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Optimization

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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A New Optimization Algorithm for the Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows: With No Negative Marginal Cost Column, the Set Covering LP Is Optimal and Bounds the VRPTW Optimum from BelowResearch Paper

Motivation

The vehicle routing problem with time windows (VRPTW) asks for minimum-cost routes from a central depot that serve every customer exactly once, respecting vehicle capacity and a time interval in which each customer's service must begin. It models school bus routing, parcel and retail distribution, and dial-a-ride services. Desrochers, Desrosiers and Solomon (Oper. Res. 40 (1992) 342–354) gave an optimization algorithm for the VRPTW that solved benchmark instances with up to 100 customers to optimality, a size far beyond earlier exact methods. Their method, which solves the linear relaxation of a set partitioning model by column generation with routes priced out by a resource-constrained shortest path dynamic program, is the template that later exact vehicle routing algorithms ("branch-and-price") follow.

The mathematical core of the method is a certificate: once the pricing subproblem reports that no route has negative marginal cost (reduced cost), the current linear programming solution is optimal over all routes the subproblem can generate, its value bounds every VRPTW solution from below, and an integral solution covering each customer exactly once is VRPTW-optimal. This mission formalizes that certificate and the lemmas of the paper it rests on.

Setting

The nodes are a depot ddd and customers N∖{d}N\setminus\{d\}N∖{d}. An arc set AAA carries, for each arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), a cost cijc_{ij}cij​ and a duration tijt_{ij}tij​; each node has a demand qiq_iqi​ and a time window [ai,bi][a_i,b_i][ai​,bi​]; vehicles have capacity QQQ.

A path (d,i1,…,iK,d)(d, i_1, \dots, i_K, d)(d,i1​,…,iK​,d) uses arcs of AAA and passes through the depot only at its ends. It is resource-feasible when there are service start times T0=0,T1,…,TK+1T_0 = 0, T_1, \dots, T_{K+1}T0​=0,T1​,…,TK+1​ with Tk+tikik+1≤Tk+1T_k + t_{i_k i_{k+1}} \le T_{k+1}Tk​+tik​ik+1​​≤Tk+1​ (waiting is allowed) and aik≤Tk≤bika_{i_k}\le T_k\le b_{i_k}aik​​≤Tk​≤bik​​, and its load ∑k=1Kqik\sum_{k=1}^{K} q_{i_k}∑k=1K​qik​​ is at most QQQ. Its cost is cr=∑k=0Kcikik+1c_r = \sum_{k=0}^{K} c_{i_k i_{k+1}}cr​=∑k=0K​cik​ik+1​​, and γir\gamma_{ir}γir​ is the number of visits of rrr to customer iii. The paper uses three solution spaces:

  1. feasible routes RRR: resource-feasible paths visiting each customer at most once;
  2. second-model paths: resource-feasible paths where customers may repeat (the state-space relaxation that tracks load and time but not the set of visited customers);
  3. third-model paths: second-model paths with no 2-cycle (i,j,i)(i, j, i)(i,j,i).

A VRPTW solution is a set of feasible routes covering each customer exactly once; its cost is the sum of the route costs.

The set covering type model (Sec. 4) over a column set R\mathcal RR is

min⁡∑rcrxrs.t.∑rγirxr≥1 (i≠d),∑rxr−Xd=0,∑rcrxr−Xc=0,\min \sum_r c_r x_r \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_r \gamma_{ir}x_r \ge 1\ (i \ne d),\quad \sum_r x_r - X_d = 0,\quad \sum_r c_r x_r - X_c = 0,minr∑​cr​xr​s.t.r∑​γir​xr​≥1 (i=d),r∑​xr​−Xd​=0,r∑​cr​xr​−Xc​=0,

with xr∈{0,1}x_r\in\{0,1\}xr​∈{0,1} and Xd,Xc≥0X_d, X_c\ge 0Xd​,Xc​≥0 integer. Its LP relaxation replaces xr∈{0,1}x_r\in\{0,1\}xr​∈{0,1} by xr≥0x_r\ge 0xr​≥0 and drops integrality. For dual values πi\pi_iπi​, πd\pi_dπd​, πc\pi_cπc​ of the three rows, the marginal cost of a column and of an arc are

cˉr=cr−∑i≠dπiγir−πd−πccr,cˉij=(1−πc)cij−πi(πi:=πd at i=d).\bar c_r = c_r - \sum_{i\ne d}\pi_i\gamma_{ir} - \pi_d - \pi_c c_r,\qquad \bar c_{ij} = (1-\pi_c)c_{ij} - \pi_i\quad(\pi_i := \pi_d \text{ at } i = d).cˉr​=cr​−i=d∑​πi​γir​−πd​−πc​cr​,cˉij​=(1−πc​)cij​−πi​(πi​:=πd​ at i=d).

Formalization targets

Goal: the column generation certificate

Let R0R_0R0​ be a finite set of third-model paths, zˉ=(xˉ,Xˉd,Xˉc)\bar z = (\bar x, \bar X_d, \bar X_c)zˉ=(xˉ,Xˉd​,Xˉc​) an optimal solution of the LP relaxation restricted to R0R_0R0​, and (π,πd,πc)(\pi,\pi_d,\pi_c)(π,πd​,πc​) an optimal solution of its dual. If every third-model path has nonnegative marginal cost, ∑k=0Kcˉikik+1≥0\sum_{k=0}^{K}\bar c_{i_k i_{k+1}} \ge 0∑k=0K​cˉik​ik+1​​≥0, then

zˉ is optimal for the LP relaxation over all third-model paths,\bar z \text{ is optimal for the LP relaxation over all third-model paths},zˉ is optimal for the LP relaxation over all third-model paths,

and, when arc costs are nonnegative, ∑rcrxˉr≤cost(S)\sum_r c_r \bar x_r \le \text{cost}(S)∑r​cr​xˉr​≤cost(S) for every VRPTW solution SSS; if moreover xˉ\bar xxˉ is integral and covers each customer exactly once, its support is an optimal VRPTW solution.

Milestones

  1. Feasible routes ⊆\subseteq⊆ third-model paths ⊆\subseteq⊆ second-model paths (Sec. 3, p. 346).
  2. cˉr=∑k=0Kcˉikik+1\bar c_r = \sum_{k=0}^{K}\bar c_{i_k i_{k+1}}cˉr​=∑k=0K​cˉik​ik+1​​ for every path (Sec. 4.1, p. 347).
  3. Nonnegative column marginal costs over all third-model paths make the restricted optimum optimal (Sec. 4, p. 346).
  4. Every VRPTW solution is a feasible LP point of equal cost (Sec. 2, p. 344).
  5. An integral, exactly covering LP point is a VRPTW solution of equal cost (Sec. 5, p. 348).
  6. Under the strict triangle inequality, LP optima over routes do not overcover (Sec. 5, p. 348).
  7. The four time window reduction conditions preserve the set of paths (Sec. 6.1, p. 349).
  8. The Figure 1 example has 11, 22 and 12 solutions in the three models (pp. 345–346).

Significance

The certificate is the correctness statement of column generation for vehicle routing: it says when the algorithm may stop, what the value it stops with means, and when the branch-and-bound tree can be skipped. The same argument, with a different subproblem, underlies branch-and-price for crew scheduling, cutting stock and many other set partitioning formulations. Milestone 2 is the observation that turns pricing into a shortest path problem on the original network, and milestone 7 is the preprocessing used before every dynamic program over time windows.

The paper's results are classical and their proofs are short in prose. None of them, nor any VRPTW column generation statement, has a machine-checked proof on the platform; the closest existing items concern split deliveries (Desaulniers 2010) or general finite LP duality. The mission produces a reusable formal model of resource-constrained paths, the set covering LP and its restricted dual, on which later branch-and-price papers can build.

Difficulty

The goal combines three ingredients that do not fit together automatically. First, LP duality for the restricted problem: the hypothesis gives an optimal dual, but optimality over all columns needs equality of the restricted primal and dual values, which is strong duality for a finite LP with equality rows and sign-constrained auxiliary variables. Second, the column set of the full LP is infinite in general: a nonelementary path can repeat customers, so the comparison must go through the finitely many columns a given feasible point uses. Third, the pricing hypothesis is about arc sums along node sequences while the LP is about column costs and visit counts; matching them needs the depot to appear exactly at the two ends of a path.

The tempting shortcut of quantifying the pricing hypothesis over the current columns only gives dual feasibility for the restricted LP, which says nothing about columns not yet generated. The lower bound also fails for arbitrary real costs, because row (4) with Xc≥0X_c \ge 0Xc​≥0 excludes negative-cost solutions from the LP while the VRPTW still contains them.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin (n+1) with the depot 0. A path is the list of its customers; its node sequence is 0 :: p ++ [0], so a path visits at least one customer and meets the depot only at its ends. The arc set is an arbitrary relation; costs, durations, demands and windows are arbitrary reals, and every sign or triangle condition a statement needs appears in its own hypotheses. The committed readings:

  • service times are indexed by position (a second-model path may visit a node twice), with T0=0T_0 = 0T0​=0;
  • the depot's window also applies at the return (0≤k≤K+10 \le k \le K+10≤k≤K+1, where the page prints 0≤k≤K0\le k\le K0≤k≤K);
  • the capacity constraint is load ≤Q\le Q≤Q (the page says "less than"; the recurrences and Figure 1 use ≤\le≤);
  • a 2-cycle is a pattern of the customer list, so (d,i,d)(d, i, d)(d,i,d) is not one;
  • the LP relaxation keeps Xd,Xc≥0X_d, X_c \ge 0Xd​,Xc​≥0, relaxes xr∈{0,1}x_r\in\{0,1\}xr​∈{0,1} to xr≥0x_r\ge 0xr​≥0 with no upper bound, and is the root LP without branching rows; its dual is that of the restricted LP, with πi,πd,πc≥0\pi_i, \pi_d, \pi_c \ge 0πi​,πd​,πc​≥0;
  • LP points are finitely supported functions on lists (Finsupp); VRPTW solutions are Finsets of routes;
  • clauses 2–3 of the goal and milestone 4 assume nonnegative arc costs (the paper's costs are distances);
  • milestone 6 adds complete arcs, positive costs, a triangle inequality on durations and nonnegative demands; milestone 7 applies the conditions at customers only; milestone 8 lists (d,2,1,2,1,d)(d,2,1,2,1,d)(d,2,1,2,1,d) where the page prints (d,2,1,2,d)(d,2,1,2,d)(d,2,1,2,d) twice.

The goal is not to be trivialized: the pricing hypothesis ranges over all third-model paths, not the current columns; equality of primal and dual values is not assumed; the full column set is not R0R_0R0​; and "covered exactly once" is not presupposed to mean elementary columns, which must be derived from integrality.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a reusable finite LP strong duality interface for Finsupp-indexed columns, and lemmas about arc sums over node sequences.

Selected references

  • M. Desrochers, J. Desrosiers, M. Solomon, A new optimization algorithm for the vehicle routing problem with time windows, Operations Research 40(2), 1992, 342–354. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.2.342
  • N. Christofides, A. Mingozzi, P. Toth, State-space relaxation procedures for the computation of bounds to routing problems, Networks 11(2), 1981, 145–164. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230110207
  • D. J. Houck, J.-C. Picard, M. Queyranne, R. R. Vemuganti, The travelling salesman problem as a constrained shortest path problem: theory and computational experience, Opsearch 17, 1980, 93–109.
  • G. Desaulniers, Branch-and-price-and-cut for the split-delivery vehicle routing problem with time windows, Operations Research 58(1), 2010, 179–192. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0713
13 thms1 active userReviewed
🏆Completed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Partition of a Matroid Into Independent Subsets: A Matroid Splits Into k Independent Sets Iff Every Subset A Has |A| ≤ k·r(A)Research Paper

Motivation

A matroid abstracts the dependence structure of the columns of a matrix: which sets of columns are linearly independent, forgetting the numbers themselves. Graphs are the special case of incidence matrices over the integers mod 2, where a set of edges is independent exactly when it contains no cycle. A natural combinatorial question in this setting is the minimum partition (or covering) problem: how few independent sets are needed to cover all the elements? For a graph this is the least number of forests that cover its edges, its arboricity.

J. Edmonds answered this question for every finite matroid in Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets (J. Res. NBS 69B, 1965, doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004). The answer is a good characterization in Edmonds's sense: there is a short certificate both that a partition into kkk independent sets exists (the partition itself) and that it does not (a single subset that is too large for its rank). The paper is also the source of the matroid partition algorithm, which together with matroid intersection became a basic tool of combinatorial optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1935 — H. Whitney introduces matroids through rank and independence postulates (doi:10.2307/2371182).
  • 1961–1964 — C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams and W. T. Tutte characterize graphs whose edges split into kkk forests, and graphs containing kkk edge-disjoint spanning trees (doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12).
  • 1965 — Edmonds proves the partition theorem for all matroids, with Nash-Williams's forest theorem as a corollary; the companion paper "Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams" treats the packing side.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements and call some subsets of MMM independent. Edmonds's two axioms are:

  • Axiom 1. Every subset of an independent set is independent. (A system satisfying this is an independence system.)
  • Axiom 2. For any subset AAA of the elements, all maximal independent sets contained in AAA contain the same number of elements.

A matroid is a system satisfying both. The rank r(A)r(A)r(A) of A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M is the largest cardinality of an independent subset of AAA; in a matroid every maximal independent subset of AAA has exactly r(A)r(A)r(A) elements.

A circuit is a minimal dependent set. A span (closed set) is a set SSS such that no circuit has exactly one element outside SSS, and the span S(A)S(A)S(A) of AAA is the minimal span containing AAA. A partition into kkk independent sets is a family I1,…,IkI_1,\dots,I_kI1​,…,Ik​ of mutually disjoint independent sets whose union is MMM; any number of the IiI_iIi​ may be empty.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 69)

For every finite matroid MMM and every integer k≥0k\ge 0k≥0, the elements of MMM can be partitioned into kkk independent sets if and only if there is no A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M with

∣A∣>k⋅r(A).|A|>k\cdot r(A).∣A∣>k⋅r(A).

The condition ranges over all subsets AAA of MMM, as printed.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's own lemmas and the claims of its main proof, in order.

  1. PROPOSITION 1. Axioms 1 and 2 are equivalent to Axioms 1 and 2', where Axiom 2' says that the union of an independent set and one element contains at most one circuit.
  2. PROPOSITION 2. Axioms 1 and 2' are equivalent to the circuit axioms 1c (no circuit contains another) and 2c (if distinct circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​ share eee, then C1∪C2−eC_1\cup C_2-eC1​∪C2​−e contains a circuit).
  3. PROPOSITION 3 (Lehman). If e∈C1∩C2e\in C_1\cap C_2e∈C1​∩C2​ and a∈C1−C2a\in C_1-C_2a∈C1​−C2​ for circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​, some circuit CCC satisfies a∈C⊆C1∪C2−ea\in C\subseteq C_1\cup C_2-ea∈C⊆C1​∪C2​−e.
  4. PROPOSITION 4. e∈S(A)e\in S(A)e∈S(A) if and only if e∈Ae\in Ae∈A or some circuit CCC has C−A={e}C-A=\{e\}C−A={e}.
  5. PROPOSITION 5. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the unique maximal set containing AAA with rank r(A)r(A)r(A); in particular r(S(I))=∣I∣r(S(I))=|I|r(S(I))=∣I∣ for independent III.
  6. "Only if" (§1.3). For any independence system, a partition into kkk independent sets gives ∣A∣≤k⋅r(A)|A|\le k\cdot r(A)∣A∣≤k⋅r(A) for all AAA.
  7. Counting step (§1.6). If xxx lies in none of kkk disjoint sets IiI_iIi​, and x∈Sx\in Sx∈S with ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S), then some IiI_iIi​ has ∣Ii∩S∣<r(S)|I_i\cap S|<r(S)∣Ii​∩S∣<r(S).
  8. Rank drop (§1.6). For a span SSS and an independent III with ∣I∩S∣<r(S)|I\cap S|<r(S)∣I∩S∣<r(S): S(I∩S)⊆SS(I\cap S)\subseteq SS(I∩S)⊆S and r(S(I∩S))<r(S)r(S(I\cap S))<r(S)r(S(I∩S))<r(S).
  9. One-element augmentation (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S) for every span SSS, any kkk disjoint independent sets missing xxx can be rearranged into kkk disjoint independent sets covering exactly the old elements and xxx.
  10. "If" from spans (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k⋅r(S)|S|\le k\cdot r(S)∣S∣≤k⋅r(S) holds for every span SSS, then MMM partitions into kkk independent sets.

A further item states the paper's COROLLARY (Nash-Williams): the edges of a loopless finite graph GGG can be colored with kkk colors so that no circuit is one color if and only if no nonempty node set UUU has ∣EU∣>k(∣U∣−1)|E_U|>k(|U|-1)∣EU​∣>k(∣U∣−1), where EUE_UEU​ is the set of edges with both ends in UUU.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the base case of matroid union: the sets coverable by kkk independent sets form a matroid whose rank is min⁡A(∣M∖A∣+k r(A))\min_{A}\bigl(|M\setminus A|+k\,r(A)\bigr)minA​(∣M∖A∣+kr(A)), and the paper's proof is the origin of the polynomial-time matroid partition algorithm and of Edmonds's later matroid intersection theory. Its graphic case gives the arboricity formula of Nash-Williams, used for sparse-graph decompositions and orientation problems. The criterion is a certificate: a single set AAA with ∣A∣>k r(A)|A|>k\,r(A)∣A∣>kr(A) proves that no partition exists.

The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every matroid textbook. As far as the platform and Mathlib record, it has no machine-checked proof: Mathlib has matroids, circuits, closure and strong circuit elimination for its own Matroid structure, but no matroid union or partition theorem. This mission produces a formal proof from Edmonds's own axioms (Axiom 2 as an equal-cardinality condition, not an exchange axiom), together with the equivalences between his axiom systems, which are themselves standard results.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is a three-line count. The difficulty lies in the converse: a greedy procedure that fills the kkk sets one after another fails even for matroids, so an element xxx that fits in no current set must be accommodated by moving other elements between sets. Such a chain of exchanges must keep all kkk sets independent and disjoint at every step and must terminate; stating it with sets whose contents change while their labels persist is the part that needs careful bookkeeping in a formal proof. A second, smaller difficulty is the translation between the paper's equal-cardinality Axiom 2 and the circuit and span language its proof uses (PROPOSITIONS 1–5).

Formalization scope

  • Elements. A finite type α\alphaα with decidable equality; MMM is Finset.univ, subsets are Finset α, and the independent sets are a predicate Indep : Finset α → Prop.
  • Axiom 1 and the rank are the published Whitney definitions IndepI1 and rankOfIndep (WhitneyMatroid.RankIndep.Postulates). The rank is integer-valued, and every inequality ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ versus k r(A)k\,r(A)kr(A) is compared in Z\mathbb ZZ with k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N.
  • Axiom 2 is stated exactly as printed: maximal independent subsets of each AAA have equal cardinality. It is not replaced by an augmentation axiom or by Mathlib's Matroid.
  • Added hypothesis. Every matroid statement assumes that ∅\emptyset∅ is independent. The paper's rank presupposes it; for the empty family Axioms 1 and 2 hold vacuously and THEOREM 1 fails (an empty ground set and k=1k=1k=1).
  • Spans are formalized from the paper's words, ∣C∖S∣≠1|C\setminus S|\ne1∣C∖S∣=1 for every circuit CCC; the formula printed beside them, ∣S∩C∣≠1|S\cap C|\ne1∣S∩C∣=1, is a misprint. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the intersection of all spans containing AAA.
  • Partitions are indexed families Fin k → Finset α of pairwise disjoint independent sets covering MMM, with empty parts allowed and k=0k=0k=0 included.
  • The COROLLARY uses a graph given by ends : E → Sym2 V (parallel edges allowed, loops excluded), with independence as linear independence of incidence columns over Z/2Z\mathbb Z/2\mathbb ZZ/2Z. It quantifies over nonempty UUU: as printed, U=∅U=\emptysetU=∅ makes the statement false.
  • Not a trivialization. The goal mentions neither spans nor circuits and quantifies over all subsets AAA; the spans-only condition is a separate milestone, and the augmentation step requires the new family to cover exactly the old elements plus xxx.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the axiom equivalences (reusable for any work with Edmonds-style or circuit-axiom matroids), the span lemmas, the augmentation step, and bridges to Mathlib's Matroid that would let its circuit and closure library be reused.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 67–72. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004
  • J. Edmonds, Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 73–77. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.005
  • C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams, Decomposition of finite graphs into forests, J. London Math. Soc. 39 (1964), 12. doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, Amer. J. Math. 57 (1935), 509–533. doi:10.2307/2371182
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Numerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Truncated-Newton Algorithms for Large-Scale Unconstrained Optimization 1: Truncated-Newton CG Iterates Have ‖g(x_k)‖ → 0 and Converge to Any Limit Point with Positive Definite HessianResearch Paper

Motivation

Large scale unconstrained optimization often makes an exact Newton step expensive. At each iterate, Newton's method asks for a solution of a linear system involving the Hessian, and the cost of solving that system can dominate the cost of evaluating the objective. Dembo and Steihaug's 1983 truncated Newton method uses conjugate gradients to stop the linear solve early, either when the residual is small enough or when the current direction has insufficient positive curvature. The resulting direction is paired with a line search. The question for this mission is whether those early exits still give a globally reliable optimization method under the paper's assumptions. The answer, in Theorem 2.1, is that every resulting run has gradient norm tending to zero, and a positive definite Hessian at one limit point makes the whole sequence converge to that point.

Setting

The objective is a twice continuously differentiable function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R. Write g(x)=∇f(x)g(x)=\nabla f(x)g(x)=∇f(x) for its gradient and H(x)=Dg(x)H(x)=Dg(x)H(x)=Dg(x) for its Hessian. For every initial point x0x_0x0​, the paper assumes that the sublevel set L(x0)={x:f(x)≤f(x0)}L(x_0)=\{x:f(x)\le f(x_0)\}L(x0​)={x:f(x)≤f(x0​)} is bounded. The formalization uses the Euclidean norm and its inner product, so the operator norm of HHH is also Euclidean.

At a major iterate xkx_kxk​, the minor conjugate-gradient iteration starts at p0=0p_0=0p0​=0 with residual and direction r0=d0=−g(xk)r_0=d_0=-g(x_k)r0​=d0​=−g(xk​). It maintains a scalar δi\delta_iδi​, initialized to ∥r0∥2\|r_0\|^2∥r0​∥2, alongside the usual conjugate-gradient state. Before taking its next conjugate-gradient step, it checks whether ⟨di,H(xk)di⟩≤εδi\langle d_i,H(x_k)d_i\rangle\le\varepsilon\delta_i⟨di​,H(xk​)di​⟩≤εδi​. If so, it returns d0=−g(xk)d_0=-g(x_k)d0​=−g(xk​) when i=0i=0i=0 and the current approximation pip_ipi​ otherwise. If this first test fails, it takes a conjugate-gradient step and checks whether ∥ri+1∥≤ηk∥g(xk)∥\|r_{i+1}\|\le\eta_k\|g(x_k)\|∥ri+1​∥≤ηk​∥g(xk​)∥. If so, it returns pi+1p_{i+1}pi+1​. A TNCG direction is the direction returned by the first exit that occurs. The forcing value ηk\eta_kηk​ sets the residual tolerance.

