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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Single Machine Scheduling with Release Dates I: The Preemptive Time-Indexed and Mean Busy Time LP Relaxations Have the Same Optimal ValueResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​ of jobs with release dates on a single machine, written 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​ in scheduling notation, is strongly NP-hard. Most constant-factor approximation algorithms for it, and for many related scheduling problems, follow one pattern: solve a linear programming relaxation, which gives a lower bound on the optimum, and round its solution into a schedule whose cost is compared with that bound. The quality of the algorithm is therefore limited by the quality of the relaxation, and the question of which relaxations are equivalent is a basic one for the method.

Two relaxations of 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​ are central. The time-indexed relaxation of Dyer and Wolsey (doi:10.1016/0166-218X(90)90104-K) has one variable per job and unit time slot, a pseudopolynomial number of variables. The mean busy time relaxation has one variable per job but one constraint per subset of jobs, the shifted parallel inequalities studied by Queyranne and others. Goemans, Queyranne, Schulz, Skutella and Wang (doi:10.1137/S089548019936223X, Section 2) show that both have the same optimal value, and that both are solved by one simple preemptive schedule. This mission formalizes that result, Corollary 2.6, together with the lemmas and theorems its proof uses.

Timeline:

  • 1990: Dyer and Wolsey formulate several time-indexed relaxations of 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​, among them the formulation (D) used here.
  • 1993: Queyranne (doi:10.1007/BF01581271) describes the polyhedron of completion-time vectors on one machine without release dates by the parallel inequalities.
  • 1994–1995: Queyranne and Schulz use shifted parallel inequalities in polyhedral approaches to machine scheduling with release dates.
  • 1996: Goemans (IPCO, LNCS 1084) gives a supermodular relaxation for scheduling with release dates, the source of the canonical decompositions used for (R).
  • 2002: Goemans, Queyranne, Schulz, Skutella and Wang prove that (D) and the mean busy time relaxation (R) have equal value, attained by the preemptive "LP schedule", and use this common bound for randomized approximation algorithms with ratios 1.74511.74511.7451 and 1.68531.68531.6853.

Setting

There are nnn jobs N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n}. Job jjj has an integral processing time pj>0p_j > 0pj​>0, an integral release date rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0 and a weight wj≥0w_j \ge 0wj​≥0. For a nonempty set SSS of jobs, p(S)=∑j∈Spjp(S) = \sum_{j\in S} p_jp(S)=∑j∈S​pj​ and rmin⁡(S)=min⁡j∈Srjr_{\min}(S) = \min_{j \in S} r_jrmin​(S)=minj∈S​rj​.

A preemptive schedule gives each job a bounded measurable set Aj⊆[rj,∞)A_j \subseteq [r_j, \infty)Aj​⊆[rj​,∞) of processing times of Lebesgue measure pjp_jpj​, the sets pairwise disjoint. The mean busy time of jjj is Mj=1pj∫Ajt dtM_j = \frac{1}{p_j}\int_{A_j} t\,dtMj​=pj​1​∫Aj​​tdt.

The LP schedule processes, at every moment, the available (released, unfinished) job of largest ratio wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​, ties broken by index. With the jobs indexed so that w1/p1≥⋯≥wn/pnw_1/p_1 \ge \cdots \ge w_n/p_nw1​/p1​≥⋯≥wn​/pn​, this is the available job of smallest index. As the data are integral, it runs one job or none in each unit slot [τ,τ+1)[\tau, \tau+1)[τ,τ+1); yjτLP∈{0,1}y^{LP}_{j\tau} \in \{0,1\}yjτLP​∈{0,1} records whether it runs jjj there, and MjLPM^{LP}_jMjLP​ is its mean busy time of jjj.

The preemptive time-indexed relaxation (D) with horizon TTT has real variables yjτ≥0y_{j\tau} \ge 0yjτ​≥0 for τ=rj,…,T−1\tau = r_j, \dots, T-1τ=rj​,…,T−1 and reads

ZD=min⁡∑jwjCjs.t.∑j:rj≤τyjτ≤1 (τ<T),∑τ=rjT−1yjτ=pj,Cj=12pj+1pj∑τ=rjT−1(τ+12)yjτ.Z_D = \min \sum_j w_j C_j \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{j : r_j \le \tau} y_{j\tau} \le 1\ (\tau < T), \qquad \sum_{\tau=r_j}^{T-1} y_{j\tau} = p_j, \qquad C_j = \tfrac12 p_j + \tfrac{1}{p_j}\sum_{\tau=r_j}^{T-1}\big(\tau + \tfrac12\big) y_{j\tau}.ZD​=minj∑​wj​Cj​s.t.j:rj​≤τ∑​yjτ​≤1 (τ<T),τ=rj​∑T−1​yjτ​=pj​,Cj​=21​pj​+pj​1​τ=rj​∑T−1​(τ+21​)yjτ​.

The mean busy time relaxation (R) reads

ZR=min⁡∑jwj(Mj+12pj)s.t.∑j∈SpjMj≥p(S)(rmin⁡(S)+12p(S))(∅≠S⊆N).Z_R = \min \sum_j w_j\big(M_j + \tfrac12 p_j\big) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{j\in S} p_j M_j \ge p(S)\big(r_{\min}(S) + \tfrac12 p(S)\big) \quad (\emptyset \ne S \subseteq N).ZR​=minj∑​wj​(Mj​+21​pj​)s.t.j∈S∑​pj​Mj​≥p(S)(rmin​(S)+21​p(S))(∅=S⊆N).

The horizon TTT is required to bound the makespan of some feasible nonpreemptive schedule, for instance T=max⁡jrj+∑jpjT = \max_j r_j + \sum_j p_jT=maxj​rj​+∑j​pj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.6

For every instance, every weight vector w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 and every admissible horizon TTT,

ZD=ZR.Z_D = Z_R .ZD​=ZR​.

No ordering of the jobs and no reference to the LP schedule appear in the goal.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1. (D) has an optimal solution with yjτ∈{0,1}y_{j\tau} \in \{0,1\}yjτ​∈{0,1}.
  2. Theorem 2.2. With the jobs sorted by wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​, yLPy^{LP}yLP is an optimal solution to (D).
  3. Lemma 2.4. For every preemptive schedule and nonempty SSS, ∑j∈SpjMj≥p(S)(rmin⁡(S)+12p(S))\sum_{j\in S} p_j M_j \ge p(S)\big(r_{\min}(S)+\tfrac12 p(S)\big)∑j∈S​pj​Mj​≥p(S)(rmin​(S)+21​p(S)), with equality if and only if SSS occupies [rmin⁡(S),rmin⁡(S)+p(S))[r_{\min}(S), r_{\min}(S)+p(S))[rmin​(S),rmin​(S)+p(S)) without interruption.
  4. Theorem 2.5. With the jobs sorted by wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​, MLPM^{LP}MLP is an optimal solution to (R).
  5. Eq. (2.6). MjLP=1pj∑τ=rjT−1yjτLP(τ+12)M^{LP}_j = \frac{1}{p_j}\sum_{\tau=r_j}^{T-1} y^{LP}_{j\tau}\big(\tau + \frac12\big)MjLP​=pj​1​∑τ=rj​T−1​yjτLP​(τ+21​).

Significance

The equality ZD=ZRZ_D = Z_RZD​=ZR​ lets one choose, for each purpose, the more convenient of the two relaxations. (D) is intuitive and a transportation problem, but has pseudopolynomially many variables; (R) has nnn variables and a supermodular right-hand side, which the paper uses to describe its polyhedron. Theorems 2.2 and 2.5 show that the common optimum is attained by the LP schedule, which is computable greedily; the approximation guarantees of Section 3 of the paper, and of later work on α\alphaα-point scheduling, are all measured against this value.

A formal development adds three things. First, a machine-checked model of preemptive single-machine schedules with release dates, of mean busy times, and of the LP schedule as a concrete recursive object, reusable by any formalization of α\alphaα-point methods (two companion missions of this series use the same objects). Second, a formal statement of the two relaxations with honest optimal values. Third, verified proofs of results that are proved in the paper by short interchange and averaging arguments, whose measure-theoretic details (integrals over processing sets, null sets in the equality case) the paper leaves implicit. The results are proved in the literature; to our knowledge none of them has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

The paper's arguments are short, and each rests on a step that is informal on the page. Lemma 2.1 cites the integrality of transportation problems, a statement about the vertices of a polytope rather than a one-line fact. Theorem 2.2 ends with the claim that a 0/1 solution admitting no improving exchange "must correspond to the LP schedule", which is a property of the greedy rule that has to be derived from its definition. Theorem 2.5 depends on how the LP schedule arranges the jobs of each prefix {1,…,i}\{1, \dots, i\}{1,…,i} of the sorted order in time; this is the only place sortedness enters, and it is again a property of the concrete schedule. Lemma 2.4 is an extremal statement about integrals over sets of prescribed measure, and its equality case holds only up to null sets. Finally, the goal concerns arbitrary, unsorted weights, while the two theorems it combines are about sorted indices, so the goal is not a direct conjunction of the milestones.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n, numbered from 000; pjp_jpj​, rjr_jrj​ and the horizon TTT are natural numbers and weights are real. A preemptive schedule is a family of processing sets Aj⊆RA_j \subseteq \mathbb RAj​⊆R, not indicator functions. The LP schedule is defined by recursion on unit slots with the smallest-index rule; the sortedness of wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​ is a hypothesis of Theorems 2.2 and 2.5, not part of the definition. Variables of (D) are functions y:jobs×N→Ry : \text{jobs} \times \mathbb N \to \mathbb Ry:jobs×N→R required to vanish outside rj≤τ<Tr_j \le \tau < Trj​≤τ<T. ZDZ_DZD​ and ZRZ_RZR​ are infima of the objective over the feasible sets; under the stated hypotheses the feasible sets are nonempty and the objectives bounded below, so these are the LP values. Optimality in the milestones is stated as attaining the minimum, not through these infima.

The horizon hypothesis rules out the trivializing case in which (D) is infeasible and its infimum takes the junk value 000; (D) is kept a linear program over real yyy, since restricting to {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} would make Lemma 2.1 vacuous. The running-time claim of Corollary 2.6 (O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn)) is not formalized.

A complete development needs: integrals of the identity over finite unions of intervals; a rearrangement lemma for sets of given measure; basic properties of the LP schedule (it is a preemptive schedule, it is work-conserving and finishes by any admissible TTT, its blocks are canonical); and a relabelling argument. The schedule model and the LP-schedule lemmas are reusable for the companion missions on α\alphaα-point scheduling. Contributions of any of these lemmas as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. X. Goemans, M. Queyranne, A. S. Schulz, M. Skutella, Y. Wang, Single machine scheduling with release dates, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 15(2):165–192, 2002. doi:10.1137/S089548019936223X
  • M. E. Dyer, L. A. Wolsey, Formulating the single machine sequencing problem with release dates as a mixed integer program, Discrete Applied Mathematics 26(2–3):255–270, 1990. doi:10.1016/0166-218X(90)90104-K
  • M. Queyranne, Structure of a simple scheduling polyhedron, Mathematical Programming 58:263–285, 1993. doi:10.1007/BF01581271
  • M. X. Goemans, Improved approximation algorithms for scheduling with release dates, Proceedings of the 8th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 591–598, 1997.
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXIII: Near-Optimality for Submodular MinimizationTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 10 turns from structure theory to algorithms: efficient methods for minimizing M-convex functions (via domain reduction) and submodular set functions (via Schrijver's and the Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige scaling algorithms). Most of chapter 10's numbered results are asymptotic running-time bounds for specific procedural algorithms — a genuinely different kind of claim from the rest of this book (see Formalization scope). This mission places the results of this block that ARE ordinary mathematical propositions: correctness certificates, min-max theorems, and structural facts the algorithms rely on and produce.

Setting

For an M-convex set B ⊆ Z^V, the central part B° (the vectors of B lying away from its boundary, defined via per-coordinate bounds ℓ°_B, u°_B) is what the domain reduction algorithm searches from. For a submodular set function ρ : 2^V → R, the base polyhedron B(ρ) and its extreme bases (one per linear ordering of V, via Eq. (10.12)) let any base be written as a convex combination of finitely many extreme bases (Eq. (10.13)); a candidate minimizer W is certified via the linear orderings representing an optimal base. The Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige (IFF) scaling algorithm relaxes this problem with a flow-augmentation parameter δ, maintaining a δ-feasible flow φ and vector z = x + ∂φ; near the end of a scaling phase, no augmenting path and no "active triple" together certify near-optimality.

Formalization targets

Goal: Near-optimality from the absence of augmenting paths (Proposition 10.20)

If S ⊆ W ⊆ V∖T, no arc of the auxiliary network leaves W, and no active triple exists, then z⁻(V) ≥ ρ(W)-nδ and x⁻(V) ≥ ρ(W)-n²δ; moreover W exactly minimizes ρ once δ is small enough relative to the smallest positive gap between two values of ρ. Chosen as goal: the book calls this "a key property of the scaling algorithm" and "a relaxation version of the min-max relation in Proposition 10.8", its own proof is the most substantial argument among this chunk's placed results, and Proposition 10.23 is a direct corollary of it.

Supporting structural targets

Proposition 10.8 is the min-max relation underlying the whole of section 10.2 (an Edmonds- intersection-theorem consequence, found by direct reading — the extractor's table missed it). Proposition 10.9 gives the three-part sufficient condition for optimality, in terms of the linear orderings representing an optimal base, that both Schrijver's algorithm and the IFF algorithm use as their termination criterion (also found by direct reading). Propositions 10.5-10.6 establish that the domain reduction algorithm's central part B° is always nonempty, via an explicit vector-extension step (Proposition 10.5 likewise missing from the extractor's table). Proposition 10.23 fixes individual coordinates once a scaling phase ends, and Proposition 10.24 gives the termination certificate for the IFF fixing algorithm's own separate graph-contraction procedure.

Significance

Chapter 10 is where this book cashes out its structure theory as algorithms with provable running times, and this mission places every result of that chapter's first two sections that is a mathematical proposition rather than a runtime bound: two min-max/optimality-certificate theorems (10.8-10.9) that are the combinatorial core making the following two strongly polynomial algorithms (Schrijver's, and Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige's) correct, one central-part nonemptiness fact (10.5-10.6) underlying the domain reduction algorithm, and the two fixing/termination certificates (10.23-10.24) that let the scaling algorithms actually output a minimizer with a proof of optimality attached, not just a numerical answer.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of submodular-function- minimization algorithms (sections 10.1-10.2). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including two results (Propositions 10.5 and 10.8) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Six numbered results in this block (Propositions 10.4, 10.7, 10.17, 10.18, 10.21, 10.22) are excluded as hard: each states a Big-O asymptotic bound on the running time, function-evaluation count, or internal-procedure-call count of a specific iterative algorithm (the domain reduction algorithm, its scaling variant, Schrijver's algorithm, the IFF scaling algorithm). Faithfully stating "this algorithm runs in O(g(n)) time" requires a cost-tracked operational semantics for that specific algorithm — a well-founded recursive procedure with an oracle for evaluating the input function, threading a step/evaluation counter, instantiated over an unbounded family of ground-set sizes n and numeric parameters (K∞, M) — which is a fundamentally different kind of formalization task (computational complexity theory) from every one of the roughly 280 other numbered results in this book, none of which require modeling the cost of computing them. See HARD.md.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq. Base M-convex-set vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions. Linear orderings of V are represented as bijections V ≃ Fin (Fintype.card V) rather than as lists, matching this series' established preference for order-indexed families over sequential data structures. Proposition 10.5's witness vector is stated as an existence claim (the mathematical content of the proposition), rather than by reconstructing the specific recursive modification procedure the book uses to produce it — a choice consistent with how this series has always formalized "the algorithm produces X" claims where X is a mathematical property, by asserting X's existence rather than executing the algorithm (see, e.g., mission 33-ch09c-networkflows's cycle-cancellation theorem). Six numbered results (Propositions 10.4, 10.7, 10.17, 10.18, 10.21, 10.22) are hard; see HARD.md. Contributions completing any of the seven sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 10.9 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • S. Iwata, L. Fleischer, and S. Fujishige, "A combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions," Journal of the ACM, 48 (2001), pp. 761-777 [102] (the IFF scaling algorithm this mission's Proposition 10.20 certifies).
  • A. Schrijver, "A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time," Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B, 80 (2000), pp. 346-355 [182] (Schrijver's algorithm, whose termination criterion is Proposition 10.9).
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XII: Steepest Descent for M-Convex Function MinimizationTextbook

Motivation

Chapters 6 through 9 characterized minimality for M-convex functions structurally (the M-optimality criterion, Theorem 6.26: a point is a global minimizer iff no local swap improves it) without saying how to find one. Chapter 10 turns that structural fact into an algorithm: the local characterization is the termination test of the simplest possible minimization procedure, steepest descent by coordinate swaps. This mission formalizes that algorithm and its two complexity bounds, plus a structural min-max identity for submodular base polyhedra that the chapter's heavier submodular-minimization algorithms build on. It is the first mission in this series whose goal names a method, not just a property of a class of functions — formalizing it faithfully means giving the algorithm itself a Lean representation that the complexity theorem then quantifies over, not just describing its output.

Setting

Let f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} be an M-convex function (MExchangeAxiom, chunk 06), n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣. The steepest descent algorithm repeatedly replaces the current point xxx by x−χu+χvx - \chi_u + \chi_vx−χu​+χv​ for a pair u≠vu \ne vu=v minimizing f(x−χu+χv)f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v)f(x−χu​+χv​), stopping when no such swap improves on f(x)f(x)f(x) — at which point, by the M-optimality criterion, xxx is a global minimizer. This mission represents a run of the algorithm as a sequence x:N→ZVx : \mathbb N \to \mathbb Z^Vx:N→ZV satisfying these step and termination relations directly, so that "the number of iterations" is a genuine property of any such run, not an informal gloss. Separately, for a submodular set function ρ:2V→R\rho : 2^V \to \mathbb Rρ:2V→R (chunk 04's SubmodularSetFunction), the base polyhedron B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) (chunk 04's BasePolyhedron) is the polytope {x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) ∀X, x(V)=ρ(V)}\{x \in \mathbb R^V : x(X) \le \rho(X)\ \forall X,\ x(V) = \rho(V)\}{x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) ∀X, x(V)=ρ(V)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 10.2 (iteration bound with tie-breaking)

For an M-convex function fff with finite ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1-diameter K1=max⁡{∥x−y∥1:x,y∈dom⁡f}K_1 = \max\{\|x-y\|_1 : x,y \in \operatorname{dom} f\}K1​=max{∥x−y∥1​:x,y∈domf} (Eq. (10.1)), the number of iterations in the steepest descent algorithm using the tie-breaking rule (10.2) — a fixed lexicographic rule for choosing among tied steepest pairs, based on an arbitrary but fixed ordering φ\varphiφ of VVV — is bounded by K1/2K_1/2K1​/2.

Milestones: Proposition 10.1, Proposition 10.8

Proposition 10.1: an unconditional warm-up — if fff has a unique minimizer x∗x^*x∗, any run of the plain (untied) algorithm from x0x^0x0 terminates within ∥x0−x∗∥1/2\|x^0 - x^*\|_1/2∥x0−x∗∥1​/2 iterations, with no tie-breaking rule needed. Proposition 10.8: a structural min-max identity, max⁡{x−(V):x∈B(ρ)}=min⁡{ρ(X):X⊆V}\max\{x^-(V) : x \in B(\rho)\} = \min\{\rho(X) : X \subseteq V\}max{x−(V):x∈B(ρ)}=min{ρ(X):X⊆V}, for a submodular set function ρ\rhoρ — chosen deliberately as a milestone that names no algorithm at all, in contrast to this mission's other two items.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 10.2 is the complexity backbone of §10.1: it is what turns "steepest descent terminates" (an easy monotonicity observation) into a genuine polynomial bound, and it is the base case the chapter's more elaborate scaling and domain-reduction algorithms (not drafted here) improve on. Proposition 10.8, though algorithm-free, is the structural fact ("verifying membership in B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) seems to need a submodular minimization procedure — but demonstrating optimality of a cut XXX only needs a base with x−(V)=ρ(X)x^-(V) = \rho(X)x−(V)=ρ(X)") that makes Schrijver's and the IFF algorithms' correctness proofs possible, and specializes chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem to the two-function case ρ1=ρ,ρ2=0\rho_1 = \rho, \rho_2 = 0ρ1​=ρ,ρ2​=0.

Formalizing it. A prior-art search (q=steepest descent, q=submodular minimization, q=base polyhedron) found no existing platform items for any of this chapter's results. This mission gives the first formal statement of an M-convex minimization algorithm's complexity, and directly reuses chunk 06's MExchangeAxiom/ArgMin/CharVec/DomZ and chunk 04's SubmodularSetFunction/BasePolyhedron — genuine cross-chunk substrate reuse spanning two different chapters' worth of prior missions.

Difficulty

The chapter's own framing (quoted in BRIEF.md) is that every other chapter's theorems state a property of a class of functions or sets, while this chapter's theorems state properties of a named algorithm run on such an object. Formalizing "the number of iterations in the steepest descent algorithm is bounded by ..." faithfully means giving the algorithm's steps (S0-S3) and termination test a Lean representation that the bound then quantifies over — stating the bound about "the minimizer" alone, with the algorithm silently dropped, would misrepresent the theorem as a fact about minimizers rather than about a procedure that finds one. This mission represents a run of the algorithm as an abstract sequence satisfying the book's own step-transition relations (documented in full in MODERATION_NOTES.md), letting the complexity theorems quantify over any valid run rather than committing to one executable implementation.

A second difficulty is scope: the chapter's recommended primary goal, Proposition 10.18 (Schrijver's algorithm's complexity), needs a scaling procedure with several auxiliary data structures — a materially larger definitional undertaking than steepest descent's simple greedy-swap loop. Per BRIEF.md's own explicit fallback authorization, this mission takes Proposition 10.2 as its goal instead; see HARD.md and MODERATION_NOTES.md for the full reasoning.

Formalization scope

Runs of the algorithm are represented as x : ℕ → V → ℤ satisfying IsSteepestDescentRun (plain) or IsSteepestDescentRunTieBreak (with the tie-breaking rule) — a step relation plus a termination test, with an explicit iteration count N the theorems bound. The tie-breaking key Φ(u,v)\Phi(u,v)Φ(u,v) (Eq. (10.2)) and its lexicographic order are formalized directly (a manual three-way comparison, not Mathlib's default componentwise Prod order). Both iteration bounds are stated as 2 * N ≤ k rather than N ≤ k / 2, avoiding natural-number division. Not drafted: the derived "hence ... in O(F⋅n2K1)O(F \cdot n^2 K_1)O(F⋅n2K1​) time" corollary of Proposition 10.2 (needs a cost-model primitive for "time" and "FFF" this mission does not otherwise use — the iteration-count bound itself, this proposition's genuine combinatorial content, is drafted in full); Schrijver's algorithm and everything in §10.2.2 onward; the steepest descent scaling algorithm, the domain reduction algorithm and its scaling variant (§10.1.2-10.1.3, structurally different algorithms); the quasi-M-convex extension mentioned immediately after Proposition 10.2. A trivializing formalization would state the iteration bound as an unconditional fact about "a" minimizer-finding procedure, or would drop the tie-breaking rule from Proposition 10.2 and thereby understate what the bound actually requires; neither is done.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXII: Network DualityTextbook

Motivation

Mission 32-ch09b-networkflows established the potential and negative-cycle optimality criteria for M-convex submodular flow problems. This mission finishes chapter 9 with the two topics that close it out: the constructive engine behind the negative-cycle criterion — cycle cancellation, which actually improves a nonoptimal flow rather than merely detecting suboptimality, resting on a delicate "unique-min condition" for bipartite matchings — and network duality, the chapter's capstone structural theorem showing that M-convexity and L-convexity are preserved (and their conjugacy is preserved) under transformation by an arbitrary network.

Setting

For a feasible integer flow ξ in the M-convex submodular flow problem MSFP2, a negative cycle in the auxiliary network (Gξ,ℓξ) witnesses suboptimality (mission 32's Theorem 9.20); cycle cancellation modifies ξ along a smallest such cycle to produce a strictly better flow ξ̄ (Eq. (9.75)). The unique-min condition for a pair (x,y) of integer vectors with ‖x-y‖∞=1 asks whether the bipartite graph G(x,y) — vertices the positive/negative supports of x-y, weights the M-convex exchange values Δf(x;v,u) — has a unique minimum-weight perfect matching; when it does, the M-convex exchange inequality of Proposition 6.25 becomes an equality. Separately, a network G=(V,A;S,T) with entrance set S and exit set T transforms a pair of functions f,g on Zˢ into induced functions f̃,g̃ on Zᵀ (Eqs. (9.81)-(9.82)), the minimum cost to meet a boundary specification at the exit given a production cost at the entrance and a transportation cost along arcs.

Formalization targets

Goal: Network duality for Z→Z functions (Theorem 9.26)

M-(resp. M♮^\natural♮-)convexity and integer-valuedness of f transfer to the induced f̃; L-(resp. L♮^\natural♮-)convexity and integer-valuedness of g transfer to g̃; and if f is M♮^\natural♮-convex, g is its L♮^\natural♮-conjugate, and each arc cost ga is the conjugate of fa, then g̃ is the conjugate of f̃. Chosen as goal: the book calls this "the harmonious relationship between network flow and M-/L-convexity", its own proof runs roughly six pages (the longest argument in this chunk), and it is the general fact from which Theorems 9.27-9.28 (analogues for other type combinations) and Notes 9.29-9.30 (the aggregation and infimal- convolution closure properties of M-convex functions, already placed in mission 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions's own Theorem 6.13) all descend.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 9.22 shows cycle cancellation strictly improves the objective; Propositions 9.23-9.25 are "the key ingredient" behind it: Proposition 9.23 shows the unique-min condition upgrades the M-convex exchange inequality to an equality, Proposition 9.24 gives a checkable characterization of when a bipartite weighted graph has a unique minimum-weight perfect matching, and Proposition 9.25 is the fact that makes the machine run — the specific pair (∂ξ,∂ξ̄) arising from cycle cancellation always satisfies the unique-min condition. Theorems 9.27 and 9.28 are the network duality theorem's own analogues for Z→R and R→R functions, the second restoring the conjugacy assertion (missing for Z→R) via the ordinary real Legendre-Fenchel transform.

