On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization II: With m + 3 Extreme Points the Best Affine Policy Can Cost More Than (2 − δ) Times the OptimumResearch Paper
Motivation
Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions made in two steps: a first-stage decision is fixed before an uncertain parameter is revealed, and a second-stage (recourse) decision may then depend on the realized value. In the robust version, the uncertain parameter ranges over an uncertainty set and the objective is the worst-case cost. Such models arise in capacity planning, network design and inventory problems with uncertain demand, where the demand is the right-hand side of the constraints.
Computing an optimal fully adaptable second-stage policy is intractable in general: the recourse is an arbitrary function of the uncertain parameter. The standard tractable surrogate, introduced by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (Math. Program. 99, 2004), restricts the recourse to an affine policy , whose optimization is a finite convex program. Practitioners report that affine policies often perform well, which raises the question of when they are optimal and how much they can lose.
Bertsimas and Goyal (Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012) answer this for problems with an uncertain right-hand side. Their Theorem 1 shows that affine policies are optimal when the uncertainty set is a simplex, that is, the convex hull of affinely independent points of . Their Theorem 2, the subject of this mission, shows that this is almost tight: one additional extreme point can make the best affine policy almost twice as expensive as the optimum.
Setting
Let , , , and let be an uncertainty set. The problem is
Here is the first-stage decision and is the second-stage policy; all inequalities between vectors are componentwise. The value is the same minimum restricted to affine policies with and ; an affine policy must still satisfy for every . Always .
The instance of (6) is defined for and an even integer . It has , , , , and
where , is the -th unit vector for , has entries in its first coordinates and in the others, and has in its first coordinates and in the others. Thus is generated by nonzero points. The last two are also extreme points when ; for or they lie in the convex hull of .
For a permutation of , write . A set is permutation-invariant with respect to if (Definition 2), and is the set (10) of permutations with .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2
Milestones
- Lemma 1. On there is a feasible fully adaptable solution with worst-case cost , so .
- Lemma 2. The set of (6) is permutation-invariant with respect to every .
- Lemma 3. There is an optimal affine solution whose intercept is constant: for all .
- First Claim of the proof of Theorem 2. For any feasible affine solution with intercept and worst-case cost at most : .
- Second Claim. Under the same assumption, for every .
- Third Claim. Under the same assumption, for all .
Significance
Together with Theorem 1 of the same paper, Theorem 2 delimits exactly where affine policies are optimal for right-hand-side uncertainty: for a simplex they are, and with one more nonzero extreme point the gap can approach . The ratio is measured against the fully adaptable optimum, which is the quantity a practitioner gives up by choosing affine recourse. Later sections of the paper push the same construction to for sets with polynomially many extreme points and prove a matching upper bound; Theorem 2 is the simplest member of this family and isolates the mechanism.
The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal model of two-stage adaptive linear optimization with uncertain right-hand side, the values and , and a verified lower-bound instance. The symmetrization statement (Lemma 3) is an instance of a general principle, that a convex problem invariant under a group has an invariant optimum, which is reusable well beyond this paper.
Difficulty
The upper bound requires a feasible policy, which can be written down. The lower bound on is a statement about all affine policies, an dimensional family, and cannot be checked policy by policy. The obvious attempt, testing an arbitrary affine policy against a few extreme points, fails because an asymmetric policy can trade cost between coordinates. The argument needs an optimal policy that is symmetric, which in turn needs both the existence of an optimal affine solution (attainment of a minimum over a non-compact set of policies) and the invariance of the instance under the permutations of and the swap of the two halves. Without the attainment step, a contradiction for every policy of cost at most yields only , not the strict inequality.
Formalization scope
Vectors are Fin m → ℝ with the componentwise order, matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, is B *ᵥ x and is d ⬝ᵥ y. Indices are 0-based: the paper's coordinate is index , so "" is (i : ℕ) < m / 2, with natural-number division (exact since is even). is x ∘ τ for τ : Equiv.Perm (Fin m).
and are the infima of the sets of real numbers for which some feasible (respectively feasible affine) solution satisfies for all . This epigraph form avoids a supremum of a possibly unbounded function; on an infeasible instance the infimum would be Lean's junk value , which is why Lemma 1 also asserts the existence of the feasible solution of cost . Optimal solutions are stated by IsOptimalAff: feasible, with worst-case cost bounded by every bound achieved by any feasible affine solution. Affine policies must be nonnegative on , as in (1).
The instance is concrete, so the standing assumptions of (1) (nonnegative costs, compact convex full-dimensional , feasibility) are properties of the data rather than hypotheses. The goal adds no hypothesis to the page: , even and . For the statement is easy but still true. The three Claims are stated for any feasible affine solution with constant intercept and worst-case cost at most , which is exactly what the paper's proof uses about the symmetric optimal solution under its contradiction hypothesis (12). Lemma 1 drops the unused hypothesis . Definition 2 prints ""; the formalization reads as the set .
Replacing by the cost of one particular affine policy, stating the goal with , or bounding only policies with constant intercept would not be Theorem 2, and is ruled out: the goal compares the two optimal values with a strict inequality.
A complete development needs convex hulls of finite point sets in Fin m → ℝ, the existence of a minimizer for the affine problem (a linear program in with infinitely many constraints indexed by , reducible to the extreme points), averaging of optimal solutions over a permutation group, and elementary estimates with . Contributions of general lemmas on attainment of semi-infinite linear programs and on symmetrization of convex programs are welcome.
Selected references
- D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Mathematical Programming Ser. A (online first 2011; received 31 Oct 2009, accepted 17 Jan 2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
- A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Mathematical Programming 99 (2004) 351–376. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
- D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu, P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010) 363–394. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0444