The major iteration chooses a positive step length λk\lambda_kλk​. With pkp_kpk​ the minor iteration's output and 0<α<1/20<\alpha<1/20<α<1/2, α<β<1\alpha<\beta<1α<β<1, the line search requires both sufficient decrease and a curvature condition:

f(xk+λkpk)≤f(xk)+αλk⟨g(xk),pk⟩,⟨g(xk+λkpk),pk⟩≥β⟨g(xk),pk⟩.f(x_k+\lambda_k p_k)\le f(x_k)+\alpha\lambda_k\langle g(x_k),p_k\rangle, \qquad \langle g(x_k+\lambda_kp_k),p_k\rangle\ge\beta\langle g(x_k),p_k\rangle.f(xk​+λk​pk​)≤f(xk​)+αλk​⟨g(xk​),pk​⟩,⟨g(xk​+λk​pk​),pk​⟩≥β⟨g(xk​),pk​⟩.

The update is xk+1=xk+λkpkx_{k+1}=x_k+\lambda_kp_kxk+1​=xk​+λk​pk​. A run is a sequence satisfying this rule from its specified starting point. The paper also states an alternative function-value curvature condition; this mission defines it because the local unit-step theorem discusses both choices, although the main run uses the displayed gradient condition.

Formalization targets

Global convergence

For every starting point there is a TNCG run, and every run satisfies

∥g(xk)∥⟶0.\|g(x_k)\|\longrightarrow0.∥g(xk​)∥⟶0.

If x∗x^*x∗ is a limit point of that run and H(x∗)H(x^*)H(x∗) is positive definite, then

xk⟶x∗.x_k\longrightarrow x^*.xk​⟶x∗.

The existence clause is the formal meaning of the paper's assertion that the iterates are well defined. The six milestones follow the paper's appendix: the conjugate-gradient relations of Theorem A.1; the uniform descent and direction bounds of Lemma A.2; the line-search existence and directional-derivative limit used in the proof of Theorem A.3; Theorem A.3 itself; and eventual unit-step admissibility in Theorem A.4. The companion Theorem 2.2 addresses the eventual residual exit and unit-step behavior when a run converges to a point with positive definite Hessian. These results are all stated in the original paper.

Significance

The target shows that the computational shortcut in the inner linear solve preserves a global first-order guarantee: no TNCG run can maintain a gradient norm bounded away from zero. It also identifies when the sequence has one limit, rather than merely having stationary accumulation points. The local companion result describes the regime where the truncated method can take full steps and the residual stopping test governs the minor iteration.

The mathematical results are proved in the 1983 paper, while this mission's Lean statements are open proof targets. A complete formalization would connect the finite-dimensional conjugate-gradient recurrence, the line-search argument on bounded sublevel sets, and the convergence statement in one machine-checked development. The conjugate-gradient identities and line-search facts could be reused in other optimization algorithms; the exact first-exit model and the global conclusion are specific to this method.

Difficulty

The minor iteration is not an ordinary positive definite conjugate-gradient solve. The Hessian may be indefinite away from a solution, and the iteration must stop at insufficient curvature before using a later residual state. A convergence argument that assumes positive definiteness at every iterate would therefore miss the case the algorithm was designed to handle. The line search must work for the returned direction, including the first iteration's steepest-descent fallback. The limit-point conclusion adds a separate issue: a vanishing gradient norm alone does not force an entire sequence to converge to a chosen limit point.

Formalization scope

Lean represents Rn\mathbb R^nRn as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), uses its Euclidean norm and inner product, and defines H(x)H(x)H(x) as the derivative of the gradient. The objective is C2C^2C2 and every sublevel set is bounded, as specified at the start of the paper. The TNCG recurrence is total, but an admissible direction must come from its first actual exit, with the curvature test preceding the residual test. At i=0i=0i=0, the curvature exit returns −g-g−g, not the zero initial approximation. This prevents a false stationary run. The residual test is written as a product inequality, equivalent to the paper's quotient when the residual test is reached.

Step lengths are positive. A run is extended through stationary points by zero directions, giving an infinite sequence on which a limit can be stated. Theorem 2.1 imposes no extra restriction on the forcing sequence and no upper bound on step lengths. Theorem A.1 corrects the printed Krylov-space index from Hk−1gH^{k-1}gHk−1g to HkgH^kgHkg. Theorem A.4 adds g(x∗)=0g(x^*)=0g(x∗)=0, needed for the conclusion and true in the paper's applications. Theorem 2.2 requires nonnegative forcing values and guards its residual-exit conclusion at stationary iterates. These corrections are recorded item by item in the moderation notes. Contributions to the conjugate-gradient identities, bounded-level-set line search, and isolated-limit-point argument are all within scope.

Selected references

  • R. S. Dembo and T. Steihaug, Truncated-Newton algorithms for large-scale unconstrained optimization, Mathematical Programming 26 (1983), 190–212. DOI: 10.1007/BF02592055.
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Linear algebraNumerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Truncated-Newton Algorithms for Large-Scale Unconstrained Optimization 2: Exact CG Meets Nonpositive Curvature Unless g Is Orthogonal to the Nonpositive Eigenspaces of HResearch Paper

Motivation

Truncated-Newton methods minimize a smooth function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb{R}^n\to\mathbb{R}f:Rn→R by taking, at each iterate xkx_kxk​, a search direction obtained by solving the Newton equation H(xk)p=−g(xk)H(x_k)p=-g(x_k)H(xk​)p=−g(xk​) only approximately, with the linear conjugate gradient (CG) method. Here ggg is the gradient and HHH the Hessian of fff. The approach was analysed by Dembo and Steihaug (Math. Programming 26, 1983), building on the inexact Newton framework of Dembo, Eisenstat and Steihaug (SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 19, 1982), and Newton–CG with curvature tests remains a standard large-scale method (Nocedal and Wright, Numerical Optimization, Ch. 7).

Away from a minimizer the Hessian need not be positive definite, and CG on an indefinite system can produce directions along which fff curves downward. The Dembo–Steihaug method stops CG when it meets such a direction. A practical question follows: started at or near a stationary point that is not a local minimizer, will the method ever notice the nonpositive curvature? Theorem 2.4 of the paper answers it for exact CG: it does, except in a degenerate case described by the eigenspaces of HHH.

Setting

Fix a symmetric linear operator HHH on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, with the Euclidean inner product uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, and a vector g∈Rng\in\mathbb{R}^ng∈Rn. In the paper these are H(xk)H(x_k)H(xk​) and g(xk)g(x_k)g(xk​) at the current iterate.

The TNCG minor iteration (p. 194) runs CG on Hp=−gHp=-gHp=−g from p0=0p_0=0p0​=0. Its state at iteration iii is (pi,ri,di,δi)(p_i,r_i,d_i,\delta_i)(pi​,ri​,di​,δi​):

p0=0,r0=−g,d0=r0,δ0=r0Tr0,p_0=0,\quad r_0=-g,\quad d_0=r_0,\quad \delta_0=r_0^{\mathsf T}r_0,p0​=0,r0​=−g,d0​=r0​,δ0​=r0T​r0​,

and, writing qi=Hdiq_i=Hd_iqi​=Hdi​,

αi=riTridiTqi,  pi+1=pi+αidi,  ri+1=ri−αiqi,  βi=ri+1Tri+1riTri,  di+1=ri+1+βidi,  δi+1=ri+1Tri+1+βi2δi.\alpha_i=\frac{r_i^{\mathsf T}r_i}{d_i^{\mathsf T}q_i},\ \ p_{i+1}=p_i+\alpha_id_i,\ \ r_{i+1}=r_i-\alpha_iq_i,\ \ \beta_i=\frac{r_{i+1}^{\mathsf T}r_{i+1}}{r_i^{\mathsf T}r_i},\ \ d_{i+1}=r_{i+1}+\beta_id_i,\ \ \delta_{i+1}=r_{i+1}^{\mathsf T}r_{i+1}+\beta_i^2\delta_i .αi​=diT​qi​riT​ri​​,  pi+1​=pi​+αi​di​,  ri+1​=ri​−αi​qi​,  βi​=riT​ri​ri+1T​ri+1​​,  di+1​=ri+1​+βi​di​,  δi+1​=ri+1T​ri+1​+βi2​δi​.

At iteration iii the method first applies the curvature test (2.1), diTHdi≤ε δid_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le\varepsilon\,\delta_idiT​Hdi​≤εδi​, and stops if it holds; otherwise it computes ri+1r_{i+1}ri+1​ and applies the truncation test (2.2), ∥ri+1∥/∥g∥≤η\|r_{i+1}\|/\|g\|\le\eta∥ri+1​∥/∥g∥≤η, and stops if it holds. With ε=η=0\varepsilon=\eta=0ε=η=0, (2.1) reads diTHdi≤0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le0diT​Hdi​≤0 and (2.2) reads ri+1=0r_{i+1}=0ri+1​=0. The method exits through (2.1) at iii when no test fired at any iteration j<ij<ij<i and (2.1) holds at iii.

For μ∈R\mu\in\mathbb{R}μ∈R the eigenspace is E(μ,H)={v:Hv=μv}E(\mu,H)=\{v: Hv=\mu v\}E(μ,H)={v:Hv=μv} (A.21). The span of vectors v1,…,vmv_1,\dots,v_mv1​,…,vm​ is written [v1,…,vm][v_1,\dots,v_m][v1​,…,vm​]; the Krylov space of ggg is [g,Hg,…,Hmg][g,Hg,\dots,H^{m}g][g,Hg,…,Hmg].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4 (p. 197)

Let ηk=ε=0\eta_k=\varepsilon=0ηk​=ε=0. If HHH is not positive definite, then either the minor iteration exits through (2.1) at some iteration iii, so that

diTHdi≤0at an iteration i the method reaches,d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le 0 \quad\text{at an iteration } i \text{ the method reaches},diT​Hdi​≤0at an iteration i the method reaches,

or

gTv=0for every v with Hv=μv, μ≤0.g^{\mathsf T}v=0\quad\text{for every } v \text{ with } Hv=\mu v,\ \mu\le0 .gTv=0for every v with Hv=μv, μ≤0.

Milestones

  1. Theorem A.1, (A.2) and (A.5), at ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 (p. 206). If diTHdi>0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i>0diT​Hdi​>0 for i=0,…,ki=0,\dots,ki=0,…,k, then diTHdj=0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_j=0diT​Hdj​=0 for i≠j≤ki\ne j\le ki=j≤k, and [d0,…,dk]=[g,Hg,…,Hkg][d_0,\dots,d_k]=[g,Hg,\dots,H^kg][d0​,…,dk​]=[g,Hg,…,Hkg].
  2. Theorem A.5 (p. 210). If ggg has a nonzero projection on each eigenspace of HHH, kkk is the number of distinct eigenvalues, and vectors d0,…,dk−1d_0,\dots,d_{k-1}d0​,…,dk−1​ are HHH-conjugate with (di,Hdi)>0(d_i,Hd_i)>0(di​,Hdi​)>0 and span [g,…,Hk−1g][g,\dots,H^{k-1}g][g,…,Hk−1g], then HHH is positive definite.
  3. The first sentence of the proof of Theorem 2.4 (p. 211). If ggg is not orthogonal to any eigenspace of HHH, and exact CG passes the curvature test up to iteration iii and ends with ri+1=0r_{i+1}=0ri+1​=0, then HHH is positive definite.

Significance

The theorem is the theoretical justification, given in the paper on p. 197, for using the direction of negative curvature did_idi​ produced in case (ii) of the minor iteration: with exact arithmetic and no truncation, CG either produces a direction of nonpositive curvature or the gradient lies entirely in the span of eigenvectors with positive eigenvalues. The paper draws the consequence that if xk→x∗x_k\to x^*xk​→x∗ and the method terminates through (2.2), then, outside this rare case, x∗x^*x∗ is a strong local minimizer. Theorem A.5 is a self-contained statement about conjugate families in Krylov spaces, usable in any analysis of CG on indefinite systems.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix, pp. 206–211), with the CG relations of Theorem A.1 cited from Hestenes and Stiefel. No machine-checked proof of these statements is known to this mission. Formalizing them produces a Lean development of CG on a symmetric, possibly indefinite operator, with its conjugacy and Krylov-span relations, which classical treatments state only for positive definite systems.

Difficulty

The CG relations of Theorem A.1 are usually proved for positive definite HHH, where every denominator is positive. Here HHH is indefinite, and the relations hold only as long as the curvature along the directions has stayed positive; the induction must carry that hypothesis and must also show the residuals do not vanish early. The passage from "CG ended with r=0r=0r=0" to a statement about all eigenspaces is the second obstacle: the CG run sees only the Krylov space of ggg, so one must relate that space to the eigenspaces that ggg meets, using symmetry of HHH and a count of distinct eigenvalues. A direct argument via "the directions span Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn" fails, because when ggg misses an eigenspace the Krylov space is a proper subspace.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); HHH is a continuous linear map that is self-adjoint (IsSelfAdjoint H), as the paper's HHH is a Hessian. Positive definiteness is vTHv>0v^{\mathsf T}Hv>0vTHv>0 for all v≠0v\ne0v=0. The CG recursion is total and carries no stopping test; division by zero returns 000 in Lean, so states after a would-be stop are junk, and the statements read the iteration only through first-exit predicates. The test (2.2) is encoded in the product form ∥ri+1∥≤η∥g∥\|r_{i+1}\|\le\eta\|g\|∥ri+1​∥≤η∥g∥.

Theorem 2.4 is stated for an arbitrary symmetric HHH and vector ggg rather than at an iterate of a run of the full algorithm. It uses nothing else about fff or the run, and every such pair occurs as the Hessian and gradient of an admissible objective. The paper's (A.5) prints Hk−1gH^{k-1}gHk−1g as the last Krylov vector; the correct HkgH^kgHkg is used.

A trivializing formalization exists and is ruled out: the first alternative is not "diTHdi≤0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le0diT​Hdi​≤0 for some iii" over the unstopped recursion, which holds automatically once a residual vanishes (the recursion then continues with d=0d=0d=0); it requires that iteration iii is reached with no earlier exit. The goal does not assume conjugacy, the Krylov span identity, or the hypotheses of Theorem A.5.

A complete development needs the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators on finite-dimensional spaces (in Mathlib), finiteness of the set of eigenvalues, and the CG invariants. The CG lemmas are reusable for any Newton–CG or trust-region CG analysis. Proofs of the milestones, and of auxiliary CG invariants such as (A.3)–(A.4), are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. S. Dembo and T. Steihaug, Truncated-Newton algorithms for large-scale unconstrained optimization, Mathematical Programming 26 (1983) 190–212. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592055
  • R. S. Dembo, S. C. Eisenstat and T. Steihaug, Inexact Newton methods, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 19 (1982) 400–408. https://doi.org/10.1137/0719025
  • M. R. Hestenes and E. Stiefel, Methods of conjugate gradients for solving linear systems, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 49 (1952) 409–436. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.049.044
  • T. Steihaug, The conjugate gradient method and trust regions in large scale optimization, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 20 (1983) 626–637. https://doi.org/10.1137/0720042
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Numerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Interior-Reflective Newton Methods for Nonlinear Minimization Subject to Bounds 1: The Interior-Reflective Line Search Algorithm Drives D_k²g_k to ZeroResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing a smooth function subject to simple bounds on the variables, l≤x≤ul\le x\le ul≤x≤u, is one of the most common problems in nonlinear optimization: it arises on its own (nonnegativity constraints, box-constrained least squares, parameter estimation with physical ranges) and as the subproblem of augmented Lagrangian and penalty methods. The classical approaches are active-set methods, which follow the boundary of the box and must guess which bounds are tight, and projected-gradient methods, which project trial points onto the box.

Coleman and Li proposed an alternative that never touches the boundary: an interior-reflective Newton method. Every iterate is strictly feasible; a new affine scaling D(x)D(x)D(x) measures how far each variable is from the bound its gradient points toward; and the line search follows a reflective path, which bounces off the faces of the box instead of stopping at them or being projected back. The method is the basis of the trust-region-reflective algorithm in MATLAB's Optimization Toolbox (fmincon, lsqnonlin), so its convergence theory underlies a widely used solver.

Timeline:

  • 1992–1994: Coleman and Li introduce the interior-reflective approach and analyse its convergence (Math. Programming 67, 1994), proving first-order global convergence (Theorem 8) and local quadratic convergence (Theorem 13).
  • 1996: Coleman and Li extend the approach to trust-region subproblems (SIAM J. Optim. 6, 1996), the version implemented in MATLAB.

This mission is the first of two drawn from the 1994 paper; the second treats the local quadratic rate.

Setting

The problem (1.1) is

min⁡x∈Rnf(x)subject tol≤x≤u,\min_{x\in\mathbb R^n} f(x)\quad\text{subject to}\quad l\le x\le u,x∈Rnmin​f(x)subject tol≤x≤u,

with l∈(R∪{−∞})nl\in(\mathbb R\cup\{-\infty\})^nl∈(R∪{−∞})n, u∈(R∪{+∞})nu\in(\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\})^nu∈(R∪{+∞})n, l≤ul\le ul≤u. The feasible box is F={x:l≤x≤u}\mathcal F=\{x:l\le x\le u\}F={x:l≤x≤u} and its strict interior is int⁡(F)={x:l<x<u}\operatorname{int}(\mathcal F)=\{x:l<x<u\}int(F)={x:l<x<u}. Write g(x)=∇f(x)g(x)=\nabla f(x)g(x)=∇f(x) and H(x)=∇2f(x)H(x)=\nabla^2 f(x)H(x)=∇2f(x), and gk=g(xk)g_k=g(x_k)gk​=g(xk​), Hk=H(xk)H_k=H(x_k)Hk​=H(xk​) along a sequence.

The standing assumption (p. 191): for the starting point x1x_1x1​, the level set L={x∈F:f(x)≤f(x1)}\mathcal L=\{x\in\mathcal F: f(x)\le f(x_1)\}L={x∈F:f(x)≤f(x1​)} is compact, and fff is twice continuously differentiable on an open set D⊇FD\supseteq\mathcal FD⊇F.

The scaling vector v(x)v(x)v(x) (Definition 2) has components vi=xi−uiv_i=x_i-u_ivi​=xi​−ui​ if gi<0g_i<0gi​<0 and ui<∞u_i<\inftyui​<∞; vi=xi−liv_i=x_i-l_ivi​=xi​−li​ if gi≥0g_i\ge0gi​≥0 and li>−∞l_i>-\inftyli​>−∞; vi=−1v_i=-1vi​=−1 if gi<0g_i<0gi​<0 and ui=∞u_i=\inftyui​=∞; vi=1v_i=1vi​=1 if gi≥0g_i\ge0gi​≥0 and li=−∞l_i=-\inftyli​=−∞. The scaling matrix is D(x)=diag⁡(∣v(x)∣1/2)D(x)=\operatorname{diag}(|v(x)|^{1/2})D(x)=diag(∣v(x)∣1/2), and Dk=D(xk)D_k=D(x_k)Dk​=D(xk​). The system D(x)2g(x)=0D(x)^2g(x)=0D(x)2g(x)=0 is equivalent to the first-order optimality conditions of (1.1).

The reflective transformation RRR (Fig. 6) folds Rn\mathbb R^nRn onto F\mathcal FF coordinate by coordinate: a coordinate with one finite bound is reflected about it, and a coordinate with two finite bounds is folded periodically (a triangle wave between lil_ili​ and uiu_iui​). The reflective path from xxx in the direction sss is p(α)=R(x+αs)−xp(\alpha)=R(x+\alpha s)-xp(α)=R(x+αs)−x: it moves along sss and reverses the corresponding component of the direction whenever it meets a face. A breakpoint is a stepsize at which the path lies on the boundary.

The interior-reflective algorithm (Fig. 9), with 0<σl<σu<10<\sigma_l<\sigma_u<10<σl​<σu​<1 and ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, starts at x1∈int⁡(F)x_1\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal F)x1​∈int(F); at each step it chooses a descent direction sks_ksk​ and a stepsize αk>0\alpha_k>0αk​>0 that is not a breakpoint and satisfies

f(xk+1)<f(xk)+σl(αkgkTsk+12αk2min⁡(skTHksk,0))(3.4)f(x_{k+1})<f(x_k)+\sigma_l\big(\alpha_kg_k^{T}s_k+\tfrac12\alpha_k^2\min(s_k^{T}H_ks_k,0)\big)\qquad(3.4)f(xk+1​)<f(xk​)+σl​(αk​gkT​sk​+21​αk2​min(skT​Hk​sk​,0))(3.4)

and either

f(xk+1)>f(xk)+σu(αkgkTsk+12αk2min⁡(skTHksk,0))(3.5)f(x_{k+1})>f(x_k)+\sigma_u\big(\alpha_kg_k^{T}s_k+\tfrac12\alpha_k^2\min(s_k^{T}H_ks_k,0)\big)\qquad(3.5)f(xk+1​)>f(xk​)+σu​(αk​gkT​sk​+21​αk2​min(skT​Hk​sk​,0))(3.5)

or αk>ρ\alpha_k>\rhoαk​>ρ; then xk+1=xk+pk(αk)x_{k+1}=x_k+p_k(\alpha_k)xk+1​=xk​+pk​(αk​).

The directions {sk}\{s_k\}{sk​} are constraint-compatible (Definition 3) if {Dk−2sk}\{D_k^{-2}s_k\}{Dk−2​sk​} is bounded, and consistent (Definition 4) if skTgk→0s_k^{T}g_k\to0skT​gk​→0 implies Dkgk→0D_kg_k\to0Dk​gk​→0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

If {xk}\{x_k\}{xk​} is generated by the algorithm of Fig. 9 and {sk}\{s_k\}{sk​} is both consistent and constraint-compatible, then

Dk2gk→0andαk2min⁡(skTHksk,0)→0.D_k^2g_k\to0\qquad\text{and}\qquad\alpha_k^2\min(s_k^{T}H_ks_k,0)\to0 .Dk2​gk​→0andαk2​min(skT​Hk​sk​,0)→0.

No constants are involved; the statement is the paper's.

Milestones

  1. The iterates stay in L\mathcal LL and f(xk)f(x_k)f(xk​) strictly decreases (proof of Theorem 8, p. 207).
  2. Theorem 3: constraint compatibility bounds the breakpoints BRk(j)=∣vkj∣/∣skj∣BR_k(j)=|v_{kj}|/|s_{kj}|BRk​(j)=∣vkj​∣/∣skj​∣ away from zero.
  3. Lemma 7, in its one-sided form: if αk→0\alpha_k\to0αk​→0, then f(xk+1)−f(xk)≤αkgkTsk+Cαk2f(x_{k+1})-f(x_k)\le\alpha_kg_k^{T}s_k+C\alpha_k^2f(xk+1​)−f(xk​)≤αk​gkT​sk​+Cαk2​ eventually.
  4. αkgkTsk→0\alpha_kg_k^{T}s_k\to0αk​gkT​sk​→0 and αk2min⁡(skTHksk,0)→0\alpha_k^2\min(s_k^{T}H_ks_k,0)\to0αk2​min(skT​Hk​sk​,0)→0 (proof of Theorem 8, p. 208).
  5. gkTsk→0g_k^{T}s_k\to0gkT​sk​→0 for constraint-compatible directions (proof of Theorem 8, p. 208).

Companion results: Theorem 2 (the acceptable stepsize interval exists, so the algorithm is well defined), and Theorems 5 (1)–(2) and 6 (1)–(2) (the scaled steepest-descent directions −Dk2gk-D_k^2g_k−Dk2​gk​ and −Dk2sgn⁡(gk)-D_k^2\operatorname{sgn}(g_k)−Dk2​sgn(gk​) are constraint-compatible and consistent).

