Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 3: Optimal Contingent-Pricing Revenue with Myopic Customers and Exponential ValuationsResearch Paper
Motivation
Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, holiday items) sell a fixed stock over a short season and routinely cut prices toward its end. A markdown of this kind segments the market over time: customers with high valuations buy early at a premium price, and customers with lower valuations are served later at a discount price. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) study how much such two-price schemes are worth when customers arrive over time, differ in their valuations, and may or may not anticipate the discount.
To measure the value of price segmentation, the paper compares every two-price scheme with the best fixed-price policy, a single price held for the whole season. Its benchmark is the case of myopic customers, who never delay a purchase strategically. Proposition 3 of the paper computes this benchmark in closed form in the simplest nontrivial setting: exponentially distributed valuations that do not decline over the season, and unlimited inventory. The resulting formula explains the pattern of the paper's Table 1, where the benefit of segmentation grows with the heterogeneity of valuations and with a late discount time.
Setting
A seller offers a product during the season ; throughout this mission , so time is measured as a fraction of the season. Customers arrive as a Poisson process with rate . Customer has a base valuation drawn independently from a distribution with tail , and values the product at at time , where is the decline factor. The paper reparametrizes it as , the fraction of the base valuation left at the end of the season.
In the numerical study, is a Gamma law with mean and coefficient of variation (standard deviation over mean): shape and rate . The paper sets . For this is the exponential law with mean one, for .
A contingent two-price policy posts the premium price on , where is fixed, and a discount price from time on. A myopic customer arriving at buys at if his valuation is at least ; otherwise he waits and buys at if his valuation is then at least . Customers arriving at or after buy if their valuation is at least . The numbers of customers in these groups are Poisson with means
With unlimited inventory, the expected revenue of the policy is
and the expected revenue of a single price is (Eq. (9) of the paper). The optimal values are and .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3
Suppose , and (unlimited inventory), with and . Then
Both maxima are attained. The goal states the two optimal values; it does not fix the optimal prices.
Milestones from the paper's proof
- The reduced problem: for , .
- Its solution: over the maximum is , attained exactly at , .
- The fixed-price optimum (a supporting item of the goal, stated in the proof on pp. 358–359): is the unique optimal single price and .
Significance
Proposition 3 gives the relative benefit of contingent pricing over a single price, , as a function of the discount time alone. It increases in and is largest at , where it equals . This is the paper's analytic anchor for its numerical findings: segmentation is most valuable when valuations are heterogeneous and customers are carried to the discount at little cost, and a late discount exposes more customers to the premium price. Under strategic customers the same quantity serves as an upper bound on the benefit of segmentation (§6.1 of the paper).
The result is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that states the reduced problem and its solution without the calculus. No machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it produces a reusable Lean encoding of the paper's segment rates as integrals of a valuation tail, a Gamma valuation law through Mathlib's gammaMeasure, and a complete verification that the integral model reduces to the two-variable problem and that the stated prices are its unique maximizer.
Difficulty
The obvious route is to write the revenue in closed form and set the gradient to zero. Two steps of that route are not automatic. First, the reduction requires evaluating the three integrals with the piecewise tail of the exponential law, including the inside , and the reduced formula is valid only for nonnegative prices; negative prices must be handled separately in the model itself, where the tail equals one. Second, the reduced objective is not concave on the region , so a stationary point is not automatically a global maximizer, and the boundary and unbounded directions have to be ruled out. Uniqueness of the maximizer, which the paper asserts, fails at and needs .
Formalization scope
All declarations sit in the namespace SeasonalPricing.MyopicExp. Time, prices and rates are real numbers. The season is with and . Integrals are interval integrals. The valuation tail is gammaValuationTail μ c x = 1 - cdf (gammaMeasure (1/c^2) (1/(μ c^2))) x, used at . The hypothesis is decayRatio α 1 = 1 with .
Readings of the paper's informal words:
- "" is read as unlimited inventory: the truncated Poisson mean of §4.2 is replaced by and stock-outs never occur. This is what the proof computes, what p. 348 writes as , and what §7.1 calls inventory that is "practically unlimited". A limit of finite-inventory optimal revenues is not stated.
- "max" is an attained maximum (
IsGreatest), not a supremum. - The optimum is taken over all real prices with , as printed; the paper never restricts signs, and negative prices are never optimal in the model.
- The seller's discount at is a best response to in the paper (, p. 349). With unlimited inventory it does not depend on the realized sales, and the nested maximum equals the joint maximum over , which is what the goal states.
- "The solution … is" (milestone 2) and "the optimal single price is given by " (the fixed-price item) are read as unique maximizers.
The Gamma density printed on p. 349 has the exponent , a misprint for ; at the exponent is either way.
A trivializing formalization would state the goal on the reduced two-variable function, dropping the model: the goal here is about built from and the Gamma tail, and about built from Eq. (9). The platform's BuyingToBundle.monopolyRevenue (definition monopoly_pricing) is a related object, ; with and , equals times it for the exponential law, but it is a supremum without arrivals or time and is not reused.
Contributions welcome: closed forms of the segment rates for the exponential tail, a general lemma that negative prices are dominated, and the two-variable maximization.
Selected references
- Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
- D. Besanko and W. L. Winston, Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
- G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999