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Operations Research

911 missions · 539 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Uncertain Linear Programs II: With Ellipsoidal Uncertainty the Robust Counterpart Is Equivalent to a Conic Quadratic ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

The data of a linear program are often not known exactly: they are measured or estimated, or they are forecasts. The robust counterpart approach, going back to Soyster (1973), asks for a solution that is feasible for every data matrix in a prescribed uncertainty set and is best among such solutions. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski's 1999 paper [1] showed that the method stays computationally tractable for a broad class of uncertainty sets, the ellipsoidal uncertainties: the robust counterpart of an uncertain LP is then a conic quadratic program (CQP), solvable by interior point methods at roughly the cost of an LP of similar size. This result is the basis of robust linear optimization as it is used today [2], [3]. It is also the reason ellipsoidal sets are the default choice in robust portfolio selection (§4 of the paper) and in many later robust models.

Timeline. Soyster (1973) treated column-wise box uncertainty, for which the counterpart is again an LP [4]. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998) developed the general theory of robust convex optimization [5]. The present paper (1999) proved the ellipsoidal-to-CQP reduction for LPs (Theorem 3.1). Its proof relies on the conic duality theory of Nesterov and Nemirovski (1994) [6].

Setting

An uncertain linear program in the homogeneous form (6) is

min⁡{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},\min\{c^Tx \mid Ax \ge 0,\ f^Tx = 1\},min{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},

where c,f∈Rnc, f \in \mathbb R^nc,f∈Rn are fixed and the matrix A∈Rm×nA \in \mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n lies in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU. A point xxx is robust feasible if fTx=1f^Tx = 1fTx=1 and Ax≥0Ax \ge 0Ax≥0 for every A∈UA \in \mathcal UA∈U. The robust counterpart (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) minimizes cTxc^TxcTx over the robust feasible set

GU={x∣Ax≥0 ∀A∈U, fTx=1}.G_{\mathcal U} = \{x \mid Ax \ge 0\ \forall A \in \mathcal U,\ f^Tx = 1\}.GU​={x∣Ax≥0 ∀A∈U, fTx=1}.

An ellipsoid in Rm×n\mathbb R^{m\times n}Rm×n (display (14)) is a set

U(Π,Q)={Π(u)∣∥Qu∥≤1},U(\Pi, Q) = \{\Pi(u) \mid \|Qu\| \le 1\},U(Π,Q)={Π(u)∣∥Qu∥≤1},

where Π(u)=P0+∑j=1LujPj\Pi(u) = P^0 + \sum_{j=1}^L u_jP^jΠ(u)=P0+∑j=1L​uj​Pj is affine in u∈RLu \in \mathbb R^Lu∈RL, QQQ is an M×LM\times LM×L matrix, and ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm. A singular QQQ gives an ellipsoidal cylinder, which may be unbounded. An ellipsoidal uncertainty is a set

U=⋂ℓ=0kU(Πℓ,Qℓ)\mathcal U = \bigcap_{\ell=0}^k U(\Pi_\ell, Q_\ell)U=ℓ=0⋂k​U(Πℓ​,Qℓ​)

(condition A) that is bounded (condition B) and contains a matrix AAA with A=Πℓ(uℓ)A = \Pi_\ell(u^\ell)A=Πℓ​(uℓ) and ∥Qℓuℓ∥<1\|Q_\ell u^\ell\| < 1∥Qℓ​uℓ∥<1 for every ℓ\ellℓ (condition C, a Slater condition).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For every x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn,

x∈GU  ⟺  fTx=1  and  ∀i≤m  ∃ λ(i),μ(i),ν(i): (x,λ(i),μ(i),ν(i)) satisfies (Ci).x \in G_{\mathcal U} \iff f^Tx = 1 \ \text{ and }\ \forall i \le m\ \ \exists\, \lambda^{(i)}, \mu^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)} :\ (x, \lambda^{(i)}, \mu^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)}) \text{ satisfies } (\mathcal C_i).x∈GU​⟺fTx=1  and  ∀i≤m  ∃λ(i),μ(i),ν(i): (x,λ(i),μ(i),ν(i)) satisfies (Ci​).

Here (Ci)(\mathcal C_i)(Ci​) is an explicit system: linear equations and one linear inequality in (x,λ,μ,ν)(x, \lambda, \mu, \nu)(x,λ,μ,ν), together with the second-order cone constraints ∥μℓ(i)∥≤νℓ(i)\|\mu^{(i)}_\ell\| \le \nu^{(i)}_\ell∥μℓ(i)​∥≤νℓ(i)​. Its coefficients are the matrices PℓjP^j_\ellPℓj​ and QℓQ_\ellQℓ​. The robust feasible set is therefore the projection of the feasible set of the conic quadratic program (CQP), which minimizes cTxc^TxcTx subject to (C1),…,(Cm)(\mathcal C_1), \dots, (\mathcal C_m)(C1​),…,(Cm​) and fTx=1f^Tx = 1fTx=1.

Milestones, in the order of the Appendix's proof

  1. U\mathcal UU equals the image of the feasible set of the problem (Pi[x])(P_i[x])(Pi​[x]) under u↦Π0(u0)u \mapsto \Pi_0(u^0)u↦Π0​(u0) (p. 15).
  2. Claim (I): with fTx=1f^Tx = 1fTx=1, xxx is robust feasible iff every (Pi[x])(P_i[x])(Pi​[x]) has nonnegative optimal value (p. 15).
  3. Claim (II): conic quadratic duality. A strictly feasible primal that is bounded below has a solvable dual with equal optimal value (p. 15).
  4. Conditions B and C make every (Pi[x])(P_i[x])(Pi​[x]) strictly feasible and bounded below (p. 16).

Companion results

The CQP forms (16) and (17) of the simplest cases (a single ellipsoid; constraint-wise ellipsoids), Remark 3.1 (bounded polytopes are ellipsoidal uncertainties), and the robust portfolio counterpart (22).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 turns a semi-infinite constraint system (one constraint for every A∈UA \in \mathcal UA∈U) into finitely many conic quadratic constraints whose size is polynomial in the data. Robust LPs with ellipsoidal uncertainty, which by Remark 3.1 include polytopic uncertainty, can therefore be solved by standard conic solvers. Later robust optimization results, such as budgeted uncertainty, affinely adjustable policies and distributionally robust LPs, refine this pattern.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and its proof is complete, but no machine-checked proof exists. A formal proof needs a conic quadratic strong duality theorem with dual attainment (claim (II)), which Mathlib does not have in this form. That duality theorem can be reused well beyond this mission. The companion results (16), (17) and (22) are self-contained computations of a minimum of a linear function over a Euclidean ball.

Difficulty

The "if" direction is weak duality: a solution of (Ci)(\mathcal C_i)(Ci​) certifies that the iii-th constraint holds for all of U\mathcal UU. The content is the "only if" direction. It requires dual attainment, not merely equality of optimal values, because a solution of (Ci)(\mathcal C_i)(Ci​) must exist. Dual attainment fails without a constraint qualification. Condition C must hold strictly for every ellipsoid, including ℓ=0\ell = 0ℓ=0, and the ellipsoids may be cylinders, so the variables uℓu^\elluℓ can range over unbounded sets even though U\mathcal UU is bounded. Projecting the problem onto a single parameter space is not available in general, because the maps Πℓ\Pi_\ellΠℓ​ need not be injective.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ and matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The indices ℓ=0,…,k\ell = 0, \dots, kℓ=0,…,k are Fin (k + 1), and the kkk equality multipliers λℓ\lambda_\ellλℓ​, ℓ≥1\ell \ge 1ℓ≥1, are indexed by Fin k. Every norm is Euclidean, written out as euclidNorm v = √(∑ v_j²), because Mathlib's norm on Fin M → ℝ is the sup norm, under which ellipsoids would become boxes. Condition B is a uniform bound on all matrix entries, and condition C is required for every ℓ=0,…,k\ell = 0, \dots, kℓ=0,…,k. The page's words say "ℓ=1,…,k\ell = 1, \dots, kℓ=1,…,k", but its display and the proof use every ℓ\ellℓ. Injectivity of Πℓ\Pi_\ellΠℓ​ is not assumed, and neither is §2.1's standing assumption that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed. An ellipsoidal uncertainty is convex automatically, and closedness is not used, so both omissions generalize the statement. Three printed slips are corrected and disclosed: the sum in the equality constraint of (CQPd_dd​) runs over ℓ=0,…,k\ell = 0, \dots, kℓ=0,…,k; (Ci)(\mathcal C_i)(Ci​) has φ(i)[x]\varphi^{(i)}[x]φ(i)[x] where the page prints f(i)[x]f^{(i)}[x]f(i)[x]; and Remark 3.1 has the factor 2/(ri−si)2/(r_i - s_i)2/(ri​−si​) where the page prints (ri−si)/2(r_i - s_i)/2(ri​−si​)/2.

The goal is not the contentless statement "some conic quadratic program has GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ as a projection", which holds for every closed convex set. It names the system (Ci)(\mathcal C_i)(Ci​) built from the data PℓjP^j_\ellPℓj​, QℓQ_\ellQℓ​. The goal also does not mention optimal values, (CQPp_pp​) or strict feasibility; those are milestones.

Contributions are welcome on the conic duality theorem (II) as a standalone result, on the finite-dimensional facts that minimize a linear function over a Euclidean ball (used in (16), (17) and (22)), and on the goal itself.

Selected references

  1. A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1):1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(99)00016-4
  2. A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831050
  3. D. Bertsimas, D. B. Brown, C. Caramanis, Theory and applications of robust optimization, SIAM Review 53(3):464–501, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/080734510
  4. A. L. Soyster, Convex programming with set-inclusive constraints and applications to inexact linear programming, Operations Research 21(5):1154–1157, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1154
  5. A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  6. Yu. Nesterov, A. Nemirovski, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM Studies in Applied Mathematics 13, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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Linear OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Constructing Uncertainty Sets for Robust Linear Optimization 1: A Distortion Risk Constraint Equals a Robust Constraint over a Permutohull and an Explicit Linear SystemResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust linear optimization replaces an uncertain constraint a~′x≥b\tilde a'x \ge ba~′x≥b by the requirement that a′x≥ba'x \ge ba′x≥b hold for every aaa in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 1999). The method leaves open where U\mathcal UU should come from. Risk theory answers a related question from the other side: a decision maker's attitude to an uncertain reward is described by a risk measure μ\muμ, and the constraint is imposed as μ(a~′x−b)≤0\mu(\tilde a'x - b) \le 0μ(a~′x−b)≤0.

Bertsimas and Brown (2009) connect the two. When μ\muμ is coherent and a~\tilde aa~ is supported on finitely many observed data points a1,…,aNa_1, \dots, a_Na1​,…,aN​, the risk constraint is exactly a robust constraint whose uncertainty set is built from the data and the family of probability vectors generating μ\muμ. For the class of distortion risk measures, the uncertainty set has an explicit polyhedral form, the qqq-permutohull of the data, and the robust constraint has a reformulation of polynomial size. This mission formalizes that chain of results, Sections 2–4.3 of the paper.

Setting

The sample space is finite, Ω={ω1,…,ωN}\Omega = \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N\}Ω={ω1​,…,ωN​}, and a random variable is a vector X∈RNX \in \mathbb R^NX∈RN, read as a reward; X≥YX \ge YX≥Y means Xi≥YiX_i \ge Y_iXi​≥Yi​ for every iii. The probability simplex is ΔN={p∈R+N:e′p=1}\Delta^N = \{p \in \mathbb R^N_+ : e'p = 1\}ΔN={p∈R+N​:e′p=1}, and Eq[X]=∑iqiXi\mathbb E_q[X] = \sum_i q_i X_iEq​[X]=∑i​qi​Xi​.

A risk measure is a function μ:RN→R\mu : \mathbb R^N \to \mathbb Rμ:RN→R with X≥Y⇒μ(X)≤μ(Y)X \ge Y \Rightarrow \mu(X) \le \mu(Y)X≥Y⇒μ(X)≤μ(Y) and μ(X+c)=μ(X)−c\mu(X + c) = \mu(X) - cμ(X+c)=μ(X)−c. It is coherent if it is moreover convex and positively homogeneous. A set Q⊆ΔN\mathcal Q \subseteq \Delta^NQ⊆ΔN generates μ\muμ if μ(X)=sup⁡q∈QEq[−X]\mu(X) = \sup_{q \in \mathcal Q} \mathbb E_q[-X]μ(X)=supq∈Q​Eq​[−X] for all XXX. The conditional value-at-risk under a probability vector ppp is CVaRα(X)=inf⁡ν∈R{ν+1αEp[(−ν−X)+]}\mathrm{CVaR}_\alpha(X) = \inf_{\nu \in \mathbb R}\{\nu + \frac1\alpha \mathbb E_p[(-\nu - X)^+]\}CVaRα​(X)=infν∈R​{ν+α1​Ep​[(−ν−X)+]} for α∈(0,1]\alpha \in (0,1]α∈(0,1].

Two random variables are comonotone if (X(ω)−X(ω′))(Y(ω)−Y(ω′))≥0(X(\omega) - X(\omega'))(Y(\omega) - Y(\omega')) \ge 0(X(ω)−X(ω′))(Y(ω)−Y(ω′))≥0 for all ω,ω′\omega, \omega'ω,ω′; μ\muμ is comonotonic if it is additive on comonotone pairs, and law invariant if it takes equal values on random variables with the same distribution. A distortion risk measure is a coherent, comonotonic, law-invariant risk measure. From Section 4.2 on, Ω\OmegaΩ carries the uniform distribution P{ωi}=1/N\mathbb P\{\omega_i\} = 1/NP{ωi​}=1/N.

The restricted simplex is Δ^N={q∈ΔN:q1≥⋯≥qN}\hat\Delta^N = \{q \in \Delta^N : q_1 \ge \cdots \ge q_N\}Δ^N={q∈ΔN:q1​≥⋯≥qN​}. For q∈Δ^Nq \in \hat\Delta^Nq∈Δ^N put

μq(X)=−∑i=1Nqix(i),\mu_q(X) = -\sum_{i=1}^N q_i x_{(i)},μq​(X)=−i=1∑N​qi​x(i)​,

where x(1)≤⋯≤x(N)x_{(1)} \le \cdots \le x_{(N)}x(1)​≤⋯≤x(N)​ are the increasing order statistics of XXX. The data are A={a1,…,aN}⊆Rn\mathcal A = \{a_1, \dots, a_N\} \subseteq \mathbb R^nA={a1​,…,aN​}⊆Rn, the uncertain vector a~\tilde aa~ takes the value aia_iai​ at ωi\omega_iωi​, and the qqq-permutohull of A\mathcal AA is

Πq(A)=conv⁡{∑i=1Nqσ(i)ai:σ∈SN}.\Pi_q(\mathcal A) = \operatorname{conv}\Big\{\sum_{i=1}^N q_{\sigma(i)} a_i : \sigma \in S_N\Big\}.Πq​(A)=conv{i=1∑N​qσ(i)​ai​:σ∈SN​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3

Under the uniform distribution, for every distortion risk measure μ\muμ there is q∈Δ^Nq \in \hat\Delta^Nq∈Δ^N with μ=μq\mu = \mu_qμ=μq​, and for this qqq, all data and every bbb,

{x:μ(a~′x−b)≤0}={x:a′x≥b ∀a∈Πq(A)}={x:∃y1,y2∈RN, e′y1+e′y2≥b, y1,i+y2,j≤qi aj′x ∀i,j}.\{x : \mu(\tilde a'x - b) \le 0\} = \{x : a'x \ge b\ \forall a \in \Pi_q(\mathcal A)\} = \{x : \exists y_1, y_2 \in \mathbb R^N,\ e'y_1 + e'y_2 \ge b,\ y_{1,i} + y_{2,j} \le q_i\, a_j'x\ \forall i, j\}.{x:μ(a~′x−b)≤0}={x:a′x≥b ∀a∈Πq​(A)}={x:∃y1​,y2​∈RN, e′y1​+e′y2​≥b, y1,i​+y2,j​≤qi​aj′​x ∀i,j}.

The vector qqq depends on μ\muμ only; the data are quantified after it.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.1. μ\muμ is coherent if and only if some family Q⊆ΔN\mathcal Q \subseteq \Delta^NQ⊆ΔN generates it.
  2. Theorem 3.1. For coherent μ\muμ generated by Q\mathcal QQ, {x:μ(a~′x−b)≤0}={x:a′x≥b ∀a∈conv⁡{Aq:q∈Q}}\{x : \mu(\tilde a'x - b) \le 0\} = \{x : a'x \ge b\ \forall a \in \operatorname{conv}\{Aq : q \in \mathcal Q\}\}{x:μ(a~′x−b)≤0}={x:a′x≥b ∀a∈conv{Aq:q∈Q}}; conversely every nonempty U⊆conv⁡(A)\mathcal U \subseteq \operatorname{conv}(\mathcal A)U⊆conv(A) arises from the coherent measure generated by {q∈ΔN:Aq∈U}\{q \in \Delta^N : Aq \in \mathcal U\}{q∈ΔN:Aq∈U}.
  3. Generation of (4). μq\mu_qμq​ is generated by the permuted vectors q∘σq \circ \sigmaq∘σ, σ∈SN\sigma \in S_Nσ∈SN​.
  4. Theorem 4.1 (Schmeidler). A coherent μ\muμ is comonotonic if and only if μ(X)=∫(−X) dg\mu(X) = \int (-X)\,dgμ(X)=∫(−X)dg (Choquet integral) for a monotone, normalized, submodular g:2Ω→[0,1]g : 2^\Omega \to [0,1]g:2Ω→[0,1].
  5. Second differences (proof of Lemma 4.1). A submodular ggg depending only on ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ has nonincreasing increments along ∅⊂{ω1}⊂{ω1,ω2}⊂⋯\emptyset \subset \{\omega_1\} \subset \{\omega_1, \omega_2\} \subset \cdots∅⊂{ω1​}⊂{ω1​,ω2​}⊂⋯.
  6. Lemma 4.1. A risk measure is a distortion risk measure if and only if μ(X)=∫(0,1]CVaRα(X) ν(dα)\mu(X) = \int_{(0,1]} \mathrm{CVaR}_\alpha(X)\,\nu(d\alpha)μ(X)=∫(0,1]​CVaRα​(X)ν(dα) for a probability measure ν\nuν.
  7. The CVaR display (proof of Theorem 4.2). CVaRα(X)=sup⁡{Eq[−X]:q∈ΔN, qi≤1/(Nα)}=μqα(X)\mathrm{CVaR}_\alpha(X) = \sup\{\mathbb E_q[-X] : q \in \Delta^N,\ q_i \le 1/(N\alpha)\} = \mu_{q^\alpha}(X)CVaRα​(X)=sup{Eq​[−X]:q∈ΔN, qi​≤1/(Nα)}=μqα​(X) with qα∈Δ^Nq^\alpha \in \hat\Delta^Nqα∈Δ^N.
  8. Theorem 4.2. A risk measure is a distortion risk measure if and only if μ=μq\mu = \mu_qμ=μq​ for some q∈Δ^Nq \in \hat\Delta^Nq∈Δ^N; every such qqq is a convex combination of the generators q^j\hat q^jq^​j of CVaRj/N\mathrm{CVaR}_{j/N}CVaRj/N​.
  9. Assignment duality (proof of Theorem 4.3). a′x≥ba'x \ge ba′x≥b on Πq(A)\Pi_q(\mathcal A)Πq​(A) if and only if the linear system in (y1,y2)(y_1, y_2)(y1​,y2​) above is feasible.

A companion item states Corollary 4.3: Π∑jλjq^j(A)=conv⁡{∑jλj1j∑i≤jaσj(i):σj∈SN}\Pi_{\sum_j \lambda_j \hat q^j}(\mathcal A) = \operatorname{conv}\{\sum_j \lambda_j \frac1j \sum_{i \le j} a_{\sigma_j(i)} : \sigma_j \in S_N\}Π∑j​λj​q^​j​(A)=conv{∑j​λj​j1​∑i≤j​aσj​(i)​:σj​∈SN​}, and the class equality it yields: the uncertainty sets Πq(A)\Pi_q(\mathcal A)Πq​(A) of all distortion risk measures μ=μq\mu = \mu_qμ=μq​ are exactly the polytopes Uλ(A)\mathcal U_\lambda(\mathcal A)Uλ​(A), λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0, ∑jλj=1\sum_j \lambda_j = 1∑j​λj​=1.

Significance

The goal theorem identifies the uncertainty set implied by any distortion risk measure: it is a permutohull of the data, a polytope with up to N!N!N! vertices that is nevertheless representable with 2N2N2N extra variables and N2N^2N2 linear constraints. Combined with Theorem 4.2, the uncertainty sets of distortion measures are exactly the mixtures of the sets of jjj-point averages of the data (Corollary 4.3), with CVaRj/N\mathrm{CVaR}_{j/N}CVaRj/N​ as the generators. The later sections of the paper build on this: centrally symmetric permutohulls (Section 4.4) and the construction of a distortion risk measure from a given polyhedral uncertainty set (Section 4.5) are the subjects of the two companion missions.