Significance

Theorem 8 is the global first-order convergence theorem of the interior-reflective approach. With Theorems 5 and 6 it shows that the simplest instance, scaled steepest descent along the reflective path, reaches first-order points from any strictly feasible start; the paper's later second-order and quadratic results for the trust-region variant are built on it. Constraint compatibility and consistency isolate exactly what a search direction must satisfy, so the theorem applies to any direction rule that can be checked against these two conditions.

The result has been proved since 1994 but, to our knowledge, not machine-checked. A formalization requires a precise model of the reflective path, which the paper describes by an algorithm (Fig. 4) and a coordinate formula (Fig. 6), and a careful treatment of points where the scaling degenerates. The formal statements also make explicit a point the printed text leaves loose: Lemma 7 is printed as an equality but only an inequality holds, and only the inequality is used.

Difficulty

The argument has the shape of a standard sufficient-decrease proof, but the step that is routine for straight-line searches fails here. The path is not a line: as α\alphaα grows, components of the direction are reversed at breakpoints, so f(xk+pk(α))−f(xk)f(x_k+p_k(\alpha))-f(x_k)f(xk​+pk​(α))−f(xk​) is not αgkTsk+O(α2)\alpha g_k^{T}s_k+O(\alpha^2)αgkT​sk​+O(α2) in general, since a reflected component changes the linear term by an amount of order α\alphaα. Lemma 7 must show that, for constraint-compatible directions, only components whose reflection decreases the linear term can be reflected at small steps, and the Taylor remainders must be controlled uniformly over a run, on a neighbourhood of the compact level set inside the open set where fff is C2C^2C2. The scaling also degenerates at the boundary, where vvv vanishes; the iterates must be kept strictly interior for Dk−2D_k^{-2}Dk−2​ to be meaningful.

Formalization scope

Points are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); the bounds are EReal vectors with li≠+∞l_i\neq+\inftyli​=+∞, ui≠−∞u_i\neq-\inftyui​=−∞ and l≤ul\le ul≤u. The box and the level set are the published LewisTorczon.BoundPS.box and levelSet. The gradient is Mathlib's gradient, and sTH(x)ss^{T}H(x)ssTH(x)s is the inner product of the derivative of the gradient map applied to sss with sss. D(x)D(x)D(x) is never formed as a matrix: D2gD^2gD2g, DgDgDg, D−2sD^{-2}sD−2s and D2sgn⁡(g)D^2\operatorname{sgn}(g)D2sgn(g) are written componentwise. The reflective path is R(x+αs)−xR(x+\alpha s)-xR(x+αs)−x with RRR the transformation of Fig. 6, which the paper describes as the same method as Fig. 4 in another notation (p. 199); "not a breakpoint" is the requirement that the new iterate be interior. Descent direction is footnote 3's: strict decrease along the path for all small α>0\alpha>0α>0. Sequences start at index 0, which is the paper's x1x_1x1​. The standing compactness and smoothness assumption is carried as explicit hypotheses.

The goal does not assume gkTsk→0g_k^{T}s_k\to0gkT​sk​→0, αk→0\alpha_k\to0αk​→0, or anything about breakpoints; a version of Theorem 8 that did, or one whose algorithm projected onto the box instead of reflecting, or whose run predicate no sequence can satisfy, would not be the paper's theorem. Lemma 7 keeps the paper's assumption αk→0\alpha_k\to0αk​→0 and records the one-sided upper bound established by its proof. Theorem 3 uses the breakpoint distance in the direction of motion and applies its bound when that distance equals ∣vkj∣/∣skj∣|v_{kj}|/|s_{kj}|∣vkj​∣/∣skj​∣.

A complete development needs Taylor's theorem with uniform remainder along piecewise linear paths in a box, and basic facts about the reflection RRR (it maps into F\mathcal FF, is the identity on F\mathcal FF, and is continuous). These are reusable for any reflective or projected line search. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are independent proofs of the companion results.

Selected references

  • T. F. Coleman and Y. Li, On the convergence of interior-reflective Newton methods for nonlinear minimization subject to bounds, Mathematical Programming 67 (1994), 189–224. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582221
  • T. F. Coleman and Y. Li, An interior trust region approach for nonlinear minimization subject to bounds, SIAM Journal on Optimization 6 (1996), 418–445. https://doi.org/10.1137/0806023
  • R. M. Lewis and V. Torczon, Pattern search algorithms for bound constrained minimization, SIAM Journal on Optimization 9 (1999), 1082–1099 (source of the published box and level-set definitions reused here). https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623496300507
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Auction Design: Giving the Object to a Bidder with the Highest Priority Level c̄ᵢ(tᵢ) ≥ t₀ and Charging (6.8) Is an Optimal Auction MechanismResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with one indivisible object must decide whether to keep it or transfer it to one of several bidders whose values she does not observe. The allocation and the payment rule affect what bidders choose to report. Myerson's 1981 paper identifies a revenue-maximizing rule when bidders' private value estimates are independent, their densities are positive, and their valuations may be revised after learning other bidders' information. It covers value distributions for which the usual virtual-value rule is not monotone, by replacing each bidder's virtual value with an ironed priority level.

The question matters to auction design because a pointwise revenue-maximizing assignment can reward a bidder for understating a value. The seller must maximize expected utility subject to both incentive compatibility and each bidder's ability to decline participation. The paper's main theorem gives a specific allocation and payment pair that meets those constraints and attains the maximum. The result is proved in the source; this mission asks for a machine-checked formalization of it.

Setting

There is a finite nonempty set NNN of bidders and one seller. Bidder iii has a value estimate tit_iti​ in a finite interval [ai,bi][a_i,b_i][ai​,bi​], where ai<bia_i<b_iai​<bi​; endpoints may be negative and may differ between bidders. The continuous density fif_ifi​ is strictly positive on that interval and has total integral one. The bidders' estimates are independent, so a profile t=(ti)i∈Nt=(t_i)_{i\in N}t=(ti​)i∈N​ has density f(t)=∏ifi(ti)f(t)=\prod_i f_i(t_i)f(t)=∏i​fi​(ti​) on T=∏i[ai,bi]T=\prod_i[a_i,b_i]T=∏i​[ai​,bi​]. Write Fi(s)=∫aisfi(u) duF_i(s)=\int_{a_i}^{s}f_i(u)\,duFi​(s)=∫ai​s​fi​(u)du for the distribution function. The seller's known value for keeping the object is t0t_0t0​.

A revision effect ej(tj)e_j(t_j)ej​(tj​) describes the change in everyone else's valuation after bidder jjj's estimate becomes known. Bidder iii's revised value is vi(t)=ti+∑j≠iej(tj)v_i(t)=t_i+\sum_{j\ne i}e_j(t_j)vi​(t)=ti​+∑j=i​ej​(tj​), while the seller's is v0(t)=t0+∑jej(tj)v_0(t)=t_0+\sum_j e_j(t_j)v0​(t)=t0​+∑j​ej​(tj​). A direct mechanism assigns each profile an allocation probability pi(t)p_i(t)pi​(t) and expected payment xi(t)x_i(t)xi​(t) for each bidder. Payments may be negative and need not vanish when a bidder loses. Its feasibility conditions say that allocation probabilities are nonnegative and sum to at most one, each bidder's interim expected utility is nonnegative at every possible value, and truthful reporting yields at least as much interim utility as any other report. The seller maximizes her expected utility over all feasible mechanisms.

The virtual value is ci(s)=s−ei(s)−(1−Fi(s))/fi(s)c_i(s)=s-e_i(s)-(1-F_i(s))/f_i(s)ci​(s)=s−ei​(s)−(1−Fi​(s))/fi​(s). In the general case it need not increase with sss. Myerson transforms cic_ici​ through the quantile q=Fi(s)q=F_i(s)q=Fi​(s): hi(q)=ci(Fi−1(q))h_i(q)=c_i(F_i^{-1}(q))hi​(q)=ci​(Fi−1​(q)), Hi(q)=∫0qhi(r) drH_i(q)=\int_0^q h_i(r)\,drHi​(q)=∫0q​hi​(r)dr, and GiG_iGi​ is the convex envelope of HiH_iHi​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope gig_igi​ of GiG_iGi​, extended across kinks, gives the ironed priority cˉi(s)=gi(Fi(s))\bar c_i(s)=g_i(F_i(s))cˉi​(s)=gi​(Fi​(s)). At profile ttt, the winning set M(t)M(t)M(t) contains exactly those bidders whose priority is maximal and at least t0t_0t0​.

Formalization targets

The goal is Myerson's §6 theorem. The proposed rule shares the object equally among bidders in M(t)M(t)M(t), or keeps it when M(t)M(t)M(t) is empty, and charges each bidder the envelope payment:

pˉi(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,i∈M(t),0,i∉M(t),xˉi(t)=pˉi(t)vi(t)−∫aitipˉi(t−i,s) ds.\bar p_i(t)=\begin{cases}|M(t)|^{-1},&i\in M(t),\\0,&i\notin M(t),\end{cases} \qquad \bar x_i(t)=\bar p_i(t)v_i(t)-\int_{a_i}^{t_i}\bar p_i(t_{-i},s)\,ds.pˉ​i​(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,0,​i∈M(t),i∈/M(t),​xˉi​(t)=pˉ​i​(t)vi​(t)−∫ai​ti​​pˉ​i​(t−i​,s)ds.

The target asserts that (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ) is feasible and that every feasible (p,x)(p,x)(p,x) has seller utility no greater than that of (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ). The milestone list follows the paper's reduction: Lemma 2 characterizes feasible direct mechanisms by a monotone interim allocation rule and an envelope identity; equation (4.12) rewrites seller utility using virtual values; Lemma 3 turns maximization of virtual surplus into optimality. Equations (6.9)–(6.13) compare virtual and ironed priorities and establish the optimality and monotonicity of the proposed allocation.

Significance

The theorem specifies both who receives the object and how payments are computed, including irregular distributions and bidder-specific supports. The ironed priorities preserve incentives while retaining the seller's maximal expected utility. Equation (4.12) also gives the revenue-equivalence consequence: once the allocation rule and each lowest-type interim utility are fixed, expected seller utility is fixed.

A formal proof would connect several reusable results: product distributions with bidder-specific densities, interim incentive constraints, an envelope characterization, virtual-surplus accounting, and one-dimensional convex ironing. The source theorem and milestones are currently statements to be proved in this development, not existing machine-checked results. Related Börgers auction statements on Prove2Me use a common nonnegative support, at least two bidders, zero revision effects, and zero seller value; they do not provide this general theorem.

Difficulty

Maximizing virtual surplus at each profile is straightforward only if each bidder's virtual value rises with her report. When it falls, the resulting win probability can also fall, violating the incentive constraint. Replacing virtual values by slopes of a convex envelope restores monotonicity, but then the proof must account exactly for the difference between the original and ironed objectives, including flat portions of the envelope. Payments must satisfy the interim envelope identity for every type, while the seller's objective includes both transfers and her value for retaining the object.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses a finite nonempty bidder type, real-valued reports and payments, one object, independent continuous positive densities normalized on each finite support, and continuous revision effects. The latter regularity is implicit in the paper's assertion that cic_ici​ is continuous. No mean-zero condition on revision effects is imposed: the paper explicitly says its equation (2.9) is unnecessary. One bidder, negative support endpoints, unequal supports, and arbitrary seller value remain allowed.

The profile law is Lebesgue measure restricted to TTT and weighted by the product density. Integrating a function after replacing coordinate iii represents the T−iT_{-i}T−i​ integral, because bidder iii's marginal density has mass one. Mechanisms are total functions, but allocation and incentive conditions quantify over supported profiles and reports. Feasibility explicitly requires integrability of allocations, payments, and their report sections so no undefined Bochner expectation can acquire Lean's default value zero. The convex envelope is the two-point infimum of equation (6.3); its defining set is nonempty and bounded below on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope uses the right derivative below quantile one and the left derivative at one. The theorem requires feasibility of the proposed pair as well as its utility bound, ruling out an empty or unconstrained maximization claim.

The Stieltjes expressions in (6.9), (6.12), and (6.13) are combined into equivalent ordinary-integral comparisons over the profile law. A complete proof needs the one-dimensional envelope theorem, product-measure integration and Fubini results, differentiation of the convex envelope, and a careful endpoint treatment. The definitions of interim utilities and ironing can be reused for related auction models; contributions that establish these analytic components or the listed source lemmas are in scope.

Selected references

  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. DOI: 10.1287/moor.6.1.58.
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Dynamic ProgrammingGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes II: The Optimal Average Cost of a Deterministic Process Is the Least Mean Cost of a Cycle Reachable from the Initial StateResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process describes repeated choices whose costs and subsequent states depend on the current state. Such models are used when a decision affects both today's expense and the options available tomorrow. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis studied how the computational difficulty of finding an optimal policy changes between stochastic and deterministic transitions. Their general finite-state problems are P-complete, while their deterministic cases admit highly parallel algorithms Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, 1987. The contrast makes the deterministic case a useful setting in which to isolate the precise graph problem hidden inside long-run optimization.

This mission concerns their infinite-horizon average-cost case. When transitions are certain, every decision is an arc in a directed graph. The long-run cost of a policy can be related to the mean cost of a cycle reachable from the initial state. That relation is the mathematical claim supporting the algorithm in the paper's Theorem 3, whose headline says that the deterministic average-cost problem is in NC Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, p. 446.

Setting

Let SSS be a finite set of states and s0∈Ss_0\in Ss0​∈S the initial state. At each s∈Ss\in Ss∈S there is a finite, nonempty decision set DsD_sDs​. A decision d∈Dsd\in D_sd∈Ds​ has a real cost c(s,d)c(s,d)c(s,d) and moves the process with certainty to next⁡(s,d)∈S\operatorname{next}(s,d)\in Snext(s,d)∈S. All of these data are stationary: they do not change with time. A policy δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t) chooses a decision for each state and each time t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\ldotst=0,1,2,…. It generates a trajectory by st+1=next⁡(st,δ(st,t))s_{t+1}=\operatorname{next}(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))st+1​=next(st​,δ(st​,t)). The corresponding directed graph has a state for each node and a decision for each arc. It may contain loops and parallel arcs, since different decisions can lead to the same next state.

The paper prints the finite average with T+1T+1T+1 cost terms and denominator TTT:

aTδ(s0)=1T∑t=0Tc(st,δ(st,t)).a_T^\delta(s_0)=\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=0}^{T}c(s_t,\delta(s_t,t)).aTδ​(s0​)=T1​t=0∑T​c(st​,δ(st​,t)).

A time-dependent policy's averages may fail to converge. We use the upper limit gδ(s0)=lim sup⁡T→∞aTδ(s0)g^\delta(s_0)=\limsup_{T\to\infty}a_T^\delta(s_0)gδ(s0​)=limsupT→∞​aTδ​(s0​) and optimize over all policies, g∗(s0)=inf⁡δgδ(s0)g^*(s_0)=\inf_\delta g^\delta(s_0)g∗(s0​)=infδ​gδ(s0​). A state uuu is reachable if some finite walk of decision arcs goes from s0s_0s0​ to uuu. A simple cycle CCC is a positive-length closed sequence of decision arcs with distinct states before it returns to its start; its mean cost is mean⁡(C)=c(C)/∣C∣\operatorname{mean}(C)=c(C)/|C|mean(C)=c(C)/∣C∣. A loop is a one-arc simple cycle.

For states u,vu,vu,v, the min-plus adjacency entry AuvA_{uv}Auv​ is the least cost of a decision arc from uuu to vvv, or +∞+\infty+∞ when no such arc exists. A min-plus product uses addition in place of multiplication and minimum in place of addition. Thus (Ak)uv(A^k)_{uv}(Ak)uv​ represents the least cost of a kkk-arc walk from uuu to vvv, when such a walk exists Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, pp. 445–446.

Formalization targets

Reachable cycles

The first target identifies the value of the original policy optimization problem:

g∗(s0)=min⁡C simple cycleC reachable from s0mean⁡(C).g^*(s_0)=\min_{\substack{C\text{ simple cycle}\\C\text{ reachable from }s_0}}\operatorname{mean}(C).g∗(s0​)=C simple cycleC reachable from s0​​min​mean(C).

It also states that a policy attains this value with convergent finite averages. The milestone for following a reachable cycle gives the attainable direction; the milestone saying that no policy can improve the least mean gives the reverse direction. The latter is formulated with lim inf⁡\liminfliminf, so it applies even when a policy's averages oscillate.

Min-plus calculation

The second target identifies the finite graph calculation used in the paper:

g∗(s0)=min⁡u reachable from s01≤k≤∣S∣(Ak)uu<+∞(Ak)uuk.g^*(s_0)=\min_{\substack{u\text{ reachable from }s_0\\1\leq k\leq |S|\\(A^k)_{uu}<+\infty}}\frac{(A^k)_{uu}}{k}.g∗(s0​)=u reachable from s0​1≤k≤∣S∣(Ak)uu​<+∞​min​k(Ak)uu​​.

The milestones establish what a min-plus power says about decision walks and why closed walks of lengths from 111 through ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ recover the least simple-cycle mean. The restriction to reachable uuu is essential: a cheap cycle in a disconnected component cannot be used from s0s_0s0​.

Significance

The result reduces optimization over infinitely many decision times and all state-and-time policies to finitely many closed-walk calculations. It also guarantees that an optimal long-run value is realized by a trajectory with a genuine limiting average, despite the nonconvergence possible for other policies. The finite formula lets one determine the value by comparing graph quantities indexed by states and lengths; it is the correctness statement beneath the paper's parallel algorithm Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, p. 446.

Formalizing the identity creates a reusable bridge between deterministic decision processes, weighted directed walks and min-plus powers. Related proved tropical-algebra results on maximum cycle means use dense matrices and a max-plus convention, rather than the reachable, possibly missing-arc, minimum-cost process here; for example, the platform's TropicalLA.tpow_isGreatest concerns greatest walk weights. The present mission keeps the policy optimum and reachability explicit. The paper proves the result mathematically; these Lean statements are open proof targets in the proposal.

Difficulty

An arbitrary policy can keep changing its choices at repeated visits to the same state. Its averages can oscillate, so one cannot simply assume that its infinite trajectory becomes periodic or that its printed limit exists. The lower-bound claim must apply to every such trajectory. There is a second distinction between a closed walk and a simple cycle: a diagonal min-plus entry allows repeated states, whereas the cycle characterization is stated using simple cycles. Finally, an unrestricted matrix calculation would include cycles unreachable from the chosen initial state.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the general finite stationary deterministic process in its own definition, then defines policies, finite walks, simple cycles, average costs and min-plus powers on top of it. Decisions are arcs, so parallel arcs remain distinguishable; AuvA_{uv}Auv​ takes their least cost and uses WithTop ℝ for a missing arc. Decision sets are explicitly nonempty because a policy has to make a choice at every state. The finite state set is automatically nonempty once s0s_0s0​ is supplied. Policy time starts at zero. The printed T+1T+1T+1 terms divided by TTT are retained; Lean's T=0T=0T=0 quotient is zero and has no effect on the limit. The optimum is the infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), not a quantity defined by cycles or by stationary policies. Finite states and finite decision sets bound the one-step costs and hence the averages; this gives real limsup and infimum their intended values.

The paper's Theorem 3 asserts membership in NC. This mission formalizes the exact optimization identity that makes that algorithm correct. Its processor count and parallel-time bound are outside the scope, as are membership in P, log-space computability of reductions, PSPACE membership and the paper's Corollaries 1–2. Contributions to the finite-walk and min-plus lemmas, the lower bound for arbitrary policy paths, and the cycle-attainment statement are all needed; the graph definitions can be reused in other deterministic control problems.

Selected references

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou and John N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3), 1987, pp. 441–450. DOI.
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Complexity TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes I: A Boolean Circuit Is True Iff Its Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Process Has Optimal Expected Cost ZeroResearch Paper

Motivation

Markov decision processes are the standard model of sequential decision making under uncertainty in operations research, control and artificial intelligence. Their finite-horizon, discounted and average-cost versions are all solvable in polynomial time, by dynamic programming or linear programming. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Math. Oper. Res. 12(3), 1987) asked the next question: can these problems be solved fast in parallel, in polylogarithmic time on polynomially many processors (the class NC)? Their Theorem 1 answers no, unless every polynomial-time problem parallelizes: all three versions are P-complete. The proof is a short reduction from the circuit value problem (CVP), the canonical P-complete problem (Ladner, 1975). This mission formalizes the mathematical heart of that reduction: the constructed process has optimal expected cost zero exactly when the circuit evaluates to true.

The result is the first of a series of five missions on the same paper; the others treat the deterministic special cases (which are in NC) and the partially observed case (which is PSPACE-hard).

Setting

A circuit is a finite sequence of triples C=((ai,bi,ci), i=1,…,k)C=((a_i,b_i,c_i),\ i=1,\dots,k)C=((ai​,bi​,ci​), i=1,…,k) with k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Each aia_iai​ is one of the operations false, true, and, or. A triple with ai∈{false,true}a_i\in\{\text{false},\text{true}\}ai​∈{false,true} is an input; a triple with ai∈{and,or}a_i\in\{\text{and},\text{or}\}ai​∈{and,or} is a gate, and a gate reads two earlier triples, 1≤bi,ci<i1\le b_i,c_i<i1≤bi​,ci​<i. The value of an input is its constant; the value of a gate is the Boolean operation aia_iai​ applied to the values of triples bib_ibi​ and cic_ici​. The value of CCC is the value of triple kkk.

A finite Markov decision process has a finite state set SSS, an initial state s0s_0s0​, and at each state sss a nonempty finite set DsD_sDs​ of decisions. Taking decision iii at state sss at time ttt costs c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t) and moves to s′s's′ with probability p(s,s′,i,t)p(s,s',i,t)p(s,s′,i,t). A policy δ\deltaδ chooses a decision δ(s,t)∈Ds\delta(s,t)\in D_sδ(s,t)∈Ds​ for every state and time. For a horizon TTT the expected cost of δ\deltaδ is

JT(δ)=Eδ[∑t=0Tc(st,δ(st,t),t)],J_T(\delta)=\mathbb E_\delta\Bigl[\sum_{t=0}^{T}c\bigl(s_t,\delta(s_t,t),t\bigr)\Bigr],JT​(δ)=Eδ​[t=0∑T​c(st​,δ(st​,t),t)],

and the optimal expected cost is JT∗=inf⁡δJT(δ)J_T^\ast=\inf_\delta J_T(\delta)JT∗​=infδ​JT​(δ) over all policies.

From a circuit CCC the proof of Theorem 1 builds a stationary process MCM_CMC​: one state per triple plus an absorbing state qqq. An input state has one decision, moving to qqq, at cost 111 if the input is false and 000 if it is true. An or gate has two free decisions, 000 moving to bib_ibi​ and 111 moving to cic_ici​. An and gate has one decision, moving to bib_ibi​ or cic_ici​ with probability 1/21/21/2 each. All other costs are zero. The initial state is triple kkk and the horizon is T=kT=kT=k.

In the Lean development these are MDPComplexity.CircuitValue.MDP (with Policy, trajProb, expCost, optCost), Circuit (with val, value, lastIdx) and Circuit.toMDP.

Formalization targets

Goal: correctness of the reduction

Jk∗(MC)≤0⟺the value of C is true,J_k^\ast(M_C)\le 0\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \text{the value of } C \text{ is true},Jk∗​(MC​)≤0⟺the value of C is true,

for every circuit CCC with k≥1k\ge1k≥1 triples (theorem1_reduction). This is the claim "the optimum expected cost is 0 or less iff the value of CCC was true" on p. 445.

