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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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🏆Completed
OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Chance-Constrained Problems via a Smooth Sample-Based Nonlinear Approximation 2: Optimal Values and Solutions of the Smoothed SAA Converge w.p.1 as N → ∞ and ε → 0Research Paper

A chance-constrained program asks for a decision that satisfies uncertain constraints with high probability rather than surely:

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Production Scheduling for Strategic Open Pit Mine Planning: A Mixed-Integer Programming Approach 2: Clique and Lifted Clique Cuts on Pairwise Incompatible Clusters Are ValidResearch Paper

Strategic open pit mine planning decides which parts of an ore body are excavated, when, and where each block of material is sent. Rivera Letelier, Espinoza, Goycoolea, Moreno and Muñoz (Operations Research 68(5), 2020) model the problem as a mixed-integer program, the precedence-constrained production scheduling problem with clusters (PCPSP-C),…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multistage Distributionally Robust Mixed-Integer Programming with Decision-Dependent Moment-Based Ambiguity Sets III: Under Slater, the Delage–Ye-Type Stage Bellman Equation Is One SDP MinimizationResearch Paper

In many multistage decision problems the probability law of the next uncertainty depends on the decision taken now: opening a facility changes the demand it attracts, a price changes the distribution of sales, maintenance changes failure rates. Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) handles an imperfectly known law by optimizing against the worst…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Production Scheduling for Strategic Open Pit Mine Planning: A Mixed-Integer Programming Approach 1: Under G, g ≥ 0 Every Minimal Optimal Schedule Stays inside the Ultimate Pit LimitResearch Paper

Strategic planning of an open pit mine decides, over a horizon of 20 to 50 years, which parts of an ore body are excavated, when, and where the excavated material is sent. A deposit is discretized into blocks, often millions of them, and the decisions are constrained by wall-slope precedences between blocks, by mining and processing capacities, and by…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Chance-Constrained Problems via a Smooth Sample-Based Nonlinear Approximation 1: Smoothed Sample Feasible Sets Lie in the True Feasible Set with Probability ≥ 1 − ⌈1/β⌉⌈2LD/t⌉ⁿ exp(−2NM²)Research Paper

A chance-constrained program minimizes a cost f(x)f(x)f(x) over a closed set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn subject to a constraint that must hold with high probability rather than surely:

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 3: With Social Learning, Responsive Pricing Beats Pre-Announced Pricing When Consumers Are ImpatientResearch Paper

A recurring question in revenue management with strategic consumers is whether a seller gains from price commitment. When customers are forward-looking, a seller who announces its whole price path in advance (pre-announced pricing) removes the customers' incentive to wait for a markdown the seller would otherwise be tempted to give; a seller who keeps the…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Production Scheduling for Strategic Open Pit Mine Planning: A Mixed-Integer Programming Approach 4: Hourglass Production Cuts Are Valid under Full and Partial IntegralityResearch Paper

Strategic open pit mine planning decides which parts of an ore body are excavated, in which period, and to which destination (a processing plant, a stockpile, a waste dump) each block of material is sent. Rivera Letelier, Espinoza, Goycoolea, Moreno and Muñoz (Operations Research 68(5), 2020) model this as a mixed-integer program, the precedence-constrained…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 2: Under Responsive Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

A firm launching a new experience good does not know how good the product is, and neither do its customers. Early buyers post reviews, and customers who wait learn from them: this is social learning (SL). Forward-looking customers anticipate this and may delay their purchase until reviews are available, which cuts into the firm's early sales. Papanastasiou…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multistage Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Unit Commitment Problem II: Under the W_it-Policy, Robust Generation and Ramping Limits Reduce to the Extreme Total-Load ScenariosResearch Paper

Unit commitment (UC) is the daily scheduling problem of electricity system operators: decide which generators are switched on in each hour of the next day, and how much each produces, so that supply meets the net load at minimum cost while respecting generation limits, ramping limits and transmission limits. With growing shares of wind and solar power, the…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

K-Adaptability in Two-Stage Robust Binary Programming 5: The ε-Approximation (6ε) Is Equivalent to the Mixed-Integer Bilinear Program (7)Research Paper

Two-stage robust optimization models decisions taken in two steps around an uncertain parameter: a first-stage decision xxx is fixed before a parameter ξ\xiξ is revealed from an uncertainty set Ξ\XiΞ, and a second-stage (recourse) decision yyy is taken afterwards. When the recourse is binary (whether to open a facility, route a vehicle, schedule a task), the exact…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

K-Adaptability in Two-Stage Robust Binary Programming 1: Under Objective Uncertainty, min{dim 𝒴, rk Q} + 1 Policies Attain the Two-Stage Optimal ValueResearch Paper

Many planning problems are made in two stages: a first decision is fixed before an uncertain parameter is observed, and a second, corrective decision is made afterwards. When the second-stage decisions are binary (which route, which facility, which crew), the resulting two-stage robust binary programs are notoriously hard: the second-stage decision is a…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

K-Adaptability in Two-Stage Robust Binary Programming 4: The ε-Approximations (6ε) Converge Uniformly to the K-Adaptability ProblemResearch Paper

Two-stage robust optimization models decisions taken in two steps around an uncertain parameter: a here-and-now decision xxx is fixed before the parameter ξ\xiξ is revealed, and a wait-and-see decision yyy adapts to it, and the decision maker guards against the worst ξ\xiξ in an uncertainty set Ξ\XiΞ. When the second-stage decisions are binary, as in routing,…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Joint Chance Constraints with Second-Order Moment Information II: Over Scaling Parameters, Worst-Case CVaR Is Essentially Exact for Joint Chance ConstraintsResearch Paper

