge \theta_S + \tfrac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}\tfrac{F_S(\theta_S)}{f_S(\theta_S)}q(θ)=1⟺θB​−1+λλ​fB​(θB​)1−FB​(θB​)​≥θS​+1+λλ​fS​(θS​)FS​(θS​)​

for some λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, exact budget balance ∫q (ψB−ψS) f=θ‾S−∫ψSf\int q\,(\psi_B - \psi_S)\,f = \overline\theta_S - \int \psi_S f∫q(ψB​−ψS​)f=θS​−∫ψS​f, and the incentive-compatible payments with binding participation of θ‾S\overline\theta_SθS​ and θ‾B\underline\theta_Bθ​B​.

  • Proposition 3.14 (profit maximization). Profit E[tB−tS]\mathbb E[t_B - t_S]E[tB​−tS​] is maximized by trading iff ψB(θB)>ψS(θS)\psi_B(\theta_B) > \psi_S(\theta_S)ψB​(θB​)>ψS​(θS​), with the same payment formulas.
  • Propositions 3.15–3.16 (uniform values on [0,1][0,1][0,1]). The second best trades iff θB−θS>1/4\theta_B - \theta_S > 1/4θB​−θS​>1/4; the profit maximizer trades iff θB−θS>1/2\theta_B - \theta_S > 1/2θB​−θS​>1/2.

Significance

The theorem locates the source of inefficiency in bilateral bargaining in private information itself, not in any particular bargaining protocol: no mechanism, however clever, achieves efficient voluntary trade without a subsidy. It is the reason efficiency in markets is studied as a limit (large double auctions approach efficiency as the number of traders grows), and why a trading platform's fee structure is analyzed as a second-best problem. The pivot-mechanism argument is the same one that proves the impossibility of first-best public-goods provision (Proposition 3.7), so the two formalizations share their structure.

All results of this section are classical and proved on paper. None is formalized on Prove2Me, and Mathlib has no mechanism-design library. The platform has the Chatterjee–Samuelson linear equilibrium as an open statement about one particular game; this mission states results about all mechanisms. A complete development yields a reusable one-dimensional envelope/payoff-equivalence library for two agents with differently oriented types (the seller's incentive constraint runs from high types down), and the Lagrangian optimality argument for a linear objective under a single linear constraint.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt to prove impossibility looks for a contradiction between incentive compatibility and budget balance state by state. That fails: incentive compatibility and participation are interim constraints, so any single state admits budget-balanced transfers consistent with them, and the contradiction exists only after integrating over the prior. Two points need care. The seller's orientation is reversed: her trade probability is decreasing and her participation constraint binds at the highest type. And the deficit of the pivot mechanism must be shown to have positive probability, which uses that the supports overlap in a set with nonempty interior. The optimal-mechanism results additionally need that the trading rule implied by a Lagrange multiplier satisfies the monotonicity constraint, which is where regularity enters, and that a multiplier exists which makes the budget constraint bind.

Formalization scope

A type vector is a pair θ : ℝ × ℝ with θ.1 the seller's and θ.2 the buyer's value. The prior is Lebesgue measure on Θ\ThetaΘ with density fS(θS)fB(θB)f_S(\theta_S) f_B(\theta_B)fS​(θS​)fB​(θB​). Densities are measurable, strictly positive on the closed supports and integrate to one; nothing else, such as continuity, is assumed. The trading rule is real-valued with values in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} on Θ\ThetaΘ (deterministic, as in Definition 3.9). The measurability the book omits (Ch. 2 note 2) is built into the admissible class: qqq, tSt_StS​, tBt_BtB​ are measurable with integrable transfers. "Increasing" is weak monotonicity, the book's convention.

Explicit formulas the statements carry: the first-best rule (3.61) with free tie rule, the pivot transfers of Definition 3.10, the rule (3.70) with parameter λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, the exact budget equation of Proposition 3.13 (ii), the payment formulas TB(θB)=θBQB(θB)−∫θ‾BθBQBT_B(\theta_B) = \theta_B Q_B(\theta_B) - \int_{\underline\theta_B}^{\theta_B} Q_BTB​(θB​)=θB​QB​(θB​)−∫θ​B​θB​​QB​ and TS(θS)=θ‾S−(1−QS(θS))θS−∫θSθ‾S(1−QS)T_S(\theta_S) = \overline\theta_S - (1 - Q_S(\theta_S))\theta_S - \int_{\theta_S}^{\overline\theta_S}(1 - Q_S)TS​(θS​)=θS​−(1−QS​(θS​))θS​−∫θS​θS​​(1−QS​), the profit rule ψB>ψS\psi_B > \psi_SψB​>ψS​, and the thresholds 1/41/41/4 and 1/21/21/2.

The goal quantifies over every first-best trading rule and imposes budget balance as the ex post equality tS=tBt_S = t_BtS​=tB​. Dropping budget balance, weakening it to tS≤tBt_S \le t_BtS​≤tB​, or fixing one tie rule would give a different, and in the first case false, statement. The pointwise "if and only if … for all θ\thetaθ" characterizations of Propositions 3.13–3.16 are stated with necessity almost everywhere, since an optimal trading rule is determined only up to null sets. For Proposition 3.14 necessity is also restricted to {ψB≠ψS}\{\psi_B \ne \psi_S\}{ψB​=ψS​}: under weak regularity that tie set can have positive probability, and profit does not depend on the trading rule there.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a two-agent payoff-equivalence lemma for the seller's reversed orientation, and a sorry-free construction of the pivot mechanism's integrability facts.

Selected references

  • R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983) 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
  • K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson, Bargaining under incomplete information, Operations Research 31 (1983) 835–851. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.31.5.835
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.4. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
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An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design III: Impossibility of First-Best Public Goods ProvisionTextbook

Motivation

Whether a community can finance a shared project out of voluntary contributions, when each member knows only her own benefit from it, is one of the founding questions of mechanism design. Bayesian mechanism design began with mechanisms for the provision of public goods: d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) showed that the efficient decision can be made Bayesian incentive compatible with a budget that balances in every state, provided agents cannot opt out. Once participation is voluntary, this is no longer possible, and Güth and Hellwig (1986) studied the best mechanism under that constraint. The same tension between efficiency, incentives, voluntary participation and budget balance drives the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem for bilateral trade, which the next mission of this series formalizes.

This mission formalizes Section 3.3 of Tilman Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015), which treats the public goods problem in the independent private values model with a continuum of types. The section proves an impossibility theorem for first best provision and then characterizes the best mechanisms that respect the budget: the welfare-maximizing (second best) mechanism and the profit-maximizing one, with a worked two-agent uniform example.

Setting

A community of agents I={1,…,N}I = \{1, \dots, N\}I={1,…,N}, N≥2N \ge 2N≥2, decides whether to produce an indivisible, nonexcludable public good, g∈{0,1}g \in \{0,1\}g∈{0,1}, at cost c>0c > 0c>0. Agent iii pays a transfer tit_iti​ and obtains utility θig−ti\theta_i g - t_iθi​g−ti​. Her type θi\theta_iθi​ is private information, drawn independently across agents from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​, strictly positive on the common support [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta, \bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], 0≤θ‾<θˉ0 \le \underline\theta < \bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ. The type space is Θ=[θ‾,θˉ]N\Theta = [\underline\theta, \bar\theta]^NΘ=[θ​,θˉ]N and f(θ)=∏ifi(θi)f(\theta) = \prod_i f_i(\theta_i)f(θ)=∏i​fi​(θi​).

A direct mechanism is a decision rule q:Θ→{0,1}q : \Theta \to \{0,1\}q:Θ→{0,1} and transfer rules ti:Θ→Rt_i : \Theta \to \mathbb Rti​:Θ→R. For agent iii reporting θi\theta_iθi​, Qi(θi)Q_i(\theta_i)Qi​(θi​) is the probability of production and Ti(θi)T_i(\theta_i)Ti​(θi​) the expected transfer, taken over the other agents' types, and Ui(θi)=Qi(θi)θi−Ti(θi)U_i(\theta_i) = Q_i(\theta_i)\theta_i - T_i(\theta_i)Ui​(θi​)=Qi​(θi​)θi​−Ti​(θi​). The mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if θiQi(θi)−Ti(θi)≥θiQi(θi′)−Ti(θi′)\theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - T_i(\theta_i) \ge \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i') - T_i(\theta_i')θi​Qi​(θi​)−Ti​(θi​)≥θi​Qi​(θi′​)−Ti​(θi′​) for all i,θi,θi′i, \theta_i, \theta_i'i,θi​,θi′​, and individually rational (IR) if Ui(θi)≥0U_i(\theta_i) \ge 0Ui​(θi​)≥0 for all i,θii, \theta_ii,θi​. It is ex post budget balanced if ∑iti(θ)≥c q(θ)\sum_i t_i(\theta) \ge c\,q(\theta)∑i​ti​(θ)≥cq(θ) for every θ\thetaθ, and ex ante budget balanced if this inequality holds after integrating both sides against fff.

Welfare is (∑iθi) g−∑iti(\sum_i \theta_i)\, g - \sum_i t_i(∑i​θi​)g−∑i​ti​. The first best decision rule is q∗(θ)=1q^*(\theta) = 1q∗(θ)=1 if ∑iθi≥c\sum_i \theta_i \ge c∑i​θi​≥c and 000 otherwise; a first best mechanism uses q∗q^*q∗ and transfers that add up to exactly c q∗(θ)c\,q^*(\theta)cq∗(θ) in every state. The pivot mechanism uses q∗q^*q∗ and

ti(θ)=θ‾ q∗(θ‾,θ−i)+(q∗(θ)−q∗(θ‾,θ−i))(c−∑j≠iθj).t_i(\theta) = \underline\theta\, q^*(\underline\theta,\theta_{-i}) + \big(q^*(\theta) - q^*(\underline\theta,\theta_{-i})\big)\Big(c - \sum_{j\ne i}\theta_j\Big).ti​(θ)=θ​q∗(θ​,θ−i​)+(q∗(θ)−q∗(θ​,θ−i​))(c−j=i∑​θj​).

The virtual valuation is ψi(θi)=θi−(1−Fi(θi))/fi(θi)\psi_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i - (1-F_i(\theta_i))/f_i(\theta_i)ψi​(θi​)=θi​−(1−Fi​(θi​))/fi​(θi​), and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ψi\psi_iψi​ is strictly increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.7

∃ an IC and IR first best mechanism  ⟺  Nθ‾≥c  or  Nθˉ≤c.\exists\ \text{an IC and IR first best mechanism} \iff N\underline\theta \ge c \ \text{ or }\ N\bar\theta \le c .∃ an IC and IR first best mechanism⟺Nθ​≥c  or  Nθˉ≤c.

In the two cases on the right, producing is efficient for every type vector or for none; in every other case efficient provision cannot be financed voluntarily.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.6: every ex ante budget balanced mechanism has an equivalent ex post budget balanced one.
  2. Lemma 3.6: the pivot mechanism is IC and IR.
  3. Lemma 3.7: among IC and IR mechanisms with decision rule q∗q^*q∗, the pivot mechanism has the largest expected budget surplus.
  4. Lemma 3.8: if Nθ‾<c<NθˉN\underline\theta < c < N\bar\thetaNθ​<c<Nθˉ, the pivot mechanism's expected budget surplus is negative.
  5. Proposition 3.8 (second best): under regularity and Nθ‾<c<NθˉN\underline\theta < c < N\bar\thetaNθ​<c<Nθˉ, an IC, IR, ex ante budget balanced mechanism maximizes expected welfare among such mechanisms iff for some λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0
q(θ)=1  ⟺  ∑iθi>c+∑iλ1+λ 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi),q(\theta) = 1 \iff \sum_i \theta_i > c + \sum_i \frac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}\,\frac{1-F_i(\theta_i)}{f_i(\theta_i)},q(θ)=1⟺i∑​θi​>c+i∑​1+λλ​fi​(θi​)1−Fi​(θi​)​,

the budget binds, ∫Θq(θ)[∑iψi(θi)−c]f(θ) dθ=0\int_\Theta q(\theta)\big[\sum_i \psi_i(\theta_i) - c\big] f(\theta)\,d\theta = 0∫Θ​q(θ)[∑i​ψi​(θi​)−c]f(θ)dθ=0, and Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQi(x) dxT_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_i(x)\,dxTi​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​(x)dx. 6. Proposition 3.9 (profit maximization): under regularity, the profit-maximizing IC and IR mechanism produces iff ∑iθi>c+∑i(1−Fi(θi))/fi(θi)\sum_i \theta_i > c + \sum_i (1-F_i(\theta_i))/f_i(\theta_i)∑i​θi​>c+∑i​(1−Fi​(θi​))/fi​(θi​), with the same formula for TiT_iTi​. 7. Proposition 3.10 (Example 3.3: N=2N=2N=2, uniform types on [0,1][0,1][0,1], 0<c<20<c<20<c<2): the second best produces iff θ1+θ2>s\theta_1+\theta_2 > sθ1​+θ2​>s, where sss is the unique root in [0,1][0,1][0,1] of −23s3+s2−(1−12s2)c=0-\tfrac23 s^3 + s^2 - (1-\tfrac12 s^2)c = 0−32​s3+s2−(1−21​s2)c=0 if c<2/3c < 2/3c<2/3, and s=12+34cs = \tfrac12 + \tfrac34 cs=21​+43​c if c≥2/3c \ge 2/3c≥2/3. 8. Proposition 3.11 (same example): the profit maximizer produces iff θ1+θ2>1+12c\theta_1+\theta_2 > 1 + \tfrac12 cθ1​+θ2​>1+21​c.

Significance

Proposition 3.7 says that with voluntary participation no mechanism both takes efficient production decisions and pays for them, outside the degenerate cases. It is the reason the rest of the section, and much of the applied literature on public goods, studies constrained optimum mechanisms: Proposition 3.8 describes what the best budget-respecting mechanism gives up (it undersupplies the good, producing only when valuations exceed a bound strictly above the cost), and Proposition 3.9 quantifies the further distortion under a monopoly supplier. The example makes the three thresholds explicit and comparable.

All results of the section are classical and proved in the book, several of them only sketched there (Proposition 3.9 is stated without proof; Proposition 3.8 invokes an infinite-dimensional Kuhn–Tucker theorem whose applicability is not checked). None of them is formalized in Lean. The mission produces a machine-checked account of the envelope and revenue-equivalence arguments with interim expectations over independent types, a checked pivot-mechanism deficit computation, and a checked Lagrangian characterization; the uniform example additionally certifies the book's arithmetic.

Difficulty

The naive argument for the goal fails at the first step: a mechanism that implements q∗q^*q∗ with a balanced budget in every state is not obviously comparable to one that is only IC and IR, because IC constrains interim expectations while budget balance is ex post. The impossibility needs a reduction of the whole class of IC, IR mechanisms with rule q∗q^*q∗ to a single extremal one, which requires the payoff equivalence formula for interim utilities and an exact integral identity for expected revenue in terms of virtual valuations. The strict deficit of the pivot mechanism then needs a case analysis over which agents are pivotal and a positive-probability argument. For Proposition 3.8, pointwise maximization of a Lagrangian is not enough: one must show the multiplier exists and is positive, that the maximizer satisfies the monotonicity constraint, and that uniqueness holds only up to null sets.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin N with N≥2N \ge 2N≥2; types are vectors in Fin N → ℝ; the type distribution is the product of the marginal measures fi(x) dxf_i(x)\,dxfi​(x)dx on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], which encodes independence. QiQ_iQi​ and TiT_iTi​ integrate the decision and transfer rules against this distribution with agent iii's coordinate overwritten by her report. Decision rules are deterministic, with values in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} on Θ\ThetaΘ, as in Definition 3.4. Ties in the first best rule produce, as in the book's note 2 to Chapter 3; the second best and profit-maximizing rules use strict inequalities, as printed.

The book omits measurability and the existence of conditional expectations; the class of direct mechanisms here requires qqq and each tit_iti​ to be Borel measurable, each tit_iti​ integrable, and each conditional expectation of tit_iti​ given one agent's type to exist. The characterizations in Propositions 3.8–3.11 are stated in two directions: the stated rule, for every θ\thetaθ, is sufficient; necessity holds for almost every θ\thetaθ, since changing qqq on a null set of type vectors changes nothing that is optimized. The explicit formulas the mission commits to are: the pivot transfers above; the second best rule with multiplier λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and the binding budget identity; Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQiT_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_iTi​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​; the cubic −23s3+s2−(1−12s2)c=0-\tfrac23 s^3 + s^2 - (1-\tfrac12 s^2)c = 0−32​s3+s2−(1−21​s2)c=0 for c<2/3c < 2/3c<2/3; s=12+34cs = \tfrac12 + \tfrac34 cs=21​+43​c for c≥2/3c \ge 2/3c≥2/3; and s=1+12cs = 1 + \tfrac12 cs=1+21​c for the profit maximizer.

A trivializing formalization of the goal takes "first best" to mean only the decision rule q∗q^*q∗; the pivot mechanism would then be a witness in every case, so first best here also requires transfers adding up to exactly c q∗(θ)c\,q^*(\theta)cq∗(θ) in every state.

Reusable infrastructure includes interim expectations over independent product distributions, the payoff and revenue equivalence lemmas for IC mechanisms, and the virtual-valuation identity for expected revenue; these are shared with the auction and bilateral trade chapters of the series. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas about product measures with densities on boxes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.3. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gérard-Varet, Incentives and incomplete information, Journal of Public Economics 11 (1979) 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4
  • W. Güth and M. Hellwig, The private supply of a public good, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, Supplement 5 (1986) 121–159.
  • R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983) 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
  • D. G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, Wiley, 1969.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design II: Myerson's Optimal Single-Unit AuctionTextbook

Why revenue-maximizing auctions matter

A seller with one indivisible good and several potential buyers, each of whom privately knows how much the good is worth to them, has to choose a selling procedure: a posted price, an English auction, a sealed-bid auction with a reserve price, or something more elaborate. Which procedure raises the most expected revenue? Myerson's answer (Myerson 1981) is the foundation of optimal auction design. It underlies reserve-price setting in practice, the analysis of sponsored-search and ad-exchange auctions, and the modern algorithmic mechanism design literature, which treats Myerson's auction as the benchmark against which simple and approximately optimal auctions are measured.

This mission formalizes Section 3.2 of Tilman Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015), the textbook treatment of Myerson's result in the independent private values model with Bayesian incentive compatibility. It is the second mission of a series covering the book.

Timeline. Vickrey (1961) showed that the second-price auction makes truthful bidding a dominant strategy and compared auction formats. Myerson (1981) characterized the revenue-maximizing mechanism for independent private values with possibly asymmetric distributions; Riley and Samuelson (1981) obtained the symmetric case and the optimal reserve price independently. The revelation principle in the Bayesian form used here goes back to Myerson (1979) and Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979).

Setting

There are N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 potential buyers i∈I={1,…,N}i \in I = \{1,\dots,N\}i∈I={1,…,N}. Buyer iii values the good at θi\theta_iθi​; if he receives it and pays tit_iti​ his utility is θi−ti\theta_i - t_iθi​−ti​, and otherwise −ti-t_i−ti​. The seller's utility is ∑iti\sum_i t_i∑i​ti​. The valuations θ1,…,θN\theta_1,\dots,\theta_Nθ1​,…,θN​ are independent; θi\theta_iθi​ has cumulative distribution function FiF_iFi​ and density fif_ifi​ with fi(θi)>0f_i(\theta_i) > 0fi​(θi​)>0 on the common support [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta, \bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], where 0≤θ‾<θˉ0 \le \underline\theta < \bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ. The type space is Θ=[θ‾,θˉ]N\Theta = [\underline\theta,\bar\theta]^NΘ=[θ​,θˉ]N and the joint density is f(θ)=∏ifi(θi)f(\theta) = \prod_i f_i(\theta_i)f(θ)=∏i​fi​(θi​).

A direct mechanism asks buyers to report their types and consists of an allocation rule q:Θ→Δq : \Theta \to \Deltaq:Θ→Δ, where Δ={(q1,…,qN):0≤qi≤1, ∑iqi≤1}\Delta = \{(q_1,\dots,q_N) : 0 \le q_i \le 1,\ \sum_i q_i \le 1\}Δ={(q1​,…,qN​):0≤qi​≤1, ∑i​qi​≤1}, and payment rules ti:Θ→Rt_i : \Theta \to \mathbb Rti​:Θ→R. Its interim quantities are the expected allocation probability, payment and utility of buyer iii conditional on his own type:

Qi(θi)=∫Θ−iqi(θi,θ−i)f−i(θ−i) dθ−i,Ti(θi)=∫Θ−iti(θi,θ−i)f−i(θ−i) dθ−i,Ui=θiQi−Ti.Q_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\Theta_{-i}} q_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i}) f_{-i}(\theta_{-i})\,d\theta_{-i},\quad T_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\Theta_{-i}} t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i}) f_{-i}(\theta_{-i})\,d\theta_{-i},\quad U_i = \theta_i Q_i - T_i.Qi​(θi​)=∫Θ−i​​qi​(θi​,θ−i​)f−i​(θ−i​)dθ−i​,Ti​(θi​)=∫Θ−i​​ti​(θi​,θ−i​)f−i​(θ−i​)dθ−i​,Ui​=θi​Qi​−Ti​.

