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2,744 missions · 1,571 completed

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Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 2: Every Strong MFE Is the Limit in Law of Markovian ε_n-Nash Equilibria of the n-Player GamesResearch Paper

Mean field games (Lasry–Lions 2006, Huang–Malhamé–Caines 2006) describe Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with very many symmetric players. In this description each player interacts with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. The mean field game is meant to be the limit of the nnn-player games as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. Making…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryInformation Theory+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Universality in Polytope Phase Transitions and Message Passing Algorithms 3: Projected Cross-Polytopes Have Weak Neighborliness ρ∗(δ) for Sub-Gaussian Matrices with a Gaussian ComponentResearch Paper

Sparse recovery asks when a vector with few nonzero coordinates can be reconstructed from fewer linear measurements than unknowns. A related geometric question asks how many faces of a high-dimensional cross-polytope survive a random linear projection. The two questions meet at the same threshold: uniqueness of a minimum-one-norm solution corresponds to a…

16 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 1: Empirical Measure Flows of Closed-Loop ε_n-Nash Equilibria Are Tight and Every Limit in Law Is a Weak MFEResearch Paper

Mean field games (MFG) were introduced by Lasry and Lions (2007) and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006) as limits of stochastic differential games with many symmetric players. The model is only meaningful if equilibria of the nnn-player games actually converge to equilibria of the limit game. That convergence depends on what information the players use. For o…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Functional AnalysisOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Bakry–Émery Curvature-Dimension Condition and Riemannian Ricci Curvature Bounds 3: Lipschitz and Pointwise Gradient Bounds on the Heat Semigroup Make Its Dual Semigroup a W₂ ContractionResearch Paper

A lower bound on Ricci curvature can be expressed in two ways that make sense far beyond smooth manifolds. The Eulerian way bounds the gradient of the heat semigroup: Bakry and Émery's Γ2\Gamma_2Γ2​-calculus gives ∣∇Ptf∣2≤e−2Kt Pt∣∇f∣2|\nabla \mathsf P_t f|^2 \le e^{-2Kt}\,\mathsf P_t|\nabla f|^2∣∇Pt​f∣2≤e−2KtPt​∣∇f∣2. The Lagrangian way bounds how heat flow moves probability measures in optimal…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisDifferential GeometryFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Bakry–Émery Curvature-Dimension Condition and Riemannian Ricci Curvature Bounds 2: The Dirichlet Form of an Energy Measure Space Is Twice the Cheeger Energy Iff It Is Upper-RegularResearch Paper

There are two standard ways to do analysis on a non-smooth space. The first starts from an energy: a Dirichlet form E\mathcal EE on L2(X,m)L^2(X,m)L2(X,m), its heat semigroup and its carré du champ Γ\GammaΓ. This is the setting of Bakry–Émery Γ\GammaΓ-calculus and of the curvature-dimension condition BE(K,N)BE(K,N)BE(K,N). The second starts from a metric measure space (X,d,m)(X,d,m)(X,d,m): slopes of…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Differential GeometryFunctional AnalysisOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Bakry–Émery Curvature-Dimension Condition and Riemannian Ricci Curvature Bounds 6: BE(K,N) on Riemannian Energy Measure Spaces Is Stable Under Sturm–Gromov–Hausdorff ConvergenceResearch Paper

Curvature bounds on a smooth Riemannian manifold control diffusion and the behavior of probability measures. Metric measure spaces extend these questions to limits that need not be smooth. A useful curvature condition must continue to hold when a sequence of spaces converges. Ambrosio, Gigli, and Savaré prove that their analytic Bakry–Émery…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 3: Under Convexity Every Markovian ε-Nash Equilibrium Is a Closed-Loop ε-Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an nnn-player stochastic differential game each player controls the drift of its own diffusion and is rewarded through a running and a terminal payoff that depend on its own state and on the empirical distribution of all states. A player's strategy can be closed-loop (path-dependent), reacting to the whole observed history of all states, or Markovian (in…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Block Successive Upper-Bound Minimization Method of Multipliers for Linearly Constrained Convex Optimization 2: Randomized BSUM-M Converges to Primal-Dual Optimal Solutions Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Many large convex problems in signal processing, networking and statistics have a separable objective coupled by linear constraints: KKK blocks of variables, each with its own nonsmooth regularizer and its own feasible set, tied together by ∑kEkxk=q\sum_k E_kx_k=q∑k​Ek​xk​=q. The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is the standard tool for such problems when K=2K=2K=2.…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Global C¹ Regularity of the Value Function in Optimal Stopping Problems 2: In Finite Horizon, Probabilistic Regularity of the Boundary Makes the Time Derivative of the Value Function ContinuousResearch Paper