The results are proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. The formalization adds checked statements of the finite-space representation theory of coherent and distortion risk measures, which the paper obtains partly by citing general results, and records the corrections the printed statements need.

Difficulty

The two equalities of the goal have unequal weight. The second is a statement about one polytope with up to N!N!N! vertices and a linear system of size O(N2)O(N^2)O(N2); it is finite-dimensional linear programming. The first requires the complete characterization of distortion risk measures on a finite uniform space, and that is where the obvious approach fails. The known representation of law-invariant comonotonic coherent measures as mixtures of CVaR (Kusuoka 2001) is proved for atomless spaces and does not transfer to a discrete Ω\OmegaΩ. The uniform distribution is essential, not a convenience: Remark 4.2 of the paper gives a two-point space with probabilities 1/3,2/31/3, 2/31/3,2/3 and a monotone, normalized, submodular set function depending only on probability whose induced distortion is not concave, so the conclusion of Theorem 4.2 fails there.

Formalization scope

  • Ω\OmegaΩ is Fin N with N≥1N \ge 1N≥1; random variables are Fin N → ℝ; indices are 0-based throughout, so qhat j is the paper's q^j+1\hat q^{j+1}q^​j+1 and q1≥⋯≥qNq_1 \ge \cdots \ge q_Nq1​≥⋯≥qN​ is Antitone q. Order statistics are X ∘ Tuple.sort X.
  • Probability measures on Ω\OmegaΩ are probability vectors in stdSimplex ℝ (Fin N). Generation (1) is an IsLUB over an arbitrary set of probability vectors, not a maximum over a finite family (that version is false).
  • Sign of the risk constraint. Display (2) and Theorem 4.3 print μ(a~′x−b)≥0\mu(\tilde a'x - b) \ge 0μ(a~′x−b)≥0. The paper introduces the constraint as μ(a~′x−b)≤0\mu(\tilde a'x - b) \le 0μ(a~′x−b)≤0 (p. 1486) and the proof of Theorem 3.1 computes μ(a~′x−b)=−inf⁡a∈Ua′x+b\mu(\tilde a'x - b) = -\inf_{a \in \mathcal U} a'x + bμ(a~′x−b)=−infa∈U​a′x+b; all statements use ≤0\le 0≤0.
  • Standing assumptions. Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 assume a probability vector ppp with pi>0p_i > 0pi​>0 (full support makes Q≪P\mathbb Q \ll \mathbb PQ≪P vacuous; with a null atom Theorem 2.1 fails for functions on Ω\OmegaΩ). From Lemma 4.1 on the distribution is uniform (Assumption 4.1). Theorem 3.1's converse adds U≠∅\mathcal U \neq \emptysetU=∅.
  • CVaR is a real infimum, used only for α∈(0,1]\alpha \in (0,1]α∈(0,1], where the objective is bounded below by E[−X]\mathbb E[-X]E[−X]. In Lemma 4.1 the mixing measure ν\nuν is a probability measure on (0,1](0,1](0,1]; the page's ∫01\int_0^1∫01​ is read over (0,1](0,1](0,1]. The CVaR display uses the corrected coefficient (Nα−⌊Nα⌋)/(Nα)(N\alpha - \lfloor N\alpha \rfloor)/(N\alpha)(Nα−⌊Nα⌋)/(Nα) in place of the printed /⌊Nα⌋/\lfloor N\alpha \rfloor/⌊Nα⌋. The assignment-duality milestone is stated for every q∈RNq \in \mathbb R^Nq∈RN.
  • The goal must assert the representation μ=μq\mu = \mu_qμ=μq​ together with the set equalities: a statement "there is some qqq for which the sets coincide" would let qqq depend on the data and is not Theorem 4.3. The goal does not assume μ=μq\mu = \mu_qμ=μq​, which is Theorem 4.2's conclusion.
  • Needed infrastructure: Birkhoff's theorem (in Mathlib), LP duality, the rearrangement inequality, Choquet integrals of step functions. Lemmas about μq\mu_qμq​ and order statistics are reusable beyond this mission; proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, D. B. Brown, Constructing uncertainty sets for robust linear optimization, Operations Research 57(6):1483–1495, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0646
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1):1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(99)00016-4
  • P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3):203–228, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00068
  • D. Schmeidler, Integral representation without additivity, Proceedings of the AMS 97(2):255–261, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1986-0835875-8
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2(3):21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • S. Kusuoka, On law invariant coherent risk measures, Advances in Mathematical Economics 3:83–95, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67891-5_4
  • H. Föllmer, A. Schied, Stochastic Finance: An Introduction in Discrete Time, 2nd ed., de Gruyter, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110212075
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Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Constructing Uncertainty Sets for Robust Linear Optimization 2: The Distortion Risk Measures with Centrally Symmetric Permutohulls Are the Mixtures of ⌊N/2⌋+1 GeneratorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear decision made with uncertain coefficients can be protected by requiring the constraint to hold for every coefficient vector in an uncertainty set. Choosing that set determines how conservative the decision is. Bertsimas and Brown connect this choice to a risk measure: a functional that assigns a cost to the random reward left by a decision. Their construction turns certain risk constraints into robust linear constraints over a convex hull of weighted samples. This mission isolates the structural question asked in §4.4 of their paper: which such risk measures always produce uncertainty sets that are centrally symmetric about the sample mean? The answer matters because this symmetric family is the class used in the paper's subsequent approximation of general polyhedral uncertainty sets. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), §§4.3–4.5.

Setting

There are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 observations, indexed by i=1,…,Ni=1,\ldots,Ni=1,…,N, with equal reference probabilities. A probability weight vector q=(q1,…,qN)q=(q_1,\ldots,q_N)q=(q1​,…,qN​) has nonnegative entries summing to one. The restricted simplex Δ^N\widehat\Delta^NΔN contains those vectors whose entries are nonincreasing: q1≥⋯≥qNq_1\ge\cdots\ge q_Nq1​≥⋯≥qN​. For a reward vector X=(x1,…,xN)X=(x_1,\ldots,x_N)X=(x1​,…,xN​), write x(1)≤⋯≤x(N)x_{(1)}\le\cdots\le x_{(N)}x(1)​≤⋯≤x(N)​ for its increasing order statistics. The associated distortion risk measure is μq(X)=−∑iqix(i)\mu_q(X)=-\sum_iq_i x_{(i)}μq​(X)=−∑i​qi​x(i)​. A larger reward therefore reduces risk. Under the uniform distribution, the paper's Theorem 4.2 identifies these functionals, for q∈Δ^Nq\in\widehat\Delta^Nq∈ΔN, with its distortion risk measures. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), Theorem 4.2.

Take arbitrary sample vectors a1,…,aN∈Rna_1,\ldots,a_N\in\mathbb R^na1​,…,aN​∈Rn. For a permutation σ\sigmaσ of their indices, form the weighted vector ∑iqσ(i)ai\sum_iq_{\sigma(i)}a_i∑i​qσ(i)​ai​. The qqq-permutohull Πq(A)\Pi_q(\mathcal A)Πq​(A) is the convex hull of all these vectors. Its center of interest is the sample mean a^=N−1∑iai\widehat a=N^{-1}\sum_i a_ia=N−1∑i​ai​. A set PPP is centrally symmetric through x0∈Px_0\in Px0​∈P when x0+x∈Px_0+x\in Px0​+x∈P implies x0−x∈Px_0-x\in Px0​−x∈P for every xxx. The quantifier “for any data” ranges over every dimension nnn and every choice of NNN sample vectors. It is stronger than symmetry for one selected data set. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), Definitions 4.7–4.8.

Formalization targets

The first target is Proposition 4.1's characterization of weights giving universal symmetry. If eNe_NeN​ is the vector with every entry 1/N1/N1/N, then

[Πq(A) is centrally symmetric through a^ for every n,A]⟺∃σ∈SN: q=2eN−qσ.\bigl[\Pi_q(\mathcal A)\text{ is centrally symmetric through }\widehat a \text{ for every }n,\mathcal A\bigr] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\sigma\in S_N:\ q=2e_N-q_\sigma.[Πq​(A) is centrally symmetric through a for every n,A]⟺∃σ∈SN​: q=2eN​−qσ​.

This condition defines the symmetric restricted simplex Δ^symN\widehat\Delta^N_{\mathrm{sym}}ΔsymN​ inside Δ^N\widehat\Delta^NΔN. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), Proposition 4.1 and Definition 4.9.

The main target is Theorem 4.4. Put N^=⌊N/2⌋+1\widehat N=\lfloor N/2\rfloor+1N=⌊N/2⌋+1. For 1≤j≤N^1\le j\le\widehat N1≤j≤N, define a generator qˉ j\bar q^{\,j}qˉ​j by

qˉi j={2/N,i<j,1/N,j≤i≤N−j+1,0,otherwise.\bar q_i^{\,j}= \begin{cases} 2/N,&i<j,\\ 1/N,&j\le i\le N-j+1,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}. \end{cases}qˉ​ij​=⎩⎨⎧​2/N,1/N,0,​i<j,j≤i≤N−j+1,otherwise.​

A functional represented by a q∈Δ^Nq\in\widehat\Delta^Nq∈ΔN whose permutohull is symmetric for every data set is exactly a convex mixture of the N^\widehat NN generator functionals:

μ(X)=∑j=1N^λjμqˉ j(X),λj≥0,∑j=1N^λj=1.\mu(X)=\sum_{j=1}^{\widehat N}\lambda_j\mu_{\bar q^{\,j}}(X), \qquad \lambda_j\ge0,\qquad\sum_{j=1}^{\widehat N}\lambda_j=1.μ(X)=j=1∑N​λj​μqˉ​j​(X),λj​≥0,j=1∑N​λj​=1.

The milestones also state the two set inclusions behind the equality of Δ^symN\widehat\Delta^N_{\mathrm{sym}}ΔsymN​ with the convex hull of these generators, including the coordinate reversal identity. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), Theorem 4.4 and its proof.

Significance

The result gives a finite list of risk functionals from which every member of the universally symmetric distortion subclass can be formed. The number of generators is ⌊N/2⌋+1\lfloor N/2\rfloor+1⌊N/2⌋+1, rather than an unspecified family. It also connects a geometric property of a robust uncertainty set to a checkable condition on its weights. The paper uses this symmetric subclass to formulate the inner approximation problem in §4.5, where a symmetric permutohull is fitted inside another polytope. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), §§4.4–4.5.

The mathematical result is proved in the 2009 paper. This formalization task is to obtain Lean proofs of the classification and its source-stated intermediate claims. The definition layer is a reusable interface for finite distortion risk measures, permutohulls, and symmetry under coordinate permutations. Formal proofs here would provide a checked foundation for later robust optimization statements using the same finite sample model. The proposed goal and milestones are open Lean statements; compiling them verifies their syntax and types, not their proofs.

Difficulty

Symmetry of one pictured polygon does not determine its weight vector. The hypothesis demands symmetry for every possible collection of sample vectors, so the converse in Proposition 4.1 must recover a relation among weights from a universal geometric property. Another difficulty is that the explicit generators change shape at the midpoint, and the odd and even cases have different middle ranges. The paper writes the calculation for odd NNN and says the even case is analogous; the theorem itself makes no parity restriction. A proof therefore has to cover the even boundary, including the generator whose 1/N1/N1/N band is empty. Bertsimas and Brown (2009), Proposition 4.1 and proof of Theorem 4.4.

Formalization scope

The Lean sample space is Fin N, with N>0N>0N>0. Its indices start at zero; the prose and source formulas above start at one. The source's N^\widehat NN is N / 2 + 1 in natural numbers. Probability vectors use Mathlib's standard simplex together with antitone coordinate order. Permutohulls use convexHull of the finite permutation family, and order statistics use Tuple.sort. The reference distribution is uniform, as in the paper's Assumption 4.1. Real vector spaces of dimension zero are allowed because the claim quantifies over every dimension; the nonempty sample condition excludes division by zero.

The goal takes an arbitrary functional μ\muμ and requires an actual representation μ=μq\mu=\mu_qμ=μq​ by a restricted-simplex weight. This is the paper's Theorem 4.2 parametrization of distortion risk measures, stated directly because that theorem is being drafted in a separate mission of the same series. Universal symmetry is derived from the data quantifier; it is not assumed as a condition on qqq. The generator mixture is likewise the conclusion, with its coefficients nonnegative and summing to one. Central symmetry includes membership of the center in the set.

Useful contributions include proofs of the source's permutation characterization, validity and symmetry of generator mixtures, and their converse spanning property. The definitions of finite probability weights and weighted permutation hulls can support further finite sample robust optimization results. The paper's inconsistent accent on the generator risk measure in Theorem 4.4 is read as the functional of the displayed generator vector; its intermediate sum on p. 1492 does not alter the stated normalized mixture.

Selected references

  • Dimitris Bertsimas and David B. Brown, Constructing Uncertainty Sets for Robust Linear Optimization, Operations Research 57(6), 1483–1495, 2009. DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0646.
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Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 2: The Rank Postulates and the Circuit Postulates Are EquivalentResearch Paper

Motivation

Hassler Whitney's 1935 paper On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence introduced matroids: finite sets of elements carrying an abstract notion of dependence that captures what linearly dependent columns of a matrix and cycles of a graph have in common. A distinctive feature of the paper is that it gives several independent axiom systems for the same structure: one in terms of rank, one in terms of independent sets, one in terms of bases, and one in terms of circuits (minimal dependent sets). It then proves they are interchangeable. These equivalences, now called cryptomorphisms, are what allow matroid theory to move freely between the algebraic picture (rank of a set of vectors) and the combinatorial one (cycles of a graph, minimal dependent column sets). Every textbook on the subject relies on them, for example J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, Chapter 1.

This mission treats one of them: the equivalence of Whitney's rank postulates (§2) and circuit postulates (§8). The circuit side is the one used in combinatorial optimization, where circuits appear as cycles in network flows, as minimal infeasible subsystems, and in the exchange arguments behind the greedy algorithm.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements. For subsets we write N+eN + eN+e for N∪{e}N \cup \{e\}N∪{e} and P1+P2P_1 + P_2P1​+P2​ for P1∪P2P_1 \cup P_2P1​∪P2​.

Rank system. A function rrr assigning an integer r(N)r(N)r(N) to each N⊆MN \subseteq MN⊆M satisfies the rank postulates if

  • (R1)(\mathrm R_1)(R1​) the rank of the null subset is zero;
  • (R2)(\mathrm R_2)(R2​) for any subset NNN and any element eee not in NNN, r(N+e)=r(N)+kr(N+e) = r(N) + kr(N+e)=r(N)+k with k=0k = 0k=0 or 111;
  • (R3)(\mathrm R_3)(R3​) for any subset NNN and elements e1,e2e_1, e_2e1​,e2​ not in NNN, if r(N+e1)=r(N+e2)=r(N)r(N+e_1) = r(N+e_2) = r(N)r(N+e1​)=r(N+e2​)=r(N), then r(N+e1+e2)=r(N)r(N+e_1+e_2) = r(N)r(N+e1​+e2​)=r(N).

With ρ(N)\rho(N)ρ(N) the number of elements of NNN, the nullity is n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N)n(N) = \rho(N) - r(N)n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N). An element eee is dependent on NNN if r(N+e)=r(N)r(N+e) = r(N)r(N+e)=r(N). A circuit of rrr is a minimal dependent set: a subset PPP with n(P)>0n(P) > 0n(P)>0 such that n(N)=0n(N) = 0n(N)=0 for every proper subset NNN of PPP. In Lean these are IsRankSystem r, nullity r N, IsDependentOn r e N and circuitsOfRank r P.

Circuit system. A family of subsets, called circuits, satisfies the circuit postulates (§8, p. 516) if

(C₁) No proper subset of a circuit is a circuit.

(C₂) If P₁ and P₂ are circuits, e₁ is in both P₁ and P₂, and e₂ is in P₁ but not in P₂, then there is a circuit P₃ in P₁ + P₂ containing e₂ but not e₁.

In Lean this is IsCircuitSystem C for a predicate C : Finset α → Prop.

Rank from circuits. Whitney defines (p. 516):

Let e₁, ⋯, e_p be any ordered set of elements of M. Set Γᵢ = 0 if there is a circuit in e₁ + ⋯ + eᵢ containing eᵢ, and set Γᵢ = 1 otherwise (compare Theorem 5). Let the "rank" of (e₁, ⋯, e_p) be r(e₁, ⋯, e_p) = Σ_{i=1}^{p} Γᵢ.

In Lean, rankSeq C l is this sum for a list l, and rankOfCircuits C N is its value on the enumeration N.toList of a subset NNN.

Formalization targets

Goal: the two systems are equivalent

For every finite set MMM:

(1)r satisfies (R)  ⟹  C(r) satisfies (C), ∅∉C(r), rC(r)=r;\text{(1)}\quad r \text{ satisfies } (\mathrm R) \;\Longrightarrow\; \mathcal C(r) \text{ satisfies } (\mathrm C),\ \emptyset \notin \mathcal C(r),\ r_{\mathcal C(r)} = r;(1)r satisfies (R)⟹C(r) satisfies (C), ∅∈/C(r), rC(r)​=r; (2)C satisfies (C), ∅∉C  ⟹  rC satisfies (R), C(rC)=C,\text{(2)}\quad \mathcal C \text{ satisfies } (\mathrm C),\ \emptyset \notin \mathcal C \;\Longrightarrow\; r_{\mathcal C} \text{ satisfies } (\mathrm R),\ \mathcal C(r_{\mathcal C}) = \mathcal C,(2)C satisfies (C), ∅∈/C⟹rC​ satisfies (R), C(rC​)=C,

where C(r)\mathcal C(r)C(r) is the family of circuits of rrr and rCr_{\mathcal C}rC​ is the rank defined from C\mathcal CC. This is Whitney's closing sentence of §8 (p. 517): "The definitions of rank and of circuits under the two systems (R), (C) agree, and hence the systems are equivalent."

Milestones, in the order the argument uses them

  • Lemma 5 (p. 512): each element of a circuit is dependent on the rest of the circuit.
  • Lemma 6 (p. 512): if e∉P1e \notin P_1e∈/P1​ is dependent on P1P_1P1​ but on no proper subset of P1P_1P1​, then P1+eP_1 + eP1​+e is a circuit.
  • Theorem 4 (p. 512): for e∉Ne \notin Ne∈/N, some circuit in N+eN + eN+e contains eee if and only if eee is dependent on NNN.
  • Theorem 5 (p. 513): if N=e1+⋯+epN = e_1 + \cdots + e_pN=e1​+⋯+ep​ is formed element by element, n(N)n(N)n(N) is the number of indices iii for which some circuit in e1+⋯+eie_1 + \cdots + e_ie1​+⋯+ei​ contains eie_iei​.
  • §5 (pp. 512–513): the circuits of a rank system satisfy (C1)(\mathrm C_1)(C1​) and (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​).
  • Lemma 7 (p. 516): r(e1,…,eq−2,eq−1,eq)=r(e1,…,eq−2,eq,eq−1)r(e_1, \dots, e_{q-2}, e_{q-1}, e_q) = r(e_1, \dots, e_{q-2}, e_q, e_{q-1})r(e1​,…,eq−2​,eq−1​,eq​)=r(e1​,…,eq−2​,eq​,eq−1​) under (C1)(\mathrm C_1)(C1​), (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​).
  • Lemma 8 (p. 517): the rank of a subset defined from circuits does not depend on the ordering of its elements.
  • §8 (p. 517): the rank defined from circuits satisfies (R1)(\mathrm R_1)(R1​)–(R3)(\mathrm R_3)(R3​).

Significance

The equivalence makes the circuit postulates a complete description of a matroid: everything stated about rank, nullity, independence and bases can be phrased through circuits and back. Downstream in the same paper, the fundamental sets of circuits of §9 (Theorem 9) and the binary-matroid characterization of the Appendix are stated in terms of circuits, and they depend on circuits and rank being interchangeable. Theorem 5, read on its own, expresses the nullity of a set as a count of circuit-closing steps. This is the abstract form of the fact that the cycle space of a graph has dimension equal to the number of non-tree edges.

On the formal side, Mathlib's Matroid is built on the base axioms and proves circuit elimination (Matroid.IsCircuit.strong_elimination) as a theorem about that structure. Whitney's own route is different: rank defined from circuits by an ordered sum of Γi\Gamma_iΓi​, with order-independence (Lemmas 7 and 8) as the central step. That route has no machine-checked version that we know of, on Prove2Me or elsewhere. This mission formalizes the 1935 argument as stated: the rank and circuit systems as Whitney wrote them, and the two translations between them.