The mechanism is incentive-compatible if θiQi(θi)−Ti(θi)≥θiQi(θi′)−Ti(θi′)\theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - T_i(\theta_i) \ge \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i') - T_i(\theta_i')θi​Qi​(θi​)−Ti​(θi​)≥θi​Qi​(θi′​)−Ti​(θi′​) for all i,θi,θi′i,\theta_i,\theta_i'i,θi​,θi′​ (truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium) and individually rational if Ui(θi)≥0U_i(\theta_i) \ge 0Ui​(θi​)≥0 for all i,θii,\theta_ii,θi​. The virtual valuation of buyer iii is

ψi(θi)=θi−1−Fi(θi)fi(θi),\psi_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i - \frac{1 - F_i(\theta_i)}{f_i(\theta_i)},ψi​(θi​)=θi​−fi​(θi​)1−Fi​(θi​)​,

and the distribution FiF_iFi​ is regular if ψi\psi_iψi​ is strictly increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Myerson's optimal auction (Proposition 3.4)

Under regularity, among all incentive-compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms, a mechanism maximizes the seller's expected revenue E[∑iti(θ)]\mathbb E[\sum_i t_i(\theta)]E[∑i​ti​(θ)] exactly when, for every buyer iii,

qi(θ)={1if ψi(θi)>0 and ψi(θi)>ψj(θj) for all j≠i,0otherwise,Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQi(x) dx,q_i(\theta) = \begin{cases}1 & \text{if } \psi_i(\theta_i) > 0 \text{ and } \psi_i(\theta_i) > \psi_j(\theta_j) \text{ for all } j \ne i,\\ 0&\text{otherwise,}\end{cases}\qquad T_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_i(x)\,dx,qi​(θ)={10​if ψi​(θi​)>0 and ψi​(θi​)>ψj​(θj​) for all j=i,otherwise,​Ti​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​(x)dx,

the allocation identity holding for almost every θ\thetaθ; and such a mechanism exists.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1, the revelation principle: every Bayesian Nash equilibrium of every mechanism is replicated by truth-telling in an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
  2. Lemmas 3.1–3.4: incentive compatibility makes QiQ_iQi​ increasing and UiU_iUi​ convex with Ui′=QiU_i' = Q_iUi′​=Qi​; payoff equivalence Ui(θi)=Ui(θ‾)+∫θ‾θiQiU_i(\theta_i) = U_i(\underline\theta) + \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_iUi​(θi​)=Ui​(θ​)+∫θ​θi​​Qi​; revenue equivalence for TiT_iTi​.
  3. Proposition 3.2: incentive compatibility holds if and only if every QiQ_iQi​ is increasing and the revenue-equivalence formula holds.
  4. Proposition 3.3: under incentive compatibility, individual rationality is equivalent to Ti(θ‾)≤θ‾Qi(θ‾)T_i(\underline\theta) \le \underline\theta Q_i(\underline\theta)Ti​(θ​)≤θ​Qi​(θ​).
  5. Lemma 3.5: an optimal mechanism has Ti(θ‾)=θ‾Qi(θ‾)T_i(\underline\theta) = \underline\theta Q_i(\underline\theta)Ti​(θ​)=θ​Qi​(θ​).
  6. Eqs. (3.4)–(3.5): expected revenue equals expected virtual surplus ∑i∫Θqi(θ)ψi(θi)f(θ) dθ\sum_i \int_\Theta q_i(\theta)\psi_i(\theta_i) f(\theta)\,d\theta∑i​∫Θ​qi​(θ)ψi​(θi​)f(θ)dθ.
  7. Proposition 3.5: a mechanism maximizes expected welfare E[∑iqi(θ)θi]\mathbb E[\sum_i q_i(\theta)\theta_i]E[∑i​qi​(θ)θi​] among incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanisms if and only if it gives the good to the highest value (almost everywhere) and Ti(θi)≤θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQiT_i(\theta_i) \le \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i}Q_iTi​(θi​)≤θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​.

Significance

The theorem identifies the revenue-maximizing selling procedure among all procedures, not among a parametric family: by the revelation principle, no auction format, however elaborate, and no equilibrium of it can beat the mechanism of Proposition 3.4. Its consequences include the optimality of first- and second-price auctions with reserve price ψ−1(0)\psi^{-1}(0)ψ−1(0) when buyers are symmetric, the revenue equivalence of standard auction formats, the fact that an asymmetric optimal auction may sell to a buyer without the highest value, and the monopoly inefficiency that the optimal seller sometimes withholds the good. The envelope characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility (Proposition 3.2) is the tool reused throughout the rest of the book, in public goods provision, bilateral trade and dynamic screening.

The result is classical and fully proved in the literature. What is missing is a machine-checked version at this generality: asymmetric distributions, an arbitrary lower support end θ‾≥0\underline\theta \ge 0θ​≥0, Bayesian (interim) rather than dominant-strategy constraints, and optimality over all incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. Existing formalizations on the platform treat the i.i.d. case with values on [0,vˉ][0,\bar v][0,vˉ].

Difficulty

The obvious argument maximizes the virtual surplus ∑iqi(θ)ψi(θi)\sum_i q_i(\theta)\psi_i(\theta_i)∑i​qi​(θ)ψi​(θi​) pointwise and declares victory, but this ignores that the seller's feasible set is constrained by monotonicity of every QiQ_iQi​; the pointwise maximizer is feasible only because regularity makes ψi\psi_iψi​ increasing, and that has to be proved for the interim probabilities, which integrate over the other buyers' types. The revenue identity links interim payments, which integrate over the other buyers' types, to an integral over the whole type space weighted by the virtual valuation, and it is only valid for mechanisms whose lowest types' payments are pinned down. The necessity direction requires showing that ties and zero virtual values are null events, which rests on strict monotonicity of every ψi\psi_iψi​ and on the absolute continuity of the type distribution. Finally, the envelope step requires convexity and almost-everywhere differentiability of UiU_iUi​, with care at the endpoints of the type interval.

Formalization scope

Buyers form a finite type with at least two elements. The prior is the measure on RN\mathbb R^NRN with density ∏ifi(θi)\prod_i f_i(\theta_i)∏i​fi​(θi​) on Θ\ThetaΘ and no mass outside it; each fif_ifi​ is measurable, strictly positive on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] and integrates to 111; Fi(θi)=∫θ‾θifiF_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} f_iFi​(θi​)=∫θ​θi​​fi​. Allocation and payment rules are total functions whose values on Θ\ThetaΘ are constrained, and QiQ_iQi​, TiT_iTi​ are prior expectations with the iii-th coordinate fixed. "Increasing" is weak monotonicity, as in the book; regularity is strict monotonicity of ψi\psi_iψi​ on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] (Assumption 3.1).

The following conventions are committed to:

  • Measurability. The book omits measurability throughout. The comparison class for optimality consists of mechanisms with measurable qi,tiq_i, t_iqi​,ti​, integrable tit_iti​, and integrable sections θ−i↦ti(θi,θ−i)\theta_{-i}\mapsto t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})θ−i​↦ti​(θi​,θ−i​). Without these hypotheses the Lean integrals would be 000 and revenue comparisons would be meaningless.
  • Almost-everywhere characterizations. Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 are printed with "for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ". Changing qqq on a null set of type vectors changes neither incentives nor revenue nor welfare, so the "only if" directions hold only almost everywhere; they are stated for almost every θ\thetaθ, and the existence of a mechanism satisfying the allocation rule at every θ\thetaθ is stated separately. The payment conditions hold for every θi\theta_iθi​.
  • Explicit formulas. The goal states Myerson's allocation rule and the payment formula Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQi(x) dxT_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_i(x)\,dxTi​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​(x)dx explicitly. Proposition 3.5 states the efficient rule qi(θ)=1q_i(\theta) = 1qi​(θ)=1 iff θi>θj\theta_i > \theta_jθi​>θj​ for all j≠ij \ne ij=i, and the payment inequality. A statement asserting only that some optimal mechanism exists, or only that the optimal auction is efficient, would not be this theorem.
  • Revelation principle. A general mechanism has arbitrary measurable message sets and an outcome function giving allocation probabilities in Δ\DeltaΔ and expected transfers; equilibria are in pure type-contingent strategies. A version in which the mechanism is already direct would be trivial and is not the statement.
  • Interim constraints. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality are Bayesian and interim, not dominant-strategy or ex post; the latter are the subject of a later mission.
  • Endpoints in Lemma 3.2. Differentiability of UiU_iUi​ and Ui′=QiU_i' = Q_iUi′​=Qi​ are stated at interior points of [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ].

The envelope and payoff-equivalence lemmas, and the revenue identity, are reused in later missions of this series, so proofs of the milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • Tilman Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.2, pp. 31–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, American Economic Review 71(3), 381–392, 1981. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1802786
  • William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • Roger B. Myerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 47(1), 61–73, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
  • Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin, The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 185–216, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming VI: Optimal Policies for the Continuous Gold-Mining ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Chapter II of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957) solves a discrete gold-mining process: a single machine can be used in one of two mines, each use extracts a fixed fraction of the gold remaining in that mine, and each use carries a fixed risk of destroying the machine. Maximizing the expected total gold leads to an index rule: work the mine whose ratio of expected yield to risk is larger. Chapter VIII, A Continuous Stochastic Decision Process, passes to continuous time. Decisions are taken at every instant, and effort may be divided between the mines. The optimal policy is characterized by first-order conditions on switching functions, the objects of Pontryagin's later maximum principle.

It is also an early continuous-time index policy of the kind later central to bandit theory. Chapter VIII treats two mines, then a third decision that works both mines at once.

Setting

Mine A holds x0≥0x_0 \ge 0x0​≥0 units of gold and mine B holds y0≥0y_0 \ge 0y0​≥0. At time ttt a proportion φ1(t)∈[0,1]\varphi_1(t) \in [0,1]φ1​(t)∈[0,1] of the machine's effort goes to A and φ2(t)=1−φ1(t)\varphi_2(t) = 1 - \varphi_1(t)φ2​(t)=1−φ1​(t) to B (Eq. (7.3)). With x(t),y(t)x(t), y(t)x(t),y(t) the gold remaining, p(t)p(t)p(t) the probability that the machine still works and f(t)f(t)f(t) the expected gold mined, the process is defined by Eq. (7.2):

dxdt=−φ1r1x,dydt=−φ2r2y,dpdt=−p (φ1q1+φ2q2),dfdt=p (φ1r1x+φ2r2y),\frac{dx}{dt} = -\varphi_1 r_1 x,\qquad \frac{dy}{dt} = -\varphi_2 r_2 y,\qquad \frac{dp}{dt} = -p\,(\varphi_1 q_1 + \varphi_2 q_2),\qquad \frac{df}{dt} = p\,(\varphi_1 r_1 x + \varphi_2 r_2 y),dtdx​=−φ1​r1​x,dtdy​=−φ2​r2​y,dtdp​=−p(φ1​q1​+φ2​q2​),dtdf​=p(φ1​r1​x+φ2​r2​y),

with x(0)=x0x(0) = x_0x(0)=x0​, y(0)=y0y(0) = y_0y(0)=y0​, p(0)=1p(0) = 1p(0)=1, f(0)=0f(0) = 0f(0)=0. The mining rates r1,r2r_1, r_2r1​,r2​ and the failure rates q1,q2q_1, q_2q1​,q2​ are positive. The objective is the expected total gold f(∞)=∫0∞f′(t) dtf(\infty) = \int_0^\infty f'(t)\,dtf(∞)=∫0∞​f′(t)dt.

In the three-choice problem (§ 12) a third decision CCC removes gold from A at rate r3r_3r3​ and from B at rate r4r_4r4​, and fails at rate q3q_3q3​. A control is a triple φ1,φ2,φ3≥0\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3 \ge 0φ1​,φ2​,φ3​≥0 with φ1+φ2+φ3=1\varphi_1 + \varphi_2 + \varphi_3 = 1φ1​+φ2​+φ3​=1 (Eq. (12.2)). For a horizon TTT, the switching functions K1,K2,K3K_1, K_2, K_3K1​,K2​,K3​ of Eq. (12.5) are computed along a control. For instance,

K1(t)=−q1∫tTf′(s) ds+r1 p(T) x(T)−r1∫tTp′(s) x(s) ds.K_1(t) = -q_1\int_t^T f'(s)\,ds + r_1\,p(T)\,x(T) - r_1\int_t^T p'(s)\,x(s)\,ds.K1​(t)=−q1​∫tT​f′(s)ds+r1​p(T)x(T)−r1​∫tT​p′(s)x(s)ds.

They measure the first-order gain from shifting effort towards each decision at time ttt. The linear forms

C1=q1r2y−q2r1x,C2=q1r4y−(q3r1−q1r3)x,C3=(q3r2−q2r4)y−q2r3xC_1 = q_1 r_2 y - q_2 r_1 x,\qquad C_2 = q_1 r_4 y - (q_3 r_1 - q_1 r_3)x,\qquad C_3 = (q_3 r_2 - q_2 r_4) y - q_2 r_3 xC1​=q1​r2​y−q2​r1​x,C2​=q1​r4​y−(q3​r1​−q1​r3​)x,C3​=(q3​r2​−q2​r4​)y−q2​r3​x

and the quantity D=q1r2r3+q2r1r4−q3r1r2D = q_1 r_2 r_3 + q_2 r_1 r_4 - q_3 r_1 r_2D=q1​r2​r3​+q2​r1​r4​−q3​r1​r2​ (Eqs. (13.2)–(13.3)) organize the analysis.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter VIII, Theorem 1

For the two-choice process, the maximum of f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) is attained by the policy

φ1=1 for q1r2y<q2r1x,φ2=1 for q1r2y>q2r1x,φ1=r2r1+r2, φ2=r1r1+r2 for q1r2y=q2r1x.\varphi_1 = 1 \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y < q_2 r_1 x,\qquad \varphi_2 = 1 \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y > q_2 r_1 x,\qquad \varphi_1 = \tfrac{r_2}{r_1+r_2},\ \varphi_2 = \tfrac{r_1}{r_1+r_2} \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y = q_2 r_1 x.φ1​=1 for q1​r2​y<q2​r1​x,φ2​=1 for q1​r2​y>q2​r1​x,φ1​=r1​+r2​r2​​, φ2​=r1​+r2​r1​​ for q1​r2​y=q2​r1​x.

The formal statement asserts that some admissible control follows this rule along its own trajectory, and that every such control maximizes f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) over all measurable controls with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Milestones

  1. Eq. (10.1): fA(∞)=r1x0/(q1+r1)f_A(\infty) = r_1 x_0/(q_1 + r_1)fA​(∞)=r1​x0​/(q1​+r1​) and fB(∞)=r2y0/(q2+r2)f_B(\infty) = r_2 y_0/(q_2 + r_2)fB​(∞)=r2​y0​/(q2​+r2​) for the pure policies.
  2. Lemmas 1–3 (§ 13): for a control that maximizes f(T)f(T)f(T), almost everywhere, Ki>KjK_i > K_jKi​>Kj​ forces φi=1\varphi_i = 1φi​=1 or φj=0\varphi_j = 0φj​=0; a strictly largest KiK_iKi​ forces φi=1\varphi_i = 1φi​=1; a strictly beaten KiK_iKi​ forces φi=0\varphi_i = 0φi​=0.
  3. Lemma 4 (§ 14): if C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 and C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 lie in the positive quadrant and D≠0D \ne 0D=0, no optimal control mixes AAA, BBB and CCC on an interval.
  4. Lemma 5 (§ 14): a mixture of exactly two decisions on an interval keeps the state on C1=0C_1 = 0C1​=0, C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 or C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 respectively, with the proportions that hold y/xy/xy/x fixed.
  5. § 15, Eq. (1) (corrected): fC(∞)=r3x0/(q3+r3)+r4y0/(q3+r4)f_C(\infty) = r_3 x_0/(q_3 + r_3) + r_4 y_0/(q_3 + r_4)fC​(∞)=r3​x0​/(q3​+r3​)+r4​y0​/(q3​+r4​).
  6. "Theorem 8" (§ 16, the chapter's third theorem): if D<0D < 0D<0 (with r3>r4r_3 > r_4r3​>r4​ and x0,y0>0x_0, y_0 > 0x0​,y0​>0), the three-choice problem is solved by the two-choice rule of Theorem 1, and every optimal control has φ3=0\varphi_3 = 0φ3​=0 almost everywhere.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives a closed-form optimal feedback policy for a continuous-time stochastic scheduling problem. The policy depends only on the slope y/xy/xy/x, and on the line q1r2y=q2r1xq_1 r_2 y = q_2 r_1 xq1​r2​y=q2​r1​x it is a mixed (chattering) policy: the discrete optimum becomes a mixture in the continuous limit. Lemmas 1–5 are a hand-made maximum principle for controls that enter linearly, read almost everywhere. "Theorem 8" says exactly when a composite decision is useless: D<0D < 0D<0 means that CCC removes gold at a higher failure cost than an equivalent mixture of AAA and BBB.

On the formal side, none of these results is formalized anywhere. Mathlib has no theory of controlled differential equations or of necessary conditions for optimal control. The platform's maximum principles (BertsekasDP.pontryagin_minimum_principle, VectorSpaceOpt.pontryagin_minimum_principle) assume smooth dynamics and a finite horizon with differentiable costs. They do not cover this process, with measurable controls and an improper-integral objective. A formal proof of Theorem 1 would be a complete optimality proof for a continuous-time index policy with chattering controls. The book's argument for Theorem 1 is partly informal; a complete proof, by that route or another, is the target.

Difficulty

The optimization is over an infinite-dimensional set of measurable controls on an infinite horizon, and the objective is not concave in the control. The first-order conditions of §§ 8–9 are necessary, not sufficient, so they do not by themselves prove that the rule is optimal. The book's argument combines them with qualitative facts (the rule is used thereafter once used above the line, and BBB is preferred near the yyy-axis). Making this rigorous requires comparing an arbitrary control with the rule, not just perturbing near an optimum. It is also not known in advance that an optimal control exists, so arguments of the form "let φ\varphiφ be optimal" need an existence step or a direct comparison. For the lemmas, the switching functions must be shown absolutely continuous, with the derivative formulas (13.1) holding almost everywhere, before "equal on an interval" can be turned into "Ck=0C_k = 0Ck​=0 on the interval".

Formalization scope

  • Process by closed forms. No differential equations are formalized. With Φi(t)=∫0tφi\Phi_i(t) = \int_0^t \varphi_iΦi​(t)=∫0t​φi​, the definitions are x=x0e−r1Φ1−r3Φ3x = x_0 e^{-r_1\Phi_1 - r_3\Phi_3}x=x0​e−r1​Φ1​−r3​Φ3​, y=y0e−r2Φ2−r4Φ3y = y_0 e^{-r_2\Phi_2 - r_4\Phi_3}y=y0​e−r2​Φ2​−r4​Φ3​, p=e−∑iqiΦip = e^{-\sum_i q_i\Phi_i}p=e−∑i​qi​Φi​, f(T)=∫0Tf′f(T) = \int_0^T f'f(T)=∫0T​f′. These are the unique absolutely continuous solutions of (7.2) and (12.1). The two-choice process is the three-choice one with φ3=0\varphi_3 = 0φ3​=0.
  • Controls are open-loop and measurable, with φi≥0\varphi_i \ge 0φi​≥0 and ∑iφi=1\sum_i \varphi_i = 1∑i​φi​=1. Decisions are indexed 0, 1, 2 for A,B,CA, B, CA,B,C.
  • f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) is a lower Lebesgue integral with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. It has no junk value, and optimality is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Theorem 1's feedback rule is encoded as a predicate on open-loop controls: the rule holds along the control's own trajectory for almost every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0. The goal also asserts that such a control exists, which rules out the trivializing reading in which no control satisfies the rule and the optimality claim is vacuous.
  • Horizon of Lemmas 1–5. § 12 considers only T=∞T = \inftyT=∞, but the variation (12.4) and the switching functions (12.5) are written for a general TTT. Each lemma is formalized for both: every finite horizon TTT, with KiK_iKi​ built from that horizon, and T=∞T = \inftyT=∞, with KiK_iKi​ given by (12.5) at T=∞T = \inftyT=∞ (boundary term 000).
  • Implicit ranges. All rates q1,q2,q3,r1,…,r4q_1, q_2, q_3, r_1, \dots, r_4q1​,q2​,q3​,r1​,…,r4​ are taken positive, and x0,y0≥0x_0, y_0 \ge 0x0​,y0​≥0. Lemmas 4–5 and "Theorem 8" take x0,y0>0x_0, y_0 > 0x0​,y0​>0, the open quadrant the book analyses. Lemma 4 carries the book's assumption that C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 and C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 lie in the positive quadrant (q1r3<q3r1q_1 r_3 < q_3 r_1q1​r3​<q3​r1​, q2r4<q3r2q_2 r_4 < q_3 r_2q2​r4​<q3​r2​). "Theorem 8" carries the standing assumption r3>r4r_3 > r_4r3​>r4​ of § 15.
  • Misprint corrected. The value of the pure CCC-policy in the proof of Lemma 6 (§ 15, Eq. (1), p. 237) is printed r3x0/(q2+r3)+r4y0/(q3+r4)r_3 x_0/(q_2 + r_3) + r_4 y_0/(q_3 + r_4)r3​x0​/(q2​+r3​)+r4​y0​/(q3​+r4​). The first denominator must be q3+r3q_3 + r_3q3​+r3​: for x0=1x_0 = 1x0​=1, y0=0y_0 = 0y0​=0, q2=1q_2 = 1q2​=1, q3=2q_3 = 2q3​=2, r3=1r_3 = 1r3​=1 the process yields 1/31/31/3, not 1/21/21/2. The corrected identity is stated.
  • Numbering. The third theorem of the chapter is printed "Theorem 8" and is cited that way.
  • Left out. Theorem 2 (D>0D > 0D>0) specifies its solution only through Fig. 7 and an unspecified line LLL. Lemmas 6–8, 11 and the two Lemmas 12 describe regions of figures. The finite-horizon analysis of § 11 has no numbered result, and neither does the nonlinear utility of § 18.