Significance

Cycle cancellation is this book's constructive answer to the negative-cycle criterion: not just a certificate of suboptimality, but an actual improvement step, the combinatorial core of the cycle-canceling algorithm explained in section 10.4.3 (mission 35-ch10c-algorithms). Its correctness proof is one of the most intricate combinatorial arguments in the entire book — a proof by contradiction using a multiset-union identity (Eq. (9.80)) to derive a smaller negative cycle from an assumed non-uniqueness, itself resting on Proposition 9.24's Monge-like characterization of unique bipartite matchings. Network duality, meanwhile, is the theorem that explains why discrete convex analysis and network flow theory are so tightly intertwined throughout this book: it is the general mechanism (matroid induction, min-max relations, the M-convex aggregation and infimal-convolution closure properties) underlying nearly every construction chapter 2 introduced informally and chapter 6 proved piecemeal.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of cycle cancellation (section 9.5.2) and network duality (section 9.6). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing the platform's coverage of chapter 9 begun in missions 12-network-flows and 32-ch09b-networkflows; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Theorem 9.26's own proof needs the full weight of everything chapter 9 has built (Theorem 9.16's potential criterion for integer flows, the conjugacy theorem of chapter 8), which this mission does not re-prove (proofs are sorry throughout, per this pass's scope) but whose statement still needs the induced-function machinery built faithfully: since the general framework's optimal-value-type quantities can genuinely be -∞ (the book's own blanket hypothesis f̃ > -∞ acknowledges this), InducedFTilde/InducedGTilde are EReal-valued, following the same soundness discipline established in mission 31-ch08d-conjugacyduality for Lagrangian duality's derived quantities.

Formalization scope

Ground-set vertices V and arcs A are Fintype with DecidableEq. All base M-/L-convexity vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions. Functions "on Zˢ" for S a proper subset of the ground set are represented as ordinary V→Z functions required to vanish outside S (SupportedOn), rather than as functions on a dependent subset type — a padding-with-zero encoding consistent with this whole series' preference for a single ambient ground-set domain. C[R→R] (univariate real polyhedral convex functions, needed only for Theorem 9.28's arc costs) is formalized as ordinary midpoint-style convexity (IsConvexUnivariateR) rather than the book's own polyhedral characterization, since polyhedrality plays no role in Theorem 9.28's conclusion beyond ensuring the induced functions are well-behaved. All seven numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed in full, with no partial-coverage scope reduction. Contributions completing any of the seven sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 9.25 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota, "Valuated matroid intersection," SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 9 (1996), pp. 545-561 [135] (the unique-max lemma Proposition 9.23 reformulates, and the proof technique behind Proposition 9.25).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (network duality and cycle cancellation for the M-convex submodular flow problem).
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXI: The Potential Criterion for Network FlowsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 9 is where discrete convex analysis meets classical network flow theory: the minimum cost flow problem's three hallmark properties — an optimality criterion by potentials, an optimality criterion by negative cycles, and integrality of optimal solutions — are shown to survive, in a precise and increasingly general form, first for arbitrary polyhedral convex costs (MCFP3), then for the M-convex submodular flow problem (MSFP2/MSFP3), the chapter's own combinatorial generalization of the classical problem. This mission places the potential criterion (Theorem 9.4) and its cascade of six corollaries and generalizations, the block of results this book's own text uses to carry every other result in the chapter.

Setting

A digraph G = (V,A) with tail/head maps ∂⁺,∂⁻ : A → V. A flow ξ : A → R has boundary ∂ξ(v) = Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁺a=v} − Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁻a=v}. A potential p : V → R has coboundary δp(a) = p(∂⁺a) − p(∂⁻a). The minimum cost flow problem MCFP3 minimizes Γ₃(ξ) = Σₐ fₐ(ξ(a)) + f(∂ξ) over flows, for polyhedral convex arc costs fₐ : R → R∪{+∞} and boundary cost f : Rⱽ → R∪{+∞}; MCFP0 is its linear-cost, fixed-supply special case. The M-convex submodular flow problem MSFP3 is MCFP3 with f additionally M-convex; MSFP2 is its linear-arc-cost special case.

Formalization targets

Goal: The potential criterion for MCFP3 (Theorem 9.4)

For a feasible flow ξ, ξ is optimal for MCFP3 iff there is a potential p with ξ(a) a minimizer of the reduced arc cost fₐ[δp(a)] for every arc and ∂ξ a minimizer of the reduced boundary cost f[−p]; and any such optimal potential characterizes optimality of every feasible flow. This is the hub result of the whole chunk: the book states Theorem 9.14 is "immediate" from it, and every other placed result either specializes it directly or builds on that specialization.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 9.5 reformulates MCFP0's optimality as the absence of a negative cycle in an auxiliary network; Theorem 9.6 gives MCFP0's primal and dual integrality, the latter identifying the optimal-potential set as an L-convex polyhedron. Theorem 9.14 specializes the goal to MSFP3; Theorem 9.15 upgrades this to a full polyhedral and integrality structure theorem for MSFP3's optimal-flow-boundary and optimal-potential sets (M2-convex and L-convex polyhedra respectively); Theorem 9.16 is the integer-flow analogue, with the boundary set now literally M2-convex and the integer-optimal-potential set literally L-convex. Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 give the negative-cycle reformulation for MSFP2, real and integer flows respectively, generalizing Theorem 9.5 by admitting a third class of auxiliary arcs governed by the M-convex boundary cost's directional derivative (or its discrete difference, in the integer case).

Significance

This is the chapter's demonstration that M-convexity is not merely an abstract combinatorial axiom but the exact structural hypothesis under which classical network-flow duality survives intact: every one of the four "nice properties" the book opens the chapter with (potentials, negative cycles, integrality, efficient algorithms) is preserved verbatim in the M-convex generalization, and this mission's eight results are the proof of that claim for the first three. The chunk's own internal dependency structure — one foundational theorem (9.4) from which every other placed result descends by specialization or direct generalization — is itself characteristic of how this book organizes its combinatorial machinery around a single convex- analytic core.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of network flow duality under M-convexity (sections 9.1, 9.4, and 9.5). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, extending the platform's coverage of chapter 9 begun in mission 12-network-flows (which covered §9.1.1-9.1.2 and §9.3, the feasibility and max-flow min-cut results, deliberately leaving this block for later apparatus); no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The eight results span real- and integer-flow versions of two nested problem hierarchies (MCFP0 ⊂ MCFP3, MSFP2 ⊂ MSFP3) and two distinct optimality certificates (potentials, negative cycles), which this mission handles by building one shared apparatus — FeasibleFlowMCFP3, Gamma3, OptimalFlowMCFP3, IsOptimalPotential — that MCFP0 and MSFP3 both instantiate (MCFP0 literally as the linear-cost/singleton-boundary special case of Eq. (9.11)), and one shared generic cycle/negative-cycle apparatus (IsCycle, CycleLength, HasNegativeCycle) instantiated three times with different auxiliary-arc types (A⊕A for MCFP0, A⊕A⊕(V×V) for MSFP2's extra Cξ arcs governed by the boundary cost's directional derivative). "Primal integral" and "dual integral" polyhedral convex functions (the book's own C[Z|R→R]/C[R→R|Z] notation, used in Theorem 9.15) needed a modeling decision, since the book's own definition of these classes lies outside this chunk's page range; see Formalization scope.

Formalization scope

Ground-set vertices V and arcs A are Fintype with DecidableEq. All base M-/L-convexity vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions in this series. "Primal integral" (C[Z|R→R], M[Z|R→R]) is formalized as integer effective domain (IsDomainIntegerArc/IsDomainIntegerR); "dual integral" (C[R→R|Z], M[R→R|Z]) is formalized as the existence of an integer subgradient at every domain point (IsDualIntegralArc/IsDualIntegralR) — a standard equivalent characterization for polyhedral convex functions, and a deliberate modeling choice recorded in MODERATION_NOTES.md rather than a literal transcription of the book's own (out-of-range) definition of these two notation classes. All eight numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed in full, with no partial-coverage scope reduction. Contributions completing any of the eight sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 9.15 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Network Flows and Monotropic Optimization, Wiley, 1984 [178] (the classical potential/Fenchel-duality framework this mission's Theorem 9.4 adapts).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (the Lagrange duality and negative-cycle theory of section 9.5 this mission's Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 draw from).
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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns: A Coordinating Target Rebate Helps the Retailer, and the Manufacturer iff Coordinated Effort Is at Least Twice Decentralized EffortResearch Paper

Motivation

A false failure return is a product returned by a consumer as defective although it has no functional or cosmetic defect; managers attribute such returns to installation difficulties, a mismatch with the consumer's preferences, and remorse. Ferguson, Guide and Souza report (pp. 376–377) that false failures account for up to 80% of Hewlett-Packard's inkjet printer returns, roughly 5% of sales, and that the per-unit cost of a false failure return to computer manufacturers is around 25% of the product's price. The manufacturer absorbs most of that cost, while the retailer is the party able to prevent the returns in the short term, by spending time with customers before the sale and supporting them after it. The retailer bears the cost of that effort but captures only part of its benefit, so without an incentive it exerts too little.

The paper (Ferguson, Guide & Souza, MSOM 2006) models this as a single-period manufacturer–retailer problem with non-contractible retailer effort, and asks which contracts restore the supply chain's optimal effort and who gains from them. It belongs to the literature on supply chain coordination with contracts (Cachon 2003) and on channel rebates with sales effort (Taylor 2002); its object is a target rebate, a payment to the retailer for every false failure return below a target.

Setting

A manufacturer with unit cost ccc sells to a retailer at wholesale price www, who sells at retail price ppp. Avoiding one false failure return is worth

Mm=m+δm(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr=r+δr(p−w) to the retailer,M_m = m + \delta_m(w - c) \ \text{to the manufacturer},\qquad R_r = r + \delta_r(p - w)\ \text{to the retailer},Mm​=m+δm​(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr​=r+δr​(p−w) to the retailer,

where mmm and rrr are the parties' return-processing costs and δm\delta_mδm​, δr\delta_rδr​ are the unit sale impacts of avoiding the return (p. 381). Both are assumed positive.

The retailer chooses an effort ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 at cost aρ2/2a\rho^2/2aρ2/2, a>0a > 0a>0. At effort ρ\rhoρ the number of false failures is a nonnegative random variable X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) with mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ, where β>0\beta > 0β>0 is the expected number at the minimum effort ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1. The coordinated supply chain earns

Π(ρ)=(Mm+Rr) β(1−1ρ)−aρ22,\Pi(\rho) = (M_m + R_r)\,\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - \frac{a\rho^2}{2},Π(ρ)=(Mm​+Rr​)β(1−ρ1​)−2aρ2​,

maximized at the coordinated effort ρC=[(Mm+Rr)β/a]1/3\rho^C = [(M_m + R_r)\beta/a]^{1/3}ρC=[(Mm​+Rr​)β/a]1/3. Without a contract the retailer earns πR(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rrβ(1−1/ρ)\pi_R(\rho) = -a\rho^2/2 + R_r\beta(1 - 1/\rho)πR​(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rr​β(1−1/ρ) and chooses the decentralized effort ρD=max⁡{(Rrβ/a)1/3,1}\rho^D = \max\{(R_r\beta/a)^{1/3}, 1\}ρD=max{(Rr​β/a)1/3,1}; the manufacturer then earns πM(ρD)=Mmβ(1−1/ρD)\pi_M(\rho^D) = M_m\beta(1 - 1/\rho^D)πM​(ρD)=Mm​β(1−1/ρD).

Under a target rebate contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) the retailer receives uuu for every false failure below the target TTT, so the profits become

πR(ρ∣T,u)=u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}−aρ22+Rrβ(1−1ρ),πM(ρ∣T,u)=Mmβ(1−1ρ)−u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}.\pi_R(\rho \mid T, u) = u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} - \frac{a\rho^2}{2} + R_r\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big),\qquad \pi_M(\rho \mid T, u) = M_m\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}.πR​(ρ∣T,u)=uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}−2aρ2​+Rr​β(1−ρ1​),πM​(ρ∣T,u)=Mm​β(1−ρ1​)−uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}.

The contract coordinates the supply chain when ρC\rho^CρC maximizes πR(⋅∣T,u)\pi_R(\cdot \mid T, u)πR​(⋅∣T,u) over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1. In the uniform case of §3.1, X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ)X(\rho) \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(0, 2\beta/\rho)X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ), and the contract must satisfy T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 383)

Assume a,β,Mm,Rr>0a, \beta, M_m, R_r > 0a,β,Mm​,Rr​>0 and (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a, and let X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) be uniform. For every coordinating contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) with u>0u > 0u>0, 0<T<2β/ρC0 < T < 2\beta/\rho^C0<T<2β/ρC,

πR(ρC∣T,u)≥πR(ρD)and(πM(ρC∣T,u)≥πM(ρD)  ⟺  ρC≥2ρD).\pi_R(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_R(\rho^D) \qquad\text{and}\qquad \Big(\pi_M(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_M(\rho^D) \iff \rho^C \ge 2\rho^D\Big).πR​(ρC∣T,u)≥πR​(ρD)and(πM​(ρC∣T,u)≥πM​(ρD)⟺ρC≥2ρD).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's §3–§3.1 and the appendix proof, in attack order: concavity of Π\PiΠ and optimality of ρC\rho^CρC (Eqs. (1)–(2)); ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1 in the interesting case; optimality of ρD\rho^DρD (Eqs. (3)–(4)); ρC≥ρD\rho^C \ge \rho^DρC≥ρD; Proposition 1 (concavity of the retailer's rebate profit when ∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0\partial^2 F(x\mid\rho)/\partial\rho^2 \le 0∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0); its uniform instance; the uniform closed form (8); the first-order condition (9); the coordinating target (10) together with the admissibility condition u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​; the manufacturer's profit Mmβ(ρC−2)/ρCM_m\beta(\rho^C - 2)/\rho^CMm​β(ρC−2)/ρC under a coordinating contract (25); the retailer's profit (27); and the retailer's gain in the two cases ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 (30) and ρD=1\rho^D = 1ρD=1 (31).

Significance

The result divides the effect of the contract between the two parties. The retailer is always at least as well off as without a contract; the manufacturer, who pays the rebate, gains exactly when the supply chain's optimal effort is at least twice what the retailer would exert alone. When ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 this is equivalent to Mm≥7RrM_m \ge 7R_rMm​≥7Rr​ (p. 383), so a target rebate pays for the manufacturer only when its own stake in avoiding a false failure dwarfs the retailer's. The companion result (10) shows that for every rebate u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​ exactly one admissible coordinating target exists, and none for u≤Mmu \le M_mu≤Mm​: a coordinating rebate is always larger than the manufacturer's own cost of a return.

The results are proved in the paper by calculus and algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of, and nothing on Prove2Me models non-contractible effort or target rebates. The mission produces a checked version of the paper's model with the expectation taken as a genuine integral against the uniform law, a formal notion of coordination as the retailer's optimization, and statements that make explicit which hypotheses each step of the appendix uses. The definitions of effort-dependent profits and coordination are reusable for other effort-inducing contracts in the same paper and in the sales-effort literature.

Difficulty

The algebra of the appendix is short once the first-order condition (9) holds at ρC\rho^CρC. The substance is getting there. Coordination is defined by optimality of ρC\rho^CρC for the retailer's profit, and that profit involves the expectation E{[T−X(ρ)]+}E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}E{[T−X(ρ)]+}, which is piecewise in ρ\rhoρ: it equals T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β only while T≤2β/ρT \le 2\beta/\rhoT≤2β/ρ, and T−β/ρT - \beta/\rhoT−β/ρ beyond. Deriving (9) requires showing that ρC\rho^CρC is an interior maximizer, that the expectation is differentiable there with the closed-form derivative, and that the side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC keeps ρC\rho^CρC in the closed-form region. The converse direction of (10), that the formula for TTT produces a coordinating contract, needs concavity of the piecewise profit on all of ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1, which is where Proposition 1 enters.

Replacing the expectation by the global formula T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β is the tempting shortcut and it changes the problem: for ρ>2β/T\rho > 2\beta/Tρ>2β/T the formula exceeds the true expectation, and the retailer's maximizer, hence the meaning of "coordinates", changes with it.

Formalization scope

All parameters are real numbers, bundled in a structure Params; MmM_mMm​ and RrR_rRr​ are Params.Mm and Params.Rr. Effort ranges over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 (Set.Ici 1); statements the paper makes for every positive effort (concavity of Π\PiΠ, the closed form (8)) are stated on ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0. Cube roots are Real.rpow with exponent 1/31/31/3 on positive bases. The uniform law is Lebesgue measure conditioned on [0,2β/ρ][0, 2\beta/\rho][0,2β/ρ], and the expectation is the Bochner integral against it. Coordination is IsMaxOn of the retailer's profit on Set.Ici 1 at ρC\rho^CρC.

Three conventions differ from the printed text, each recorded in the item's formalization note:

  1. The interesting case is printed as (m+r)β>a(m + r)\beta > a(m+r)β>a; the condition equivalent to the stated consequence ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1, which the proof uses, is (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a. The formalization uses the latter.
  2. The printed evaluation EX{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T(T−x)(ρ/2β) dxE_X\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} = u\int_0^T (T - x)(\rho/2\beta)\,dxEX​{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T​(T−x)(ρ/2β)dx carries a stray factor uuu; the expectation is T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β.
  3. Proposition 1 is stated for an arbitrary family of probability laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) whose distribution functions are C2C^2C2 in ρ\rhoρ with nonpositive second derivative for x∈[0,T]x \in [0,T]x∈[0,T]; the paper's further assumptions on FFF (differentiable, strictly increasing in xxx, mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ) are not imposed.

The side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC of §3.1 is a hypothesis of the goal and of the appendix milestones; without it a coordinating contract with u=Mmu = M_mu=Mm​ exists and the "if" direction fails. The unused page assertion δr<δm<1\delta_r < \delta_m < 1δr​<δm​<1 is not imposed.

The goal is not trivialized by its coordination hypothesis: coordination is the retailer's optimization over the true profit, and milestone (10) shows that coordinating contracts with T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC exist for every u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​, so the hypotheses are satisfiable (Example 1 of the paper, p. 384, is an instance). The retailer half of the goal is comparatively short under this definition of coordination; that is a property of the paper's theorem, not of the encoding. The manufacturer half needs (8), (9) and (25).

The development needs only Mathlib: real calculus (derivatives, concavity, Real.rpow) and Lebesgue integration against a conditioned Lebesgue measure. The model definitions (effort-dependent profits, coordination as the retailer's optimization) are reusable for the paper's other effort-inducing contracts. Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on expectations of [T−X]+[T - X]^+[T−X]+ under uniform laws.

Selected references

  • M. Ferguson, V. D. R. Guide Jr., G. C. Souza, Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 8(4):376–393, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1060.0112
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, Elsevier, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8):992–1007, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Applied Combinatorics VII: Minimum Spanning Trees and Dijkstra's AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

Two optimization problems on weighted networks sit at the base of operations research and algorithm design. The first asks for the cheapest way to connect every node of a network, such as a cable, pipeline or communication network. The answer is a minimum weight spanning tree. The second asks for the shortest route from a depot to every other node of a road or data network, the single-source shortest path problem. Chapter 12 of Keller and Trotter's Applied Combinatorics (appliedcombinatorics.org, CC BY-SA 4.0) treats both. It proves the structural lemmas behind the greedy spanning tree algorithms of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957), and the correctness of the shortest path algorithm of Dijkstra (1959).

The minimum spanning tree problem goes back to Borůvka (1926), who designed an electrical network for Moravia. Kruskal and Prim gave the two greedy algorithms taught today, and Dijkstra's 1959 note treated both problems. Dijkstra's shortest path method, with heap-based refinements such as Fredman and Tarjan (1987), remains the standard solver for non-negative lengths and a building block of routing, scheduling and network flow codes.

Setting

A graph G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) has a finite vertex set VVV and a set EEE of 2-element subsets of VVV. A weight w(e)∈N0w(e) \in \mathbb N_0w(e)∈N0​ is attached to each edge, and a set SSS of edges has weight w(S)=∑e∈Sw(e)w(S) = \sum_{e \in S} w(e)w(S)=∑e∈S​w(e). A spanning forest of GGG is an acyclic graph H=(V,S)H = (V, S)H=(V,S) with S⊆ES \subseteq ES⊆E. A spanning tree is a spanning forest that is connected. The weight of a spanning tree is the weight of its edge set. In Lean these are SimpleGraph V with [Fintype V], IsSpanningForest G H (H≤GH \le GH≤G and acyclic), IsSpanningTree G T (T≤GT \le GT≤G and a tree), and weight w T for a weight w : Sym2 V → ℕ.

A digraph G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) has E⊆V×VE \subseteq V \times VE⊆V×V with x≠yx \ne yx=y for every directed edge (x,y)(x, y)(x,y). Each directed edge has a length w(x,y)∈N0w(x, y) \in \mathbb N_0w(x,y)∈N0​. The length is extended by w(x,y)=∞w(x, y) = \inftyw(x,y)=∞ for non-edges. A directed path from aaa to bbb is a sequence (a=u0,…,ut=b)(a = u_0, \dots, u_t = b)(a=u0​,…,ut​=b) of distinct vertices in which consecutive pairs are directed edges. Its length is ∑i<tw(ui,ui+1)\sum_{i<t} w(u_i, u_{i+1})∑i<t​w(ui​,ui+1​). The distance dist⁡(a,b)∈N0∪{∞}\operatorname{dist}(a, b) \in \mathbb N_0 \cup \{\infty\}dist(a,b)∈N0​∪{∞} is the minimum length of a directed path from aaa to bbb, and is ∞\infty∞ when no such path exists. A shortest path is a directed path attaining it. In Lean this is WeightedDigraph V with ext, IsDirPath, pathLength, dist and IsShortestPath.

Dijkstra's algorithm (Algorithm 12.14) with root rrr and n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣ keeps a sequence σ\sigmaσ of permanent vertices, a value δ(x)∈N0∪{∞}\delta(x) \in \mathbb N_0 \cup \{\infty\}δ(x)∈N0​∪{∞} and a sequence P(x)P(x)P(x) for each vertex. Step 1 sets δ(r)=0\delta(r) = 0δ(r)=0, P(r)=(r)P(r) = (r)P(r)=(r), σ=(r)\sigma = (r)σ=(r), and δ(x)=w(r,x)\delta(x) = w(r, x)δ(x)=w(r,x), P(x)=(r,x)P(x) = (r, x)P(x)=(r,x) for x≠rx \ne rx=r. Step iii with 1<i<n1 < i < n1<i<n scans from the last permanent vertex viv_ivi​. For every temporary xxx it sets δ(x)←min⁡{δ(x),δ(vi)+w(vi,x)}\delta(x) \leftarrow \min\{\delta(x), \delta(v_i) + w(v_i, x)\}δ(x)←min{δ(x),δ(vi​)+w(vi​,x)}, and on a strict decrease it replaces P(x)P(x)P(x) by P(vi)P(v_i)P(vi​) followed by xxx. Each step ends by appending to σ\sigmaσ a temporary vertex of minimum δ\deltaδ, chosen arbitrarily among ties. The algorithm halts at Step nnn. DijkstraRun G r i s holds when some sequence of admissible choices leads to state s at the start of Step iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: correctness of Dijkstra's algorithm (Theorem 12.18)

For every halted state of every run, and every vertex xxx,

δ(x)=dist⁡(r,x),dist⁡(r,x)<∞  ⟹  P(x) is a shortest path from r to x.\delta(x) = \operatorname{dist}(r, x), \qquad \operatorname{dist}(r, x) < \infty \implies P(x) \text{ is a shortest path from } r \text{ to } x.δ(x)=dist(r,x),dist(r,x)<∞⟹P(x) is a shortest path from r to x.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 12.3. A spanning forest H=(V,S)H = (V, S)H=(V,S) of a graph on n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 vertices has ∣S∣≤n−1|S| \le n - 1∣S∣≤n−1 and exactly n−∣S∣n - |S|n−∣S∣ components. It is a spanning tree if and only if ∣S∣=n−1|S| = n - 1∣S∣=n−1.
  2. Proposition 12.4 (Exchange Principle). Let TTT be a spanning tree and xy∈E∖Txy \in E \setminus Txy∈E∖T. Then TTT contains a unique path x=x0,…,xt=yx = x_0, \dots, x_t = yx=x0​,…,xt​=y, and replacing any edge xixi+1x_i x_{i+1}xi​xi+1​ of it by xyxyxy gives a spanning tree.
  3. Lemma 12.6. In a connected weighted graph, let FFF be a spanning forest and CCC a component of FFF. A minimum weight edge leaving CCC lies in some spanning tree that has minimum weight among the spanning trees containing FFF.
  4. Proposition 12.16. Every prefix and every suffix of a shortest path is a shortest path.
  5. Proposition 12.17. When the algorithm halts, δ(v1)≤δ(v2)≤⋯≤δ(vn)\delta(v_1) \le \delta(v_2) \le \cdots \le \delta(v_n)δ(v1​)≤δ(v2​)≤⋯≤δ(vn​).

Milestones 4 and 5 are the two statements the book's proof of the goal rests on. Milestones 1–3 are the spanning tree half of the chapter. Lemma 12.6 is the result from which the book derives the correctness of Kruskal's and Prim's algorithms.

Significance

Theorem 12.18 certifies that one pass of nnn steps computes all distances from rrr and a shortest path tree, with no condition on the digraph beyond non-negative lengths. Lemma 12.6 is the cut property. Every greedy minimum spanning tree method (Kruskal, Prim, Borůvka) is an instance of it, and the exchange principle is the matroid basis-exchange axiom specialised to the graphic matroid.

All of these results are classical and proved. None is formalized in this form on the platform. Mathlib has spanning trees of connected graphs, uniqueness of paths in acyclic graphs, and the edge count n−1n - 1n−1 of a tree. It has no edge–component count for forests, no exchange principle, no weighted spanning trees, and no Dijkstra. On Prove2Me, FamousTheorems.tree_card_edges_6b and ClassicalGaps.isAcyclic_edges_eq_card_sub_one_imp_connected cover only the tree case of Proposition 12.3. KServer.mst_cut_property is a cut property for complete graphs encoded by parent maps, a different statement. The label-correcting algorithm of Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control II (BertsekasDP.label_correcting_*) is a different algorithm: it keeps an open list and scans in arbitrary order, not by minimum label.

Difficulty

The goal is a statement about the final state of a run, but the facts it depends on only become visible across steps: a permanent vertex's δ\deltaδ and PPP never change again, and δ(x)\delta(x)δ(x) is always the length of the current P(x)P(x)P(x). None of this is recorded in the final state itself. An argument over the steps of the run has to show that each P(x)P(x)P(x) remains a path with distinct vertices, including when edges of length 000 allow ties. It also has to handle the value ∞\infty∞, where ∞+a=∞\infty + a = \infty∞+a=∞ and a comparison between two infinite values never counts as a decrease. Tie-breaking is arbitrary, so no argument may depend on which minimum is chosen. For Lemma 12.6 the difficulty is the exchange step: removing an edge of a tree path and adding a crossing edge must again give a tree that still contains the forest FFF, and this is a statement about cycles and components, not about counts.