Difficulty

The obvious definition of the rank of a set from its circuits enumerates the set and counts the elements that do not close a circuit with their predecessors. This definition depends on the enumeration, and nothing in (C1)(\mathrm C_1)(C1​), (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​) obviously prevents two orderings from giving different counts. Lemma 7, the swap of two adjacent elements, is where (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​) does real work, through a case analysis on which of the two swapped elements closes a circuit. In the other direction, (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​) for circuits of a rank function requires turning the local postulate (R3)(\mathrm R_3)(R3​) into a statement about unions of two circuits. Defining the circuit rank as a maximum over orderings, or as the size of a largest circuit-free subset, sidesteps exactly the step the paper proves and is not this mission.

Formalization scope

  • The elements form a finite type α with [Fintype α] [DecidableEq α]. The ground set is all of α, and subsets are Finset α. Whitney's matroid is a finite set e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​.
  • Ranks and nullities are integers (ℤ), so that n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N)n(N) = \rho(N) - r(N)n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N) is a true difference.
  • Ordered sets of elements are lists. Lemmas 7, 8 and Theorem 5 assume the list has no repetitions, as Whitney's "ordered set of elements" means. "A circuit in e1+⋯+eie_1 + \cdots + e_ie1​+⋯+ei​" means a circuit contained in {e1,…,ei}\{e_1, \dots, e_i\}{e1​,…,ei​}.
  • The rank of a subset from circuits is computed along one fixed enumeration N.toList. Its independence from the enumeration is Lemma 8, and the definition does not build it in.
  • Tacit hypothesis made explicit. Whitney's circuits are nonempty, since a circuit of a rank system has positive nullity. The family {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} satisfies (C1)(\mathrm C_1)(C1​), (C2)(\mathrm C_2)(C2​) vacuously, but its circuit rank is ρ\rhoρ, which has no circuits, so the round trip fails. Part (2) of the goal therefore assumes ∅∉C\emptyset \notin \mathcal C∅∈/C, and part (1) asserts ∅∉C(r)\emptyset \notin \mathcal C(r)∅∈/C(r).
  • Lemma 6 assumes e∉P1e \notin P_1e∈/P1​, which the paper leaves tacit.
  • Ruled out. Neither system may be encoded as Mathlib's Matroid in the statements. Doing so would turn the equivalence into a library lemma. The statements are about Whitney's postulates on bare functions and predicates.

The development needs only finite sets, lists and permutations from Mathlib. The definitions IsRankSystem and IsCircuitSystem can be reused for the other cryptomorphisms of the paper. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and so are local helper lemmas, such as monotonicity of rank under (R1)(\mathrm R_1)(R1​)–(R3)(\mathrm R_3)(R3​) or invariance of rankSeq under prefix-preserving changes.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), no. 3, 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford Graduate Texts in Mathematics 21, Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
  • Mathlib, Mathlib/Combinatorics/Matroid/Circuit.lean (circuits of Mathlib's Matroid). https://github.com/leanprover-community/mathlib4
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons 1: A Fixed Price Earns at Least 1 − 1/(2√min{n, λ*t}) of the Optimal Expected RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm holds a fixed stock of a perishable or seasonal product: airline seats, hotel rooms, fashion goods, tickets. It must sell the stock over a finite season, and whatever is left at the end is worth nothing. The firm can change its price at any time, and demand responds to the price at random. Should it adjust its price continually as sales occur and time runs out, or is one well-chosen price nearly as good?

Gallego and van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons (Management Science 40(8), 1994, doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999), set up this question as a continuous-time stochastic control problem and answered it. The source for this mission is the published 1994 article. Its answer is quantitative: the expected revenue of a single fixed price is within a factor 1−1/(2min⁡{n,λ∗t})1-1/(2\sqrt{\min\{n,\lambda^*t\}})1−1/(2min{n,λ∗t}​) of the best possible dynamic policy. The paper is one of the founding results of dynamic pricing in revenue management. The deterministic (fluid) upper bound it introduced became the standard benchmark of the field, and later work on re-solving heuristics, network revenue management and learning-while-pricing builds on it.

Setting

Demand. The firm chooses a demand intensity λ\lambdaλ from an interval Λ∋0\Lambda\ni 0Λ∋0 of allowable rates, and the market charges the inverse-demand price p(λ)p(\lambda)p(λ). On nonzero rates, ppp is strictly decreasing and nonnegative; rate 000 corresponds to the null price p∞p_\inftyp∞​, at which nothing sells. The revenue rate is r(λ)=λp(λ)r(\lambda)=\lambda p(\lambda)r(λ)=λp(λ). It has r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0, and it is continuous, concave and bounded on Λ\LambdaΛ. λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ denotes its least maximizer, and p∗=p(λ∗)p^*=p(\lambda^*)p∗=p(λ∗), r∗=r(λ∗)r^*=r(\lambda^*)r∗=r(λ∗). Such data form a regular demand function (§2.1).

The stochastic problem. At time 000 the firm holds nnn items and has a horizon [0,t][0,t][0,t]. A non-anticipating pricing policy uuu chooses the intensity λs∈Λ\lambda_s\in\Lambdaλs​∈Λ at each elapsed time sss as a function of the sales history so far. Sales follow a Poisson process with this controlled intensity, and at most nnn items can be sold. A sale at time sss earns the current price psp_sps​. The expected revenue is Ju(n,t)=Eu[∫0tps dNs]J_u(n,t)=E_u[\int_0^t p_s\,dN_s]Ju​(n,t)=Eu​[∫0t​ps​dNs​], where NsN_sNs​ counts the sales, and the optimal expected revenue is J∗(n,t)=sup⁡uJu(n,t)J^*(n,t)=\sup_u J_u(n,t)J∗(n,t)=supu​Ju​(n,t).

The deterministic problem. Replacing random sales by their rates gives

JD(x,t)=sup⁡{∫0tr(λ(s)) ds: λ(s)∈Λ, ∫0tλ(s) ds≤x}.J^D(x,t)=\sup\Big\{\int_0^t r(\lambda(s))\,ds:\ \lambda(s)\in\Lambda,\ \int_0^t\lambda(s)\,ds\le x\Big\}.JD(x,t)=sup{∫0t​r(λ(s))ds: λ(s)∈Λ, ∫0t​λ(s)ds≤x}.

It is solved by the constant rate λD=min⁡{λ∗,x/t}\lambda^D=\min\{\lambda^*,x/t\}λD=min{λ∗,x/t} (Proposition 2).

Fixed-price heuristics. JFP(n,t)J^{FP}(n,t)JFP(n,t) is the expected revenue of charging pD=p(λD)p^D=p(\lambda^D)pD=p(λD) for the whole horizon. JOFP(n,t)J^{OFP}(n,t)JOFP(n,t) is the expected revenue of the best constant price.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and t>0t>0t>0, J∗(n,t)J^*(n,t)J∗(n,t) is finite and positive, and

JOFP(n,t)J∗(n,t) ≥ JFP(n,t)J∗(n,t) ≥ 1−12min⁡{n,λ∗t}.\frac{J^{OFP}(n,t)}{J^*(n,t)}\ \ge\ \frac{J^{FP}(n,t)}{J^*(n,t)}\ \ge\ 1-\frac{1}{2\sqrt{\min\{n,\lambda^*t\}}}.J∗(n,t)JOFP(n,t)​ ≥ J∗(n,t)JFP(n,t)​ ≥ 1−2min{n,λ∗t}​1​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2: λD\lambda^DλD solves (11), and JD(x,t)=t r(λD)J^D(x,t)=t\,r(\lambda^D)JD(x,t)=tr(λD).
  2. Eqs. (13)–(14): Eu[Nt]=Eu[∫0tλsds]≤nE_u[N_t]=E_u[\int_0^t\lambda_s ds]\le nEu​[Nt​]=Eu​[∫0t​λs​ds]≤n and Ju(n,t)=Eu[∫0tr(λs)ds]J_u(n,t)=E_u[\int_0^t r(\lambda_s)ds]Ju​(n,t)=Eu​[∫0t​r(λs​)ds] for every policy.
  3. Eq. (15) and Lemma 1: Ju(n,t)≤Ju(n,t,μ)≤JD(n,t,μ)J_u(n,t)\le J_u(n,t,\mu)\le J^D(n,t,\mu)Ju​(n,t)≤Ju​(n,t,μ)≤JD(n,t,μ) for all μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0.
  4. The zero duality gap: JD(n,t)=min⁡μ≥0JD(n,t,μ)J^D(n,t)=\min_{\mu\ge0}J^D(n,t,\mu)JD(n,t)=minμ≥0​JD(n,t,μ).
  5. Theorem 2: J∗(n,t)≤JD(n,t)J^*(n,t)\le J^D(n,t)J∗(n,t)≤JD(n,t) for all n≥0n\ge 0n≥0, t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  6. Eq. (17): a fixed price ppp earns p E[min⁡{n,Nλ(p)t}]p\,E[\min\{n,N_{\lambda(p)t}\}]pE[min{n,Nλ(p)t​}], with NNN Poisson.
  7. Inequality (18), Gallego's bound E[(N−n)+]≤(σ2+(n−μ)2−(n−μ))/2E[(N-n)^+]\le(\sqrt{\sigma^2+(n-\mu)^2}-(n-\mu))/2E[(N−n)+]≤(σ2+(n−μ)2​−(n−μ))/2, already on the platform.
  8. The two case bounds of the proof of Theorem 3, including (19), and the exact fixed-price revenue of the Remark.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 says that uncertainty can only cost revenue. The deterministic value is a computable upper bound for every policy, so any heuristic can be judged against it. Theorem 3 turns this into a guarantee: with 400 items and scarce stock, a single price earns at least 97.5% of the optimum. The loss vanishes as the expected sales volume grows. This is the justification for the stable, rarely changed prices seen in practice, and the template for the asymptotic-optimality analyses that followed: fluid bounds, re-solving, bid prices.

Formalizing it. The results are proved on paper, and none is formalized. The platform has a discrete-time Bernoulli analogue of Theorem 2 (Talluri–van Ryzin, RevenueManagement.deterministic_upper_bound) and Bitran–Caldentey's periodic-review version as open items. Neither is this continuous-time model. A formalization would add a controlled Poisson sales process with a policy-dependent intensity, the compensator identities (13)–(14) for it, and a Lagrangian-duality argument over measurable rate paths. These are reusable for every continuous-time revenue-management model on the platform. Gallego's moment bound (18) is already proved there.

Difficulty

The deterministic side (Proposition 2, the duality gap) is convex analysis on one concave function. The fixed-price bounds reduce to a Poisson computation and (18). The obstacle is Theorem 2's stochastic step. The revenue is collected at random jump times chosen by an adaptive policy, and comparing it with a deterministic integral requires the compensator identity Eu[∫ps dNs]=Eu[∫r(λs) ds]E_u[\int p_s\,dN_s]=E_u[\int r(\lambda_s)\,ds]Eu​[∫ps​dNs​]=Eu​[∫r(λs​)ds] for an arbitrary non-anticipating intensity. The paper cites Brémaud's martingale theory for this, which Mathlib does not have. A first idea is to apply Jensen's inequality to JuJ_uJu​ directly. It fails because the stock constraint holds only pathwise, through Nt≤nN_t\le nNt​≤n, and not in expectation for a rate path. Restricting to Markovian policies does not remove the need for the identity.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Rates are real numbers, and Λ⊆[0,∞)\Lambda\subseteq[0,\infty)Λ⊆[0,∞) is an interval containing 000. ppp is a real function, strictly decreasing and nonnegative on Λ∖{0}\Lambda\setminus\{0\}Λ∖{0}. r(λ)=λp(λ)r(\lambda)=\lambda p(\lambda)r(λ)=λp(λ) is continuous, concave and bounded above on Λ\LambdaΛ, and λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ is its least maximizer. p(0)p(0)p(0) is never used, since the null price may be +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Policies depend on elapsed time and the past sale times (the internal history); randomized policies are not included. Intensities are jointly measurable and locally integrable.
  • The sales process is built from i.i.d. Exp(1)\mathrm{Exp}(1)Exp(1) clocks, one per item. A sale occurs when the intensity integrated since the last sale reaches the next clock, so at most nnn items are sold. Constraint (2) is part of the construction, not a hypothesis.
  • Values. Expected revenues and J∗J^*J∗ are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], as lower Lebesgue integrals and suprema. JDJ^DJD is a real supremum over measurable, integrable rate paths, nonempty and bounded for x,t≥0x,t\ge0x,t≥0. JFPJ^{FP}JFP and JOFPJ^{OFP}JOFP are expected revenues of constant-price policies of this process, and the goal also asserts 0<J∗<∞0<J^*<\infty0<J∗<∞. Defining JuJ_uJu​ by the right side of (14), J∗J^*J∗ by the HJB equation, or JFPJ^{FP}JFP by formula (17) would trivialize the mission, and is ruled out.
  • Added hypotheses. Theorem 3 assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1, t>0t>0t>0 and λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, which the page leaves implicit: the ratios divide by J∗J^*J∗, which vanishes otherwise. Eqs. (13)–(14) are stated for every policy, without Proposition 1's bound λs≤λ∗\lambda_s\le\lambda^*λs​≤λ∗, and without the reduction to Markovian policies.
  • Corrected slips. (12) prints JD(x,t)=tmin⁡{r∗,r0}J^D(x,t)=t\min\{r^*,r^0\}JD(x,t)=tmin{r∗,r0}, which is false for x>λ∗tx>\lambda^*tx>λ∗t (exponential demand with x=atx=atx=at gives r0=0r^0=0r0=0). The statement uses t r(λD)t\,r(\lambda^D)tr(λD), and the printed form where x≤λ∗tx\le\lambda^*tx≤λ∗t. The Remark's "E(Nn−n)+=n(1−P{Nn=n})E(N_n-n)^+=n(1-P\{N_n=n\})E(Nn​−n)+=n(1−P{Nn​=n})" should read E[min⁡{Nn,n}]E[\min\{N_n,n\}]E[min{Nn​,n}]; its displayed JFPJ^{FP}JFP formula is right. Proposition 2's "the optimal solution" is stated as optimality, since uniqueness fails without strict concavity.
  • Welcome contributions. Infrastructure for counting processes with stochastic intensity (the clock construction, the compensator identity), Jensen and Lagrangian duality for concave integral functionals on rate paths, and Poisson truncated-mean computations.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • G. Gallego, A Minmax Distribution Free Procedure for the (Q, R) Inventory Model, Operations Research Letters 11:55–60, 1992 (cited in the paper's references, p. 1019).
  • P. Brémaud, Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1980 (as cited in the paper).
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004 (Chapter 5; on the platform as RevenueManagement.*).
  • G. Bitran, R. Caldentey, An Overview of Pricing Models for Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(3):203–229, 2003 (on the platform as PricingRM.DetHeuristic.*).
15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Control of Markov Processes with Incomplete State Information 1: Reduction to Complete State Information on the Conditional State Distributions, with the Same Optimal LawResearch Paper

Motivation

A controller often cannot see the state of the system it steers. It sees only measurements that are noisy functions of that state. In operations research this happens in machine maintenance and inspection, in queues observed only partially, and in inventory systems with inexact stock records. In control engineering it is the usual case. The question is what the controller should base its decisions on. The full record of past measurements is the obvious choice, but that record grows with time, so a law that uses it is a function on a space whose dimension grows with the horizon.

K. J. Åström's 1965 paper Optimal Control of Markov Processes with Incomplete State Information answered this question for finite Markov chains. The answer is that the conditional distribution of the hidden state given the measurements is a sufficient statistic. The problem with incomplete information is equivalent to a problem with complete information whose state is that distribution. This is the model now called a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), and the conditional distribution is now called the belief state.

Timeline. For linear systems with quadratic cost and Gaussian noise, the separation theorem of Joseph and Tou (1961) and Gunckel and Franklin (1963) says that the optimal control is a fixed function of the conditional mean of the state. Åström (1965) proved the reduction for finite-state Markov chains with arbitrary costs, with the conditional distribution as the new state. Smallwood and Sondik (1973) showed that for finite horizons the value function is piecewise linear and concave in the belief, which made exact computation possible. Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) and Bäuerle and Rieder (2011) gave the reduction for general Borel models.

Setting

The hidden state xtx_txt​, t=1,…,Nt = 1, \dots, Nt=1,…,N, takes values in a finite set SSS. The controls u=(u1,…,ur)u = (u_1, \dots, u_r)u=(u1​,…,ur​) range over a compact nonempty set U⊂RrU \subset \mathbb R^rU⊂Rr. The state moves by the transition probabilities pij(u,t)=P{xt=j∣xt−1=i}p_{ij}(u, t) = P\{x_t = j \mid x_{t-1} = i\}pij​(u,t)=P{xt​=j∣xt−1​=i}, which are continuous in uuu. The state is observed through outputs yty_tyt​ in a finite set YYY, with qij=P{yt=j∣xt=i}q_{ij} = P\{y_t = j \mid x_t = i\}qij​=P{yt​=j∣xt​=i}, conditionally independent given the states. The law of x1x_1x1​ is p1p^1p1. An instantaneous cost g(u,i,t)g(u, i, t)g(u,i,t), continuous in uuu, is paid at each time.

A control law chooses u(t)=c(η1,…,ηt,t)∈Uu(t) = c(\eta_1, \dots, \eta_t, t) \in Uu(t)=c(η1​,…,ηt​,t)∈U from the outputs observed so far, η(t)=(η1,…,ηt)\eta(t) = (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_t)η(t)=(η1​,…,ηt​). With u(t)u(t)u(t) moving xtx_txt​ to xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​, a law determines the joint law of (x1,…,xN,y1,…,yN)(x_1, \dots, x_N, y_1, \dots, y_N)(x1​,…,xN​,y1​,…,yN​) and the expected cost

EL=E∑t=1Ng(u(t),xt,t).(2.6)EL = E \sum_{t=1}^N g(u(t), x_t, t). \tag{2.6}EL=Et=1∑N​g(u(t),xt​,t).(2.6)

Problem P.1 is to find an admissible law minimizing (2.6).

The conditional state distribution is wi(t)=P{xt=i∣η(t)}w_i(t) = P\{x_t = i \mid \eta(t)\}wi​(t)=P{xt​=i∣η(t)}. It is updated by Bayes' rule: with zj(u,w)i=∑sqij psi(u,t+1) wsz^j(u, w)_i = \sum_s q_{ij}\, p_{si}(u, t+1)\, w_szj(u,w)i​=∑s​qij​psi​(u,t+1)ws​ and ∥z∥=∑i∣zi∣\|z\| = \sum_i |z_i|∥z∥=∑i​∣zi​∣, the output ηt+1=j\eta_{t+1} = jηt+1​=j gives w(t+1)=zj(u(t),w(t))/∥zj(u(t),w(t))∥w(t+1) = z^j(u(t), w(t)) / \|z^j(u(t), w(t))\|w(t+1)=zj(u(t),w(t))/∥zj(u(t),w(t))∥, and ∥zj∥\|z^j\|∥zj∥ is the probability of that output. The cost-to-go Vk(w)V_k(w)Vk​(w) is the minimal expected cost of the steps k,…,Nk, \dots, Nk,…,N when xkx_kxk​ has distribution www, with VN+1=0V_{N+1} = 0VN+1​=0. Problem P.2 controls the process w(t)w(t)w(t) directly: a law chooses u(t)u(t)u(t) from w(1),…,w(t)w(1), \dots, w(t)w(1),…,w(t) to minimize E∑t=1N∑ig(u(t),i,t) wi(t)E\sum_{t=1}^N \sum_i g(u(t), i, t)\, w_i(t)E∑t=1N​∑i​g(u(t),i,t)wi​(t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

P.1 has a solution if and only if P.2 has one. For every solution (V,c0)(V, c^0)(V,c0) of the functional equation

Vk(w)=min⁡u∈U{∑ig(u,i,k) wi+∑jVk+1(zj(u,w)∥zj(u,w)∥)∥zj(u,w)∥},VN+1=0,(3.28)V_k(w) = \min_{u \in U} \Big\{ \sum_i g(u, i, k)\, w_i + \sum_j V_{k+1}\Big(\frac{z^j(u, w)}{\|z^j(u, w)\|}\Big) \|z^j(u, w)\| \Big\}, \qquad V_{N+1} = 0, \tag{3.28}Vk​(w)=u∈Umin​{i∑​g(u,i,k)wi​+j∑​Vk+1​(∥zj(u,w)∥zj(u,w)​)∥zj(u,w)∥},VN+1​=0,(3.28)

with c0(w,k)c^0(w, k)c0(w,k) attaining the minimum, the law

u(t)=c0(w(t),t)u(t) = c^0(w(t), t)u(t)=c0(w(t),t)

is optimal for P.1 and for P.2, among all admissible laws of each, and both minimal values equal Eη1V1(w(1))E_{\eta_1} V_1(w(1))Eη1​​V1​(w(1)).