Useful infrastructure: the derivative formulas (13.1) for the KiK_iKi​, a first-variation lemma for f(T)f(T)f(T) under bounded perturbations of a measurable control, and a comparison principle for deteriorating projects. The last is reusable for other continuous-time index policies. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010. Chapter VIII, pp. 222–244. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • L. S. Pontryagin, V. G. Boltyanskii, R. V. Gamkrelidze, E. F. Mishchenko, The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes, Interscience, 1962.
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming V: Optimality of a Constant Stock Level for the Optimal Inventory EquationTextbook

Motivation

The optimal inventory problem asks how much of an item to stock when demand is random, ordering costs money, and running short costs more. Arrow, Harris and Marschak formulated it as a sequential decision problem in 1951 (Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19), and Dvoretzky, Kiefer and Wolfowitz studied its structure in 1952–53. Chapter V of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (1957) treats the problem through a single functional equation for the minimal expected discounted cost. It shows that when ordering and shortage costs are proportional to quantity, the optimal policy is described by one number, a constant stock level xˉ\bar xxˉ, computed from the demand distribution alone.

This result is an early form of the base-stock (order-up-to) policy. Base-stock policies are the standard structure in periodic-review inventory theory: Karlin (1958), Scarf's (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) theorem (1960) and Veinott (1965) extend it. Chapter V is also a worked example of a point the book makes throughout: the method of successive approximations determines the shape of an optimal policy, and not only its existence.

Setting

A single item is stocked over an unbounded sequence of periods. At the start of a period the stock is x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The decision maker orders up to a level y≥xy \ge xy≥x, at cost k(y−x)k(y-x)k(y−x) with k>0k > 0k>0. A demand s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 then arrives, with probability density φ\varphiφ: φ(s)>0\varphi(s) > 0φ(s)>0 for s>0s > 0s>0, ∫0∞φ(s) ds=1\int_0^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds = 1∫0∞​φ(s)ds=1, and ∫0∞s φ(s) ds<∞\int_0^\infty s\,\varphi(s)\,ds < \infty∫0∞​sφ(s)ds<∞. If s≤ys \le ys≤y, the next period starts with stock y−sy - sy−s. If s>ys > ys>y, the excess s−ys - ys−y is bought at the penalty rate p>0p > 0p>0 and the next period starts with stock 000. Costs one period ahead are multiplied by a discount factor 0<a<10 < a < 10<a<1.

Write f(x)f(x)f(x) for the minimal expected discounted cost from stock xxx. Enumerating the cases gives Bellman's equation (5.1):

f(x)=min⁡y≥xT(y,x,f),f(x) = \min_{y \ge x} T(y,x,f),f(x)=y≥xmin​T(y,x,f), T(y,x,f)=k(y−x)+a[∫y∞p(s−y)φ(s) ds+f(0)∫y∞φ(s) ds+∫0yf(y−s)φ(s) ds].T(y,x,f) = k(y-x) + a\Big[\int_y^\infty p(s-y)\varphi(s)\,ds + f(0)\int_y^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds + \int_0^y f(y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds\Big].T(y,x,f)=k(y−x)+a[∫y∞​p(s−y)φ(s)ds+f(0)∫y∞​φ(s)ds+∫0y​f(y−s)φ(s)ds].

A policy assigns an order-up-to level y(x)≥xy(x) \ge xy(x)≥x to each stock xxx. It is optimal when y(x)y(x)y(x) attains the minimum. The mission takes the equation itself as the model; no stochastic process is built.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter V, Theorem 1 (with (4b) corrected)

The equation has exactly one solution fff among measurable functions bounded on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). If ap>kap > kap>k, the equation

k=ap∫xˉ∞φ(s) ds+ak∫0xˉφ(s) dsk = ap\int_{\bar x}^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds + ak\int_0^{\bar x}\varphi(s)\,dsk=ap∫xˉ∞​φ(s)ds+ak∫0xˉ​φ(s)ds

has exactly one root xˉ≥0\bar x \ge 0xˉ≥0, and for every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 the minimum is attained at

y(x)=max⁡(x,xˉ).y(x) = \max(x, \bar x).y(x)=max(x,xˉ).

If ap≤kap \le kap≤k, the minimum is attained at y(x)=xy(x) = xy(x)=x: never order.

Milestones

  1. Chapter IV, Theorem 6 (proportional costs): existence and uniqueness of a solution bounded on every finite interval, its continuity, and convergence of fn+1(x)=min⁡y≥xT(y,x,fn)f_{n+1}(x) = \min_{y\ge x} T(y,x,f_n)fn+1​(x)=miny≥x​T(y,x,fn​) from any non-negative continuous f0f_0f0​.
  2. Eq. (5.8): xˉ\bar xxˉ is the unique root of ∫0yφ(s) ds=(ap−k)/a(p−k)\int_0^{y}\varphi(s)\,ds = (ap-k)/a(p-k)∫0y​φ(s)ds=(ap−k)/a(p−k).
  3. Appendix, Theorem 9: the renewal equation u(x)=f(x)+∫0xu(x−s)φ(s) dsu(x) = f(x) + \int_0^x u(x-s)\varphi(s)\,dsu(x)=f(x)+∫0x​u(x−s)φ(s)ds with ∫0∞∣φ∣<1\int_0^\infty|\varphi| < 1∫0∞​∣φ∣<1 has a unique locally bounded solution. The solution is the limit of successive approximations, satisfies a derivative identity, and is non-negative when f,φ≥0f, \varphi \ge 0f,φ≥0.
  4. Theorem 3: in the undiscounted nnn-stage process with p>kp > kp>k, the optimal policy at each horizon is a constant stock level xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​, and xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​ increases with nnn.
  5. Theorem 4: with a fixed stock-out charge qqq added to the penalty, the constant-stock-level policy is still optimal when the last minimum of
ψ(y)=ky+a[∫y∞[p(s−y)+q]φ(s) ds−k∫0y(y−s)φ(s) ds]\psi(y) = ky + a\Big[\int_y^\infty [p(s-y)+q]\varphi(s)\,ds - k\int_0^y (y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds\Big]ψ(y)=ky+a[∫y∞​[p(s−y)+q]φ(s)ds−k∫0y​(y−s)φ(s)ds]

is its absolute minimum.

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-horizon stochastic control problem to a scalar equation. Rewriting it as ∫0xˉφ=(ap−k)/a(p−k)\int_0^{\bar x}\varphi = (ap-k)/a(p-k)∫0xˉ​φ=(ap−k)/a(p−k) gives the critical-fractile form familiar from the newsvendor problem, with the discount factor entering the fractile. The level depends on the demand law only through its distribution function, and the policy does not depend on the current stock except through max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ). This is what makes the policy implementable and its parameters estimable from data, the point Bellman makes in § 1. Theorem 3 shows the same structure over a finite horizon, with levels that rise as more periods remain. Theorem 4 marks where the structure starts to depend on the demand density.

As far as a search of the platform shows (queries recorded in the mission files), none of these results has a machine-checked proof. Base-stock theorems on the platform, Veinott's multi-product theorem and Gallego–Özer's advance-demand model, use discrete periods, different excess-demand conventions and different state spaces. They do not cover a continuous-demand, lost-sales-at-penalty, discounted functional equation. Formalizing Chapter V would produce an explicit solution of a nonlinear integral equation of renewal type, a uniqueness theorem for that equation, and a Lean treatment of the renewal equation that other applied-probability missions can reuse.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the obvious argument. First, the minimization is over the unbounded set y≥xy \ge xy≥x, and the unknown fff enters through a convolution with φ\varphiφ. The operator f↦min⁡y≥xT(y,x,f)f \mapsto \min_{y\ge x}T(y,x,f)f↦miny≥x​T(y,x,f) is a contraction on bounded functions, which settles uniqueness in the bounded class. Uniqueness among functions bounded only on finite intervals (Chapter IV's class) is not a contraction statement, because the minimization reaches arbitrarily far to the right. Second, optimality of max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ) for x>xˉx > \bar xx>xˉ requires f(y)+kyf(y) + kyf(y)+ky to be nondecreasing on [xˉ,∞)[\bar x,\infty)[xˉ,∞). There fff is defined only implicitly, as the solution of a renewal-type equation, and this monotonicity is a positivity statement about that solution, not a consequence of the first-order condition. Checking that the first-order condition holds at xˉ\bar xxˉ is not enough, and neither is checking that the candidate function satisfies the equation at the single level xˉ\bar xxˉ.

Formalization scope

Functions are ℝ → ℝ; only their values on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) enter. Integrals over (y,∞)(y,\infty)(y,∞) are Lebesgue integrals and ∫0y\int_0^y∫0y​ are interval integrals. The equation is stated with an infimum (IsGLB), as Chapter IV writes it, and every policy statement asserts that the minimum is attained (IsLeast) at the stated level. Uniqueness is asserted on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Set.EqOn … (Set.Ici 0)). Solution classes require measurability. This is the standing convention that makes ∫0yf(y−s)φ(s) ds\int_0^y f(y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds∫0y​f(y−s)φ(s)ds meaningful; without it a non-measurable function would make the integral default to 000. "φ(s)>0\varphi(s) > 0φ(s)>0" is read as positivity on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

Conventions and corrections, each stated in the items:

  • Theorem 1, (4b) is printed "for x≥xˉx \ge \bar xx≥xˉ, y=xˉy = \bar xy=xˉ". Read literally, a stock x>xˉx > \bar xx>xˉ would be "ordered down" to xˉ<x\bar x < xxˉ<x, which violates y≥xy \ge xy≥x. The proof (p. 163, "the minimum occurs at y=xy = xy=x") and Theorem 4's (7) give y=xy = xy=x, which is what the goal states. The printed text reads: "(4) a. for 0 ≤ x ≤ x̄, y = x̄, b. for x ≥ x̄, y = x̄."
  • The goal's uniqueness class is "uniformly bounded functions over x≥0x \ge 0x≥0" (p. 164). Chapter IV, Theorem 6 is stated in its own larger class.
  • Theorem 4 gives no range for qqq; q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is assumed. Its phrase "the last minimum of ψ\psiψ is the absolute minimum" is read as: xˉ\bar xxˉ minimizes ψ\psiψ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and ψ\psiψ is nondecreasing on [xˉ,∞)[\bar x,\infty)[xˉ,∞). The bracket of (6), unbalanced in print, is closed at the end.
  • Theorem 3 assumes "p>kp > kp>k"; k>0k > 0k>0 and the density conditions of Theorem 1 are carried over.
  • Theorem 9's derivative clause assumes fff continuously differentiable, where the book says "differentiable". The derivative identity is asserted for x>0x > 0x>0.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out. The goal does not assume the stated policy is optimal, does not assume fff is given, and does not take xˉ\bar xxˉ as a hypothesis. It asserts the existence of the root, the existence and uniqueness of the solution, and attainment of the minimum at max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ) for every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

Theorems 2 (two items, joint density), 5 (one-period delivery lag) and 6 (strictly convex ordering cost) are not part of this mission. Theorem 2 is printed with a sign error in (6) and garbled marginals. Theorem 5 states no hypotheses. Theorem 6's (9b) contradicts itself at x=xˉx = \bar xx=xˉ. Welcome contributions include a Lean library for the renewal equation (existence by successive approximation, positivity, differentiation under the convolution), which Theorem 9 needs and which is independent of inventory theory, and the contraction estimate for min⁡y≥xT(y,x,⋅)\min_{y\ge x}T(y,x,\cdot)miny≥x​T(y,x,⋅) on bounded measurable functions.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter V and Chapter IV § 9. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg, O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906813
  • A. Dvoretzky, J. Kiefer, J. Wolfowitz, The inventory problem: I. Case of known distributions of demand, Econometrica 20(2), 1952, 187–222. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907847
  • A. F. Veinott, Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions VI: Almost-Sure Convergence of the Stochastic Subgradient MethodTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems in operations research are posed on an expectation: a two-stage or multistage stochastic program minimizes f(x)=E F(x,ξ)f(x) = E\,F(x,\xi)f(x)=EF(x,ξ), where F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ) is convex but nonsmooth and the expectation cannot be computed exactly. What can be computed is a stochastic subgradient, a random vector whose mean is a subgradient of fff. The stochastic subgradient method replaces the exact subgradient in the classical method by such a random vector. It was introduced by Yu. M. Ermoliev and N. Z. Shor in 1968 and developed by Ermoliev, Nurminski and others into a standard tool of stochastic programming; the same scheme, under the name stochastic (sub)gradient descent, underlies most of large-scale machine learning.

This mission formalizes Section 2.6 of N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions (Springer 1985): the almost-sure convergence theorem for the stochastic subgradient method (Theorem 2.19), together with two deterministic results of the same section on perturbed and restarted variants of the subgradient method (Theorems 2.18 and 2.20).

Timeline, as recorded in the book:

  • 1968, Ermoliev and Shor: the notion of a stochastic subgradient, introduced for a random search method for two-stage stochastic programs; the convergence theorem reproduced as Theorem 2.19.
  • 1972, Bazhenov: convergence of a subgradient method with restarts for almost differentiable (in general nonconvex) functions, Theorem 2.18.
  • 1976, Shepilov: stability of the subgradient method with respect to errors in the point where the subgradient is computed, Theorem 2.20.

Setting

EnE_nEn​ is nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x,y)(x,y). A vector ggg is a subgradient of f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R at x0x_0x0​ if f(x)−f(x0)≥(g,x−x0)f(x) - f(x_0) \ge (g, x - x_0)f(x)−f(x0​)≥(g,x−x0​) for all xxx; M∗M^*M∗ is the set of minimum points of fff.

Stochastic subgradient method. Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P) with a filtration (Fk)k≥0(\mathcal F_k)_{k \ge 0}(Fk​)k≥0​, a deterministic starting point x0x_0x0​, stepsize rules hk:En→Rh_k : E_n \to \mathbb{R}hk​:En​→R and random vectors gk:Ω→Eng_k : \Omega \to E_ngk​:Ω→En​. The iterates are

xk+1=xk−hk(xk) gk,k=0,1,…x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k(x_k)\, g_k, \qquad k = 0,1,\dotsxk+1​=xk​−hk​(xk​)gk​,k=0,1,…

In the book's notation gk=gω(xk)g_k = g_\omega(x_k)gk​=gω​(xk​): a random vector whose expectation, given the state at step kkk, is a subgradient of fff at xkx_kxk​. In the Lean development the iterates are stochIter h G x₀ k ω.

Perturbed subgradient method (Shepilov). Given a subgradient selection gfg_fgf​, points x~k\tilde x_kx~k​ with ∥x~k−xk∥≤δk\|\tilde x_k - x_k\| \le \delta_k∥x~k​−xk​∥≤δk​, and steps hk>0h_k > 0hk​>0: xk+1=xk−hk gf(x~k)/∥gf(x~k)∥x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k\, g_f(\tilde x_k)/\|g_f(\tilde x_k)\|xk+1​=xk​−hk​gf​(x~k​)/∥gf​(x~k​)∥.

Restarted method (Bazhenov). For a function fff that is almost differentiable (Lipschitz on bounded sets, differentiable almost everywhere, with gradient continuous where it exists) and a selection gf(x)g_f(x)gf​(x) of almost-gradients (limit points of gradients at nearby points of differentiability), with Sr={x:∥x−x∗∥≤r}S_r = \{x : \|x - x^*\| \le r\}Sr​={x:∥x−x∗∥≤r}: take the normalized step xˉk+1=xk−hk gf(xk)/∥gf(xk)∥\bar x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k\, g_f(x_k)/\|g_f(x_k)\|xˉk+1​=xk​−hk​gf​(xk​)/∥gf​(xk​)∥ and restart from x0x_0x0​ whenever xˉk+1\bar x_{k+1}xˉk+1​ leaves SrS_rSr​ (resetIter).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.19 (p. 46)

Let fff be convex with a unique minimum point x∗x^*x∗. Suppose E{gk∣Fk}E\{g_k \mid \mathcal F_k\}E{gk​∣Fk​} is a subgradient of fff at xkx_kxk​, E{∥gk∥2∣Fk}≤cE\{\|g_k\|^2 \mid \mathcal F_k\} \le cE{∥gk​∥2∣Fk​}≤c, and almost surely hk(xk)>0h_k(x_k) > 0hk​(xk​)>0, ∑khk(xk)=+∞\sum_k h_k(x_k) = +\infty∑k​hk​(xk​)=+∞, ∑khk2(xk)<∞\sum_k h_k^2(x_k) < \infty∑k​hk2​(xk​)<∞. Then

P(lim⁡k→∞∥xk−x∗∥=0)=1.P\Big(\lim_{k\to\infty} \|x_k - x^*\| = 0\Big) = 1 .P(k→∞lim​∥xk​−x∗∥=0)=1.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (2.42), the conditional one-step inequality
E{∥xk+1−x∗∥2∣Fk}≤∥xk−x∗∥2+c hk2(xk).E\{\|x_{k+1} - x^*\|^2 \mid \mathcal F_k\} \le \|x_k - x^*\|^2 + c\,h_k^2(x_k).E{∥xk+1​−x∗∥2∣Fk​}≤∥xk​−x∗∥2+chk2​(xk​).
  1. Proof of Theorem 2.19, pp. 46–47: with probability one ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 converges to a finite limit (no divergence condition on the steps).
  2. Theorem 2.20 (Shepilov): under δk→0\delta_k \to 0δk​→0, ∑hkδk<∞\sum h_k\delta_k < \infty∑hk​δk​<∞, ∑hk2<∞\sum h_k^2 < \infty∑hk2​<∞, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞, the perturbed method converges to a point of M∗M^*M∗.
  3. Theorem 2.18 (Bazhenov): if f(x∗)=min⁡Srff(x^*) = \min_{S_r} ff(x∗)=minSr​​f and inf⁡Sr∖Sε(gf(x),x−x∗)>0\inf_{S_r\setminus S_\varepsilon} (g_f(x), x - x^*) > 0infSr​∖Sε​​(gf​(x),x−x∗)>0 for every 0<ε<r0 < \varepsilon < r0<ε<r, the restarted method with hk→0h_k \to 0hk​→0, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞ converges to x∗x^*x∗ from any x0∈Srx_0 \in S_rx0​∈Sr​.

Significance

Theorem 2.19 is the basic justification of stochastic subgradient methods: without computing fff or any exact subgradient, the method reaches the minimizer with probability one, under stepsize conditions that are met by hk=1/(k+1)h_k = 1/(k+1)hk​=1/(k+1). It is the nonsmooth convex counterpart of the Robbins–Monro theorem and the prototype of the almost-sure convergence results for stochastic quasi-gradient methods used in stochastic programming. Theorem 2.20 shows that the deterministic method tolerates summable errors in the point where the subgradient is evaluated, which is what allows subgradients to be approximated by finite differences (Section 1.3). Theorem 2.18 extends the convergence of the normalized method to local minima of a class of nonconvex functions.

All four results are proved in the literature. To the best of the platform search (September 2026), none is machine-checked: the platform has almost-sure convergence theorems for smooth stochastic approximation under ODE-type hypotheses (Borkar–Meyn) and in-expectation bounds for stochastic gradient descent, neither of which covers this recursion. A formal proof of the goal would give a reusable almost-sure convergence argument for nonsmooth stochastic methods on top of Mathlib's martingale theory.

