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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification: The α-GSP Mechanism Has an Efficient Nash Equilibrium Whenever the α-VCG Mechanism DoesResearch Paper

Search engines sell the ad slots next to their results in position auctions: advertisers bid, the highest bidder gets the top slot, the second highest the next one, and so on. A slot higher on the page is clicked more often, and the ratio of click rates between slots is described by a vector of relative position values. The textbook truthful mechanism,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Inventory Systems with Record Inaccuracy: Transaction Errors vs. Unobservable Loss: the restocking cost is unimodal in the restocking time, so the optimal restocking policy is a threshold policyResearch Paper

Retail inventory records are often wrong. In an audit of 370,000 inventory records from 37 stores of one retailer, only 35% were accurate (DeHoratius and Raman 2008, as reported by the paper, p.1). The record drifts for two reasons. Unobservable loss (theft, damage, misplacement) removes units without touching the record. Transaction errors at the checkout…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Pick-an-Object Mechanisms: an individually rational rule is pick-an-object implementable in perfect ex-post equilibrium iff it is strategy-proof and monotonically discoverableResearch Paper

Many allocation procedures used in practice — school choice, university admissions, course allocation — are run as one-shot direct mechanisms: every participant submits a full ranking, and an algorithm such as deferred acceptance or top trading cycles computes the assignment. Sequential alternatives, in which participants repeatedly pick one option from a…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: iris

Risk-Averse Bargaining in a Stochastic Optimization Context: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Strategy Proofness and Continuity Characterize the Allocation Proportional to Endowment AcceptabilitiesResearch Paper

When independent firms pool resources, they can share not only a deterministic profit but a random one, chosen through a joint decision. Cooperative models for operations management usually value such payoffs in expectation or by a concave utility, and then bargain over the expected values. Gutjahr, Kovacevic and Wozabal (author manuscript) replace this…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Educational Inequality and Reservation Policy in Developing Markets: the inequality-eliminating seat transfer has a closed form and strictly exceeds the welfare-maximizing transferResearch Paper

Many developing countries reserve college seats for disadvantaged students, and how large the reservation should be is a live policy question: in 1993 the Supreme Court of India capped reservations at 50% of seats. Bao, Ni and Singh (SSRN 3772113, version of May 30, 2023; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.00249) build an equilibrium…

56 thms2 active usersReviewed
Optimization·Captain: iris

Crowdsourcing Last-Mile Deliveries: robust crowdsourcing is feasible iff P^≤min⁡{PˉN,P~,1}\hat P\le\min\{\bar P^N,\tilde P,1\}P^≤min{PˉN,P~,1}, with optimal crowd share P∗=min⁡{PˉN,P~,1}P^*=\min\{\bar P^N,\tilde P,1\}P∗=min{PˉN,P~,1} and binding crowd wage w∗w^*w∗Research Paper

Retailers such as Amazon (Flex) and Walmart (Spark) use independent crowd drivers to meet on-demand delivery windows. Those drivers decide for themselves whether to work, and they are paid only while busy. A firm therefore faces two linked decisions: how much on-demand work to give the crowd, and what hourly wage to pay. A low utilization leaves drivers…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Optimal Learning Under Robustness and Time-Consistency: Learning in Ellsberg's Urns Is Rejected Iff Ambiguity Is Large; Otherwise Sample Until ∣Z∣|Z|∣Z∣ Hits zˉ\bar zzˉ, Then Bet on the Ambiguous UrnResearch Paper

Ellsberg's two-urn experiment (Ellsberg 1961) asks a decision maker to bet on the color of a ball drawn from a risky urn, with known proportion one half of red balls, or from an ambiguous urn of unknown composition. Most people bet on the risky urn whichever color they bet on, which no single prior over the ambiguous urn can explain. The maxmin expected…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Probability·Captain: iris

Supply Chain Performance with Target-Oriented Firms: a target-oriented retailer raises wholesale-price supply-chain profit for moderate targets and reaches first-best at αr=bξc+a\alpha^r = b\xi^c + aαr=bξc+aResearch Paper

