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2,743 missions · 1,549 completed

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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Direct Trade Sourcing Strategies for Specialty Coffee: specialized, mixed or diversified sourcing is optimal exactly when marginal revenue at QLQ_LQL​ and QHQ_HQH​ is below or above marginal costResearch Paper

Specialty coffee roasters buy single-origin beans through direct trade: they contract acreage with a grower before harvest and take the crop that passes the quality specification. A single-origin label (SL) sells at a premium to a small connoisseur segment, while a blend label (BL) has a much larger market. Beans bought for SL can always be sold as BL, a…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Technical Note—On Hiring Secretaries with Stochastic Departures: An Optimal Policy Depends Only on Time and Number of Arrivals, Monotone in the Number and, for Uniform Arrivals, in TimeResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem a known number nnn of candidates is interviewed in uniformly random order, and each candidate must be accepted or rejected on the spot; the goal is to hire the best one. Its optimal rule (reject the first ≈n/e\approx n/e≈n/e candidates, then accept the first one better than all before) and its success probability ≈1/e\approx 1/e≈1/e are…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy: Every Hyperfinite Purely Atomic Bayesian Game Has a Harsányi ε-Equilibrium for Every ε > 0Research Paper

In a game of incomplete information each player learns a private type and then acts. Two equilibrium notions coexist. A Bayesian (interim) equilibrium asks every type of every player to best-respond given its beliefs. A Harsányi (ex ante) equilibrium asks each player to choose a strategy for all of their types at once that is optimal on average under their…

40 thms1 active userReviewed
Statistics·Captain: Shuze Chen

Always Valid Inference: Continuous Monitoring of A/B Tests: First-order efficiency of mixture sequential probability ratio testsResearch Paper

An A/B experiment collects observations while a user decides whether the evidence is strong enough to act. A user may inspect the experiment repeatedly and stop when a result looks convincing. A test calibrated only for one sample size does not automatically retain its error guarantee under that behavior. A sequential test instead makes the stopping…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Exact Simulation of Stochastic Volatility and Other Affine Jump Diffusion Processes: Exact Heston simulation and unbiased derivative pricingResearch Paper

A Monte Carlo price estimate averages discounted payoffs over simulated scenarios. Its statistical error can be assessed from the variation of those payoffs. When a continuous-time stochastic model is replaced by a finite time grid, a second error enters: the simulated distribution differs from the model distribution. Increasing the number of scenarios does…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Dynamic Pricing with Demand Learning in the Presence of Outlier Customers: Adaptive regret with general inventoryResearch Paper

A retailer must learn demand while selling a fixed stock over a finite season. A high price preserves inventory but may leave profitable sales unrealized. A low price can exhaust stock before later customers arrive. Learning is harder when some customers behave unlike the population whose demand the retailer wants to learn. Those customers can arrive in a…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Stopping and Free-Boundary Problems VI: Uniqueness of the American Put BoundaryTextbook

An American put option gives its holder the right to sell an asset for a fixed strike price before a specified maturity. Exercising produces an immediate payoff, while waiting preserves the possibility of receiving a larger payoff later. The pricing problem therefore includes a decision about when to stop. In the geometric Brownian model without dividends,…

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Stochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Stopping and Free-Boundary Problems IV: Sharp Logarithmic Maximal InequalitiesTextbook

A process may make a large excursion before returning to a small terminal value. A maximal inequality quantifies how much information about that excursion is retained by a terminal observation. For nonnegative submartingales, logarithmic moments provide a useful level of control between a first moment and a fixed higher power moment. This mission concerns…

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Control Theory·Captain: Shuze Chen

Entropy Regularization for Mean Field Games with Learning: Explicit Nash equilibrium with enhanced entropyResearch Paper

A large population of interacting agents can make individual decisions depend on the distribution of everyone else's states and actions. A mean field game describes this interaction through a representative agent and population distributions. Randomizing actions allows an agent to explore while still responding to the population. Entropy regularization…

6 thms1 active userReviewed
Markov ChainOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stability of Queueing Networks III: Fluid-Limit Stability Implies Positive Harris RecurrenceTextbook

A queueing network can have spare capacity at every station and still accumulate an ever-growing population of jobs. Service priorities and routing can prevent the available capacity from being used where it is needed. For networks with general interarrival and service distributions, an explicit stationary distribution is usually unavailable. The stability…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Markov ChainOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stability of Queueing Networks I: Product-Form Stationary DistributionsTextbook

A queueing network describes jobs that receive service at several stations and move between them before leaving. A stationary distribution answers questions about the network at a typical time: how many jobs are waiting, which classes they belong to, and how jobs are arranged at each station. Such distributions can be difficult to determine because a…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Actuarial ScienceOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory for Measures of Tail Risk: A Tail Risk Measure Is Coherent, Convex or Monetary if and Only if Its Generator IsResearch Paper

Banking and insurance regulation measures capital requirements with risk measures that look only at the tail of a loss distribution. The Basel framework moved from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES) for market risk (BCBS, Minimum capital requirements for market risk, 2016), and both VaR and ES at level ppp depend on a loss only through its…

15 thms1 active userReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Optimization XII: Finite-Horizon Robust Bellman RecursionTextbook

A routing decision can have a known immediate cost while its consequences depend on uncertain weather. A controller observes the current state, chooses an action, and then faces a random next state. A policy optimized for one estimated transition model may perform poorly when those estimates change. Chapter 13 of Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski, Robust…

4 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

A Probabilistic Approach to Extended Finite State Mean Field Games: With Lipschitz Rates and Costs and a Unique Hamiltonian Minimizer, a Nash Equilibrium in Closed-Loop Strategies ExistsResearch Paper