Milestones

  1. Every policy has Jk(δ)≥0J_k(\delta)\ge0Jk​(δ)≥0 ("it cannot be less").
  2. For any finite process with nonnegative costs, JT(δ)=0J_T(\delta)=0JT​(δ)=0 iff no positive cost is incurred on any trajectory of positive probability ("the states with positive costs are impossible to reach").
  3. If some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0, then CCC is true.
  4. If CCC is true, some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0.

Further statement

The discounted analogue, which the paper asserts in one sentence: for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), the optimal expected discounted cost inf⁡δ∑t≥0βt Eδ[c(st,δ(st,t))]\inf_\delta\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\,\mathbb E_\delta[c(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))]infδ​∑t≥0​βtEδ​[c(st​,δ(st​,t))] of MCM_CMC​ is at most 000 iff CCC is true (discounted_reduction).

Significance

Combined with the log-space computability of MCM_CMC​ from CCC, the goal shows that the finite-horizon Markov decision problem is P-hard, hence not in NC unless P = NC. This is the reason dynamic programming for general Markov decision processes is believed to be inherently sequential, and it frames the contrast drawn in the rest of the paper: deterministic processes are in NC, and partially observed ones are PSPACE-hard. The construction is also stationary, so it shows that even the stationary finite-horizon problem is P-hard, as the paper remarks.

The theorem is proved in the paper, in one paragraph; it is not open. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of it exists. Formalizing it produces a precise statement of what the reduction proves, a reusable finite-trajectory model of finite-horizon Markov decision processes with time-dependent policies, and a reusable encoding of Boolean circuits and their value.

Difficulty

The informal argument is short, but two points need care. First, the optimum ranges over all time-dependent policies, which form an infinite type; the infimum is attained only because the expected cost depends on finitely many decisions, and this must be established rather than assumed. Second, the passage from "the expected cost is zero" to "the circuit is true" turns a statement about trajectory probabilities into a statement about the recursive value of the circuit, and the and gates (where both successors are reached with positive probability) behave differently from the or gates (where only the chosen successor is reached). Reasoning only along a single path, as for a deterministic process, does not suffice at and gates.

Formalization scope

Theorem 1 is a complexity statement: "The Markov Decision Process problem is P-complete in all three cases." Membership in P, the log-space computability of the construction, the notion of P-completeness, and the average-cost case are not part of this mission; Mathlib has no log-space reductions or class P. The mission states the correctness of the reduction, for the exact process of the proof.

Conventions committed to:

  • Triples are indexed by Fin k (paper index iii is Lean index i−1i-1i−1); k≥1k\ge1k≥1 via [NeZero k]. The fields bi,cib_i,c_ibi​,ci​ of an input are unused (the paper sets them to 000, not a triple index). Triple kkk need not be a gate.
  • States of MCM_CMC​ are Option (Fin k), with none the state qqq; decisions are Fin 2 at or gates and Fin 1 elsewhere.
  • The and-gate row is 121[s′=bi]+121[s′=ci]\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=b_i]+\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=c_i]21​1[s′=bi​]+21​1[s′=ci​], so that bi=cib_i=c_ibi​=ci​ (allowed by the paper) gives a probability vector.
  • Rows of the transition kernel are probability vectors and every DsD_sDs​ is nonempty (implicit in the paper, explicit here).
  • The expected cost is a finite sum over trajectories, with the §2 horizon convention ∑t=0T\sum_{t=0}^{T}∑t=0T​ and T=kT=kT=k. The optimum is a real infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), not over stationary ones.
  • The discounted cost is ∑tβt\sum_t\beta^t∑t​βt times the expected time-ttt cost, which equals the expectation of the discounted series for bounded nonnegative costs.

A formalization that defines the optimal cost directly as "the cost of the best choice at the or gates", or optimizes only over stationary policies, would make the goal a restatement of the circuit's value; the mission's optimum is over all time-dependent policies of the general model.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and the goal; lemmas on the trajectory model (marginalization of trajProb, attainment of the infimum for policies that matter only up to time TTT) that are reusable for any finite-horizon process.

Selected references

  • C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 441–450. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.441
  • R. E. Ladner, The Circuit Value Problem is Log Space Complete for P, SIGACT News 7(1) (1975) 18–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/990518.990519
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 6: For δ > 1, the Powers-of-δ LP Optimum Scaled by (δ^(2γ̄+1), δ^(γ̄+1)) Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which products a retailer should offer when customers choose among the offered products according to a probabilistic choice model, so as to maximize expected revenue. Under the nested logit model the products are grouped into nests: a customer first picks a nest, then a product inside it. The model is the standard relaxation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the multinomial logit, and it is used throughout revenue management and transportation demand modelling.

Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) classify the complexity of the assortment problem under four variants of the nested logit model, according to whether the dissimilarity parameters are at most one and whether a customer who picks a nest always buys there. The problem is NP-hard as soon as some dissimilarity parameter exceeds one (their Theorem 5), and also when the nests have positive no-purchase weights (Theorem 8), so for the general variant approximation is the realistic aim. §6.2 of the paper gives an approximation scheme for the most general variant: for any δ>1\delta > 1δ>1 it restricts each nest to a short list of candidate assortments indexed by the powers of δ\deltaδ, solves a small linear program, and loses at most a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimal revenue. This mission formalizes the guarantee behind that scheme, Theorem 12.

Setting

There are nests MMM and products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} in each nest. Product jjj of nest iii has revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0; the products are ordered so that ri1≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0 and a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of leaving without choosing a nest. Offering Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N in nest iii gives

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑iVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑iVi(Si)γi.V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \qquad \Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

The optimal expected revenue Z∗=max⁡ΠZ^* = \max \PiZ∗=maxΠ is the optimal value of the linear program (3): minimize xxx subject to v0x≥∑iyiv_0 x \ge \sum_i y_iv0​x≥∑i​yi​ and yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x) for every nest iii and every Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Problem (4) keeps the second family of constraints only for a candidate collection of assortments in each nest.

Let γˉ=max⁡iγi\bar\gamma = \max_i \gamma_iγˉ​=maxi​γi​, assumed >1> 1>1 throughout §6, and fix δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Put viL=vi0+min⁡jvijv^L_i = v_{i0} + \min_j v_{ij}viL​=vi0​+minj​vij​, viU=vi0+∑jvijv^U_i = v_{i0} + \sum_j v_{ij}viU​=vi0​+∑j​vij​, and let liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ be the least integers with δl≥viL\delta^{l} \ge v^L_iδl≥viL​, δl≥viU\delta^l \ge v^U_iδl≥viU​. For each level l=liL,…,liUl = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_il=liL​,…,liU​, problem (15) maximizes ∑j∈Srijvij\sum_{j \in S} r_{ij} v_{ij}∑j∈S​rij​vij​ over the assortments with δl−1≤Vi(S)≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le V_i(S) \le \delta^lδl−1≤Vi​(S)≤δl; its value is G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​. An assortment S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ is feasible for (15) and satisfies δ∑j∈S^ilrijvij≥G^il\delta \sum_{j \in \hat S_{il}} r_{ij} v_{ij} \ge \hat G_{il}δ∑j∈S^il​​rij​vij​≥G^il​. The candidate collection of nest iii is {S^il:l=liL,…,liU}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il} : l = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_i\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​:l=liL​,…,liU​}∪{∅}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12 (p. 28)

If (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) is an optimal solution of problem (4) over the candidate collections {S^il}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il}\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​}∪{∅}, then

(δ2γˉ+1x^, δγˉ+1y^) is feasible for problem (3).\big(\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x,\ \delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y\big) \text{ is feasible for problem (3).}(δ2γˉ​+1x^, δγˉ​+1y^​) is feasible for problem (3).

Milestones (Appendix A.6, pp. 53–54)

  1. x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  2. Every nonempty assortment of nest iii lies in some level liL≤l≤liUl^L_i \le l \le l^U_iliL​≤l≤liU​.
  3. If δl−1≤a≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le a \le \delta^lδl−1≤a≤δl, then aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+a^{\gamma-1} \ge (\delta^l)^{\gamma-1}\delta^{-[\gamma-1]^+}aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+.
  4. Under the same hypothesis, (δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1(\delta^l)^{\gamma-1} \ge \delta^{-[1-\gamma]^+} a^{\gamma-1}(δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1.
  5. δγˉδ−[γi−1]+δ−[1−γi]+≥1\delta^{\bar\gamma}\delta^{-[\gamma_i-1]^+}\delta^{-[1-\gamma_i]^+} \ge 1δγˉ​δ−[γi​−1]+δ−[1−γi​]+≥1 and δγˉ+γi+1≤δ2γˉ+1\delta^{\bar\gamma+\gamma_i+1} \le \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δγˉ​+γi​+1≤δ2γˉ​+1.
  6. The scaled pair satisfies δγˉ+1y^i≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−δ2γˉ+1x^)\delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x)δγˉ​+1y^​i​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−δ2γˉ​+1x^) for every nonempty SiS_iSi​.
  7. The same inequality for Si=∅S_i = \emptysetSi​=∅.

Companions

  • The guarantee stated after Theorem 12: with v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the assortment assembled from the candidates solving problem (5) earns at least Z∗/δ2γˉ+1Z^*/\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}Z∗/δ2γˉ​+1.
  • Proposition 15 (p. 51): when (15) is feasible, one of the explicit assortments S^(JL,JS)\hat S(J_L, J_S)S^(JL​,JS​), built from at most q=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉q = \lceil \delta/(\delta-1)\rceilq=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉ large and at most qqq small products by a greedy continuous knapsack, is feasible for (15) and within a factor δ\deltaδ of G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​.
  • The count liU−liL≤1+log⁡δ(viU/viL)l^U_i - l^L_i \le 1 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i)liU​−liL​≤1+logδ​(viU​/viL​) (p. 28).

Significance

Theorem 12 is the analytical half of the approximation scheme. Together with the paper's Theorem 1 it shows that a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and at most 1+m(2+log⁡δ(viU/viL))1 + m(2 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i))1+m(2+logδ​(viU​/viL​)) constraints yields an assortment within a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimum, for the most general variant, which is NP-hard, and Proposition 15 makes the candidate assortments computable. Letting δ↓1\delta \downarrow 1δ↓1 trades accuracy for running time, so the result is the paper's answer to how well the general problem can be approximated by this LP approach.

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to formalize the known proof. To the best of a search of the Prove2Me library (local index and platform mirror, October 2026), no nested logit approximation result, and no knapsack lemma matching Proposition 15, has a machine-checked statement or proof. The definitions of the shared model (the instance, ViV_iVi​, RiR_iRi​, Π\PiΠ, the linear programs (3) and (4)) are common to the six missions of this series.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary assortment SiS_iSi​ with the candidate of its level and uses the candidate's constraint in (4). This fails as a direct comparison because the nest weight Vi(⋅)γiV_i(\cdot)^{\gamma_i}Vi​(⋅)γi​ enters twice with different exponents, γi−1\gamma_i - 1γi​−1 in front of the revenue and γi\gamma_iγi​ in front of x^\hat xx^, and within one level ViV_iVi​ may vary by a factor δ\deltaδ. When γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 and when γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 the monotonicity of t↦tγi−1t \mapsto t^{\gamma_i - 1}t↦tγi​−1 goes in opposite directions, so the losses must be tracked separately by [γi−1]+[\gamma_i - 1]^+[γi​−1]+ and [1−γi]+[1 - \gamma_i]^+[1−γi​]+, and they are absorbed by the common factor δγˉ\delta^{\bar\gamma}δγˉ​ only because γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1. The other half, Proposition 15, concerns a knapsack with both a lower and an upper bound on the total weight, where a feasible solution must be produced as well as a good objective value.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 for 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n), nests a finite type, powers VγV^{\gamma}Vγ real powers, and x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. The shared model carries the standing assumptions of §1 with the disclosed pins vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 (the page allows γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0 and zero-weight padding products, under which its convention 0γi=00^{\gamma_i} = 00γi​=0 and its proofs fail). Every statement of the mission also assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 (for viLv^L_iviL​), γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ is the greatest of the γi\gamma_iγi​ (so at least one nest exists) with γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1, and δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Integer powers δl\delta^lδl are zpow, and liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ are written ⌈log⁡δviL⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^L_i\rceil⌈logδ​viL​⌉, ⌈log⁡δviU⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^U_i\rceil⌈logδ​viU​⌉, which equal the minima of the paper. An optimal solution of (4) is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs. The companion guarantee adds v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the pin of Theorem 1. In Proposition 15 the capacity row of (33) includes v0v_0v0​, correcting a printed slip, and the running-time claim is not stated.

The assortments S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ enter Theorem 12 as an arbitrary family with the two properties of p. 28; the theorem is stated for every such family. A level at which (15) has no feasible assortment imposes nothing on S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​, as on the page. Requiring S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ to lie in its level unconditionally would make the hypothesis unsatisfiable for most instances and the goal vacuous; that encoding, and any goal that assumes displays (34)–(36) or the exponent bounds, is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the real-power milestones (3)–(5), which are self-contained, of the two cases (6)–(7), and of Proposition 15, whose fractional knapsack lemma (the greedy solution of a continuous knapsack sorted by ratio is optimal) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014; cited from the revised manuscript of June 18, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • A. M. Frieze, M. R. B. Clarke, Approximation algorithms for the m-dimensional 0–1 knapsack problem: worst-case and probabilistic analyses, European Journal of Operational Research 15(1), 1984. (cited on p. 50 of the paper for the continuous knapsack (33); link not verified here)
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait-and-Judge Scenario Optimization 2: Over Generic Sets, P^N{V(x*_N) > ε(s*_N)} ≤ γ*, the Least ξ(1) over Degree-N Polynomials Feasible for (31)Research Paper

Motivation

A solution of a scenario optimization program is chosen after observing finitely many uncertain constraints. Its future reliability depends on constraints that were not sampled. The usual advance question asks how many samples are needed to make every output reliable. Campi and Garatti instead ask what can be certified after solving the program, when the number of sampled constraints that actually determined its solution is visible. Their wait-and-judge result uses that observed number to set a violation threshold. This mission concerns their extension from convex programs in finite-dimensional spaces to programs over an arbitrary decision set, with no convexity requirement.

The generic extension matters when a dimension bound on the number of influential constraints is unavailable. A decision may be a combinatorial object, a function, or an element of an infinite-dimensional space. The paper allows the support count to range from zero to the full sample size NNN, and its threshold includes the case of NNN support constraints. The paper's Section 6 gives the model and its two probability guarantees.

Setting

Let SSS be a set of decisions. A subset X⊆SX\subseteq SX⊆S is the domain; a real function f:S→Rf:S\to\mathbb Rf:S→R is the cost. An uncertain outcome δ\deltaδ belongs to a measurable space Δ\DeltaΔ with probability measure PPP, and imposes a constraint set Xδ⊆SX_\delta\subseteq SXδ​⊆S. For a sample ω=(δ(1),…,δ(N))\omega=(\delta^{(1)},\ldots,\delta^{(N)})ω=(δ(1),…,δ(N)) of NNN independent outcomes, the program minimizes f(x)f(x)f(x) over x∈Xx\in Xx∈X that belongs to every sampled Xδ(i)X_{\delta^{(i)}}Xδ(i)​. The sample law is PNP^NPN. There is no algebraic or topological condition on the feasible sets or on fff.

A fixed finite sequence of real tie-break functions is minimized lexicographically after the original cost. This selects one solution xN∗(ω)x_N^*(\omega)xN∗​(ω) whenever the program has a selected minimizer. Assumption 1 requires existence and uniqueness for every finite sample, including the empty one. A sampled constraint is a support constraint if removing it changes this selected solution. The number of support constraints is sN∗(ω)s_N^*(\omega)sN∗​(ω). Assumption 2 says that, with probability one, keeping only the support constraints gives the same selected solution. Both assumptions are part of the source's generic setting; they are substantive restrictions even though the sets and cost are otherwise arbitrary.

The violation of a decision is V(x)=P{δ:x∉Xδ}V(x)=P\{\delta:x\notin X_\delta\}V(x)=P{δ:x∈/Xδ​}. Thus V(xN∗)V(x_N^*)V(xN∗​) is the probability that a fresh constraint rejects the computed solution. Since the solution and support count depend on the sample, the wait-and-judge event uses a threshold function ε\varepsilonε evaluated at the observed count, {V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}. For each k≥0k\ge0k≥0, the paper also uses a generalized distribution function Fk(v)=Pk{V(xk∗)≤v, sk∗=k}F_k(v)=P^k\{V(x_k^*)\le v,\ s_k^*=k\}Fk​(v)=Pk{V(xk∗​)≤v, sk∗​=k}. It need not have total mass one.

Formalization targets

Variational bound, Theorem 3

For any N≥1N\ge1N≥1 and any [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued ε\varepsilonε on {0,…,N}\{0,\ldots,N\}{0,…,N}, let γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ be the infimum of feasible values q(1)q(1)q(1) over real polynomials of degree at most NNN satisfying

q(k)(t)k!≥(Nk)tN−k1[0,1−ε(k))(t),0≤k≤N,0≤t≤1.\frac{q^{(k)}(t)}{k!}\ge {N\choose k}t^{N-k}{\bf1}_{[0,1-\varepsilon(k))}(t),\qquad 0\le k\le N,\quad 0\le t\le1.k!q(k)(t)​≥(kN​)tN−k1[0,1−ε(k))​(t),0≤k≤N,0≤t≤1.

The goal is the paper's Theorem 3:

PN{V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}≤γ∗.P^N\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}\le\gamma^*.PN{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}≤γ∗.

The polynomial value retains the full dependence on the chosen threshold function. The source prints an extraneous ddd in Theorem 3's range for kkk; its generic setting and variational problem use 0≤k≤N0\le k\le N0≤k≤N.

Explicit confidence bound, Theorem 4

For 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, the paper's Theorem 4 defines t(k)∈(0,1)t(k)\in(0,1)t(k)∈(0,1) as the unique root of

βN+1∑m=kN(mk)tm−k−(Nk)tN−k=0(0≤k<N).\frac{\beta}{N+1}\sum_{m=k}^{N}{m\choose k}t^{m-k}-{N\choose k}t^{N-k}=0\qquad(0\le k<N).N+1β​m=k∑N​(km​)tm−k−(kN​)tN−k=0(0≤k<N).

With ε(k)=1−t(k)\varepsilon(k)=1-t(k)ε(k)=1−t(k) for k<Nk<Nk<N and ε(N)=1\varepsilon(N)=1ε(N)=1, its conclusion is

PN{V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}≤β.P^N\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}\le\beta.PN{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}≤β.

The terminal value ε(N)=1\varepsilon(N)=1ε(N)=1 is essential because the paper gives examples with sN∗=Ns_N^*=NsN∗​=N and V(xN∗)=1V(x_N^*)=1V(xN∗​)=1.

Significance

Theorem 3 makes the observed support count a usable statistic for assessing the solution's future constraint violation without a dimension bound. Theorem 4 turns it into a certificate at any chosen confidence parameter β\betaβ. The confidence threshold depends on the count seen after the program is solved. These statements do not claim that every generic program satisfies Assumptions 1–2; they say what follows for programs that do.

A formal development must make the statistical objects and the analytic value agree exactly: the solution must come from the feasible set and the fixed tie-break rule, the support count must record changes of solution, and γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ must be the value of the derivative-constrained polynomial problem. The reusable outputs include the generic scenario model, its generalized violation distributions, and the finite moment and dual formulations. The statements are known results of Campi and Garatti; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of those results and their selected intermediate claims.

Difficulty

The observed support count is data-dependent. Conditioning on sN∗=ks_N^*=ksN∗​=k therefore cannot be treated as conditioning on a fixed subset of kkk sample coordinates. Symmetry across possible support subsets must agree with the selected solution under removal of nonsupport constraints. Assumption 2 is what rules out a degenerate change of solution when only support constraints remain. In the generic setting the possible count grows with NNN, so the distributional characterization has one measure FkF_kFk​ for every k≥0k\ge0k≥0 and moment equations for every sample size. The resulting infinite family must still be related to the finite degree-NNN polynomial value in (31). No convexity or finite-dimensional geometry is available to supply a fixed support bound.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the decision set by an arbitrary type SSS, with a measurable structure only to state the paper's implicit measurability convention. Samples are functions Fin N → Δ with zero-based indices and product law Measure.pi. The published generic violation definition is reused. The domain, constraint family, cost, finite lexicographic tie-break, selected solution, support set, and FkF_kFk​ are defined locally. A Nonempty S instance provides an unused fallback value to the total solution selector; Assumption 1 already implies that SSS is nonempty.

The source takes measurability for granted in a footnote. Here the constraint relation is jointly measurable, every solution map is measurable, and each support event is measurable. These pins assign probabilities to the events the paper uses. The FkF_kFk​ are finite measures on R\mathbb RR, so the paper's Stieltjes integrals are represented as integrals over (ε(k),1](\varepsilon(k),1](ε(k),1] or [0,1][0,1][0,1] against those measures. The polynomial class PN\mathcal P_NPN​ means degree at most NNN, matching the N+1N+1N+1 coefficients in (36). The value γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ is a real infimum; a separate sanity proof gives a feasible polynomial and a zero lower bound on all feasible values.

The goal retains Assumptions 1–2 and states the actual tail bound. It does not assume the moment equations or a favorable value of γ∗\gamma^*γ∗, and no support count is fixed in advance. Contributions toward the distributional decomposition, the moment equations, the finite weak-duality inequality, the polynomial identity, and the explicit-root theorem are within scope.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi and S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. DOI: 10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9. The mission uses the authors' accepted manuscript, especially Sections 6–7 and Theorems 3–4.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait-and-Judge Scenario Optimization 1: For Convex Programs, Seeing s*_N Support Constraints Gives P^N{V(x*_N) > ε(s*_N)} ≤ γ*, the Value of the Variational Problem (10)Research Paper

Motivation

Many decision problems in control, finance and engineering must hold against an uncertain parameter δ\deltaδ whose distribution is unknown, while samples of δ\deltaδ (measurements, historical records, simulations) are available. The scenario approach replaces the uncertain constraint by the constraints of the NNN observed samples and solves the resulting convex program. The open question is then how robust its solution is: with what probability does a new, unseen δ\deltaδ violate it?

The classical answer, due to Calafiore and Campi (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y, 2005; doi:10.1109/TAC.2006.875041, 2006) and sharpened by Campi and Garatti (doi:10.1137/07069821X, 2008), is an a-priori bound: it depends only on NNN and the dimension ddd, and it is tight for the worst problems. It is conservative for the many problems whose solution is determined by far fewer than ddd samples. Campi and Garatti's wait-and-judge theorem (doi:10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9, Math. Program. 2018) replaces it by an a-posteriori certificate: after solving, count the samples that actually determine the solution and certify the solution at a level that depends on that count.

Timeline:

  • 2005–2006, Calafiore and Campi: a convex scenario program in Rd\mathbb R^dRd has at most ddd support constraints; first sample-size bounds.
  • 2008, Campi and Garatti: the exact bound PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon\}\le\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i, with equality for fully-supported problems.
  • 2018, Campi and Garatti: the wait-and-judge bound, Theorem 1 below, with the 2008 bound as a corollary.