A wholesale price contract is the simplest agreement between a supplier and a retailer: the supplier names a unit price and the retailer chooses how much to buy. It is widely used and it is known to be inefficient when both firms maximize expected profit. The retailer bears all the demand risk and orders less than a centralized firm would, the double…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings: the unique legal set of assignments is the set of stable assignments of a subinstanceResearch Paper

Stable assignments are the standard output of centralized school choice, but insisting on stability can leave many students worse off than necessary (Faenza–Zhang, §1). Morrill (2016) proposed legality as a relaxation motivated by legal standing: a student who forms a blocking pair has a complaint only if the remedy, the assignment of that student to that…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: iris

Tax-Favored Stock Donations by Corporate Insiders and Consequences for Equity Markets: price efficiency rises with donors and traders, faster with donors, and falls with tax ratesResearch Paper

Corporate insiders are barred from trading on private information, but in the United States they may donate appreciated shares to charity. The donor deducts the shares' market value from ordinary income and never pays capital-gains tax on the appreciation. Empirical work documents that such gifts are well timed: donations by insiders predict poor future…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: iris

Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences: the joint review policy attains the full-information optimum and strictly beats both the association and global policiesResearch Paper

A customer who is about to buy a new product usually reads the reviews of earlier buyers. Those reviews say something about the product's quality, which all customers share, and something about its fit with the reviewer's own taste, which only similar customers share. A platform decides how much of this to show. In the paper's examples, Apple's App Store…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users: when a firm strictly prefers a transparent hiring algorithm, region by region in the agents' cost planeResearch Paper

Firms increasingly screen job applicants, borrowers and customers with algorithms built on observable features. Regulators and the public ask for these algorithms to be made transparent, and firms often resist, arguing that agents who know the algorithm will game it. Wang, Huang, Jasin and Singh (arXiv:2008.09283, 2020; published in Management Science,…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: iris

Marketplace Scalability and Strategic Use of Platform Investment: when sellers can scale, the platform is less likely to offer the ancillary service, and its price and profit are no higherResearch Paper

Marketplace platforms often sell their sellers a service that those sellers could otherwise buy or build. Order fulfillment is the standard example: Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba offer logistics and distribution services to third-party sellers, while other platforms have delayed or declined to offer them. Li, Pisano, Xu and Zhu (SSRN 3310484; published in Mana…

30 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

The Strategic Role of Supplier Learning: the optimal two-period procurement contract under private cost and private learning outcomesResearch Paper

Learning curves are a standard fact of manufacturing: unit cost falls with cumulative output, so a buyer who orders more today buys cheaper tomorrow (Yelle 1979). Procurement contracts with an outside supplier then face a second problem: the supplier knows its own cost and learning ability better than the buyer does, and it also observes privately how…

70 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: iris

Strategic Bank Liability Structure Under Capital Requirements: the value-maximizing bank sets its endogenous default boundary equal to the regulatory total capital boundary, in closed formResearch Paper

A bank funds its assets with two kinds of debt that a nonbank firm does not mix in the same way: insured deposits, which earn the bank a service profit but cost a risk-based insurance premium, and nondeposit debt (bonds), which carries a credit spread. Regulators close a bank whose total capital falls below a fixed fraction of its assets, and the deposit…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: iris

Dynamic Programming Deconstructed: Transformations of the Bellman Equation and Computational Efficiency: Refactored Value Iteration Converges to g* and g*-Greedy Policies Are OptimalResearch Paper

Many dynamic programs are solved faster after the Bellman equation has been rewritten. The Q-factor form of reinforcement learning moves the maximization inside an expectation over state-action pairs; Rust's expected value function for discrete choice models (Rust 1987) integrates out the next state before maximizing; optimal stopping problems are routinely…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: iris

Managing Competition from Within and Outside: Using Strategic Inventory and Network Externality to Combat Copycats: equilibria of both contracts and the strategic-inventory cutoff h1Research Paper