Formalization scope

  • Graphs are SimpleGraph V over a Fintype V. Weights are Sym2 V → ℕ (the book's w:E→N0w : E \to \mathbb N_0w:E→N0​; values off EEE are never used). Acyclic, tree and connected components are Mathlib's. In Proposition 12.3, ∣S∣=n−k|S| = n - k∣S∣=n−k is written ∣S∣+k=n|S| + k = n∣S∣+k=n and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 is assumed, which the bound n−1n - 1n−1 presupposes.
  • Lemma 12.6 assumes GGG connected, the section's standing assumption (p. 239). The page's "to avoid trivialities, we assume n≥3n \ge 3n≥3" is not imposed, because the statement holds for every nnn. The crossing edge may have either endpoint in CCC.
  • Lengths in the digraph are ℕ, and δ\deltaδ and distances are ℕ∞, where ∞\infty∞ is ⊤, never a large finite number. A version with real or ℝ≥0 lengths would be a generalization and is not what is asked.
  • Dijkstra's algorithm is defined step by step exactly as on pp. 246–247, including δ(x)=w(r,x)=∞\delta(x) = w(r, x) = \inftyδ(x)=w(r,x)=∞ and P(x)=(r,x)P(x) = (r, x)P(x)=(r,x) for non-neighbours at Step 1. The goal quantifies over every halted state, so it holds for every tie-breaking. A halted state always exists; a sorry-free check of this is in the workspace. For a vertex not reachable from rrr the book is silent. The distance there is read as ∞\infty∞, and the shortest-path conclusion is asserted only at finite distance.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: δ\deltaδ is computed by the update rule of Algorithm 12.14, not defined as the distance, and the theorem is not stated for an arbitrary procedure satisfying its own conclusion.
  • The book uses no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) bounds or approximate constants in these statements, so there are no constants to instantiate.
  • Reusable infrastructure: a list-based theory of directed paths and distances in ℕ∞, the invariants of Dijkstra's algorithm, and forest edge counting. Contributions of general lemmas (walks shortcut to paths without increasing length, component counts under edge insertion) are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. T. Keller and W. T. Trotter, Applied Combinatorics, 2017 Edition, Chapter 12. https://www.appliedcombinatorics.org/
  • E. W. Dijkstra, "A note on two problems in connexion with graphs", Numerische Mathematik 1 (1959) 269–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01386390
  • J. B. Kruskal, "On the shortest spanning subtree of a graph and the traveling salesman problem", Proc. AMS 7 (1956) 48–50. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1956-0078686-7
  • R. C. Prim, "Shortest connection networks and some generalizations", Bell System Technical Journal 36 (1957) 1389–1401. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1957.tb01515.x
  • M. L. Fredman and R. E. Tarjan, "Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved network optimization algorithms", J. ACM 34 (1987) 596–615. https://doi.org/10.1145/28869.28874
  • O. Borůvka, "O jistém problému minimálním", Práce Moravské přírodovědecké společnosti 3 (1926) 37–58. https://dml.cz/handle/10338.dmlcz/500114
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Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model III: The Reduced Linear Program Is Equivalent to the Choice-Based Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

Network revenue management decides which products to make available to arriving customers when products share scarce resources: an airline sells itineraries (products) that consume seats on flight legs (resources), and each itinerary has a fare. When customers choose among the offered products, rather than asking for one fixed product, the standard planning tool is a deterministic linear program that replaces random choices by their expected values. Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004, Columbia CORC technical report TR-2004-01) and Liu and van Ryzin (2008) formulated this choice-based linear program; its solution drives bid-price and offer-set policies used in practice.

The difficulty is size. The choice-based program has one variable for each subset of products, 2n2^n2n in all, and is solved by column generation, whose pricing subproblem is itself an assortment problem. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) show that when customers choose under the Markov chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (2016), the choice-based program is equivalent to a linear program with only 2n2n2n variables and m+nm+nm+n constraints. This mission formalizes that equivalence, Theorem 7 of the paper.

Setting

There are nnn products, N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Under the Markov chain choice model a customer first visits product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If the product she visits is offered, she buys it. Otherwise she moves from product jjj to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, or leaves without buying with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. The paper assumes throughout that

λj>0and∑i∈Nρj,i<1for all j∈N.\lambda_j>0\quad\text{and}\quad\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1\qquad\text{for all } j\in N.λj​>0andi∈N∑​ρj,i​<1for all j∈N.

For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ is the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is offered, which is its purchase probability, and Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ is the expected number of visits to jjj while it is not offered. The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is the solution of the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j∈N,Pj,S=0  ∀j∉S,Rj,S=0  ∀j∈S.P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j\in N,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\notin S,\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\in S .Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j∈N,Pj,S​=0  ∀j∈/S,Rj,S​=0  ∀j∈S.

Dropping the constraints tied to SSS gives the polyhedron

H={(x,z)∈R+2n:xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi  ∀j∈N}.\mathcal H=\Big\{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+ : x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\}.H={(x,z)∈R+2n​:xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​  ∀j∈N}.

The network has mmm resources, M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m}, with capacities cqc_qcq​; the selling horizon has TTT periods; product jjj earns rjr_jrj​ and consumes aq,ja_{q,j}aq,j​ units of resource qqq. With uSu_SuS​ the probability of offering SSS in a period, the (Choice Based) linear program is

max⁡u∈R+2n{∑S⊆N∑j∈NTrjPj,SuS: ∑S⊆N∑j∈NTaq,jPj,SuS≤cq ∀q∈M, ∑S⊆NuS=1},\max_{u\in\mathbb R^{2^n}_+}\Big\{\sum_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}T r_jP_{j,S}u_S:\ \sum_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}Ta_{q,j}P_{j,S}u_S\le c_q\ \forall q\in M,\ \sum_{S\subseteq N}u_S=1\Big\},u∈R+2n​max​{S⊆N∑​j∈N∑​Trj​Pj,S​uS​: S⊆N∑​j∈N∑​Taq,j​Pj,S​uS​≤cq​ ∀q∈M, S⊆N∑​uS​=1},

and the (Reduced) linear program is

max⁡(x,z)∈R+2n{∑j∈NTrjxj: ∑j∈NTaq,jxj≤cq ∀q∈M, xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi ∀j∈N}.\max_{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}T r_jx_j:\ \sum_{j\in N}Ta_{q,j}x_j\le c_q\ \forall q\in M,\ x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \forall j\in N\Big\}.(x,z)∈R+2n​max​{j∈N∑​Trj​xj​: j∈N∑​Taq,j​xj​≤cq​ ∀q∈M, xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​ ∀j∈N}.

In (Reduced), xjx_jxj​ is the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is available and zjz_jzj​ the expected number of visits while it is not.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

Let (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) be an optimal solution of (Reduced). Then there are subsets S1,…,SK⊆NS^1,\dots,S^K\subseteq NS1,…,SK⊆N and positive scalars γ1,…,γK\gamma^1,\dots,\gamma^Kγ1,…,γK with ∑kγk=1\sum_k\gamma^k=1∑k​γk=1 such that

x^=∑k=1KγkPSk,z^=∑k=1KγkRSk,\hat x=\sum_{k=1}^K\gamma^kP_{S^k},\qquad \hat z=\sum_{k=1}^K\gamma^kR_{S^k},x^=k=1∑K​γkPSk​,z^=k=1∑K​γkRSk​,

and for any such subsets and scalars the vector u^\hat uu^ with u^Sk=γk\hat u_{S^k}=\gamma^ku^Sk​=γk and u^S=0\hat u_S=0u^S​=0 for S∉{S1,…,SK}S\notin\{S^1,\dots,S^K\}S∈/{S1,…,SK} is optimal for (Choice Based), with objective value equal to that of (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) in (Reduced). In particular the two programs have the same optimal value.

Milestones

  1. (Balance) has a unique and nonnegative solution for every offer set (§2, p. 1325).
  2. Lemma 1: an extreme point (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) of H\mathcal HH equals (PS,RS)(P_{S},R_{S})(PS​,RS​) for S={j:x^j>0}S=\{j:\hat x_j>0\}S={j:x^j​>0} (p. 1326).
  3. Lemma 10: H\mathcal HH is bounded (quoted on p. 1331; proved in the online appendix).
  4. Every point of H\mathcal HH is a positive convex combination of finitely many extreme points of H\mathcal HH (proof of Theorem 7, p. 1331).
  5. Every feasible uuu of (Choice Based) yields the feasible point x~j=∑SPj,SuS\tilde x_j=\sum_S P_{j,S}u_Sx~j​=∑S​Pj,S​uS​, z~j=∑SRj,SuS\tilde z_j=\sum_S R_{j,S}u_Sz~j​=∑S​Rj,S​uS​ of (Reduced), with the same objective value (proof of Theorem 7, p. 1332).

Significance

The result. Theorem 7 replaces a program with 2n2^n2n columns by one with 2n2n2n variables and m+nm+nm+n constraints, solvable directly by any LP solver, and it returns an optimal solution of the original program, not only its value. The optimal value is the standard upper bound on the optimal expected revenue of a network revenue management policy, and the dual variables of the capacity constraints are the bid prices used to control sales. The decomposition of part 1 is what turns the small program's solution back into offer-set frequencies that a policy can implement; Section 7 of the paper makes that decomposition algorithmic (a separate mission of this series).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to the best of available knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof checks the link between polyhedral geometry (extreme points of H\mathcal HH and the solutions of (Balance)) and linear-programming optimality, and records exactly which properties of the Markov chain choice model are used: the standing assumptions enter through uniqueness and nonnegativity of (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) and through boundedness of H\mathcal HH.

Difficulty

The inequality "(Reduced) ≥\ge≥ (Choice Based)" is a direct computation: averaging the (Balance) equations with weights uSu_SuS​ lands in H\mathcal HH. The reverse direction is where the obvious argument fails. A point of H\mathcal HH has no offer set attached to it, and a general polyhedron need not be the convex hull of its extreme points: it can contain lines or rays. The argument requires that H\mathcal HH is bounded, which depends on the substochasticity ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1, and that each extreme point is exactly some (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​), which uses the structure of the balance equations and the uniqueness of their solution. Neither follows from general linear-programming facts. In Lean, the finite vertex representation of a bounded polyhedron is also not a one-line consequence of Mathlib's Krein–Milman theorem, which gives only the closure of the convex hull.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n, offer sets Finset (Fin n), resources Fin m. The model is a structure Model n holding λ\lambdaλ, ρ\rhoρ (rho j i =ρj,i=\rho_{j,i}=ρj,i​, the transition from jjj to iii) and the standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1; the nonnegativity ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0, implicit in the paper because the ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ are probabilities, is an added field. (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon, and milestone 1 is what identifies it with the paper's unique solution. H\mathcal HH is a subset of (Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin n → ℝ), extreme points are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ, and boundedness is Bornology.IsBounded. TTT is a natural number entering as a real factor exactly where the paper writes it; ccc, aaa, rrr carry no sign conditions, as in the paper. "Optimal solution" means feasible and at least as good as every feasible point; no supremum is used.

Two conventions are disclosed. The paper defines u^\hat uu^ by u^Sk=γk\hat u_{S^k}=\gamma^ku^Sk​=γk; the formalization sets u^S=∑k:Sk=Sγk\hat u_S=\sum_{k:S^k=S}\gamma^ku^S​=∑k:Sk=S​γk, which agrees when the SkS^kSk are distinct and is the only consistent reading otherwise. Milestone 5 is stated for every feasible uuu of (Choice Based), while the paper applies it to an optimal one; its argument uses only feasibility. No printed statement needed correction.

The goal is not only the decomposition of part 1, which is milestones 2 and 4 combined: it also asserts optimality of u^\hat uu^ and equality of the optimal values, and a formalization that drops part 2 does not state Theorem 7. Part 2 is required for every decomposition, and part 1 guarantees one exists, so part 2 is not vacuous.

A complete development needs the vertex representation of polytopes (reusable beyond this mission; LinearOptimization.polyhedron_resolution on the platform proves the resolution theorem in another encoding), the theory of substochastic matrices behind (Balance) (invertibility of I−QˉI-\bar QI−Qˉ​ with a nonnegative inverse), and finite-sum manipulations over Finset (Fin n). Contributions to any milestone, and bridges to existing polyhedral results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0172
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey, Managing Flexible Products on a Network, Computational Optimization Research Center Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004 (technical report; no DOI).
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model II: Optimal Offer Sets Grow with Remaining Capacity and Remaining TimeResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental firms sell a fixed stock of capacity (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and control revenue mainly by deciding which products (fare classes, rate plans) to make available at each moment. When customers substitute between products, the decision in each period is an assortment: a subset of products to offer. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 2004) formulated this single resource revenue management problem as a dynamic program for a general choice model, and showed that structural properties of the optimal policy depend strongly on how customers choose.

The Markov chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (technical report 2013; Oper. Res. 2016) describes substitution by a Markov chain on the products and approximates a broad class of random-utility models. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) study assortment and revenue management problems under this model. This mission formalizes their structural result for the single resource problem (Theorem 5): there is an optimal policy whose offer sets are nested in the remaining capacity and in the remaining time, so that it can be implemented by protection levels, one capacity threshold per product and period.

Setting

There are nnn products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. A customer arrives to purchase product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If jjj is offered she buys it; otherwise she moves to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, and leaves with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. The paper assumes λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑i∈Nρj,i<1\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1∑i∈N​ρj,i​<1 for all jjj. For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, the purchase probabilities Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ and the visit counts Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ of unavailable products solve the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j,Pj,S=0  (j∉S),Rj,S=0  (j∈S).P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ (j\notin S),\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ (j\in S).Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j,Pj,S​=0  (j∈/S),Rj,S​=0  (j∈S).

With product revenues rjr_jrj​, the (Assortment) problem is max⁡S⊆N∑jPj,Srj\max_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j}P_{j,S}r_jmaxS⊆N​∑j​Pj,S​rj​, and its (Dual) linear program is

min⁡v∈Rn{∑jλjvj:vj≥rj, vj≥∑iρj,ivi  ∀j}.\min_{v\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{\sum_{j}\lambda_jv_j : v_j\ge r_j,\ v_j\ge\sum_{i}\rho_{j,i}v_i\ \ \forall j\Big\}.v∈Rnmin​{j∑​λj​vj​:vj​≥rj​, vj​≥i∑​ρj,i​vi​  ∀j}.

In the single resource problem there are TTT periods and ccc units of capacity. In each period at most one customer arrives; a sale of product jjj earns rjr_jrj​ and uses one unit. The optimal expected revenue Vt(x)V_t(x)Vt​(x) from period ttt on with xxx units left satisfies the (Single Resource) dynamic program

Vt(x)=max⁡S⊆N{∑j∈NPj,S{rj+Vt+1(x−1)−Vt+1(x)}}+Vt+1(x),V_t(x)=\max_{S\subseteq N}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}\{r_j+V_{t+1}(x-1)-V_{t+1}(x)\}\Big\}+V_{t+1}(x),Vt​(x)=S⊆Nmax​{j∈N∑​Pj,S​{rj​+Vt+1​(x−1)−Vt+1​(x)}}+Vt+1​(x),

with VT+1(x)=0V_{T+1}(x)=0VT+1​(x)=0 and Vt(0)=0V_t(0)=0Vt​(0)=0. An optimal subset S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) is a maximizer of the problem on the right side. The marginal value of capacity is ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1)\Delta V_t(x)=V_t(x)-V_t(x-1)ΔVt​(x)=Vt​(x)−Vt​(x−1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 1329)

There exists an optimal policy, i.e. a choice of maximizers S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) for all 1≤t≤T1\le t\le T1≤t≤T, 1≤x≤c1\le x\le c1≤x≤c, such that

S^t(x−1)⊆S^t(x)andS^t−1(x)⊆S^t(x).\hat S_t(x-1)\subseteq \hat S_t(x)\qquad\text{and}\qquad \hat S_{t-1}(x)\subseteq\hat S_t(x).S^t​(x−1)⊆S^t​(x)andS^t−1​(x)⊆S^t​(x).

The offer set shrinks as capacity runs down, and it is smaller when more periods remain.

Milestones

  1. (§2, p. 1325) The (Balance) equations have a unique nonnegative solution for every SSS.
  2. (Theorem 2, p. 1326) If v^\hat vv^ is optimal for (Dual), then {j:v^j=rj}\{j:\hat v_j=r_j\}{j:v^j​=rj​} is optimal for (Assortment).
  3. (Lemma 3, p. 1327) For η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, with v^η\hat v^\etav^η optimal for (Dual) with revenues rj−ηr_j-\etarj​−η,
{j:v^jη=rj−η}⊆{j:v^j0=rj}.\{j:\hat v^\eta_j=r_j-\eta\}\subseteq\{j:\hat v^0_j=r_j\}.{j:v^jη​=rj​−η}⊆{j:v^j0​=rj​}.
  1. ((Single Resource), pp. 1328–1329) The value functions satisfy the printed recursion Vt(x)=max⁡S{∑jPj,S{rj+Vt+1(x−1)}+{1−∑jPj,S}Vt+1(x)}V_t(x)=\max_S\{\sum_jP_{j,S}\{r_j+V_{t+1}(x-1)\}+\{1-\sum_jP_{j,S}\}V_{t+1}(x)\}Vt​(x)=maxS​{∑j​Pj,S​{rj​+Vt+1​(x−1)}+{1−∑j​Pj,S​}Vt+1​(x)} and the boundary conditions.
  2. (Proof of Theorem 5, p. 1329) ΔVt+1(x)≤ΔVt+1(x−1)\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\le\Delta V_{t+1}(x-1)ΔVt+1​(x)≤ΔVt+1​(x−1) and ΔVt+1(x)≤ΔVt(x)\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\le\Delta V_t(x)ΔVt+1​(x)≤ΔVt​(x).

Significance

Theorem 5 makes the optimal policy a protection level policy: for each product jjj and period ttt there is a threshold xˉjt\bar x_{jt}xˉjt​ such that jjj is offered exactly when at least xˉjt\bar x_{jt}xˉjt​ units remain. The policy can then be stored as n Tn\,TnT numbers instead of a table of subsets, and each product can be controlled separately, which is how airline inventory systems are organized. The paper also shows (Table 2, p. 1330) that the products need not be closed in revenue order: a higher-fare product can be closed before a lower-fare one, so the result is genuinely about nested sets, not about nested fare classes. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) show that under the multinomial logit model an optimal assortment consists of a number of products with the largest revenues; the Markov chain choice model does not have this property (Table 1, p. 1328), so their structure of the optimal policy does not carry over directly.

The result is proved in the paper. No part of it is formalized on Prove2Me. The monotonicity of marginal values for an abstract choice model is published and proved as RevenueManagement.choice_marginal_values, stated over the definitions RevenueManagement_singleResource; milestone 5 is the same statement for this paper's dynamic program and can be bridged to it. A complete development here produces machine-checked Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 for the Markov chain choice model, which are reusable for any assortment problem under this model.

Difficulty

The obvious argument chooses, for each (t,x)(t,x)(t,x), any maximizer of the stage problem. This fails: the stage problems have ties, and an arbitrary choice of maximizers need not be nested, so the theorem is an existence statement about a coordinated choice. The dependence of Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ on SSS is through the solution of a linear system, so the effect of adding or removing a product on the other purchase probabilities has no simple sign, and optimal assortments need not be nested by revenue (Table 1, p. 1328). The link between two stage problems is that their revenues differ by the same constant for all products, and what has to be shown is that such a uniform shift moves an optimal assortment in a controlled direction. Revenues in the stage problems, rj−ΔVt+1(x)r_j-\Delta V_{t+1}(x)rj​−ΔVt+1​(x), can be negative.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n, offer sets Finset (Fin n), the paper's ⊂\subset⊂ is non-strict inclusion ⊆\subseteq⊆. The model is a structure with fields λ\lambdaλ, ρ\rhoρ and the standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0, ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1; ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0 is added as a field because the ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ are probabilities. (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon; milestone 1 states that it is the unique nonnegative one. The value function is defined by recursion on the number of periods to go, and VtV_tVt​ is used only for 1≤t≤T+11\le t\le T+11≤t≤T+1. Maxima over S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N are taken over the finite family of all subsets, so they are attained; dual optimality is "feasible and no worse than every feasible point".

One hypothesis is added to Theorem 5 and milestone 5, and disclosed: ∑jλj≤1\sum_j\lambda_j\le1∑j​λj​≤1, implied by the paper's description of at most one arrival per period (it makes 1−∑jPj,S1-\sum_jP_{j,S}1−∑j​Pj,S​ a probability). No sign condition is placed on the revenues, as on the page. Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 are stated for arbitrary real revenues, as the proof of Theorem 5 applies them to rj−ΔVt+1(x)r_j-\Delta V_{t+1}(x)rj​−ΔVt+1​(x). The first inclusion of Theorem 5 is stated for x≥2x\ge2x≥2: with x−1=0x-1=0x−1=0 units there is no decision, and the paper reads S^t(0)\hat S_t(0)S^t​(0) as ∅\emptyset∅. The existential requires every S^t(x)\hat S_t(x)S^t​(x) in range to be optimal for its stage problem; a statement without that clause would be satisfied by the empty sets and is ruled out.

Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 need LP duality for (Dual) and the (Balance) system; milestone 5 needs the standard induction on the dynamic program, or a bridge to the published choice_marginal_values (with arrival probabilities 111 and choice model Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​). Proofs of any milestone, and bridges to published Mathlib or platform LP duality results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model I: The Dual Linear Program Yields an Optimal AssortmentResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline decides which products to make available, and customers choose among what is offered. When a preferred product is missing, many customers substitute to another product instead of leaving. Assortment optimization asks which subset of products to offer so that the expected revenue from a customer is as large as possible, and its answer depends entirely on the choice model used to describe substitution.

The Markov chain choice model was introduced by Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (EC 2013; Oper. Res. 64(4), 2016), who showed that it contains the multinomial logit model as a special case and proposed it as an approximation of general random-utility choice models. Feldman and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 65(5), 2017) study revenue management under this model. Their first result, the subject of this mission, is that the assortment problem, a search over all 2n2^n2n offer sets, is solved by one linear program with nnn variables. The same paper uses this result for its dynamic single-resource and network results, which are the subjects of the companion missions II–IV of this series.

Timeline:

  • 2013/2016: Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal introduce the model and give a polynomial-time assortment algorithm.
  • 2017: Feldman and Topaloglu show that the optimal assortment is read off an optimal solution of a dual linear program (their Theorem 2), and derive structural and capacity-control consequences.

Setting

There are nnn products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. A customer arrives to purchase product jjj with probability λj\lambda_jλj​. If the product she visits is offered, she buys it. Otherwise she transitions to product iii with probability ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​ and checks whether iii is offered, or leaves without buying with probability 1−∑i∈Nρj,i1-\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}1−∑i∈N​ρj,i​. Throughout, λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0, ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0 and ∑i∈Nρj,i<1\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}<1∑i∈N​ρj,i​<1 for all jjj.

For an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, let Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ be the expected number of visits to product jjj while it is offered (the probability that jjj is purchased) and Rj,SR_{j,S}Rj,S​ the expected number of visits to jjj while it is not offered. The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is the unique solution of the (Balance) equations

Pj,S+Rj,S=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jRi,S  ∀j∈N,Pj,S=0  ∀j∉S,Rj,S=0  ∀j∈S.P_{j,S}+R_{j,S}=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}R_{i,S}\ \ \forall j\in N,\qquad P_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\notin S,\qquad R_{j,S}=0\ \ \forall j\in S .Pj,S​+Rj,S​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​Ri,S​  ∀j∈N,Pj,S​=0  ∀j∈/S,Rj,S​=0  ∀j∈S.

With revenue rj∈Rr_j\in\mathbb Rrj​∈R for product jjj, the (Assortment) problem is max⁡S⊆N∑j∈NPj,Srj\max_{S\subseteq N}\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}r_jmaxS⊆N​∑j∈N​Pj,S​rj​. Two linear programs enter: the maximization of ∑jrjxj\sum_j r_jx_j∑j​rj​xj​ over the polyhedron

H={(x,z)∈R+2n: xj+zj=λj+∑i∈Nρi,jzi  ∀j∈N},\mathcal H=\Big\{(x,z)\in\mathbb R^{2n}_+:\ x_j+z_j=\lambda_j+\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{i,j}z_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\},H={(x,z)∈R+2n​: xj​+zj​=λj​+i∈N∑​ρi,j​zi​  ∀j∈N},

and its dual

min⁡v∈Rn{∑j∈Nλjvj: vj≥rj  ∀j∈N,  vj≥∑i∈Nρj,ivi  ∀j∈N}.(Dual)\min_{v\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{\sum_{j\in N}\lambda_jv_j:\ v_j\ge r_j\ \ \forall j\in N,\ \ v_j\ge\sum_{i\in N}\rho_{j,i}v_i\ \ \forall j\in N\Big\}.\qquad\text{(Dual)}v∈Rnmin​{j∈N∑​λj​vj​: vj​≥rj​  ∀j∈N,  vj​≥i∈N∑​ρj,i​vi​  ∀j∈N}.(Dual)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1326)

For every optimal solution v^\hat vv^ of (Dual), the set S^={j∈N:v^j=rj}\hat S=\{j\in N:\hat v_j=r_j\}S^={j∈N:v^j​=rj​} is an optimal assortment:

∑j∈NPj,S rj ≤ ∑j∈NPj,S^ rjfor all S⊆N.\sum_{j\in N}P_{j,S}\,r_j\ \le\ \sum_{j\in N}P_{j,\hat S}\,r_j\qquad\text{for all } S\subseteq N .j∈N∑​Pj,S​rj​ ≤ j∈N∑​Pj,S^​rj​for all S⊆N.

Milestones, in the order the paper uses them

  1. (p. 1325) The (Balance) equations have a unique nonnegative solution for every SSS.
  2. Lemma 1 (p. 1326): for an extreme point (x^,z^)(\hat x,\hat z)(x^,z^) of H\mathcal HH and Sx^={j:x^j>0}S_{\hat x}=\{j:\hat x_j>0\}Sx^​={j:x^j​>0}, Pj,Sx^=x^jP_{j,S_{\hat x}}=\hat x_jPj,Sx^​​=x^j​ and Rj,Sx^=z^jR_{j,S_{\hat x}}=\hat z_jRj,Sx^​​=z^j​ for all jjj.
  3. (p. 1326) The linear program over H\mathcal HH has an optimal solution, and its optimal value equals the optimal value of (Assortment).
  4. (p. 1326) (Dual) has an optimal solution, and its optimal value equals that of the linear program over H\mathcal HH.
  5. (p. 1326, proof of Theorem 2) An optimal v^\hat vv^ satisfies v^j=rj\hat v_j=r_jv^j​=rj​ or v^j=∑iρj,iv^i\hat v_j=\sum_i\rho_{j,i}\hat v_iv^j​=∑i​ρj,i​v^i​ for each jjj.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces a combinatorial problem over 2n2^n2n offer sets to a linear program, so the assortment problem under the Markov chain choice model is solvable in polynomial time. The same structure drives the rest of the paper: the dual variables v^j\hat v_jv^j​ are used to show that optimal offer sets shrink when all revenues fall by a common amount, to show that the optimal offer sets of the single-resource dynamic program are nested in the remaining capacity and time, and to reduce the choice-based network linear program to a compact one.

The result is proved in the paper. This mission produces a machine-checked version of it and of its supporting lemmas; to the knowledge of the mission author no formalization of the Markov chain choice model exists. The definition layer (the model, the (Balance) solution, H\mathcal HH and (Dual)) is the first formal encoding of this choice model and is shared, with the same encoding, by missions II–IV.