A chance constraint asks that a decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn satisfy uncertain inequalities with high probability. In the setting of Zymler, Kuhn and Rustem (Math. Program. 137, 2013), mmm affine inequalities yi0(x)+yi(x)⊤ξ~≤0y_i^0(x)+y_i(x)^\top\tilde\xi\le0yi0​(x)+yi​(x)⊤ξ~​≤0, whose coefficients depend affinely on xxx, must hold jointly with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ. Joint chance constraints…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization III: The Lifting Theorem — a Conic Bound on E[g(z̃)] Describes Exactly the z̃-Marginals of a Lifted Ambiguity SetResearch Paper

Distributionally robust optimization asks a decision to perform well against every probability distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP, a family of distributions consistent with partial information about an uncertain parameter z~∈RP\tilde z \in \mathbb R^Pz~∈RP. Which kinds of information an ambiguity set can encode decides which models a solver can handle.…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Optimal TransportOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Short and General Duality Proof for Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization II: Interchangeability Holds for Diagonally Dominant Functions iff Measurable Projection and Weak Selection DoResearch Paper

In Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization (DRO) a decision is evaluated against the worst distribution within an optimal-transport ball around a nominal distribution P^\widehat{\mathbb P}P. Every tractable reformulation rests on a strong duality theorem that replaces the supremum over distributions by a one-dimensional minimization over a multiplier …

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimal TransportOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Short and General Duality Proof for Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization I: Worst-Case Loss = min over λ ≥ 0 of λρ + E[sup f − λc] for All ρ > 0 iff Interchangeability HoldsResearch Paper

Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization (DRO) hedges a decision against every probability distribution within a given transport distance of a nominal one, typically the empirical distribution of data. The inner problem, the worst-case loss, is an optimization over an infinite-dimensional set of measures, and every practical use of Wasserstein DRO —…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Markov Decision Processes 2: The Affine Reward-to-Go Semidefinite Program Is Exact for One Quadratic Constraint and Conservative for SeveralResearch Paper

A Markov decision process (MDP) evaluates a policy by its expected discounted reward, which requires the transition probabilities. In practice these are estimated from data, and the optimal policy of the estimated model can perform badly under the true kernel. Robust MDPs replace the kernel by an ambiguity set of kernels and judge a policy by its worst-case…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization II: The Naïve Approximation Implies the Infimal Convolution Bound, Which Implies the Distributionally Robust ConstraintResearch Paper

A constraint E[v(x,z~)]≤w\mathbb E[v(x,\tilde z)] \le wE[v(x,z~)]≤w on a decision xxx needs the distribution of the random vector z~\tilde zz~, which in practice is known only through partial information: a support, some moments, the probability mass of a few regions. Distributionally robust optimization requires the constraint for every distribution consistent with that information.…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models 2: Customization Raises the Optimal Expected Revenue by at Most a Factor m, and the Factor Is TightResearch Paper

An assortment decision determines which products a seller makes available to a customer. When customers differ, the seller may first choose a limited collection of products and then decide which of those products to display to each arriving customer. This is a concrete way to represent personalized product pages or offers with a common inventory or display…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy III: For Every Set of Cost Functions, Congestion Games Are Tight — the Worst-Case Pure Price of Anarchy Equals the Best Smoothness BoundResearch Paper

In a congestion game, each player chooses resources and pays a cost that depends on how many players use each chosen resource. Such games model shared facilities and network use, where independently chosen strategies can cost more in total than a coordinated choice. The price of anarchy measures this inefficiency by comparing the social cost of an…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Type Matching: Under the Modified Monge Condition There Is an Optimal Matching Policy That Respects the Priority Relation ≻MsResearch Paper

Many platforms match two sides of a market over time: ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers, blood banks match donated units with patients, organ allocation matches donors with recipients, and retailers pool inventory across fulfilment centres to serve orders from several regions. Demand and supply arrive in several types (locations, blood…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 4: Bundling k ≥ 2 I.I.D. Goods Guarantees a Fraction c/log k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with several goods and a single buyer is the smallest setting in which multi-dimensional mechanism design differs from the one-good theory. For one good, Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) says the optimal mechanism posts a price. For two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be non-monotone in the buyer's values, and is in…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 3: Selling k ≥ 2 Independent Goods Separately Guarantees a Fraction c/log² k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller who knows the distributions of a buyer's values for several goods can, in principle, design a mechanism that offers lotteries and prices conditional on the buyer's reported values. Finding the best such mechanism can be difficult even with two goods. Separate selling is much simpler: choose a one-good price for each item and let the buyer decide…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 1: Every Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Iff the Distribution Rules Are Generalized Weighted Shapley ValuesResearch Paper

In a cost sharing game (or, symmetrically, a revenue sharing game) self-interested players each pick a set of resources, every resource generates a welfare that depends on who uses it, and a distribution rule splits that welfare among the users. Network formation, atomic routing, coverage and distributed-control problems all fit this model (Anshelevich et…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 1: For Independent Groups of Goods Y and Z, Rev(Y, Z) ≤ Rev(Y) + Rev(Z) + BRev(Y) + BRev(Z)Research Paper

A seller who offers several goods to a buyer with private values has to choose a selling mechanism. For one good the optimal mechanism is known: post the best take-it-or-leave-it price (Myerson 1981). For two or more goods the optimal mechanism can be complicated: it may use lotteries, its menu may be infinite, and it may not be computable in closed form…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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