Milestones

  1. (3.20)–(3.25): the conditional distributions obey the Bayes recursion, and ∥zj∥=P[yt+1=j∣η(t)]\|z^j\| = P[y_{t+1} = j \mid \eta(t)]∥zj∥=P[yt+1​=j∣η(t)].
  2. Theorem 1: the cost-to-go satisfies (3.28) with the minimum attained, and an optimal Markov law attains it.
  3. Theorem 2: a solution of (3.28) gives an optimal law for P.1 with value (3.29).
  4. Lemma 1: under u(t)=c(w(t),t)u(t) = c(w(t), t)u(t)=c(w(t),t), {w(t)}\{w(t)\}{w(t)} is a Markov process with transition probabilities P(y,Γ,u)=∑k∈K∥zk(u,y)∥P(y, \Gamma, u) = \sum_{k \in K} \|z^k(u, y)\|P(y,Γ,u)=∑k∈K​∥zk(u,y)∥.
  5. Proof of Theorem 3: the integral against this kernel is the sum in (3.28).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 replaces a minimization over functions of ever longer measurement records with a recursion over a fixed space, the probability simplex over the states. Every exact and approximate POMDP algorithm starts from it: value iteration on beliefs, the piecewise-linear representation of Smallwood and Sondik, point-based methods. It also splits the controller in two. A filter computes w(t)w(t)w(t) in real time, and the function c0c^0c0 can be computed off-line. This is the decomposition the paper draws on p. 189, and it extends the linear-quadratic separation theorem to arbitrary finite chains.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved. The platform has the reduction in Bäuerle and Rieder's discounted Borel model with an observable state component and rewards in extended reals. It does not have Åström's model: finite chains, time-dependent transition matrices, an unobservable state, costs, and laws of the raw output history. This mission formalizes Åström's statements as he gives them. The cost (2.6) is defined from the joint law of states and outputs, and the comparison classes are all laws of the outputs (P.1) and all laws of the distribution history (P.2). The finite setting makes every expectation a finite sum, so a complete development needs no measure theory.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is backward induction on the conditional distributions. The difficulty is that w(t)w(t)w(t) depends on the controls already used, so it is not given in advance: the state of the reduced problem is produced by the law being optimized. It has to be shown that the expected cost of an arbitrary law of the outputs, computed from the joint law, splits as the reduced recursion says. In particular, laws that use more of the record than w(t)w(t)w(t) must gain nothing. Restricting the comparison class to laws of the form c(w(t),t)c(w(t), t)c(w(t),t) assumes this conclusion.

A second difficulty is attainment. "Min" in (3.28) and "has a solution" presuppose that minima over UUU are attained, which needs continuity of Vk+1V_{k+1}Vk+1​ on the simplex. The weights ∥zj(u,w)∥\|z^j(u, w)\|∥zj(u,w)∥ can vanish, and then the update zj/∥zj∥z^j/\|z^j\|zj/∥zj∥ is undefined.

Formalization scope

States and outputs are finite types, St and Obs, with the chain given by the structure Model. Controls are Fin r → ℝ, and UUU is compact and nonempty. The law p1p^1p1 of x1x_1x1​ is the datum in place of the paper's law of x0x_0x0​, since no control u(0)u(0)u(0) exists. The transition from xtx_txt​ to xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​ uses u(t)u(t)u(t) and the matrix p(u(t),t+1)p(u(t), t+1)p(u(t),t+1). Times 1,…,N1, \dots, N1,…,N are indexed by Fin N as 0,…,N−10, \dots, N-10,…,N−1.

The norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm l1, not Mathlib's sup norm. Conditional distributions are ratios of path sums, condState, and are claimed only on output histories of positive probability. When ∥zj∥=0\|z^j\| = 0∥zj∥=0 the update is the zero vector and is always multiplied by 000.

The cost-to-go costToGo is an infimum over admissible tail laws. Its index set is nonempty and the costs are bounded below, so the real infimum is a true infimum. It is never defined through (3.28), since that would make Theorem 1 circular. The P.2 functional sums branch by branch over the outputs, with weights ∥zj∥\|z^j\|∥zj∥. "Given by Theorem 1" is read as "c0(w,k)∈Uc^0(w, k) \in Uc0(w,k)∈U attains the minimum in (3.28)" (IsSolution328).

The goal is not the bare equivalence of solvability. In this compact, continuous, finite setting both problems always have solutions, so that sentence alone is trivially true. The goal also requires the law c0(w(t),t)c^0(w(t), t)c0(w(t),t) to be optimal in both problems, against every admissible law, with equal minimal values.

Reusable beyond this mission are the finite POMDP model, the joint path law, the Bayes filter and the belief-MDP kernel. Welcome contributions include proofs of the milestones, the continuity of VkV_kVk​ on the simplex, and existence of solutions of (3.28).

Selected references

  • K. J. Åström, Optimal control of Markov processes with incomplete state information, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 10(1):174–205, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(65)90154-X
  • R. D. Smallwood and E. J. Sondik, The optimal control of partially observable Markov processes over a finite horizon, Operations Research 21(5):1071–1088, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1071
  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978, Chapter 10. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9
  • P. D. Joseph and J. T. Tou, On linear control theory, Transactions of the AIEE, Part II 80(4):193–196, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAI.1961.6371743
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Contraction Mappings in the Theory Underlying Dynamic Programming 1: Under the Contraction and Monotonicity Assumptions the Solution of the Functional Equation Is the Optimal ReturnResearch Paper

Why this problem arose

Dynamic programming often replaces a search over whole plans with an equation for a value function. That replacement is useful only when solving the equation recovers the value actually available through policies. In his 1967 paper, Eric Denardo isolated conditions on an abstract return function that make this identification possible, without committing to a particular transition law or a finite state space. The framework covers discounted decision models and other examples discussed in the paper, while allowing different decisions at different states. Denardo, 1967.

The mission concerns the paper's first regime: a one-step contraction together with monotonicity. It focuses on the question raised just after equation (4): does the solution of the functional equation equal the supremum of the return functions generated by policies? The paper proves that it does under these assumptions. Its later NNN-stage regime is a separate mission. Denardo, 1967, pp. 167–169.

States, decisions, and returns

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a set of states. At each x∈Ωx\in\Omegax∈Ω there is a decision set DxD_xDx​. A policy δ\deltaδ selects a decision δx∈Dx\delta_x\in D_xδx​∈Dx​ at every state, so the policy space Δ\DeltaΔ is the full Cartesian product ∏x∈ΩDx\prod_{x\in\Omega}D_x∏x∈Ω​Dx​. Let VVV be the bounded real functions on Ω\OmegaΩ, with the uniform metric ρ(u,v)=sup⁡x∈Ω∣u(x)−v(x)∣\rho(u,v)=\sup_{x\in\Omega}|u(x)-v(x)|ρ(u,v)=supx∈Ω​∣u(x)−v(x)∣. A return function h(x,d,v)h(x,d,v)h(x,d,v) assigns a real return to a state, an available decision, and a continuation value v∈Vv\in Vv∈V. Denardo, 1967, p. 166.

For a policy δ\deltaδ, its policy operator HδH_\deltaHδ​ acts by (Hδv)(x)=h(x,δx,v)(H_\delta v)(x)=h(x,\delta_x,v)(Hδ​v)(x)=h(x,δx​,v). Under the contraction assumption, some ccc satisfies 0≤c<10\le c<10≤c<1 and ∣h(x,d,u)−h(x,d,v)∣≤cρ(u,v)|h(x,d,u)-h(x,d,v)|\le c\rho(u,v)∣h(x,d,u)−h(x,d,v)∣≤cρ(u,v) for all eligible x,d,u,vx,d,u,vx,d,u,v. Each HδH_\deltaHδ​ then has a unique fixed point vδ∈Vv_\delta\in Vvδ​∈V, called that policy's return function. The optimal return function is defined pointwise by f(x)=sup⁡δ∈Δvδ(x)f(x)=\sup_{\delta\in\Delta}v_\delta(x)f(x)=supδ∈Δ​vδ​(x). These are the paper's definitions, rather than a presumed equality between fff and a Bellman fixed point. Denardo, 1967, pp. 166–167.

The maximization operator AAA instead chooses the best decision at each state for a supplied continuation value: (Av)(x)=sup⁡d∈Dxh(x,d,v)(Av)(x)=\sup_{d\in D_x}h(x,d,v)(Av)(x)=supd∈Dx​​h(x,d,v). Denardo assumes that HδvH_\delta vHδ​v and AvAvAv remain bounded, so both operators act on VVV. The monotonicity assumption says that u≥vu\ge vu≥v pointwise implies Hδu≥HδvH_\delta u\ge H_\delta vHδ​u≥Hδ​v for every policy. These are separate conditions: contraction controls distance between value functions, while monotonicity controls their order. Denardo, 1967, pp. 166–168.

Formalization targets

The central target is Theorem 3. Under contraction and monotonicity, the unique bounded solution v∗v^*v∗ of equation (4) is the optimal return:

Av∗=v∗,v∗(x)=f(x)=sup⁡δ∈Δvδ(x)(x∈Ω).Av^*=v^*,\qquad v^*(x)=f(x)=\sup_{\delta\in\Delta}v_\delta(x)\quad(x\in\Omega).Av∗=v∗,v∗(x)=f(x)=δ∈Δsup​vδ​(x)(x∈Ω).

The milestones follow the paper's route to that assertion. Theorem 1 bounds a policy's return by its fixed-point residual, ρ(vδ,w)≤ρ(Hδw,w)/(1−c)\rho(v_\delta,w)\le\rho(H_\delta w,w)/(1-c)ρ(vδ​,w)≤ρ(Hδ​w,w)/(1−c). Theorem 2 says that AAA itself has modulus at most ccc. The text accompanying equation (4) establishes that AAA has exactly one fixed point. Corollary 1 then gives, for each ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, a policy with residual at most ε(1−c)\varepsilon(1-c)ε(1−c) at that fixed point and return within ε\varepsilonε of it, together with an exact equality criterion for zero residual. Denardo, 1967, pp. 167–168.

What the result gives

Theorem 3 justifies reading the functional equation as an optimization equation: its solution is the pointwise supremum of returns realized by the paper's policy model. Corollary 1 supplies policy returns arbitrarily close to that solution in the uniform metric. With the compactness and continuity assumptions of Corollary 2, the paper also obtains a policy that attains it, though that optional result is outside this mission's milestone list. Denardo, 1967, pp. 167–168.

The mathematical result was proved in the cited paper. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its abstract statements in Lean, including the residual estimate, the maximization operator's contraction, fixed-point existence, and the identification with optimal policy return. The definitions are reusable for decision models whose returns fit Denardo's assumptions; they do not prescribe a probability kernel or a finite action set.

Where the difficulty lies

The fixed-point theorem alone identifies a unique solution of Av=vAv=vAv=v; it does not identify that solution with fff, because fff is defined through the separate fixed points of all HδH_\deltaHδ​. The distinction matters: the paper observes that contraction without monotonicity can leave v∗v^*v∗ different from fff, and gives h(x,d,v)=−v(x)/2h(x,d,v)=-v(x)/2h(x,d,v)=−v(x)/2 as a nonmonotone example. The formal goal therefore retains both definitions and requires monotonicity. Denardo, 1967, pp. 167–168.

There is also a choice issue in Corollary 1. A near-maximizing decision is available separately at every state, while its conclusion asks for one policy choosing all those decisions at once. The full Cartesian policy space is essential to the statement. On an infinite state set, the value functions must remain bounded even after applying AAA or a policy operator; contraction of differences by itself does not provide that range condition. Denardo, 1967, pp. 166–168.

Formalization scope

Lean represents VVV by bounded real functions lp (fun _ : Ω => ℝ) ⊤; its metric is ρ\rhoρ. The state type may be infinite or empty, and decision sets depend on the state. Policies are precisely dependent functions δ:(x:Ω)→Dx\delta:(x:\Omega)\to D_xδ:(x:Ω)→Dx​. The operators HδH_\deltaHδ​ and AAA are maps into VVV supplied with equations fixing their values from hhh. This expresses the bounded-range assumptions on pages 166–167. Pointwise order is explicit because the bounded-function type has no order instance. Denardo, 1967, pp. 166–168.

Every supremum in the mission is a genuine real least upper bound. IsMaxOperator requires it for the decision returns at each state; IsOptimalReturn requires it for the policy returns. These predicates avoid assigning a default value to an empty or unbounded supremum. Where states exist, IsMaxOperator also entails a nonempty decision set. The family vδv_\deltavδ​ is supplied with Hδvδ=vδH_\delta v_\delta=v_\deltaHδ​vδ​=vδ​; contraction ensures each such return exists uniquely. Equation (4) and the main goal explicitly assert existence of the fixed point of AAA, so the goal cannot hold merely because there is no solution to identify. Defining fff from the fixed point of AAA, or defining v∗v^*v∗ from the policy supremum, would erase the paper's substantive claim and is excluded.

The definition layer needs bounded functions, uniform distance, real least upper bounds, and dependent policies. The theorem layer needs fixed-point and order reasoning on these objects. Contributions toward those general operator facts and the paper's four milestone statements are within scope.

Selected references

  • Eric V. Denardo, Contraction Mappings in the Theory Underlying Dynamic Programming, SIAM Review 9(2), 165–177, 1967. DOI: 10.1137/1009030.
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing 1: Controlled Variance Pricing Has Regret O(T^α + T^(1−α) log T)Research Paper

Motivation

A firm that sets prices without knowing how demand responds to them has to learn the demand curve from its own sales. Each price it charges is both a revenue decision and an experiment. The natural policy, certainty equivalent pricing, re-estimates the demand parameters after every period and charges the price that would be optimal if the estimates were exact. den Boer and Zwart show that this policy can fail: with positive probability its prices settle at a suboptimal value, because they converge too fast for the estimates to keep improving (den Boer–Zwart 2014, Proposition 1, the subject of the companion mission). The same phenomenon was found by Lai and Robbins (1982) for a linear control problem.

Their remedy, Controlled Variance Pricing (CVP), keeps certainty equivalent pricing but forces the sample variance of the chosen prices to decay no faster than tα−1t^{\alpha-1}tα−1. The main result is that this small amount of enforced exploration gives regret O(Tα+T1−αlog⁡T)O(T^\alpha + T^{1-\alpha}\log T)O(Tα+T1−αlogT), hence O(T1/2+δ)O(T^{1/2+\delta})O(T1/2+δ) for every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0, for a broad class of demand models that are specified only through their first two moments. Keskin and Zeevi (2014) later placed CVP in a larger family of semi-myopic policies with Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT regret for linear demand.

Setting

A seller chooses in each period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… a price pt∈[pl,ph]p_t \in [p_l, p_h]pt​∈[pl​,ph​], with 0<pl<ph0 < p_l < p_h0<pl​<ph​, and then observes demand dtd_tdt​. Demand at price ppp has mean h(a0(0)+a1(0)p)h(a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)}p)h(a0(0)​+a1(0)​p) and variance σ2v(h(a0(0)+a1(0)p))\sigma^2 v(h(a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)}p))σ2v(h(a0(0)​+a1(0)​p)), where the link hhh and variance function vvv are known and C2C^2C2 on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), h˙>0\dot h > 0h˙>0, and the parameter a(0)=(a0(0),a1(0))a^{(0)} = (a_0^{(0)}, a_1^{(0)})a(0)=(a0(0)​,a1(0)​) with a0(0)>0>a1(0)a_0^{(0)} > 0 > a_1^{(0)}a0(0)​>0>a1(0)​ is unknown. The noise et=dt−h(a0(0)+a1(0)pt)e_t = d_t - h(a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)}p_t)et​=dt​−h(a0(0)​+a1(0)​pt​) is a martingale difference with conditional variance σ2v(⋅)\sigma^2 v(\cdot)σ2v(⋅) and a uniformly bounded conditional moment of some order r>3r > 3r>3.

The expected revenue is r(p,a)=p h(a0+a1p)r(p, a) = p\,h(a_0 + a_1p)r(p,a)=ph(a0​+a1​p). Near a(0)a^{(0)}a(0) it has a unique maximizer p(a)p(a)p(a) in the open interval (pl,ph)(p_l, p_h)(pl​,ph​) with ∂p2r<0\partial_p^2 r < 0∂p2​r<0 there, and popt=p(a(0))p_{\mathrm{opt}} = p(a^{(0)})popt​=p(a(0)). The regret of a policy is

Regret⁡(T)=E[∑t=1Tr(popt,a(0))−r(pt,a(0))].\operatorname{Regret}(T) = \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r(p_{\mathrm{opt}}, a^{(0)}) - r(p_t, a^{(0)})\Big].Regret(T)=E[t=1∑T​r(popt​,a(0))−r(pt​,a(0))].

The estimate a^t\hat a_ta^t​ is the maximum quasi-likelihood estimate (MQLE), the root of the quasi-score equation (3), ∑i≤th˙σ2v(h)(1,pi)⊤(di−h(a^0+a^1pi))=0\sum_{i\le t} \frac{\dot h}{\sigma^2 v(h)}(1, p_i)^\top(d_i - h(\hat a_0 + \hat a_1 p_i)) = 0∑i≤t​σ2v(h)h˙​(1,pi​)⊤(di​−h(a^0​+a^1​pi​))=0. With pˉt\bar p_tpˉ​t​ and Var⁡(p)t\operatorname{Var}(p)_tVar(p)t​ the sample mean and variance of p1,…,ptp_1,\dots,p_tp1​,…,pt​, the taboo interval is TI(t)=(pˉt−wt,pˉt+wt)\mathrm{TI}(t) = (\bar p_t - w_t, \bar p_t + w_t)TI(t)=(pˉ​t​−wt​,pˉ​t​+wt​) with wt=c[(t+1)α−tα](t+1)/tw_t = \sqrt{c[(t+1)^\alpha - t^\alpha](t+1)/t}wt​=c[(t+1)α−tα](t+1)/t​. CVP starts from two distinct prices p1,p2p_1, p_2p1​,p2​, fixes α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) and 0<c<2−α(p1−p2)2min⁡{1,(3α)−1}0 < c < 2^{-\alpha}(p_1-p_2)^2\min\{1,(3\alpha)^{-1}\}0<c<2−α(p1​−p2​)2min{1,(3α)−1}, and for t≥2t \ge 2t≥2: if a^t\hat a_ta^t​ does not exist or has the wrong signs, it charges whichever of p1,p2p_1, p_2p1​,p2​ is farther from pˉt\bar p_tpˉ​t​; otherwise it charges p(a^t)p(\hat a_t)p(a^t​) if that keeps Var⁡(p)t+1≥c(t+1)α−1\operatorname{Var}(p)_{t+1} \ge c(t+1)^{\alpha-1}Var(p)t+1​≥c(t+1)α−1, and the best price outside TI(t)\mathrm{TI}(t)TI(t) if not.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Regret⁡(T,CVP)=O(Tα+T1−αlog⁡T)(1/2<α<1),\operatorname{Regret}(T, \mathrm{CVP}) = O\big(T^\alpha + T^{1-\alpha}\log T\big) \qquad (1/2 < \alpha < 1),Regret(T,CVP)=O(Tα+T1−αlogT)(1/2<α<1),

stated as: there is K>0K > 0K>0, depending on the model, α\alphaα, ccc and the initial prices but not on TTT, with Regret⁡(T)≤K(Tα+T1−αlog⁡T)\operatorname{Regret}(T) \le K(T^\alpha + T^{1-\alpha}\log T)Regret(T)≤K(Tα+T1−αlogT) for all T≥1T \ge 1T≥1. The constant is left free, so the statement survives any sharpening of the constants.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2: Var⁡(p)t≥c tα−1\operatorname{Var}(p)_t \ge c\,t^{\alpha-1}Var(p)t​≥ctα−1 for all t≥2t \ge 2t≥2 along every CVP path.
  2. Lemma 1: λmax⁡(Pt)≤(1+ph2)t\lambda_{\max}(P_t) \le (1+p_h^2)tλmax​(Pt​)≤(1+ph2​)t and tVar⁡(p)t≤(1+ph2)λmin⁡(Pt)t\operatorname{Var}(p)_t \le (1+p_h^2)\lambda_{\min}(P_t)tVar(p)t​≤(1+ph2​)λmin​(Pt​) for the design matrix Pt=∑i≤t(1,pi)⊤(1,pi)P_t = \sum_{i\le t}(1,p_i)^\top(1,p_i)Pt​=∑i≤t​(1,pi​)⊤(1,pi​).
  3. Proposition 3: a^t\hat a_ta^t​ eventually exists, a^t→a(0)\hat a_t \to a^{(0)}a^t​→a(0) a.s., and for some ρ0\rho_0ρ0​, E[Tρ01/2]<∞\mathbb E[T_{\rho_0}^{1/2}] < \inftyE[Tρ0​1/2​]<∞ and E[∥a^t−a(0)∥21t>Tρ0]=O(log⁡t/tα)\mathbb E[\|\hat a_t - a^{(0)}\|^2\mathbf 1_{t > T_{\rho_0}}] = O(\log t/t^\alpha)E[∥a^t​−a(0)∥21t>Tρ0​​​]=O(logt/tα).
  4. Eq. (11): in the normal–linear case, E∥a^t−a(0)∥2=O(log⁡t/tα)\mathbb E\|\hat a_t - a^{(0)}\|^2 = O(\log t / t^\alpha)E∥a^t​−a(0)∥2=O(logt/tα).
  5. Eqs. (17), (18), (20): the quadratic revenue gap, the local Lipschitz bound on p(a)p(a)p(a), and ∣pt+1−p(a^t)∣≤∣TI(t)∣|p_{t+1} - p(\hat a_t)| \le |\mathrm{TI}(t)|∣pt+1​−p(a^t​)∣≤∣TI(t)∣ for large ttt.
  6. The closing bound E[(pt−popt)2]=O(tα−1+log⁡t/tα)\mathbb E[(p_t - p_{\mathrm{opt}})^2] = O(t^{\alpha-1} + \log t/t^\alpha)E[(pt​−popt​)2]=O(tα−1+logt/tα).