Difficulty

The obvious route, comparing ∑jPj,Srj\sum_jP_{j,S}r_j∑j​Pj,S​rj​ across offer sets directly, fails because Pj,SP_{j,S}Pj,S​ is defined only implicitly through a linear system whose coefficient matrix changes with SSS; there is no closed-form expression that can be compared across offer sets, and enumerating the 2n2^n2n sets is exponential. The connection to linear programming needs an exact correspondence between the vertices of H\mathcal HH and the (Balance) solutions, which is a statement about polyhedra, not about Markov chains. Even well-posedness is not free: existence, uniqueness and nonnegativity of (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) depend on the row sums ∑iρj,i\sum_i\rho_{j,i}∑i​ρj,i​ being strictly below one. Mathlib has extreme points of convex sets but no ready-made theory of vertices of polyhedra or of linear programming duality in this form.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0-based), offer sets are Finset (Fin n) (the paper's S⊂NS\subset NS⊂N is non-strict inclusion, so every subset including ∅\emptyset∅ and NNN is an offer set), and rho j i is ρj,i\rho_{j,i}ρj,i​, the transition from jjj to iii. The model structure carries the paper's standing assumptions λj>0\lambda_j>0λj​>0 and ∑iρj,i<1\sum_i\rho_{j,i}<1∑i​ρj,i​<1 (p. 1325) and the implicit nonnegativity ρj,i≥0\rho_{j,i}\ge0ρj,i​≥0. Revenues are arbitrary reals with no sign assumption. R2n\mathbb R^{2n}R2n is (Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin n → ℝ), and extreme points are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ.

The pair (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) is a solution of (Balance) chosen by Classical.epsilon; milestone 1 states that it satisfies (Balance), is nonnegative and equals every solution, so all statements are about the paper's (PS,RS)(P_S,R_S)(PS​,RS​) and not about a junk value. Every optimum (of (Assortment), of the linear program over H\mathcal HH, of (Dual)) is stated as "feasible and at least as good as every feasible point", never through sSup or sInf. The goal is stated for every optimal v^\hat vv^ of (Dual), which is what the proof uses; uniqueness of v^\hat vv^ is neither assumed nor claimed. Replacing the hypothesis "v^\hat vv^ optimal for (Dual)" by "v^\hat vv^ feasible for (Dual)" would make the statement false, and an existential over v^\hat vv^ would weaken it; neither is the target.

No hypothesis beyond the paper's is added. Two printed index slips on pp. 1325–1326 (a garbled sum in the discussion after (Balance), and ∑iρi,jz^j\sum_i\rho_{i,j}\hat z_j∑i​ρi,j​z^j​ for ∑iρi,jz^i\sum_i\rho_{i,j}\hat z_i∑i​ρi,j​z^i​ in the proof of Lemma 1) are not part of any statement here.

Welcome contributions: the existence and uniqueness of (Balance) solutions via Neumann series for substochastic matrices, a characterization of vertices of polyhedra given by equality constraints and nonnegativity, and a strong duality statement usable for this primal–dual pair. These are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue Management Under the Markov Chain Choice Model, Operations Research 65(5):1322–1342, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Operations Research 64(4):886–905, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem IV: Insertion Heuristics Can Return Poor k-Optimal ToursResearch Paper

Motivation

Insertion heuristics build a traveling salesman tour one city at a time: start from a single city, and at each step choose a city not yet on the subtour and splice it into the subtour where it lengthens the subtour least. Local search heuristics start from a tour and repeatedly replace a few of its edges by others while this shortens the tour. Both families are standard in practice, and a natural engineering idea is to combine them: run an insertion heuristic, then polish the result by local search. The question this mission formalizes is whether local optimality of the insertion tour certifies anything about its quality.

Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis (SIAM J. Comput. 6(3), 1977) answered this for graphs satisfying the triangle inequality. Their §4 proves that nearest and cheapest insertion always return a tour of length at most 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) times the optimal length, and their Theorem 5 shows this bound is attained. Their §7 then shows that the very tour attaining the bound is kkk-optimal for every k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4: no exchange of kkk edges shortens it. So the insertion bound is tight even for tours that local search with kkk-changes cannot improve.

Timeline, as far as this mission is concerned:

  • 1965: Lin (Bell System Tech. J. 44) defines kkk-optimal tours and uses 3-optimal local search.
  • 1973: Lin and Kernighan (Oper. Res. 21) generalize the edge-exchange neighbourhoods.
  • 1977: Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis prove the 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) upper bound for nearest and cheapest insertion (Theorem 4 and its corollary), its tightness for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 (Theorem 5), the existence of kkk-optimal tours with the same ratio (Theorem 6, stated for n≥8n\ge 8n≥8), and the Corollary combining the two.

Setting

A traveling salesman graph on nnn nodes is the node set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} with a distance d(i,j)≥0d(i,j)\ge 0d(i,j)≥0 that is symmetric and satisfies the triangle inequality d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)\le d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k). A tour is a Hamiltonian circuit; its length is the sum of its edge lengths; OPTIMAL is the least length of a tour. As in the paper, the identically zero distance is excluded, so OPTIMAL >0>0>0.

A subtour is a circuit on a subset of the nodes (a single node is a subtour without edges). For a subtour TTT and a node k∉Tk\notin Tk∈/T, TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is obtained by deleting an edge (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) of TTT minimizing d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)-d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y) and adding (x,k)(x,k)(x,k) and (k,y)(k,y)(k,y); COST(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is the resulting increase in length. An insertion method chooses nodes a0,a1,…,an−1a_0,a_1,\dots,a_{n-1}a0​,a1​,…,an−1​, starts from T1={a0}T_1=\{a_0\}T1​={a0​} and sets Ti+1=TOUR(Ti,ai)T_{i+1}=\mathrm{TOUR}(T_i,a_i)Ti+1​=TOUR(Ti​,ai​); INSERT is the length of TnT_nTn​. Nearest insertion chooses aia_iai​ minimizing d(Ti,x)=min⁡y∈Tid(y,x)d(T_i,x)=\min_{y\in T_i}d(y,x)d(Ti​,x)=miny∈Ti​​d(y,x) over x∉Tix\notin T_ix∈/Ti​; cheapest insertion chooses aia_iai​ minimizing COST(Ti,x)(T_i,x)(Ti​,x). Ties are broken arbitrarily.

A kkk-change of a tour deletes kkk of its edges and adds kkk other edges so that another tour is obtained. A tour is kkk-optimal if no kkk-change produces a strictly shorter tour.

The extremal instance is the circle (Nn,dn)(N_n,d_n)(Nn​,dn​): nnn cities equally spaced on a circular road, with dn(i,j)d_n(i,j)dn​(i,j) the smallest m≥0m\ge 0m≥0 with i−j≡mi-j\equiv mi−j≡m or j−i≡m(modn)j-i\equiv m \pmod nj−i≡m(modn). The insertion run of Theorem 5 inserts the cities in the order 1,2,…,n1,2,\dots,n1,2,…,n and produces the zig-zag tour TnT_nTn​: city 1, then the even cities in increasing order, then the odd cities in decreasing order.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Corollary to Theorem 6

For n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 and 4k≤n4k\le n4k≤n there is a traveling salesman graph with OPTIMAL >0>0>0 on which some run of nearest insertion, and some run of cheapest insertion, return a kkk-optimal tour with

INSERTOPTIMAL=2(1−1n).\frac{\mathrm{INSERT}}{\mathrm{OPTIMAL}}=2\left(1-\frac1n\right).OPTIMALINSERT​=2(1−n1​).

Milestones

  1. The insertion run on the circle: the subtours TiT_iTi​ and nodes ai=i+1a_i=i+1ai​=i+1 form an insertion run that obeys both the nearest and the cheapest rule (proof of Theorem 5).
  2. On the circle, TnT_nTn​ has length 2(n−1)2(n-1)2(n−1) and OPTIMAL =n=n=n (proof of Theorem 5).
  3. Theorem 5: for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 there is a graph with INSERT/OPTIMAL =2(1−1/n)=2(1-1/n)=2(1−1/n) for both methods.
  4. Equation (7.4): the length of a tour of the circle is the sum over unit edges eee of COUNT(e,T)(e,T)(e,T), the number of times eee is traversed when each tour edge is replaced by a shortest arc.
  5. Every tour of the circle is odd or even (all counts of one parity), eq. (7.5).
  6. TnT_nTn​ is the shortest even tour, so every tour shorter than TnT_nTn​ is odd.
  7. TnT_nTn​ is kkk-optimal for every k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4.
  8. Theorem 6: for n≥8n\ge 8n≥8 there is a graph with a tour that is kkk-optimal for all k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4 and has LOCALOPT/OPTIMAL =2(1−1/n)=2(1-1/n)=2(1−1/n).

Significance

The result. The Corollary shows that the 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) worst-case guarantee of nearest and cheapest insertion cannot be improved by requiring that the returned tour survive kkk-change local search, for kkk up to a quarter of the number of cities. Theorem 6 says more generally that kkk-optimality with k≤n/4k\le n/4k≤n/4 does not bound the ratio to the optimum below 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n). Together with the paper's upper bound, the insertion guarantee is exact, and it stays exact after local polishing with small neighbourhoods.

Formalizing it. All statements are proved in the paper; none, to our knowledge, has been machine-checked. The platform has an upper bound for nearest insertion (SupplyChainTheory, Theorem 10.7, ratio at most 2) but no tightness example and no notion of kkk-optimality. This mission produces a reusable definition of kkk-changes against arbitrary tours, the circle metric, and the parity-counting argument on a cycle, and it supplies the calculations the paper omits ("We omit these calculations but note that they require the assumption n≥6n\ge 6n≥6").

Difficulty

Two steps carry the weight. First, the omitted calculations for the insertion run: at each stage one must show that inserting aia_iai​ between i−1i-1i−1 and iii minimizes the insertion increase over every edge of the zig-zag subtour, and that no other outside city can be inserted for less than 2; the claim fails for n=4n=4n=4 and n=5n=5n=5, so the verification must use n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 in an essential way. Second, kkk-optimality is a statement about every tour at edge difference kkk, not about 2-opt segment reversals or any specific move family. A search over moves of a special form does not establish it; the argument must bound the length of an arbitrary tour at edge difference kkk from below.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n, so the paper's node mmm is index m−1m-1m−1 and ai=i+1a_i=i+1ai​=i+1 is index iii; subtour indices stay 1-based (T1=[a0]T_1=[a_0]T1​=[a0​], approximation TnT_nTn​). A distance is d : Fin n → Fin n → ℝ with the structure IsTSPDist (symmetric, nonnegative, triangle inequality, and d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0; the last is a normalization absent from the paper that changes no length). A tour is an Equiv.Perm (Fin n), a subtour a list read cyclically; OPTIMAL is Finset.univ.inf' over permutations, the true minimum. TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is insertion at a position minimizing the new length; COST is a minimum over positions; the nearest-insertion distance (4.1) takes values in WithTop ℝ, so no junk value arises. kkk-optimality compares the tour with every permutation whose edge set (unordered pairs) misses exactly kkk of the tour's edges. Ratios are multiplied out.

COUNT(e,T)(e,T)(e,T) needs a choice of shortest arc for antipodal pairs when nnn is even; the formalization takes the arc through min⁡(x,y),…,max⁡(x,y)\min(x,y),\dots,\max(x,y)min(x,y),…,max(x,y). The paper's argument does not depend on this choice.

Deviations from the printed text: the Corollary is stated for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6 (the printed statement says only 4k≤n4k\le n4k≤n, but its proof uses the example of Theorem 5, which exists for n≥6n\ge 6n≥6; for k=0k=0k=0, n=3n=3n=3 the printed statement is false). Theorem 6 keeps its printed n≥8n\ge 8n≥8. In the proof of Theorem 5 the paper writes "(4.2) holds" where the cheapest-insertion condition (4.3) is meant; the formal statement uses (4.3).

The existence statements carry OPTIMAL >0>0>0, the paper's standing assumption (1.1). Without it, the zero distance would make every length zero and every tour kkk-optimal, which would satisfy the ratio equations trivially; that formalization is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular the omitted insertion calculations and the parity lemma, and reusable lemmas on cyclic lists and edge sets of permutations.

Selected references

  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns, P. M. Lewis II, An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem, SIAM J. Comput. 6(3):563–581, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • S. Lin, Computer solutions of the traveling salesman problem, Bell System Tech. J. 44:2245–2269, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1965.tb04146.x
  • S. Lin, B. W. Kernighan, An effective heuristic algorithm for the traveling-salesman problem, Oper. Res. 21(2):498–516, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.2.498
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Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders III: A Greedy Price-Update Algorithm Is a 2-Approximation for XOS BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a set of mmm items is sold to nnn bidders who value bundles of items rather than single items. Spectrum auctions, procurement of transportation lanes and the allocation of cloud resources all have this form, and the central algorithmic question is how to allocate the items so as to maximize the social welfare, the sum of the bidders' values for what they receive. Even to describe a general valuation takes 2m2^m2m numbers, so algorithms access the bidders through queries, and the achievable approximation depends on the class of valuations allowed.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010) study bidders without complementarities. For the class of XOS valuations, maxima of additive valuations, which strictly contains the submodular valuations, they give LP-based algorithms and, in §3.3, a purely combinatorial algorithm: bidders arrive one at a time, take their demanded bundle at the current item prices, and raise the prices of what they took. Its analysis charges the welfare of any allocation to the item prices the algorithm sets, an argument that uses only the demand and XOS oracles.

Setting

The items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and the bidders 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n.

  • An additive valuation (a clause) www assigns nonnegative values w(1),…,w(m)w(1),\dots,w(m)w(1),…,w(m) to the items and w(S)=∑j∈Sw(j)w(S)=\sum_{j\in S}w(j)w(S)=∑j∈S​w(j) to a bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M.
  • An XOS valuation vvv is given by a nonempty finite set of clauses {w1,…,wt}\{w_1,\dots,w_t\}{w1​,…,wt​} (its XOS expression) through v(S)=max⁡kwk(S)v(S)=\max_k w_k(S)v(S)=maxk​wk​(S). A clause wkw_kwk​ with wk(S)=v(S)w_k(S)=v(S)wk​(S)=v(S) is a maximizing clause for SSS. Every XOS valuation is normalized, v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, and monotone.
  • An allocation is a tuple of pairwise disjoint bundles O1,…,OnO_1,\dots,O_nO1​,…,On​; items may stay unallocated. Its welfare is ∑ivi(Oi)\sum_i v_i(O_i)∑i​vi​(Oi​).
  • A demand oracle for bidder iii answers, given item prices p∈Rmp\in\mathbb R^mp∈Rm, a bundle maximizing vi(T)−∑j∈Tpjv_i(T)-\sum_{j\in T}p_jvi​(T)−∑j∈T​pj​. An XOS oracle answers, given a bundle SSS, a maximizing clause for SSS in viv_ivi​.

The greedy price-update algorithm. Start with all bundles empty and all prices pj=0p_j=0pj​=0. For i=1,…,ni=1,\dots,ni=1,…,n: let SiS_iSi​ be bidder iii's demand at the current prices; remove the items of SiS_iSi​ from the bundles of the earlier bidders; let qiq^iqi be the maximizing clause for SiS_iSi​ in viv_ivi​; set pj=qjip_j=q^i_jpj​=qji​ for j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​. Write pkp^kpk for the prices after stage kkk (p0=0p^0=0p0=0), pk(T)=∑j∈Tpjkp^k(T)=\sum_{j\in T}p^k_jpk(T)=∑j∈T​pjk​, and A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ for the final bundles.

In the Lean development these objects are XOSExpr, XOSExpr.val, IsAllocation, welfare, IsDemandOracle, IsXOSOracle, greedyState, greedyPrices and greedyAlloc in the namespace ComplementFreeCA.XOSGreedy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3

For XOS valuations v1,…,vnv_1,\dots,v_nv1​,…,vn​, every demand oracle and every XOS oracle, and every allocation O1,…,OnO_1,\dots,O_nO1​,…,On​,

∑i=1nvi(Oi)  ≤  2∑i=1nvi(Ai).\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(O_i)\;\le\;2\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(A_i).i=1∑n​vi​(Oi​)≤2i=1∑n​vi​(Ai​).

The comparison with every allocation is the paper's comparison with the optimal allocation.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.4. The final prices are paid for by the algorithm's welfare:
pn(M)≤∑ivi(Ai).p^n(M)\le\sum_i v_i(A_i).pn(M)≤i∑​vi​(Ai​).
  1. Lemma 3.5. Prices never decrease: pjk≤pjk′p^k_j\le p^{k'}_jpjk​≤pjk′​ for all items jjj and stages k≤k′k\le k'k≤k′.
  2. Lemma 3.6. For every allocation OOO,
∑ivi(Oi)≤2 pn(M).\sum_i v_i(O_i)\le 2\,p^n(M).i∑​vi​(Oi​)≤2pn(M).

Three further statements are included without being milestones: the output A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ is an allocation (used implicitly by the paper); the first sentence of the proof of Lemma 3.6, that with Δi=pi(M)−pi−1(M)\Delta^i=p^i(M)-p^{i-1}(M)Δi=pi(M)−pi−1(M) one has Δi=max⁡T⊆M(vi(T)−pi−1(T))\Delta^i=\max_{T\subseteq M}\bigl(v_i(T)-p^{i-1}(T)\bigr)Δi=maxT⊆M​(vi​(T)−pi−1(T)); and the factor 222 is attained on the paper's two-item, two-bidder example (p. 9).

Significance

Theorem 3.3 shows that a factor-2 approximation of the optimal welfare for XOS bidders needs no linear program: one pass over the bidders, one demand query and one XOS query each. The paper's LP-based algorithm of §3.2 attains the better ratio e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1), and Theorem 4.1 of the paper shows that for the larger class of complement-free bidders no (2−ϵ)(2-\epsilon)(2−ϵ)-approximation is possible with polynomial communication.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces a formal model of XOS valuations, demand and XOS oracles and the greedy run that is reusable for other price-based arguments, and a formal proof of the guarantee for every tie-breaking in both oracles.

Difficulty

The argument is elementary, but its bookkeeping is where a formal proof can go wrong. Items move between bidders: an item taken from an earlier bidder in step (b) is re-priced in step (d), and every priced item lies in exactly one final bundle. Lemma 3.4 needs this invariant across all nnn stages, together with the fact that a maximizing clause for the demanded set bounds viv_ivi​ on every subset, which holds because it is a clause of viv_ivi​ itself, not merely an additive function agreeing with viv_ivi​ on SiS_iSi​. Lemma 3.5 is a contradiction argument using optimality of the demand; Lemma 3.6 telescopes the price increases and needs prices to stay nonnegative. The argument must hold for arbitrary oracle answers, so no canonical demand can be assumed.

Formalization scope

  • Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), values in ℝ. An XOS valuation is represented by its expression: a nonempty Finset (Fin m → ℝ) of clauses with nonnegative entries, evaluated with Finset.sup'. The paper's standing assumptions, normalized and monotone valuations (p. 1), hold automatically in this representation.
  • The oracles are function parameters dem : Fin n → (Fin m → ℝ) → Finset (Fin m) and cl : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → (Fin m → ℝ) with hypotheses IsDemandOracle and IsXOSOracle; every theorem holds for every such pair, so no tie-breaking rule is fixed.
  • The run is a recursion on the stage: stage k+1k+1k+1 processes the 0-based bidder kkk, i.e. the paper's bidder k+1k+1k+1; after stage nnn the state is constant.
  • The paper's goal compares with the optimal allocation; the Lean goal compares with every allocation, which is equivalent and avoids an argmax. Stating the bound against one particular allocation, or against the algorithm's own output, would be trivial and is excluded.
  • There are no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) constants: the factor 222 is the paper's.
  • Printed slip: the model on p. 1 writes an allocation as S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​; it is one bundle per bidder, S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​.
  • Out of scope: running time, the cost of simulating oracles (Proposition 2.1), and communication lower bounds.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones and of the goal, and reusable lemmas on the invariant that every priced item lies in exactly one final bundle.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities, Games and Economic Behavior 55(2):270–296, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006
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Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders II: Clause-Based Randomized Rounding for XOS BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers mmm indivisible items to nnn bidders, each of whom values bundles of items rather than single items. Allocating the items so as to maximize the total value (the social welfare) is the central optimization problem of the area: it models spectrum auctions, procurement and resource allocation, and it is NP-hard and hard to approximate for general valuations. A large literature therefore studies restricted classes of valuations without complementarities. Among them the class XOS (valuations that are a maximum of additive valuations, also called fractionally subadditive) sits strictly between submodular and subadditive valuations and has become a standard benchmark class in algorithmic game theory.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010) gave, among other results, a randomized algorithm that approximates the optimal welfare for XOS bidders within a factor 1/(1−(1−1/n)n)1/(1-(1-1/n)^n)1/(1−(1−1/n)n), which is at most e/(e−1)≈1.582e/(e-1)\approx 1.582e/(e−1)≈1.582. The algorithm rounds the standard LP relaxation and resolves conflicts between bidders using the XOS structure. This mission formalizes that guarantee (Theorem 3.2 of the paper).

A short timeline: Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan (EC 2001) introduced the XOS terminology and a 2-approximation for submodular bidders; the conference version of the present paper (STOC 2005) gave the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) bound for XOS with demand and XOS oracles; Feige (STOC 2006) extended the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) ratio to XOS bidders with demand oracles only and gave a 2-approximation for subadditive bidders.

Setting

Items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and bidders are N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} with n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Bidder iii has a valuation viv_ivi​ assigning a real number vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) to every bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. An allocation is a tuple (O1,…,On)(O_1,\dots,O_n)(O1​,…,On​) of pairwise disjoint bundles; its welfare is ∑ivi(Oi)\sum_i v_i(O_i)∑i​vi​(Oi​).

A clause is an additive valuation www given by nonnegative item values w1,…,wmw_1,\dots,w_mw1​,…,wm​, with w(S)=∑j∈Swjw(S)=\sum_{j\in S}w_jw(S)=∑j∈S​wj​. A valuation vvv is XOS if there is a nonempty finite set WWW of clauses with

v(S)=max⁡w∈W ∑j∈Swj(S⊆M).v(S)=\max_{w\in W}\ \sum_{j\in S}w_j\qquad(S\subseteq M).v(S)=w∈Wmax​ j∈S∑​wj​(S⊆M).

A clause of WWW attaining the maximum for SSS is a maximizing clause for SSS in vvv; an XOS oracle returns one (arbitrarily, if several attain it).

The LP relaxation has a variable xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ for every bidder iii and bundle SSS and asks to maximize OPT∗=∑i,Sxi,Svi(S)\mathrm{OPT}^*=\sum_{i,S}x_{i,S}v_i(S)OPT∗=∑i,S​xi,S​vi​(S) subject to ∑i∑S∋jxi,S≤1\sum_{i}\sum_{S\ni j}x_{i,S}\le1∑i​∑S∋j​xi,S​≤1 for each item jjj, ∑Sxi,S≤1\sum_S x_{i,S}\le1∑S​xi,S​≤1 for each bidder iii, and xi,S≥0x_{i,S}\ge0xi,S​≥0.

Randomized rounding draws a preallocation S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​: independently for each bidder iii, bundle SSS is chosen with probability xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ and the empty bundle with the remaining probability 1−∑Sxi,S1-\sum_S x_{i,S}1−∑S​xi,S​. The preallocation can give an item to several bidders.

The algorithm of §3.2: (i) draw a preallocation from an optimal LP solution xxx; (ii) let pi=(p1i,…,pmi)p^i=(p^i_1,\dots,p^i_m)pi=(p1i​,…,pmi​) be the maximizing clause for SiS_iSi​ in viv_ivi​; (iii) give each item jjj to a bidder iii with pji≥pji′p^i_j\ge p^{i'}_jpji​≥pji′​ for all i′i'i′. Write ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG for the welfare of the resulting allocation.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

For every XOS profile, every optimal LP solution xxx, every choice of maximizing clauses, every tie-breaking in step (iii) and every allocation OOO,

(1−(1−1n)n)∑ivi(Oi) ≤ E[ALG].\Big(1-\Big(1-\frac1n\Big)^n\Big)\sum_i v_i(O_i)\ \le\ \mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}].(1−(1−n1​)n)i∑​vi​(Oi​) ≤ E[ALG].

Milestones

  1. ∑ivi(Oi)≤OPT∗\sum_i v_i(O_i)\le\mathrm{OPT}^*∑i​vi​(Oi​)≤OPT∗ for an optimal LP solution (step (i) of the proof of Theorem 3.1).
  2. Pointwise, ALG≥∑jQj\mathrm{ALG}\ge\sum_j Q_jALG≥∑j​Qj​ with Qj=max⁡ipjiQ_j=\max_i p^i_jQj​=maxi​pji​.
  3. Eq. (1): for 1≤k≤n1\le k\le n1≤k≤n and X1,…,Xk∈[0,1]X_1,\dots,X_k\in[0,1]X1​,…,Xk​∈[0,1] with ∑Xi≤1\sum X_i\le1∑Xi​≤1,
1−∏i≤k(1−Xi) ≥ 1−(1−∑Xik)k ≥ (1−(1−1k)k)∑Xi ≥ (1−(1−1n)n)∑Xi.1-\prod_{i\le k}(1-X_i)\ \ge\ 1-\Big(1-\tfrac{\sum X_i}{k}\Big)^k\ \ge\ \Big(1-\big(1-\tfrac1k\big)^k\Big)\sum X_i\ \ge\ \Big(1-\big(1-\tfrac1n\big)^n\Big)\sum X_i .1−i≤k∏​(1−Xi​) ≥ 1−(1−k∑Xi​​)k ≥ (1−(1−k1​)k)∑Xi​ ≥ (1−(1−n1​)n)∑Xi​.
  1. Lemma 3.3: E[Qj]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)∑i∑S∋jxi,S pj(i,S)\mathbb E[Q_j]\ge(1-(1-1/n)^n)\sum_i\sum_{S\ni j}x_{i,S}\,p^{(i,S)}_jE[Qj​]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)∑i​∑S∋j​xi,S​pj(i,S)​ for every feasible xxx.
  2. E[ALG]≥(1−(1−1/n)n) OPT∗(x)\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\ge(1-(1-1/n)^n)\,\mathrm{OPT}^*(x)E[ALG]≥(1−(1−1/n)n)OPT∗(x) for every feasible xxx.

Milestone 5 is stronger than the goal (it compares with the fractional value); the goal is stated against the integral optimum because that is what Theorem 3.2 asserts.

Significance

The bound 1−(1−1/n)n≥1−1/e1-(1-1/n)^n\ge1-1/e1−(1−1/n)n≥1−1/e is a constant-factor guarantee for a class that includes every submodular valuation, obtained from nothing more than the LP relaxation and the clause structure of XOS. It shows that the integrality gap of the configuration LP for XOS bidders is at most 1/(1−(1−1/n)n)1/(1-(1-1/n)^n)1/(1−(1−1/n)n), a fact reused in later work on welfare maximization, online allocation and posted-price mechanisms. The per-item analysis (Lemma 3.3 and Eq. (1)) is the same "1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e" correlation-gap argument that recurs in submodular maximization and prophet-inequality proofs.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces a Lean statement and proof of the guarantee with the randomness made explicit, a reusable model of the configuration LP and of randomized rounding over bundles, and a formal version of the inequality in Eq. (1), which is independently useful.