Setting

The decision variable is x∈Rdx\in\mathbb R^dx∈Rd. A problem consists of a cost vector c∈Rdc\in\mathbb R^dc∈Rd, a convex domain X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd, convex constraint sets Xδ⊆Rd\mathcal X_\delta\subseteq\mathbb R^dXδ​⊆Rd indexed by δ\deltaδ in a probability space (Δ,F,P)(\Delta,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Δ,F,P), and convex tie-break functions t1,…,tpt_1,\dots,t_pt1​,…,tp​. Given an i.i.d. sample δ(1),…,δ(N)\delta^{(1)},\dots,\delta^{(N)}δ(1),…,δ(N) with N>dN>dN>d, the scenario program is

min⁡x∈X cTxsubject tox∈⋂i=1NXδ(i).\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\ c^{\mathsf T}x\quad\text{subject to}\quad x\in\bigcap_{i=1}^N\mathcal X_{\delta^{(i)}}.x∈Xmin​ cTxsubject tox∈i=1⋂N​Xδ(i)​.

Ties are broken by minimising t1t_1t1​ among the minimisers, then t2t_2t2​, and so on; the resulting solution is xN∗x^*_NxN∗​.

  • The violation of a point is V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∉Xδ}V(x)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta: x\notin\mathcal X_\delta\}V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∈/Xδ​}.
  • A constraint is a support constraint if removing it changes the solution; sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ is their number.
  • Assumption 1: for every mmm and every sample of size mmm, the program with those mmm constraints has a unique tie-broken solution.
  • Assumption 2 (non-degeneracy): for every mmm, with probability one, keeping only the support constraints does not change the solution.

The variational problem (10) is: for a function ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,\dots,d\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1],

γ∗=inf⁡ξ∈Cd[0,1]ξ(1)s.t.1k!dkdtkξ(t)≥(Nk)tN−k 1[0,1−ϵ(k))(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.\gamma^*=\inf_{\xi\in C^d[0,1]}\xi(1)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}\xi(t)\ge\binom Nk t^{N-k}\,\mathbf 1_{[0,1-\epsilon(k))}(t),\ \ t\in[0,1],\ k=0,\dots,d.γ∗=ξ∈Cd[0,1]inf​ξ(1)s.t.k!1​dtkdk​ξ(t)≥(kN​)tN−k1[0,1−ϵ(k))​(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)

For every [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), under Assumptions 1 and 2,

PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)} ≤ γ∗.\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}\ \le\ \gamma^*.PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)} ≤ γ∗.

The level ϵ\epsilonϵ is evaluated at the observed number of support constraints. The goal fixes no particular ϵ\epsilonϵ, which keeps it stable under any later choice of levels.

Milestones (the proof of Theorem 1, Sect. 5.1)

  1. sm∗≤ds^*_m\le dsm∗​≤d for every sample (quoted from [7]).
  2. (14): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗=k}=(Nk) PN{A}\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(k)\wedge s^*_N=k\}=\binom Nk\,\mathbb P^N\{A\}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗​=k}=(kN​)PN{A}, where AAA adds "the first kkk constraints are of support".
  3. A=BA=BA=B up to a null set, where BBB concerns the program on the first kkk samples.
  4. (16): PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{A\}=\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v), with Fk(v)=Pk{V(xk∗)≤v∧sk∗=k}F_k(v)=\mathbb P^k\{V(x^*_k)\le v\wedge s^*_k=k\}Fk​(v)=Pk{V(xk∗​)≤v∧sk∗​=k}.
  5. (17): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)}=∑k=0d(Nk)∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}=\sum_{k=0}^d\binom Nk\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)}=∑k=0d​(kN​)∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v).
  6. (18): ∑k=0min⁡{m,d}(mk)∫[0,1](1−v)m−k dFk(v)=1\sum_{k=0}^{\min\{m,d\}}\binom mk\int_{[0,1]}(1-v)^{m-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)=1∑k=0min{m,d}​(km​)∫[0,1]​(1−v)m−kdFk​(v)=1 for every mmm.
  7. Weak duality between the truncated moment problem (20) and its dual (21), giving (22).
  8. (23): 1k!dkdtktm=(mk)tm−k\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}t^m=\binom mk t^{m-k}k!1​dtkdk​tm=(km​)tm−k for m≥km\ge km≥k, and 000 otherwise.
  9. (24): the infimum of p(1)p(1)p(1) over polynomials feasible for (10) equals γ∗\gamma^*γ∗.

Companions

  • Theorem 2 (p. 11): for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and ϵ(k)=1−t(k)\epsilon(k)=1-t(k)ϵ(k)=1−t(k), with t(k)t(k)t(k) the unique root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) of βN+1∑m=kN(mk)tm−k−(Nk)tN−k=0\frac{\beta}{N+1}\sum_{m=k}^N\binom mk t^{m-k}-\binom Nk t^{N-k}=0N+1β​∑m=kN​(km​)tm−k−(kN​)tN−k=0, the probability is at most β\betaβ.
  • The root lemma of Sect. 5.3, including its sign and divergence claims.
  • γ∗≤∑i<d(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\gamma^*\le\sum_{i<d}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}γ∗≤∑i<d​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i for constant ϵ\epsilonϵ (Sect. 5.2).
  • Corollary 1, the 2008 bound.

Significance

Theorem 1 turns the number of support constraints, which is observed after solving, into a confidence statement that holds uniformly over all convex problems and all distributions. With Theorem 2's choice of ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), a user who finds k≪dk\ll dk≪d support constraints obtains a level ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) comparable to that of a kkk-dimensional problem, which is far below the a-priori level for dimension ddd. The classical bound (2) is recovered as Corollary 1, so Theorem 1 contains the earlier theory.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization produces:

  • a formal account of scenario programs with lexicographic tie-break and of support constraints in the "changes the solution" sense;
  • the exchangeability argument (14) on product measures;
  • the representation (17) of a tail probability through generalized distribution functions;
  • a weak-duality argument for a generalized moment problem. The 2008 bound itself is posed on the platform as an open problem under other hypotheses; Corollary 1 states it under this paper's assumptions.

Difficulty

The obvious approach bounds the probability for each value of sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ separately by a binomial tail, then sums. This fails: the event sN∗=ks^*_N=ksN∗​=k is not known in advance, and summing the individual bounds over kkk loses the uniformity that makes the result useful. The paper instead characterises every convex problem by the (d+1)(d+1)(d+1)-tuple (F0,…,Fd)(F_0,\dots,F_d)(F0​,…,Fd​). It then maximises (17) over all tuples satisfying the infinitely many moment conditions (18), which is a generalized moment problem in d+1d+1d+1 measures, and solves it by duality.

Two steps carry most of the work. One is the almost-sure identity A=BA=BA=B, which depends on the precise interplay of Assumptions 1 and 2 with the tie-break. The other is passing from the polynomial dual problems to the variational problem (10), which needs a density argument in Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1]. The bound sN∗≤ds^*_N\le dsN∗​≤d itself is quoted from the earlier literature; it needs a Helly-type argument adapted to the lexicographic tie-break.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. The decision space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with its Borel σ-algebra, and samples are Fin N → Δ, indexed from 000. P\mathbb PP is a probability measure and PN\mathbb P^NPN is the product measure.
  • Tie-break. The tie-broken solution is the lexicographic minimiser of (cTx,t1(x),…,tp(x))(c^{\mathsf T}x,t_1(x),\dots,t_p(x))(cTx,t1​(x),…,tp​(x)) and depends only on the feasible set, which is what makes the exchangeability step valid. A support constraint is one whose removal changes this solution; this is not the platform's earlier "removal lowers the cost" notion.
  • Assumptions. Assumption 1 is required for every sample, Assumption 2 almost surely.
  • Measurability. The paper takes measurability for granted (footnote 1). Here it is two explicit hypotheses: the relation {(x,δ):x∈Xδ}\{(x,\delta):x\in\mathcal X_\delta\}{(x,δ):x∈Xδ​} is measurable, and every solution map ω↦xm∗(ω)\omega\mapsto x^*_m(\omega)ω↦xm∗​(ω) is measurable. No event is assumed measurable directly.
  • FkF_kFk​. FkF_kFk​ is the finite measure on R\mathbb RR given by the law of V(xk∗)V(x^*_k)V(xk∗​) on the event {sk∗=k}\{s^*_k=k\}{sk∗​=k}; it is not normalised.
  • Problem (10). Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1] is ContDiffOn ℝ d on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with derivatives taken within [0,1][0,1][0,1]. γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ is a real infimum over a set that is nonempty (ξ(t)=tN\xi(t)=t^Nξ(t)=tN) and bounded below by 000.
  • Probabilities are compared with real quantities through ENNReal.ofReal.
  • Theorem 2 is stated for every ϵ\epsilonϵ whose values 1−ϵ(k)1-\epsilon(k)1−ϵ(k) are roots of (11) in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), which by its first part is the paper's ϵ\epsilonϵ.
  • Added hypothesis. The constant-ϵ\epsilonϵ companion assumes d≥1d\ge1d≥1: at d=0d=0d=0, ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0 its inequality is false.

Ruled-out trivializations:

  • The solution is never a free function of the sample.
  • The goal does not mention FkF_kFk​, moments or polynomials.
  • Assumption 1 is not weakened to almost surely.
  • N>dN>dN>d is kept on Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 1.
  • The indicators keep the paper's open and closed ends: [0,1−ϵ(k))[0,1-\epsilon(k))[0,1−ϵ(k)) in (10), (ϵ(k),1](\epsilon(k),1](ϵ(k),1] in (16)–(21).

Contributions welcome:

  • the support-constraint bound under lexicographic tie-break, which is reusable for any convex scenario result;
  • the exchangeability lemma on Measure.pi;
  • the duality and density lemmas, which are pure analysis.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming 167 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, Uncertain convex programs: randomized solutions and confidence levels, Mathematical Programming 102 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments VI: Revenue-Ordered Offer Sets Grow with Capacity Left and Shrink with Time LeftResearch Paper

Motivation

In airline and hotel revenue management a firm sells a fixed stock of a perishable resource (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and in each period decides which fare classes to open. Customers do not buy a fixed fare: they choose among the fares on offer, or leave. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science, 2004) formulated this single-leg, choice-based problem as a dynamic program over the time remaining and the units remaining.

Practical revenue management systems rarely offer arbitrary sets of fares. They use nested controls: fares are opened from the most expensive downwards, so the open set is always "every fare above some threshold". Whether restricting to such revenue-ordered offer sets is natural depends on how the optimal threshold moves as the state changes. For mixtures of multinomial logit models, Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (Production and Operations Management, 2014, Theorem 6) showed that the best revenue-ordered threshold moves monotonically in both the remaining capacity and the remaining time.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, §5, Theorem 5.1) extend these two monotonicity properties to every regular discrete choice model, the class that contains essentially every model used in revenue management, including all random utility models. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

A finite nonempty set C\mathcal CC of products is sold. For a choice set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and a product xxx, P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) is the probability that a customer offered SSS buys xxx; the no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The system P\mathcal PP is regular when (i) all these probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le 1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′, for every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and for the no-purchase option x=0x=0x=0.

Each product xxx has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Let r1<r2<⋯<rkr_1<r_2<\cdots<r_kr1​<r2​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues. For ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k}\ell\in[k]=\{1,\dots,k\}ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k} the revenue-ordered assortment is Sℓ={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ}S_\ell=\{x\in\mathcal C:r(x)\ge r_\ell\}Sℓ​={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ​}; a larger index ℓ\ellℓ gives a smaller set, S1=CS_1=\mathcal CS1​=C.

In the multi-period model one customer arrives per period. With ttt periods remaining and qqq units left, the firm offers some SℓS_\ellSℓ​. The values of the revenue-ordered dynamic program are

Jt(q,ℓ)=∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+Jt−1(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ) Jt−1(q)(t,q>0),\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)\bigl(r(x)+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q-1)\bigr)+\mathcal P(0,S_\ell)\,\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)\qquad(t,q>0),Jt​(q,ℓ)=x∈Sℓ​∑​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+Jt−1​(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ​)Jt−1​(q)(t,q>0),

Jt(q,ℓ)=0\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=0Jt​(q,ℓ)=0 when t=0t=0t=0 or q=0q=0q=0, and Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∈[k]Jt(q,ℓ)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell\in[k]}\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)Jt​(q)=maxℓ∈[k]​Jt​(q,ℓ). The optimal revenue-ordered index is the smallest maximiser,

ℓt∗(q)=min⁡{ℓ∈[k]:Jt(q,ℓ)=Jt(q)},\ell^*_t(q)=\min\{\ell\in[k]:\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\mathcal J_t(q)\},ℓt∗​(q)=min{ℓ∈[k]:Jt​(q,ℓ)=Jt​(q)},

and ΔJt(q)=Jt(q)−Jt(q−1)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)=\mathcal J_t(q)-\mathcal J_t(q-1)ΔJt​(q)=Jt​(q)−Jt​(q−1) is the marginal value of capacity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For every t≥1t\ge 1t≥1 and q≥1q\ge 1q≥1,

ℓt∗(q)≤ℓt∗(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗(q)≥ℓt−1∗(q)  if t≥2.\ell^*_t(q)\le\ell^*_t(q-1)\ \text{ if } q\ge 2,\qquad \ell^*_t(q)\ge\ell^*_{t-1}(q)\ \text{ if } t\ge 2 .ℓt∗​(q)≤ℓt∗​(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗​(q)≥ℓt−1∗​(q)  if t≥2.

More units left give a weakly larger optimal offer set; more periods left give a weakly smaller one. The paper states the theorem for t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T], q∈[Q]q\in[Q]q∈[Q]; the horizon and the capacity only bound ttt and qqq, so the goal is stated for all t,q≥1t,q\ge 1t,q≥1.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  2. Lemma .1 (p. 35): with L∗(δ)\mathcal L^*(\delta)L∗(δ) the set of indices ℓ\ellℓ maximising ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+δ)\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)+\delta)∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+δ), if δ1+rk≥0\delta_1+r_k\ge 0δ1​+rk​≥0 and δ1≤δ2\delta_1\le\delta_2δ1​≤δ2​ then min⁡L∗(δ2)≤min⁡L∗(δ1)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_2)\le\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_1)minL∗(δ2​)≤minL∗(δ1​).
  3. Equation (16) (p. 36): Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)−ΔJt−1(q))+Jt−1(q)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell}\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)Jt​(q)=maxℓ​∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)−ΔJt−1​(q))+Jt−1​(q).
  4. Equations (17)–(18) (p. 36): ℓt∗(q)=min⁡L∗(−ΔJt−1(q))\ell^*_t(q)=\min\mathcal L^*(-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))ℓt∗​(q)=minL∗(−ΔJt−1​(q)).
  5. Marginal value at most rkr_krk​ (p. 36): ΔJt(q)≤rk\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le r_kΔJt​(q)≤rk​.
  6. Marginal value non-increasing in capacity (p. 36, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 4): ΔJt(q+1)≤ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q+1)\le\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q+1)≤ΔJt​(q).
  7. Marginal value non-decreasing in time (p. 37, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 5): ΔJt(q)≤ΔJt+1(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le\Delta\mathcal J_{t+1}(q)ΔJt​(q)≤ΔJt+1​(q).

Milestones 5–7 are asserted or cited in the paper, not proved there; milestones 6–7 are stated for this restricted dynamic program, which is the one the paper applies them to.

Significance

The theorem says that a firm restricted to revenue-ordered offer sets can implement its policy as a nested booking control: as seats sell out, the threshold fare can only rise, and as departure approaches with seats in hand, it can only fall. This is the structure that standard revenue management systems already assume, and Rusmevichientong et al. point out that such monotonicity can be used to implement them. The paper's contribution is that the property depends only on regularity of the choice model, not on its multinomial-logit form.

Formalizing it adds a machine-checked statement of the single-leg choice-based dynamic program over a general choice model, a precise account of the tie-breaking rule (the smallest maximiser), and machine-checked versions of the two marginal-value monotonicity facts that the paper cites from Talluri and van Ryzin rather than proves. To our knowledge none of these statements has been formalized in any proof assistant; the paper's proofs are informal.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is short, but two of its steps are not proved there. The marginal-value inequalities are imported from Talluri and van Ryzin, whose dynamic program optimises over all offer sets; here only the kkk revenue-ordered sets are available and the empty set is not, so those proofs have to be redone for this program, and the bound ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ is needed to keep each stage's shifted problem well behaved. The claim ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ itself is justified on the page only by an informal sentence.

The second subtlety is tie-breaking. The monotonicity is about the smallest optimal index. Several indices can be optimal at once, and the comparison of Lemma .1 transfers optimality of one index from one shift to another only through Lemma 2.1, that is, through the no-purchase case of the regularity axiom. Without that case the statement fails.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite nonempty type C; choice probabilities are P : C → Finset C → ℝ, defined on all pairs. The no-purchase option is not a product: its probability is the derived quantity noPurchase P S = 1 − ∑_{x∈S} P x S.
  • IsChoiceSystem P is axioms (i)–(iii); IsRegular P adds axiom (iv) for products and for the no-purchase option. Milestones 5–7 assume only axioms (i)–(iii), as the paper says suffices; Lemma .1, (16), (18) and the goal assume regularity and r>0r>0r>0.
  • Revenue levels use the paper's 1-based index: level r ℓ is rℓr_\ellrℓ​ for 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, topRevenue r is rkr_krk​, and roSet r ℓ is SℓS_\ellSℓ​ as a Finset. The paper's sorting of products (Sℓ={1,…,j(ℓ)}S_\ell=\{1,\dots,j(\ell)\}Sℓ​={1,…,j(ℓ)}) is notation only and is not used.
  • The dynamic program is defined by structural recursion on ttt; there is no stochastic process. Maxima over [k][k][k] are Finset.sup', and the minima defining ℓt∗(q)\ell^*_t(q)ℓt∗​(q) and min⁡L∗(δ)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta)minL∗(δ) are Finset.min' over sets proved nonempty.
  • ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q) is used only for q≥1q\ge 1q≥1; milestones are stated with t+1t+1t+1, q+1q+1q+1 in place of the paper's t−1t-1t−1, q−1q-1q−1 to avoid natural-number subtraction, which the goal keeps under its hypotheses q≥2q\ge 2q≥2, t≥2t\ge 2t≥2.

Formalizations that would trivialize the statement are ruled out: the dynamic program maximises over the kkk revenue-ordered sets only, never over all subsets (that is Talluri and van Ryzin's program); ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗ is the smallest maximiser, never the largest; and TTT, QQQ, kkk and the choice model are arbitrary, never fixed.

The definitions (regular choice model, revenue-ordered assortments, the restricted dynamic program) are reusable for other results on nested policies. Proofs of the cited Talluri–van Ryzin lemmas for this program are especially welcome, as they are the part the paper leaves to the literature.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments V: Stackelberg Matroid Pricing Is an Assortment Problem Under a Regular Choice ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

In Stackelberg network pricing a leader sets prices on some resources, and a follower then buys the cheapest structure available to them, paying the leader for the priced resources they use. The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem, introduced by Cardinal, Demaine, Fiorini, Joret, Langerman, Newman and Weimann (Algorithmica 2011), is the version in which the follower buys a minimum spanning tree. The best known approximation factors for it are those of uniform pricing, which gives every priced edge the same price (Berbeglia–Joret, p. 21).

Independently, revenue management studies assortment optimisation: a seller chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among the offered products according to a discrete choice model. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371, Algorithmica 2020) analyse the revenue-ordered heuristic (offer every product whose revenue is at least some threshold) under any regular choice model, and prove tight approximation bounds.

§4.6 of that paper shows that the two problems are the same problem: a Stackelberg Matroid pricing instance is an assortment problem under a regular choice model, and uniform pricing is the revenue-ordered heuristic on that model. The bounds of Cardinal et al. on uniform pricing thus become special cases of the general bounds on revenue-ordered assortments. This mission formalizes that correspondence (Theorem 4.16).

Setting

Choice model. Let C\mathcal CC be a finite set of products. A system of choice probabilities assigns to each offered set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx a probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S), with no-purchase probability P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). It is regular if (i) all probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}. With revenues r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​, rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S)r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x) and OPT=max⁡Srev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_S\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS​rev(S). The revenue-ordered assortment generated by yyy is {y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)}\{y'\in\mathcal C:r(y')\ge r(y)\}{y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)}.

Greedy algorithm. Given a family of independent sets, a linear ordering LLL and a set FFF, greedy(F,L)\mathrm{greedy}(F,L)greedy(F,L) scans FFF in the order induced by LLL, starting from ∅\emptyset∅, and adds each element that keeps the current set independent.

Stackelberg Matroid problem. An instance is a matroid M=(E,X)M=(E,\mathcal X)M=(E,X), a bipartition E=R⊔BE=R\sqcup BE=R⊔B into red and blue elements, and red costs c:R→R>0c:R\to\mathbb R_{>0}c:R→R>0​; some base of MMM lies inside RRR. The leader chooses prices p:B→R>0p:B\to\mathbb R_{>0}p:B→R>0​. The customer buys a minimum-weight base by running greedy on R∪BR\cup BR∪B with an ordering L∗L^*L∗ that is non-decreasing in weight (ccc on RRR, ppp on BBB) and puts blue elements first on ties. The leader earns revStack(p,L∗)=∑e∈B∩greedyM(R∪B,L∗)p(e)\mathrm{rev}_{\mathrm{Stack}}(p,L^*)=\sum_{e\in B\cap\mathrm{greedy}_M(R\cup B,L^*)}p(e)revStack​(p,L∗)=∑e∈B∩greedyM​(R∪B,L∗)​p(e).

The assortment instance. Let c1<⋯<ckc_1<\dots<c_kc1​<⋯<ck​ be the distinct red costs. Products are C=B×{c1,…,ck}\mathcal C=B\times\{c_1,\dots,c_k\}C=B×{c1​,…,ck​} with r((e,q))=∣B∣ qr((e,q))=|B|\,qr((e,q))=∣B∣q. The auxiliary matroid M′M'M′ on R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C declares XXX independent when it holds at most one pair (e,q)(e,q)(e,q) per blue eee and (R∩X)∪{e:(e,q)∈X}(R\cap X)\cup\{e:(e,q)\in X\}(R∩X)∪{e:(e,q)∈X} is independent in MMM. With an ordering LLL of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C that is non-decreasing in cost and puts products before red elements on ties, P((e,q),S)=1/∣B∣\mathcal P((e,q),S)=1/|B|P((e,q),S)=1/∣B∣ if (e,q)∈greedyM′(R∪S,L)(e,q)\in\mathrm{greedy}_{M'}(R\cup S,L)(e,q)∈greedyM′​(R∪S,L) and 000 otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.16 (p. 24)

For the instance above, with B≠∅B\ne\emptysetB=∅ and every admissible LLL:

P is regular,r>0,max⁡S⊆Crev(S)=max⁡p>0, L∗revStack(p,L∗),\mathcal P\ \text{is regular},\quad r>0,\qquad \max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)=\max_{p>0,\ L^*}\mathrm{rev}_{\mathrm{Stack}}(p,L^*),P is regular,r>0,S⊆Cmax​rev(S)=p>0, L∗max​revStack​(p,L∗),

and uniform pricing corresponds to revenue-ordered assortments: for each cic_ici​ some revenue-ordered assortment earns the revenue of the uniform price cic_ici​, and every revenue-ordered assortment earns the revenue of some uniform price cic_ici​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.14 (p. 23): for F⊆F′F\subseteq F'F⊆F′, ∣greedyM(F′,L)∣≥∣greedyM(F,L)∣|\mathrm{greedy}_M(F',L)|\ge|\mathrm{greedy}_M(F,L)|∣greedyM​(F′,L)∣≥∣greedyM​(F,L)∣ and F∩greedyM(F′,L)⊆greedyM(F,L)F\cap\mathrm{greedy}_M(F',L)\subseteq\mathrm{greedy}_M(F,L)F∩greedyM​(F′,L)⊆greedyM​(F,L).
  2. Property (14) (p. 31): orderings agreeing on a block partition make greedy pick the same number of elements per block.
  3. Lemma 4.15 (p. 23): the Stackelberg revenue does not depend on the compatible ordering.
  4. M′M'M′ is a matroid (p. 32).
  5. Regularity of P\mathcal PP (pp. 32–33).
  6. rev(S)\mathrm{rev}(S)rev(S) equals the Stackelberg revenue of pS(e)=min⁡{q:(e,q)∈S}p_S(e)=\min\{q:(e,q)\in S\}pS​(e)=min{q:(e,q)∈S} (pp. 33–34).
  7. Rounding prices up to the cost levels does not decrease revenue (p. 34).
  8. For prices in {c1,…,ck}∪{+∞}\{c_1,\dots,c_k\}\cup\{+\infty\}{c1​,…,ck​}∪{+∞}, rev(Sp)\mathrm{rev}(S_p)rev(Sp​) equals the Stackelberg revenue of ppp (pp. 34–35).