Significance

The theorem shows that a policy that is certainty equivalent almost all of the time, with a single interpretable tuning parameter α\alphaα, attains regret O(T1/2+δ)O(T^{1/2+\delta})O(T1/2+δ) in generalized linear demand models, without distributional assumptions beyond two moments. It explains the role of α\alphaα precisely: TαT^\alphaTα is the cost of exploration and T1−αlog⁡TT^{1-\alpha}\log TT1−αlogT the cost of estimation error. Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 are reusable for any policy that enforces a variance floor on its actions, and (11) is a self-contained rate for least squares under adaptively chosen designs.

The result is proved in the paper, with Proposition 3 delegated to den Boer and Zwart (2012) for general links. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formalization would verify the delegated consistency argument, fix the conditions under which it applies (see Formalization scope), and provide a Lean development of adaptive least squares and quasi-likelihood rates that the related Keskin–Zeevi missions also need.

Difficulty

The deterministic parts are short. The difficulty is Proposition 3. The prices are chosen adaptively from past data, so the regressors are not independent of the noise, and standard rates for (quasi-)likelihood estimates do not apply. The natural argument, bounding ∥a^t−a(0)∥2\|\hat a_t - a^{(0)}\|^2∥a^t​−a(0)∥2 by Qt/λmin⁡(Pt)Q_t/\lambda_{\min}(P_t)Qt​/λmin​(Pt​) with QtQ_tQt​ a self-normalized martingale quadratic form, needs a bound E[Qt]=O(log⁡t)\mathbb E[Q_t] = O(\log t)E[Qt​]=O(logt) that holds in expectation and not only almost surely, as in Lai and Wei (1982). For a non-linear link the MQLE is defined only implicitly, and its existence near a(0)a^{(0)}a(0) has to be shown first, with a moment bound on the last time it fails. That is the random time TρT_\rhoTρ​. Turning almost-sure consistency into a rate in expectation is where most of the work lies.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace CVPricing.Regret. Periods are 1-based. Prices, demands and parameters are real; a=(a0,a1)∈R×Ra = (a_0, a_1) \in \mathbb R \times \mathbb Ra=(a0​,a1​)∈R×R with the Euclidean norm (euclidNorm), not Mathlib's sup norm. The design matrix, sample mean and tVar⁡(p)tt\operatorname{Var}(p)_ttVar(p)t​ are the published Keskin–Zeevi definitions fisherOf, avgPriceOf, infoMetricOf. Every O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is "there is K>0K > 0K>0 such that for all ttt", with KKK quantified after the model data. Rates are stated for t≥2t \ge 2t≥2 and the regret for T≥1T \ge 1T≥1. hhh and vvv are total functions constrained on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). A root of (3) counts only where a^0+a^1pi≥0\hat a_0 + \hat a_1 p_i \ge 0a^0​+a^1​pi​≥0 for every observed pip_ipi​. CVP is a predicate on a realized path that allows every maximizer in (7) and (8).

Disclosed deviations from the page:

  • the model requires a0(0)+a1(0)ph>0a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)}p_h > 0a0(0)​+a1(0)​ph​>0 (printed: ≥0\ge 0≥0), because in the boundary case the policy's case (c) fires infinitely often and the proof of Theorem 1 does not cover it;
  • (3) is assumed to have at most one root (the page notes roots need not be unique, and the policy cannot select the root nearest a(0)a^{(0)}a(0));
  • the neighbourhood assumption is read as a unique maximizer over [pl,ph][p_l, p_h][pl​,ph​] lying in (pl,ph)(p_l, p_h)(pl​,ph​);
  • the demand process is given by its conditional mean, its conditional variance and (2), with integrable noise moments, not by a fixed law D(p)D(p)D(p);
  • the initial prices are deterministic.

Corrected slips: Proposition 2 is stated for c≤2−α(p1−p2)2min⁡{1/2,(3α)−1}c \le 2^{-\alpha}(p_1-p_2)^2\min\{1/2,(3\alpha)^{-1}\}c≤2−α(p1​−p2​)2min{1/2,(3α)−1}, because the printed range fails at t=2t=2t=2 (Var⁡(p)2=(p1−p2)2/4\operatorname{Var}(p)_2 = (p_1-p_2)^2/4Var(p)2​=(p1​−p2​)2/4, not /2/2/2). Theorem 1 keeps the printed range. Eq. (20) is stated for pt+1p_{t+1}pt+1​ and for ttt beyond an explicit threshold.

The goal does not assume the variance bound, consistency or (20). The policy contains the variance check and the taboo interval, and the regret is the expectation over the actual price process. A statement that assumed any of these, or that dropped the taboo step, would be trivial or false. Contributions are welcome on adaptive least squares (Sherman–Morrison and determinant-ratio bounds), martingale last-time moment bounds, and the implicit-function step (18).

Selected references

  • A. V. den Boer, B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
  • A. V. den Boer, B. Zwart, Mean square convergence rates for maximum quasi-likelihood estimators, Stochastic Systems 4(2):375–403, 2014 (cited as 2012 working paper). https://doi.org/10.1214/12-SSY086
  • T. L. Lai, C. Z. Wei, Least squares estimates in stochastic regression models with applications to identification and control of dynamic systems, Annals of Statistics 10(1):154–166, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176345697
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Iterated least squares in multiperiod control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0196-8858(82)80005-5
  • N. B. Keskin, A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing 2: Certainty Equivalent Pricing Fails to Converge to the Optimal Price with Positive ProbabilityResearch Paper

Why myopic pricing is a problem

A seller who does not know how demand responds to price has to learn the demand curve from its own sales while it is selling. The most natural policy is certainty equivalent pricing (also called myopic pricing or passive learning): after every period, estimate the unknown demand parameters from all data collected so far, and charge the price that would be optimal if the estimates were the truth. It is simple, uses all data, and is what a price manager would do without further thought.

den Boer and Zwart (Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014) show that this policy can fail. In the linear-demand, Gaussian-noise model, the prices it produces fail to converge to the optimal price with positive probability: the policy is not strongly consistent. The result motivates the paper's main contribution, controlled variance pricing, which adds just enough price dispersion to keep learning (treated in the companion mission of this series).

The phenomenon has a history in adaptive control:

  • 1976. Anderson and Taylor study the linear system yt=a0+a1xt+ϵty_t = a_0 + a_1x_t + \epsilon_tyt​=a0​+a1​xt​+ϵt​ controlled by a certainty equivalent rule that steers yty_tyt​ to a target, and examine by simulation the statistical properties of the least squares estimates it produces (Econometrica 44(6), 1976).
  • 1982. Lai and Robbins (Adv. Appl. Math. 3(1), 1982) prove that there are parameter values for which the certainty equivalent controls converge with positive probability to a value different from the optimal control.
  • 2014. den Boer and Zwart adapt the argument to revenue maximization with linear demand, without the conditions Lai and Robbins place on the initial inputs and the input bounds: any two different initial prices in [pl,ph][p_l, p_h][pl​,ph​] give the failure with positive probability.

Setting

A monopolist sells one product in periods t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… at prices ptp_tpt​ from an interval [pl,ph][p_l, p_h][pl​,ph​] with 0<pl<ph0 < p_l < p_h0<pl​<ph​. The demand in period ttt is

dt=a0(0)+a1(0)pt+et,d_t = a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)} p_t + e_t ,dt​=a0(0)​+a1(0)​pt​+et​,

where e1,e2,…e_1, e_2, \dotse1​,e2​,… are independent N(0,σ2)N(0, \sigma^2)N(0,σ2) random variables. The parameters are unknown to the seller and satisfy σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, a0(0)>0a_0^{(0)} > 0a0(0)​>0, a1(0)<0a_1^{(0)} < 0a1(0)​<0, a0(0)+a1(0)ph≥0a_0^{(0)} + a_1^{(0)}p_h \ge 0a0(0)​+a1(0)​ph​≥0. The expected revenue at price ppp is r(p,a0,a1)=p(a0+a1p)r(p, a_0, a_1) = p(a_0 + a_1p)r(p,a0​,a1​)=p(a0​+a1​p), maximized at the optimal price

popt=−a0(0)2a1(0),pl<popt<ph.p_{\mathrm{opt}} = -\frac{a_0^{(0)}}{2a_1^{(0)}}, \qquad p_l < p_{\mathrm{opt}} < p_h .popt​=−2a1(0)​a0(0)​​,pl​<popt​<ph​.

Certainty equivalent pricing charges two different initial prices p1≠p2p_1 \ne p_2p1​=p2​ in [pl,ph][p_l, p_h][pl​,ph​]. After t≥2t \ge 2t≥2 periods it computes the least squares estimates a^t=(a^0t,a^1t)\hat a_t = (\hat a_{0t}, \hat a_{1t})a^t​=(a^0t​,a^1t​), the solution of the normal equations ∑i≤t(1,pi)T(di−a^0t−a^1tpi)=0\sum_{i \le t}(1, p_i)^{\mathsf T}(d_i - \hat a_{0t} - \hat a_{1t}p_i) = 0∑i≤t​(1,pi​)T(di​−a^0t​−a^1t​pi​)=0, and charges

pt+1=arg⁡max⁡p∈[pl,ph]p (a^0t+a^1tp),p_{t+1} = \arg\max_{p \in [p_l, p_h]} p\,(\hat a_{0t} + \hat a_{1t}p),pt+1​=argp∈[pl​,ph​]max​p(a^0t​+a^1t​p),

with pt+1=php_{t+1} = p_hpt+1​=ph​ when the estimated slope a^1t\hat a_{1t}a^1t​ is nonnegative.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

P(pt↛popt)>0.P\big(p_t \not\to p_{\mathrm{opt}}\big) > 0 .P(pt​→popt​)>0.

The goal states only the failure of convergence, for every admissible parameter and every pair of different initial prices; it does not fix where the prices go.

Stronger: the prices stick at the boundary

P(pt=ph for all t≥3)>0.P\big(p_t = p_h \ \text{for all } t \ge 3\big) > 0 .P(pt​=ph​ for all t≥3)>0.

This is what the paper's argument establishes; since popt<php_{\mathrm{opt}} < p_hpopt​<ph​ it implies the goal.

Milestones

The milestones are the displayed steps of the appendix proof, in attack order: the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the linear system (12); the bound P(sup⁡t≥3∣(t−2)−1∑i=3tei∣>ϵ)≤8σ2ϵ−2<1P(\sup_{t \ge 3}|(t-2)^{-1}\sum_{i=3}^t e_i| > \epsilon) \le 8\sigma^2\epsilon^{-2} < 1P(supt≥3​∣(t−2)−1∑i=3t​ei​∣>ϵ)≤8σ2ϵ−2<1 for ϵ>8 σ\epsilon > \sqrt 8\,\sigmaϵ>8​σ; positivity of the probability of an explicit event AδA_\deltaAδ​ on the noise for large δ\deltaδ; the case t=2t = 2t=2 (the first fitted line pushes p3p_3p3​ to php_hph​); the representation a^t−a(0)=(eˉt−pˉtCt/Vt, Ct/Vt)\hat a_t - a^{(0)} = (\bar e_t - \bar p_tC_t/V_t,\ C_t/V_t)a^t​−a(0)=(eˉt​−pˉ​t​Ct​/Vt​, Ct​/Vt​) of the least squares error; recursive and closed forms of VtV_tVt​ and CtC_tCt​; and the deterministic induction that every noise path in AδA_\deltaAδ​ keeps the price at php_hph​ forever.

Significance

The result is the standard counterexample to certainty equivalence in dynamic pricing. It shows that estimation and optimization cannot be separated naively: a policy that always exploits its current estimate can lock itself into a price at which the data no longer move the estimate enough to correct it. Every later policy in this literature that forces exploration (controlled variance pricing, semi-myopic policies, constrained iterated least squares) is designed against this failure, and its necessity is argued by pointing to results of this kind.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it adds:

  • a verified pathwise analysis of the least squares recursion along a price path, reusable for other proofs about adaptive estimation with two parameters;
  • a verified maximal bound for running means of i.i.d. Gaussian noise, of the kind used in many consistency proofs;
  • a clean probabilistic statement of the failure, against which consistency results for exploration policies can later be contrasted.

Difficulty

The obvious heuristic, "with positive probability the first two observations are so noisy that the fitted slope is wrong", is not enough: one bad estimate is corrected by later data unless the policy stops generating informative data. The proof has to control the whole infinite future. It does so by showing that on a single event, defined through the first two noise values and a uniform bound on all later running means, the price stays at php_hph​ forever, which requires the closed form of the least squares estimate along a price path that is constant from period 3 on. That event involves infinitely many noise variables, so its probability is positive only through a maximal inequality, and independence between (e1,e2)(e_1, e_2)(e1​,e2​) and the later noise. A second subtlety is the choice of constants: the size of the band δ\deltaδ enters the conditions on (e1,e2)(e_1, e_2)(e1​,e2​), so the order in which δ\deltaδ and the set of admissible (e1,e2)(e_1, e_2)(e1​,e2​) are chosen matters (the printed proof picks them in a circular order; a non-circular choice exists).

Formalization scope

  • Model. CVPricing.CertEquiv.Model bundles pl,ph,a0(0),a1(0),σp_l, p_h, a_0^{(0)}, a_1^{(0)}, \sigmapl​,ph​,a0(0)​,a1(0)​,σ with the standing assumptions of §2 as fields, including pl<popt<php_l < p_{\mathrm{opt}} < p_hpl​<popt​<ph​ (the paper's neighbourhood assumption specialized to linear demand). The noise is the referenced published definition RobustBooking.Shared.GaussianNoise (measurable, mutually independent, each N(0,σ2)N(0, \sigma^2)N(0,σ2)); its Lean index kkk is period k+1k+1k+1, so the paper's eie_iei​ is ε (i - 1).
  • Policy. cePrice is a deterministic recursion on a noise path, so the random price process is obtained by evaluating it at ω\omegaω. Periods are 1-based. The least squares estimate is the referenced KeskinZeevi.SufficientConditions.lsEstimateOf, the solution of the normal equations (4), unique whenever p1≠p2p_1 \ne p_2p1​=p2​. The certainty equivalent rule is the projection of −a^0t/(2a^1t)-\hat a_{0t}/(2\hat a_{1t})−a^0t​/(2a^1t​) onto [pl,ph][p_l, p_h][pl​,ph​] when a^1t<0\hat a_{1t} < 0a^1t​<0, and php_hph​ when a^1t≥0\hat a_{1t} \ge 0a^1t​≥0; the latter is the convention the paper's proof adopts for wrong-signed estimates.
  • Corrected slips. The definition of the event AAA is printed with "δ∣eˉt∣≤δ\delta|\bar e_t| \le \deltaδ∣eˉt​∣≤δ" (read ∣eˉt∣≤δ|\bar e_t| \le \delta∣eˉt​∣≤δ) and with its second line missing a factor δ\deltaδ on the term (2ph−p1−p2)(2p_h - p_1 - p_2)(2ph​−p1​−p2​); both are restored as in (12) and the last display of the proof. The intercept of the first fitted line is printed without a0(0)a_0^{(0)}a0(0)​; the correct intercept is stated, and the printed condition remains sufficient for p3=php_3 = p_hp3​=ph​.
  • WLOG. The steps of the proof assume p1<p2p_1 < p_2p1​<p2​ and are stated under that ordering; the goal and the stronger statement cover p1≠p2p_1 \ne p_2p1​=p2​.
  • No trivialization. The goal is a statement about the Gaussian law of the noise: a theorem that exhibits one bad noise path, or that assumes P(A)>0P(A) > 0P(A)>0, does not prove it. The event in the goal is a set of outcomes whose measurability is not asserted.
  • Welcome contributions. Kolmogorov's maximal inequality for sums of independent square-integrable variables; least squares identities for two-parameter regression; the independence argument separating (e1,e2)(e_1, e_2)(e1​,e2​) from the later noise.

Selected references

  • A. V. den Boer, B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Iterated least squares in multiperiod control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0196-8858(82)80005-5
  • T. W. Anderson, J. B. Taylor, Some experimental results on the statistical properties of least squares estimates in control problems, Econometrica 44(6):1289–1302, 1976. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914261
  • Y. S. Chow, H. Teicher, Probability Theory: Independence, Interchangeability, Martingales, 3rd ed., Springer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1950-7
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ProbabilityReinforcement LearningStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory Management: Base-Stock Values from Any Two Starting States Differ by at Most 36 max(h,p)LxResearch Paper

Motivation

The lost-sales inventory problem with lead times is a basic model of operations management. A retailer reviews one product's stock each period and places an order that arrives LLL periods later. Demand that cannot be met from stock on hand is lost, and the retailer pays a holding cost hhh per unit left on the shelf and a penalty ppp per unit of lost demand. The optimal policy depends on the whole pipeline of outstanding orders, so the state space grows with LLL, and the problem is computationally hard for long lead times. Simple base-stock (order-up-to) policies are therefore the standard heuristic, and Huh, Janakiraman, Muckstadt and Rusmevichientong (Management Science 2009) showed they are asymptotically optimal as the lost-sales penalty grows.

Agrawal and Jia (arXiv:1905.04337) study the learning version, in which the demand distribution is unknown and only sales, not demands, are observed. They give an algorithm whose regret against the best base-stock policy is O~(LT)\tilde O(L\sqrt T)O~(LT​), improving the earlier bound of Zhang, Chao and Shi, which grows exponentially in LLL. The improvement rests on one structural fact: started from two different states, the base-stock system accumulates expected costs that differ by an amount linear in LLL and independent of the horizon. That fact, Lemma 2.5 of the paper, is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Fix a lead time L≥0L\ge 0L≥0 and a base-stock level xxx. A state is a vector s=(s(0),s(1),…,s(L))\mathbf s=(s(0),s(1),\dots,s(L))s=(s(0),s(1),…,s(L)) of real numbers. Its entry s(0)s(0)s(0) is the on-hand inventory after the current period's arrival, and s(1),…,s(L)s(1),\dots,s(L)s(1),…,s(L) are the outstanding orders, s(L)s(L)s(L) the most recent. Under a base-stock policy with level xxx the states lie in

Sx={s:s(i)≥0 for all i, ∑i=0Ls(i)=x}.\mathcal S^x=\Big\{\mathbf s : s(i)\ge 0\ \text{for all } i,\ \sum_{i=0}^{L}s(i)=x\Big\}.Sx={s:s(i)≥0 for all i, i=0∑L​s(i)=x}.

In each period ttt a demand dt≥0d_t\ge 0dt​≥0 is drawn, independently across periods, from a distribution FFF on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The sales are yt=min⁡{st(0),dt}y_t=\min\{s_t(0),d_t\}yt​=min{st​(0),dt​} and the on-hand inventory is It=st(0)I_t=s_t(0)It​=st​(0). The policy reorders exactly what was sold, so for L≥1L\ge 1L≥1 the next state is

st+1=(st(0)−yt+st(1), st(2), …, st(L), yt),\mathbf s_{t+1}=\big(s_t(0)-y_t+s_t(1),\ s_t(2),\ \dots,\ s_t(L),\ y_t\big),st+1​=(st​(0)−yt​+st​(1), st​(2), …, st​(L), yt​),

and for L=0L=0L=0 the state (x)(x)(x) never changes. The pseudo-cost of period ttt is Ctx=h(st(0)−yt)−p ytC^x_t=h(s_t(0)-y_t)-p\,y_tCtx​=h(st​(0)−yt​)−pyt​, and the value over horizon TTT from the start state s\mathbf ss is

VTx(s)=E[∑t=1TCtx ∣ s1=s].V^x_T(\mathbf s)=\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T}C^x_t\ \Big|\ \mathbf s_1=\mathbf s\Big].VTx​(s)=E[t=1∑T​Ctx​ ​ s1​=s].

Along a demand path, nTx(s)=∑t=1Tytn^x_T(\mathbf s)=\sum_{t=1}^T y_tnTx​(s)=∑t=1T​yt​ is the total sales and mTx(s)=∑t=1TItm^x_T(\mathbf s)=\sum_{t=1}^T I_tmTx​(s)=∑t=1T​It​ the total on-hand inventory.