Difficulty

Each piece of the argument is short; the work is in the bookkeeping. The preallocation is infeasible, so welfare cannot be read off from the rounding directly; the proof reduces it to per-item quantities QjQ_jQj​ and then lower-bounds E[Qj]\mathbb E[Q_j]E[Qj​] by comparing with a different assignment of item jjj that is not the algorithm's. The expectation of that auxiliary assignment involves a product of probabilities over bidders ordered by a conditional expectation, and the final bound needs the calculus inequality of Eq. (1) together with a summation by parts. A naive attempt to bound E[ALG]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]E[ALG] bidder by bidder fails, because a bidder's received bundle is not contained in its preallocated bundle, and the clause values of other bidders decide what it receives.

Formalization scope

  • Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), valuations Finset (Fin m) → ℝ. XOS is stated through its expression: each viv_ivi​ comes with a nonempty finite clause set WiW_iWi​ of nonnegative clauses, and vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) is attained by a clause of WiW_iWi​ and bounded by all of them. Normalization and monotonicity, the paper's standing assumptions (p. 1), follow from this.
  • The LP has a variable for every bundle, including ∅\emptyset∅. "Optimal" is stated as feasible and not beaten by any feasible solution; existence of an optimum is not asserted.
  • The rounding is a finite product distribution over profiles σ:Fin n→\sigma:\mathrm{Fin}\,n\toσ:Finn→ bundles, with bidder iii's law qi(S)=xi,S+1[S=∅](1−∑Txi,T)q_i(S)=x_{i,S}+\mathbf 1[S=\emptyset](1-\sum_T x_{i,T})qi​(S)=xi,S​+1[S=∅](1−∑T​xi,T​); expectations are finite sums.
  • The XOS oracle is a function parameter with its specification, and step (iii) is any rule selecting a bidder with maximal clause value; every statement quantifies over all of them.
  • "Approximation" in Theorem 3.2 is read in expectation, as its proof establishes. There are no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) constants in this mission.
  • Printed slip: the display of Lemma 3.3 (and the identity for OPT∗\mathrm{OPT}^*OPT∗ before it) sums xi,Spj(i,S)x_{i,S}p^{(i,S)}_jxi,S​pj(i,S)​ over all (i,S)(i,S)(i,S); the proof's final line restricts to S∋jS\ni jS∋j, and the printed version is false. The Lean states Lemma 3.3 with S∋jS\ni jS∋j.
  • Running time, the ellipsoid method and oracle complexity are out of scope.
  • Ruled out as trivializing: dropping the LP constraints on xxx (the item constraint is what makes Eq. (1) apply), stating the bound for a fixed preallocation instead of the expectation, or allowing negative clause values.

A complete development needs finite product distributions over bundles, the AM–GM inequality, monotonicity of (1−1/k)k(1-1/k)^k(1−1/k)k, and a summation-by-parts argument. The LP and rounding model are reusable for the other randomized-rounding results of the paper; proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders, STOC 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060681
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities, EC 2001. https://doi.org/10.1145/501158.501161
  • U. Feige, On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive, STOC 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132540
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders I: LP Rounding for Subadditive BiddersResearch Paper

Motivation

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers mmm indivisible items to nnn bidders, each of whom values bundles of items rather than single items. Allocating the items to maximize total value is the basic welfare problem of spectrum auctions, procurement and resource allocation, and it is the running example of algorithmic mechanism design. For general valuations no polynomial-time algorithm achieves a ratio polynomially better than m\sqrt mm​ under standard assumptions, so positive results require restricting the valuations. The most natural restriction is complement freeness (subadditivity): a bundle is never worth more than the sum of its parts.

Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira (Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010; conference version STOC 2005) gave the first polynomial-time algorithms with sub-polynomial approximation ratios for complement-free bidders given demand oracles. This mission formalizes their Section 3.1 algorithm, which rounds the linear-programming relaxation of the auction and splits the resulting infeasible solution into feasible ones.

Timeline. Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan (2001) introduced the complement-free hierarchy and treated submodular bidders. The original version of the algorithm formalized here claimed an O(log⁡m)O(\log m)O(logm) ratio; Feige observed that the same algorithm achieves O(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)O(\log m/\log\log m)O(logm/loglogm) and that its ratio is at least Ω(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)\Omega(\sqrt{\log m/\log\log m})Ω(logm/loglogm​) (Feige, SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009). Feige then obtained a constant ratio (222) for subadditive bidders by a different rounding.

Setting

Items are M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\dots,m\}M={1,…,m} and bidders N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Bidder iii has a valuation viv_ivi​ assigning a real value vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) to each bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. Every valuation is normalized, vi(∅)=0v_i(\emptyset)=0vi​(∅)=0, and monotone, S⊆T⇒vi(S)≤vi(T)S\subseteq T\Rightarrow v_i(S)\le v_i(T)S⊆T⇒vi​(S)≤vi​(T). A valuation is complement free if v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T)v(S\cup T)\le v(S)+v(T)v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T) for all S,TS,TS,T. An allocation is a tuple (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) of pairwise disjoint bundles; its welfare is ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​), and OPTOPTOPT denotes the largest welfare.

The LP relaxation has a variable xi,S≥0x_{i,S}\ge0xi,S​≥0 for each bidder and bundle, with ∑i,S∋jxi,S≤1\sum_{i,S\ni j}x_{i,S}\le1∑i,S∋j​xi,S​≤1 for each item jjj and ∑Sxi,S≤1\sum_S x_{i,S}\le1∑S​xi,S​≤1 for each bidder iii; its objective is ∑i,Sxi,Svi(S)\sum_{i,S}x_{i,S}v_i(S)∑i,S​xi,S​vi​(S), with optimum OPT∗≥OPTOPT^*\ge OPTOPT∗≥OPT. Randomized rounding lets each bidder independently draw bundle SSS with probability xi,Sx_{i,S}xi,S​ and ∅\emptyset∅ with the remaining probability. The result, a preallocation, has expected welfare OPT∗OPT^*OPT∗ but may give an item to several bidders.

The algorithm takes k=⌊3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m⌋k=\lfloor 3\log m/\log\log m\rfloork=⌊3logm/loglogm⌋ and:

  1. rounds until the preallocation (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) has every item in at most kkk bundles and ∑ivi(Si)≥OPT∗/3\sum_i v_i(S_i)\ge OPT^*/3∑i​vi​(Si​)≥OPT∗/3;
  2. splits each SiS_iSi​ into layers SirS_i^rSir​, r=1,…,kr=1,\dots,kr=1,…,k, where SirS_i^rSir​ holds the items of SiS_iSi​ that appear in exactly r−1r-1r−1 of S1,…,Si−1S_1,\dots,S_{i-1}S1​,…,Si−1​;
  3. picks the layer index rrr maximizing ∑ivi(Sir)\sum_i v_i(S_i^r)∑i​vi​(Sir​) and sets Ti=SirT_i=S_i^rTi​=Sir​;
  4. if some bidder has vi(M)≥∑i′vi′(Ti′)v_i(M)\ge\sum_{i'}v_{i'}(T_{i'})vi​(M)≥∑i′​vi′​(Ti′​), gives that bidder everything instead.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1, with the explicit ratio

For all sufficiently large mmm, for normalized, monotone, complement-free valuations and an optimal LP solution xxx with value OPT∗OPT^*OPT∗:

  1. if OPT∗>3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*>3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗>3maxi​vi​(M), one rounding meets the two conditions of step 1 with probability >1/6>1/6>1/6;
  2. from any preallocation meeting them, every admissible run of steps 2–4 outputs an allocation with
∑ivi(outputi) ≥ OPT3k,k=⌊3log⁡mlog⁡log⁡m⌋;\sum_i v_i(\text{output}_i)\ \ge\ \frac{OPT}{3k},\qquad k=\Big\lfloor\frac{3\log m}{\log\log m}\Big\rfloor;i∑​vi​(outputi​) ≥ 3kOPT​,k=⌊loglogm3logm​⌋;
  1. if OPT∗≤3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*\le3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗≤3maxi​vi​(M), the bidder maximizing vi(M)v_i(M)vi​(M) alone achieves OPT/3OPT/3OPT/3.

Milestones

  • OPT≤OPT∗OPT\le OPT^*OPT≤OPT∗ (proof, step (i)).
  • The layers of each index form an allocation and partition each SiS_iSi​ (proof, step (ii)).
  • Complement freeness gives ∑rvi(Sir)≥vi(Si)\sum_r v_i(S_i^r)\ge v_i(S_i)∑r​vi​(Sir​)≥vi​(Si​), and the best layer has welfare ≥OPT∗/(3k)\ge OPT^*/(3k)≥OPT∗/(3k) (proof, step (iii)).
  • Lemma 3.1: independent Bernoulli variables with ∑ipi≤1\sum_i p_i\le1∑i​pi​≤1 exceed 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm with probability ≤1/m2\le1/m^2≤1/m2.
  • Lemma 3.2: for XXX a sum of independent [0,1][0,1][0,1] variables with mean μ\muμ, Pr⁡[∣X−μ∣≥α]≤μ/α2\Pr[|X-\mu|\ge\alpha]\le\mu/\alpha^2Pr[∣X−μ∣≥α]≤μ/α2.
  • §3.1.1: some item appears more than 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm times with probability ≤1/m\le1/m≤1/m; the preallocation's welfare falls below OPT∗/3OPT^*/3OPT∗/3 with probability <3/4<3/4<3/4.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 was among the first polynomial-time approximation guarantees for welfare maximization with general subadditive bidders, and its layering argument is the standard way to turn an LP solution that is feasible up to a factor kkk into a feasible allocation losing only a factor kkk for subadditive objectives. The same argument applies to the kkk-duplicates auction and reappears in later rounding schemes. Lemma 3.1 is the standard balls-in-bins tail bound behind every log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m\log m/\log\log mlogm/loglogm load estimate.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized, on this platform or in Mathlib, as far as searches show. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the algorithm's guarantee with an explicit constant 3k3k3k in place of O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), a precise statement of the probabilistic step, and reusable statements of two concentration inequalities for sums of independent bounded variables.

Difficulty

The combinatorial part (steps (ii) and (iii)) is short. The difficulty is in step (i). The rounding is a product distribution over bundles, while the count of an item is a sum over bidders of indicators that depend on each bidder's whole bundle; connecting the finite product law to independent Bernoulli variables, and then to Lemma 3.1, requires building the independence structure explicitly. Lemma 3.1 itself does not follow from a Chernoff bound with a fixed relative deviation: the threshold 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm grows with mmm while the mean stays at most 111, and the bound must hold uniformly in the number of variables, which a fixed-deviation Chernoff statement does not give. Finally, the event-BBB bound needs the preallocation's welfare as a sum of independent variables in [0,1][0,1][0,1], which requires rescaling by max⁡ivi(M)\max_i v_i(M)maxi​vi​(M) and monotonicity.

Formalization scope

Bidders are Fin n, items Fin m, bundles Finset (Fin m), valuations Finset (Fin m) → ℝ. Normalization and monotonicity, the paper's standing assumptions (p. 1), are hypotheses of the goal. log⁡\loglog is the natural logarithm; the paper does not fix a base. The rounding law is written as explicit finite sums over profiles σ:Fin n→Finset (Fin m)\sigma:\texttt{Fin } n\to\texttt{Finset (Fin } m)σ:Fin n→Finset (Fin m) with product weights, so independence across bidders is literal; Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 are stated measure-theoretically with Mathlib's iIndepFun.

Explicit constants and conventions that replace the paper's notation:

  • The ratio O(k)=O(log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m)O(k)=O(\log m/\log\log m)O(k)=O(logm/loglogm) is stated as 3k3k3k with k=⌊3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m⌋k=\lfloor3\log m/\log\log m\rfloork=⌊3logm/loglogm⌋, the constant the proof establishes (step (iii), p. 6). "Sufficiently large mmm" is an existential m0m_0m0​.
  • The w.l.o.g. scaling max⁡ivi(M)=1\max_i v_i(M)=1maxi​vi​(M)=1 and the split at OPT∗=3OPT^*=3OPT∗=3 become the scale-free split at OPT∗=3max⁡ivi(M)OPT^*=3\max_i v_i(M)OPT∗=3maxi​vi​(M).
  • The choice of rrr in step (iii) and of the bidder in step (iv) are universally quantified over all admissible choices.

Printed slips resolved in the statements:

  • Lemma 3.1 mixes nnn and mmm. Here the number of variables is arbitrary, "sufficiently large" refers to mmm, and ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1 is relaxed to ∑ipi≤1\sum_ip_i\le1∑i​pi​≤1, which is what the application uses.
  • The display after Lemma 3.1 writes the threshold log⁡m/(3log⁡log⁡m)\log m/(3\log\log m)logm/(3loglogm); the lemma's 3log⁡m/log⁡log⁡m3\log m/\log\log m3logm/loglogm is used.
  • "Pr⁡[∨jEj]<1/n\Pr[\vee_jE_j]<1/nPr[∨j​Ej​]<1/n" and "≤1/n+3/4\le 1/n+3/4≤1/n+3/4" should read 1/m1/m1/m.
  • The event BBB is defined without its sum; it means ∑ivi(Si)<OPT∗/3\sum_iv_i(S_i)<OPT^*/3∑i​vi​(Si​)<OPT∗/3.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the guarantee assumes the item-count bound (without it the layers do not cover the bundles), the probability statements assume an LP-feasible xxx, neither the layer index nor the step-(iv) bidder is fixed, and the ratio is the explicit 3k3k3k rather than an unspecified constant. Running time, the ellipsoid method and oracle complexity are out of scope. Contributions of general concentration lemmas for sums of independent bounded variables are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, M. Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(1):1–13, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0436
  • U. Feige, On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):122–142, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680977
  • B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, N. Nisan, Combinatorial Auctions with Decreasing Marginal Utilities, Games and Economic Behavior 55(2):270–296, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006
  • M. Mitzenmacher, E. Upfal, Probability and Computing, Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813603
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis VII: The L-Optimality Criterion and the Proximity TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Submodularity — the diminishing-returns property g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(p \vee q) + g(p \wedge q)g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q) on a lattice — is one of the most useful structural hypotheses in combinatorial optimization, underlying efficient algorithms for network flows, matroid theory, and set-function minimization. Chapter 7 studies L-convex functions: functions on the integer lattice ZV\mathbb Z^VZV that are submodular and linear along the all-ones direction. This is the "dual" notion, under the conjugacy developed later in the book, to chunk 06's M-convex functions, and it inherits the same strong minimization theory — a purely local optimality criterion and a proximity theorem with an explicit distance bound — while additionally supporting a genuinely new characterization with no M-convex counterpart: discrete midpoint convexity, the direct lattice analogue of the classical real-valued midpoint convexity condition. This mission formalizes the chapter's definitional theorem, its midpoint-convexity characterization, the L-optimality criterion, and the L-proximity theorem itself.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A function g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} with nonempty effective domain is an L-convex function if it satisfies (SBF[Z]): g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(p \vee q) + g(p \wedge q)g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q) for all p,qp, qp,q (∨,∧\vee, \wedge∨,∧ componentwise max/min), and (TRF[Z]): there is r∈Rr \in \mathbb Rr∈R with g(p+1)=g(p)+rg(p + \mathbf 1) = g(p) + rg(p+1)=g(p)+r for all ppp, where 1\mathbf 11 is the all-ones vector. An L♮^\natural♮-convex function is one whose lift to the extended ground set {0}∪V\{0\} \cup V{0}∪V is L-convex; equivalently (Theorem 7.1), ggg satisfies the translation-submodularity axiom (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]): g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1))g(p) + g(q) \ge g((p - \alpha\mathbf 1) \vee q) + g(p \wedge (q + \alpha\mathbf 1))g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1)) for all p,qp, qp,q and all nonnegative integers α\alphaα. Discrete midpoint convexity asks g(p)+g(q)≥g(⌈(p+q)/2⌉)+g(⌊(p+q)/2⌋)g(p) + g(q) \ge g(\lceil (p+q)/2 \rceil) + g(\lfloor (p+q)/2 \rfloor)g(p)+g(q)≥g(⌈(p+q)/2⌉)+g(⌊(p+q)/2⌋) componentwise. For α\alphaα a positive integer, a point satisfies scaled local optimality if g(pα)≤g(pα±αχY)g(p_\alpha) \le g(p_\alpha \pm \alpha \chi_Y)g(pα​)≤g(pα​±αχY​) for every Y⊆VY \subseteq VY⊆V.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.18 (the L-proximity theorem)

Assume α\alphaα is a positive integer and n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣. (1) If ggg is L-convex with g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1) for all ppp, and pα∈dom⁡gp_\alpha \in \operatorname{dom} gpα​∈domg satisfies g(pα)≤g(pα+αχY)g(p_\alpha) \le g(p_\alpha + \alpha\chi_Y)g(pα​)≤g(pα​+αχY​) for all Y⊆VY \subseteq VY⊆V, then arg⁡min⁡g≠∅\arg\min g \ne \emptysetargming=∅ and there is p∗∈arg⁡min⁡gp^* \in \arg\min gp∗∈argming with the componentwise bound

pα≤p∗≤pα+(n−1)(α−1)1.p_\alpha \le p^* \le p_\alpha + (n-1)(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1.pα​≤p∗≤pα​+(n−1)(α−1)1.

(2) If ggg is L♮^\natural♮-convex and pαp_\alphapα​ satisfies the two-sided version, then there is p∗p^*p∗ with pα−n(α−1)1≤p∗≤pα+n(α−1)1p_\alpha - n(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1 \le p^* \le p_\alpha + n(\alpha-1)\mathbf 1pα​−n(α−1)1≤p∗≤pα​+n(α−1)1. The bound is a genuine vector (lattice-order) inequality, not an ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞-norm bound — the form later chapters' applications need.

Milestones: Theorems 7.1, 7.7, 7.14

Theorem 7.1: L♮^\natural♮-convexity (defined via the lift) is equivalent to the direct translation-submodularity axiom. Theorem 7.7: this same class is also characterized by discrete midpoint convexity — a three-way equivalence with the approach property (L♮^\natural♮-APR[Z]) as a bridge — giving L-convexity a genuinely different, more geometric face than anything available on the M-convex side. Theorem 7.14 (the L-optimality criterion): global optimality reduces to a purely local check against the sign-pattern neighbors p±χYp \pm \chi_Yp±χY​, mirroring chunk 06's Theorem 6.26 but with the plain L-convex case additionally requiring the periodicity condition g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1).

Significance

The result itself. Discrete midpoint convexity (Theorem 7.7) is philosophically important: it shows the lattice-submodularity definition of L-convexity is not an arbitrary discretization choice but coincides exactly with the most direct discrete analogue of ordinary midpoint convexity, the classical characterization of convex functions via f((p+q)/2)≤(f(p)+f(q))/2f((p+q)/2) \le (f(p)+f(q))/2f((p+q)/2)≤(f(p)+f(q))/2. The L-optimality criterion and L-proximity theorem give L-convex minimization the same algorithmic footing as M-convex minimization (chunk 06): scaling algorithms for L-convex objectives — which arise naturally from network flow and submodular-function duality — inherit a provable, dimension-and-scale-explicit distance guarantee between a coarse-scale local optimum and the true minimizer.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for L-convex functions, discrete midpoint convexity, or the L-optimality/proximity theorems. This mission gives the first formal statement of these results, completing (alongside chunk 06's M-convex-function results) both halves of the exchange-axiom-based theory that chapter 8's conjugacy duality later unifies.

Difficulty

A natural shortcut, given the structural parallel to chunk 06, is to assume the L-proximity theorem's proof is a mechanical relabeling of the M-proximity theorem's proof. It is not: the M-convex proof (chunk 06) crucially uses the exchange axiom's additive four-term inequality to build a chain of strictly improving points, whereas the L-convex proof instead exploits (TRF[Z])'s periodicity directly — it reduces to the case pα=0p_\alpha = 0pα​=0 using translation invariance, then constructs a minimal (with respect to the lattice order) point among all sufficiently good solutions and shows this minimality, combined with submodularity (SBF[Z]), forces the componentwise bound. The vector (rather than norm) form of the conclusion is not cosmetic: it is exactly what this lattice-order argument naturally produces, and is the form needed by later chapters' applications.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} is (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ. Unlike chunk 06's M-convex axiom, (SBF[Z]), (TRF[Z]), and (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]) are stated for all of ZV\mathbb Z^VZV, not restricted to dom⁡g\operatorname{dom} gdomg, so no explicit import of chunk 05's L-convex-set vocabulary was needed for dom g's structure (unlike the corresponding note in chunk 06's BRIEF.md, which flagged the same concern for dom f). L♮^\natural♮-convexity is represented via an explicit lift to Option V, matching the book's own primary definition, with the direct axiom (SBF♮^\natural♮[Z]) kept as a separate object related to it by Theorem 7.1.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would convert its componentwise vector bound into an ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞-norm bound (losing the direction-of-approach information the vector form carries) or drop Part (1)'s periodicity hypothesis g(p)=g(p+1)g(p) = g(p+\mathbf 1)g(p)=g(p+1); neither is done here. Propositions establishing dom g as an L-convex set, the L/L♮^\natural♮ relationship (Theorem 7.3), the submodular-set-function embedding (Proposition 7.4), and several structural closure properties are cut from this mission's scope (see MODERATION_NOTES.md) but are natural targets for a follow-on mission or for chunk 09, which builds directly on this chunk's exchange-axiom vocabulary, mirroring chunks 06→07.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXIII: Directional Derivatives and Subdifferentials of M-Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

An M-convex function is defined on the integer lattice, but chapter 6's earlier results (companion missions 06-mconvex-functions-i, 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions) show it always extends to a genuine convex function on real space. Once that extension exists, every tool of classical convex analysis — directional derivatives, subdifferentials, positive homogeneity — becomes available, and the natural question is whether these classical objects remain combinatorially special when applied to an M-convex function's extension. This mission answers that question at its sharpest: the directional derivative of an M-convex function at any point is again a positively homogeneous M-convex function, its subdifferential is exactly the admissible-potential set of a distance function satisfying the triangle inequality, and this correspondence between positively homogeneous M-convex functions and triangle-inequality distance functions is itself a clean one-to-one correspondence. This closes the loop between chapters 4-5 (M-convex and L-convex sets, distance functions) and the continuous convex-analytic machinery chapter 8 needs for its duality theory.

Companion missions 06-mconvex-functions-i, 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, and 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions cover this chapter's optimality theory, algebraic toolkit, and convex-extensibility characterization. This mission builds the vocabulary those results also need (redeclared here, since sibling drafts cannot yet import one another) and proves the chapter's real-variable capstones: the transfer of M-convexity's basic operations, optimality criterion, and supermodularity to the polyhedral (real-variable) setting, the identification of positively homogeneous M-convex functions with distance functions satisfying the triangle inequality, and — this mission's goal — the full directional-derivative/subdifferential correspondence.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. A polyhedral convex function g:RV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:RV→R∪{+∞} is (polyhedral) M-convex if it satisfies the real-variable exchange axiom (M-EXC[R]): for x,y∈dom⁡Rgx,y \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} gx,y∈domR​g and u∈supp⁡+(x−y)u \in \operatorname{supp}^+(x-y)u∈supp+(x−y), some v∈supp⁡−(x−y)v \in \operatorname{supp}^-(x-y)v∈supp−(x−y) and α0>0\alpha_0 > 0α0​>0 make the exchange inequality hold on α∈[0,α0]\alpha \in [0,\alpha_0]α∈[0,α0​]; M♮-convex if its lift to one extra coordinate is M-convex. The directional derivative of ggg at x∈dom⁡Rgx \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} gx∈domR​g in direction ddd is g′(x;d)=inf⁡t>0(g(x+td)−g(x))/tg'(x;d) = \inf_{t>0} (g(x+td) - g(x))/tg′(x;d)=inft>0​(g(x+td)−g(x))/t. A function is positively homogeneous if g(tx)=t⋅g(x)g(tx) = t \cdot g(x)g(tx)=t⋅g(x) for all t>0t > 0t>0; write 0M[R→R]0M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[R→R] for the positively homogeneous polyhedral M-convex functions. A distance function γ\gammaγ satisfying the triangle inequality and its set of admissible potentials D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ) were introduced in chapter 5; the subdifferential ∂Rf(x)={p:f(y)−f(x)≥⟨p,y−x⟩ ∀y}\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x) = \{p : f(y) - f(x) \ge \langle p, y-x \rangle\ \forall y\}∂R​f(x)={p:f(y)−f(x)≥⟨p,y−x⟩ ∀y} generalizes this to any function fff at a point xxx in its domain.

Formalization targets

Goal: the directional-derivative/subdifferential correspondence

For f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R] and x∈dom⁡Rfx \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb R} fx∈domR​f, setting γf,x(u,v)=f′(x;−χu+χv)\gamma_{f,x}(u,v) = f'(x;-\chi_u+\chi_v)γf,x​(u,v)=f′(x;−χu​+χv​):

γf,x satisfies the triangle inequality,∂Rf(x)=D(γf,x)≠∅,f′(x;⋅)=γf,x^(⋅),\gamma_{f,x} \text{ satisfies the triangle inequality}, \quad \partial_{\mathbb R} f(x) = D(\gamma_{f,x}) \ne \emptyset, \quad f'(x;\cdot) = \widehat{\gamma_{f,x}}(\cdot),γf,x​ satisfies the triangle inequality,∂R​f(x)=D(γf,x​)=∅,f′(x;⋅)=γf,x​​(⋅),

with the analogous statement for f∈M[Z→R]f \in M[\mathbb Z \to \mathbb R]f∈M[Z→R] at an integer point xxx, using γf,x(u,v)=f(x−χu+χv)−f(x)\gamma_{f,x}(u,v) = f(x-\chi_u+\chi_v)-f(x)γf,x​(u,v)=f(x−χu​+χv​)−f(x) (Theorem 6.61). This is the weakest stable form: it identifies the subdifferential exactly, as a set, rather than bounding its size or complexity, and holds at every point of the domain uniformly.

Supporting structural targets

Ten further results build the real-variable toolkit and the positive-homogeneity correspondence this goal completes: the transfer of M♮-convexity, the basic operations, the optimality criterion, supermodularity, and weighted-minimizer polyhedrality to the real-variable setting (Theorems 6.48-6.52, Proposition 6.53), the identification of the classes 0M[Z∣R→R]0M[\mathbb Z|\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[Z∣R→R] and 0M[R→R]0M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]0M[R→R] and the compatibility of convex extension with positive homogeneity (Proposition 6.56), the two directions of the correspondence between positively homogeneous M-convex functions and triangle-inequality distance functions (Propositions 6.57-6.58, Theorem 6.59), and the fact that a directional derivative of an M-convex function is itself positively homogeneous and M-convex (Proposition 6.60).