In an optimal stopping problem the value function VVV and the gain function GGG agree on the stopping set D={V=G}D=\{V=G\}D={V=G}, and V>GV>GV>G on the continuation set CCC. The smooth fit principle says that, at the boundary ∂C\partial C∂C between them, VVV meets GGG with matching first derivatives. Smooth fit is one of the boundary conditions in the free-boundary problems that…

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Mean Field Game of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation 2: The Value Functions of the Penalized Mean Field Games Converge in L¹ to the Value Function of the Liquidation-Constrained GameResearch Paper

Optimal portfolio liquidation asks how a trader should unwind a position of X\mathcal XX shares over a horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T] when trading moves prices. Since Almgren and Chriss (2001) the standard model charges a quadratic cost ηtξt2\eta_t\xi_t^2ηt​ξt2​ for trading at rate ξt\xi_tξt​ (temporary impact) and a risk penalty λtXt2\lambda_tX_t^2λt​Xt2​ on the open position, and imposes the liquidation…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Bakry–Émery Curvature-Dimension Condition and Riemannian Ricci Curvature Bounds 1: The Weak, Pointwise and Gradient Forms of the Bakry–Émery Condition BE(K,N) Are EquivalentResearch Paper

On a Riemannian manifold, a lower bound Ric≥K\mathrm{Ric}\ge KRic≥K together with a dimension bound NNN can be read off from the heat flow alone. This is the Bakry–Émery curvature-dimension condition BE(K,N)BE(K,N)BE(K,N): Bochner's inequality Γ2(f)≥K Γ(f)+1N(Δf)2\Gamma_2(f)\ge K\,\Gamma(f)+\tfrac1N(\Delta f)^2Γ2​(f)≥KΓ(f)+N1​(Δf)2 for the iterated carré du champ. The condition makes sense for any diffusion: weighted…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
Functional AnalysisPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

From Nonlinear Fokker-Planck Equations to Solutions of Distribution Dependent SDE: Density-Dependent McKean–Vlasov SDEs Have Weak Solutions Whose Marginals Solve the Nonlinear FPEResearch Paper

A McKean–Vlasov stochastic differential equation, or distribution dependent SDE, is an SDE whose coefficients depend on the law of the solution itself:

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On Viscosity Solutions of Path Dependent PDEs: Comparison Principle for Viscosity Sub- and Supersolutions of Semilinear PPDEs, and u^0 from the BSDE Is the Unique Viscosity SolutionResearch Paper

Many quantities in stochastic control, mathematical finance and stochastic differential games depend on the whole past of a Brownian path rather than on its current position: the price of an Asian or lookback option, the value of a control problem with delay, the solution of a non-Markovian backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). For Markovian…

16 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

From the Master Equation to Mean Field Game Limit Theory: Large Deviations and Concentration of Measure 2: Nash Equilibrium Empirical Measure Flows Satisfy a Weak LDP Under Common NoiseResearch Paper

A mean field game describes the Nash equilibria of nnn symmetric players whose states interact only through their empirical distribution, in the limit n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. The law of large numbers for the equilibria — convergence of the empirical measure of the nnn-player equilibrium to the mean field equilibrium — was proved in the diffusion setting by Cardaliaguet,…

23 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryOptimal TransportPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Mean Field Games Master Equations with Nonseparable Hamiltonians and Displacement Monotonicity: Under Displacement Monotone H and G, the Master Equation Has a Unique Global Classical SolutionResearch Paper

Mean field games (Lasry–Lions 2006–2007; Huang–Malhamé–Caines 2006) describe Nash equilibria of games with a very large number of symmetric players, each interacting with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. When all players are also exposed to a common noise, the equilibrium is no longer described by a forward–backward pair…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimal TransportStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

From the Master Equation to Mean Field Game Limit Theory: Large Deviations and Concentration of Measure 1: Without Common Noise, n-Player Nash Equilibria Concentrate Dimension-FreeResearch Paper

A large stochastic game has one state process per player. Each player's feedback changes with the empirical distribution of all states, so a finite population remains coupled even when the idiosyncratic Brownian motions are independent. A useful quantitative question is whether a statistic of the entire collection of equilibrium trajectories can deviate…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Functional Itô Calculus and Stochastic Integral Representation of Martingales 2: The Vertical Derivative Extends to a Bijective Isometry W^{1,2}(X) → L²(X) Inverting the Itô IntegralResearch Paper