Difficulty

The deterministic proof of convergence of the subgradient method compares ∥xk+1−x∗∥2\|x_{k+1}-x^*\|^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2 with ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 along the whole trajectory. With random directions this comparison holds only in conditional expectation, and the term hk(gk−E{gk∣Fk},xk−x∗)h_k(g_k - E\{g_k\mid\mathcal F_k\}, x_k - x^*)hk​(gk​−E{gk​∣Fk​},xk​−x∗) is not controlled pathwise. Taking expectations of the one-step inequality and summing gives only bounds on E∥xk−x∗∥2E\|x_k - x^*\|^2E∥xk​−x∗∥2, which do not yield almost-sure convergence. Moreover the stepsize hk(xk)h_k(x_k)hk​(xk​) depends on the random iterate, so the conditions ∑hk2(xk)<∞\sum h_k^2(x_k) < \infty∑hk2​(xk​)<∞ and ∑hk(xk)=∞\sum h_k(x_k) = \infty∑hk​(xk​)=∞ hold only almost surely, not uniformly, and the iterates need not be square-integrable. Identifying the almost-sure limit as 000 requires using the uniqueness of the minimizer to bound (E{gk∣Fk},xk−x∗)(E\{g_k\mid\mathcal F_k\}, x_k - x^*)(E{gk​∣Fk​},xk​−x∗) away from zero outside a neighbourhood of x∗x^*x∗.

In Theorems 2.18 and 2.20 the difficulty is that the distance to x∗x^*x∗ is not monotone: steps taken near the solution, or with a perturbed subgradient, can increase it, and a restart can move the iterate far away.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); fff is real-valued (finite everywhere); convexity is ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ f; uniqueness of x∗x^*x∗ is a separate hypothesis.
  • Probabilistic model. The book assumes the distribution of gω(xk)g_\omega(x_k)gω​(xk​) is determined by xkx_kxk​ and independent of the past, and remarks this is inessential. The formalization uses a filtration: gkg_kgk​ is Fk+1\mathcal F_{k+1}Fk+1​-measurable, each hkh_khk​ is Borel measurable, x0x_0x0​ is deterministic, and the hypotheses are on conditional expectations given Fk\mathcal F_kFk​. This contains the book's model.
  • Condition (iii) is printed as E∥gω(xk)∥2≤cE\|g_\omega(x_k)\|^2 \le cE∥gω​(xk​)∥2≤c; the proof uses the conditional bound in (2.42), and the formalization assumes the conditional bound E{∥gk∥2∣Fk}≤cE\{\|g_k\|^2\mid\mathcal F_k\} \le cE{∥gk​∥2∣Fk​}≤c almost surely.
  • Every expectation carries an integrability hypothesis (gkg_kgk​ and ∥gk∥2\|g_k\|^2∥gk​∥2 integrable), so no conditional expectation defaults to Lean's junk value 000. The one-step milestone assumes ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 integrable and a bounded stepsize rule at that step, and concludes integrability of ∥xk+1−x∗∥2\|x_{k+1}-x^*\|^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2.
  • Conditions (i)–(ii) on the random stepsizes are required almost surely. "With probability one lim⁡∥xk−x∗∥=0\lim\|x_k - x^*\| = 0lim∥xk​−x∗∥=0" is ∀ᵐ ω ∂μ, Tendsto (fun k => ‖x k ω - x*‖) atTop (𝓝 0).
  • Division by zero. In Theorems 2.18 and 2.20 the normalized step is undefined when the subgradient vanishes; the formalization skips the step (the iterate is repeated) by an explicit branch, not through Lean's convention x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0. When the subgradient never vanishes the sequences are exactly the book's.
  • The printed display (2.42) has xkx_kxk​ where xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​ is meant on its left-hand side; the corrected inequality is stated.
  • A trivializing formalization, for instance dropping the integrability hypotheses so that the conditional expectations vanish, or quantifying the stepsize conditions so that they cannot hold, is excluded by the hypotheses above; the hypotheses are satisfiable (deterministic subgradients of f(x)=∥x∥f(x) = \|x\|f(x)=∥x∥ with hk=1/(k+1)h_k = 1/(k+1)hk​=1/(k+1)).
  • Mathlib supplies conditional expectation (MeasureTheory.condExp), filtrations, and almost-sure convergence of L1L^1L1-bounded (sub/super)martingales; the supermartingale convergence theorem the book cites from Doob is used from Mathlib, not restated. A Robbins–Siegmund-type lemma for nonnegative almost-supermartingales would be the natural reusable contribution. The almost-differentiability and subgradient definitions duplicate drafts of other missions in this series.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, Section 2.6, pp. 44–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev and N. Z. Shor, A random search method for two-stage problems of stochastic programming and its generalization, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 1, 90–92, 1968.
  • L. G. Bazhenov, On the conditions for convergence of methods for minimizing almost differentiable functions, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 4, 71–72, 1972.
  • M. A. Shepilov, On a method of generalized gradient for finding the absolute minimum of a convex function, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 4, 52–57, 1976.
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev, Methods of Stochastic Programming, Nauka, Moscow, 1976.
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications, in Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press, 1971, pp. 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • J. L. Doob, Stochastic Processes, Wiley, New York, 1953 (supermartingale convergence theorem).
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems VII: The (BOR) Assumptions and Positive Recurrence of Optimal PoliciesTextbook

Motivation

Queueing control problems (admission control, routing, service rate selection) are naturally modelled as Markov decision chains with a countably infinite state space and unbounded costs, for instance a holding cost that grows with the queue length. For such models the long-run average cost criterion is often the relevant one, and the central question is whether an optimal stationary policy exists and can be computed from an average cost optimality equation (ACOE). Chapter 7 of Linn I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems (Wiley, 1999, doi:10.1002/9780470317037) develops a verifiable set of conditions, the (SEN) assumptions, under which an average cost optimality inequality (ACOI) holds and yields an optimal stationary policy. The inequality may be strict (Example 7.3.1), and an optimal policy may induce a Markov chain without positive recurrent states.

Sections 7.4 and 7.5 answer two practical questions: when is the ACOI in fact an equation, and how can (SEN) be checked in a concrete model? The answer culminates in the (BOR) assumptions, which require only one well-behaved stationary policy and the finiteness of a set of low-cost states.

According to the book's bibliographic notes (p. 163): the (BOR) assumptions modify a line of development due to Borkar (SIAM J. Control Optim. 22, 1984, and 27, 1989; monograph 1991) and are weaker than his original conditions; the proof that (BOR) implies (SEN) is from Cavazos-Cadena and Sennott (Oper. Res. Letters 11, 1992), and the version of (BOR) used here is from Sennott (Prob. Eng. Inform. Sci. 7, 1993). Proposition 7.5.5 and the (CAV*) assumptions go back to Cavazos-Cadena (Kybernetika 25, 1989); Proposition 7.5.3 and Corollary 7.5.4 to Sennott (Oper. Res. 37, 1989).

Setting

A Markov decision chain consists of a countable state space SSS, finite nonempty action sets AiA_iAi​, nonnegative finite costs C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a) and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a). A policy θ\thetaθ may use the whole history and randomize. For α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) the discount value function is Vα(i)=inf⁡θVθ,α(i)V_\alpha(i)=\inf_\theta V_{\theta,\alpha}(i)Vα​(i)=infθ​Vθ,α​(i), the infimum of ∑tαtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]\sum_t\alpha^tE_\theta[C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i]∑t​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i]; the average cost of θ\thetaθ is Jθ(i)=lim sup⁡n1nEθ[∑t<nC(Xt,At)∣X0=i]J_\theta(i)=\limsup_n\frac1nE_\theta[\sum_{t<n}C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i]Jθ​(i)=limsupn​n1​Eθ​[∑t<n​C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i] and the minimum average cost is J(i)=inf⁡θJθ(i)J(i)=\inf_\theta J_\theta(i)J(i)=infθ​Jθ​(i). All of these lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

For a distinguished state zzz the relative value is hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i)=V_\alpha(i)-V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z). The (SEN) assumptions are: (SEN1) (1−α)Vα(z)(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(z)(1−α)Vα​(z) is bounded on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); (SEN2) hα≤Mh_\alpha\le Mhα​≤M for a finite function M≥0M\ge0M≥0; (SEN3) hα≥−Lh_\alpha\ge-Lhα​≥−L for a finite constant L≥0L\ge0L≥0. Under (SEN), J=lim⁡α→1−(1−α)Vα(i)J=\lim_{\alpha\to1^-}(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(i)J=limα→1−​(1−α)Vα​(i) is a finite constant, and a limit function hhh is a pointwise limit of hβnh_{\beta_n}hβn​​ along some βn→1−\beta_n\to1^-βn​→1−. The ACOI and ACOE read

J+h(i) ≥ (resp. =) min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a)h(j)},i∈S.J+h(i)\ \ge\ (\text{resp. }=)\ \min_{a\in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a)+\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h(j)\Big\},\qquad i\in S.J+h(i) ≥ (resp. =) a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+j∑​Pij​(a)h(j)},i∈S.

For a nonempty set GGG the first passage time is T=min⁡{n≥1:Xn∈G}T=\min\{n\ge1:X_n\in G\}T=min{n≥1:Xn​∈G}. The class ℜ(i,G)\Re(i,G)ℜ(i,G) consists of the policies that, from iii, enter GGG with probability one in finite expected time miG(θ)m_{iG}(\theta)miG​(θ); ℜ∗(i,G)\Re^*(i,G)ℜ∗(i,G) adds a finite expected first passage cost ciG(θ)=Eθ[∑t<TC(Xt,At)]c_{iG}(\theta)=E_\theta[\sum_{t<T}C(X_t,A_t)]ciG​(θ)=Eθ​[∑t<T​C(Xt​,At​)]. A (randomized) stationary policy ddd is zzz standard if the Markov chain it induces has miz<∞m_{iz}<\inftymiz​<∞ and ciz<∞c_{iz}<\inftyciz​<∞ for every iii; it then has a single positive recurrent class Rd∋zR_d\ni zRd​∋z and a finite constant average cost JdJ_dJd​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.5.6

Assume (BOR): (BOR1) a zzz standard policy ddd exists; (BOR2) for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 the set D={i:C(i,a)≤Jd+ε for some a}D=\{i: C(i,a)\le J_d+\varepsilon\text{ for some }a\}D={i:C(i,a)≤Jd​+ε for some a} is finite; (BOR3) every i∈D−Rdi\in D-R_di∈D−Rd​ can be reached from zzz by some θi∈ℜ∗(z,i)\theta_i\in\Re^*(z,i)θi​∈ℜ∗(z,i). Then (SEN) holds and every limit function satisfies the ACOE; every average cost optimal stationary policy eee has a positive recurrent state in

D(e)={i:C(i,e)≤J+ε},D(e)=\{i: C(i,e)\le J+\varepsilon\},D(e)={i:C(i,e)≤J+ε},

at most ∣D(e)∣|D(e)|∣D(e)∣ positive recurrent classes and no null recurrent class; and a policy realizing the minimum in the ACOE satisfies e∈ℜ∗(i,D(e)∩R(e))e\in\Re^*(i,D(e)\cap R(e))e∈ℜ∗(i,D(e)∩R(e)) for every iii.

Milestones

  • Lemma 7.4.1: hα(i)≤ciz(θi)h_\alpha(i)\le c_{iz}(\theta_i)hα​(i)≤ciz​(θi​) for θi∈ℜ∗(i,z)\theta_i\in\Re^*(i,z)θi​∈ℜ∗(i,z), hence (SEN2).
  • Lemma 7.4.2: h(i)≤ciG(θ)−JmiG(θ)+Eθ[h(XT)]h(i)\le c_{iG}(\theta)-Jm_{iG}(\theta)+E_\theta[h(X_T)]h(i)≤ciG​(θ)−JmiG​(θ)+Eθ​[h(XT​)] for θ∈ℜ(i,G)\theta\in\Re(i,G)θ∈ℜ(i,G) under an integrability condition.
  • Theorem 7.4.3: four sufficient conditions for equality in the ACOI at a state.
  • Lemma 7.5.2: Jd=(1−α)∑i∈Rπi(d)Vd,α(i)J_d=(1-\alpha)\sum_{i\in R}\pi_i(d)V_{d,\alpha}(i)Jd​=(1−α)∑i∈R​πi​(d)Vd,α​(i) for a zzz standard ddd.
  • Proposition 7.5.3: a zzz standard policy gives (SEN1–2).
  • Corollary 7.5.4: on S={0,1,… }S=\{0,1,\dots\}S={0,1,…}, increasing VαV_\alphaVα​ plus a 000 standard policy gives (SEN), with nonnegative increasing limit functions.
  • Proposition 7.5.5: an optimal stationary policy has a positive recurrent state of cost at most J+εJ+\varepsilonJ+ε, reachable from iii, when (7.33) holds.
  • Corollaries 7.5.9 and 7.5.10: the (CAV) and (CAV*) conditions imply (BOR).

Significance

Theorem 7.5.6 reduces the verification of the ACOE for a queueing model to three checks that do not involve the discount value function: exhibit one stationary policy with finite mean return times and costs to a fixed state (typically a stable "serve at maximal rate" policy), check that low costs occur on a finite set (automatic when the holding cost grows without bound, Corollaries 7.5.9–7.5.10), and check reachability of finitely many states. Its conclusions go beyond existence: optimal stationary policies induce chains with positive recurrent classes located in a known finite set, and ACOE-realizing policies reach them in finite expected time and cost. This is what makes value iteration and approximating-sequence methods in later chapters of the book applicable to these models.

The results are proved in the book. The present mission produces machine-checked statements of the first passage calculus for general (history-dependent, randomized) policies, of (SEN) and limit functions, and of the chain of implications from (CAV*) to the ACOE. No machine-checked version of these statements is known.

Difficulty

The obvious approach to the ACOE is to pass to the limit α→1−\alpha\to1^-α→1− in the discount optimality equation. Exchanging this limit with ∑jPij(a)hα(j)\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h_\alpha(j)∑j​Pij​(a)hα​(j) requires a dominating function, and (SEN2) only gives a pointwise bound MMM whose expectation may be infinite; Fatou's lemma then yields only the inequality. Obtaining equality requires tracking first passages to sets and showing that the discrepancy Φ\PhiΦ vanishes along them, which in turn needs finiteness of ciGc_{iG}ciG​ that is not assumed but has to be derived. On the recurrence side, the average cost criterion is a limit superior of Cesàro averages over a countable state space, and mass can escape to infinity; the finiteness of the set DDD is what prevents an optimal policy from spending its time in transient or null recurrent states, and turning that into positive recurrence requires the renewal-type identities of Appendix C.

Formalization scope

States form a countable type SSS; action sets are nonempty Finsets; costs are in ℝ≥0; transition probabilities are ℝ≥0∞-valued with row sums one on admissible actions. Policies are general: a history is a state sequence and an action sequence, and all probabilities and expectations (hitting probabilities, miGm_{iG}miG​, ciGc_{iG}ciG​, Pθ(XT=j)P_\theta(X_T=j)Pθ​(XT​=j), Qij(n)Q^{(n)}_{ij}Qij(n)​) are computed from the history probabilities of the process. VαV_\alphaVα​, JθJ_\thetaJθ​, miGm_{iG}miG​ and ciGc_{iG}ciG​ take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; miG=∞m_{iG}=\inftymiG​=∞ when GGG is missed with positive probability; the first passage time satisfies T≥1T\ge1T≥1. hαh_\alphahα​ and ∑jPij(a)h(j)\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h(j)∑j​Pij​(a)h(j) are in the extended reals, with the book's convention that a function bounded below has an expectation in (−∞,+∞](-\infty,+\infty](−∞,+∞]. Limit functions are real valued. Positive recurrence, communicating classes and steady state probabilities πj=(mjj)−1\pi_j=(m_{jj})^{-1}πj​=(mjj​)−1 are the notions for the chain induced by a (randomized) stationary policy. JdJ_dJd​ is the average cost of ddd from zzz.

A formalization in which the ACOE is asserted for some convenient function instead of every limit function, or in which ∣D(e)∣|D(e)|∣D(e)∣ is a natural-number cardinality that vanishes on infinite sets, would trivialize part of the goal; the statements quantify over all limit functions and use Set.encard.

A complete development needs: history-dependent policies and their path laws on countable spaces; first passage decompositions (strong Markov property at TTT); Abelian limits of ∑tαtP(T=t)\sum_t\alpha^tP(T=t)∑t​αtP(T=t); Fatou and dominated convergence for series; and the renewal reward theorem for positive recurrent classes (Appendix C of the book). The first passage and Markov chain layer is reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, and sharper statements of the Appendix C facts they use, are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, 1999. doi:10.1002/9780470317037
  • V. S. Borkar, "On minimum cost per unit time control of Markov chains", SIAM J. Control Optim. 22 (1984), 965–978.
  • V. S. Borkar, "Control of Markov chains with long-run average cost criterion: the dynamic programming equations", SIAM J. Control Optim. 27 (1989), 642–657.
  • V. S. Borkar, Topics in Controlled Markov Chains, Pitman Research Notes in Mathematics 240, Longman, 1991.
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena, "Weak conditions for the existence of optimal stationary policies in average Markov decision chains with unbounded costs", Kybernetika 25 (1989), 145–156.
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena and L. I. Sennott, "Comparing recent assumptions for the existence of average optimal stationary policies", Oper. Res. Letters 11 (1992), 33–37.
  • L. I. Sennott, "The average cost optimality equation and critical number policies", Prob. Eng. Inform. Sci. 7 (1993).
  • L. I. Sennott, "Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs", Operations Research 37 (1989), 626–633. doi:10.1287/opre.37.4.626
  • K. L. Chung, Markov Chains with Stationary Transition Probabilities, 2nd ed., Springer, 1967.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems VI: The (SEN) Assumptions and the Average Cost Optimality InequalityTextbook

Motivation

Queueing control problems (admission control, routing, service-rate selection, flow control) are naturally posed as Markov decision chains with a denumerably infinite state space, such as the number of customers in a buffer, and are usually judged by their long-run average cost per unit time. When the state space is finite, Chapter 6 of Sennott's book shows that an average cost optimal stationary policy always exists. On a countable state space this fails: Section 7.1 of the book gives examples in which no average cost optimal policy exists, and one in which no stationary policy comes within a given distance of the minimum average cost. The question addressed by this mission is under which verifiable conditions on the discounted value functions a countable-state model has a constant minimum average cost and an optimal stationary policy.

Timeline, following the book's bibliographic notes (p. 163). The book names Taylor (1965) and Derman (1966) as earlier pivotal work and Ross (1968), and his 1983 textbook, as the direct predecessor. Sennott (1989, Operations Research 37) weakened Ross's assumptions to cover models with unbounded costs, and proved the main result of Section 7.2; the (SEN) assumptions of Chapter 7 are the cleaner version of Sennott (1993). Cavazos-Cadena (1991) gave the example, adapted as Example 7.3.1 of the book, showing that under these assumptions the optimality inequality can be strict. The weaker (H*) assumptions of Section 7.7 appear, in a slightly different form, in Sennott (1995). Part (iv) of Theorem 7.2.3 is new in the book.

Setting

A Markov decision chain (MDC) Δ\DeltaΔ has a countable state space SSS, for each state iii a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​, a nonnegative finite cost C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a), and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) with ∑jPij(a)=1\sum_j P_{ij}(a) = 1∑j​Pij​(a)=1. A policy θ\thetaθ chooses the action at time nnn at random according to a distribution that may depend on the whole history (X0,A0,…,Xn)(X_0, A_0, \dots, X_n)(X0​,A0​,…,Xn​); a stationary policy fff always chooses f(i)∈Aif(i) \in A_if(i)∈Ai​ in state iii.

For an initial state iii, the nnn-horizon cost is vθ,n(i)=∑t=0n−1Eθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]v_{\theta,n}(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{n-1} E_\theta[C(X_t,A_t) \mid X_0 = i]vθ,n​(i)=∑t=0n−1​Eθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i], the average cost is Jθ(i)=lim sup⁡nvθ,n(i)/nJ_\theta(i) = \limsup_{n} v_{\theta,n}(i)/nJθ​(i)=limsupn​vθ,n​(i)/n, and the minimum average cost is J(i)=inf⁡θJθ(i)J(i) = \inf_\theta J_\theta(i)J(i)=infθ​Jθ​(i) over all policies. A policy is average cost optimal if Jθ≡JJ_\theta \equiv JJθ​≡J. For α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) the discounted value function is Vα(i)=inf⁡θ∑t≥0αtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]V_\alpha(i) = \inf_\theta \sum_{t \ge 0} \alpha^t E_\theta[C(X_t,A_t) \mid X_0 = i]Vα​(i)=infθ​∑t≥0​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i]. All these quantities lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

Fix a distinguished state zzz and put hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i) = V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z). The (SEN) assumptions are:

  • (SEN1) (1−α)Vα(z)(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(z)(1−α)Vα​(z) is bounded for α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1);
  • (SEN2) there is a nonnegative finite function MMM with hα(i)≤M(i)h_\alpha(i) \le M(i)hα​(i)≤M(i) for all iii and α\alphaα;
  • (SEN3) there is a nonnegative finite constant LLL with −L≤hα(i)-L \le h_\alpha(i)−L≤hα​(i) for all iii and α\alphaα.