Significance

Theorem 4.16 transfers every guarantee for revenue-ordered assortments under regular models to uniform pricing in Stackelberg Matroid pricing. Specialising Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the paper through it gives exactly the three bounds on uniform pricing proved by Cardinal et al. for Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree (Theorem 3 of their paper), which those authors showed to be tight (p. 24). It also places uniform pricing inside a general picture: it is a threshold policy for a regular choice model whose purchase probabilities come from a matroid greedy algorithm, and the paper notes that the argument extends to polymatroids.

The result is proved in the paper, with two steps left to the reader (M′M'M′ is a matroid) or justified briefly (rounding prices). No machine-checked proof exists. A formalization also produces a reusable greedy algorithm on finite matroids with its monotonicity properties (Lemma 4.14, (14)), which Mathlib at the pinned revision does not have.

Difficulty

The obvious argument identifies the customer's run of greedy on (M,R∪B)(M,R\cup B)(M,R∪B) with the run of greedy on (M′,R∪S)(M',R\cup S)(M′,R∪S) step by step. That identification fails as stated: the choice probabilities are defined with one fixed ordering LLL of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C, while the customer's ordering L∗L^*L∗ is any ordering compatible with the prices, and ties among blue elements of equal price, or between a product and a red element of equal cost, may be broken differently. Equality of revenues therefore needs the tie-independence property (14) applied to M′M'M′ as well as to MMM, which in turn needs M′M'M′ to be a matroid. A second gap is axiom (iv) for the no-purchase option: it requires that offering more products never decreases the number of products greedy selects, which is Lemma 4.14 (i)–(ii) for M′M'M′ combined, not a pointwise statement. Finally, the paper's "+∞+\infty+∞" price must be handled with the red base: without a base inside RRR, a blue element priced above all costs can still be bought and the optimum is unbounded.

Formalization scope

  • Elements and orderings. The matroid is a Mathlib Matroid α; RRR, BBB are Finset α with R∪BR\cup BR∪B equal to the ground set; costs and prices are functions α → ℝ, used only on RRR and BBB. A linear ordering is a duplicate-free List covering the set; greedy on FFF scans the whole list and skips elements outside FFF, so FFF is never re-sorted.
  • Greedy is defined for an arbitrary independence predicate on finite sets, so that it applies to M′M'M′ before M′M'M′ is shown to be a matroid.
  • Customer model. Compatibility (15a)–(15b), including blue priority on ties, is part of the definition of an admissible customer ordering. The red base is a field of every instance.
  • Assortment instance. Elements of R∪CR\cup\mathcal CR∪C live in α ⊕ (α × ℝ). The paper's conditions (1)–(2) for M′M'M′ contain two typos (a missing "∈X\in X∈X" and X\mathcal XX for XXX); the intended conditions are formalized. The price +∞+\infty+∞ is the real number 1+∑f∈Rc(f)1+\sum_{f\in R}c(f)1+∑f∈R​c(f), strictly above every red cost.
  • Goal shape. The theorem is stated for the explicit instance of the proof, for every admissible LLL. The optimum of the Stackelberg side is a maximum (IsGreatest) over positive real prices and all compatible customer orderings. Cost levels are quantified as elements of the set of red costs rather than by index.
  • Ruled out. An existential statement ("some regular instance has the same optimum") is met by a single product with revenue OPTStack\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{Stack}}OPTStack​ and is not this theorem; so is a customer model without tie-breaking, a formalization without the red base, or Lemma 4.14 only for F=F′F=F'F=F′.

Contributions welcome: proofs of Lemma 4.14 and (14) for Mathlib matroids (reusable beyond this mission), the matroid property of parallel extensions such as M′M'M′, and the three revenue identities.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019 (Algorithmica, 2020). https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • J. Cardinal, E. D. Demaine, S. Fiorini, G. Joret, S. Langerman, I. Newman and O. Weimann, The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game, Algorithmica 59(2):129–144, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9299-y
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Vol. B, Algorithms and Combinatorics 24, Springer, 2003 (matroids and the greedy algorithm). https://link.springer.com/book/9783540443896
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A Numerically Stable Dual Method for Solving Strictly Convex Quadratic Programs: The Dual Algorithm Solves the QP or Detects Its Infeasibility in Finitely Many StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Strictly convex quadratic programs — minimize a positive definite quadratic subject to linear inequalities — are the subproblems solved at every iteration of successive quadratic programming (SQP) methods for nonlinear optimization, and they arise directly in least-squares estimation with constraints, portfolio selection and model predictive control. In SQP the unconstrained minimizer of the quadratic model is available at no cost, while a feasible point is not.

D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani (Math. Programming 27 (1983) 1–33) proposed a dual active-set method that exploits this asymmetry. It starts at the unconstrained minimizer, which is optimal for the problem with all constraints removed, and adds violated constraints one at a time while keeping the current point optimal for the subproblem defined by the current active set. No phase 1 is needed. The method, usually called the Goldfarb–Idnani algorithm, is the basis of widely used solvers (for example the quadprog package in R and QuadProg++), and the paper proves that it terminates finitely with a correct answer.

Earlier dual methods for quadratic programming include the modified-simplex methods of Lemke (Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453) and of Van de Panne and Whinston (1964), which the paper compares with its own in Section 7.

Setting

Fix n,m∈Nn, m \in \mathbb Nn,m∈N, a vector a∈Rna \in \mathbb R^na∈Rn, a symmetric positive definite n×nn\times nn×n matrix GGG, an n×mn\times mn×m matrix CCC with columns n1,…,nmn_1,\dots,n_mn1​,…,nm​, and b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The quadratic program (1.1) is

min⁡x f(x)=aTx+12xTGxsubject tosi(x)=niTx−bi≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.\min_x\ f(x) = a^{\mathsf T}x + \tfrac12 x^{\mathsf T}Gx \quad\text{subject to}\quad s_i(x) = n_i^{\mathsf T}x - b_i \ge 0,\quad i \in K = \{1,\dots,m\}.xmin​ f(x)=aTx+21​xTGxsubject tosi​(x)=niT​x−bi​≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.

The gradient is g(x)=Gx+ag(x) = Gx + ag(x)=Gx+a. For J⊆KJ \subseteq KJ⊆K, the subproblem P(J)P(J)P(J) keeps only the constraints indexed by JJJ; P(∅)P(\emptyset)P(∅) is solved by x0=−G−1ax^0 = -G^{-1}ax0=−G−1a. A set A⊆KA \subseteq KA⊆K is linearly independent if the normals nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, are.

For an independent AAA, let NNN be the matrix with columns nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, and define

N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.N^* = (N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1},\qquad H = G^{-1} - G^{-1}N(N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}.N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.

The multipliers are u(x)=N∗g(x)u(x) = N^*g(x)u(x)=N∗g(x); for a constraint p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A with normal n+=npn^+ = n_pn+=np​ the infeasibility multipliers are r=N∗n+r = N^*n^+r=N∗n+; a superscript +++ denotes the same objects for A+=A∪{p}A^+ = A\cup\{p\}A+=A∪{p}.

An S-pair (x,A)(x, A)(x,A) is an independent active set AAA with si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai\in Ai∈A and xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A). A V-triple (x,A,p)(x, A, p)(x,A,p) has p∉Ap\notin Ap∈/A, A+A^+A+ independent, sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0, si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai \in Ai∈A, H+g(x)=0H^+g(x) = 0H+g(x)=0 and u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0u^+(x) = (N^+)^*g(x) \ge 0u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0.

The dual algorithm starts from (x0,∅)(x^0, \emptyset)(x0,∅). In Step 1 it stops if xxx is feasible; otherwise it picks any violated constraint ppp. In Step 2 it moves along the primal direction z=Hn+z = Hn^+z=Hn+ and the dual direction (−r;1)(-r; 1)(−r;1) with step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1, t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​}, where t1t_1t1​ is the largest step that keeps the multipliers nonnegative and t2=−sp(x)/zTn+t_2 = -s_p(x)/z^{\mathsf T}n^+t2​=−sp​(x)/zTn+ makes constraint ppp active. If both are infinite it reports infeasibility. A full step (t=t2t = t_2t=t2​) adds ppp and returns to Step 1. A partial step (t=t1<t2t = t_1 < t_2t=t1​<t2​), or a dual step (z=0z = 0z=0), drops a constraint kkk attaining t1t_1t1​ and repeats Step 2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every choice of the violated constraint ppp and of the dropped constraint kkk:

no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.\text{no run from } (x^0,\emptyset) \text{ is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in } \begin{cases}\text{STOP at an optimal } x \text{ of (1.1)}, \text{ or}\\ \text{STOP with } \{x : C^{\mathsf T}x \ge b\} = \emptyset.\end{cases}no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.​

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Properties (2.6)–(2.9) (p. 5): Hw=0  ⟺  w∈range⁡NHw = 0 \iff w \in \operatorname{range} NHw=0⟺w∈rangeN; H⪰0H \succeq 0H⪰0; HGH=HHGH = HHGH=H; N∗GH=0N^*GH = 0N∗GH=0.
  2. Optimality conditions (2.3)–(2.4) (p. 5): on the manifold of AAA, xxx solves P(A)P(A)P(A) iff N∗g(x)≥0N^*g(x) \ge 0N∗g(x)≥0 and Hg(x)=0Hg(x) = 0Hg(x)=0.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 8): along xˉ=x+tHn+\bar x = x + tHn^+xˉ=x+tHn+ from a V-triple, H+g(xˉ)=0H^+g(\bar x) = 0H+g(xˉ)=0, the constraints of AAA stay active, u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1)u^+(\bar x) = u^+(x) + t(-r;1)u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1) and sp(xˉ)=sp(x)+t zTn+s_p(\bar x) = s_p(x) + t\,z^{\mathsf T}n^+sp​(xˉ)=sp​(x)+tzTn+.
  4. Theorem 1 (pp. 8–9): the step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1,t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​} increases sps_psp​ and fff; a partial step yields a V-triple, a full step an S-pair.
  5. Theorem 2 (p. 10): if np=Nrn_p = Nrnp​=Nr and sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0 at an S-pair, then r≤0r \le 0r≤0 means P(A∪{p})P(A\cup\{p\})P(A∪{p}) is infeasible; otherwise dropping a minimizing kkk gives a V-triple.
  6. One round of Step 2 (p. 11): from an S-pair and a violated ppp, at most ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ partial or dual steps and one final step end either in infeasibility of (1.1) or in a new S-pair (xˉ,Aˉ∪{p})(\bar x, \bar A \cup\{p\})(xˉ,Aˉ∪{p}) with Aˉ⊆A\bar A\subseteq AAˉ⊆A and f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3 is the correctness certificate of the Goldfarb–Idnani method: whatever rule an implementation uses to choose the entering and leaving constraints, it cannot cycle and its answer is right. In particular the infeasibility verdict is a proof that (1.1) has no feasible point, which matters in SQP where infeasible subproblems trigger a different branch of the outer method. The intermediate results (the operator identities, Lemma 1, Theorems 1–2) are the standard analysis of dual active-set methods for quadratic programming.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces verified projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, a verified KKT characterization for equality-active subproblems, and a verified finite-termination proof for a nondeterministic algorithm with an explicit step relation. The platform already has a proved KKT sufficiency theorem for general convex programs (ConvexOptimization.kkt_sufficient_for_convex), stated over EuclideanSpace with general convex functions and gradient fields; it can serve as background for the sufficiency half of milestone 2, but it is not stated in this mission's matrix objects.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that fff increases strictly at every iteration and there are finitely many active sets. It fails as stated: partial steps may leave xxx unchanged (the dual steps of Step 2(c)(ii)), so fff is only nondecreasing between consecutive states. A termination proof therefore needs a measure that also decreases along steps that do not move xxx. Any such argument relies on invariants (independence of A+A^+A+, nonnegativity of the multipliers, sp<0s_p < 0sp​<0 along partial steps) that hold only on reachable states, and the operators N∗N^*N∗ and HHH are meaningful only while those invariants hold. Correctness of the infeasibility verdict requires the dependent case (Theorem 2), not only Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, GGG is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with G.PosDef, CCC is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, and active sets are Finset (Fin m). Multiplier vectors are indexed by constraint index (Fin m → ℝ, zero off the active set), not by position in AAA. Lean's matrix inverse returns 000 for singular matrices, so every statement about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH assumes G≻0G \succ 0G≻0 and an independent active set (directly, or through an S-pair or V-triple).

The algorithm is the inductive relation Step on states step1 x A u, step2 x A p u⁺, stopOptimal x, stopInfeasible, with one transition per admissible choice of ppp and kkk. Infinite step lengths are separate transitions; a tie t1=t2t_1 = t_2t1​=t2​ takes the full step, as the paper tests t=t2t = t_2t=t2​ first. The running value of fff and the factorizations of Section 4 are not part of the state.

Explicit readings of the paper's words:

  • "solves the QPP or indicates infeasibility in a finite number of steps" is: no infinite sequence of Step transitions from the Step-0 state, and every reachable state without a successor is a STOP whose verdict is correct (optimal for (1.1), or (1.1) infeasible);
  • "S-pair" is: AAA independent and active at xxx, with xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A) (the reading every use in the paper needs);
  • in Theorem 1 the partial-step clause carries t<t2t < t_2t<t2​ (as in its proof), and the multiplier printed uj+1+u^+_{j+1}uj+1+​ in (3.16) is uq+1+u^+_{q+1}uq+1+​, the entry belonging to ppp;
  • "an S-pair can never reoccur" is expressed as the strict increase f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x) in milestone 6.

Property (2.10), printed HH+=H+HH^+ = H^+HH+=H+, is false unless G=IG = IG=I and is not formalized. Equality constraints (1.2), Section 4 (numerically stable implementation), Sections 5–6 (computations), Section 7 (comparisons) and the Appendix example are out of scope.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every run of the relation (not one selection rule, not "some run terminates"), the infeasibility verdict is about (1.1) itself, and the algorithm is a relation that always has a successor until a STOP, so correctness cannot hold because a run gets stuck.

Needed infrastructure: Schur-complement and projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH; first-order optimality for convex quadratics on affine subspaces with inequality multipliers; well-foundedness arguments for a nondeterministic relation. The operator identities and the KKT characterization are reusable for other active-set and SQP analyses. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of reusable lemmas about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani, A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs, Mathematical Programming 27 (1983) 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591962
  • C. E. Lemke, A method of solution for quadratic programs, Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.8.4.442
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006, Chapter 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
10 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows I: A Minimum-Cost Flow Exists iff Every Simple Circulation Has Nonnegative Cost, and Then an Extreme One Exists (Theorem 1)Research Paper

Why minimum-concave-cost flows

Many network design and production–distribution problems have economies of scale: shipping twice as much along an arc costs less than twice as much, because of fixed charges, set-up costs or volume discounts. Modelled as network flows, such problems ask for a flow of least cost when each arc cost is a concave function of the flow on the arc. Classical instances include the uncapacitated lot-sizing problem, the fixed-charge transportation problem, and the Steiner tree problem in graphs. Unlike linear costs, concave costs make the problem NP-hard in general, and the usual linear-programming arguments do not apply directly.

Erickson, Monma and Veinott (Math. Oper. Res. 12 (1987) 634–664) give the send-and-split method, a dynamic program that solves such problems in time exponential only in the number of demand nodes. Before the method can run, two questions must be settled: when does a minimum-cost flow exist at all, and can the arc costs be shifted so that they are nonnegative on flows? Theorem 1 of the paper answers both. This mission formalizes Theorem 1.

Timeline. Hirsch and Hoffman (1961) showed that a concave function bounded below on a polyhedron's extreme rays attains its minimum at a vertex; Rockafellar's Convex Analysis (1970, pp. 61, 343) gives the polyhedral form. Edmonds and Karp (1972) showed how to choose node potentials making linear arc costs nonnegative. Theorem 1 (1987) extends both to additive concave costs on uncapacitated networks.

Setting

A graph G=(N,A)G = (N, A)G=(N,A) has nnn nodes and a set AAA of ordered pairs of distinct nodes, the arcs. A demand vector r∈Rnr \in \mathbb{R}^nr∈Rn assigns a demand rir_iri​ to each node (negative demands are supplies). A preflow is a nonnegative matrix x=(xij)x = (x_{ij})x=(xij​) carried by the arcs, and a flow for rrr is a preflow with

∑(j,i)∈Axji−∑(i,k)∈Axik=ri(i∈N),\sum_{(j,i)\in A} x_{ji} - \sum_{(i,k)\in A} x_{ik} = r_i \qquad (i \in N),(j,i)∈A∑​xji​−(i,k)∈A∑​xik​=ri​(i∈N),

inflow minus outflow equal to demand. A circulation is a flow for r=0r = 0r=0.

The flow cost is c(x)=∑(i,j)∈Acij(xij)c(x) = \sum_{(i,j)\in A} c_{ij}(x_{ij})c(x)=∑(i,j)∈A​cij​(xij​), where each cijc_{ij}cij​ is concave on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0. A minimum-cost flow for rrr is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for rrr.

A preflow induces the subgraph of arcs with nonzero flow. An extreme flow is a flow whose induced subgraph is a forest (in the undirected sense; two antiparallel arcs form a cycle). A simple circuit is a directed cycle through at least two distinct nodes, with arc set CCC; a simple circulation is a circulation whose induced subgraph is a simple circuit. The slope at infinity c˙ij(∞)∈[−∞,∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty) \in [-\infty, \infty)c˙ij​(∞)∈[−∞,∞) is the limit of the right derivative of cijc_{ij}cij​.

Two nodes are in the same strong component if chains (directed walks) join them both ways; a component is a sink if no chain leaves it. The augmented graph G‾\underline{G}G​ appends a node ν\nuν and an arc (i,ν)(i,\nu)(i,ν) for exactly one node iii of each sink component. Its arc costs c‾\underline{c}c​ are c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) on arcs inside strong components and arbitrary real numbers elsewhere; π‾i\underline{\pi}_iπ​i​ is the infimum of the costs of chains from iii to ν\nuν. For π∈Rn\pi \in \mathbb{R}^nπ∈Rn, the altered costs are cijπ(y)=cij(y)−(πi−πj)yc^\pi_{ij}(y) = c_{ij}(y) - (\pi_i - \pi_j) ycijπ​(y)=cij​(y)−(πi​−πj​)y.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

The following are equivalent:

1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈Cc˙ij(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G‾ to ν under c‾.\begin{aligned} &1^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;}\\ &2^\circ\ \text{the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;}\\ &3^\circ\ \text{for every } r \text{ with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for } r \text{ is extreme;}\\ &4^\circ\ c(y) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circulation } y;\\ &5^\circ\ \textstyle\sum_{(i,j)\in C} \dot c_{ij}(\infty) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circuit with arc set } C;\\ &6^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of } \underline{G} \text{ to } \nu \text{ under } \underline{c}. \end{aligned}​1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈C​c˙ij​(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G​ to ν under c​.​

If moreover rrr admits a flow and c‾ijz≤cij(z)\underline{c}_{ij} z \le c_{ij}(z)c​ij​z≤cij​(z) on arcs joining distinct strong components, where z=∑iri+z = \sum_i r_i^+z=∑i​ri+​, they are equivalent to

7∘∃π  cijπ(xij)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,7^\circ\quad \exists \pi\ \ c^\pi_{ij}(x_{ij}) \ge 0 \text{ for all arcs } (i,j) \text{ and all flows } x \text{ for } r,7∘∃π  cijπ​(xij​)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,

and π=π‾\pi = \underline{\pi}π=π​ is real and satisfies 7∘7^\circ7∘.

Milestones

The milestones are the statements the paper's proof rests on: the Hirsch–Hoffman extension (p. 638), cπ(x)=c(x)+∑iπiric^\pi(x) = c(x) + \sum_i \pi_i r_icπ(x)=c(x)+∑i​πi​ri​, the bounds 12c(2x)+12c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy)\tfrac12 c(2x) + \tfrac12 c(2\theta y) \le c(x+\theta y) \le c(x) + c(\theta y)21​c(2x)+21​c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy), the circuit-wise form of 4° ⇔ 5°, uniqueness of the extreme circulation, xij≤zx_{ij} \le zxij​≤z between strong components, and the two inequalities giving 7∘7^\circ7∘ (all p. 639).

Significance

Theorem 1 decides existence of an optimum from the costs alone: conditions 4° and 5° do not mention the demand vector, so one test settles every demand pattern at once, and 3° guarantees the optimum may be sought among extreme (forest) flows, which is what the send-and-split recursion enumerates. Condition 6° is checkable by a shortest-chain computation, and 7° supplies node potentials that convert the instance into an equivalent one with nonnegative arc costs, the standing assumption of the paper's Theorem 2 and of its running-time analysis. For linear costs the theorem reduces to the familiar statement that a minimum-cost flow exists iff no simple circuit has negative cost.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been machine-checked. The formalization adds a precise model of extreme flows over arcs (so that antiparallel arcs form a cycle), a treatment of slopes that may equal −∞-\infty−∞, and the Hirsch–Hoffman extension specialized to network polyhedra, which the paper cites rather than proves. Related platform items cover the linear, capacitated case: CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_no_negative_cycle and CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_exists_price (Goldberg–Tarjan), and LinearOptimization.positive_directed_cycle_of_circulation and LinearOptimization.network_basic_iff_tree on a different arc encoding.

Difficulty

The first idea, to argue as for linear costs by cancelling negative cycles, fails because concave costs are not additive along cycle decompositions: the cost of a flow is not the sum of the costs of its cycle and path components, and a circuit can be harmless at small flow and arbitrarily negative at large flow. Existence therefore depends on the asymptotic slopes c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞), which may be −∞-\infty−∞, rather than on any finite cost evaluation. The implication from bounded rays to an attained minimum (Hirsch–Hoffman) requires identifying the vertices of the flow polyhedron with forest flows and its extreme rays with simple circulations. The potential step 6° ⇒ 7° needs a cost bound on arcs between strong components, where the concave cost is only controlled up to the total positive demand zzz.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; a graph is ArcGraph n, a Finset (Fin n × Fin n) of arcs without loops. Preflows are real matrices vanishing off the arcs; arc costs are functions R→R\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R→R, concave on Set.Ici 0 with value 000 at 000 (the paper's "without further mention" assumption, made a hypothesis). The augmented graph has nodes Option (Fin n), with none the node ν\nuν; chain costs, c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) and π‾\underline{\pi}π​ are EReal-valued.