A brand-name product sold through a supplier and a retailer suffers from double marginalization: each firm adds its own margin, so the retail price is too high and both firms earn less than an integrated firm would. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that, in a two-period channel where the supplier sets each period's wholesale price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: iris

When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice: below w*_f the unique symmetric bonus-and-commission equilibrium has advice cutoffs independent of liabilityResearch Paper

Financial products, insurance and many other goods are sold through advisors whose pay comes from the product providers. A large policy literature asks whether such advice is biased and how regulation should respond; a common answer is liability: make the advisor bear more of the cost of an unsuitable recommendation, through penalties, fiduciary duties or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Geometrically Convergent Simulation of the Extrema of Lévy Processes: the stick-breaking errors of the supremum and its time decay geometrically in L^p, at rate η_p ∈ [3/2, 2] with explicit constantsResearch Paper

The supremum of a Lévy process over a finite horizon, and the time at which it is attained, enter the prices of lookback and barrier options, ruin probabilities in insurance, and the workload of queues and storage systems. Their law is explicit only in special cases, so in practice they are computed by Monte Carlo simulation. The classical method, the…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: iris

A Stochastic Representation for Nonlocal Parabolic PDEs with Applications: the nonlocal terminal-boundary problem has a unique bounded solution, given by a Feynman-Kac formula with boundary jumpsResearch Paper

Classical Feynman–Kac theorems connect a parabolic equation with fixed boundary data to the expectation of a functional of a diffusion stopped at the boundary. Several models in finance and physics do not fit this frame, because the terminal and boundary values depend on the solution in the interior. Dai, Kou and Yang (SSRN 3541591, later in Mathematics of…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: iris

Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by Credit Default Swap Investors: an intervening CDS seller raises equilibrium firm value, with full hedging, no liquidation and a positive CDS premiumResearch Paper

A credit default swap (CDS) insures a lender against the default of a borrower: the protection buyer (the lender) pays an upfront premium, and the protection seller (a dealer) pays the insured amount if a credit event occurs. Because the payment depends on whether the firm is liquidated, both sides of the contract have a stake in how a distressed firm is…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Robustness in the Optimization of Risk Measures: Value-at-Risk is not robust against optimization for budget-constrained functional problemsResearch Paper

Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall are the two risk measures used in banking and insurance regulation. Their robustness has traditionally been studied as a property of the functional alone, applied to one fixed position. In that setting Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010) found VaR more robust than coherent risk measures, while later work such as Embre…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: iris

Masking Anstreicher's linx Bound for Improved Entropy Bounds: The Identity Mask Lowers the Optimally Scaled linx Bound by at Least 0.024036·nResearch Paper

The maximum-entropy sampling problem (MESP) asks, for an n×nn\times nn×n covariance matrix CCC of Gaussian random variables and an integer 0<s<n0<s<n0<s<n, for the sss variables of largest joint differential entropy:

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

On the Diameter of the Stopped Spider Process: for n ≥ 3 rays, 2√U(0,0,0) is the best constant in E D_τ ≤ C √(E τ) for the British-rail diameter of stopped Walsh Brownian motionResearch Paper

A one-dimensional Brownian motion can be viewed as reflecting Brownian motion ∣B∣|B|∣B∣ whose excursions away from 000 receive independent random signs. The spider process, also called Walsh Brownian motion, replaces the sign by a uniformly random choice among nnn rays meeting at the origin (Walsh 1978; Barlow, Pitman and Yor 1988). It is the basic diffusion on a…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Probability·Captain: iris

Warranty Matching in a Consumer Electronics Closed-Loop Supply Chain: a distribution-free bound on the expected mismatch cost of random assignmentResearch Paper

A wireless service provider (WSP) that sells phones with a customer warranty must replace a device that fails while that warranty is in force. Replacements come from an inventory of refurbished devices, each still carrying what is left of its OEM warranty, the manufacturer's warranty under which the WSP can return a failed device for free repair. When a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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