A limit function hhh is a pointwise limit of hβnh_{\beta_n}hβn​​ along some sequence βn→1−\beta_n \to 1^-βn​→1−. If fαf_\alphafα​ is a stationary policy realizing the discount optimality equation Vα(i)=min⁡a{C(i,a)+α∑jPij(a)Vα(j)}V_\alpha(i) = \min_a \{C(i,a) + \alpha\sum_j P_{ij}(a)V_\alpha(j)\}Vα​(i)=mina​{C(i,a)+α∑j​Pij​(a)Vα​(j)}, a limit point fff is a stationary policy with fβn(i)=f(i)f_{\beta_n}(i) = f(i)fβn​​(i)=f(i) for large nnn, for each iii, along some βn→1−\beta_n \to 1^-βn​→1−.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.2.3

Under (SEN), there is a finite constant J=lim⁡α→1−(1−α)Vα(i)J = \lim_{\alpha\to1^-}(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(i)J=limα→1−​(1−α)Vα​(i) independent of iii; limit functions exist, satisfy −L≤h≤M-L \le h \le M−L≤h≤M and the average cost optimality inequality (ACOI)

J+h(i)≥min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a)h(j)},i∈S;J + h(i) \ge \min_{a \in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a) + \sum_j P_{ij}(a)h(j)\Big\}, \qquad i \in S;J+h(i)≥a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+j∑​Pij​(a)h(j)},i∈S;

every stationary policy realizing the minimum is average cost optimal with Je≡JJ_e \equiv JJe​≡J and Ee[h(Xn)]/n→0E_e[h(X_n)]/n \to 0Ee​[h(Xn​)]/n→0; every limit point of discount optimal stationary policies is average cost optimal and satisfies the corresponding inequality for an associated limit function; and the average cost of any optimal policy is a limit, not only a limit supremum.

Milestones

  • Proposition 7.1.1: finitely many initial transitions with finite cost do not change JθJ_\thetaJθ​.
  • Lemma 7.2.1: a bounded-below solution (J,h)(J,h)(J,h) of the ACOI inequality for a stationary eee gives Je≤JJ_e \le JJe​≤J.
  • Proposition B.6: a sequence of functions squeezed between −L-L−L and MMM on a countable set has a pointwise convergent subsequence.
  • Proposition 7.2.4: (SEN) does not depend on the choice of zzz.
  • Proposition 7.7.1: (SEN) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (H*) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (H).
  • Proposition 7.7.2: the conclusions of Theorem 7.2.3 hold under (H), with a state-dependent lower bound L(i)L(i)L(i).

Significance

Theorem 7.2.3 is the existence theorem the rest of Chapter 7 builds on (p. 128): the ACOE results of Section 7.4, the (BOR) and (CAV) sufficient conditions of Section 7.5, and the worked queueing models of Section 7.6 all work under (SEN) and invoke it. It justifies computing an average cost optimal policy for a queueing model as a limit of discount optimal policies, and it shows that the minimum average cost is the Abelian limit of the normalized discounted value.

The results are proved in the book and in Sennott (1989, 1993, 1995), but none of them has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has no Markov decision processes, and the platform's average cost results concern finite state spaces or Borel models with different assumptions. The formalization produces a general-policy, countable-state MDC development with extended-real values, reusable by the later missions of this series.

Difficulty

On a finite state space the relative value functions are bounded and the Abelian limit (1−α)Vα(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(1−α)Vα​ can be controlled directly. Here hαh_\alphahα​ is bounded above only by a function MMM that may be unbounded, so passing to the limit in the discounted optimality equation ∑jPij(a)hα(j)\sum_j P_{ij}(a)h_\alpha(j)∑j​Pij​(a)hα​(j) cannot use dominated convergence, and in general only an inequality survives in the limit; Example 7.3.1 shows that the inequality in the ACOI can be strict. Showing that a policy realizing the ACOI is optimal requires control of Ee[h(Xn)]/nE_e[h(X_n)]/nEe​[h(Xn​)]/n for a function hhh that is unbounded above, and part (iv) requires comparing the limit inferior and limit superior of Cesàro averages for an arbitrary, possibly history-dependent optimal policy.

Formalization scope

The state space is any countable type ([Countable S]); actions form a type with finite nonempty Finset action sets; costs are ℝ≥0; transition probabilities, costs over time and value functions are ℝ≥0∞. Policies are general: randomized and history dependent, with histories encoded as finite state and action sequences and the process law built by an explicit recursive product. Finite horizon costs have terminal cost 000, as the chapter prescribes.

The relative value hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i) = V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z) is computed in EReal, never through a truncated real subtraction: a state with Vα(i)=∞V_\alpha(i) = \inftyVα​(i)=∞ gives hα(i)=+∞h_\alpha(i) = +\inftyhα​(i)=+∞, so (SEN2) cannot hold through a junk value, and (SEN1) is a bound by a finite constant that itself forces Vα(z)<∞V_\alpha(z) < \inftyVα​(z)<∞. Sums ∑jPij(a)h(j)\sum_j P_{ij}(a)h(j)∑j​Pij​(a)h(j) and expectations E[h(Xn)]E[h(X_n)]E[h(Xn​)] of real functions are extended reals, computed as positive part minus negative part; they are never Bochner integrals and never default to 000 when not summable. The limit α→1−\alpha \to 1^-α→1− is the filter 𝓝[<] 1. Limit functions and limit points follow Definition 7.2.2 literally, over arbitrary sequences αn→1−\alpha_n \to 1^-αn​→1− in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and the (SEN), (H), (H*) sets are predicates carrying their witnesses MMM and LLL.

A development that bounds only hαh_\alphahα​ as a free function, rather than the one built from the infimum over all policies, or that quantifies only over stationary policies in J(i)J(i)J(i), proves a different and weaker theorem and does not count.

Needed infrastructure: the law of the controlled process under a general policy, monotone and Fatou-type limit interchanges for countable sums, the Abelian inequality lim sup⁡(1−α)∑αtct≤lim sup⁡1n∑t<nct\limsup(1-\alpha)\sum\alpha^t c_t \le \limsup \frac1n\sum_{t<n}c_tlimsup(1−α)∑αtct​≤limsupn1​∑t<n​ct​ (Proposition 6.1.1 of the book), and the existence and optimality of discount optimal stationary policies (Theorem 4.1.4). The MDC layer and these two results are shared with other missions of the series; contributions to them are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Chapter 7 (pp. 127–166) and Appendix B. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • L. I. Sennott, Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs, Operations Research 37 (1989) 626–633. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.4.626
  • L. I. Sennott, The average cost optimality equation and critical number policies, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences 7 (1993). (Cited in the book's bibliography, p. 321.)
  • L. I. Sennott, Another set of conditions for average optimality in Markov control processes, Systems & Control Letters 24 (1995) 147–151. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena, A counterexample on the optimality equation in Markov decision chains with the average cost criterion, Systems & Control Letters 16 (1991) 387–392. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • S. M. Ross, Non-discounted denumerable Markovian decision models, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 39 (1968) 412–423. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • H. M. Taylor, Markovian sequential replacement processes, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36 (1965) 1677–1694. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • E. A. Feinberg and Y. Liang, On the optimality equation for average cost Markov decision processes and its validity for inventory control; formalized on Prove2Me in the mission of the same name (Borel state spaces, a different model).
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems V: The Average Cost Optimality Equation and Value Iteration for Finite State SpacesTextbook

Motivation

Average cost Markov decision chains model systems that run indefinitely and are judged by their long-run cost per step: admission and routing control in queues, inventory replenishment, machine maintenance. For a finite state space the classical tool is the average cost optimality equation (ACOE)

J+h(i)=min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a) h(j)},J + h(i) = \min_{a \in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a) + \sum_j P_{ij}(a)\,h(j)\Big\},J+h(i)=a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+j∑​Pij​(a)h(j)},

whose solution gives both the minimum average cost JJJ and an optimal stationary policy. To be useful the equation has to be solved numerically, and the method used in practice is value iteration: compute the minimum nnn-horizon costs vnv_nvn​ and extract JJJ and hhh from their growth. This mission formalizes Sections 6.4–6.6 of L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems (Wiley, 1999, doi:10.1002/9780470317037): when the minimum average cost is constant, the ACOE holds, any solution of it is optimal, and value iteration converges, provided the optimal policies are aperiodic. When they are not, a transformation of the model makes them so.

Related classical work includes Blackwell's discrete dynamic programming (1962) and Schweitzer–Federgruen's analysis of undiscounted value iteration (1977); Sennott's treatment derives the ACOE from the discounted value function VαV_\alphaVα​ as α→1−\alpha \to 1^-α→1−, which is the route that extends to countable state spaces in later chapters of the book.

Setting

A Markov decision chain (MDC) Δ\DeltaΔ has a finite state space SSS; in each state iii a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​; nonnegative costs C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a); and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a). A policy θ\thetaθ may use the whole history and randomize; a stationary policy eee always chooses e(i)∈Aie(i) \in A_ie(i)∈Ai​ in state iii and induces a Markov chain with transitions Pij(e)=Pij(e(i))P_{ij}(e) = P_{ij}(e(i))Pij​(e)=Pij​(e(i)).

For a policy θ\thetaθ and initial state iii: vθ,n(i)v_{\theta,n}(i)vθ,n​(i) is the expected cost of the first nnn steps, Vθ,α(i)V_{\theta,\alpha}(i)Vθ,α​(i) the expected α\alphaα-discounted cost, and Jθ(i)=lim sup⁡nvθ,n(i)/nJ_\theta(i) = \limsup_n v_{\theta,n}(i)/nJθ​(i)=limsupn​vθ,n​(i)/n the average cost. The value functions are the infima over all policies: vnv_nvn​, VαV_\alphaVα​ and the minimum average cost J(i)J(i)J(i). A policy is average cost optimal if Jθ≡JJ_\theta \equiv JJθ​≡J.

Section 6.2 of the book provides a stationary policy fff that is α\alphaα discount optimal for all α\alphaα close to 111 (a Blackwell optimal policy), and Section 6.3 builds from it a relative value function w∗w^*w∗. For a distinguished state zzz put

hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z),h(i)=lim⁡α→1−hα(i),dn(i)=h(i)+nJ−vn(i).h_\alpha(i) = V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z), \qquad h(i) = \lim_{\alpha\to1^-} h_\alpha(i), \qquad d_n(i) = h(i) + nJ - v_n(i).hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z),h(i)=α→1−lim​hα​(i),dn​(i)=h(i)+nJ−vn​(i).

For a distinguished state xxx the finite horizon relative value function is rn(i)=vn(i)−vn(x)r_n(i) = v_n(i) - v_n(x)rn​(i)=vn​(i)−vn​(x).

A positive recurrent class RRR of a Markov chain is aperiodic if Pij(n)→πjP^{(n)}_{ij} \to \pi_jPij(n)​→πj​ for i,j∈Ri, j \in Ri,j∈R, where π\piπ is the steady state distribution. Assumption OPA ("optimal policies are aperiodic") requires every positive recurrent class of every average cost optimal stationary policy to be aperiodic. The aperiodicity transformation Δ∗\Delta^*Δ∗ with 0<τ<10<\tau<10<τ<1 keeps states and actions, scales costs by τ\tauτ, and sets Pij∗(a)=τPij(a)P^*_{ij}(a) = \tau P_{ij}(a)Pij∗​(a)=τPij​(a) for j≠ij \ne ij=i, Pii∗(a)=τPii(a)+(1−τ)P^*_{ii}(a) = \tau P_{ii}(a) + (1-\tau)Pii∗​(a)=τPii​(a)+(1−τ).

Formalization targets

Goal: convergence of value iteration (Proposition 6.6.3)

If J(i)≡JJ(i) \equiv JJ(i)≡J and Assumption OPA holds, then for any distinguished state xxx

lim⁡n→∞[vn(x)−vn−1(x)]=J,lim⁡n→∞rn(i)=:r(i) exists,\lim_{n\to\infty}[v_n(x) - v_{n-1}(x)] = J, \qquad \lim_{n\to\infty} r_n(i) =: r(i) \text{ exists},n→∞lim​[vn​(x)−vn−1​(x)]=J,n→∞lim​rn​(i)=:r(i) exists,

(J,r)(J, r)(J,r) solves the ACOE, and every limit point of the finite horizon optimal stationary policies is average cost optimal.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6.4.1: unichain structure, bounded ∣Vα(i)−Vα(z)∣|V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z)|∣Vα​(i)−Vα​(z)∣, or pairwise reachability imply J(i)≡JJ(i) \equiv JJ(i)≡J, with the implication diagram (6.26).
  2. Theorem 6.4.2: under J(i)≡JJ(i) \equiv JJ(i)≡J, hhh exists, solves the ACOE (6.31), yields optimal policies, ∣dn∣≤L|d_n| \le L∣dn​∣≤L and vn/n→Jv_n/n \to Jvn​/n→J.
  3. Proposition 6.5.1: any finite solution (F,r)(F, r)(F,r) of the ACOE (or of the inequality (6.36)) gives J≡FJ \equiv FJ≡F and optimal policies, and differs from hhh by constants on recurrent classes.
  4. Lemma 6.6.2: on an aperiodic positive recurrent class of an optimal policy, dnd_ndn​ converges to a constant.
  5. Lemma 6.6.5 and Proposition 6.6.6: Δ∗\Delta^*Δ∗ has the same recurrent classes and steady states, all of them aperiodic, costs scaled by τ\tauτ; value iteration on Δ∗\Delta^*Δ∗ produces a solution (J∗/τ,r∗)(J^*/\tau, r^*)(J∗/τ,r∗) of the ACOE of Δ\DeltaΔ.

Significance

The ACOE with constant JJJ is the standard certificate of optimality for finite average cost models, and Proposition 6.5.1 is what allows any numerical solution of it to be trusted. Proposition 6.6.3 is the correctness theorem of the value iteration algorithm (VIA 6.6.4 of the book), and Proposition 6.6.6 removes its one extra hypothesis at the price of a model transformation. Chapter 8 of the book runs this algorithm on a sequence of finite truncations to compute optimal policies for countable-state queueing models, so these results are the base of the book's computational method.

All results in this mission are proved in the book; none has a machine-checked proof. Existing formalizations on the platform treat average reward models under a unichain hypothesis with a single action set type; this mission assumes only a constant minimum average cost (multichain models allowed) and uses the general policy class throughout.

Difficulty

The ACOE itself is not the obstacle; convergence of vn(x)−vn−1(x)v_n(x) - v_{n-1}(x)vn​(x)−vn−1​(x) is. Theorem 6.4.2 bounds dnd_ndn​ but does not make it converge, and Example 6.6.1 of the book (a two-state periodic chain) shows that without aperiodicity vn(x)−vn−1(x)v_n(x) - v_{n-1}(x)vn​(x)−vn−1​(x) oscillates. The naive argument, passing to the limit in the finite horizon optimality equation, assumes the limits exist, which is exactly what is in question. Chain structure is the obstruction: a multichain optimal policy has several recurrent classes, and the Cesàro-type convergence that suffices for the ACOE itself is weaker than the pointwise convergence value iteration needs. The policy statement is also delicate, since the finite horizon minimizers fnf_nfn​ need not converge.

Formalization scope

  • The state type S is finite ([Fintype S]); actions are a type Act with per-state nonempty Finset action sets. Costs are in ℝ≥0, transition probabilities in ℝ≥0∞, and all value functions are defined in [0,∞] as infima over all history-dependent randomized policies, then converted to ℝ (they are finite for finite SSS).
  • JJJ constant is stated as J(i)=JJ(i) = JJ(i)=J for all iii, with J∈R≥0J \in \mathbb R_{\ge 0}J∈R≥0​. The relative value hhh is defined as the limit α→1−\alpha \to 1^-α→1− of hαh_\alphahα​, not taken as an arbitrary solution of the ACOE; Theorem 6.4.2(i) asserts the limit exists. The Blackwell optimal policy fff enters as a hypothesis: any stationary policy discount optimal on an interval (α0,1)(\alpha_0,1)(α0​,1).
  • min_a is Finset.inf' over AiA_iAi​. Limit points of policy sequences follow Definition B.1 (a subsequence agreeing eventually in every state). Finite horizon optimal policies fnf_nfn​ are any minimizers of vn(i)=min⁡a{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a)vn−1(j)}v_n(i) = \min_a\{C(i,a) + \sum_j P_{ij}(a) v_{n-1}(j)\}vn​(i)=mina​{C(i,a)+∑j​Pij​(a)vn−1​(j)}.
  • Aperiodicity of a class is the book's definition (Pij(n)→πjP^{(n)}_{ij} \to \pi_jPij(n)​→πj​ on the class), with πj=1/mjj\pi_j = 1/m_{jj}πj​=1/mjj​. Assumption OPA quantifies over average cost optimal stationary policies only, not over all stationary policies.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: hhh, rnr_nrn​, dnd_ndn​ and vnv_nvn​ are computed from the model, not free functions constrained by the ACOE, and the ACOE conclusions are equalities of real numbers with the minimum over the actual action sets.
  • The model, criteria and Markov chain definitions restate those of mission IV of this series in their own namespace; they are reusable for any finite average cost result. Contributions of general Markov chain facts (convergence of P(n)P^{(n)}P(n) on aperiodic classes, Cesàro limits 1n∑tP(t)\frac1n\sum_t P^{(t)}n1​∑t​P(t)) are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, Wiley, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33 (1962), 719–726. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • P. J. Schweitzer and A. Federgruen, The asymptotic behavior of undiscounted value iteration in Markov decision problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 2 (1977), 360–381. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.4.360
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
13 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VII: Palm's Theorem for Nonstationary DemandTextbook

Motivation

Spare-parts inventory models for repairable items rest on Palm's theorem: if demands arrive as a Poisson process with constant rate λ\lambdaλ and each demanded unit spends an independent, identically distributed resupply time with mean τˉ\bar\tauτˉ in the pipeline, the number of units in resupply is Poisson with mean λτˉ\lambda\bar\tauλτˉ in steady state. Stock levels, backorders and fill rates are all computed from that distribution.

Both assumptions fail in practice. Military flying programmes ramp up and down within weeks, repair shops close for periods, and commercial parts distribution centres see demand that varies by day of the week. Chapter 9 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) extends Palm's theorem to a nonstationary Poisson demand process with time-dependent resupply-time distributions, gives the compound (multi-unit order) version, and uses the result to compute, at any time ttt, the distribution of units in repair at the depot of a two-echelon system.

Timeline: Palm (1938) proved the stationary result for telephone traffic; Feeney and Sherbrooke (1966) extended it to compound Poisson demand; Hillestad and Carrillo (RAND, 1980) and Crawford (RAND, 1981) developed the time-dependent extensions, summarized by Carrillo (RAND, 1989). The chapter presents these results.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location, and every demand is for one unit.

  • Demand rate λ(s)≥0\lambda(s) \ge 0λ(s)≥0, integrable on bounded intervals, with mean function m(t)=∫0tλ(s) dsm(t) = \int_0^t \lambda(s)\,dsm(t)=∫0t​λ(s)ds.
  • Demand process: a nonstationary Poisson process with mean function mmm, with N(0)=0N(0) = 0N(0)=0. N(t)N(t)N(t) counts demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t] and T0<T1<⋯T_0 < T_1 < \cdotsT0​<T1​<⋯ are the demand epochs.
  • Resupply times: a unit demanded at time sss is resupplied within www time units with probability Gs(w)G_s(w)Gs​(w). Resupply times are nonnegative, have finite expectations, are independent from unit to unit, and are independent of the demand process.
  • X(t)X(t)X(t) is the number of units in resupply at time ttt: demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t] whose resupply is not complete at ttt.

The mean of X(t)X(t)X(t) is

α(t)=∫0t(1−Gs(t−s))λ(s) ds.\alpha(t) = \int_0^t \bigl(1 - G_s(t-s)\bigr)\lambda(s)\,ds.α(t)=∫0t​(1−Gs​(t−s))λ(s)ds.

In the compound version (Section 9.2), orders arrive as above and each order is for Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 units, with a time-stationary law uj=P(Q=j)u_j = P(Q = j)uj​=P(Q=j). All units of an order share its resupply time, Y(t)Y(t)Y(t) counts units demanded in [0,t][0,t][0,t], and uk(n)u^{(n)}_kuk(n)​ is the nnn-fold convolution of (uj)(u_j)(uj​).

In the two-echelon version (Section 9.3), base iii has failure rate λi\lambda_iλi​. A failure is repaired at the base with probability rir_iri​ and at the depot otherwise. Depot repair of a failure occurring at time uuu takes a deterministic time D(u)D(u)D(u) with D(t)+t≥D(s)+sD(t) + t \ge D(s) + sD(t)+t≥D(s)+s for s<ts < ts<t (no crossing). Write t~=inf⁡{u≥0:D(u)+u>t}\tilde t = \inf\{u \ge 0 : D(u) + u > t\}t~=inf{u≥0:D(u)+u>t}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 13 (p. 216)

For every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0,

P{X(t)=k}=e−α(t)α(t)kk!,k=0,1,2,…P\{X(t) = k\} = e^{-\alpha(t)}\frac{\alpha(t)^k}{k!}, \qquad k = 0,1,2,\dotsP{X(t)=k}=e−α(t)k!α(t)k​,k=0,1,2,…

This is an exact statement at each finite time, not a limit. With constant λ\lambdaλ and Gs=GG_s = GGs​=G it reduces to the finite-time step of Palm's theorem.