Significance

Theorem 6.61 is the technical bridge that lets discrete convex analysis borrow the entire apparatus of classical convex duality: because the subdifferential of an M-convex function is always the admissible-potential set of a chapter-5 distance function, every fact already proved about D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ) (its polyhedral structure, its own L-convexity, its relationship to shortest paths) transfers immediately to subdifferentials of M-convex functions. This is exactly the mechanism the book calls out as essential for Chapter 8's separation theorem for M♮-convex functions. The 0M↔T0M \leftrightarrow T0M↔T correspondence (Theorem 6.59) is independently significant: it says the positively homogeneous special case of M-convex function theory — which is what directional derivatives of any M-convex function reduce to, by Proposition 6.60 — is exactly as rich as ordinary shortest-path distance function theory, no more and no less, so nothing new needs to be built to understand local behavior at a point.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of how the discrete exchange axiom interacts with directional differentiation and subgradients, a bridge chapter between the purely combinatorial theory of chapters 4-6 and the duality theory of chapter 8. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, extending the shared Lean vocabulary (MExchangeAxiomR, DirDeriv, GammaHat) the Discrete Convex Analysis series builds on; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to Theorem 6.61 would try to compute ∂Rf(x)\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)∂R​f(x) directly from the definition of subgradient and separately verify it happens to equal some D(γ)D(\gamma)D(γ); the book's actual proof instead derives the equality of sets from the M-optimality criterion (Theorem 6.52) applied pointwise: p∈∂Rf(x)p \in \partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)p∈∂R​f(x) is shown, via a chain of logical equivalences, to be exactly the condition defining D(γf,x)D(\gamma_{f,x})D(γf,x​), so no separate verification of polyhedrality or nonemptiness is needed beyond what Theorem 6.52 and Proposition 6.60 already supply. The genuine difficulty is upstream, in Proposition 6.60 itself: showing a directional derivative is M-convex requires exploiting the local validity of the identity f(x+d)−f(x)=f′(x;d)f(x+d)-f(x) = f'(x;d)f(x+d)−f(x)=f′(x;d) for small ∥d∥1\|d\|_1∥d∥1​ (Eq. (6.85)) and then extending the exchange property from that neighborhood to all of RV\mathbb R^VRV using positive homogeneity — a two-step argument with no single-step shortcut, since the exchange axiom's defining inequality is not obviously homogeneous-invariant on its own.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; real-domain functions are (V→ℝ)→WithTop ℝ. The directional derivative is built directly as an infimum of difference quotients over t>0t>0t>0, matching the book's own local characterization (Eq. (6.85)) without a separate limit construction. Positive homogeneity and the classes 0M[R→R]/0M[Z→R] are stated exactly as the book defines them (the latter via positive homogeneity of the convex extension, not of f itself, since f is undefined off Zⱽ). Theorems 6.49-6.50 restate 4 of their 8 operations (matching the identical scope decision for chunk 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions's Theorem 6.13); Theorem 6.61 omits the dual-integral refinement clauses for the M[R→R|Z]/ M[Z→Z] sub-classes. Both reductions are documented, not trivializing omissions — see Difficulty above and HARD.md/MODERATION_NOTES.md. No numeric constants are hard-coded anywhere in this mission. This mission's definitions are redeclared from chunks 06-mconvex-functions-i, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets (for the distance-function/admissible-potential vocabulary), 22-ch06b-mconvexfunctions, and 23-ch06c-mconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 6.60 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 (the polyhedral M-convex function theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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Convex OptimizationNumerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

The Relaxation Method for Linear Inequalities III: Reflexion in a Closed Bounded Convex Set Terminates or Ends in OscillationResearch Paper

Motivation

The relaxation method for a system of linear inequalities, introduced by Agmon and by Motzkin and Schoenberg in back-to-back papers of the Canadian Journal of Mathematics (1954), solves ∑jaijxj+bi≥0\sum_j a_{ij}x_j + b_i \ge 0∑j​aij​xj​+bi​≥0 by repeatedly moving a point towards, or across, the most violated half-space. It is the ancestor of the perceptron algorithm, of Kaczmarz-type projection methods, and of the method of alternating projections, all of which are still used in feasibility problems, tomography and machine learning.

Motzkin and Schoenberg's paper ends (Part IV, §§9–10) by asking whether the behaviour of the reflexion process — the relaxation step with factor λ=2\lambda = 2λ=2 — survives when the finite family of half-spaces is replaced by an infinite one. They answer this for one natural infinite family: all supporting half-spaces of a closed bounded convex set. This mission formalizes that answer, Theorem 3 of the paper.

Timeline of the thread this mission belongs to:

  • 1922 — Fejér observes that a sequence approaching every point of a set monotonically has useful convergence properties (Fejér, Math. Annalen 85, 1922).
  • 1954 — Agmon proves convergence of the relaxation method for 0<λ<20 < \lambda < 20<λ<2 (Agmon, Canad. J. Math. 6, 1954, pp. 382–392); Motzkin and Schoenberg prove finite termination of the reflexion method (λ=2\lambda = 2λ=2) for full-dimensional solution polytopes (Theorem 1), the oscillation behaviour in lower dimension (Theorem 2), and the convex-body version (Theorem 3) (Motzkin–Schoenberg 1954).

Setting

Let EnE_nEn​ be nnn-dimensional Euclidean space and let A⊆EnA \subseteq E_nA⊆En​ be a nonempty, closed, bounded, convex set. Its dimension rrr is the dimension of its affine span LrL_rLr​, the smallest flat containing AAA.

For p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A let qqq be the point of AAA nearest to ppp; it exists and is unique. The image of ppp with respect to AAA is

p1=F(p)=p+2(q−p),(3.1)p_1 = F(p) = p + 2(q - p), \qquad (3.1)p1​=F(p)=p+2(q−p),(3.1)

the reflexion of ppp through qqq. The reflexion process starts at p0∉Ap_0 \notin Ap0​∈/A and sets pν+1=F(pν)p_{\nu+1} = F(p_\nu)pν+1​=F(pν​) as long as pν∉Ap_\nu \notin Apν​∈/A (3.2). Either the process terminates with some pN∈Ap_N \in ApN​∈A, or it produces an infinite sequence of points outside AAA.

The family FFF of supporting half-spaces of AAA consists of the closed half-spaces H⊇AH \supseteq AH⊇A whose bounding hyperplane touches AAA. The paper observes that the half-space H0H_0H0​ through qqq normal to pqpqpq is the member of FFF farthest from ppp, so (3.1) is exactly the reflexion step of the relaxation method applied to the infinite family FFF.

A sequence {qν}\{q_\nu\}{qν​} of points outside AAA is Fejér-monotone with respect to AAA if qν≠qν+1q_\nu \ne q_{\nu+1}qν​=qν+1​ and ∣qν+1−a∣≤∣qν−a∣|q_{\nu+1} - a| \le |q_\nu - a|∣qν+1​−a∣≤∣qν​−a∣ for all a∈Aa \in Aa∈A. Two points u,vu, vu,v are symmetric with respect to a flat LLL if their midpoint lies in LLL and u−vu - vu−v is orthogonal to LLL.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 402)

For every nonempty closed bounded convex A⊆EnA \subseteq E_nA⊆En​ with affine span LrL_rLr​, every p0∉Ap_0 \notin Ap0​∈/A and every run {pν}\{p_\nu\}{pν​} of the reflexion process:

Case 1: r=n  ⟹  ∃N, pN∈A.\textbf{Case 1: } r = n \implies \exists N,\ p_N \in A.Case 1: r=n⟹∃N, pN​∈A. Case 2: r<n  ⟹  {p0∈Lr  ⟹  ∃N, pN∈A,p0∉Lr  ⟹  pν∉A ∀ν, and ∃ν0,u≠v symmetric w.r.t. Lr: {pν,pν+1}={u,v} ∀ν>ν0.\textbf{Case 2: } r < n \implies \begin{cases} p_0 \in L_r \implies \exists N,\ p_N \in A,\\[2pt] p_0 \notin L_r \implies p_\nu \notin A\ \forall \nu, \text{ and } \exists \nu_0, u \ne v \text{ symmetric w.r.t. } L_r:\ \{p_\nu, p_{\nu+1}\} = \{u, v\}\ \forall \nu > \nu_0. \end{cases}Case 2: r<n⟹{p0​∈Lr​⟹∃N, pN​∈A,p0​∈/Lr​⟹pν​∈/A ∀ν, and ∃ν0​,u=v symmetric w.r.t. Lr​: {pν​,pν+1​}={u,v} ∀ν>ν0​.​

No number of steps is fixed: termination is finite but not uniformly bounded.

Milestones (attack order)

  1. §9 — the half-space H0H_0H0​ belongs to FFF, maximizes dist⁡(p,H)\operatorname{dist}(p, H)dist(p,H) over FFF, and every farthest member of FFF yields the step (3.1).
  2. §10 — an infinite run of the reflexion process is Fejér-monotone with respect to AAA.
  3. Lemma 1, Case 1 — a sequence Fejér-monotone with respect to a set of dimension nnn converges to a point.
  4. §10 — the limit of an infinite run lies in AAA and on its boundary.
  5. Theorem 3, Case 1 — if r=nr = nr=n the process always terminates.
  6. §10 — orthogonal projection on a flat L⊇AL \supseteq AL⊇A commutes with the image map, and each step keeps the distance to LLL while switching sides.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 shows that the dichotomy proved in the paper for finitely many half-spaces — finite termination when the target is full-dimensional, eventual oscillation otherwise — holds for the infinite family of all supporting half-spaces of a convex body. Case 1 says that reflecting through the nearest point, a method that uses no information about AAA beyond metric projection, reaches a full-dimensional convex body in finitely many steps from any start. Case 2 says that for a lower-dimensional body the process detects this: the iterates settle into a two-cycle whose midpoint is a point of AAA, so a solution can be read off.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper (1954), with a short proof of Case 1 that relies on geometric intuition about normal cones near a boundary point. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. A complete development produces a verified finite-termination theorem for a projection method on general convex bodies, together with reusable facts about Fejér-monotone sequences and metric projections that recur throughout the analysis of projection algorithms.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Case 1 is: the run is Fejér-monotone, hence converges (Lemma 1), and its limit aaa lies on the boundary of AAA; then derive a contradiction. For a polytope (Theorem 1) the contradiction comes from finiteness: eventually every reflexion is in one of finitely many hyperplanes through aaa, which keeps the iterates on a sphere around aaa. For a convex body there are infinitely many supporting hyperplanes near aaa, and the iterates are reflected in a different one at every step; no finiteness argument is available. What replaces finiteness is an argument about how the supporting hyperplanes of AAA at boundary points near aaa are oriented, and the paper gives it only as an informal geometric sketch. Making this step rigorous is the main work of the mission.

Numerical experiments show that termination can take tens of thousands of steps near sharp corners of a polygon, so no bound on the number of steps in terms of the distance of p0p_0p0​ to AAA alone can be expected.

Formalization scope

  • Space. EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). AAA is a Set with four explicit hypotheses: A.Nonempty, IsClosed A, Convex ℝ A, Bornology.IsBounded A. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper ("of dimension rrr", "the point of AAA nearest to ppp").
  • The image as a relation. IsImage A p p₁ holds when p1=p+2(q−p)p_1 = p + 2(q - p)p1​=p+2(q−p) for a nearest point qqq of AAA; the nearest point is not chosen by a function. For closed convex nonempty AAA this relation is a function on EnE_nEn​. A run is any sequence with IsImage A (p ν) (p (ν+1)) whenever p ν ∉ A; values after entering AAA are unconstrained. Every statement quantifies over every run from every p0∉Ap_0 \notin Ap0​∈/A; a formalization that only asserts the existence of some terminating run is ruled out.
  • Dimension. LrL_rLr​ is affineSpan ℝ A; r=nr = nr=n is affineSpan ℝ A = ⊤, r<nr < nr<n is affineSpan ℝ A ≠ ⊤. No separate natural number rrr is introduced.
  • Symmetry. IsSymmetricWrt L u v: midpoint ℝ u v ∈ L and u - v orthogonal to L.direction. For r<n−1r < n - 1r<n−1 this is a point reflection through the foot of the perpendicular, not a reflection in a hyperplane. The goal also requires u≠vu \ne vu=v and strict alternation pν↔pν+1p_\nu \leftrightarrow p_{\nu+1}pν​↔pν+1​ for ν>ν0\nu > \nu_0ν>ν0​ (strict inequality, as printed).
  • Boundary is frontier A; distances to sets are Metric.infDist.
  • Generalizations recorded. Lemma 1, Case 1 is stated for an arbitrary set A⊆EnA \subseteq E_nA⊆En​ with full affine span (the paper states it for the polytope of (1.4) and applies it in §10 to a convex body). The projection milestone is stated for any flat L⊇AL \supseteq AL⊇A, not only after the paper's reduction to r=n−1r = n - 1r=n−1. The §9 milestone expresses "the reflexion process with respect to FFF amounts to (3.1)" as: every farthest member of FFF, with any nearest point on it, gives the same step.
  • Duplication. Case 1 appears both as a milestone and inside the goal, because the paper's proof of Case 2 cites Case 1. Solvers will need to transfer Case 1 from EnE_nEn​ to the flat LrL_rLr​ (an isometric copy of ErE_rEr​).
  • Infrastructure. Mathlib's metric projection onto complete convex sets (exists_norm_eq_iInf_of_complete_convex, norm_eq_iInf_iff_real_inner_le_zero) and EuclideanGeometry.orthogonalProjection cover the basic geometry. Normal cones of convex sets and their upper semicontinuity are not in Mathlib; a contribution there is reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of Case 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. S. Motzkin and I. J. Schoenberg, The relaxation method for linear inequalities, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 6 (1954), 393–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1954-038-x
  • S. Agmon, The relaxation method for linear inequalities, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 6 (1954), 382–392 (the companion paper in the same issue).
  • L. Fejér, Über die Lage der Nullstellen von Polynomen, die aus Minimumforderungen gewisser Art entspringen, Mathematische Annalen 85 (1922), 41–48.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XX: Perpetual American Options and Credit GrantingTextbook

Motivation

An American option may be exercised at any moment up to maturity, so pricing one is not an integration problem but a stopping problem: the holder must decide, at each date and in each state of the market, whether the payoff available now beats the option value of waiting. A perpetual American put pushes this to its limit — there is no maturity at all, so the horizon is unbounded and the problem has no terminal condition to induct backwards from. What replaces the terminal condition is a fixed point characterization, and the classical answer, going back to McKean (1965) and Merton (1973) in continuous time and to Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) in the binomial model, is that the price is the smallest superharmonic majorant of the payoff.

Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 11 (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011) derives this from their own general unbounded-horizon stopping theory rather than from stochastic analysis, and in the same chapter applies the bounded-horizon version to a problem from banking rather than trading: when should a bank cancel a credit line? The two halves share one mathematical shape — a stopping problem whose optimal policy turns out to be of threshold type — and this mission formalizes both, with the perpetual put as the goal.

Setting

The binomial model (§11.1). A stock moves from price xxx to xuxuxu with risk-neutral probability qqq and to xdxdxd with 1−q1-q1−q, where 0<d<u0 < d < u0<d<u, and the discount factor is β∈(0,1]\beta \in (0,1]β∈(0,1]. The defining relation of the risk-neutral measure,

βqu+β(1−q)d=1,\beta q u + \beta(1-q)d = 1,βqu+β(1−q)d=1,

is carried as a hypothesis of the model: it is what makes the discounted stock price a martingale, and the proofs use it directly.

The American put with strike KKK pays (K−x)+(K-x)^+(K−x)+ when exercised. With nnn periods to maturity its price satisfies the recursion J0(x)=(K−x)+J_0(x) = (K-x)^+J0​(x)=(K−x)+ and

Jn(x)=max⁡{(K−x)+, β(qJn−1(xu)+(1−q)Jn−1(xd))}=:TJn−1(x),J_n(x) = \max\Big\{(K-x)^+,\ \beta\big(q J_{n-1}(xu) + (1-q)J_{n-1}(xd)\big)\Big\} =: \mathcal{T}J_{n-1}(x),Jn​(x)=max{(K−x)+, β(qJn−1​(xu)+(1−q)Jn−1​(xd))}=:TJn−1​(x),

the maximum being "exercise now" against "hold". Proposition 11.1.2 describes the price πn(x):=JN−n(x)\pi_n(x) := J_{N-n}(x)πn​(x):=JN−n​(x) at time nnn of an option maturing at NNN: it is continuous in xxx, decreasing in nnn, and — the part that carries the argument — x↦πn(x)+xx \mapsto \pi_n(x) + xx↦πn​(x)+x is increasing, even though πn\pi_nπn​ itself decreases in xxx. That single reformulation, obtained by adding xxx to both sides of the recursion and using the risk-neutral relation, is what yields the threshold structure: there are exercise boundaries K=:xN∗≥xN−1∗≥⋯≥x0∗≥0K =: x_N^* \ge x_{N-1}^* \ge \dots \ge x_0^* \ge 0K=:xN∗​≥xN−1∗​≥⋯≥x0∗​≥0 with τ∗=inf⁡{n≤N∣Xn≤xn∗}\tau^* = \inf\{n \le N \mid X_n \le x_n^*\}τ∗=inf{n≤N∣Xn​≤xn∗​} optimal. Exercise when the stock falls far enough, and the boundary rises as maturity approaches.

The perpetual put (Theorem 11.1.3, the goal). With no expiration date the price at time zero is a supremum over all stopping times, τ≤∞\tau \le \inftyτ≤∞ included:

P(x):=sup⁡τ≤∞ExQ[βτ(K−Sτ)],P(x) := \sup_{\tau \le \infty} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}_x\big[\beta^\tau (K - S_\tau)\big],P(x):=τ≤∞sup​ExQ​[βτ(K−Sτ​)],

with the stopping reward set to zero on {τ=∞}\{\tau = \infty\}{τ=∞}. The theorem says four things: PPP is the limit of the finite-maturity prices JnJ_nJn​; PPP solves TP=P\mathcal{T}P = PTP=P and satisfies 0≤P≤K0 \le P \le K0≤P≤K; PPP is the smallest superharmonic function majorizing (K−x)+(K-x)^+(K−x)+; and, if the value Jf∗J_{f^*}Jf∗​ of the exercise-region policy dominates TJf∗\mathcal{T}J_{f^*}TJf∗​, then PPP equals that value and τ∗=inf⁡{n∣Xn∈E∗}\tau^* = \inf\{n \mid X_n \in E^*\}τ∗=inf{n∣Xn​∈E∗}, the hitting time of E∗={x∣P(x)=(K−x)+}E^* = \{x \mid P(x) = (K-x)^+\}E∗={x∣P(x)=(K−x)+}, is optimal.

The conditional in part d) is the book's own and is not decoration: without it the exercise region need not deliver an optimal stopping time, and the unconditional version is a different, false statement. The boundedness 0≤P≤K0 \le P \le K0≤P≤K in b) is likewise a genuine claim rather than a side remark — the fixed point equation alone admits other solutions, and it is boundedness together with minimality that pins PPP down among them.

Credit granting (§11.2). A bank holds a credit contract of maximal duration NNN. Each period it observes a rating class xnx_nxn​ evolving as a Markov process QXQ^XQX, and chooses to extend — earning c(x)c(x)c(x) — or to cancel, ending the contract. The value iteration is Jn(x)=max⁡{0, c(x)+β∫Jn−1 dQX(⋅∣x)}J_n(x) = \max\{0,\ c(x) + \beta\int J_{n-1}\,dQ^X(\cdot|x)\}Jn​(x)=max{0, c(x)+β∫Jn−1​dQX(⋅∣x)}. Under two structural assumptions — ccc increasing, and QXQ^XQX stochastically monotone, so that a better-rated borrower stays better-rated — Theorem 11.2.1 gives the same shape of answer as the option: cancel exactly when the rating falls below a threshold xn∗x_n^*xn∗​, and those thresholds rise as the remaining duration shortens, since a marginal borrower is no longer worth keeping when there is little time left to recover.

Theorem 11.2.2 repeats this when the borrower is not rated at all. The bank has only a prior μ0\mu_0μ0​ on the repayment probability and one signal per period; the state (s,n)(s,n)(s,n) records sss positive signals out of nnn, and the expected repayment probability is the posterior mean q(s,n)q(s,n)q(s,n). Monotonicity here is for the order of p. 342 — more positive signals and fewer negative ones — and not the coordinatewise order, under which the claim would be false: an extra signal that is negative makes the state worse.

What is being asked

Formalize Theorem 11.1.3 in full, all four parts: the limit identification, the fixed point equation with its bounds, the minimality among superharmonic majorants, and the conditional optimality of the exercise-region stopping time. The three milestones are Proposition 11.1.2, the finite-horizon put whose threshold structure the perpetual case specializes, and the two credit granting theorems, which run the same bounded-horizon argument on a different model.

The stopping-time apparatus is built rather than assumed: the stock path, the law Q\mathbb{Q}Q pinned by its finite-dimensional distributions, stopping times valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb{N}\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, and the reward vanishing at ∞\infty∞. Part a) of the goal is the identification of the supremum with lim⁡nJn\lim_n J_nlimn​Jn​, so carrying PPP as an abstract function would make the theorem vacuous.

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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems III: The Worst-Case Ratio of the Weighted Algorithm B2Research Paper

Motivation

MAXIMUM SATISFIABILITY asks for a truth assignment satisfying as many clauses of a given set as possible. It was among the first NP-hard optimization problems for which an approximation algorithm came with a proven worst-case guarantee. In Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems (J. Comput. System Sci. 9, 1974, doi:10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9), David S. Johnson set up a framework for measuring such guarantees and analyzed two heuristics for the problem. The second of these, algorithm B2, weights each clause by 2−∣C∣2^{-|C|}2−∣C∣ and repeatedly sets a literal so that the heavier side is satisfied. On inputs whose clauses all have at least kkk literals, it satisfies at least a 1−2−k1 - 2^{-k}1−2−k fraction of the optimum.

B2 is the ancestor of a line of work on MAX-SAT approximation:

  • 1974. Johnson proves the 2k/(2k−1)2^k/(2^k-1)2k/(2k−1) bound for B2 on MS(k) and the (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k bound for the unweighted greedy algorithm B1.
  • 1994. Goemans and Williamson (SIAM J. Discrete Math. 7) present Johnson's algorithm as the derandomization, by conditional expectations, of the uniformly random assignment, and combine it with LP rounding to obtain a 3/43/43/4-approximation.
  • 1999. Chen, Friesen and Zheng (JCSS 58) show that B2 is a 2/32/32/3-approximation on general inputs, sharper than the 1/21/21/2 that Johnson's bound gives at k=1k = 1k=1.

Setting

A literal is a variable xix_ixi​ or its negation xˉi\bar x_ixˉi​. A clause is a finite set of literals. A truth assignment is a set TTT of literals containing no pair {xi,xˉi}\{x_i, \bar x_i\}{xi​,xˉi​}; it satisfies a clause CCC when C∩T≠∅C \cap T \ne \emptysetC∩T=∅. An input is a finite set SSS of clauses, and S∗S^*S∗ is the largest ∣S′∣|S'|∣S′∣ over subsets S′⊆SS' \subseteq SS′⊆S satisfied by one truth assignment. MS(k) is the restriction to inputs in which every clause contains at least kkk distinct literals.

Algorithm B2 keeps a set SUB of satisfied clauses, a set LEFT of unsettled clauses, the literals LIT still available, and a weight w(C)w(C)w(C) per clause, starting from w(C)=2−∣C∣w(C) = 2^{-|C|}w(C)=2−∣C∣, SUB=∅\mathrm{SUB} = \emptysetSUB=∅, LEFT=S\mathrm{LEFT} = SLEFT=S. While some literal of LIT occurs in a clause of LEFT, it picks any such literal yyy. Let YT be the clauses of LEFT containing yyy and YF those containing yˉ\bar yyˉ​. If ∑YTw≥∑YFw\sum_{\mathrm{YT}} w \ge \sum_{\mathrm{YF}} w∑YT​w≥∑YF​w, it makes yyy true, moves YT to SUB and doubles the weight of each clause of YF; otherwise it does the symmetric move with yˉ\bar yyˉ​. Finally it removes y,yˉy, \bar yy,yˉ​ from LIT. When no literal of LIT remains in LEFT it returns SUB.

The choice of yyy is free, so several outputs may be choosable on one input. Johnson measures the algorithm by its worst choosable output, through the ratio r(B2,S)=S∗/∣SUB∣r(B2, S) = S^*/|\mathrm{SUB}|r(B2,S)=S∗/∣SUB∣ and its maximum R[B2,MS(k)](n)R[B2, \mathrm{MS}(k)](n)R[B2,MS(k)](n) over inputs of size at most nnn.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, with the equality range corrected

For every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, every SSS in MS(k) and every SUB choosable by B2 on SSS,

(2k−1) S∗≤2k ∣SUB∣,(2^k - 1)\,S^* \le 2^k\,|\mathrm{SUB}|,(2k−1)S∗≤2k∣SUB∣,

and for every k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 there are SSS in MS(k) and a choosable SUB with ∣SUB∣>0|\mathrm{SUB}| > 0∣SUB∣>0 and

(2k−1) S∗=2k ∣SUB∣.(2^k - 1)\,S^* = 2^k\,|\mathrm{SUB}|.(2k−1)S∗=2k∣SUB∣.

The paper states equality "for all sufficiently large nnn" for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1. At k=1k = 1k=1 this is false: the ratio 2 would require every clause to be a unit clause and all clauses to be jointly satisfiable, and on such inputs B2 satisfies everything. The goal therefore asserts tightness for k≥2k \ge 2k≥2. A separate item states that at k=1k = 1k=1 the ratio is never attained.

Milestones

  1. Initially, the total weight of LEFT is at most ∣S∣/2k|S|/2^k∣S∣/2k.
  2. No iteration increases the total weight of LEFT, so at halting it is still at most ∣S∣/2k|S|/2^k∣S∣/2k.
  3. At halting, every clause left in LEFT has weight exactly 111.
  4. At halting, ∣LEFT∣≤∣S∣/2k|\mathrm{LEFT}| \le |S|/2^k∣LEFT∣≤∣S∣/2k and ∣SUB∣≥∣S∣(1−2−k)|\mathrm{SUB}| \ge |S|(1 - 2^{-k})∣SUB∣≥∣S∣(1−2−k).
  5. The eight-clause instance for k=3k = 3k=3 has S∗=8S^* = 8S∗=8 and admits a choosable output of size 777.

Significance

The bound 1−2−k1 - 2^{-k}1−2−k is exactly the expected fraction of clauses a uniformly random assignment satisfies on MS(k). B2 attains it deterministically, and the proof bounds ∣SUB∣|\mathrm{SUB}|∣SUB∣ against ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ rather than against S∗S^*S∗, a feature the paper points out. For k=3k = 3k=3 the constant 8/78/78/7 was later shown by Håstad (2001) to be optimal among polynomial-time algorithms unless P = NP, so the guarantee of this 1974 algorithm is best possible for MAX-E3-SAT.

Formalizing the result produces a machine-checked potential-function argument for a nondeterministic algorithm: the invariant links each clause's weight to how many of its literals have been removed. The mission also records a correction to the printed statement at k=1k = 1k=1. The paper's proof is complete; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists.