Every square-integrable martingale of a Brownian filtration is a stochastic integral, Y(T)=E[Y(T)]+∫0Tϕ⋅dWY(T)=E[Y(T)]+\int_0^T\phi\cdot dWY(T)=E[Y(T)]+∫0T​ϕ⋅dW (Itô's representation theorem). The classical theorem gives no formula for ϕ\phiϕ. In hedging, ϕ\phiϕ is the replicating strategy of a claim. In filtering and stochastic control it is the quantity one has to compute. The Clark–Haussmann–Ocone…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamical SystemsMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Convergence and Dynamical Behavior of the ADAM Algorithm for Nonconvex Stochastic Optimization 4: Constant-Step Adam Iterates Converge in Probability to the ODE Solution as γ → 0Research Paper

Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2015, arXiv:1412.6980) is one of the most widely used optimizers for training neural networks. It is a stochastic gradient method that keeps exponential moving averages of the stochastic gradients and of their coordinatewise squares, rescales both by bias-correction factors, and divides the first by the square root of the second. Its…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Functional Itô Calculus and Stochastic Integral Representation of Martingales 1: Functional Itô Formula for C^{1,2}_b Nonanticipative Functionals of a Continuous SemimartingaleResearch Paper

Many quantities in stochastic analysis and mathematical finance depend on the whole past of a process, not only on its current value: running maxima, averages, integrals against the quadratic variation, payoffs of path-dependent options, conditional expectations of path functionals. The classical Itô formula describes the evolution of f(t,X(t))f(t,X(t))f(t,X(t)) for a smooth…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Mean-Field Stochastic Differential Equations and Associated PDEs: The Mean-Field Value Function Is the Unique Classical Solution of Its PDE on [0,T] × ℝ^d × P₂(ℝ^d)Research Paper

A McKean–Vlasov or mean-field stochastic differential equation is an SDE whose coefficients depend on the law of the solution itself. Such equations describe the limit of large systems of weakly interacting particles (Kac's kinetic models, McKean's propagation of chaos) and are the state dynamics of mean-field games and mean-field control. For a classical…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOptimal TransportStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimax Statistical Learning with Wasserstein Distances III: Excess Local Minimax Risk of Wasserstein ERM When One Hypothesis Is SmoothResearch Paper

In ordinary statistical learning, a hypothesis is chosen from training data drawn from a distribution PPP and judged by its risk under that same PPP. In practice the test distribution often differs from the training one: covariate shift, domain drift, adversarial perturbation of inputs. Distributionally robust learning replaces the risk at PPP by the worst risk…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOptimal TransportStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimax Statistical Learning with Wasserstein Distances II: Excess Local Minimax Risk of Wasserstein ERM for a Uniformly Lipschitz ClassResearch Paper

In statistical learning a hypothesis fff is chosen from a class F\mathcal FF using nnn samples drawn from an unknown distribution PPP, and its quality is measured by the risk R(P,f)=EP[f(Z)]R(P,f) = \mathbf E_P[f(Z)]R(P,f)=EP​[f(Z)]. When the distribution at deployment time may differ from the one that generated the data (domain drift, adversarial perturbation, model misspecification), a natural…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-Field Games 2: The Mean-Field Strategies Form an ε_N-Nash Equilibrium of the N-Player Game, with ε_N ≤ cN^{−1/(d+4)}Research Paper

Mean-field games were introduced by Lasry and Lions (2007) and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006) as limits of stochastic differential games with many symmetric players, each interacting with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. The limit replaces a game of NNN coupled players by one representative player facing a deterministic…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-Field Games 1: The McKean–Vlasov FBSDE of a Convex Mean-Field Game Has a Solution, with a Lipschitz FBSDE Value FunctionResearch Paper

A mean-field game describes a population of agents whose individual dynamics and costs depend on the distribution of the population's states. In a large population, an individual agent has negligible influence on that distribution but still responds to it. The mathematical problem is to find a control whose induced state law agrees with the distribution…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Numerical AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On a Perturbation Theory and on Strong Convergence Rates for Stochastic Ordinary and Partial Differential Equations with Nonglobally Monotone Coefficients: Stopped-Tamed Euler Converges at Rate 1/2Research Paper

Stochastic differential equations (SDEs) dXt=μ(Xt) dt+σ(Xt) dWtdX_t=\mu(X_t)\,dt+\sigma(X_t)\,dW_tdXt​=μ(Xt​)dt+σ(Xt​)dWt​ model physical, biological and financial systems whose drift μ\muμ often grows superlinearly: the stochastic Lorenz equation, the stochastic van der Pol and Duffing–van der Pol oscillators, Langevin dynamics. Solutions are rarely explicit, so they are simulated by time-stepping…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
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