Mean field games describe the limit of stochastic differential games with a large number of statistically identical players, each interacting with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states (Lasry and Lions, Mean field games, 2007; Huang, Malhamé and Caines, 2006). Models whose players move among finitely many states (an infection…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonasymptotic Analysis of Monte Carlo Tree Search: UCB with a Polynomial Bonus on a Non-Stationary Bandit Converges and Concentrates PolynomiallyResearch Paper

Monte Carlo tree search repeatedly chooses actions using estimates built from earlier simulations. The rewards attached to an action need not form an independent, identically distributed sequence: deeper parts of the search tree change as the search proceeds. Shah, Xie and Xu isolate this difficulty in a non-stationary multi-armed bandit and study a version…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reusing Historical Trajectories in Natural Policy Gradient via Importance Sampling: Asymptotic Normality of the RNPG Error, with Reuse Shrinking the Joint-Noise Covariance by 1/KResearch Paper

In reinforcement learning, each policy update may require new interaction with an environment. When interaction is costly, an optimizer can retain past trajectories and use them again, provided it corrects for the different policy that generated them. Lin, Wang, and Zhou study this idea for natural policy gradient, using importance weights to reuse earlier…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
CombinatoricsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Conditional Uniformity and Hawkes Processes: Given Its Size, a Hawkes Cluster's Compensator Points Are ρ Times the Order Statistics of a Uniform Random Parking Function Minus i.i.d. UniformsResearch Paper

Hawkes processes are point processes in which every event raises the rate of future events. They are used to model contagion in financial markets, earthquake aftershocks, the spread of posts on social networks and arrivals to service systems (Hawkes 1971; Hawkes and Oakes 1974). Hawkes and Oakes showed that a stationary Hawkes process is a Poisson stream of…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
Optimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Convergence Rates for Regularized Optimal Transport via Quantization: Entropic and f-Divergence Rates for Costs with Bounded Second Derivative via Martingale Quantization of an Optimal PlanResearch Paper

Optimal transport asks how cheaply several prescribed probability distributions can be coupled. Adding a divergence penalty relative to their independent product makes the problem amenable to numerical methods, but changes its value. A quantitative bound on that change tells users of regularized transport how much bias a chosen regularization parameter can…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Constrained Information Design: The Value of an Information Design Problem with Equality and Inequality Constraints Equals the Concave Hull of the Constraint-Modified Objective at the PriorResearch Paper

In information design (Bayesian persuasion), a designer commits to a signal about an unknown state, and every signal induces a distribution over the receiver's posterior beliefs. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) showed that the distributions a signal can induce are exactly the Bayes-plausible ones, those whose mean posterior is the prior, and that the…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distortion in Prices Due to Passive Investing: Market Indexing Leaves the Price Efficiency of the Market Portfolio Unchanged and Erodes That of Every Other Portfolio at an Increasing RateResearch Paper

Passive funds hold a market index rather than selecting individual stocks. In the model of Baruch and Zhang (2022), this difference matters for what prices reveal. An investor who studies individual stocks can bring information about their payoffs into trading; an investor restricted to the market portfolio cannot make the same stock-by-stock trades. The…

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Mean Field Analysis of Deep Neural Networks: The SGD-Trained Two-Hidden-Layer Network Converges, as Its Layer Widths Grow in Turn, to the Unique Solution of a Limiting Integro-Differential SystemResearch Paper

A neural network can change its behavior substantially when both its width and its training duration grow. For a network with two hidden layers, the parameters of the layers interact during training, so a large-width description must account for the output of the actual optimization algorithm. Sirignano and Spiliopoulos study this question for online…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Terminal Ranking Games: The Rank-Based Mean Field Tournament Has an Equilibrium, Characterized by an Explicit Quantile Formula, a Fixed-Point Equation for the Mean and an Explicit Game ValueResearch Paper

Tournaments and contests reward agents by their relative standing: sales bonuses for the top performers, promotions, prizes for the first to finish, research competitions. Since Lazear and Rosen (Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, 1981) such rank-order incentives have been a standard object in economics and operations research, and the…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Set Values for Nonzero-Sum Games with Multiple Equilibriums: The Set Value of a Continuous-Time Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Game Satisfies the Dynamic Programming PrincipleResearch Paper

A nonzero-sum game can have several Nash equilibria with different cost vectors. Selecting one equilibrium before asking how the game behaves over time loses information and may make a proposed dynamic rule depend on that selection. Feinstein, Rudloff and Zhang study the entire set of equilibrium cost vectors and ask whether it can be evaluated consistently…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

McKean–Vlasov Optimal Control: Limit Theory and Equivalence Between Different Formulations: The N-Player Common-Noise Control Value Converges to the McKean–Vlasov ValueResearch Paper

A controller of a large population may choose a separate action for each participant while all participants experience the same random environment. The resulting optimization problem has a growing state space: with NNN participants, the state records NNN paths and NNN controls. A McKean–Vlasov control problem replaces the empirical distribution of those…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficiently Breaking the Curse of Horizon in Off-Policy Evaluation with Double Reinforcement Learning: Cross-Fitted DRL Is Asymptotically Linear and Normal at the MDP Efficiency BoundResearch Paper

Off-policy evaluation (OPE) asks for the long-run value of a target decision policy, using only data collected under a different policy. It arises wherever running the target policy is expensive or unsafe: a new treatment rule in medicine, a new recommendation or pricing rule, a candidate controller in reinforcement learning. Importance-sampling estimators…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
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