Milestones

  1. E[N(t)]=m(t)E[N(t)] = m(t)E[N(t)]=m(t) (Section 9.1, p. 216).
  2. Theorem 12 (p. 216): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the epochs T0,…,Tn−1T_0, \dots, T_{n-1}T0​,…,Tn−1​ are distributed as the order statistics of nnn i.i.d. variables with distribution function F(x)=m(x)/m(t)F(x) = m(x)/m(t)F(x)=m(x)/m(t) on [0,t)[0,t)[0,t).
  3. The binomial step of the proof of Theorem 13 (pp. 216–217): P{X(t)=k∣N(t)=n}=(nk)pk(1−p)n−kP\{X(t) = k \mid N(t) = n\} = \binom nk p^k(1-p)^{n-k}P{X(t)=k∣N(t)=n}=(kn​)pk(1−p)n−k, with p=∫0t(1−Gs(t−s))λ(s)/m(t) dsp = \int_0^t (1 - G_s(t-s))\lambda(s)/m(t)\,dsp=∫0t​(1−Gs​(t−s))λ(s)/m(t)ds.
  4. Section 9.2 (p. 218): E[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q]E[Y(t)] = m(t)E[Q]E[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q] and Var⁡[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q2]\operatorname{Var}[Y(t)] = m(t)E[Q^2]Var[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q2].
  5. Theorem 14 (p. 218): P[X(t)=k]=∑n≥1uk(n)e−α(t)α(t)n/n!P[X(t) = k] = \sum_{n\ge1} u^{(n)}_k e^{-\alpha(t)}\alpha(t)^n/n!P[X(t)=k]=∑n≥1​uk(n)​e−α(t)α(t)n/n! for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, and e−α(t)e^{-\alpha(t)}e−α(t) at k=0k = 0k=0.
  6. Section 9.3.2 (p. 221): P{X0(t)=k}=e−m0(t~,t)m0(t~,t)k/k!P\{X_0(t) = k\} = e^{-m_0(\tilde t,t)} m_0(\tilde t,t)^k/k!P{X0​(t)=k}=e−m0​(t~,t)m0​(t~,t)k/k! with m0(t~,t)=∫t~t∑iλi(u)(1−ri) dum_0(\tilde t,t) = \int_{\tilde t}^t \sum_i \lambda_i(u)(1-r_i)\,dum0​(t~,t)=∫t~t​∑i​λi​(u)(1−ri​)du.

A plain supporting item states that N(t)N(t)N(t) is Poisson with mean m(t)m(t)m(t), the factor the proof of Theorem 13 uses.

Significance

Theorem 13 gives the full distribution of the pipeline at every instant. Time-dependent expected backorders, ∑x>s(t)(x−s(t))P{X(t)=x}\sum_{x > s(t)} (x - s(t)) P\{X(t) = x\}∑x>s(t)​(x−s(t))P{X(t)=x}, and fill rates P{X(t)<s(t)}P\{X(t) < s(t)\}P{X(t)<s(t)} follow from it, so stock levels can be planned against a surge or a repair outage without a steady-state approximation. Theorem 14 does the same for multi-unit orders. The depot result feeds the base-level convolution of Section 9.3.3, which in turn gives time-dependent performance measures for a two-echelon system.

These results are proved in the literature, and the chapter reproduces the proofs of Theorems 13 and 14. It cites Theorem 12 without proof ("similar to the one given in Chapter 3"). No machine-checked version of any of them is known, and neither Mathlib nor this platform has a Poisson process, stationary or not, a thinning theorem, or an order-statistics theorem. The formal content of this mission therefore includes the construction and the first distributional facts of the nonstationary Poisson process.

Difficulty

The algebra of the proof is a Poisson mixture of binomials and is short. The difficulty is Theorem 12 and its use. The obvious argument treats "the nnn demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t]" as nnn independent draws from FFF and assigns each an independent resupply time with law GdrawG_{\text{draw}}Gdraw​. Making this rigorous requires identifying the conditional joint law of the epochs given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n. The resupply time of the jjj-th demand is not independent of its epoch: its law depends on the epoch. So it must be shown that, after conditioning, the marks attached to sorted epochs behave like marks attached to unsorted i.i.d. draws. The book's constant-rate argument (Chapter 3) uses the uniform density n!/tnn!/t^nn!/tn on the simplex. Here the density involves λ\lambdaλ, which may vanish on intervals, and mmm need not be invertible.

Formalization scope

  • Demand process. The nonstationary Poisson process is constructed, not postulated. With i.i.d. exponential(1) gaps and unit-rate points Γk=A0+⋯+Ak\Gamma_k = A_0 + \cdots + A_kΓk​=A0​+⋯+Ak​, the kkk-th demand occurs at Tk=inf⁡{s≥0:m(s)≥Γk}T_k = \inf\{s \ge 0 : m(s) \ge \Gamma_k\}Tk​=inf{s≥0:m(s)≥Γk​}, and N(t)=#{k:Γk≤m(t)}N(t) = \#\{k : \Gamma_k \le m(t)\}N(t)=#{k:Γk​≤m(t)}.
  • Resupply times. Resupply times are ρ(Tk,Uk)\rho(T_k, U_k)ρ(Tk​,Uk​) for a jointly measurable ρ≥0\rho \ge 0ρ≥0 and i.i.d. marks UkU_kUk​ independent of the gaps, with Gs(w)=ν{ρ(s,⋅)≤w}G_s(w) = \nu\{\rho(s,\cdot) \le w\}Gs​(w)=ν{ρ(s,⋅)≤w}. Every measurable family GsG_sGs​ arises this way, and joint measurability makes α(t)\alpha(t)α(t) a genuine integral. Independence of resupply times from the demand process is not written in Theorem 12 or 13 but is used in the proof; it is part of the model.
  • Pinnings and conventions.
    • "λ\lambdaλ integrable" is read as integrable on bounded intervals.
    • Time is t≥0t \ge 0t≥0.
    • Theorem 12 assumes m(t)>0m(t) > 0m(t)>0, since FFF is 0/00/00/0 otherwise, and sets F=0F = 0F=0 on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0).
    • Conditional probabilities are written as joint probabilities.
    • E[Y(t)]E[Y(t)]E[Y(t)] is stated in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the variance identity assumes E[Q2]<∞E[Q^2] < \inftyE[Q2]<∞.
    • t~\tilde tt~ is an infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0, and D≥0D \ge 0D≥0.
    • Counts are cardinalities, and are 000 on the null event where they would be infinite.
  • Corrections. Theorem 14's printed sum starts at n=1n = 1n=1, which gives P[X(t)=0]=0P[X(t) = 0] = 0P[X(t)=0]=0. The statement keeps the book's formula for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and adds P[X(t)=0]=e−α(t)P[X(t) = 0] = e^{-\alpha(t)}P[X(t)=0]=e−α(t). The depot's Poisson demand stream with rate ∑iλi(1−ri)\sum_i \lambda_i(1-r_i)∑i​λi​(1−ri​) is generated from the bases' processes and independent repair-location choices, not assumed.
  • Not stated.
    • Eqs. (9.1)–(9.2), the FCFS depot backorders owed to base iii: the derivation on p. 221 is informal, and (9.1) prints the exponent s0(t−1)s_0(t-1)s0​(t−1) for s0(t)−1s_0(t)-1s0​(t)−1.
    • The base analysis of Section 9.3.3.
    • The compound law of Y(t)Y(t)Y(t) on p. 217, which has the same n=0n = 0n=0 omission.
  • Trivialization ruled out. X(t)X(t)X(t) is computed from the demand epochs and resupply times, not defined by its law, and resupply times cannot depend on the demand epochs except through the prescribed GsG_sGs​. Either shortcut would make the goal empty or false.
  • Infrastructure. The time-changed Poisson construction, its count law, the order-statistics property and marked thinning are reusable well beyond this chapter: in queueing (Mt/Gt/∞M_t/G_t/\inftyMt​/Gt​/∞), in reliability, and in the stationary Palm mission of this series. Contributions of these general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 9, pp. 215–222. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • C. Palm, "Analysis of the Erlang traffic formulae for busy-signal arrangements", Ericsson Technics 5, 1938, 39–58.
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, "The (s−1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand", Management Science 12(5), 1966, 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
  • R. J. Hillestad and M. J. Carrillo, Models and techniques for recoverable item stockage when demand and the repair processes are nonstationary — Part I: Performance measurement, Report N-1482-AF, RAND Corporation, 1980.
  • G. B. Crawford, Palm's theorem for nonstationary processes, Report R-2750-RC, RAND Corporation, 1981.
  • M. J. Carrillo, Generalizations of Palm's theorem and Dyna-METRIC's demand and pipeline variability, Report R-3698-AF, RAND Corporation, 1989.
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Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains IV: Backorder Convexity and Everett's TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Service parts (spares for aircraft, machines, and networks) are typically managed item by item with a one-for-one replenishment policy, the (s−1,s)(s-1, s)(s−1,s) policy: every unit withdrawn to meet a demand triggers an order for one replacement, so the inventory position stays at the stock level sss. A firm stocking thousands of such items at one location has to choose all the stock levels together, trading a budget on inventory investment against a service measure. Chapter 3 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) sets up the three standard service measures (fill rate, ready rate, expected backorders), shows which of them have the convexity that optimization needs, and solves two multi-item stocking problems: minimum expected backorders under an investment budget, by Lagrangian relaxation justified by Everett's theorem, and maximum average fill rate, by a greedy marginal-analysis rule.

The Lagrangian method goes back to Everett (Operations Research 1963); the search for the multiplier in one-constraint problems of this kind is Fox and Landi (Operations Research 1970); the compound Poisson (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) model is Feeney and Sherbrooke (Management Science 1966). The same separable Lagrangian structure underlies the multi-echelon METRIC-type models later in the book.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location, demand not met from stock is backordered, and customer orders arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. An order is for jjj units with probability uju_juj​, where u0=0u_0 = 0u0​=0 and the mean order size uˉ=∑jjuj\bar u = \sum_j j u_juˉ=∑j​juj​ is finite (compound Poisson demand; simple Poisson demand is u1=1u_1 = 1u1​=1). Resupply times have mean τˉ>0\bar\tau > 0τˉ>0. The steady-state probability that xxx units are in resupply is

p(0∣λτˉ)=e−λτˉ,p(x∣λτˉ)=∑j≥1e−λτˉ(λτˉ)jj! ux(j)(x≥1),p(0 \mid \lambda\bar\tau) = e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}, \qquad p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau) = \sum_{j \ge 1} e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}\frac{(\lambda\bar\tau)^j}{j!}\,u^{(j)}_x \quad (x \ge 1),p(0∣λτˉ)=e−λτˉ,p(x∣λτˉ)=j≥1∑​e−λτˉj!(λτˉ)j​ux(j)​(x≥1),

where ux(j)u^{(j)}_xux(j)​ is the probability that jjj orders total xxx units. In this mission p(⋅∣λτˉ)p(\cdot \mid \lambda\bar\tau)p(⋅∣λτˉ) is the definition of the model, not a consequence of Palm's theorem. The mean lead-time demand is μ=λτˉuˉ\mu = \lambda\bar\tau\bar uμ=λτˉuˉ, and the book also writes p(x∣μ)p(x \mid \mu)p(x∣μ).

For a stock level s∈{0,1,2,… }s \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}s∈{0,1,2,…}:

  • the ready rate is R(s)=∑x≤sp(x∣λτˉ)R(s) = \sum_{x \le s} p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)R(s)=∑x≤s​p(x∣λτˉ);
  • the expected backorders are B(s)=∑x>s(x−s) p(x∣λτˉ)B(s) = \sum_{x > s}(x - s)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)B(s)=∑x>s​(x−s)p(x∣λτˉ);
  • the expected on-hand inventory is ∑x≤s(s−x) p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_{x \le s}(s - x)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x≤s​(s−x)p(x∣λτˉ);
  • under simple Poisson demand the fill rate is F(s)=∑x<sp(x∣λτˉ)F(s) = \sum_{x < s} p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)F(s)=∑x<s​p(x∣λτˉ).

Forward differences are Δf(s)=f(s+1)−f(s)\Delta f(s) = f(s+1) - f(s)Δf(s)=f(s+1)−f(s) and Δ2f(s)=Δf(s+1)−Δf(s)\Delta^2 f(s) = \Delta f(s+1) - \Delta f(s)Δ2f(s)=Δf(s+1)−Δf(s); discrete convexity means Δ2f≥0\Delta^2 f \ge 0Δ2f≥0.

With nnn items, unit costs ci>0c_i > 0ci​>0 and budget bbb, Problem 4 (3.40) is

min⁡∑iBi(si)s.t.∑ici [si−μi+Bi(si)]≤b,si∈{0,1,… }.\min \sum_i B_i(s_i) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i c_i\,[s_i - \mu_i + B_i(s_i)] \le b,\quad s_i \in \{0,1,\dots\}.mini∑​Bi​(si​)s.t.i∑​ci​[si​−μi​+Bi​(si​)]≤b,si​∈{0,1,…}.

For a multiplier θ>0\theta > 0θ>0, the item-wise criterion defines si∗(θ)s_i^*(\theta)si∗​(θ) as the least sss with ∑x≤sp(x∣μi)≥1/(1+θci)\sum_{x \le s} p(x \mid \mu_i) \ge 1/(1 + \theta c_i)∑x≤s​p(x∣μi​)≥1/(1+θci​), and C(θ)=∑ici [si∗(θ)−μi+Bi(si∗(θ))]C(\theta) = \sum_i c_i\,[s_i^*(\theta) - \mu_i + B_i(s_i^*(\theta))]C(θ)=∑i​ci​[si∗​(θ)−μi​+Bi​(si∗​(θ))].

Formalization targets

Goal: the Lagrangian stock levels solve Problem 4

For every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0, each si∗(θ)s_i^*(\theta)si∗​(θ) exists and

∑ici [si−μi+Bi(si)]≤C(θ) ⟹ ∑iBi(si∗(θ))≤∑iBi(si)\sum_i c_i\,[s_i - \mu_i + B_i(s_i)] \le C(\theta) \ \Longrightarrow\ \sum_i B_i(s_i^*(\theta)) \le \sum_i B_i(s_i)i∑​ci​[si​−μi​+Bi​(si​)]≤C(θ) ⟹ i∑​Bi​(si∗​(θ))≤i∑​Bi​(si​)

for every vector sss of nonnegative integer stock levels. That is, s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) is optimal for Problem 4 at budget b=C(θ)b = C(\theta)b=C(θ). This is what the book asserts by combining Theorem 10 (p. 57, with the remark on p. 58) and the criterion of p. 61, and it is the basis of its bisection algorithm (p. 63). The goal fixes no numerical constant.

Milestones

  1. Section 3.3, p. 53: ΔF(s)=p(s∣λτˉ)\Delta F(s) = p(s \mid \lambda\bar\tau)ΔF(s)=p(s∣λτˉ) and Δ2F(s)=p(s∣λτˉ) (λτˉ/(s+1)−1)\Delta^2 F(s) = p(s \mid \lambda\bar\tau)\,(\lambda\bar\tau/(s+1) - 1)Δ2F(s)=p(s∣λτˉ)(λτˉ/(s+1)−1), so under simple Poisson demand FFF is discretely concave exactly on s≥⌊λτˉ⌋s \ge \lfloor\lambda\bar\tau\rfloors≥⌊λτˉ⌋ (resp. s≥λτˉ−1s \ge \lambda\bar\tau - 1s≥λτˉ−1 for integer λτˉ\lambda\bar\tauλτˉ).
  2. Section 3.3, p. 55: ΔB(s)=−(1−R(s))\Delta B(s) = -(1 - R(s))ΔB(s)=−(1−R(s)) and Δ2B(s)=p(s+1∣λτˉ)\Delta^2 B(s) = p(s+1 \mid \lambda\bar\tau)Δ2B(s)=p(s+1∣λτˉ).
  3. Theorem 10 (Everett), p. 57.
  4. Section 3.4.2, p. 60: E[On-hand]=s−λτˉuˉ+B(s)E[\text{On-hand}] = s - \lambda\bar\tau\bar u + B(s)E[On-hand]=s−λτˉuˉ+B(s).
  5. Section 3.4.2, p. 61: the least sss with R(s)≥1/(1+θc)R(s) \ge 1/(1+\theta c)R(s)≥1/(1+θc) minimizes f(s)=(1+θc)B(s)+θcsf(s) = (1 + \theta c)B(s) + \theta c sf(s)=(1+θc)B(s)+θcs.
  6. Section 3.4.2, p. 61: s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) and C(θ)C(\theta)C(θ) are nonincreasing in θ\thetaθ.
  7. Section 3.4.2, p. 63: at θmax⁡=max⁡ici−1(1/p(0∣μi)−1)\theta_{\max} = \max_i c_i^{-1}(1/p(0 \mid \mu_i) - 1)θmax​=maxi​ci−1​(1/p(0∣μi​)−1) every si∗(θmax⁡)=0s_i^*(\theta_{\max}) = 0si∗​(θmax​)=0.
  8. Section 3.4.3, p. 65: every solution produced by the greedy marginal-analysis rule for Problem 5 (3.41), maximum average fill rate subject to ∑icisi≤b\sum_i c_i s_i \le b∑i​ci​si​≤b and si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋, is optimal at the budget it uses.

Significance

The goal reduces a coupled integer program over thousands of items to one scalar search: for a fixed multiplier each item is solved by a single scan of its distribution function, and each multiplier yields a point on the exact efficient frontier of expected backorders against investment. Milestone 8 does the same for fill rates on the region where they are concave, and milestone 1 explains why that region, s≥⌊λτˉ⌋s \ge \lfloor\lambda\bar\tau\rfloors≥⌊λτˉ⌋, is imposed in practice. Milestone 4 is the identity that turns an investment budget into the constraint of Problem 4.

All results are proved in the book (Theorem 10 with a complete proof; the others by short derivations, the greedy optimality by a sketch). None of them is formalized, as far as the platform shows: there is no Everett-type Lagrangian sufficiency theorem, no compound Poisson backorder function, and no discrete marginal-analysis optimality result. The mission produces a reusable layer for later chapters: the compound Poisson steady-state law with its backorder function, and the Lagrangian machinery the book reuses for multi-echelon systems.

Difficulty

The algebra of first differences is elementary; the difficulties are elsewhere. B(s)B(s)B(s) is an infinite series whose convergence rests on the finiteness of the mean order size, and exchanging the difference with the sum, and identifying ∑xx p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_x x\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x​xp(x∣λτˉ) with λτˉuˉ\lambda\bar\tau\bar uλτˉuˉ, requires manipulating a doubly infinite sum over order counts and convolution powers. Existence of s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) requires that the compound Poisson probabilities sum to one. For milestone 8 the obvious argument ("greedy is optimal for concave separable objectives") fails for knapsack constraints with unequal costs at arbitrary budgets; it holds only at the budgets the greedy run generates, and only on the region where every FiF_iFi​ is concave; dropping the floor constraints si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋ makes it false.

Formalization scope

Stock levels are natural numbers; probabilities, rates, costs and multipliers are reals. The compound Poisson law is a structure with fields λ,τˉ>0\lambda, \bar\tau > 0λ,τˉ>0, an order-size distribution uuu with u0=0u_0 = 0u0​=0, uj≥0u_j \ge 0uj​≥0, ∑juj=1\sum_j u_j = 1∑j​uj​=1, and summable jujj u_jjuj​ (the finite mean is added: without it BBB is infinite). Expected on-hand inventory is the finite sum E[(s−X)+]E[(s - X)^+]E[(s−X)+]. Items are indexed by an arbitrary finite type (nonempty where a maximum over items is taken).

Pinnings and deviations, each stated in the item's Formalization Note:

  • θ>0\theta > 0θ>0 and c>0c > 0c>0. The book allows θ≥0\theta \ge 0θ≥0 in (3.38); at θ=0\theta = 0θ=0 the threshold 111 is never reached and f=Bf = Bf=B has no minimizer.
  • Theorem 10 without convexity and for an arbitrary set SSS: the book assumes f,gf, gf,g convex, but its proof does not use it and the applications are to integer vectors (labelled generalization).
  • BBB's identities for compound Poisson demand. The book derives them under simple Poisson demand and uses them for compound demand on p. 61; strict convexity and strict decrease are stated only for simple Poisson demand, as in the book.
  • Optimality is always against every feasible vector, never an infimum; the greedy procedure is a relation on sequences, covering every tie-breaking rule.
  • Problem 5 keeps the constraints si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal is stated for the book's own backorder function BBB built from the compound Poisson law, not for an arbitrary convex function nor for a BBB defined through its differences.

