Supermodularity and Complementarity I: Lattices and the Tarski-Zhou Fixed Point TheoremTextbook
Motivation
Many results in economics and operations research reduce to a single question: does a
system of interacting, mutually reinforcing choices settle at an equilibrium? A firm
choosing input levels that are complements, a Cournot duopoly whose best responses move
together, a matching market where agents' preferences reinforce assortative pairings —
each is a fixed-point problem, but classical fixed-point theory (Brouwer, Kakutani) asks
for convexity and continuity that these problems rarely have. Tarski's fixed point
theorem [1955] showed that order, not topology, suffices: every increasing (monotone)
self-map of a nonempty complete lattice has a fixed point, and the fixed points themselves
form a nonempty complete lattice, with no continuity or convexity assumed at all. Zhou
[1994] extended this from single-valued functions to set-valued correspondences,
which is what is needed once "best response" becomes "the (possibly non-unique) set of
optimizers." This mission formalizes Zhou's theorem (Topkis's Theorem 2.5.1) together
with its parametric extension (Theorem 2.5.2), the two capstones of the lattice-theoretic
toolkit that the rest of Topkis's monograph — and, within this series, its mission on
supermodular games (Supermodularity and Complementarity V) — builds on directly.
Setting
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every pair of elements has a join (least upper bound) and a meet (greatest lower bound). is a complete lattice if every subset (not just every pair) has a supremum and an infimum in ; a nonempty complete lattice always has a greatest element and a least element .
To compare sets of points — not just points — Topkis defines the induced set ordering : for , holds when every and satisfy and . Restricted to singletons, says exactly , so is the natural extension of from points to sets, and it is the order with respect to which set-valued maps (correspondences) are called increasing: implies .
A subset is a sublattice if it is closed under the binary join and meet of . is subcomplete if, more strongly, the supremum and infimum in of every nonempty subset of exist and lie in — so a subcomplete sublattice is itself a complete lattice under the order it inherits. A point is a fixed point of a correspondence if .
Formalization targets
Goal — Theorem 2.5.1 (Zhou's fixed point theorem)
Let be a nonempty complete lattice and an increasing correspondence with subcomplete for every . Then:
and the set of fixed points of , under its inherited order, is itself a nonempty complete lattice.
Theorem 2.5.2 (the parametric extension)
Let be a partially ordered set and a jointly increasing, subcomplete-valued correspondence on . Then for each the greatest and least fixed points , of exist and are increasing functions of ; under the further hypothesis that whenever , both become strictly increasing in . This is the theorem that gives comparative statics their bite: it says an equilibrium moves monotonically — even strictly — as a parameter of the underlying system changes.
Two supporting results are formalized as milestones because Theorem 2.5.1's own proof invokes them directly: Lemma 2.4.2 (supremum and infimum are monotone under , whenever they exist) and Theorem 2.4.2 (an intersection of increasing correspondences, if it stays nonempty, is itself increasing).
Significance
The result itself. Tarski–Zhou is the order-theoretic alternative to Brouwer–Kakutani: where the latter needs a convex, compact strategy space and a continuous map, Tarski–Zhou needs only a lattice order and monotonicity, and it delivers something Brouwer–Kakutani does not — a greatest and a least fixed point, with an explicit order-theoretic formula for each, and the guarantee that the whole fixed-point set is a complete lattice in its own right. This is exactly the machinery behind existence proofs for supermodular games (Topkis's own Theorem 4.2.1, where the fixed points of the best-response correspondence are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria) and behind monotone comparative statics more broadly (Milgrom–Roberts [1994], of which Theorem 2.5.2 is a strict generalization to correspondences).
Formalizing it. Mathlib already has Tarski's theorem for single-valued monotone
functions (OrderHom.lfp/gfp, fixedPoints.completeLattice, Knaster–Tarski). Nothing
in Mathlib currently proves it for set-valued correspondences: this mission is a genuine
strengthening of existing formalized mathematics, not a restatement of it, and it
introduces the induced set ordering and subcompleteness — reused throughout the rest of
this book's mission series — for the first time.
Difficulty
The natural first idea — "apply Knaster–Tarski to some selection function built from " — fails because there is no canonical way to select a single point from each that remains monotone without already knowing the theorem: an arbitrary selection from an increasing correspondence need not itself be increasing (this is exactly the subtlety Topkis's Theorem 2.4.3 addresses only for correspondences with a greatest/least element). The real argument instead builds the candidate fixed point directly as a supremum over an auxiliary set and establishes it is a fixed point using the monotonicity lemma (Lemma 2.4.2) at each step — no selection is ever made. A second subtlety is that the fixed-point set is not, in general, a sublattice of : Topkis's Example 2.5.1 exhibits an increasing self-map of whose four fixed points are not closed under /. Part (b)'s claim that the fixed points form their own complete lattice must therefore be proved without ever assuming, or implying, that ambient joins and meets of fixed points are again fixed points.
Formalization scope
is formalized as an abstract CompleteLattice, not ℝⁿ — the theorem is genuinely
about order, and specializing to would hide exactly the generality Zhou's result
adds over finite-dimensional fixed-point theorems. The induced set ordering
InducedSetOrder and the predicate Subcomplete are defined once in this mission and
reused by every later mission in the series that reasons about correspondences ordered
by . A formalization that replaced the correspondence by a single-valued
function would trivialize the mission into a restatement of Mathlib's existing
Knaster–Tarski theorem; the set-valued, subcomplete-ranged correspondence is not an
optional generality but the entire content being added. Part (b) of Theorem 2.5.1 is
formalized as a completeness statement about the induced order on the fixed-point set
itself — not as a claim that the fixed-point set is closed under 's ambient join and
meet, which Example 2.5.1 refutes. "Partially ordered set" throughout is Lean's
PartialOrder, matching the book's own usage in Chapter 2.
Selected references
- Tarski, A., A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 5(2), 1955, pp. 285–309. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1955.5.285
- Zhou, L., The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice, Games and Economic Behavior 7(2), 1994, pp. 295–300. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1051
- Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., Comparing equilibria, American Economic Review 84(3), 1994, pp. 441–459. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118061
- Topkis, D. M., Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 2011 (DOI 10.1515/9781400822539), Chapter 2, §2.2–2.5.