The explicit readings of loose phrases are:

  • "minimum-cost flow" is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for the same demands (attained, never an infimum);
  • "bounded below on each half-line" is ∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy)\exists M\ \forall \theta \ge 0,\ M \le c(x+\theta y)∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy);
  • c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) is the infimum over t>0t > 0t>0 of the right derivative at ttt, equal to the limit by concavity;
  • "chain" is a directed walk; "minimum-cost chain" is a chain of real cost at most every chain's cost;
  • 6° quantifies over every admissible choice of the appended arcs and of the finite costs c‾\underline{c}c​;
  • in the 7° part, "flows xxx" are flows for the given rrr, and the existence of such a flow is an added hypothesis: without it 7° is vacuous while 4° can fail;
  • "π‾\underline{\pi}π​ satisfies 7°" uses the real values of π‾\underline{\pi}π​, which the theorem asserts are real.

A formalization in which extreme flows are forests of a simple graph built from the support, in which chains are simple paths, or in which a chain of cost −∞-\infty−∞ counts as a minimum would make 3°, 6° or the equivalence trivially or falsely true; all three are ruled out by the definitions. The running-time remarks, the computation paragraph and the linear-cost remark after the proof are not formalized. Contributions are welcome on the polyhedral side (vertices and extreme rays of {x≥0:conservation}\{x \ge 0 : \text{conservation}\}{x≥0:conservation}), on right derivatives of concave functions at infinity, and on walk costs with negative cycles; all are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. E. Erickson, C. L. Monma, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(4), 1987, 634–664. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.4.634
  • W. M. Hirsch, A. J. Hoffman, Extreme varieties, concave functions, and the fixed charge problem, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 14, 1961, 355–369. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160140312
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • J. Edmonds, R. M. Karp, Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems, Journal of the ACM 19(2), 1972, 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts I: The Newsvendor Quantity-Flexibility Contract (w_q(δ), δ) Gives the Retailer at Least Π(q°) at δ = 0, the Supplier at Least Π(q°) at δ = 1Textbook

Why contracts in a newsvendor supply chain

A supplier sells to a retailer who must order before a single selling season with random demand. Each firm maximizes its own expected profit, and with the simplest contract, a fixed wholesale price per unit, the retailer orders too little: he bears all the risk of unsold stock but earns only part of the margin on each sale. The supply chain as a whole then earns less than it could. A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the chain-optimal actions are an equilibrium of the two firms' game. Which contracts coordinate, and how they divide the chain's profit, is the subject of a large literature in operations management. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter in the Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Cachon 2003) gives its standard account. This mission formalizes §6.2 of that chapter, Coordinating the newsvendor, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003).

Timeline of the contracts treated in §6.2:

  • Pasternack (1985) shows that buy-back (returns) contracts coordinate the newsvendor.
  • Tsay (1999) and Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility contracts, in which the supplier refunds unsold units up to a fraction δ of the order.
  • Cachon and Lariviere (2005, working paper 2000) analyze revenue sharing and show it is equivalent to buy back in the newsvendor.
  • Taylor (2002) studies sales rebates. Moorthy (1987) and Kolay and Shaffer (2002) treat quantity discounts.

Setting

Demand D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 has distribution function FFF, with Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F and mean μ=E[D]\mu = E[D]μ=E[D]. The retail price is ppp. The supplier's unit production cost is csc_scs​ and the retailer's unit cost is crc_rcr​, with c=cs+cr<pc = c_s + c_r < pc=cs​+cr​<p. Unmet demand costs the retailer a goodwill penalty grg_rgr​ per unit and the supplier gsg_sgs​, with g=gs+grg = g_s + g_rg=gs​+gr​. Each unsold unit is worth v<cv < cv<c to the retailer.

Expected sales are S(q)=E[min⁡(q,D)]S(q) = E[\min(q, D)]S(q)=E[min(q,D)], leftover inventory is I(q)=E[(q−D)+]I(q) = E[(q - D)^+]I(q)=E[(q−D)+] and lost sales are L(q)=E[(D−q)+]L(q) = E[(D - q)^+]L(q)=E[(D−q)+]. If TTT is the expected payment from the retailer to the supplier, the firms earn

πr(q)=(p−v+gr)S(q)−(cr−v)q−grμ−T,πs(q)=gsS(q)−csq−gsμ+T,\pi_r(q) = (p - v + g_r)S(q) - (c_r - v)q - g_r\mu - T, \qquad \pi_s(q) = g_sS(q) - c_sq - g_s\mu + T,πr​(q)=(p−v+gr​)S(q)−(cr​−v)q−gr​μ−T,πs​(q)=gs​S(q)−cs​q−gs​μ+T,

and the chain earns Π(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ\Pi(q) = (p - v + g)S(q) - (c - v)q - g\muΠ(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ. Let qoq^oqo be a maximizer of Π\PiΠ, with Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0.

Under the quantity flexibility contract (wq,δ)(w_q, \delta)(wq​,δ) the retailer pays wqw_qwq​ per unit ordered and is refunded wq+cr−vw_q + c_r - vwq​+cr​−v for each unsold unit, up to δq\delta qδq units:

Tq(q,wq,δ)=wqq−(wq+cr−v)∫(1−δ)qqF(y) dy.T_q(q, w_q, \delta) = w_qq - (w_q + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F(y)\,dy.Tq​(q,wq​,δ)=wq​q−(wq​+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)qq​F(y)dy.

The wholesale price that makes qoq^oqo satisfy the retailer's first-order condition is

wq(δ)=(p−v+gr) Fˉ(qo)Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)−cr+v.w_q(\delta) = \frac{(p - v + g_r)\,\bar F(q^o)}{\bar F(q^o) + (1-\delta)F((1-\delta)q^o)} - c_r + v.wq​(δ)=Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)​−cr​+v.

Formalization targets

Goal: the quantity flexibility contract can split the profit in any way

With πr(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_r(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πr​(q,wq​(δ),δ) and πs(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_s(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πs​(q,wq​(δ),δ) the firms' profits under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ):

πr(qo,wq(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo),\pi_r(q^o, w_q(0), 0) = \Pi(q^o) + g_s\big(\mu - S(q^o) + \bar F(q^o)q^o\big) \ge \Pi(q^o),πr​(qo,wq​(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs​(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo), πs(qo,wq(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr≥Π(qo),\pi_s(q^o, w_q(1), 1) = \Pi(q^o) + \mu g_r \ge \Pi(q^o),πs​(qo,wq​(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr​≥Π(qo),

and for every a∈[0,Π(qo)]a \in [0, \Pi(q^o)]a∈[0,Π(qo)] some δ∈[0,1]\delta \in [0,1]δ∈[0,1] gives the retailer aaa and the supplier Π(qo)−a\Pi(q^o) - aΠ(qo)−a (§6.2.5, p. 25).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F, I(q)=q−S(q)I(q) = q - S(q)I(q)=q−S(q), L(q)=μ−S(q)L(q) = \mu - S(q)L(q)=μ−S(q) (p. 10).
  2. The unique maximizer qoq^oqo of Π\PiΠ satisfies Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g)\bar F(q^o) = (c - v)/(p - v + g)Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g) (Eq. (2), p. 11).
  3. wq(0)=(p−v+gr)Fˉ(qo)+v−crw_q(0) = (p - v + g_r)\bar F(q^o) + v - c_rwq​(0)=(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)+v−cr​ and wq(1)=p+gr−crw_q(1) = p + g_r - c_rwq​(1)=p+gr​−cr​. Also, wqw_qwq​ is increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1], which gives v−cr≤wq(δ)≤p+gr−crv - c_r \le w_q(\delta) \le p + g_r - c_rv−cr​≤wq​(δ)≤p+gr​−cr​ (p. 24).
  4. qoq^oqo maximizes the retailer's profit under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ) (Eq. (11), p. 24).
  5. The supplier's first-order condition holds at qoq^oqo (p. 25).
  6. The δ = 0 identity and the δ = 1 identity (p. 25).

Companion results of §6.2

  • Revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r,\phi\}{wr​,ϕ} equals the buy back wb=wr+(1−ϕ)pw_b = w_r + (1-\phi)pwb​=wr​+(1−ϕ)p, b=(1−ϕ)(p−v)b = (1-\phi)(p - v)b=(1−ϕ)(p−v) for every demand realization (p. 22).
  • The sales rebate contract: first-order condition (12), price (13), the retailer's profit and its monotonicity in the threshold (p. 27), and failure under voluntary compliance (p. 28).
  • The quantity discount gives the retailer πr=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−grμ\pi_r = \lambda(\Pi(q) + g\mu) - g_r\muπr​=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−gr​μ, so qoq^oqo is optimal for both firms (p. 29).
  • Under the wholesale price contract, the retailer's profit increases in the induced quantity (p. 14).

Significance

The goal is what makes quantity flexibility a complete coordinating family. Retailer optimality (milestone 4) says qoq^oqo can be implemented. The allocation statement says that bargaining power can then be expressed through the single parameter δ without losing efficiency. Together with the supplier's first-order condition, these are the facts that matter in practice: forced compliance suffices for coordination, and the choice of δ is purely distributional. The companions put §6.2's other contracts on the same footing. Revenue sharing and buy back are equivalent. Sales rebates coordinate only with forced compliance. Quantity discounts coordinate with a bounded retailer share.

All of these results are stated in the source. Related results are Proved on the platform in Snyder and Shen's chapter (SupplyChainTheory.*), including the chain-optimal fractile and retailer optimality under quantity flexibility. This mission states them locally because Snyder and Shen's contract data impose stronger restrictions on salvage value than Cachon's model. The efficiency formula (k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2)(k+1)^{-(1+1/k)}(k+2)(k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2) for the power distribution on p. 14 is already posed as the Open item RevShareCoord.Wholesale.alpha_family_efficiency and is not posed again.

Difficulty

Each identity is elementary algebra once SSS, its derivative and the integrals of FFF are under control. That is where the work lies. Expected sales are defined as an expectation, so S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F is a theorem to prove, not a definition to unfold.

Differentiating ∫(1−δ)qqF\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F∫(1−δ)qq​F needs continuity of FFF at two points. The sales rebate transfer is piecewise and has a kink at the threshold, so derivatives must be taken on the right side of it.

The allocation clause rests on continuity of δ ↦ π_r(q^o, w_q(δ), δ). The obvious argument, "the profits are continuous in δ", hides two facts. First, the denominator of wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) stays positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Second, F((1−δ)qo)F((1-\delta)q^o)F((1−δ)qo) moves continuously, which fails for a demand law with atoms. Both must be derived from the model, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The local ContractData follows Cachon's v<cs+crv<c_s+c_rv<cs​+cr​ and cs+cr<pc_s+c_r<pcs​+cr​<p. Its rrr is Cachon's price ppp, and its ps,prp_s,p_rps​,pr​ are the goodwill penalties gs,grg_s,g_rgs​,gr​. The penalties are nonnegative costs. Net salvage may be negative and may exceed crc_rcr​; both possibilities were excluded by the related published model.

A demand law is a probability measure on ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty, 0)(−∞,0), finite mean and no atoms (so FFF is continuous). FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) as long as F<1F < 1F<1. Its derivative is specified on the positive interior of that active support. This reading admits the bounded-support power law the chapter itself uses on p. 14, whose cdf has a corner at the support endpoint. Derivative conclusions use HasDerivAt.

Optimality is IsMaxOn … Set.univ over real quantities; the optimum is positive under the model assumptions. Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0 is a hypothesis wherever an optimum is named, following p. 11.

Cachon's sales rebate rrr is rebate in Lean.

Three printed slips are corrected, and the milestone quotes keep the print:

  • p. 24 writes www for wqw_qwq​ in TqT_qTq​.
  • p. 25 mixes qqq and qoq^oqo in the δ = 0 and δ = 1 displays.
  • p. 28 has a spurious −v-v−v in ws(r)−rw_s(r) - rws​(r)−r.

Two encodings are ruled out. wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) is the explicit formula, never "the solution of (11)". The supplier's profit is the model's own function, not Π\PiΠ minus the retailer's profit, so no clause holds by definition.

The local definition file CachonCoord.Newsvendor.Contracts contains the model, its expected profits, the contract transfers, the sales rebate price ws(r)w_s(r)ws​(r), the quantity discount schedule, and realized profits and payments. Lemmas about SSS, ∫F\int F∫F and continuity of contract prices are reusable across the series. The sales rebate existence-of-threshold argument and the normal-distribution counterexample of p. 25 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in OR & MS Vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003 (3rd draft, Jan. 2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • A. A. Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier–customer incentives, Management Science 45(10), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Machine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift 3: Softmax Policy Gradient Ascent with Step Size η ≤ (1−γ)³/8 Converges to the Optimal ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

Policy gradient methods optimize a parameterized policy of a Markov decision process by gradient ascent on its expected discounted return. They underlie much of modern reinforcement learning (REINFORCE, actor–critic methods, TRPO, PPO), yet the objective θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta \mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ) is non-concave in the parameters, and until recently even the most basic question was open: does exact gradient ascent, run on a finite MDP with the standard softmax parameterization, reach the optimal values at all?

Agarwal, Kakade, Lee and Mahajan (arXiv:1908.00261v5, JMLR 22(98), 2021) answer this in the affirmative. Their Theorem 5.1 shows that unregularized softmax policy gradient with a small constant step size converges to the optimal value at every state, provided the start distribution used for the gradient puts positive mass on every state. The result is asymptotic: no rate is given. Later work (Mei, Xiao, Szepesvári and Schuurmans, ICML 2020, arXiv:2005.06392) obtained an O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) rate with constants that can be exponentially large, and the same paper by Agarwal et al. gives polynomial rates once a log-barrier regularizer is added (its Corollary 5.1) or once the natural gradient is used (its Theorem 5.3). Theorem 5.1 is the unregularized baseline for all of these.

Setting

A finite MDP consists of finite sets S\mathcal SS of states and A\mathcal AA of actions (A\mathcal AA nonempty), a transition kernel P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1] and a discount factor γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1). A policy π\piπ assigns to each state a probability vector π(⋅∣s)\pi(\cdot\mid s)π(⋅∣s) on A\mathcal AA. Its value Vπ(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(s) is the expected discounted sum of rewards E[∑t≥0γtr(st,at)∣s0=s]\mathbb E[\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t r(s_t,a_t)\mid s_0=s]E[∑t≥0​γtr(st​,at​)∣s0​=s] when actions are drawn from π\piπ; its state–action value is Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′)Q^\pi(s,a)=r(s,a)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)V^\pi(s')Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′) and its advantage is Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s)A^\pi(s,a)=Q^\pi(s,a)-V^\pi(s)Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s). For a distribution μ\muμ on states, Vπ(μ)=∑sμ(s)Vπ(s)V^\pi(\mu)=\sum_s\mu(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(μ)=∑s​μ(s)Vπ(s), and the discounted state visitation distribution is dμπ(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0γtPr⁡π(st=s∣s0∼μ)d^\pi_\mu(s)=(1-\gamma)\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t\Pr^\pi(s_t=s\mid s_0\sim\mu)dμπ​(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0​γtPrπ(st​=s∣s0​∼μ). A policy π⋆\pi^\starπ⋆ is optimal if Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s)V^{\pi}(s)\le V^{\pi^\star}(s)Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s) for every policy π\piπ and every state sss; V⋆=Vπ⋆V^\star=V^{\pi^\star}V⋆=Vπ⋆.

The softmax policy with parameters θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣\theta\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣ is

πθ(a∣s)=exp⁡(θs,a)∑a′∈Aexp⁡(θs,a′).\pi_\theta(a\mid s)=\frac{\exp(\theta_{s,a})}{\sum_{a'\in\mathcal A}\exp(\theta_{s,a'})}.πθ​(a∣s)=∑a′∈A​exp(θs,a′​)exp(θs,a​)​.

Softmax policy gradient ascent with step size η\etaη produces, from an arbitrary θ(0)\theta^{(0)}θ(0), the iterates

θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η ∇θV(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t).\theta^{(t+1)}=\theta^{(t)}+\eta\,\nabla_\theta V^{(t)}(\mu),\qquad V^{(t)}=V^{\pi_{\theta^{(t)}}} .θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η∇θ​V(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t)​.

The Lean development names these softmaxPolicy, softmaxValue P r γ µ θ =Vπθ(μ)=V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)=Vπθ​(μ), and IsSoftmaxPGRun P r γ µ η θ for the update rule; PolicyValue, QFunction and IsOptimalPolicy are the published FoundationsML definitions, and valueAt, advantage and visitation are the series' shared layer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

If μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every state and 0<η≤(1−γ)3/80<\eta\le(1-\gamma)^3/80<η≤(1−γ)3/8, then for every state sss

V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).V^{(t)}(s)\longrightarrow V^\star(s)\qquad(t\to\infty).V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).

Milestones (Appendices C.1 and D)

  1. Lemma C.1, the gradient formula ∂Vπθ(μ)/∂θs,a=11−γdμπθ(s)πθ(a∣s)Aπθ(s,a)\partial V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\frac1{1-\gamma}d^{\pi_\theta}_\mu(s)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)A^{\pi_\theta}(s,a)∂Vπθ​(μ)/∂θs,a​=1−γ1​dμπθ​​(s)πθ​(a∣s)Aπθ​(s,a).
  2. Lemma D.1, smoothness 5∥c∥∞5\|c\|_\infty5∥c∥∞​ of θs↦∑aπθ(a∣s)ca\theta_s\mapsto\sum_a\pi_\theta(a\mid s)c_aθs​↦∑a​πθ​(a∣s)ca​.
  3. Lemma D.4 at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, smoothness 8/(1−γ)38/(1-\gamma)^38/(1−γ)3 of θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ).
  4. Lemma C.2, pointwise monotone improvement of V(t)(s)V^{(t)}(s)V(t)(s) and Q(t)(s,a)Q^{(t)}(s,a)Q(t)(s,a) for η≤(1−γ)2/5\eta\le(1-\gamma)^2/5η≤(1−γ)2/5.
  5. Lemma C.3, existence of the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) and the bound (40).
  6. Lemma C.4, eventual sign separation (41) of the advantages on I+s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)}I^s_+=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)>V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I+s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)} and I−s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}I^s_-=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)<V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I−s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}.
  7. Lemma C.5, vanishing gradients, π(t)(a∣s)→0\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to0π(t)(a∣s)→0 off I0s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}I^s_0=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)=V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I0s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}, and ∑a∈I0sπ(t)(a∣s)→1\sum_{a\in I^s_0}\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to1∑a∈I0s​​π(t)(a∣s)→1.
  8. Lemma C.6, eventual strict monotonicity of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I±sI^s_\pmI±s​.
  9. Lemma C.7, divergence of max⁡a∈I0sθs,a(t)\max_{a\in I^s_0}\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}maxa∈I0s​​θs,a(t)​ and min⁡aθs,a(t)\min_a\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}mina​θs,a(t)​ when I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅.
  10. Lemma C.11, lower boundedness of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I+sI^s_+I+s​ and θs,a(t)→−∞\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}\to-\inftyθs,a(t)​→−∞ on I−sI^s_-I−s​.

The goal states only convergence to the optimal values, with the paper's constants in the step-size bound; no rate is claimed.

Significance

The theorem establishes that the non-concavity of the softmax objective does not trap exact gradient ascent: from any initialization, the values of the iterates converge to V⋆V^\starV⋆ at every state, not only on average under μ\muμ. It is the reference point for the rate results of the same paper (log-barrier regularization, natural policy gradient) and for the subsequent literature on softmax policy gradient rates and lower bounds. It also isolates the role of exploration in the start distribution: Remark 5.1 of the paper leaves open whether μ>0\mu>0μ>0 can be dropped.

The result is proved in the paper; to the knowledge of the mission authors none of it is formalized in Lean or any other proof assistant. A complete development would provide a machine-checked gradient formula for the softmax class, smoothness bounds for discounted values, and a monotone-improvement argument for policy gradient, each reusable for other parameterizations and other policy optimization methods.

Difficulty

The obvious route fails. The gradient domination property of the direct parameterization (Lemma 4.1 of the paper) would conclude from ∇πVπ(μ)→0\nabla_\pi V^\pi(\mu)\to0∇π​Vπ(μ)→0, but under softmax ∂V/∂θs,a=πθ(a∣s) ∂V/∂πθ(a∣s)\partial V/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\pi_\theta(a\mid s)\,\partial V/\partial\pi_\theta(a\mid s)∂V/∂θs,a​=πθ​(a∣s)∂V/∂πθ​(a∣s), so a vanishing θ\thetaθ-gradient says nothing once some action probabilities vanish, and the iterates do drive probabilities to zero while parameters diverge. A smoothness-based argument therefore gives only stationarity in the limit. The asymptotic analysis must instead track which actions keep positive limiting advantage, how the individual parameters θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ move once the advantage signs are frozen, and why an action with strictly positive limiting advantage cannot coexist with the behaviour of the remaining parameters. Lemmas C.7–C.12 carry that bookkeeping; the limiting sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​ and the existence of the limits are themselves consequences of the pointwise monotone improvement of Lemma C.2, which needs its own smoothness bound.

Formalization scope

Standing setting of §3: finite types S, A with decidable equality, A nonempty; IsFiniteMDP P r γ (a transition kernel, rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], 0≤γ<10\le\gamma<10≤γ<1); IsDist µ. Parameters live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (S × A), so norms are ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ and Mathlib's gradient is ∇θ\nabla_\theta∇θ​; the coordinate (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) of the gradient is ∂/∂θs,a\partial/\partial\theta_{s,a}∂/∂θs,a​. Logarithms do not appear. Conventions committed to:

  • V⋆(s)V^\star(s)V⋆(s) is PolicyValue πstar P r γ s for a policy πstar with IsOptimalPolicy πstar P r γ, optimal simultaneously at every state; it is not a real supremum over all functions.
  • The step size satisfies 0<η0<\eta0<η, which "gradient ascent" presupposes and the page does not write; at η=0\eta=0η=0 the theorem is false.
  • μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every sss is a hypothesis of the goal and of Lemmas C.5–C.11; Lemmas C.1–C.4 are stated without it, and Lemma C.1 for an arbitrary real weighting μ\muμ.
  • In Lemmas C.4–C.11 the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) are parameters with the hypotheses that they are the limits of V(t)V^{(t)}V(t), Q(t)Q^{(t)}Q(t). The paper's Δ=min⁡A(∞)(s,a)≠0∣A(∞)(s,a)∣\Delta=\min_{A^{(\infty)}(s,a)\neq0}|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|Δ=minA(∞)(s,a)=0​∣A(∞)(s,a)∣ is replaced by any Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0 bounded by every nonzero ∣A(∞)(s,a)∣|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|∣A(∞)(s,a)∣, which avoids an undefined minimum over an empty set.
  • "→±∞\to\pm\infty→±∞" is Tendsto … atTop atTop / atBot; "strictly increasing for t≥T1t\ge T_1t≥T1​" is StrictMonoOn on Set.Ici T1, with T1T_1T1​ existentially quantified.

The goal theorem does not assume the existence of limits, monotonicity of the iterates, or anything about the sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​; a formalization that did would assume the substance of the proof. Lemmas C.7 and C.11 (first part) carry the hypothesis I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅ of the paper's proof by contradiction, which no actual run satisfies once Theorem 5.1 is proved; they are steps of that argument.