Welcome contributions: summability and normalization lemmas for the compound Poisson law, a general discrete Lagrangian lemma for separable objectives, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 3, pp. 47–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • H. Everett III, Generalized Lagrange multiplier method for solving problems of optimum allocation of resources, Operations Research 11(3):399–417, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.3.399
  • B. L. Fox and D. M. Landi, Searching for the multiplier in one-constraint optimization problems, Operations Research 18(2):253–262, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.18.2.253
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, The (s−1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand, Management Science 12(5):391–411, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization VI: Adaptive Stepsizes and Cesàro Convergence of Stochastic Quasigradient MethodsTextbook

Motivation

Stochastic quasigradient (SQG) methods minimize an expectation F(x)=Eωf(x,ω)F(x)=E_\omega f(x,\omega)F(x)=Eω​f(x,ω) over a constraint set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn when neither FFF nor its gradient can be computed, only random vectors whose conditional mean is (close to) a subgradient. They are the workhorse of stochastic programming and, under the name stochastic gradient descent, of large-scale statistical learning. The classical convergence theory, going back to Robbins and Monro (1951) and to Ermoliev's quasi-Féjer analysis, asks the stepsizes to be chosen in advance with ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0, ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞, ∑ρs2<∞\sum\rho_s^2<\infty∑ρs2​<∞. Uryasev, in Chapter 18 of Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Ermoliev and Wets, eds., 1988), points out that such programmed rules are slow in practice, and that practitioners want adaptive stepsizes computed on line from the observed directions.

Timeline:

  • 1951: Robbins and Monro, stochastic approximation with programmed steps.
  • 1976: Ermoliev, Methods of Stochastic Programming: the SQG projection method and its a.s. convergence through stochastic quasi-Féjer sequences.
  • 1983: Mirzoakhmedov and Uryasev (Zh. Vychisl. Mat. i Mat. Fiz., cited as [7] in Ch. 18 and [14] in Ch. 17): Cesàro convergence of the weighted mean with ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0 and ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ only, under the two measurability regimes. Chapter 17 states it as Theorem (ii); Chapter 18 as Theorem 1.
  • 1988: Uryasev, Ch. 18, applies it to the adaptive rule (18.5) (Theorem 2).
  • 1992: Polyak and Juditsky, averaging of iterates for smooth stochastic approximation, with optimal asymptotic variance.

Setting

Let X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn be nonempty, convex and compact, C1=max⁡x,y∈X∥x−y∥C_1=\max_{x,y\in X}\|x-y\|C1​=maxx,y∈X​∥x−y∥ its diameter, and FFF convex on an open convex set U⊇XU\supseteq XU⊇X, with subdifferential ∂F(x)\partial F(x)∂F(x). The projection πX(y)\pi_X(y)πX​(y) is the point of XXX nearest to yyy. On a probability space, the SQG method generates

xs+1=πX(xs−ρsξs),s=0,1,…(18.2)x^{s+1}=\pi_X(x^s-\rho_s\xi^s),\qquad s=0,1,\dots\qquad(18.2)xs+1=πX​(xs−ρs​ξs),s=0,1,…(18.2)

from x0∈Xx^0\in Xx0∈X, where the direction ξs\xi^sξs is a stochastic quasigradient: E(ξs∣Bs)=Fx(xs)+bsE(\xi^s\mid B_s)=F_x(x^s)+b^sE(ξs∣Bs​)=Fx​(xs)+bs with Fx(xs)∈∂F(xs)F_x(x^s)\in\partial F(x^s)Fx​(xs)∈∂F(xs), a bias bsb^sbs, and BsB_sBs​ the σ\sigmaσ-algebra induced by (x0,…,xs,ξ0,…,ξs−1)(x^0,\dots,x^s,\xi^0,\dots,\xi^{s-1})(x0,…,xs,ξ0,…,ξs−1).

The adaptive stepsize rule of the chapter is, for fixed a>1a>1a>1, δ>0\delta>0δ>0 and ρ0>0\rho_0>0ρ0​>0,

ρs+1=ρs a⟨ξs+1, xs−xs+1⟩−δρs(18.5).\rho_{s+1}=\rho_s\,a^{\langle\xi^{s+1},\,x^s-x^{s+1}\rangle-\delta\rho_s}\qquad(18.5).ρs+1​=ρs​a⟨ξs+1,xs−xs+1⟩−δρs​(18.5).

The step grows when consecutive moves point the same way and shrinks otherwise. The weighted (Cesàro) averages are

xˉs=∑ℓ=0sρℓxℓ/∑ℓ=0sρℓ(18.6).\bar x^s=\sum_{\ell=0}^s\rho_\ell x^\ell\Big/\sum_{\ell=0}^s\rho_\ell\qquad(18.6).xˉs=ℓ=0∑s​ρℓ​xℓ/ℓ=0∑s​ρℓ​(18.6).

The sequence xsx^sxs is Cesàro convergent when xˉs\bar x^sxˉs converges to the solution set.

Chapter 17 (Pflug) uses the same method for f(x)=EP q(x,ξ)f(x)=E_P\,q(x,\xi)f(x)=EP​q(x,ξ) over a closed convex S⊆RkS\subseteq\mathbb R^kS⊆Rk, with Y=∇q(Xn,ξn)Y=\nabla q(X_n,\xi_n)Y=∇q(Xn​,ξn​) from i.i.d. ξn\xi_nξn​ and stepsizes adapted to σ(ξ0,…,ξn−1)\sigma(\xi_0,\dots,\xi_{n-1})σ(ξ0​,…,ξn−1​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 of Chapter 18

Under sup⁡s∥ξs∥<C2\sup_s\|\xi^s\|<C_2sups​∥ξs∥<C2​ (18.15), lim sup⁡∥bs∥≤bˉ\limsup\|b^s\|\le\bar blimsup∥bs∥≤bˉ (18.16) and δ>C2lim sup⁡sinf⁡h∈∂F(xs)∥ξs−h∥\delta>C_2\limsup_s\inf_{h\in\partial F(x^s)}\|\xi^s-h\|δ>C2​limsups​infh∈∂F(xs)​∥ξs−h∥ (18.17), almost surely,

lim sup⁡s→∞(F(xˉs)−min⁡x∈XF(x))≤bˉ C1,\limsup_{s\to\infty}\Big(F(\bar x^s)-\min_{x\in X}F(x)\Big)\le\bar b\,C_1,s→∞limsup​(F(xˉs)−x∈Xmin​F(x))≤bˉC1​,

and if bs→0b^s\to0bs→0 a.s., then F(xˉs)→min⁡XFF(\bar x^s)\to\min_XFF(xˉs)→minX​F and all accumulation points of xˉs\bar x^sxˉs are minimizers, almost surely.

Milestones

  1. Chapter 17, Theorem (i): ∑ρn=∞\sum\rho_n=\infty∑ρn​=∞ and ∑ρn2<∞\sum\rho_n^2<\infty∑ρn2​<∞ a.s. imply Xn→x∗X_n\to x^*Xn​→x∗ a.s.
  2. Chapter 17, Theorem (ii): for convex fff and bounded SSS, ρn→0\rho_n\to0ρn​→0 and ∑ρn=∞\sum\rho_n=\infty∑ρn​=∞ a.s. imply Xˉn→x∗\bar X_n\to x^*Xˉn​→x∗ a.s.
  3. Chapter 18, Theorem 1: for any stepsizes with ρs>0\rho_s>0ρs​>0, Eρs2<∞E\rho_s^2<\inftyEρs2​<∞, ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0, ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ and measurability condition (1) or (2), lim sup⁡F(xˉs)−F(x∗)≤bˉC1\limsup F(\bar x^s)-F(x^*)\le\bar bC_1limsupF(xˉs)−F(x∗)≤bˉC1​ a.s.
  4. Chapter 18, Corollary: with bs→0b^s\to0bs→0, the accumulation points of xˉs\bar x^sxˉs are solutions.
  5. Eq. (18.18): ∥xs+1−xs∥≤∥ρsξs∥≤ρsC2\|x^{s+1}-x^s\|\le\|\rho_s\xi^s\|\le\rho_sC_2∥xs+1−xs∥≤∥ρs​ξs∥≤ρs​C2​.
  6. Proof of Theorem 2, step 1: the adaptive steps satisfy ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞.
  7. Proof of Theorem 2, step 2: under (18.17), ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0.
  8. End of step 2: ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0 implies ρs+1/ρs→1\rho_{s+1}/\rho_s\to1ρs+1​/ρs​→1.

Significance

Theorem 2 is a convergence guarantee for a stepsize rule that is computed from the run itself. It needs no square summability of the steps, and it tolerates a nonvanishing bias at a cost linear in the bias. This is the regime of practical SQG codes; §18.4–18.5 of the chapter discuss implementation and numerical experiments. Theorem 1 isolates the reason: Cesàro convergence needs only ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0 and ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞. It also allows a stepsize that depends on the current direction, provided consecutive steps have ratio tending to 111.

The volume proves none of the probabilistic results in full. Theorem 1 of Chapter 18 is cited from Uryasev's earlier report. Theorem 2 has an outline proof that reduces it to Theorem 1. Chapter 17 gives a sketch through the Robbins–Siegmund lemma. None of these results is formalized. The mission produces machine-checked statements of all of them, with the misprints of the page resolved, and it separates the pathwise part of the Theorem 2 argument (steps 1 and 2, which are deterministic) from the martingale part (Theorem 1).

Difficulty

The obvious route to a.s. convergence is the quasi-Féjer or Robbins–Siegmund argument. It controls ∥xs−x∗∥2\|x^s-x^*\|^2∥xs−x∗∥2 and needs ∑ρs2∥ξs∥2<∞\sum\rho_s^2\|\xi^s\|^2<\infty∑ρs2​∥ξs∥2<∞, which is exactly what is not available here. The averaged analysis has to show that the martingale term ∑ℓρℓ⟨ξℓ−E(ξℓ∣Bℓ),x∗−xℓ⟩\sum_\ell\rho_\ell\langle\xi^\ell-E(\xi^\ell\mid B_\ell),x^*-x^\ell\rangle∑ℓ​ρℓ​⟨ξℓ−E(ξℓ∣Bℓ​),x∗−xℓ⟩ is o(∑ℓρℓ)o(\sum_\ell\rho_\ell)o(∑ℓ​ρℓ​) almost surely, and that ∑ℓρℓ2∥ξℓ∥2\sum_\ell\rho_\ell^2\|\xi^\ell\|^2∑ℓ​ρℓ2​∥ξℓ∥2 is o(∑ℓρℓ)o(\sum_\ell\rho_\ell)o(∑ℓ​ρℓ​), when the stepsizes are themselves random. Under condition (2) of Theorem 1, ρs\rho_sρs​ is not even measurable with respect to the σ\sigmaσ-algebra of the conditional expectation. So E(ρsξs∣Bs)≠ρsE(ξs∣Bs)E(\rho_s\xi^s\mid B_s)\ne\rho_sE(\xi^s\mid B_s)E(ρs​ξs∣Bs​)=ρs​E(ξs∣Bs​), and the standard decomposition breaks. For the adaptive rule, the stepsizes are coupled to the iterates through the exponent. Neither ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ nor ρs→0\rho_s\to0ρs​→0 is given, and both must be derived path by path.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Sequences are indexed from 000. Chapter 17 is shifted by one against the page: its Xn,ξn,FnX_n,\xi_n,\mathcal F_nXn​,ξn​,Fn​, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, become indices n−1n-1n−1. Conditional expectations are Mathlib's condExp with respect to the history σ\sigmaσ-algebras of the definition file. Every lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup bound is written out as "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, eventually ⋯≤⋯+ε\dots\le\dots+\varepsilon⋯≤⋯+ε", or in (18.17) as a bound LLL with C2L<δC_2L<\deltaC2​L<δ. Expectations of squared norms are lower Lebesgue integrals. The deterministic proof steps (items 5 to 8) are stated for one sample path.

Readings of the page, each recorded in the item's Formalization Note:

  • (18.17) prints C1C_1C1​. The proof's estimate gives (C2Cs−δ)ρs(C_2C_s-\delta)\rho_s(C2​Cs​−δ)ρs​, and only C2C_2C2​ is invariant under rescaling of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, so C2C_2C2​ is stated.
  • (18.5) has two forms that agree only without projection. The proof uses the second, a⟨ξs+1,xs−xs+1⟩−δρsa^{\langle\xi^{s+1},x^s-x^{s+1}\rangle-\delta\rho_s}a⟨ξs+1,xs−xs+1⟩−δρs​, which is stated.
  • (18.8) prints Fs(xs)F_s(x^s)Fs​(xs) for Fx(xs)F_x(x^s)Fx​(xs). (18.11) prints EρssE\rho_s^sEρss​, read as Eρs2<∞E\rho_s^2<\inftyEρs2​<∞.
  • Theorem 2's "F(xs)−min⁡z∈XF(x)→0F(x^s)-\min z\in XF(x)\to0F(xs)−minz∈XF(x)→0" is read as F(xˉs)−min⁡XF→0F(\bar x^s)-\min_XF\to0F(xˉs)−minX​F→0.
  • The end of step 2 prints ρs+1/ρs→0\rho_{s+1}/\rho_s\to0ρs+1​/ρs​→0, read as →1\to1→1.
  • Chapter 17, assumption (ii) prints ∥∇f(x)∥≤A+B∥x−x∗∥2\|\nabla f(x)\|\le A+B\|x-x^*\|^2∥∇f(x)∥≤A+B∥x−x∗∥2. The proof uses ∥∇f(x)∥2\|\nabla f(x)\|^2∥∇f(x)∥2, and the printed form makes part (i) false, so the squared form is stated. Var(Yx)≤C\mathrm{Var}(Y_x)\le CVar(Yx​)≤C is read as E∥Yx−EYx∥2≤CE\|Y_x-EY_x\|^2\le CE∥Yx​−EYx​∥2≤C.
  • The Corollary adds lower semicontinuity of FFF on XXX, without which it fails.
  • x0∈Xx^0\in Xx0∈X is assumed, and ρ0\rho_0ρ0​ in Theorem 2 is a fixed positive number.

No explicit constants replace an O(·) or an unspecified "C": every constant appears in the book's statements.

A trivializing formalization states Theorem 2 for arbitrary stepsizes satisfying (18.10)–(18.13), which is Theorem 1 again. Here the stepsizes are tied to the iterates by (18.5), and the δ\deltaδ of (18.17) is the δ\deltaδ of the rule.

Needed infrastructure: a Robbins–Siegmund almost-supermartingale lemma, which Mathlib does not have; a strong law for martingale differences with random weights (Kronecker's lemma in its stochastic form); nonexpansiveness of the projection onto a closed convex set; and nonemptiness of the subdifferential of a finite convex function on an open set. The first two are reusable across stochastic approximation. Contributions of any of the milestones, or of these lemmas as separate theorems, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Ch. Pflug, Stepsize Rules, Stopping Times and their Implementation in Stochastic Quasigradient Algorithms, in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer 1988, Ch. 17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • S. Uryasev, Adaptive Stochastic Quasigradient Procedures, ibid., Ch. 18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • Yu. Ermoliev, Stochastic Quasigradient Methods, ibid., Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • F. Mirzoakhmedov and S. P. Uryasev, Adaptive step size control for stochastic optimization algorithm, Zh. Vychisl. Mat. i Mat. Fiz. 23(6) (1983) 1314–1325 (in Russian); cited in the volume above, no online copy linked.
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A Stochastic Approximation Method, Ann. Math. Statist. 22 (1951) 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications, in Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press 1971, 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • B. T. Polyak and A. B. Juditsky, Acceleration of Stochastic Approximation by Averaging, SIAM J. Control Optim. 30 (1992) 838–855. https://doi.org/10.1137/0330046
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Introduction to the Scenario Approach II: Violation Guarantees after Discarding k ConstraintsTextbook

Motivation

Decisions under uncertainty are often required to satisfy a constraint θ∈Θδ\theta \in \Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​ that depends on a random parameter δ\deltaδ, and requiring it for every possible δ\deltaδ is usually too conservative or infeasible. The scenario approach replaces the unknown distribution of δ\deltaδ by NNN independent samples (scenarios) and enforces only the sampled constraints; its generalization theorem (Campi and Garatti, 2008) bounds the probability that the resulting decision violates a fresh constraint.

Enforcing all NNN sampled constraints can still be costly: a few unusual scenarios may dominate the solution. A practitioner therefore often discards kkk of the sampled constraints, optimally, greedily or at random, and re-solves. The question is what guarantee survives: the removed constraints were chosen by looking at the data, so the solution is biased towards points of higher risk. Campi and Garatti (2011) answered it with a bound that holds for every removal procedure. This mission formalizes that answer as it is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3 of the textbook Introduction to the Scenario Approach (Campi and Garatti, SIAM/MOS 2018), together with its explicit corollary, Theorem 1.2. Applications include chance-constrained control, portfolio selection and prediction, where discarding scenarios trades a controlled amount of risk for a better cost.

Setting

A decision θ\thetaθ ranges over Rd\mathbb R^dRd (in Lean, EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d)), with a closed convex domain Θ\ThetaΘ and a linear cost cTθc^{\mathsf T}\thetacTθ. An uncertain parameter δ\deltaδ takes values in a measurable space Δ\DeltaΔ with probability P\mathbb PP, and each δ\deltaδ determines a closed convex constraint set Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​. The violation probability of a decision is

V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}.V(\theta) = \mathbb P\{\delta \in \Delta : \theta \notin \Theta_\delta\}.V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​}.

Given independent samples δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ with joint law PN\mathbb P^NPN, the scenario program minimizes cTθc^{\mathsf T}\thetacTθ over θ∈Θ∩⋂i=1NΘδi\theta \in \Theta \cap \bigcap_{i=1}^N \Theta_{\delta_i}θ∈Θ∩⋂i=1N​Θδi​​. For a set III of indexes, the program without the constraints in III minimizes the same cost over Θ∩⋂i∉IΘδi\Theta \cap \bigcap_{i \notin I} \Theta_{\delta_i}Θ∩⋂i∈/I​Θδi​​; its solution is written θI∗\theta^*_IθI∗​. A removal procedure selects, as a function of the whole sample, a set of kkk indexes, and θk∗\theta^*_kθk∗​ denotes the solution of the program without them. The procedure is required to output a solution that violates exactly the kkk removed constraints (with probability one): a removed constraint that turns out to be satisfied is reinstated and another is removed. Two standing assumptions are used throughout: Assumption 3.4, that Θ\ThetaΘ and every Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ are convex and closed, and Assumption 3.6, that for every sample size mmm and every sample the scenario program has exactly one solution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.9

For N≥dN \ge dN≥d, under Assumptions 3.4 and 3.6, for every removal procedure and every ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon \in [0,1]ε∈[0,1],

PN{V(θk∗)>ε}≤(k+d−1k)∑i=0k+d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*_k) > \varepsilon\} \le \binom{k+d-1}{k} \sum_{i=0}^{k+d-1} \binom Ni \varepsilon^i (1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}.PN{V(θk∗​)>ε}≤(kk+d−1​)i=0∑k+d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i.

The bound depends on the problem only through ddd, and on the removal procedure not at all. For k=0k = 0k=0 it is Theorem 3.7.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.7 (no removal): PN{V(θ∗)>ε}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*) > \varepsilon\} \le \sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}PN{V(θ∗)>ε}≤∑i=0d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i, used for the program with the N−kN-kN−k kept constraints.
  2. Eq. (5.11): up to a zero probability set, the event {V(θk∗)>ε}\{V(\theta^*_k) > \varepsilon\}{V(θk∗​)>ε} is contained in the union over all kkk-element index sets III of the events "θI∗\theta^*_IθI∗​ violates all constraints in III and V(θI∗)>εV(\theta^*_I) > \varepsilonV(θI∗​)>ε".
  3. Eq. (5.13): for a fixed III, the probability of that event equals ∫(ε,1]αkFV(dα)\int_{(\varepsilon,1]} \alpha^k F_V(d\alpha)∫(ε,1]​αkFV​(dα), where FVF_VFV​ is the law of V(θI∗)V(\theta^*_I)V(θI∗​).
  4. Eq. (5.14) and Theorem 3.9 for d=2d = 2d=2: the book's complete proof in the plane.
  5. Eqs. (3.15)–(3.17) and the conclusion of Section 3.3.1: with the explicit level εk\varepsilon_kεk​ of (1.9), the right-hand side of (3.13) is at most β\betaβ.
  6. Theorem 1.2: with probability at least 1−β1-\beta1−β, V(θk∗)≤εkV(\theta^*_k) \le \varepsilon_kV(θk∗​)≤εk​, where
εk=kN+[kN+k+1N((d−1)ln⁡(k+d−1)+d−1k+ln⁡1β)].\varepsilon_k = \frac{k}{N} + \left[\frac{\sqrt k}{N} + \frac{\sqrt k+1}{N}\left((d-1)\ln(k+d-1) + \frac{d-1}{\sqrt k} + \ln\frac1\beta\right)\right].εk​=Nk​+[Nk​​+Nk​+1​((d−1)ln(k+d−1)+k​d−1​+lnβ1​)].