States are compared by the order of Definition B.1: s′⪰s\mathbf s'\succeq\mathbf ss′⪰s if s′−s=δ\mathbf s'-\mathbf s=\deltas′−s=δ with ∑iδi=0\sum_i\delta_i=0∑i​δi​=0 and some 0≤k≤L−10\le k\le L-10≤k≤L−1 such that δi≥0\delta_i\ge 0δi​≥0 for i≤ki\le ki≤k and δi≤0\delta_i\le 0δi​≤0 for i>ki>ki>k. Thus s′\mathbf s's′ holds the same total, shifted toward the shelf. The state s^=(x,0,…,0)\hat{\mathbf s}=(x,0,\dots,0)s^=(x,0,…,0) dominates every state of Sx\mathcal S^xSx.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 2.5 (p. 8)

For every xxx, every horizon TTT, all costs h,p≥0h,p\ge 0h,p≥0, every demand law FFF and all s,s′∈Sx\mathbf s,\mathbf s'\in\mathcal S^xs,s′∈Sx,

VTx(s)−VTx(s′)≤36max⁡(h,p) L x.V^x_T(\mathbf s)-V^x_T(\mathbf s')\le 36\max(h,p)\,L\,x .VTx​(s)−VTx​(s′)≤36max(h,p)Lx.

The constant is the paper's printed one. The proof's last display gives 18(h+p)Lx18(h+p)Lx18(h+p)Lx, a stronger bound, which is deliberately not the goal.

Milestones (Appendix B and the proof of Lemma 2.5)

All of the following hold for L≥1L\ge 1L≥1, along any single demand path that drives both chains:

  1. Lemma B.2 (p. 20). If s1′⪰s1\mathbf s'_1\succeq\mathbf s_1s1′​⪰s1​ then for t≤L+1t\le L+1t≤L+1 the cumulative sales satisfy Yt′−Yt≤max⁡0≤k≤t−1(δ0+⋯+δk)Y'_t-Y_t\le\max_{0\le k\le t-1}(\delta_0+\dots+\delta_k)Yt′​−Yt​≤max0≤k≤t−1​(δ0​+⋯+δk​).
  2. Lemma B.3 (p. 20). If moreover It′≥ItI'_t\ge I_tIt′​≥It​ for t=1,…,L+1t=1,\dots,L+1t=1,…,L+1, then nT(sL+1′)=nT(sL+1)n_T(\mathbf s'_{L+1})=n_T(\mathbf s_{L+1})nT​(sL+1′​)=nT​(sL+1​) for every TTT.
  3. Lemma B.5 (p. 21). At the successive first crossing times σi,τi\sigma_i,\tau_iσi​,τi​ of Definition B.4, the state order alternates: sσi′⪰sσi\mathbf s'_{\sigma_i}\succeq\mathbf s_{\sigma_i}sσi​′​⪰sσi​​ and sτi′⪯sτi\mathbf s'_{\tau_i}\preceq\mathbf s_{\tau_i}sτi​′​⪯sτi​​ whenever these times exist.
  4. Lemma B.6 (p. 21). If s′⪰s\mathbf s'\succeq\mathbf ss′⪰s in Sx\mathcal S^xSx then ∣nTx(s′)−nTx(s)∣≤3x|n^x_T(\mathbf s')-n^x_T(\mathbf s)|\le 3x∣nTx​(s′)−nTx​(s)∣≤3x.
  5. Lemma B.7 (p. 23). If s′⪰s\mathbf s'\succeq\mathbf ss′⪰s in Sx\mathcal S^xSx then ∣mTx(s)−mTx(s′)∣≤6Lx|m^x_T(\mathbf s)-m^x_T(\mathbf s')|\le 6Lx∣mTx​(s)−mTx​(s′)∣≤6Lx.
  6. Proof of Lemma 2.5 (p. 9). s^⪰s\hat{\mathbf s}\succeq\mathbf ss^⪰s for every s∈Sx\mathbf s\in\mathcal S^xs∈Sx.
  7. Proof of Lemma 2.5 (p. 9). ∣VTx(s)−VTx(s^)∣≤9(h+p)Lx|V^x_T(\mathbf s)-V^x_T(\hat{\mathbf s})|\le 9(h+p)Lx∣VTx​(s)−VTx​(s^)∣≤9(h+p)Lx.

Significance

Lemma 2.5 bounds the dependence of the base-stock chain's finite-horizon cost on its starting state, uniformly in the horizon. In the paper it yields three consequences: the long-run average cost (the loss) of a base-stock policy does not depend on the initial state (Lemma 2.6), the bias of the chain is bounded by 36max⁡(h,p)Lx36\max(h,p)Lx36max(h,p)Lx (Lemma 2.8), and finite-horizon average costs concentrate around the loss (Lemma 2.10). These feed the regret bound of Theorem 1.3. The lemma is also a statement about the base-stock lost-sales system alone, without any learning, so it is of independent interest for coupling arguments on lost-sales chains.

The paper's proof is complete on paper, but nothing in it has a machine-checked proof. Neither the lost-sales base-stock chain with lead times started from an arbitrary pipeline state nor any of the coupling lemmas of Appendix B is formalized elsewhere. This mission produces a checked proof of the goal and of the pathwise comparison lemmas. Theorem 1.3 is not posed: its supporting lemmas rely on limits whose existence the paper settles only by an informal discretization (Remark 4).

Difficulty

The obvious argument couples the two chains on a common demand path and waits until they coalesce. Coalescence is guaranteed only after LLL consecutive periods of zero demand, an event of probability exponentially small in LLL, so this argument gives a bound exponential in LLL. That is the bound of earlier work.

The linear bound needs a finer pathwise accounting. The two coupled chains do not stay ordered: the one that starts with more inventory on the shelf sells more at first, then runs short and sells less. The order ⪰\succeq⪰ between the two states alternates along a sequence of times, and the sales gained in one phase must be shown to be lost again in the next, so that the cumulative difference stays bounded by a constant multiple of xxx for every horizon. Turning this alternation into a bound requires tracking how the pipeline vectors evolve between alternation times, including the boundary cases in which the chains coalesce or the horizon ends inside a phase.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace LostSalesLearning.ValueGap. A state is a function Fin (L + 1) → ℝ, a demand path is a function ℕ → ℝ≥0, and time is 0-based: traj s d 0 is the paper's s1\mathbf s_1s1​, traj s d t is st+1\mathbf s_{t+1}st+1​, and ∑t=1T\sum_{t=1}^T∑t=1T​ is a sum over Finset.range T. The demand law FFF is a probability measure on ℝ≥0, and the demand path has the product law Measure.infinitePi (fun _ => F). The value is the expectation of the summed pseudo-costs, which equals Definition 2.4 by the tower property and is the form used in the paper's proof.

Committed conventions:

  • The costs satisfy h≥0h\ge 0h≥0 and p≥0p\ge 0p≥0, the reading of "per unit holding cost and per unit lost sales penalty".
  • No assumption is placed on FFF. The paper's assumptions F(0)>0F(0)>0F(0)>0 and bounded demand belong to other results.
  • The goal holds for every L≥0L\ge 0L≥0; the Appendix B milestones carry L≥1L\ge 1L≥1, as Appendix B does.
  • The order ⪰\succeq⪰ is Definition B.1 verbatim, with the equal-sum clause and the split index k≤L−1k\le L-1k≤L−1.
  • The pathwise milestones quantify over every demand path and drive both chains with the same path.
  • The first crossing times of Definition B.4 are represented by alternationTimes; an absent next crossing is none.

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out. A comparison of the two values on different or fixed demand paths would be a different statement: the goal compares two expectations under the same law, and each pathwise milestone uses one common path. A Bochner integral of a non-integrable function would be 000. The integrand here is measurable and bounded by T(h+p)xT(h+p)xT(h+p)x on Sx\mathcal S^xSx, so the values are genuine expectations.

A complete development needs the elementary dynamics of the chain, including invariance of Sx\mathcal S^xSx and the shift of trajectories, which is reusable for other lost-sales models. It also needs the alternation times of Definition B.4, and measurability of the trajectory in the demand path. Proofs of individual milestones, alternative proofs of the goal, and sharper constants as separate statements are all welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal and R. Jia, Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory Management, arXiv:1905.04337v1, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04337
  • W. T. Huh, G. Janakiraman, J. A. Muckstadt and P. Rusmevichientong, Asymptotic Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems, Management Science 55(3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0945
  • H. Zhang, X. Chao and C. Shi, Closing the Gap: A Learning Algorithm for Lost-Sales Inventory Systems with Lead Times, Management Science 66(5), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3288
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Oracle-Based Robust Optimization via Online Learning 2: Follow the Perturbed Leader with an ε-Approximate Linear Oracle Has Expected Regret at Most 2√(DRAT) + 2εTResearch Paper

Motivation

Many decision problems are solved repeatedly against data that arrive over time: routing traffic, allocating budgets, choosing portfolios or combinatorial structures. Online linear optimization models this. At each round t=1,…,Tt = 1, \ldots, Tt=1,…,T a learner picks a decision xtx_txt​ from a fixed domain K⊆Rn\mathcal K\subseteq\mathbb R^nK⊆Rn, then a reward vector ftf_tft​ is revealed and the learner earns ft⋅xtf_t\cdot x_tft​⋅xt​. Performance is measured by regret, the gap to the best fixed decision in hindsight. When K\mathcal KK is combinatorial (paths, spanning trees, assignments), the only computationally reasonable access to K\mathcal KK is a procedure that optimizes a linear function over it, and in practice such procedures are often only approximate.

Follow the Perturbed Leader (FPL), introduced by Hannan (1957) and analysed for linear optimization by Kalai and Vempala (JCSS 2005), uses exactly one call to an exact linear optimizer per round and achieves regret O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) over arbitrary, not necessarily convex, domains. Ben-Tal, Hazan, Koren and Mannor (arXiv:1402.6361, Operations Research 2015) needed a version of FPL that works with an additively approximate linear optimizer, as a building block for oracle-based robust optimization with linearly parametrized uncertainty sets. Their §3.3 analyses this variant and proves Theorem 6, the goal of this mission.

Setting

Fix a dimension nnn, a domain K⊆Rn\mathcal K\subseteq\mathbb R^nK⊆Rn (arbitrary: not necessarily convex, closed or bounded) and ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0. An ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate linear optimization procedure over K\mathcal KK is a map Mϵ:Rn→RnM_\epsilon:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^nMϵ​:Rn→Rn such that, for every g∈Rng\in\mathbb R^ng∈Rn,

Mϵ(g)∈Kandg⋅Mϵ(g)  ≥  g⋅x−ϵfor all x∈K.M_\epsilon(g)\in\mathcal K \qquad\text{and}\qquad g\cdot M_\epsilon(g)\;\ge\; g\cdot x-\epsilon\quad\text{for all }x\in\mathcal K .Mϵ​(g)∈Kandg⋅Mϵ​(g)≥g⋅x−ϵfor all x∈K.

Reward vectors f1,…,fT∈Rnf_1,\ldots,f_T\in\mathbb R^nf1​,…,fT​∈Rn are fixed in advance (an oblivious adversary). Write f1:t=∑τ=1tfτf_{1:t}=\sum_{\tau=1}^t f_\tauf1:t​=∑τ=1t​fτ​, with f1:0=0f_{1:0}=0f1:0​=0, and ∥v∥1=∑i∣vi∣\|v\|_1=\sum_i|v_i|∥v∥1​=∑i​∣vi​∣.

Follow the Approximate Perturbed Leader with parameter η>0\eta>0η>0 plays at round ttt

xt=Mϵ(f1:t−1+pt),pt uniform on the cube [0,1/η]n.x_t = M_\epsilon\big(f_{1:t-1}+p_t\big),\qquad p_t \text{ uniform on the cube } [0,1/\eta]^n .xt​=Mϵ​(f1:t−1​+pt​),pt​ uniform on the cube [0,1/η]n.

Three scale parameters enter the bound: DDD bounds the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ diameter of K\mathcal KK, ∥x−y∥1≤D\|x-y\|_1\le D∥x−y∥1​≤D for x,y∈Kx,y\in\mathcal Kx,y∈K; AAA bounds ∥ft∥1\|f_t\|_1∥ft​∥1​; and RRR bounds how much each reward varies over the domain, ∣ft⋅x−ft⋅y∣≤R|f_t\cdot x-f_t\cdot y|\le R∣ft​⋅x−ft​⋅y∣≤R for x,y∈Kx,y\in\mathcal Kx,y∈K.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 11)

With η=D/(RAT)\eta=\sqrt{D/(RAT)}η=D/(RAT)​, for every x∗∈Kx^*\in\mathcal Kx∗∈K,

∑t=1Tft⋅x∗−E[∑t=1Tft⋅xt]  ≤  2DRAT+2ϵT.\sum_{t=1}^T f_t\cdot x^* - \mathbf E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t\cdot x_t\Big]\;\le\;2\sqrt{DRAT}+2\epsilon T .t=1∑T​ft​⋅x∗−E[t=1∑T​ft​⋅xt​]≤2DRAT​+2ϵT.

The bound for every η\etaη (proof of Theorem 6, p. 13)

For every η>0\eta>0η>0 and x∈Kx\in\mathcal Kx∈K,

E[∑t=1Tft⋅xt]  ≥  f1:T⋅x−Dη−ηRAT−2ϵT.\mathbf E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t\cdot x_t\Big]\;\ge\; f_{1:T}\cdot x-\frac D\eta-\eta RAT-2\epsilon T .E[t=1∑T​ft​⋅xt​]≥f1:T​⋅x−ηD​−ηRAT−2ϵT.

Supporting lemmas (pp. 12–13)

  • Lemma 7 (approximate be-the-leader): ∑t=1TMϵ(f1:t)⋅ft≥Mϵ(f1:T)⋅f1:T−ϵT\sum_{t=1}^T M_\epsilon(f_{1:t})\cdot f_t\ge M_\epsilon(f_{1:T})\cdot f_{1:T}-\epsilon T∑t=1T​Mϵ​(f1:t​)⋅ft​≥Mϵ​(f1:T​)⋅f1:T​−ϵT.
  • Lemma 8 (be the approximate perturbed leader): for T≥2T\ge2T≥2, p∈[0,1/η]np\in[0,1/\eta]^np∈[0,1/η]n and x∈Kx\in\mathcal Kx∈K, ∑t=1TMϵ(f1:t+p)⋅ft≥f1:T⋅x−D/η−2ϵT\sum_{t=1}^T M_\epsilon(f_{1:t}+p)\cdot f_t\ge f_{1:T}\cdot x-D/\eta-2\epsilon T∑t=1T​Mϵ​(f1:t​+p)⋅ft​≥f1:T​⋅x−D/η−2ϵT.
  • Lemma 9 (stability): for ppp uniform on [0,1/η]n[0,1/\eta]^n[0,1/η]n, E[Mϵ(f1:t−1+p)⋅ft]−E[Mϵ(f1:t+p)⋅ft]≥−ηRA\mathbf E[M_\epsilon(f_{1:t-1}+p)\cdot f_t]-\mathbf E[M_\epsilon(f_{1:t}+p)\cdot f_t]\ge-\eta RAE[Mϵ​(f1:t−1​+p)⋅ft​]−E[Mϵ​(f1:t​+p)⋅ft​]≥−ηRA.

Significance

Theorem 6 shows that perturbed-leader online linear optimization is robust to additive error in its optimization subroutine: an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate oracle costs only 2ϵT2\epsilon T2ϵT extra regret, so the average regret is 2DRA/T+2ϵ2\sqrt{DRA/T}+2\epsilon2DRA/T​+2ϵ. This allows the algorithm to be run over domains where exact linear optimization is intractable but a good additive approximation is available, and the paper invokes it as the online-learning primitive of its oracle-based scheme for linearly parametrized uncertainty in §3.2 (that application is not part of this mission). Unlike online gradient methods, it requires no convexity of K\mathcal KK and no projection.

On the formal side, no regret bound for Follow the Perturbed Leader, exact or approximate, is currently formalized on the platform, and the Kalai–Vempala stability argument (comparing a uniform distribution on a cube with its translate) is a reusable piece of measure theory. The mission's statements are proved on paper; the work here is to formalize those proofs, with one correction to a hypothesis, explained under Formalization scope.

Difficulty

Lemmas 7 and 8 are deterministic and combinatorial. The substance is Lemma 9. It compares the expectations of one bounded function of Mϵ(⋅)M_\epsilon(\cdot)Mϵ​(⋅) under the uniform law on a cube and under its translate by ftf_tft​. The natural first attempt, a pointwise comparison of Mϵ(f1:t−1+p)M_\epsilon(f_{1:t-1}+p)Mϵ​(f1:t−1​+p) and Mϵ(f1:t+p)M_\epsilon(f_{1:t}+p)Mϵ​(f1:t​+p), fails: an approximate (even an exact) maximizer can jump arbitrarily under an arbitrarily small change of its input, and MϵM_\epsilonMϵ​ is not assumed continuous or even consistent between nearby inputs. Any valid argument must therefore control the two distributions as a whole rather than the decisions point by point, which in the formal development involves Lebesgue measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, conditioning on a box and translation invariance.

A second subtlety is that the stability bound depends on how RRR is read, which is the reason for the correction below.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ with dotProduct. All ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ quantities are written as ∑i∣vi∣\sum_i|v_i|∑i​∣vi​∣, never with the default norm (the sup norm). Rewards are a function f : ℕ → Fin n → ℝ read at t=1,…,Tt=1,\ldots,Tt=1,…,T, and f1:tf_{1:t}f1:t​ is prefixSum f t. The perturbation law is Lebesgue measure conditioned on the cube [0,1/η]n[0,1/\eta]^n[0,1/η]n (ProbabilityTheory.cond volume), a probability measure for η>0\eta>0η>0. Maxima over K\mathcal KK are expressed as "for every x∈Kx\in\mathcal Kx∈K", so neither attainment nor boundedness of K\mathcal KK is presupposed.

Conventions and deviations, each also stated in the affected item:

  1. RRR is an oscillation bound. The paper takes R≥max⁡t,x∣ft⋅x∣R\ge\max_{t,x}|f_t\cdot x|R≥maxt,x​∣ft​⋅x∣. With that reading Lemma 9 is false (for K={−1,1}\mathcal K=\{-1,1\}K={−1,1}, the exact maximizer, f1:t−1=−Af_{1:t-1}=-Af1:t−1​=−A, ft=A=Rf_t=A=Rft​=A=R, ηA≤1\eta A\le1ηA≤1, the left side is −2ηRA-2\eta RA−2ηRA), and the printed constant in Theorem 6 does not follow. The proof's step "they can differ by at most RRR" is correct when R≥∣ft⋅x−ft⋅y∣R\ge|f_t\cdot x-f_t\cdot y|R≥∣ft​⋅x−ft​⋅y∣ for x,y∈Kx,y\in\mathcal Kx,y∈K; Lemma 9, the display and Theorem 6 are stated with that hypothesis. The printed hypothesis implies it with 2R2R2R; for non-negative rewards the two coincide.
  2. Expected reward. E[∑tft⋅xt]\mathbf E[\sum_t f_t\cdot x_t]E[∑t​ft​⋅xt​] is written as ∑t∫ft⋅Mϵ(f1:t−1+p) dμη(p)\sum_t\int f_t\cdot M_\epsilon(f_{1:t-1}+p)\,d\mu_\eta(p)∑t​∫ft​⋅Mϵ​(f1:t−1​+p)dμη​(p), which by linearity of expectation is the same for independent or shared perturbations (the paper makes the same observation).
  3. Printed typos. In (13) the summand ftf_tft​ is fτf_\taufτ​ and round ttt uses f1:t−1f_{1:t-1}f1:t−1​; in Lemma 8 and the display, max⁡xf1:t⋅x\max_{x}f_{1:t}\cdot xmaxx​f1:t​⋅x means f1:Tf_{1:T}f1:T​.
  4. Added hypotheses. MϵM_\epsilonMϵ​ is measurable (otherwise every expectation would be a Bochner integral of a non-measurable function and equal 000); an approximate maximizer can always be chosen measurable. D,R,A>0D,R,A>0D,R,A>0 and T≥1T\ge1T≥1 make η=D/(RAT)\eta=\sqrt{D/(RAT)}η=D/(RAT)​ a positive real. The display is stated for T≥1T\ge1T≥1 (Lemma 8 needs T≥2T\ge2T≥2 as printed; the case T=1T=1T=1 also holds).
  5. No O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) appears: all constants are the paper's explicit ones.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: MϵM_\epsilonMϵ​ must return points of K\mathcal KK (otherwise DDD would not bound ∥Mϵ(⋅)−Mϵ(⋅)∥1\|M_\epsilon(\cdot)-M_\epsilon(\cdot)\|_1∥Mϵ​(⋅)−Mϵ​(⋅)∥1​), it must be measurable, and the perturbation law is the normalized uniform distribution, not Lebesgue measure restricted to the cube (which is not a probability measure for η≠1\eta\neq1η=1).