Difficulty

The obvious argument follows the counting proof for algorithm B1 and compares clauses saved with clauses wounded in each step. It fails here: B2 can wound more clauses than it saves in a step, and the bound holds only in the weighted sense. The weight of a clause is not a static quantity. It is 2−∣C∣2^{-|C|}2−∣C∣ times 222 to the number of its literals already discarded, and this invariant must be carried through every step, including clauses that contain both yyy and yˉ\bar yyˉ​. Tightness needs an explicit input and an explicit adversarial run that exploits the tie in Step 4, and then a proof that every assignment of the remaining variables kills exactly one clause.

Formalization scope

  • Literals and clauses. A literal is a pair (variable index in N\mathbb NN, sign). Clauses are Finsets of literals, and an input is a Finset of clauses, so there are no duplicate clauses. Truth assignments are partial and consistent. S∗S^*S∗ is a maximum over the finite, nonempty family of satisfiable subsets.
  • B2 as a relation. B2 is a nondeterministic run relation, and "choosable" means reachable by finitely many steps from the initial state and halting. Step 3 allows a literal of either sign. The tie in Step 4 goes to yyy, and the comparison and doublings use the weights before the update. Weights are rationals.
  • Size-free ratios. The size-dependent R[B2,MS(k)](n)R[B2, \mathrm{MS}(k)](n)R[B2,MS(k)](n) is replaced by statements about every input (upper bound) and one attaining input (tightness). The two forms are equivalent because RRR is a maximum over finitely many inputs and nondecreasing in nnn.
  • No division. All ratios are multiplied out, so no division by zero can make a bound vacuous.
  • Trivializations ruled out. A deterministic tie-break in Step 3 or 4, or tightness at a single fixed kkk, would be a weaker theorem and is not acceptable. So is stating only the upper bound.

The definitions (the MS layer, the run relation) can be reused by other MAX-SAT approximation results, and an identical MS layer appears in the companion mission on algorithm B1. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, of the k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 tightness family, and of the k=1k = 1k=1 correction.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems, J. Comput. System Sci. 9 (1974) 256–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9
  • J. Chen, D. K. Friesen, H. Zheng, Tight bound on Johnson's algorithm for maximum satisfiability, J. Comput. System Sci. 58 (1999) 622–640. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcss.1998.1610
  • M. X. Goemans, D. P. Williamson, New 3/4-approximation algorithms for the maximum satisfiability problem, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 7 (1994) 656–666. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895480192243516
  • J. Håstad, Some optimal inapproximability results, J. ACM 48 (2001) 798–859. https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502098
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Markov Decision Processes XVI: Piecewise Deterministic Markov Decision ProcessesTextbook

Motivation

Every mission in this series so far has treated a control problem that already lives in discrete time: a decision maker observes a state, chooses an action, and the process moves to a new state at the next integer time step. Many real systems evolve in continuous time instead — a machine that runs deterministically until it randomly breaks down and is repaired into a new condition, an inventory that drains continuously until a random demand arrives, a population that grows deterministically between random catastrophic events. Chapter 8 of Bäuerle and Rieder's Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance (Springer, 2011) shows that an entire class of such continuous-time control problems — Piecewise Deterministic Markov Decision Processes, where the state moves along a deterministic, controlled flow between randomly-timed jumps to a new state — can be solved by exactly the discrete-time machinery this book's series has already built, once the problem is re-expressed as a Markov Decision Model at the jump times themselves. This mission covers that embedding and its consequences (§8.2), and a simpler, discrete-state special case, the continuous-time Markov Decision Chain, treated with both an infinite and a finite time horizon (§8.3).

Setting

A Piecewise Deterministic Markov Decision Model (Definition 8.1.1) consists of a Borel state space EEE, a Borel control space UUU, a deterministic drift μ(x,u)\mu(x,u)μ(x,u) governing the flow φtα(x)\varphi^\alpha_t(x)φtα​(x) between jumps, a Poisson jump clock of rate λ\lambdaλ, a kernel QQQ giving the distribution of the post-jump state, a reward rate rrr, and a discount rate β\betaβ. A control is a whole measurable function α:R≥0→U\alpha : \mathbb R_{\ge0} \to Uα:R≥0​→U fixed at each jump time and applied until the next one — so the "action space" of the embedded discrete-time problem is itself a function space, a genuinely new technical wrinkle this book's earlier chapters never face. Embedding at the jump times produces a discrete-time Markov Decision Model (E,A,Q′,r′)(E,A,Q',r')(E,A,Q′,r′) whose reward and kernel are themselves integrals of the original data against the flow (Eqs. (8.4)-(8.5)); Chapter 7's infinite-horizon existence theory, already developed for a general Borel state space, applies directly to this embedded model once its own compactness and semicontinuity hypotheses are checked. Checking them forces a further enlargement of the control space to the relaxed controls RRR — measurable functions into probability measures on UUU rather than UUU itself — which is compact in a suitable topology where the space of literal control functions is not.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 8.2.6, is the chapter's central existence result: given a continuous upper bounding function with the discrete embedded model's own contraction-type condition and a package of continuity/compactness assumptions, the value function of the model embedded with relaxed controls is bounded, upper semicontinuous, and a genuine fixed point of the maximal- reward operator, and an optimal relaxed Markov policy exists. The milestones build up to it and extend past it: Theorem 8.2.1 establishes the foundational fact that the continuous-time expected reward of the original process equals the discrete-time embedded model's own value — the correspondence every other result in the chapter relies on; Lemma 8.2.5 is the technical semicontinuity-preservation step the goal's proof needs; Theorem 8.2.7 upgrades the goal's relaxed optimal policy to a genuine, nonrelaxed one under an uncontrolled-flow or convexity condition; Theorem 8.2.8 gives the classical Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman verification technique as an alternative, differential route to the same value function. Section 8.3's continuous-time Markov Decision Chain — the same theory specialized to a countable state space, transition rates in place of a kernel, and an uncontrolled flow — is covered for both an infinite horizon (Theorem 8.3.1) and, the more finance-relevant case, a finite horizon with a terminal reward (Theorems 8.3.2-8.3.3).

Significance

Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes have no substrate anywhere in Mathlib or on the platform, and this mission's content is a genuine method, not just a specialization of existing results: it shows how to reduce an entire continuous-time control problem to the discrete-time theory already available, at the cost of enlarging the state of the discrete embedded problem's own data (which becomes an integral against a whole flow, not a pointwise value) and enlarging the control space when compactness is needed for existence. This mission is careful to keep two distinctions the book itself insists on separate: relaxed versus nonrelaxed controls (Theorem 8.2.6 produces only the former; recovering the latter is Theorem 8.2.7's own, harder, conditional content), and the general Piecewise Deterministic model of §8.1-8.2 versus the simpler, discrete-state Markov Decision Chain of §8.3, which is a genuinely different structure (sums over a countable state space rather than integrals against a controlled flow), not an instance of the general model specialized after the fact.

Difficulty

The central formalization challenge is representing the continuous-time expected reward Vπ(x)V^\pi(x)Vπ(x) (Eq. (8.2)) faithfully, since the book itself only asserts the existence of a probability space carrying the jump-time/post-jump-state process with a specified conditional law, citing general marked-point-process theory rather than constructing it. This mission builds that probability-space data directly — via Mathlib's conditional expectation, conditioning on the current post-jump state — rather than treating VπV^\piVπ as a bare hypothesis-only quantity, so that Theorem 8.2.1's value-equality claim is a genuine, non-vacuous correspondence between two independently-defined objects (a continuous-time path functional and a discrete-time recursion) rather than true by definitional fiat. A second, compounding difficulty is that the same correspondence must be built twice — once for the general flow-driven process (§8.2) and again, independently, for the discrete-state jump process of the finite-horizon chain (§8.3) — since the two models share no state-space structure. A third difficulty specific to Theorem 8.2.8 is that its Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman verification argument is genuinely differential (a process generator built from a gradient, a self-referential closed-loop control solving its own ODE), unlike every other result in this chapter, which works through the discrete-time embedding alone.

Formalization scope

The book's own topology on the control-function space AAA (the coarsest making certain integrals measurable) and the Young topology on the relaxed-control space RRR (which the book cites as making RRR separable, metric and compact, without reconstructing it) are not rebuilt from scratch; continuity/compactness hypotheses that need a topology on these spaces are stated directly against the pointwise/product topology on the underlying function types, a faithful but representationally simpler stand-in documented in MODERATION_NOTES.md. The embedded kernel Q′Q'Q′ (Eqs. (8.4), (8.7)) is bundled as data satisfying its own defining integral identity rather than literally constructed as a mixture of pushforward measures — a routine but heavy argument that would add no mathematical content beyond the formula itself. This mission's own goal (Theorem 8.2.6) explicitly produces a relaxed-control optimal policy, not a nonrelaxed one: stating it with a UUU-valued policy instead would silently substitute Theorem 8.2.7's strictly harder, conditionally-true conclusion for Theorem 8.2.6's own unconditional one, exactly the trivializing formalization this chapter's own structure warns against.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • M. H. A. Davis, Markov Models and Optimization, Chapman & Hall, 1993 (the standard reference for Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes, cited by the book for extensions of this chapter's basic model).
  • A. A. Yushkevich, "On reducing a jump controllable Markov model to a model with discrete time", Theory of Probability and its Applications, 1980 (the topology on the control-function space AAA cited by Definition 8.1.1's own construction).
  • H. J. Kushner and P. G. Dupuis, Numerical Methods for Stochastic Control Problems in Continuous Time, 2nd ed., Springer, 2001 (the Young topology and the Chattering Theorem, cited by Remark 8.2.3).
  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, "Optimal control of piecewise deterministic Markov processes with finite time horizon", in Modern Trends of Controlled Stochastic Processes: Theory and Applications, 2010 (cited for the finite-horizon extension of this chapter's model, applied in chunk 09b's Sections 9.3-9.4).
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Discrete Convex Analysis V: The M-Optimality Criterion and the Proximity TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Scaling algorithms are one of the standard techniques for solving discrete optimization problems efficiently: instead of searching a huge integer domain directly, an algorithm first solves a coarsened version of the problem — checking optimality only against neighbors reached by a large step size α\alphaα — and then refines the resulting approximate solution down to the true optimum. This strategy is only as good as the guarantee that a coarse-scale local optimum is provably close to a true, fine-scale global optimum; without such a guarantee, refinement could require an unbounded number of steps. Results providing this guarantee are called proximity theorems, and they are a standard tool across combinatorial optimization, from network flow scaling algorithms to submodular function minimization.

M-convex functions, the subject of this chapter, are exactly the class of discrete convex functions for which the classical local-optimality test of chapter 3 (checking a full neighborhood of up to 3n−13^n-13n−1 sign patterns) sharpens to a much smaller, purely pairwise test: checking f(x)≤f(x−χu+χv)f(x) \le f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v)f(x)≤f(x−χu​+χv​) for every pair of coordinates u,vu, vu,v. This mission formalizes the chapter's central definitional equivalence (Theorem 6.2), this pairwise optimality criterion (Theorem 6.26), a structural minimizer-cut lemma (Theorem 6.28), and the chapter's capstone, the M-proximity theorem (Theorem 6.37) — the result that makes M-convex scaling algorithms provably correct, with an explicit, dimension-and-scale-only distance bound between a coarse-scale local optimum and a true global minimizer.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A function f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} with nonempty effective domain dom⁡f\operatorname{dom} fdomf is an M-convex function if it satisfies the exchange axiom (M-EXC[Z]): for x,y∈dom⁡fx, y \in \operatorname{dom} fx,y∈domf and uuu in the positive support of x−yx - yx−y, there is vvv in the negative support of x−yx-yx−y with

f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu+χv)+f(y+χu−χv).f(x) + f(y) \ge f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v) + f(y + \chi_u - \chi_v).f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu​+χv​)+f(y+χu​−χv​).

An M♮^\natural♮-convex function is one whose lift f~\tilde ff~​ to the extended ground set V~={0}∪V\tilde V = \{0\} \cup VV~={0}∪V — defined by f~(x0,x)=f(x)\tilde f(x_0, x) = f(x)f~​(x0​,x)=f(x) when x0=−x(V)x_0 = -x(V)x0​=−x(V), and +∞+\infty+∞ otherwise — is M-convex; equivalently (Theorem 6.2, below) fff satisfies the axiom (M♮^\natural♮-EXC[Z]), a variant of (M-EXC[Z]) that additionally allows a single-coordinate move (uuu alone, with no compensating vvv). Every M-convex function is M♮^\natural♮-convex, but not conversely. For α\alphaα a positive integer, a point satisfies the scaled local optimality condition at scale α\alphaα if f(xα)≤f(xα+α(χv−χu))f(x_\alpha) \le f(x_\alpha + \alpha(\chi_v - \chi_u))f(xα​)≤f(xα​+α(χv​−χu​)) for all relevant u,vu, vu,v — a check against neighbors α\alphaα steps away rather than adjacent ones.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.37 (the M-proximity theorem)

Assume α\alphaα is a positive integer and n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣.

(1) f M-convex, f(xα)≤f(xα+α(χv−χu)) ∀u,v  ⟹  ∃x∗∈arg⁡min⁡f, ∥xα−x∗∥∞≤(n−1)(α−1),\text{(1) } f \text{ M-convex, } f(x_\alpha) \le f(x_\alpha + \alpha(\chi_v-\chi_u))\ \forall u,v \implies \exists x^* \in \arg\min f,\ \|x_\alpha - x^*\|_\infty \le (n-1)(\alpha-1),(1) f M-convex, f(xα​)≤f(xα​+α(χv​−χu​)) ∀u,v⟹∃x∗∈argminf, ∥xα​−x∗∥∞​≤(n−1)(α−1), (2) f M♮-convex, same hypothesis over u,v∈V∪{0}  ⟹  ∃x∗∈arg⁡min⁡f, ∥xα−x∗∥∞≤n(α−1).\text{(2) } f \text{ M}^\natural\text{-convex, same hypothesis over } u,v \in V \cup \{0\} \implies \exists x^* \in \arg\min f,\ \|x_\alpha - x^*\|_\infty \le n(\alpha-1).(2) f M♮-convex, same hypothesis over u,v∈V∪{0}⟹∃x∗∈argminf, ∥xα​−x∗∥∞​≤n(α−1).

Both bounds are exact and specific to their hypothesis class; replacing either with an unspecified function of nnn and α\alphaα would discard exactly the content chapter 10's algorithms rely on.

Milestones: Theorems 6.2, 6.26, 6.28

Theorem 6.2: M♮^\natural♮-convexity (defined via the lift) is equivalent to the direct exchange axiom (M♮^\natural♮-EXC[Z]) — the chapter's central definitional theorem, needed to work with M♮^\natural♮-convex functions without repeatedly invoking the lift construction. Theorem 6.26 (the M-optimality criterion): global optimality of fff at xxx is equivalent to a purely pairwise local check, f(x)≤f(x−χu+χv)f(x) \le f(x-\chi_u+\chi_v)f(x)≤f(x−χu​+χv​) for all u,vu,vu,v (plus, in the M♮^\natural♮ case, f(x)≤f(x±χv)f(x) \le f(x\pm\chi_v)f(x)≤f(x±χv​)). Theorem 6.28 (the M-minimizer cut): from any point and any coordinate pair minimizing a one-step exchange, one can certify a coordinate-wise bound that some global minimizer must satisfy — the structural fact underlying both the domain-reduction algorithm and, via the same proof technique, the proximity theorem itself.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 6.26 already sharpens chapter 3's local-to-global criterion (checking a full 3n−13^n-13n−1-point neighborhood) to an O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2)-size pairwise check — the minimum spanning tree optimality criterion is a direct special case. The proximity theorem builds on this to control what happens when the local check is only performed at a coarse scale α\alphaα: it guarantees that scaling-based algorithms, which alternate between coarse-scale local search and scale reduction, terminate with a guaranteed-close approximation at every stage, with an explicit linear-in-nnn, linear-in-α\alphaα error bound rather than a qualitative "eventually converges" guarantee.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for M-convex functions, the exchange axiom, or a discrete proximity theorem of this kind. This mission gives the first formal statement of the M-optimality criterion and the M-proximity theorem, together with the exchange-axiom / lift-based-definition equivalence (Theorem 6.2) that the rest of the M-convex function theory (chunks 07, and indirectly 10–14) is built on.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt at Theorem 6.37 is to try a direct coordinatewise argument: since the scaled hypothesis holds for every pair u,vu, vu,v, one might hope to bound ∣xα(v)−x∗(v)∣|x_\alpha(v) - x^*(v)|∣xα​(v)−x∗(v)∣ coordinate by coordinate independently. This does not work, because a single application of the exchange axiom only ever improves fff by trading one coordinate down and one other coordinate up simultaneously — there is no way to move a single coordinate toward a minimizer in isolation without accounting for where the compensating mass goes. The actual proof instead fixes a target coordinate vvv, constructs a chain of strictly decreasing function values y0=xα,y1,…,yky_0 = x_\alpha, y_1, \ldots, y_ky0​=xα​,y1​,…,yk​ by repeatedly applying (M-EXC[Z]) against a fixed near-optimal point x∗x^*x∗ (exactly the technique of Theorem 6.28's proof), and then bounds how far each other coordinate can move along this chain using the scaled hypothesis itself, before summing those bounds via the M-convex domain's hyperplane constraint x(V)=x(V) = x(V)= constant to recover the bound on vvv. The chain construction, not a per-coordinate estimate, is what makes the linear-in-nnn bound provable at all.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} is (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ. M♮^\natural♮-convexity is represented via an explicit lift to Option V (none standing for the extended ground set's new element 000), matching the book's own primary definition; the direct exchange-axiom form is a separate predicate related to it by Theorem 6.2, not conflated with it. `‖x_\alpha - x^*|_\infty \le c$ is stated pointwise.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would replace either exact bound, (n−1)(α−1)(n-1)(\alpha-1)(n−1)(α−1) or n(α−1)n(\alpha-1)n(α−1), with an unspecified asymptotic bound, or merge the two hypothesis classes into a single weaker statement; neither is done here. Propositions establishing dom f as an M-convex set, the M/M♮^\natural♮ relationship (Theorem 6.3), and several structural closure properties are cut from this mission's scope (not needed by the chosen items' statements — see MODERATION_NOTES.md) but are natural targets for a follow-on mission or for chunk 07, which builds directly on this chunk's exchange-axiom vocabulary. Contributions building the arg min f M-convexity corollary (Proposition 6.29) or the scaled minimizer cut (Theorem 6.39, the direct generalization of Theorem 6.28 drafted here) are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • D. S. Hochbaum, "Lower and upper bounds for the allocation problem and other nonlinear optimization problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2), 1994, pp. 390–409.
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Markov Decision Processes XIII: Contracting Infinite-Horizon Markov Decision ModelsTextbook

Motivation

Every mission in this series so far has treated a finite-horizon decision problem: an investor or planner with a fixed, known number of periods left. Many of the most important applications — perpetual investment, an infinitely-repeated inventory or maintenance problem, a firm that never stops operating — have no natural end date at all. Chapter 7 of Bäuerle and Rieder's Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance (Springer, 2011) builds the theory needed to make sense of "the value of a decision problem that never ends," and does so on a general Borel state space rather than a finite one. This mission covers the chapter's first three sections: the general infinite-horizon setup, the semicontinuous existence theory that makes it usable, and the sharper contraction-based theory that is the chapter's, and arguably the whole book's, theoretical center.

Setting

An infinite-horizon Markov Decision Model reuses the same data (E,A,D,Q,r,β)(E,A,D,Q,r,\beta)(E,A,D,Q,r,β) as the finite-horizon models of earlier chapters, but drops the terminal reward and applies a single (possibly randomized) decision rule at every one of infinitely many stages. Its performance criterion, J∞(x):=sup⁡πExπ[∑k=0∞βkr(Xk,fk(Xk))]J_\infty(x) := \sup_\pi \mathbb E^\pi_x\big[\sum_{k=0}^\infty \beta^kr(X_k,f_k(X_k)) \big]J∞​(x):=supπ​Exπ​[∑k=0∞​βkr(Xk​,fk​(Xk​))], is only meaningful once an integrability condition (Assumption (A)) and a convergence condition (Assumption (C)) rule out the sum diverging or the finite-horizon approximations failing to settle down. Both conditions follow automatically once the model has an upper bounding function bbb — a function controlling both the size of the reward and how fast the transition kernel can grow bbb itself — with βαb<1\beta\alpha_b < 1βαb​<1, the manageable special case that covers both the classical bounded-reward discounted case and the case of a non-positive reward.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 7.3.5 (Structure Theorem), is the chapter's capstone: under a genuine bounding function (a two-sided reward bound making the space IBbIB_bIBb​ of finite-weighted-norm functions a Banach space) with βαb<1\beta\alpha_b < 1βαb​<1, and one abstract structural hypothesis — a closed class IM⊂IBbIM \subset IB_bIM⊂IBb​ containing 000, mapped into itself by the Bellman operator TTT, on which a maximizing action always exists — Banach's fixed point theorem delivers existence, uniqueness, an explicit geometric convergence rate for value iteration, and existence of an optimal stationary policy, all at once. The milestones build up to it in three stages: the general infinite-horizon machinery (Lemmas 7.1.4-7.1.5, Theorems 7.1.6-7.1.8 — reward iteration, a verification theorem, and a structure theorem under an abstract structure assumption that is not yet tied to any checkable property of the model); the semicontinuous existence theory that gives primitive, checkable conditions implying that abstract assumption (Theorem 7.2.1 and its two corollaries, including a genuine policy iteration conclusion); and the contracting theory proper (Lemma 7.3.3's contraction estimate, Theorem 7.3.4's sharpened verification theorem, and Theorem 7.3.6's continuous specialization of the goal).

Significance

The goal is the direct, general-Borel-space generalization of what finite-state dynamic programming theorems already on the platform (BertsekasDP.discounted_main_theorem, BertsekasDP.ssp_main_theorem) establish only for a finite state and action space, where Banach's theorem is applied directly on Rn\mathbb R^nRn: this mission's content is that the same conclusions — including the same explicit geometric convergence rate for value iteration — hold on an arbitrary Borel state space, the moment one abstract, structural condition is checked. That condition is not vacuous or automatic: Example 7.2.4 (cited but not itself formalized, being an unnumbered worked counterexample rather than a numbered result) shows that without compactness of the feasible-action correspondence, the naive Structure Assumption of Chapter 2 is not enough and value iteration can converge to the wrong limit (J≠J∞J \ne J_\inftyJ=J∞​). Theorems 7.1.8's Structure Assumption (SA) is built precisely to rule this out, and Theorem 7.2.1's semicontinuity/ compactness conditions are the practical, checkable sufficient conditions for it.

Difficulty

The central formalization challenge is representing J∞πJ_\infty^\piJ∞π​, the genuine infinite-horizon expected discounted reward, without constructing a canonical infinite-horizon path measure from the model's transition kernel — a substantial undertaking the book itself sidesteps by proving (via an appendix result, Theorem B.1.1, not itself reproved here) that J∞πJ_\infty^\piJ∞π​ equals the limit of the finite-horizon truncations JnπJ_n^\piJnπ​. This mission takes that limit characterization as its own definition, via Filter.limsup for the same total, junk-safe reasons this book's series has used throughout (no canonical path measure anywhere in chunks 02a, 05a, 05b, 06). A second, genuinely new difficulty is Ls, the "upper limit of a sequence of sets" that drives every policy-iteration conclusion: it is a statement about accumulation points of a sequence of points, one drawn from each set in the sequence, not the more familiar set-theoretic limsup of a sequence of sets — getting this distinction right is the entire content of what "policy iteration" asserts.

Formalization scope

Every operator, bounding-function class, and value function of §7.1-7.3 is restated (not imported) in this chunk's own namespace from the finite-horizon originals of chunks 02a/02b, adapted to drop the time index and bake the discount into the one-stage operator directly, per this chapter's own presentation. The contracting theory's genuinely real-valued Banach-space objects (Tf′T_f'Tf′​, T′T'T′, IBbIB_bIBb​, the weighted norm ∥⋅∥b\|\cdot\|_b∥⋅∥b​) are kept separate from the general theory's EReal-valued objects (TfT_fTf​, TTT, IM(E)IM(E)IM(E)), matching the book's own distinction between a value function that is a priori only known to avoid +∞+\infty+∞ and one known to be genuinely finite everywhere. Part (d) of the goal — the explicit geometric convergence rate — is stated in full, not weakened to bare qualitative convergence, since a formalization that dropped it would lose exactly the fact (used again by this book's own Theorem 7.5.12, a different chunk) that makes value iteration a genuine numerical method with a computable error bound rather than merely an existence argument.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. II, 4th ed., Athena Scientific, 2012 (the finite-state discounted/SSP theorems this goal generalizes).
  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978 (analytic measurability of J∞J_\inftyJ∞​, JJJ; cited by the book for this chapter's foundational measure-theoretic facts).
  • K. Hinderer, Foundations of Non-stationary Dynamic Programming with Discrete Time Parameter, Lecture Notes in Operations Research and Mathematical Systems 33, Springer, 1970 (Theorem 18.4, cited for the fact that history-dependent policies do not improve on Markov ones).
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A Stochastic Quasi-Newton Method for Large-Scale Optimization: The Expected Suboptimality Bound of the SQN MethodResearch Paper

Motivation

Training a statistical model by empirical risk minimization means minimizing an average of NNN losses over a parameter vector w∈Rnw\in\mathbb R^nw∈Rn, where both NNN and nnn can be in the millions. Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is the standard method: each step uses the gradient of a small random batch of losses. It is cheap per step but sensitive to the scaling of the problem. Quasi-Newton methods such as L-BFGS correct the scaling in deterministic optimization, but naive stochastic versions are unstable, because differences of noisy gradients are poor curvature estimates.

Byrd, Hansen, Nocedal and Singer (SIAM J. Optim. 26(2), 2016) proposed the stochastic quasi-Newton (SQN) method. It decouples the two estimates: gradients come from small batches at every step, while curvature pairs are formed only every LLL steps, from averaged iterates and subsampled Hessian–vector products. The paper's analysis (Section 3) shows that the method keeps the O(1/k)O(1/k)O(1/k) expected suboptimality rate of SGD on strongly convex problems. The same eigenvalue bound was obtained independently by Mokhtari and Ribeiro (JMLR 16, 2015). Bottou, Curtis and Nocedal later gave a general treatment of such preconditioned stochastic methods (SIAM Review 60(2), 2018).

Setting

Let f1,…,fN:Rn→Rf_1,\dots,f_N:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf1​,…,fN​:Rn→R be twice continuously differentiable losses and

F(w)=1N∑i=1Nfi(w).F(w)=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N f_i(w).F(w)=N1​i=1∑N​fi​(w).