Significance

Theorem 3.9 certifies every constraint-removal heuristic at once. Since the guarantee is the same for optimal, greedy and random removal, a user may pick the removal strategy purely for cost, and may inspect several values of kkk before choosing, paying only a union bound over the values tried (Section 3.3). Theorem 1.2 turns the bound into an explicit rate: when k/Nk/Nk/N is held fixed, the violation exceeds the empirical risk k/Nk/Nk/N by a margin of order ln⁡N/N\ln N/\sqrt NlnN/N​, only slightly worse than the 1/N1/\sqrt N1/N​ rate for estimating the probability of a fixed event. The result also shows that the violation after removal concentrates around the target level, which is the basis of the book's comparison between sampling-and-discarding and simply using fewer scenarios (Example 3.10).

Theorem 3.9 is proved in the literature for general ddd (Campi and Garatti, 2011); the textbook proves it for d=2d = 2d=2. To our knowledge no part of the scenario approach has a machine-checked proof. A formal development would supply the first verified version of the removal bound, a Lean treatment of solution maps of random convex programs, and reusable combinatorial and binomial-tail estimates.

Difficulty

The removed set is chosen after seeing the data, so the kept constraints are not an independent sample and Theorem 3.7 cannot be applied to θk∗\theta^*_kθk∗​ directly. The argument must pass through all (Nk)\binom Nk(kN​) fixed index sets and account for the event that the removed constraints are violated; a plain union bound that ignores this event loses a factor (Nk)\binom Nk(kN​) and does not give (3.13). For a fixed index set, the probability that the kkk removed scenarios are all violated involves the distribution of V(θI∗)V(\theta^*_I)V(θI∗​), which is only known to be dominated by a Beta law, so a stochastic-domination argument for the increasing function α↦αk\alpha \mapsto \alpha^kα↦αk is needed. In general dimension the combinatorial constant (k+d−1k)\binom{k+d-1}{k}(kk+d−1​) comes from a sharper counting than the two-dimensional computation of Section 5.3, and that argument is in the cited paper rather than in the book.

Formalization scope

Decisions live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), samples of size mmm are maps Fin m → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ => P) for a probability measure P, and the violation is the real number (P {δ | θ ∉ Θδ δ}).toReal. Events over samples are compared in ℝ≥0∞ with ENNReal.ofReal of the book's right-hand side. The removal procedure is an arbitrary map I : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) with (I ω).card = k, and θk is a map that, for every sample, solves the program without the constraints in I ω, and violates each of them with probability one. The following implicit hypotheses of the book are written as binders:

  • d≥1d \ge 1d≥1, d≤Nd \le Nd≤N, k≤Nk \le Nk≤N and ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon \in [0,1]ε∈[0,1];
  • Assumption 3.6 for every mmm, including m=0m = 0m=0, and for every sample (not almost every);
  • the removed constraints are violated with probability one (∀ᵐ ω ∂ℙ^N), the book's own hypothesis on p. 65, so (5.11) is an inclusion up to a null set as on the page; requiring the violation for every sample would be unsatisfiable for 1≤k<N1 \le k < N1≤k<N (on a sample with all δi\delta_iδi​ equal a kept constraint coincides with a removed one) and would make the results vacuous;
  • measurability, which the book glosses over (p. 33): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta) : \theta \in \Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is jointly measurable, the solution map of the scenario program with mmm constraints is measurable for every mmm, and θk∗\theta^*_kθk∗​ is measurable;
  • for Theorem 1.2 and Section 3.3.1: k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 (formula (1.9) divides by k\sqrt kk​), N≥1N \ge 1N≥1, β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0,1)β∈(0,1); Section 3.3.1 additionally assumes εk≤1\varepsilon_k \le 1εk​≤1, the range in which its chain of inequalities holds.

Theorem 1.2 is stated in the constraint formulation of Chapter 3, to which the book says it "straightforwardly generalizes" (p. 20), with the hypotheses of Theorem 3.9 from which Section 3.3.1 derives it. Eq. (5.14) and the closing display of Section 5.3 are stated for d=2d = 2d=2 only, as in the book.

A trivializing formalization is excluded: the removal procedure is universally quantified, the solutions are exact minimizers rather than arbitrary feasible points, and the event is the strict V(θk∗)>εV(\theta^*_k) > \varepsilonV(θk∗​)>ε; a statement for one fixed rule, or with θk∗\theta^*_kθk∗​ unconstrained, would be a different theorem.

A complete development needs: product measures and Fubini over Fin N → Δ, reindexing of the kept constraints as a sample of size N−kN-kN−k, the Beta form of the binomial tail (the platform's binomial_upper_tail_eq_incomplete_beta is available), and stochastic domination for monotone integrands. Solution-map and violation infrastructure is shared with the sibling missions of this series. Contributions on any milestone, including the general-ddd counting argument of the cited paper, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi and S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi and S. Garatti, A sampling-and-discarding approach to chance-constrained optimization: feasibility and optimality, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 148(2), 257–280, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-010-9754-6
  • M. C. Campi and S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19(3), 1211–1230, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • G. C. Calafiore and M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51(5), 742–753, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
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Introduction to the Scenario Approach IV: The FAST Algorithm Keeps the Beta Bound and Adds a Factor (1−ε)^{N₂}Textbook

Motivation

The scenario approach turns an optimization problem under uncertainty into a finite, data-driven program: sample NNN instances of the uncertain parameter, optimize against all of them, and certify how often the resulting design fails on a new instance. Its main guarantee (Theorem 3.7 of Campi and Garatti's Introduction to the Scenario Approach) bounds the probability of failure by a binomial tail in NNN and in the number ddd of optimization variables. To reach a failure level ε\varepsilonε with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β, the number of scenarios grows roughly like 2ε(ln⁡1β+d−1)\frac{2}{\varepsilon}\big(\ln\frac1\beta+d-1\big)ε2​(lnβ1​+d−1) (Theorem 1.1 of the book). The product of ddd and 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε is what makes medium- and large-scale designs expensive: each scenario is one more constraint in the program that has to be solved.

FAST (Fast Algorithm for the Scenario Technique), introduced by Carè, Garatti and Campi in Operations Research 62 (2014), removes that product. It solves the program with a moderate number N1N_1N1​ of scenarios and then, instead of re-optimizing, raises the returned cost level until it covers N2N_2N2​ further scenarios. The book presents the algorithm and its guarantee, Theorem 8.5, in §8.3, and refers to the paper for the proof. This mission formalizes that guarantee.

Timeline:

  • 2006, Calafiore and Campi: violation bounds for the solution of convex scenario programs.
  • 2008, Campi and Garatti: the exact binomial bound, tight for fully supported problems (Theorem 3.7 of the book).
  • 2014, Carè, Garatti and Campi: FAST and its two-stage bound, Eq. (8.5).
  • 2018, Campi and Garatti's textbook, §8.3, the source of this mission.

Setting

Let Δ\DeltaΔ be a measurable space carrying a probability measure P\mathbb PP, and let ℓ(ν,δ)\ell(\nu,\delta)ℓ(ν,δ) be a real loss of a decision ν∈Rd−1\nu\in\mathbb R^{d-1}ν∈Rd−1 under the uncertain parameter δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ. As a standing assumption of the book, ℓ(⋅,δ)\ell(\cdot,\delta)ℓ(⋅,δ) is convex for every δ\deltaδ.

Given scenarios δ1,…,δm\delta_1,\dots,\delta_mδ1​,…,δm​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program (1.4) is

min⁡ν∈Rd−1 [max⁡i=1,…,m ℓ(ν,δi)].\min_{\nu\in\mathbb R^{d-1}}\ \Big[\max_{i=1,\dots,m}\ \ell(\nu,\delta_i)\Big].ν∈Rd−1min​ [i=1,…,mmax​ ℓ(ν,δi​)].

Its solution is ν∗\nu^*ν∗ and its optimal value ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗. Assumption 3.6 requires that for every mmm and every sample the solution exist and be unique. The pair (ν,ℓ)(\nu,\ell)(ν,ℓ) has ddd components, and ddd is the number that enters every bound.

The risk (Definition 8.2) of a decision ν\nuν with cost level ℓ\ellℓ is

R(ν,ℓ)=P{δ∈Δ: ℓ(ν,δ)>ℓ},R(\nu,\ell)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\ \ell(\nu,\delta)>\ell\},R(ν,ℓ)=P{δ∈Δ: ℓ(ν,δ)>ℓ},

the probability that a new instance costs more than promised. It is the violation V(ν,ℓ)V(\nu,\ell)V(ν,ℓ) of the epigraphic constraint ℓ≥ℓ(ν,δ)\ell\ge\ell(\nu,\delta)ℓ≥ℓ(ν,δ).

FAST takes N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ independent scenarios. It solves (1.4) with the first N1N_1N1​ of them, obtaining νN1∗\nu^*_{N_1}νN1​∗​. In the detuning step it then sets

ℓF∗=max⁡i=1,…,N1+N2 ℓ(νN1∗,δi),\ell^*_F=\max_{i=1,\dots,N_1+N_2}\ \ell(\nu^*_{N_1},\delta_i),ℓF∗​=i=1,…,N1​+N2​max​ ℓ(νN1​∗​,δi​),

the smallest level that covers every scenario seen. The output is (νF∗,ℓF∗)(\nu^*_F,\ell^*_F)(νF∗​,ℓF∗​) with νF∗=νN1∗\nu^*_F=\nu^*_{N_1}νF∗​=νN1​∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.5, Eq. (8.5)

For every ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1],

PN1+N2{V(νF∗,ℓF∗)>ε} ≤ (1−ε)N2∑i=0d−1(N1i)εi(1−ε)N1−i.\mathbb P^{N_1+N_2}\{V(\nu^*_F,\ell^*_F)>\varepsilon\}\ \le\ (1-\varepsilon)^{N_2}\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom{N_1}{i}\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N_1-i}.PN1​+N2​{V(νF∗​,ℓF∗​)>ε} ≤ (1−ε)N2​i=0∑d−1​(iN1​​)εi(1−ε)N1​−i.

No relation between N1N_1N1​ and ddd is required. When N1<dN_1<dN1​<d the sum equals 111 and the bound reads (1−ε)N2(1-\varepsilon)^{N_2}(1−ε)N2​.

Milestone: Theorem 3.7 for program (1.4)

The first stage is an ordinary scenario program with N1N_1N1​ scenarios. For N≥dN\ge dN≥d,

PN{R(ν∗,ℓ∗)>ε} ≤ ∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i,\mathbb P^N\{R(\nu^*,\ell^*)>\varepsilon\}\ \le\ \sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom{N}{i}\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i},PN{R(ν∗,ℓ∗)>ε} ≤ i=0∑d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i,

that is, R(ν∗,ℓ∗)R(\nu^*,\ell^*)R(ν∗,ℓ∗) is dominated by a B(d,N−d+1)B(d,N-d+1)B(d,N−d+1) distribution (recalled on p. 90).

Milestone: the N2N_2N2​ rule

For ε,β∈(0,1)\varepsilon,\beta\in(0,1)ε,β∈(0,1), N2≥1εln⁡1βN_2\ge\frac1\varepsilon\ln\frac1\betaN2​≥ε1​lnβ1​ makes the right-hand side of (8.5) at most β\betaβ (p. 95).

Significance

The result. Theorem 8.5 makes the guarantee of the scenario approach cheap to obtain. With N1=KdN_1=KdN1​=Kd (the book suggests K≈20K\approx20K≈20) and N2≥1εln⁡1βN_2\ge\frac1\varepsilon\ln\frac1\betaN2​≥ε1​lnβ1​, the total number of scenarios is Kd+1εln⁡1βKd+\frac1\varepsilon\ln\frac1\betaKd+ε1​lnβ1​. This is additive in ddd and 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε rather than multiplicative, and the added N2N_2N2​ scenarios cost only function evaluations, not a larger optimization. The price is suboptimality: ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ is in general higher than the value a classical scenario program with the same confidence would return.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper, in the cited 2014 article; the book states it without proof. No part of the scenario theory has been machine-checked on this platform, as far as a search of the catalog shows. The mission produces a checked two-stage bound whose first stage is the loss-function form of Theorem 3.7, which is reusable by every mission of the series that works with program (1.4). The N2N_2N2​ rule is an elementary but explicit sample-size certificate.

Difficulty

The obvious route treats the detuning step as a fresh scenario program with N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ scenarios and applies Theorem 3.7 to it. That fails: νF∗\nu^*_FνF∗​ is not the solution of that program, and Theorem 3.7 with N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ scenarios gives a bound that is not of the product form (8.5). The level ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ depends on all N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ scenarios at once, including those that determined νN1∗\nu^*_{N_1}νN1​∗​, and the map c↦R(ν,c)c\mapsto R(\nu,c)c↦R(ν,c) is monotone but need not be continuous, so the event V(νF∗,ℓF∗)>εV(\nu^*_F,\ell^*_F)>\varepsilonV(νF∗​,ℓF∗​)>ε is not a simple event about the new scenarios. Underneath the goal sits Theorem 3.7 itself, which is the main theorem of the book and whose proof occupies Chapter 5.

Formalization scope

Lean representation:

  • The decision space Rd−1\mathbb R^{d-1}Rd−1 is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); the book's ddd is written n+1n+1n+1, never with natural-number subtraction.
  • A sample of size mmm is ω : Fin m → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ => P), and the same P\mathbb PP defines the risk. FAST draws one sample ω : Fin (N₁ + N₂) → Δ; its first stage is ω ∘ Fin.castAdd N₂.
  • The maximum in (1.4) and in ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ is Finset.sup' over a nonempty index set. ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ runs over all N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ scenarios, not over the N2N_2N2​ new ones only.
  • The risk is (P {δ | c < ℓ ν δ}).toReal, with the strict inequality of Definition 8.2 and the strict event V>εV>\varepsilonV>ε of (8.5). Probabilities of sample events are compared in ℝ≥0∞ through ENNReal.ofReal.
  • The first-stage solution is a map νstar from samples to decisions, with the hypothesis that νstar ω₁ solves the program for every sample ω₁.

Hypotheses the book leaves implicit, stated explicitly:

  1. ℓ(⋅,δ)\ell(\cdot,\delta)ℓ(⋅,δ) is convex for every δ\deltaδ (standing assumption, p. 6).
  2. Existence and uniqueness of the solution (Assumption 3.6) for every m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and every sample. The program with no scenario has no minimum, so m=0m=0m=0 is excluded.
  3. N1≥1N_1\ge1N1​≥1, since the first stage needs a scenario.
  4. ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1]; for ε>1\varepsilon>1ε>1 the factor (1−ε)N2(1-\varepsilon)^{N_2}(1−ε)N2​ can be negative.
  5. The loss is jointly measurable in (ν,δ)(\nu,\delta)(ν,δ) and the first-stage solution map is measurable. The book glosses over measurability (p. 6, footnote 1; p. 33).

A formalization that bounds only the N2N_2N2​ new scenarios is ruled out, because ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ is defined as a maximum over all N1+N2N_1+N_2N1​+N2​ scenarios. So is one that takes ℓF∗\ell^*_FℓF∗​ as a free variable or drops Assumption 3.6: the goal is stated for the output of FAST as the book defines it.

A complete development needs the scenario program in loss form, product-measure conditioning on ΔN1×ΔN2\Delta^{N_1}\times\Delta^{N_2}ΔN1​×ΔN2​, and Theorem 3.7. The loss-form Theorem 3.7 is the reusable piece. Proofs of the milestones and of intermediate conditioning lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM, 2018, §8.3 and Theorem 3.7. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • A. Carè, S. Garatti, M. C. Campi, FAST—Fast Algorithm for the Scenario Technique, Operations Research 62(3):662–671, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1257
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19(3):1211–1230, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51(5):742–753, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
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Operations ResearchStatisticsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Elements of Queueing Theory V: Strassen's Theorems and the Stochastic Ordering of QueuesTextbook

Strassen's Theorems and the Stochastic Ordering of Queues

Background

Chapters 1–3 of Baccelli and Brémaud's Elements of Queueing Theory compute exact quantities: Palm identities, stability criteria, PASTA, Pollaczek–Khinchin. Chapter 4 asks a different question. When you cannot compute a queue, can you at least say it is better than another one?

That requires an order on distributions. The chapter builds a family of them — integral orders — by choosing a class ℒ of test functions and declaring F ≤_ℒ G when ∫f dF ≤ ∫f dG for all f ∈ ℒ. Three matter: {i} the non-decreasing functions, giving the strong (stochastic) order; {cx} the convex functions, giving the convex order; and their intersection {icx}.

The goal

An integral order compares two distributions that need not live on the same probability space, and that is both its convenience and its difficulty. Strassen's theorems say each of these orders is secretly a statement about a coupling.

Theorem 4.2.2 (p.278), Strassen's ≤_cx theorem:

F ≤_cx G   ⟺   ∃ X ~ F, Y ~ G on one space with  E[Y | X] = X  a.s.
F ≤_icx G  ⟺   the same with  E[Y | X] ≥ X  a.s.

The convex order holds exactly when G is a martingale dilation of F — obtained by spreading each point out without moving its conditional mean. That is what makes the order usable: comparison results for queues become induction arguments on a coupling instead of analytic manipulations of convolutions of c.d.f.'s.

Its companion Theorem 4.2.1 is the ≤_st version, where the coupling is the simpler X ≤ Y a.s. In dimension one both are explicit — take X = F⁻¹(U), Y = G⁻¹(U) for a uniform U. In dimension n there is no such formula, and that is why these are Strassen's theorems. The book attributes both to Strassen (1965) and proves neither.

Why FIFO is optimal

§4.1 is a different kind of comparison: not between two queues, but between two service disciplines for the same queue. The order there is majorization ≺, which compares how spread out two vectors of the same total are.

The answer is that FIFO minimizes E⁰[f(V)] for every convex f (Property 4.1.3), and the proof is an interchange argument. Under any non-preemptive discipline that uses no information on the service times, customer k effectively receives service σ_{γ(k)} for some permutation γ; Lemma 4.1.3 shows the same queue is produced by FIFO fed with that reordered input, and that the reordering does not change the law of the input. Lemma 4.1.4 passes to the limit, which needs ρ < 1. Lemmas 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 then do the combinatorics: undoing one inversion of γ makes the waiting-time vector less spread out, so the identity permutation — FIFO — is extremal.

Feller's paradox, and what survives it

§4.4 compares time-stationary queues, and opens with a warning. T_n[P⁰] ≤_i T̃_n[P̃⁰] for every n does not imply T_n[P] ≤_i T̃_n[P̃]: Example 4.4.1, "Feller's paradox revisited", exhibits a Poisson process and a renewal process where the Palm order holds and the stationary one fails. The order does not pass from the Palm probability to the stationary one.

For ≤_cx it does. Lemma 4.4.1 is why: it expands E_P[f(N[0,x))] as a series of second differences of f against Palm expectations, and a convex f makes every coefficient non-negative. Lemma 4.4.2 handles the S-orders, built by dividing Palm integrals by the mean cycle length, and shows that the normalisation does not hide the comparison it normalises by.

Formalization scope

  • Orders. ≤_i, ≤_cx, ≤_icx on distributions on ℝⁿ are integral orders over the book's test classes (§4.2.1), with the page's qualification that only test functions with well-defined integrals count. Majorization ≺ is (4.1.2) with increasing reorderings of both vectors.
  • Strassen. Both theorems are stated as equivalences, with the coupling existential over the probability space. Theorem 4.2.2 carries both clauses — E[Y | X] = X for ≤_cx, E[Y | X] ≥ X for ≤_icx, as conditional expectations given σ(X) — and assumes both distributions integrable; Theorem 4.2.1 has no integrability hypothesis. A one-directional statement (the Jensen half) is not the theorem.
  • The queue of §4.1.3 is constructed: a GI/GI input (i.i.d. inter-arrival and service times, independent), a single work-conserving server started empty, and any non-preemptive discipline whose choices are measurable in the information the book's σ-field 𝒢_t carries (arrivals, service times of customers already started) plus external randomisation. FIFO is one such discipline. The interchange permutations γ_n and their limit γ are built from the schedule as on pp.268–270; Lemma 4.1.4 assumes ρ = E[σ₀]/E[τ₀] < 1.
  • Lemma 4.4.1 is stated with the exact second-difference series and assumes that series converges absolutely; the page states it for all f, which fails for heavy-tailed counts and sparse f.
  • The S-orders test against {I-ℒ} — primitives ∫_0^t f(u, x) du of test functions — and apply only to distributions whose first coordinate is a.s. positive with a finite mean.

What this mission provides

None of it exists. Mathlib has no stochastic order, no convex order, no increasing-convex order, no majorization, no Schur-convexity and no Strassen theorem; the platform returns zero hits for q=stochastic ordering. Everything in this chapter is new substrate — and §§4.1–4.2 need nothing from Palm calculus, so this mission can be read on its own.

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