Needed infrastructure: the overlap estimate for a cube and its translate, vol([0,1/η]n∩(v+[0,1/η]n))≥(1−η∥v∥1) η−n\mathrm{vol}([0,1/\eta]^n\cap(v+[0,1/\eta]^n))\ge(1-\eta\|v\|_1)\,\eta^{-n}vol([0,1/η]n∩(v+[0,1/η]n))≥(1−η∥v∥1​)η−n, and the integrability of bounded measurable functions of MϵM_\epsilonMϵ​. Both are reusable for any perturbation-based online-learning analysis; contributions of these as standalone lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, E. Hazan, T. Koren, S. Mannor, Oracle-Based Robust Optimization via Online Learning, Operations Research 63(3), 2015; preprint arXiv:1402.6361v1, 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.6361
  • A. Kalai, S. Vempala, Efficient algorithms for online decision problems, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 71(3), 291–307, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2004.10.016
  • J. Hannan, Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play, Contributions to the Theory of Games III, Annals of Mathematics Studies 39, 97–139, 1957.
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Deriving Robust Counterparts of Nonlinear Uncertain Inequalities: For a Regular Nominal Vector, a Concave Uncertain Constraint Holds Robustly iff Its Fenchel Counterpart (FRC) Is SolvableResearch Paper

Motivation

In robust optimization, a decision must satisfy a constraint for every parameter value in a prescribed uncertainty set. A nonlinear uncertain constraint can be difficult to use directly because it contains a universal condition over a continuum of parameters. Ben-Tal, den Hertog, and Vial study constraints whose value is concave in the uncertain parameter. Their Theorem 2 replaces the universal condition by one inequality involving a new vector and two conjugate functions. The replacement is the general framework used for the paper's later examples, including uncertainty regions assembled from simpler sets and nonlinear functions whose conjugates have explicit forms. The discussion paper, §§2–4 is the source for this mission; theorem and page numbers refer to that 2012 version.

The paper's result extends a more specialized counterpart for a linear uncertain constraint under a φ-divergence uncertainty region. That 2013 result has a proved formalization on Prove2Me, but its divergence-specific conjugate and uncertainty set are different objects. The same earlier formalization also supplies a proved version of the self-concordant-barrier statement that this paper quotes as Lemma 33, with a differently printed constant. Neither earlier theorem supplies the general concave-constraint result here.

Setting

Fix dimensions m,n,Lm,n,Lm,n,L. The nominal vector is a0∈Rma^0\in\mathbb R^ma0∈Rm, and A∈Rm×LA\in\mathbb R^{m\times L}A∈Rm×L maps a primitive uncertainty ζ∈Z⊆RL\zeta\in Z\subseteq\mathbb R^Lζ∈Z⊆RL to an uncertain parameter a=a0+Aζa=a^0+A\zetaa=a0+Aζ. Thus the uncertainty set is U={a0+Aζ:ζ∈Z}U=\{a^0+A\zeta:\zeta\in Z\}U={a0+Aζ:ζ∈Z}. The paper assumes that ZZZ is nonempty, convex, and compact, with 000 in its relative interior ri⁡Z\operatorname{ri}ZriZ. Relative interior is taken inside the affine hull of a set, so ZZZ may lie in a lower-dimensional plane.

A decision is x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn. For each decision, D(x)D(x)D(x) is the effective domain of the uncertain constraint f(⋅,x)f(\cdot,x)f(⋅,x): f(a,x)f(a,x)f(a,x) is real on D(x)D(x)D(x) and is interpreted as −∞-\infty−∞ outside it. The function is concave in aaa on D(x)D(x)D(x) for every xxx; the paper imposes no convexity assumption in the decision xxx. The robust constraint (RC) is f(a,x)≤0f(a,x)\le0f(a,x)≤0 for every a∈Ua\in Ua∈U. In the domain representation used here, this means every a∈U∩D(x)a\in U\cap D(x)a∈U∩D(x). The nominal vector is regular when a0∈ri⁡D(x)a^0\in\operatorname{ri}D(x)a0∈riD(x) for every decision xxx, as in Definition 1.

The support function of SSS is δ∗(y∣S)=sup⁡a∈SyTa\delta^*(y\mid S)=\sup_{a\in S}y^Taδ∗(y∣S)=supa∈S​yTa. The partial concave conjugate is f∗(v,x)=inf⁡a∈D(x)(aTv−f(a,x))f_*(v,x)=\inf_{a\in D(x)}(a^Tv-f(a,x))f∗​(v,x)=infa∈D(x)​(aTv−f(a,x)). Both have extended-real values: an empty support set has support value −∞-\infty−∞, and the conjugate can be −∞-\infty−∞ when its infimum is unbounded below. These values matter in the equivalence; replacing them by a default real number changes the constraint.

Formalization targets

The goal is the paper's Theorem 2. Under the standing assumptions and regularity, for every decision xxx,

[∀a∈U∩D(x), f(a,x)≤0]⟺[∃v∈Rm: (a0)Tv+δ∗(ATv∣Z)−f∗(v,x)≤0].\left[\forall a\in U\cap D(x),\ f(a,x)\le0\right] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \left[\exists v\in\mathbb R^m:\ (a^0)^Tv+\delta^*(A^Tv\mid Z)-f_*(v,x)\le0\right].[∀a∈U∩D(x), f(a,x)≤0]⟺[∃v∈Rm: (a0)Tv+δ∗(ATv∣Z)−f∗​(v,x)≤0].

The right-hand inequality is the Fenchel robust counterpart (FRC). Its existence claim is essential: equality of primal and dual infima alone would not show that an auxiliary vector satisfying FRC exists.

Four source statements form the milestone path. Remark 5 gives the weak-duality inequality and the FRC-to-RC implication without concavity. Equations (16)–(18) calculate the support function of UUU. Equation (7) states the relative-interior qualification. Equations (13)–(15) state the worst-case/dual-value identity and, through the printed minimum, attainment of the dual infimum. The milestone list quotes those source passages and identifies their printed pages. Theorem 2 and its proof appear on pp. 4–5.

Significance

The equivalence gives an exact way to replace an infinite family of uncertain inequalities by an existential constraint. In examples where the support function and concave conjugate can be evaluated or represented with standard optimization constraints, it yields a finite robust counterpart. The conclusion remains a mathematical equivalence even when such an explicit representation has not been found. It is also independent of any convexity of fff in the decision variable, a point the paper makes after Corollary 3.

This mission supplies reusable, domain-aware support and conjugate definitions and formal statements for the duality path in the paper's central result. The new goal and milestones are open proof obligations: their Lean declarations compile, but they do not yet have machine-checked proofs. The proved 2013 φ-divergence case is narrower and does not close them. A completed development would make the general relative-interior and attained-duality steps reusable for other robust optimization models.

Difficulty

The delicate point is the direction from RC to the existence of an FRC vector. Weak duality gives only a one-sided bound. Identifying the two optimal values still leaves an existence question when an infimum is not attained. The paper invokes Fenchel duality under a relative-interior intersection condition; replacing relative interior by ordinary interior would exclude lower-dimensional uncertainty sets and effective domains that the source permits. A second difficulty is keeping finite and infinite conjugate values distinct while subtracting them in the counterpart inequality. An unbounded-below conjugate must make a finite-support FRC value +∞+\infty+∞, not a plausible finite number.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions on Fin m, Fin n, and Fin L; AAA is a real matrix, and dot products use the finite-vector dot product. Mathlib's intrinsicInterior ℝ represents relative interior. The domain map D(x)D(x)D(x) is explicit, with the concavity hypothesis imposed on that domain. The real representative of fff outside D(x)D(x)D(x) is ignored everywhere. The paper's Notation paragraph calls its generic concave functions closed, but the statements here omit closedness: the finite-dimensional duality qualification used for Theorem 2 needs relative-interior overlap, not that extra regularity. This is a stated strengthening of the source theorem, not a change of its feasible points.

Support functions, conjugates, worst-case values, and dual values use EReal. The paper's “max” in (8), (13), and Remark 5 is read as an extended-real supremum; its “min” in (15) is an infimum accompanied by an attaining vector. The support identity includes Z=∅Z=\varnothingZ=∅, where both sides are −∞-\infty−∞, although Theorem 2 keeps the paper's nonempty, convex, compact ZZZ. On the theorem's hypotheses the support value is finite and D(x)D(x)D(x) is nonempty, so the undefined-looking combinations +∞−(+∞)+\infty-(+\infty)+∞−(+∞) and −∞+(+∞)-\infty+(+\infty)−∞+(+∞) cannot occur in FRC. No all-space real-valued substitute for f∗f_*f∗​ is used, and the theorem still quantifies over every decision and every allowed uncertainty vector.

The proof development needs finite-dimensional relative-interior behavior under affine maps and Fenchel duality with attainment. General convex conjugates and support functions can serve later missions. Corollary 3 and the paper's complexity discussion are outside this mission. Theorem A.1 is not separately made a milestone here: as printed, its domain-restricted dual maximum has a problematic −∞-\infty−∞ case; the directly used, attained identity (13)–(15) is the target under the main theorem's standing assumptions.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, J.-P. Vial, Deriving robust counterparts of nonlinear uncertain inequalities, CentER Discussion Paper 2012-053, Tilburg University, 2012. Discussion-paper PDF; journal version, Mathematical Programming, 2015, DOI 10.1007/s10107-014-0750-8.
  • A. Ben-Tal et al., Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science, 2013. Prove2Me formalization of its φ-divergence case.
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OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems: Ordering Up to the Newsvendor Level for Penalty b + τh Is Asymptotically Optimal as b → ∞Research Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory systems face a simple choice each period: how much to order before the next demand is known. When unmet demand is lost, the order can affect the stock available several periods later without preserving a backlog that records earlier shortages. This makes the optimal policy difficult to describe when replenishment takes time. An order-up-to policy offers a practical rule: order enough to bring the inventory position to a fixed level. Huh, Janakiraman, Muckstadt and Rusmevichientong ask when that simple rule performs as well as the best admissible lost-sales policy as the penalty for a lost unit grows. Their working paper, pp. 3–4 and 17–18, proves asymptotic optimality for a particular level obtained from a related backorder system.

The motivating costs are concrete. A lost sale may represent an expedited service part or a missed sale whose cost is much larger than one period of holding inventory. The paper's central comparison concerns the high-penalty regime while holding the demand law, lead time and holding rate fixed. The fixed-level policy can be computed from the distribution of demand over the lead time plus the order period; it does not require solving the full lost-sales control problem. The paper also supplies a finite-penalty bound, which this mission retains as a milestone. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 17–18.

Setting

Let D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\ldotsD1​,D2​,… be independent, identically distributed nonnegative demands with finite positive mean. An order takes a fixed integer lead time τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 to arrive. At the start of period ttt, the order placed τ\tauτ periods earlier arrives; then a new order is placed, and demand DtD_tDt​ is observed. Unmet demand is lost. At period end, each unit remaining on hand incurs holding cost h>0h>0h>0, and each lost unit incurs penalty b>0b>0b>0. The inventory position counts on-hand units and outstanding orders. An order-up-to-SSS policy raises this position to S≥0S\ge0S≥0 whenever possible.

Write CL,S(h,b)C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)CL,S(h,b) for the long-run average cost of that policy and CL∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b)CL∗(h,b) for the infimum over admissible policies. The corresponding backorder system retains unmet demand as negative net inventory and charges bbb per backordered unit per period. For an order-up-to level SSS, its stationary average cost is

CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=∑i=1τ+1Di.C^{\mathcal B,S}(h,b)=h\mathbb E[(S-\mathbf D)^+]+b\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S)^+],\qquad \mathbf D=\sum_{i=1}^{\tau+1}D_i.CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=i=1∑τ+1​Di​.

The newsvendor level SB∗(h,b)S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)SB∗(h,b) is the smallest nonnegative SSS with Pr⁡(D≤S)≥b/(b+h)\Pr(\mathbf D\le S)\ge b/(b+h)Pr(D≤S)≥b/(b+h); it attains the best backorder order-up-to cost CB∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)CB∗(h,b). The paper's Assumption 1 concerns this lead-time demand D\mathbf DD: if mD(t)=E[D−t∣D>t]m_{\mathbf D}(t)=\mathbb E[\mathbf D-t\mid\mathbf D>t]mD​(t)=E[D−t∣D>t] when the conditioning event has positive probability and zero otherwise, then mD(t)/t→0m_{\mathbf D}(t)/t\to0mD​(t)/t→0 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 9, 11–12.

Formalization targets

Asymptotically optimal order-up-to level

Fix hhh, τ\tauτ and the demand law satisfying Assumption 1. Set Sb+τh=SB∗(h,b+τh)S_{b+\tau h}=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b+\tau h)Sb+τh​=SB∗(h,b+τh). The goal is the equivalent multiplicative form of Theorem 15(b): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, all sufficiently large bbb satisfy

inf⁡S≥0CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).\inf_{S\ge0}C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)\le C^{\mathcal L,S_{b+\tau h}}(h,b)\le(1+\varepsilon)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b).S≥0inf​CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh​(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).

The infimum over order-up-to levels captures the paper's best such policy. The right-hand comparator remains the infimum over all admissible lost-sales policies. The multiplicative form also covers an almost-surely constant demand law, where both costs can be zero and a literal ratio would be undefined. Huh et al., Theorem 15(b), p. 17.

Explicit finite-penalty bound

Theorem 15(a) is a milestone. With S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1))S'=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b/(\tau+1))S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1)) and ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+])\psi(S';h,q)=q\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S')^+]/(h\mathbb E[(S'-\mathbf D)^+])ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+]), its factor is

1+νbψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1)),νb=(b+τh)(τ+1)b.\frac{1+\nu_b\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))}{1+\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))},\qquad \nu_b=\frac{(b+\tau h)(\tau+1)}{b}.1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+νb​ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))​,νb​=b(b+τh)(τ+1)​.

The milestone states the bound where the expected holding quantity in ψ\psiψ is positive. Earlier milestones state the pathwise comparison of the systems, the two-sided average-cost comparison with penalties b/(τ+1)b/(\tau+1)b/(τ+1) and b+τhb+\tau hb+τh, the lower bound on unrestricted lost-sales optimal cost, the newsvendor formula, and the backorder sensitivity results used by the theorem. Huh et al., Lemmas 5, 9, 13 and Theorems 6, 15, pp. 11–18.

Significance

The theorem gives a specific computable stock level whose relative cost loss vanishes in the high-penalty regime. It addresses the gap between a tractable backorder benchmark and the more difficult lost-sales control problem. The finite-penalty factor states how the comparison depends on lead time, holding cost, penalty and the shortage-to-holding ratio; the asymptotic statement alone would not quantify that dependence. The paper establishes these mathematical results; the mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the stated Lean targets. Huh et al., pp. 17–18.

Formalizing the result would also supply reusable infrastructure for coupled inventory systems: measurable demand-path laws, pathwise recursions with delayed delivery, extended nonnegative long-run costs, and a clean comparison between an explicit policy and the infimum over unrestricted policies. The backorder newsvendor and mean-residual-life components can be reused beyond this particular lost-sales model.

Difficulty

The backorder system has a closed stationary cost formula, while a lost-sales order-up-to process generally cannot be replaced directly by that formula. The paper notes that its on-hand inventory distribution need not converge from every starting state, even under a fixed order-up-to policy. One must therefore justify the long-run comparison without assuming stationarity from an arbitrary start. A second difficulty is the benchmark: comparing only against other order-up-to policies is too weak to establish Theorem 15, because the goal uses the optimal cost over all admissible lost-sales policies. Huh et al., pp. 14–16, 18.

Formalization scope

Lean reuses the published CappedBaseStock lost-sales model. Its demands are nonnegative and i.i.d. with finite positive mean; τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 and h,b>0h,b>0h,b>0. Period zero in Lean is period one in the paper. Both coupled processes start with zero on-hand stock and an empty pipeline. Inventory XtX_tXt​ is read immediately after delivery, before current demand. Lost-sales costs lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and use the limsup of expected Cesàro averages; the backorder closed form uses real Bochner expectations under finite-mean demand. The paper's stationary lost-sales cost and this Cesàro cost are identified using its long-run results, but those convergence results are outside this proposal. Huh et al., pp. 14–16.

The paper prints nonnegative rates in Theorem 15, while its displayed newsvendor fraction and shortage-to-holding ratios require positive denominators. Theorem 6(a) therefore states the ratio limit for nonconstant demand laws. The main theorem uses a multiplicative limit bound that also covers constant demand, where the printed ratio is undefined.

The quantity CL∗C^{\mathcal L*}CL∗ is an infimum over measurable, history-dependent policies with private randomization; no attaining policy is assumed. The backorder optimum is an infimum over nonnegative order-up-to levels. Assumption 1 is imposed on the sum of τ+1\tau+1τ+1 demands, and the limit b→∞b\to\inftyb→∞ is expressed by a positive threshold uniform over all parameter records with the fixed lead time and holding rate. The mission excludes a restricted policy comparator, a fixed penalty, a one-period lead-time specialization, and Assumption 1 on single-period demand. Solvers may contribute proofs of any milestone, along with finite-mean and measurability lemmas needed to connect the model to the backorder benchmarks.

Selected references

  • W. T. Huh, G. Janakiraman, J. A. Muckstadt and P. Rusmevichientong, Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems, working paper, December 4, 2006; published in Management Science 55(3), 2009. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0945.
  • G. Janakiraman, S. Seshadri and G. Shanthikumar, A Comparison of the Optimal Costs of Two Canonical Inventory Systems, working paper, Stern School of Business, New York University, 2005; bound quoted in Huh et al., §5, p. 13. Quoted source.
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Oracle-Based Robust Optimization via Online Learning 1: The Dual-Subgradient Meta-Algorithm Returns a 2ε-Approximate Robust Solution or Certifies Infeasibility within ⌈G²D²/ε²⌉ Oracle CallsResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization protects a decision against every realization of uncertain data in a prescribed uncertainty set. The standard approach replaces the uncertain constraints by a deterministic robust counterpart and solves that counterpart directly (Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui, Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, 2009). The counterpart is often a harder problem than the original: a robust linear program with ellipsoidal uncertainty becomes a second-order cone program, and a robust quadratic program can become a semidefinite program. A practitioner who has an efficient, specialised solver for the nominal problem may therefore have no efficient solver for its robust version.

Ben-Tal, Hazan, Koren and Mannor (arXiv:1402.6361, Operations Research 2015) ask whether the robust problem can be solved by repeatedly calling a solver of the nominal problem, with the number of calls independent of the dimension. Their first answer, the dual-subgradient meta-algorithm of §3.1, does so whenever the constraints are concave in the noise and the uncertainty set is convex. It is a primal–dual scheme: an online-learning algorithm picks the noise, and the nominal solver answers. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3.

Setting

Let D⊆Rn\mathcal D\subseteq\mathbb R^nD⊆Rn be a convex domain, U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd a convex uncertainty set, and f1,…,fm:Rn×Rd→Rf_1,\dots,f_m:\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb Rf1​,…,fm​:Rn×Rd→R constraint functions. The robust feasibility problem (3) is

∃ x∈D:fi(x,ui)≤0∀ui∈U, i=1,…,m.\exists\,x\in\mathcal D:\qquad f_i(x,u_i)\le 0\quad\forall u_i\in\mathcal U,\ i=1,\dots,m .∃x∈D:fi​(x,ui​)≤0∀ui​∈U, i=1,…,m.

(An objective is handled by binary search on its value, so feasibility is the core question.) A point x∈Dx\in\mathcal Dx∈D is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate solution if fi(x,u)≤ϵf_i(x,u)\le\epsilonfi​(x,u)≤ϵ for all u∈Uu\in\mathcal Uu∈U and all iii.

An ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate oracle Oϵ\mathcal O_\epsilonOϵ​ (Figure 1) takes a noise vector u=(u1,…,um)∈Umu=(u_1,\dots,u_m)\in\mathcal U^mu=(u1​,…,um​)∈Um and either returns some x∈Dx\in\mathcal Dx∈D with fi(x,ui)≤ϵf_i(x,u_i)\le\epsilonfi​(x,ui​)≤ϵ for all iii, or answers "infeasible", which it may do only if no x∈Dx\in\mathcal Dx∈D has fi(x,ui)≤0f_i(x,u_i)\le 0fi​(x,ui​)≤0 for all iii.

The standing assumptions of §3.1 are: each fi(⋅,u)f_i(\cdot,u)fi​(⋅,u) is convex on D\mathcal DD; each fi(x,⋅)f_i(x,\cdot)fi​(x,⋅) is concave on U\mathcal UU for x∈Dx\in\mathcal Dx∈D; D≥∥u−v∥2D\ge\|u-v\|_2D≥∥u−v∥2​ for all u,v∈Uu,v\in\mathcal Uu,v∈U; and ∥∇ufi(x,u)∥2≤G\|\nabla_u f_i(x,u)\|_2\le G∥∇u​fi​(x,u)∥2​≤G for x∈Dx\in\mathcal Dx∈D, u∈Uu\in\mathcal Uu∈U. Write PPP for the Euclidean projection onto U\mathcal UU.