A full development needs: differentiability of θ↦Vπθ\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}θ↦Vπθ​ and the policy gradient theorem in the occupancy-measure form, the performance difference lemma, the descent lemma for LLL-smooth functions, and Hessian bounds for the softmax map. Contributions to any of these, to the optional Lemmas C.8–C.10 and C.12 of the paper, or to the final contradiction argument are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Agarwal, S. M. Kakade, J. D. Lee, G. Mahajan, On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift, JMLR 22(98), 2021; arXiv:1908.00261v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.00261
  • J. Mei, C. Xiao, C. Szepesvári, D. Schuurmans, On the Global Convergence Rates of Softmax Policy Gradient Methods, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06392
  • S. Kakade, J. Langford, Approximately Optimal Approximate Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2002. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/645531.656005
  • R. S. Sutton, D. McAllester, S. Singh, Y. Mansour, Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation, NeurIPS 1999. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/1713-policy-gradient-methods-for-reinforcement-learning-with-function-approximation
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach 2: Empirical Likelihood Intervals for the Optimal Value inf_x E[ℓ(x;ξ)] Have Exact Coverage P(χ²₁ ≤ ρ)Research Paper

Why coverage of an optimal value matters

Many stochastic optimization problems choose a decision by minimizing an expected loss. The optimum depends on an unknown distribution, so a data-based optimum alone gives no measure of uncertainty about the best achievable expected loss. This mission concerns a confidence set for that optimal value, rather than a confidence set for the decision itself. The result of Duchi, Glynn, and Namkoong shows that a broad class of divergence neighborhoods of the empirical distribution yields a calibrated limit for this set. The same construction covers nonsmooth losses and constrained decisions when the regularity assumptions below hold.

The paper develops generalized empirical likelihood for smooth functionals of a distribution and then applies it to optimization. Its Theorem 3 states the exact asymptotic coverage result for the optimal value; Appendix C identifies the functional derivative, while Appendix B gives the uniform linearization and expansion on which calibration rests. The statistical result is proved in the paper. The mission asks for a machine-checked development of its statements and proof under an explicit nondegeneracy condition required by the paper's general coverage theorem.

Decisions, losses, and divergence neighborhoods

Let X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd be a nonempty compact decision set. An observation ξ\xiξ has population law P0P_0P0​, and ℓ(x;ξ)∈R\ell(x;\xi)\in\mathbb Rℓ(x;ξ)∈R is the loss at decision xxx. The quantity of interest is the optimal-value functional

Topt(P)=inf⁡x∈XEP[ℓ(x;ξ)].T_{\rm opt}(P)=\inf_{x\in\mathcal X}\mathbb E_P[\ell(x;\xi)].Topt​(P)=x∈Xinf​EP​[ℓ(x;ξ)].

The observations ξ1,…,ξn\xi_1,\ldots,\xi_nξ1​,…,ξn​ are independent and identically distributed with law P0P_0P0​. Write P^n\widehat P_nPn​ for their empirical distribution. A candidate distribution supported on the indexed observations is represented by nonnegative weights pip_ipi​ with ∑ipi=1\sum_i p_i=1∑i​pi​=1. Indexed weights also cover samples with repeated observations. For a convex divergence generator fff normalized by f(1)=f′(1)=0f(1)=f'(1)=0f(1)=f′(1)=0 and f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2, its divergence from the empirical law is Df(p∥P^n)=n−1∑if(npi)D_f(p\|\widehat P_n)=n^{-1}\sum_i f(np_i)Df​(p∥Pn​)=n−1∑i​f(npi​). Assumption A further requires fff to be three times continuously differentiable near 111; it permits f(0)=+∞f(0)=+\inftyf(0)=+∞.

At radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n, the divergence ball consists of the weights with ∑if(npi)≤ρ\sum_i f(np_i)\le\rho∑i​f(npi​)≤ρ. The confidence set is its image under ToptT_{\rm opt}Topt​:

Cn,ρ={Topt(p):Df(p∥P^n)≤ρ/n}.C_{n,\rho}=\{T_{\rm opt}(p):D_f(p\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n\}.Cn,ρ​={Topt​(p):Df​(p∥Pn​)≤ρ/n}.

Assumption B makes X\mathcal XX compact and requires ℓ(⋅;ξ)\ell(\cdot;\xi)ℓ(⋅;ξ) to be Lipschitz on it with a measurable random coefficient M(ξ)M(\xi)M(ξ). The theorem adds finite second moments for MMM and for the loss at one feasible decision. These conditions control losses at every feasible decision. They also make the population and weighted empirical infima finite on the cases used in the limit.

Formalization targets

The goal is the exact asymptotic coverage of the population optimal value, with x⋆x^\starx⋆ the unique optimizer and Var⁡P0(ℓ(x⋆;ξ))>0\operatorname{Var}_{P_0}(\ell(x^\star;\xi))>0VarP0​​(ℓ(x⋆;ξ))>0:

P∗ ⁣(Topt(P0)∈Cn,ρ)⟶P(χ12≤ρ),ρ≥0.P^*\!\left(T_{\rm opt}(P_0)\in C_{n,\rho}\right)\longrightarrow P(\chi_1^2\le\rho),\qquad \rho\ge0.P∗(Topt​(P0​)∈Cn,ρ​)⟶P(χ12​≤ρ),ρ≥0.

Here P∗P^*P∗ denotes outer probability, and χ12\chi_1^2χ12​ is the square of a standard normal variable. The milestone statements follow the paper's path to this theorem. Lemma 17 gives the directional derivative of an optimal-value functional. Lemma 13 bounds feasible empirical weights relative to uniform weights. Lemma 16 makes the nonlinear remainder uniformly negligible on the divergence ball. The display after (37) then gives a first-order expansion of the upper endpoint of Cn,ρC_{n,\rho}Cn,ρ​; the next display gives its one-sided Gaussian coverage limit. The goal concerns membership in the image set Cn,ρC_{n,\rho}Cn,ρ​, including both sides of that interval.

What the result provides

The limit specifies a radius through a one degree of freedom chi square quantile. It applies to the value of a constrained stochastic optimization problem without requiring the optimizer or the loss to be differentiable. The positive variance condition ensures that the influence function supplies a genuine Gaussian scale. Without such a condition, a deterministic optimal loss can make coverage identically one, so the stated chi square limit would fail. The general theorem in the paper explicitly requires positive influence variance; this mission makes the condition visible in the specialized optimal-value statement.

A complete formalization would connect finite-sample divergence geometry to an asymptotic confidence claim about an optimization functional. The empirical mean and variance definitions, divergence ball, and normalized generator already exist as reusable declarations. This mission adds the optimal-value functional, its influence function, the nonlinear remainder, and the statistical limits. Those definitions can also support later confidence statements for other stochastic optimization models. The result is proved in the source paper; the Lean statements here are open targets awaiting proofs.

The mathematical obstacle

Pointwise control of each loss ℓ(x;ξ)\ell(x;\xi)ℓ(x;ξ) is insufficient for the optimal value: the decision minimizing an empirical weighted objective can move with the weights. A pointwise mean expansion therefore does not by itself control the infimum over xxx. The required limit combines uniform control over the loss class with sensitivity of the infimum functional near its population minimizer. The uniform remainder in Lemma 16 is stronger than a statement for the ordinary empirical distribution because it covers every distribution in the shrinking divergence ball. The final event is membership in the image of that ball; bounds on its upper endpoint alone do not establish two-sided coverage.

Formalization scope

Lean represents decisions by EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and assumes a nonempty compact feasible set. Assumption B uses its Euclidean norm. The paper allows any norm in finite dimension; norm equivalence permits this choice after rescaling the Lipschitz coefficient. The population law is the pushforward of the first measurable observation from a probability space. Samples are indexed from zero, so the first nnn observations are indices 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1. Independence and identical distribution are explicit hypotheses. Loss measurability is explicit so the population integrals have their intended values. Square integrability and compact Lipschitz control keep the real infima meaningful.

The generator takes values in EReal so a divergence infinite at zero is representable. The ball uses the published probability uncertainty set with radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n and includes nonnegativity and unit mass. Its weights represent distributions absolutely continuous with respect to the empirical law. With tied observations, equal splitting across copies preserves the induced distribution and does not increase a convex divergence. The upper endpoint is sup⁡pinf⁡x\sup_p\inf_xsupp​infx​; the different minimax expression inf⁡xsup⁡p\inf_x\sup_pinfx​supp​ is not substituted. The chi square target uses the standard Gaussian measure of {z:z2≤ρ}\{z:z^2\le\rho\}{z:z2≤ρ}.

Mathlib measures are outer measures on arbitrary sets, so the probability of a possibly nonmeasurable membership or supremum event is the paper's outer probability. The Lemma 17 milestone expresses a signed measure through its action H(x)H(x)H(x) on the losses, as Appendix C.2 does, and uses positive directional steps. Real suprema and infima are used only where the hypotheses provide nonempty bounded values. The variance hypothesis rules out the trivial deterministic-loss counterexample. Useful contributions include the compactness and continuity facts needed for those extrema, the action-level derivative, empirical process limits, and the final two-sided event argument.

Selected references

  • John C. Duchi, Peter W. Glynn, and Hongseok Namkoong, Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach, arXiv:1610.03425v3, 2018; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. arXiv preprint
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach 1: The f-Divergence Robust Mean Is the Sample Mean plus √(ρ·s_n²/n) up to o(n^(−1/2)) Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

Distributionally robust optimization replaces the average of a loss over a sample by its worst-case average over all distributions close to the sample. When closeness is measured by an fff-divergence, the worst case over a ball of radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n around the empirical distribution is also the upper endpoint of a generalized empirical likelihood confidence interval. Empirical likelihood (Owen, 1988–2001) is the case f(t)=−2log⁡t+2t−2f(t)=-2\log t+2t-2f(t)=−2logt+2t−2; the χ2\chi^2χ2, Cressie–Read and other divergences give the rest of the family.

Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong (arXiv:1610.03425, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021) show that these robust objects behave, to first order, like the sample mean plus a variance penalty. Their Lemma 1 is the scalar version of that statement and, in the authors' words (p. 7), an expansion "that essentially gives all of the major distributional convergence results in this paper": with the central limit theorem it yields the asymptotically exact χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ coverage of empirical likelihood intervals for a mean, and its uniform extension yields the coverage results for optimal values of stochastic programs.

Timeline. Owen (1988, 1990) proved the χ2\chi^2χ2 calibration of empirical likelihood for means of i.i.d. data. Its extension to smooth fff-divergences is, as the paper notes (p. 6), essentially due to Baggerly (1998), Corcoran (1998) and Bertail, Gautherat and Harari-Kermadec (2014). Lam (arXiv:1605.09349) proved an in-probability version of the expansion below for f(t)=−2log⁡tf(t)=-2\log tf(t)=−2logt. Namkoong and Duchi (2017, arXiv:1610.02581) proved a finite-sample, high-probability version for the χ2\chi^2χ2 divergence and bounded variables. Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong proved the almost-sure version for every smooth fff and for stationary ergodic data.

Setting

Let f:[0,∞)→(−∞,+∞]f:[0,\infty)\to(-\infty,+\infty]f:[0,∞)→(−∞,+∞] be convex and lower semicontinuous, as every divergence generator in the paper is. Assumption A asks that fff be finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), three times differentiable near 111, with f(1)=f′(1)=0f(1)=f'(1)=0f(1)=f′(1)=0 and f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2; the value f(0)f(0)f(0) may be +∞+\infty+∞.

Let z=(z1,…,zn)z=(z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) be a sample with empirical distribution P^n\widehat P_nPn​. A distribution P≪P^nP\ll\widehat P_nP≪Pn​ is a weight vector p≥0p\ge0p≥0 with ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1, and Df(P∥P^n)=∑i=1n1nf(npi)D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)=\sum_{i=1}^n\frac1nf(np_i)Df​(P∥Pn​)=∑i=1n​n1​f(npi​). The robust mean is

sup⁡P: Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/nEP[Z]=sup⁡{∑ipizi:p≥0, ∑ipi=1, ∑i1nf(npi)≤ρn}.\sup_{P:\,D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n}E_P[Z]=\sup\Big\{\sum_ip_iz_i : p\ge0,\ \sum_ip_i=1,\ \sum_i\tfrac1nf(np_i)\le\tfrac\rho n\Big\}.P:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/nsup​EP​[Z]=sup{i∑​pi​zi​:p≥0, i∑​pi​=1, i∑​n1​f(npi​)≤nρ​}.

The sample mean is EP^n[Z]=1n∑iziE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]=\frac1n\sum_iz_iEPn​​[Z]=n1​∑i​zi​ and the sample variance is sn2=EP^n[Z2]−EP^n[Z]2s_n^2=E_{\widehat P_n}[Z^2]-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]^2sn2​=EPn​​[Z2]−EPn​​[Z]2 (normalised by 1/n1/n1/n).

A sequence Z1,Z2,…Z_1,Z_2,\dotsZ1​,Z2​,… of real random variables is strictly stationary and ergodic if the law μZ\mu_ZμZ​ of the path (Z1,Z2,… )(Z_1,Z_2,\dots)(Z1​,Z2​,…) on RN\mathbb R^{\mathbb N}RN is invariant under the left shift θ\thetaθ and every θ\thetaθ-invariant measurable set of paths has μZ\mu_ZμZ​-measure 000 or 111. Every i.i.d. sequence qualifies (Kolmogorov's 000–111 law), as do stationary Markov chains started in a unique invariant law and stationary mixing sequences.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 1, the almost-sure variance expansion (p. 7)

Let Z1,Z2,…Z_1,Z_2,\dotsZ1​,Z2​,… be strictly stationary and ergodic with E[Z12]<∞E[Z_1^2]<\inftyE[Z12​]<∞, let fff satisfy Assumption A and ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0. Then almost surely

n  ∣sup⁡P: Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/nEP[Z]−EP^n[Z]−ρn sn2∣  ⟶  0.\sqrt n\;\Big|\sup_{P:\,D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n}E_P[Z]-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]-\sqrt{\frac\rho n\,s_n^2}\Big|\;\longrightarrow\;0 .n​​P:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/nsup​EP​[Z]−EPn​​[Z]−nρ​sn2​​​⟶0.

This is the paper's (8), "≤ϵn/n\le\epsilon_n/\sqrt n≤ϵn​/n​ with ϵn→0\epsilon_n\to0ϵn​→0 a.s.", with ϵn\epsilon_nϵn​ taken to be the left-hand side. No rate is asserted, so the goal is not tied to any constant.

Milestones (Appendix A, pp. 31–33)

  1. (30): there are 0<c,C<∞0<c,C<\infty0<c,C<∞ depending only on fff with 2(1−Cϵ)hϵ(t)≤f(t+1)2(1-C\epsilon)h_\epsilon(t)\le f(t+1)2(1−Cϵ)hϵ​(t)≤f(t+1) for t≥−1t\ge-1t≥−1 and f(t+1)≤(1+Cϵ)t2f(t+1)\le(1+C\epsilon)t^2f(t+1)≤(1+Cϵ)t2 for ∣t∣≤ϵ|t|\le\epsilon∣t∣≤ϵ, whenever 0<ϵ≤c0<\epsilon\le c0<ϵ≤c. Here hϵh_\epsilonhϵ​ is the Huber function, t2/2t^2/2t2/2 for ∣t∣≤ϵ|t|\le\epsilon∣t∣≤ϵ and ϵ∣t∣−ϵ2/2\epsilon|t|-\epsilon^2/2ϵ∣t∣−ϵ2/2 otherwise.
  2. (32): with the sets Usm⊂U⊂Ubig\mathcal U_{\rm sm}\subset\mathcal U\subset\mathcal U_{\rm big}Usm​⊂U⊂Ubig​ of (31), sup⁡UsmuTz≤(robust mean)−EP^n[Z]=sup⁡UuTz≤sup⁡UbiguTz\sup_{\mathcal U_{\rm sm}}u^Tz\le(\text{robust mean})-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]=\sup_{\mathcal U}u^Tz\le\sup_{\mathcal U_{\rm big}}u^TzsupUsm​​uTz≤(robust mean)−EPn​​[Z]=supU​uTz≤supUbig​​uTz.
  3. Lemma 8: sup⁡u∈UsmuTz=ρsn(z)2/n /1+Cϵ\sup_{u\in\mathcal U_{\rm sm}}u^Tz=\sqrt{\rho s_n(z)^2/n}\,/\sqrt{1+C\epsilon}supu∈Usm​​uTz=ρsn​(z)2/n​/1+Cϵ​ when ∥z−zˉn∥∞/n≤ϵsn(z)(1+Cϵ)/ρ\|z-\bar z_n\|_\infty/\sqrt n\le\epsilon s_n(z)\sqrt{(1+C\epsilon)/\rho}∥z−zˉn​∥∞​/n​≤ϵsn​(z)(1+Cϵ)/ρ​.
  4. Lemma 9: sup⁡u∈UbiguTz≤ρsn(z)2/n /1−Cϵ\sup_{u\in\mathcal U_{\rm big}}u^Tz\le\sqrt{\rho s_n(z)^2/n}\,/\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}supu∈Ubig​​uTz≤ρsn​(z)2/n​/1−Cϵ​ under the same condition with 1−Cϵ1-C\epsilon1−Cϵ.
  5. Lemma 6: on the event max⁡i≤n∣zi−zˉn∣/n≤ϵsn(1−Cϵ)/ρ\max_{i\le n}|z_i-\bar z_n|/\sqrt n\le\epsilon s_n\sqrt{(1-C\epsilon)/\rho}maxi≤n​∣zi​−zˉn​∣/n​≤ϵsn​(1−Cϵ)/ρ​, the robust mean lies between EP^n[Z]+ρsn2/n/1+CϵE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho s_n^2/n}/\sqrt{1+C\epsilon}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​/1+Cϵ​ and EP^n[Z]+ρsn2/n/1−CϵE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho s_n^2/n}/\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​/1−Cϵ​.
  6. Lemma 7: for identically distributed (possibly dependent) ZiZ_iZi​ with E∣Z1∣k<∞E|Z_1|^k<\inftyE∣Z1​∣k<∞, P(∣Zn∣≥ϵn1/k i.o.)=0P(|Z_n|\ge\epsilon n^{1/k}\text{ i.o.})=0P(∣Zn​∣≥ϵn1/k i.o.)=0 for every ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and max⁡i≤n∣Zi∣/n1/k→0\max_{i\le n}|Z_i|/n^{1/k}\to0maxi≤n​∣Zi​∣/n1/k→0 almost surely.

Significance

The result. The expansion says the robust mean is a variance-regularised mean, EP^n[Z]+ρ sn2/nE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho\,s_n^2/n}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​, up to o(n−1/2)o(n^{-1/2})o(n−1/2), for every smooth divergence at once. Combined with the central limit theorem and Slutsky's lemma, it gives P(E[Z]∈{EP[Z]:Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/n})→P(χ12≤ρ)P\big(E[Z]\in\{E_P[Z]:D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n\}\big)\to P(\chi^2_1\le\rho)P(E[Z]∈{EP​[Z]:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/n})→P(χ12​≤ρ), the exact asymptotic coverage of generalized empirical likelihood intervals (the paper's Proposition 1 for d=1d=1d=1). The paper's uniform expansion (Theorem 2) and its coverage theorem for optimal values (Theorem 3) rest on the same mechanism. Because the statement is almost sure and allows stationary ergodic data, it also covers time series and simulation output.

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version of it, of (30), or of Lemmas 6–9 exists. A complete development would give the first formal link between fff-divergence balls and variance regularisation for general fff, and a formal almost-sure theory for empirical likelihood beyond the i.i.d. case. The χ2\chi^2χ2-only finite-sample expansion of Namkoong and Duchi (2017) is posed, not proved, on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious route is a second-order Taylor expansion of fff around 111 inside the supremum. It fails because the optimal weights npinp_inpi​ are close to 111 only if no single observation is large compared with n sn\sqrt n\,s_nn​sn​; a heavy observation drives a weight to 000, where fff may be infinite and is not approximated by its Taylor polynomial. The argument has to sandwich the divergence ball between a quadratic ball and a Huber ball valid on all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), then show that the event "no observation of order n\sqrt nn​" holds eventually almost surely, which under only a second moment and no independence needs a Borel–Cantelli argument for identically distributed variables (Lemma 7). The sample variance limit needs Birkhoff's pointwise ergodic theorem, which Mathlib does not yet contain.

Formalization scope

  • Samples. Z:N→Ω→RZ:\mathbb N\to\Omega\to\mathbb RZ:N→Ω→R on a probability space; Lean's Z 0 is the paper's Z1Z_1Z1​ and the nnn-th sample vector is fun i : Fin n => Z i ω. Stationary ergodicity is IsStationaryErgodic: each Z i measurable and Mathlib's Ergodic for the left shift on the path law (which includes shift invariance). The mixing display on p. 7 implies this; the Lean hypothesis is the weaker standard notion named in the lemma.
  • Divergence. f:R→f:\mathbb R\tof:R→ EReal, using the published IsPhiDivergenceFunction (convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), f(1)=0f(1)=0f(1)=0, f(0)=+∞f(0)=+\inftyf(0)=+∞ allowed); AssumptionA adds lower semicontinuity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (the paper's standing condition on divergence generators), three-times differentiability on an interval (a,b)∋1(a,b)\ni1(a,b)∋1, f′(1)=0f'(1)=0f′(1)=0, f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2. The reading "finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞)" follows the paper's remark that only the behaviour at 000 is unrestricted.
  • Robust mean. Distributions are weight vectors on the sample (P≪P^nP\ll\widehat P_nP≪Pn​), the ball is the published probUncertaintySet, and the supremum is a real sSup of a non-empty bounded set. Mean and variance are the published empMean, empVar.
  • Constants. In (32) and Lemmas 6, 8, 9 the constant CCC is a parameter, and the two inequalities of (30) at the given ϵ\epsilonϵ and CCC are hypotheses; (30) itself asserts that such c,Cc,Cc,C exist. ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 throughout, ϵ<1\epsilon<1ϵ<1 where the sets (31) are used, and Cϵ<1C\epsilon<1Cϵ<1 wherever 1−Cϵ\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}1−Cϵ​ appears.
  • Ruling out trivialisations. The ball always contains the uniform weights, so the robust mean is never the junk value of an empty supremum; the goal's limit statement makes n=0n=0n=0 irrelevant. A formalization that assumes i.i.d. data, a finite moment of order above two, or a specific fff proves a different, weaker statement.
  • Infrastructure. Needed: Birkhoff's pointwise ergodic theorem for the shift (not in Mathlib; posed but unproved on the platform as PalmQueueing.Ergodic.discrete_pointwise, for bijective flows), Borel–Cantelli (in Mathlib), and elementary convex analysis of the Huber function. The pointwise ergodic theorem and Lemma 7 are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the ergodic theorem for one-sided shifts, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. C. Duchi, P. W. Glynn, H. Namkoong, Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach, arXiv:1610.03425v3 (2018); Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03425
  • A. B. Owen, Empirical likelihood ratio confidence regions, Annals of Statistics 18(1), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176347494
  • K. A. Baggerly, Empirical likelihood as a goodness-of-fit measure, Biometrika 85(3), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/85.3.535
  • H. Lam, Recovering best statistical guarantees via the empirical divergence-based distributionally robust optimization, Operations Research, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09349
  • S. A. Corcoran, Bartlett adjustment of empirical discrepancy statistics, Biometrika 85(4), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/85.4.967
  • H. Namkoong, J. C. Duchi, Variance-based regularization with convex objectives, NeurIPS 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02581
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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