For a sample S⊆{1,…,N}\mathcal S\subseteq\{1,\dots,N\}S⊆{1,…,N} of size bbb, the minibatch gradient is ∇FS(w)=1b∑i∈S∇fi(w)\nabla F_{\mathcal S}(w)=\frac1b\sum_{i\in\mathcal S}\nabla f_i(w)∇FS​(w)=b1​∑i∈S​∇fi​(w). For a sample SH\mathcal S_HSH​ of size bHb_HbH​, the subsampled Hessian is ∇2FSH(w)=1bH∑i∈SH∇2fi(w)\nabla^2F_{\mathcal S_H}(w)=\frac1{b_H}\sum_{i\in\mathcal S_H}\nabla^2 f_i(w)∇2FSH​​(w)=bH​1​∑i∈SH​​∇2fi​(w).

Assumption 1 requires constants 0<λ,Λ0<\lambda,\Lambda0<λ,Λ with λI≺∇2FSH(w)≺ΛI\lambda I\prec\nabla^2F_{\mathcal S_H}(w)\prec\Lambda IλI≺∇2FSH​​(w)≺ΛI for every www and every Hessian sample. It also requires a bound γ2\gamma^2γ2 on the second moment of the stochastic gradient. w∗w^*w∗ denotes the minimizer of FFF.

Algorithm 2 turns correction pairs (sj,yj)(s_j,y_j)(sj​,yj​) into a matrix HtH_tHt​. With m~=min⁡{t,M}\tilde m=\min\{t,M\}m~=min{t,M}, it starts from stTytytTytI\frac{s_t^Ty_t}{y_t^Ty_t}IytT​yt​stT​yt​​I and applies the BFGS update

H←(I−ρjsjyjT)H(I−ρjyjsjT)+ρjsjsjT,ρj=1yjTsj,H\leftarrow(I-\rho_js_jy_j^T)H(I-\rho_jy_js_j^T)+\rho_js_js_j^T,\qquad\rho_j=\frac1{y_j^Ts_j},H←(I−ρj​sj​yjT​)H(I−ρj​yj​sjT​)+ρj​sj​sjT​,ρj​=yjT​sj​1​,

for j=t−m~+1,…,tj=t-\tilde m+1,\dots,tj=t−m~+1,…,t.

Algorithm 1 (SQN) runs for k=1,2,…k=1,2,\dotsk=1,2,…. It draws a gradient sample Sk\mathcal S_kSk​ and steps

wk+1=wk−αkH∇FSk(wk),w^{k+1}=w^k-\alpha^kH\nabla F_{\mathcal S_k}(w^k),wk+1=wk−αkH∇FSk​​(wk),

where H=IH=IH=I for k≤2Lk\le2Lk≤2L and H=HtH=H_tH=Ht​, t=⌊(k−1)/L⌋−1t=\lfloor(k-1)/L\rfloor-1t=⌊(k−1)/L⌋−1, afterwards. Every LLL iterations it forms the block average wˉt\bar w_twˉt​ of the last LLL iterates and a new pair

st=wˉt−wˉt−1,yt=∇2FSH,t(wˉt) st.s_t=\bar w_t-\bar w_{t-1},\qquad y_t=\nabla^2F_{\mathcal S_{H,t}}(\bar w_t)\,s_t .st​=wˉt​−wˉt−1​,yt​=∇2FSH,t​​(wˉt​)st​.

Samples are drawn independently and uniformly among the subsets of their size. The step length is αk=β/k\alpha^k=\beta/kαk=β/k.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 3.3, with a corrected constant

There are 0<μ1≤μ20<\mu_1\le\mu_20<μ1​≤μ2​, depending only on the problem data, such that every matrix Algorithm 1 applies satisfies μ1I≺H≺μ2I\mu_1I\prec H\prec\mu_2Iμ1​I≺H≺μ2​I. Moreover, for every β>1/(2μ1λ)\beta>1/(2\mu_1\lambda)β>1/(2μ1​λ),

E[F(wk)−F(w∗)]≤Qc(β)k(k≥1),E[F(w^k)-F(w^*)]\le\frac{Q_c(\beta)}k\qquad(k\ge1),E[F(wk)−F(w∗)]≤kQc​(β)​(k≥1), Qc(β)=max⁡{Λμ22β2γ22(2μ1λβ−1), Λμ22β2γ2, F(w1)−F(w∗)}.Q_c(\beta)=\max\Big\{\frac{\Lambda\mu_2^2\beta^2\gamma^2}{2(2\mu_1\lambda\beta-1)},\ \Lambda\mu_2^2\beta^2\gamma^2,\ F(w^1)-F(w^*)\Big\}.Qc​(β)=max{2(2μ1​λβ−1)Λμ22​β2γ2​, Λμ22​β2γ2, F(w1)−F(w∗)}.

The constants μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2μ1​,μ2​ are not fixed numerically. The goal asserts a rate of order 1/k1/k1/k with an explicit constant in terms of them.

Milestones

  • (3.8)–(3.10): the curvature bounds λ∥s∥2≤yTs≤Λ∥s∥2\lambda\|s\|^2\le y^Ts\le\Lambda\|s\|^2λ∥s∥2≤yTs≤Λ∥s∥2 and λ≤∥y∥2/yTs≤Λ\lambda\le\|y\|^2/y^Ts\le\Lambdaλ≤∥y∥2/yTs≤Λ for Hessian-product pairs.
  • (3.11) and (3.12): the trace bound and Powell's determinant formula for the direct L-BFGS matrices.
  • Lemma 3.1: μ1I≺Ht≺μ2I\mu_1I\prec H_t\prec\mu_2Iμ1​I≺Ht​≺μ2​I uniformly along every run.
  • (3.18): expected descent for the general Newton-like iteration wk+1=wk−αkHk∇f(wk,ξk)w^{k+1}=w^k-\alpha^kH_k\nabla f(w^k,\xi^k)wk+1=wk−αkHk​∇f(wk,ξk).
  • (3.19): 2λ[F(w)−F(w∗)]≤∥∇F(w)∥22\lambda[F(w)-F(w^*)]\le\|\nabla F(w)\|^22λ[F(w)−F(w∗)]≤∥∇F(w)∥2.
  • (3.22): the recursion ϕk+1≤(1−2αkμ1λ)ϕk+Λ2(αkμ2)2γ2\phi_{k+1}\le(1-2\alpha^k\mu_1\lambda)\phi_k+\frac\Lambda2(\alpha^k\mu_2)^2\gamma^2ϕk+1​≤(1−2αkμ1​λ)ϕk​+2Λ​(αkμ2​)2γ2.
  • Theorem 3.2: the Qc(β)/kQ_c(\beta)/kQc​(β)/k rate for the Newton-like iteration.

Significance

The corollary says that curvature information costs nothing in rate. With uniformly bounded preconditioners and the β/k\beta/kβ/k schedule, the SQN method converges in expectation at the same order as SGD, which is the order known to be optimal for this class of problems. Lemma 3.1 is the reusable part: it holds for any L-BFGS matrix built from pairs whose curvature is controlled by a bounded Hessian. Theorem 3.2 applies to every stochastic method whose preconditioner is fixed before the sample is drawn and has uniformly bounded spectrum.

The formalization adds three things. First, it states the result correctly. As printed, Theorem 3.2 is false and Assumption 1(3) cannot be satisfied (see Formalization scope), and the mission states and labels the repaired versions. Second, it gives a machine-checked statement of the SQN algorithm itself, which is not currently formalized anywhere. Third, it provides L-BFGS and preconditioned-SGD infrastructure that later missions on stochastic second-order methods can reuse. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is to feed the iterates of Algorithm 1 to a standard SGD rate theorem. This fails for two reasons. The preconditioner HtH_tHt​ depends on the past iterates and on independent Hessian samples, so the analysis needs a filtration in which HtH_tHt​ is known before the gradient sample is drawn. Also, the rate proof itself is an induction that breaks in the first iterations, which is exactly where the printed argument goes wrong.

On the linear-algebra side, the difficulty is a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue of HtH_tHt​ that is uniform over all runs and all ttt. The curvature bounds on each individual pair do not give it directly, because the BFGS updates compound across the memory window. The expectation side needs conditional expectations of vector-valued functions and a descent inequality under a Hessian bound, neither of which Mathlib packages for this setting.

Formalization scope

Vectors live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ acting through Matrix.toEuclideanLin, and A≺BA\prec BA≺B is (B - A).PosDef. Hessians are fderiv ℝ (gradient f) w. Indices k,tk,tk,t start at 111 as in the paper. In the corollary, EEE is an exact finite average over sample histories, and "almost surely" means "on every history". Theorem 3.2 uses a general probability space with a filtration. HkH_kHk​ and wkw^kwk are Fk\mathcal F_kFk​-measurable, the sample ξk\xi^kξk is Fk+1\mathcal F_{k+1}Fk+1​-measurable, and unbiasedness is a conditional expectation. Integrability of F(wk)F(w^k)F(wk) is part of each conclusion, so a junk-zero integral cannot satisfy it.

Two corrections to the paper, each labelled in the item titles and notes:

  • Iterate-wise γ\gammaγ. Assumption 1(3) says Eξ∥∇f(w,ξ)∥2≤γ2E_\xi\|\nabla f(w,\xi)\|^2\le\gamma^2Eξ​∥∇f(w,ξ)∥2≤γ2 for all www. Together with unbiasedness and λ\lambdaλ-strong convexity on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, this forces λ∥w−w∗∥≤∥∇F(w)∥≤γ\lambda\|w-w^*\|\le\|\nabla F(w)\|\le\gammaλ∥w−w∗∥≤∥∇F(w)∥≤γ for every www, which is impossible. The mission imposes the bound at the iterates, conditionally on the past, which is how the proof uses it.
  • Constant Qc(β)Q_c(\beta)Qc​(β). The induction after (3.22) multiplies by 1−2βμ1λ/k1-2\beta\mu_1\lambda/k1−2βμ1​λ/k, which is negative for k<2βμ1λk<2\beta\mu_1\lambdak<2βμ1​λ. Counterexample: n=1n=1n=1, f1,2(w)=(w∓1)2/2f_{1,2}(w)=(w\mp1)^2/2f1,2​(w)=(w∓1)2/2, Hk=IH_k=IHk​=I, w1=0w^1=0w1=0, β=2\beta=2β=2, γ2=5\gamma^2=5γ2=5. Then F(w2)−F(w∗)=2>Q(2)/2=5/3F(w^2)-F(w^*)=2>Q(2)/2=5/3F(w2)−F(w∗)=2>Q(2)/2=5/3, and the example survives perturbing the constants so that every strict inequality holds. The middle entry of QcQ_cQc​ repairs it, and Qc=QQ_c=QQc​=Q whenever 2μ1λβ≤3/22\mu_1\lambda\beta\le3/22μ1​λβ≤3/2.

Smaller conventions:

  • The pairs must satisfy st≠0s_t\neq0st​=0, since Algorithm 2 is undefined otherwise.
  • Hessian samples have size bH≥1b_H\ge1bH​≥1; the empty sample makes (2.3) a 0/00/00/0.
  • The corollary's undefined μ2\mu_2μ2​ is Lemma 3.1's constant, enlarged together with μ1\mu_1μ1​ to cover the initial H=IH=IH=I steps.
  • The block average of Algorithm 1 is used, not Eq. (2.1).

Trivializing encodings are ruled out: HtH_tHt​ is Algorithm 2 applied to Algorithm 1's own pairs, not an arbitrary bounded matrix, and the second-moment bound is not imposed for all www.

Needed infrastructure, all welcome as contributions: the symmetry and spectral bounds of Hessians of C2C^2C2 functions, trace and determinant identities for BFGS updates, the descent lemma from a Hessian upper bound, conditional-expectation manipulations for adapted iterations, and the reduction of Algorithm 1 with uniform finite sampling to the abstract iteration.

Selected references

  • R. H. Byrd, S. L. Hansen, J. Nocedal, Y. Singer, A Stochastic Quasi-Newton Method for Large-Scale Optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 26(2):1008–1031, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1137/140954362
  • A. Mokhtari, A. Ribeiro, Global Convergence of Online Limited Memory BFGS, J. Mach. Learn. Res. 16:3151–3181, 2015. https://jmlr.org/papers/v16/mokhtari15a.html
  • L. Bottou, F. E. Curtis, J. Nocedal, Optimization Methods for Large-Scale Machine Learning, SIAM Review 60(2):223–311, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1137/16M1080173
  • A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan, A. Shapiro, Robust Stochastic Approximation Approach to Stochastic Programming, SIAM J. Optim. 19(4):1574–1609, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070704277
  • M. J. D. Powell, Some global convergence properties of a variable metric algorithm for minimization without exact line searches, in Nonlinear Programming, SIAM-AMS Proc. IX, 1976, pp. 53–72.
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Markov Decision Processes XII: Terminal Wealth and Mean-Variance under Partial ObservationTextbook

Motivation

Every portfolio-choice model treated so far in this series assumes the investor knows the exact law governing the market's returns. Real investors do not: the drift of a stock, the regime a market is in, or the probability of an up-move in a simplified binomial model is itself uncertain and must be learned from the very prices being observed. Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 6 (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011) is the book's synthesis of two threads developed separately earlier: Chapter 5's reduction of a partially observable decision problem to an ordinary one on an enlarged "belief" state space, and Chapter 4's classical solutions of terminal-wealth utility maximization and dynamic mean-variance portfolio choice. Combining them answers a natural question with no simple a priori answer: how does not knowing which market you are in change the qualitatively optimal way to invest, and can the closed-form solutions of the fully-observed theory be recovered, term for term, once the unknown factor is replaced by a belief about it?

Setting

The market has an unobservable factor Y (state space E_Y) driving the vector of relative risks Z ∈ ℝ^d of d risky assets: given Y_n = y, the next return Z_{n+1} has a density q_R(y,\cdot), and Y itself evolves via its own transition density q_Y(y,\cdot), jointly — crucially, this joint law depends only on y, never on wealth or the action taken. An investor observes only the stock prices (equivalently, the return history), never Y itself. Bayes' rule turns this into a filtering problem: the investor's belief ρ_n \in \mathbb P(E_Y) about the current factor is updated one return at a time by an operator Φ(ρ,z) that depends only on the current belief and the newly observed return — a genuine simplification of Chapter 5's general Bayes operator, forced by the market's own structure. The pair (x_n,ρ_n) — observable wealth and current belief — is then an ordinary, fully observed state for an ordinary Markov Decision Model, and every value function and optimal policy of this chapter lives on that enlarged state space.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 6.2.3, solves the dynamic mean-variance problem (MV): minimize the variance of terminal wealth X_N subject to a target expectation \mathbb E[X_N] \ge \mu, under partial observation. It is reached by a Lagrangian embedding into an auxiliary quadratic-loss problem QP(b), solved explicitly in Theorem 6.2.2, whose value function factors as ((xS^0_N/S^0_n)-b)^2 d_n(\rho) for a belief-only sequence (d_n) satisfying the backward recursion (6.7); Lemma 6.2.1 shows this sequence always lies strictly between 0 and 1, which is exactly what makes the final variance formula and Lagrange multiplier well-posed. The remaining milestones develop the parallel terminal-wealth theory of §6.1: the general structure theorem (Theorem 6.1.1), its power- and logarithmic-utility closed forms (Theorems 6.1.2, 6.1.7), and — for the specific binomial market with an unknown up-probability — a likelihood-ratio monotonicity result for the filter update (Lemma 6.1.4) and a comparison between the partially and completely observed optimal investment fractions (Theorem 6.1.5).

Significance

The chapter's organizing insight is that partial observation does not require a new theory: once the belief is added as a state coordinate, every general result already proved for fully observed Markov Decision Models — the Bellman equation, the existence of optimal Markov policies, the Lagrangian embedding technique for mean-variance problems — applies unchanged. What is genuinely new, and genuinely non-trivial, is checking that the reduced model inherits the structural hypotheses (monotonicity, boundedness, positive-definiteness of covariance matrices) those general theorems require, expressed now as conditions on the belief-indexed quantities Φ(ρ,z), d_n(\rho), \ell_n(\rho), C_n(\rho) rather than on the original, unobserved factor. Theorem 6.1.5's comparison result is a genuinely new phenomenon with no fully-observed analogue at all: it quantifies, in the two opposite directions dictated by the sign of the risk-aversion parameter γ, how residual uncertainty about the market itself changes the qualitatively optimal amount to invest — the discrete-time analogue of a continuous-time result in the literature this book cites (Sass and Haussmann 2004).

Difficulty

The recurring difficulty across every result in this mission is that the reduced model's state space E_X \times \mathbb P(E_Y) includes a space of probability measures as one coordinate, and every quantity that must be shown well-defined, monotone, or bounded is a functional on that space, not a function on a concrete Euclidean set. Formalizing the mean-variance recursion (6.7) in particular is a three-way mutual computation — a scalar d_n(\rho), a vector \ell_n(\rho), and a matrix C_n(\rho), each an integral against the same belief-dependent predictive law of the next return, each feeding the next stage's version of all three — where Lemma 6.2.1's strict-inequality bound is not a bookkeeping detail but exactly the fact that keeps C_n(\rho) invertible and the whole construction from breaking down. Theorem 6.2.3 itself is the hardest single step: verifying that the specific constant b^* the Lagrangian method selects makes the mean constraint bind at exact equality, and that the resulting variance is the true constrained minimum (not merely a feasible value), is exactly the non-trivial content a superficial restatement of Theorem 6.2.2 at an unspecified b would silently discard.

Formalization scope

Every value function of this chapter — the terminal-wealth maximization of §6.1, the quadratic loss QP(b) and the mean-variance problem (MV) of §6.2 — is built from one shared history-dependent value-function scaffold, parametrized by its terminal payoff (the utility U, a quadratic loss, or the raw first/second moment), its rate sequence (constant in §6.1, non-stationary in §6.2), and its feasible-action correspondence, rather than four separately re-derived constructions. Optimal fractions in the binomial sub-model (Lemma 6.1.4, Theorem 6.1.5) are characterized as any maximizer of the relevant one-step concave problem rather than through the closed-form solution the book's own proof derives via machinery from a different, unavailable chunk (Lemma 4.2.9) — the comparison and monotonicity results proved here are facts about any such maximizer, not about that specific formula. A formalization that assumed the reduced model's filter update or covariance structure directly, rather than deriving it from the market's own return and factor densities via the Bayes operator Φ, would trivialize every result in this mission; none of the items here take that shortcut.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • R. Sass and U. G. Haussmann, "Optimizing trading strategies with respect to drawdown in the hidden Markov model," Statistics & Decisions, 2004.
  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, "Portfolio optimization with unobservable Markov-modulated drift process," Journal of Applied Probability, 2007.
  • V. Runggaldier, W. Trivellato, and T. Vargiolu, "A Bayesian adaptive control approach to parameter estimation and optimal portfolio selection," in Mathematical Finance, Trends in Mathematics, Birkhäuser, 2002 (the binomial-market source this chapter's §6.1 example specializes).
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Discrete Convex Analysis IV: Discrete Separation for L-Convex SetsTextbook

Motivation

The classical separating hyperplane theorem says that any two disjoint convex sets in Rn\mathbb R^nRn can be separated by a hyperplane with an arbitrary real normal vector. When the sets in question are not arbitrary convex sets but the integer points of specially structured discrete sets, one can sometimes ask for much more: not merely that a separator exists, but that it can be chosen from a small, structured, dimension-independent family regardless of the size or shape of the sets being separated. Results of this kind — "discrete separation theorems" — are a recurring and often surprising theme in combinatorial optimization, playing the role that the ordinary separation theorem plays in continuous convex analysis, but with genuinely combinatorial content beyond it.

L-convex sets, introduced by Murota as part of the discrete convex analysis framework, are one of the two dual families of well-behaved discrete convex sets studied in the book (the other being M-convex sets, chunk 04 of this series). They are defined by a lattice-closure axiom together with translation invariance, and they correspond one-to-one to integer-valued distance functions satisfying the triangle inequality — objects long familiar from network flow theory and shortest-path duality, even though the L-convexity terminology is not traditionally used there. This mission formalizes the chapter's central results, culminating in Theorem 5.9: two disjoint L-convex sets can always be separated by a vector with entries in {−1,0,1}\{-1, 0, 1\}{−1,0,1}, no matter how large or complicated the sets are.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A nonempty set D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is an L-convex set if it satisfies the sublattice axiom (SBS[Z]) — p,q∈D  ⟹  p∨q, p∧q∈Dp, q \in D \implies p \vee q,\ p \wedge q \in Dp,q∈D⟹p∨q, p∧q∈D, where ∨,∧\vee, \wedge∨,∧ are componentwise maximum and minimum — and the translation axiom (TRS[Z]) — p∈D  ⟹  p±1∈Dp \in D \implies p \pm \mathbf 1 \in Dp∈D⟹p±1∈D, where 1\mathbf 11 is the all-ones vector. A distance function γ:V×V→R∪{+∞}\gamma : V \times V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}γ:V×V→R∪{+∞} satisfies γ(v,v)=0\gamma(v,v) = 0γ(v,v)=0 for every vvv; it satisfies the triangle inequality if γ(v1,v2)+γ(v2,v3)≥γ(v1,v3)\gamma(v_1,v_2) + \gamma(v_2,v_3) \ge \gamma(v_1,v_3)γ(v1​,v2​)+γ(v2​,v3​)≥γ(v1​,v3​) for all v1,v2,v3v_1, v_2, v_3v1​,v2​,v3​. The admissible-potential polyhedron of γ\gammaγ is

D(γ)={p∈RV:p(v)−p(u)≤γ(u,v) (∀u≠v)}.D(\gamma) = \{p \in \mathbb R^V : p(v) - p(u) \le \gamma(u,v)\ (\forall u \ne v)\}.D(γ)={p∈RV:p(v)−p(u)≤γ(u,v) (∀u=v)}.

The convex hull of a discrete set D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is written Dˉ⊆RV\bar D \subseteq \mathbb R^VDˉ⊆RV.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.9 (discrete separation for L-convex sets)

If D1,D2⊆ZVD_1, D_2 \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD1​,D2​⊆ZV are disjoint L-convex sets, there exists x∗∈{−1,0,1}Vx^* \in \{-1,0,1\}^Vx∗∈{−1,0,1}V such that

inf⁡{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D1}−sup⁡{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D2}≥1.\inf\{\langle p, x^*\rangle : p \in D_1\} - \sup\{\langle p, x^*\rangle : p \in D_2\} \ge 1.inf{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D1​}−sup{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D2​}≥1.

Dropping the {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V restriction and allowing an arbitrary real separator would recover the classical separation theorem for convex sets, which holds regardless of L-convexity and carries no discrete-convexity content; the three-valued restriction is the weakest correct strengthening and is kept in full.

Milestones: Theorems 5.2, 5.5, 5.7

Theorem 5.2: an L-convex set is hole free (D=Dˉ∩ZVD = \bar D \cap \mathbb Z^VD=Dˉ∩ZV) — its integer points are exactly the integer points of its own convex hull. Theorem 5.5: DDD is L-convex if and only if D=D(γ)∩ZVD = D(\gamma) \cap \mathbb Z^VD=D(γ)∩ZV for some integer-valued distance function γ\gammaγ satisfying the triangle inequality — L-convex sets and such distance functions are two descriptions of the same object, the discrete analogue of chunk 04's M-convex-set / submodular- function correspondence. Theorem 5.7 (parts (1), (4)): L-convex sets are closed under intersection in the strongest sense — the convex hulls intersect exactly where the sets do, and a nonempty intersection of L-convex sets is again L-convex.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 5.9 packs two claims into one, as the book itself points out: the separator is forced into {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V (explicit in the statement), and disjoint L-convex sets satisfy "convexity in intersection" — their convex hulls are already disjoint whenever the sets themselves are (implicit, and necessary for the stated inequality to be possible at all). The {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} structure connects directly to combinatorial duality in network flows: L-convex polyhedra are, without the name, a familiar object there, and a {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1}-separator corresponds to a signed cut or a negative-cost cycle in an associated graph. Theorem 5.5's correspondence is the L-convex mirror of chunk 04's M-convex/submodular correspondence, and the book explicitly flags that the two will be unified into a single conjugacy relationship in a later chapter (Note 5.6) — this mission's formalization of the L-side is a prerequisite for that later unification.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform (searches for "L-convex", "distance function", and "negative cycle" return only unrelated results — number-theoretic distance estimates, polytope graph metrics, shortest-path graph structures — none matching the combinatorial L-convexity/discrete-separation content here). This mission gives the first formal statement of L-convex sets and their central separation theorem. Notably, Theorem 5.9's own statement — unlike the analogous M-convex Theorem 4.18 — needs none of the distance-function machinery that its proof uses; only the L-convexity axiom itself appears in the goal, making its formal statement comparatively lean even though the underlying mathematics is just as deep.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt at Theorem 5.9 is to try to construct x∗x^*x∗ directly from the structure of D1,D2D_1, D_2D1​,D2​ — for instance, from a normal vector to a real separating hyperplane, rounded coordinatewise. This does not work: rounding an arbitrary real separator gives no control over its entries, and there is no reason a rounded vector should still separate. The book's actual proof instead represents D1,D2D_1, D_2D1​,D2​ via distance functions γ1,γ2\gamma_1, \gamma_2γ1​,γ2​ (Theorem 5.5), combines them into γ12=min⁡(γ1,γ2)\gamma_{12} = \min(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)γ12​=min(γ1​,γ2​), and extracts the separator from a shortest negative cycle in the associated graph: the vertices of the cycle alternate between the two sets' "tight" arcs, and the alternating ±1\pm 1±1 pattern around the cycle is exactly the {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} vector x∗x^*x∗ — with the cycle's negativity translating directly into the required gap of at least 111. Locating the right combinatorial object (a shortest negative cycle, not an arbitrary one) is what pins the separator down to a vector supported on a single alternating cycle rather than an arbitrary {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} pattern, and is the step a naive rounding or linear-algebra argument has no analogue of.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is a Set (V → ℤ). Distance functions take values in WithTop ℝ; the goal's infimum and supremum are taken in EReal (a complete lattice), since L-convex sets are always infinite (translation invariance along the all-ones direction), so an ℝ-valued supremum/infimum would silently return a junk value on an unbounded set. The conclusion is stated as sup⁡D2⟨p,x∗⟩+1≤inf⁡D1⟨p,x∗⟩\sup_{D_2}\langle p,x^*\rangle + 1 \le \inf_{D_1}\langle p,x^*\ranglesupD2​​⟨p,x∗⟩+1≤infD1​​⟨p,x∗⟩, an addition-based reformulation of the book's subtraction inequality that avoids EReal's ⊤ - ⊤ ambiguity while remaining equivalent whenever both sides are finite.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would drop the {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V constraint on x∗x^*x∗ (recovering the classical, L-convexity-independent separation theorem) or fix a single coordinate pattern rather than asserting existence over the full three-valued family; neither is done here. Theorem 5.5 is stated existentially rather than via the book's named bijection Φ,Ψ\Phi, \PsiΦ,Ψ (a documented scope reduction, parallel to chunk 04's treatment of Theorem 4.15), and Theorem 5.7 is drafted with only its two representation-independent clauses (parts (1) and (4); see MODERATION_NOTES.md). Contributions building the distance-function/admissible- potential apparatus needed for Theorem 5.7's remaining clauses, or the L-convex/integrally-convex bridge (Theorem 5.10, needing chunk 03's vocabulary), are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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