Algorithm 1 sets T=⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉T=\lceil G^2D^2/\epsilon^2\rceilT=⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉ and η=D/(GT)\eta=D/(G\sqrt T)η=D/(GT​), starts from u10,…,um0∈Uu^0_1,\dots,u^0_m\in\mathcal Uu10​,…,um0​∈U, and for t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T updates

uit=P(uit−1+η ∇ufi(xt−1,uit−1)),xt=Oϵ(u1t,…,umt),u^t_i=P\bigl(u^{t-1}_i+\eta\,\nabla_u f_i(x^{t-1},u^{t-1}_i)\bigr),\qquad x^t=\mathcal O_\epsilon(u^t_1,\dots,u^t_m),uit​=P(uit−1​+η∇u​fi​(xt−1,uit−1​)),xt=Oϵ​(u1t​,…,umt​),

stopping with "infeasible" as soon as the oracle says so, and otherwise returning xˉ=1T∑t=1Txt\bar x=\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T x^txˉ=T1​∑t=1T​xt. In Lean these are alg1T, alg1Eta, alg1U, alg1X, alg1Output and alg1Calls in the namespace OracleRO.DualSubgrad.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 7)

For every ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate oracle,

output="infeasible" ⟹ ¬ ∃x∈D ∀i ∀u∈U: fi(x,u)≤0,\text{output}=\text{"infeasible"}\ \Longrightarrow\ \neg\,\exists x\in\mathcal D\ \forall i\ \forall u\in\mathcal U:\ f_i(x,u)\le 0,output="infeasible" ⟹ ¬∃x∈D ∀i ∀u∈U: fi​(x,u)≤0, output=xˉ ⟹ xˉ∈D  and  fi(xˉ,u)≤2ϵ  ∀i, ∀u∈U,\text{output}=\bar x\ \Longrightarrow\ \bar x\in\mathcal D\ \text{ and }\ f_i(\bar x,u)\le 2\epsilon\ \ \forall i,\ \forall u\in\mathcal U,output=xˉ ⟹ xˉ∈D  and  fi​(xˉ,u)≤2ϵ  ∀i, ∀u∈U,

and the number of oracle calls is at most ⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉\lceil G^2D^2/\epsilon^2\rceil⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 5, Zinkevich 2003): projected online gradient ascent with step η=D/(GT)\eta=D/(G\sqrt T)η=D/(GT​) on concave rewards has regret ∑tft(x∗)−∑tft(xt)≤GDT\sum_t f_t(x^*)-\sum_t f_t(x_t)\le GD\sqrt T∑t​ft​(x∗)−∑t​ft​(xt​)≤GDT​ for every x∗x^*x∗ in the decision set.
  2. (6) (p. 7): if a point is returned, 1T∑t=1Tfi(xt,uit)≤ϵ\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T f_i(x^t,u^t_i)\le\epsilonT1​∑t=1T​fi​(xt,uit​)≤ϵ for every iii.
  3. (7) (p. 8): for every iii and u∈Uu\in\mathcal Uu∈U, 1T∑tfi(xt,u)−1T∑tfi(xt,uit)≤GD/T≤ϵ\frac1T\sum_t f_i(x^t,u)-\frac1T\sum_t f_i(x^t,u^t_i)\le GD/\sqrt T\le\epsilonT1​∑t​fi​(xt,u)−T1​∑t​fi​(xt,uit​)≤GD/T​≤ϵ.
  4. Final inequality of the proof (p. 8): fi(xˉ,u)≤1T∑tfi(xt,u)f_i(\bar x,u)\le\frac1T\sum_t f_i(x^t,u)fi​(xˉ,u)≤T1​∑t​fi​(xt,u) for u∈Uu\in\mathcal Uu∈U.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 turns any approximate solver of the nominal problem into an approximate solver of its robust counterpart, at a cost of ⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉\lceil G^2D^2/\epsilon^2\rceil⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉ solver calls, a number that depends on the geometry of U\mathcal UU and the sensitivity of the constraints to the noise but not on nnn, ddd or mmm. It is the prototype of the paper's oracle-based reductions: the same primal–dual template, with a different online learner, gives the dual-perturbation algorithm of §3.2–3.3 for non-convex uncertainty sets, and the applications of §4 (robust linear programs, quadratic programs, semidefinite programs) instantiate it.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; none of it is machine-checked. A formal development adds a checked statement of the reduction with an explicit call count in place of the paper's O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), and a reusable regret bound for projected online gradient ascent on concave rewards (Lemma 1), which the paper quotes from Zinkevich without proof and which many other online-learning results rest on.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the dual side fails at one point: in round ttt the primal point xtx^txt is computed from utu^tut, so the reward fi(xt,⋅)f_i(x^t,\cdot)fi​(xt,⋅) that the dual player faces depends on its own current move. A regret bound that assumed rewards fixed in advance, or drawn independently of the learner's play, would not apply. Lemma 1 must be used in its adversarial form, valid for every sequence of reward functions, including adaptively chosen ones. A second point is that the projection step requires the variational characterization of a nearest point in a convex set, which a mere "map into U\mathcal UU" does not provide.

Formalization scope

Points are elements of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k), so every norm is the ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ norm. The projection is a predicate IsProjOnto U P (each P(y)P(y)P(y) is a nearest point of U\mathcal UU to yyy), not a construction; the oracle is a function (Fin m → E d) → Option (E n) with none for "infeasible", constrained by the predicate IsApproxOracle on inputs in Um\mathcal U^mUm. The goal is quantified over every oracle meeting that specification. The gradient ∇ufi(x,u)\nabla_u f_i(x,u)∇u​fi​(x,u) is a given map gradU with HasGradientAt at points of U\mathcal UU; no differentiability in xxx is assumed. Rounds are indexed by natural numbers with index 000 for the initialization; the starting primal point x0∈Dx^0\in\mathcal Dx0∈D, used by the first update and left undefined by the algorithm, is an input. Hypotheses D>0D>0D>0 and G>0G>0G>0 are added so that η\etaη and T≥1T\ge1T≥1 are meaningful. Maxima over U\mathcal UU are stated as "for every u∈Uu\in\mathcal Uu∈U".

Explicit instantiations and corrections:

  • The paper's "O(G2D2/ϵ2)O(G^2D^2/\epsilon^2)O(G2D2/ϵ2) calls" is stated as at most ⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉\lceil G^2D^2/\epsilon^2\rceil⌈G2D2/ϵ2⌉ calls (one call per round, TTT rounds).
  • Lemma 1's "G≥max⁡t∥ft(xt)∥G\ge\max_t\|f_t(x_t)\|G≥maxt​∥ft​(xt​)∥" is read as the gradient bound ∥∇ft(xt)∥≤G\|\nabla f_t(x_t)\|\le G∥∇ft​(xt​)∥≤G, as the same sentence describes it.
  • The proof's "Combining (10) and (12)" refers to (6) and (7).

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: an oracle specification under which "infeasible" is never returned, or an output that is not the average of the oracle's answers, would not be Theorem 3. The "infeasible" conclusion is about the robust problem, not the nominal one.

A complete development needs the variational inequality for nearest points in a convex set, the gradient (supergradient) inequality for a concave function differentiable at a point of a convex set, Zinkevich's telescoping argument, and Jensen's inequality for finite averages. The first two and Lemma 1 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, E. Hazan, T. Koren, S. Mannor, Oracle-Based Robust Optimization via Online Learning, arXiv:1402.6361v1, 2014; Operations Research 63(3), 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.6361v1
  • M. Zinkevich, Online Convex Programming and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent, ICML 2003. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3041838.3041955
  • A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831050
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, Foundations and Trends in Optimization, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
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Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization with Stochastic Dominance Constraints: Lagrange Multipliers of a Second-Order Dominance Constraint Are Concave Nondecreasing Utility FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker choosing a random outcome XXX (a portfolio return, a policy's cost savings, a schedule's throughput) often has a reference outcome YYY, the result of a benchmark policy, and wants the new outcome to be preferable to it for every risk-averse decision maker, not just on average. Expected-utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern) makes this precise: XXX is preferred to YYY by every decision maker with a concave nondecreasing utility function uuu exactly when XXX dominates YYY in the second order, X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y. Requiring X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y as a constraint in an optimization problem avoids having to elicit any particular utility function, which is rarely possible in practice and impossible when several decision makers must agree.

Dentcheva and Ruszczyński (preprint 2002, published in SIAM J. Optim. 14(2), 2003) introduced optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints and developed their optimality and duality theory. The central finding is that the Lagrange multiplier of a second-order dominance constraint is itself a concave nondecreasing utility function: the optimal solution maximizes the objective plus an expected utility, for a utility function implied by the problem. This interpretation underlies the later literature on dominance-constrained portfolio optimization, risk-averse stochastic programming, and the dual (quantile) theory of stochastic orders.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and L1=L1(Ω,F,P)\mathcal L^1=\mathcal L^1(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)L1=L1(Ω,F,P) the space of integrable random variables with its norm topology. For X∈L1X\in\mathcal L^1X∈L1 the distribution function is F(X;η)=P[X≤η]F(X;\eta)=P[X\le\eta]F(X;η)=P[X≤η] and the second-order shortfall function is

F2(X;η)=∫−∞ηF(X;α) dα,η∈R.(2.1)F_2(X;\eta)=\int_{-\infty}^{\eta}F(X;\alpha)\,d\alpha,\qquad \eta\in\mathbb R. \tag{2.1}F2​(X;η)=∫−∞η​F(X;α)dα,η∈R.(2.1)

Changing the order of integration gives F2(X;η)=E[(η−X)+]F_2(X;\eta)=\mathbb E[(\eta-X)_+]F2​(X;η)=E[(η−X)+​] (2.6), where (⋅)+=max⁡(0,⋅)(\cdot)_+=\max(0,\cdot)(⋅)+​=max(0,⋅). The relation X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y means F2(X;η)≤F2(Y;η)F_2(X;\eta)\le F_2(Y;\eta)F2​(X;η)≤F2​(Y;η) for all η\etaη, and A2(Y)={X∈L1:X⪰(2)Y}A_2(Y)=\{X\in\mathcal L^1:X\succeq_{(2)}Y\}A2​(Y)={X∈L1:X⪰(2)​Y}.

The problem data are a reference outcome Y∈L1Y\in\mathcal L^1Y∈L1, a convex closed set C⊆L1C\subseteq\mathcal L^1C⊆L1, a functional fff that is concave and continuous on CCC, and an interval [a,b][a,b][a,b]. The paper studies the relaxation in which dominance is enforced on [a,b][a,b][a,b]:

max⁡f(X)subject toE[(η−X)+]≤E[(η−Y)+]  for all η∈[a,b],X∈C.(3.1–3.3)\max f(X)\quad\text{subject to}\quad\mathbb E[(\eta-X)_+]\le\mathbb E[(\eta-Y)_+]\ \ \text{for all }\eta\in[a,b],\qquad X\in C. \tag{3.1–3.3}maxf(X)subject toE[(η−X)+​]≤E[(η−Y)+​]  for all η∈[a,b],X∈C.(3.1–3.3)

The uniform dominance condition (Definition 4.1) asks for some X~∈C\tilde X\in CX~∈C with inf⁡η∈[a,b]{F2(Y;η)−F2(X~;η)}>0\inf_{\eta\in[a,b]}\{F_2(Y;\eta)-F_2(\tilde X;\eta)\}>0infη∈[a,b]​{F2​(Y;η)−F2​(X~;η)}>0.

The multiplier class U1\mathcal U_1U1​ consists of the functions u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R that are concave and nondecreasing, vanish on [b,∞)[b,\infty)[b,∞), and are affine on (−∞,a](-\infty,a](−∞,a]: u(t)=u(a)+c(t−a)u(t)=u(a)+c(t-a)u(t)=u(a)+c(t−a) for t≤at\le at≤a, with a constant c≥0c\ge0c≥0. The Lagrangian is

L(X,u)=f(X)+E[u(X)]−E[u(Y)].(4.1)L(X,u)=f(X)+\mathbb E[u(X)]-\mathbb E[u(Y)]. \tag{4.1}L(X,u)=f(X)+E[u(X)]−E[u(Y)].(4.1)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2

Assume the uniform dominance condition. If X^\hat XX^ is an optimal solution of (3.1)–(3.3), there is u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ with

L(X^,u^)=max⁡X∈CL(X,u^)(4.2)andE[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)].(4.3)L(\hat X,\hat u)=\max_{X\in C}L(X,\hat u)\quad(4.2)\qquad\text{and}\qquad\mathbb E[\hat u(\hat X)]=\mathbb E[\hat u(Y)].\quad(4.3)L(X^,u^)=X∈Cmax​L(X,u^)(4.2)andE[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)].(4.3)

Conversely, if for some u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ a maximizer X^∈C\hat X\in CX^∈C of L(⋅,u^)L(\cdot,\hat u)L(⋅,u^) satisfies (3.2) and (4.3), then X^\hat XX^ is optimal for (3.1)–(3.3).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof. They are: finiteness of E[u(X)]\mathbb E[u(X)]E[u(X)] for u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​; the identity (2.6), already proved on the platform; Proposition 2.3 (convexity and closedness of A2(Y)A_2(Y)A2​(Y), and its recession cone); the concavity of the constraint operator G(X)(η)=F2(Y;η)−F2(X;η)G(X)(\eta)=F_2(Y;\eta)-F_2(X;\eta)G(X)(η)=F2​(Y;η)−F2​(X;η) with respect to the cone of nonnegative functions; the existence of a nonnegative measure multiplier μ^\hat\muμ^​ on [a,b][a,b][a,b] satisfying (4.5)–(4.6); the facts that the function uμ(t)=−∫tbμ([τ,b]) dτu_\mu(t)=-\int_t^b\mu([\tau,b])\,d\tauuμ​(t)=−∫tb​μ([τ,b])dτ (t<bt<bt<b), uμ(t)=0u_\mu(t)=0uμ​(t)=0 (t≥bt\ge bt≥b) of a nonnegative measure lies in U1\mathcal U_1U1​ and that every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​ is uμu_\muuμ​ for exactly one μ\muμ; the key identity

∫abF2(X;η) dμ(η)=−E[uμ(X)];(4.9)\int_a^b F_2(X;\eta)\,d\mu(\eta)=-\mathbb E[u_\mu(X)]; \tag{4.9}∫ab​F2​(X;η)dμ(η)=−E[uμ​(X)];(4.9)

and the weak-duality step: (3.2) implies E[u(X)]≥E[u(Y)]\mathbb E[u(X)]\ge\mathbb E[u(Y)]E[u(X)]≥E[u(Y)] for every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​.

Further: Theorem 5.1

With D(u)=sup⁡X∈CL(X,u)D(u)=\sup_{X\in C}L(X,u)D(u)=supX∈C​L(X,u), the dual problem min⁡u∈U1D(u)\min_{u\in\mathcal U_1}D(u)minu∈U1​​D(u) has a solution, its value equals the primal optimal value, and its solutions are exactly the u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ satisfying (4.2)–(4.3).

Significance

Theorem 4.2 turns an infinite family of constraints, one for each η∈[a,b]\eta\in[a,b]η∈[a,b], into a single scalar trade-off: at the optimum, the decision maker behaves as an expected-utility maximizer for an implicit utility u^\hat uu^, and the dominance constraint is active exactly in the sense E[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)]\mathbb E[\hat u(\hat X)]=\mathbb E[\hat u(Y)]E[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)]. Theorem 5.1 makes U1\mathcal U_1U1​ the space of dual variables, which is the starting point of dual decomposition and cutting-plane methods for dominance-constrained problems and of their extensions to several constraints and to higher orders (Sections 6–7 of the paper, not part of this mission).

All results are proved in the paper. Apart from the identity (2.6), which is proved on the platform, none of them is formalized as far as the platform records show. A machine-checked development would provide, on top of the paper, a rigorous treatment of the measure–utility correspondence that the paper obtains from a textbook theorem "after an obvious adaptation", and a careful account of the multiplier class itself (see the scope section on the constant ccc). The definitions of F2F_2F2​ and of the identity (2.6) are shared with the platform's missions on Dual Stochastic Dominance and Related Mean-Risk Models (Ogryczak and Ruszczyński, 2002).

Difficulty

The necessity half needs a Lagrange multiplier for a constraint taking values in the infinite-dimensional space C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]); finite-dimensional convex duality does not apply, and the multiplier first appears as a nonnegative measure on [a,b][a,b][a,b], an element of the dual of C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]). A Slater-type point is required: without the uniform dominance condition the multiplier may not exist. This is why the dominance relation, which the paper first poses on all of R\mathbb RR, is relaxed to a bounded interval [a,b][a,b][a,b]: for a reference outcome with a smallest value y1y_1y1​, F2(Y;y1)=0F_2(Y;y_1)=0F2​(Y;y1​)=0, so no X~\tilde XX~ can dominate YYY strictly near y1y_1y1​.

The second obstacle is the translation of that measure into a utility function. The identity (4.9) requires an interchange of integrals over R×[a,b]\mathbb R\times[a,b]R×[a,b] and an integration by parts against the distribution function of an arbitrary integrable XXX, followed by a limit in which the integrability of XXX controls the linear growth of uuu at −∞-\infty−∞. The converse direction needs every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​ to be represented by a unique measure, through the left derivative of a concave function.

Formalization scope

Outcomes are elements of Mathlib's L1L^1L1 space Ω →₁[P] ℝ over a probability measure P, coerced to functions inside integrals; no statement is pointwise in ω\omegaω. F2F_2F2​ is the published definition DualSSD.Shared.secondPerformance, a Bochner integral of P[X≤α]P[X\le\alpha]P[X≤α] over (−∞,η](-\infty,\eta](−∞,η]. The problem data form a structure whose fields include every standing assumption of the paper: CCC convex and closed, fff concave and continuous on CCC. The constraint (3.2) is stated in its printed expectation form, while Definition 4.1 and the proof objects use F2F_2F2​, as printed; their equality is (2.6).

Committed conventions:

  • U1\mathcal U_1U1​ uses c≥0c\ge0c≥0. The paper prints c>0c>0c>0. With c>0c>0c>0 the necessity half of Theorem 4.2 is false: take Y≡0Y\equiv0Y≡0, [a,b]=[1,2][a,b]=[1,2][a,b]=[1,2], f(X)=EXf(X)=\mathbb EXf(X)=EX and CCC the constant random variables with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Then X~≡1\tilde X\equiv1X~≡1 satisfies Definition 4.1, X^≡1\hat X\equiv1X^≡1 is optimal, and (4.3) forces c=0c=0c=0. The proof itself produces c=μ([a,b])c=\mu([a,b])c=μ([a,b]), which vanishes for the zero multiplier of a slack constraint, and the paper calls U1\mathcal U_1U1​ a convex cone, which must contain 000.
  • Definition 4.1's infimum is encoded as a positive lower bound ε\varepsilonε on [a,b][a,b][a,b]. "=max⁡X∈C=\max_{X\in C}=maxX∈C​" is encoded as membership in CCC plus an upper bound over CCC.
  • A nonnegative measure in rca([a,b])\mathbf{rca}([a,b])rca([a,b]) is a finite Borel measure on R\mathbb RR giving zero mass to the complement of [a,b][a,b][a,b], which is the paper's own extension by zero. Integrals ∫ab⋅ dμ\int_a^b\cdot\,d\mu∫ab​⋅dμ are over the closed interval, so atoms at aaa and bbb count.
  • No relation between aaa and bbb is assumed. For a>ba>ba>b every statement remains meaningful: the constraint is vacuous and U1={0}\mathcal U_1=\{0\}U1​={0}.
  • Theorem 5.1's dual function takes values in the extended reals.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: a junk-valued expectation (a Bochner integral of a non-integrable function, which Lean sets to 000) cannot occur for u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​, and its integrability is a milestone. Dropping the concavity of fff or the convexity of CCC would make the necessity half false, so these assumptions are fields of the problem data.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: convex duality for cone constraints in C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]) (or a direct separation argument in R×C([a,b])\mathbb R\times\mathcal C([a,b])R×C([a,b])), the Riesz representation of nonnegative functionals on C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]), Fubini and integration by parts for Stieltjes measures, and the measure of a left-continuous monotone function. These pieces are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome. The extensions to several dominance constraints and to higher-order dominance are not included.

Selected references

  • D. Dentcheva and A. Ruszczyński, Optimization with stochastic dominance constraints, preprint dated December 27, 2002 (Stochastic Programming E-Print Series); published in SIAM Journal on Optimization 14(2):548–566, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623402420528
  • W. Ogryczak and A. Ruszczyński, Dual stochastic dominance and related mean-risk models, SIAM Journal on Optimization 13(1):60–78, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400375075
  • J. F. Bonnans and A. Shapiro, Perturbation Analysis of Optimization Problems, Springer, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1394-9
  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1944.
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Uniformly Bounded Regret in the Multi-Secretary Problem 1: The Budget-Ratio Policy Has Regret at Most a₁M(ε), Uniformly in the Number of Candidates n and the Budget kResearch Paper

Motivation

The multi-secretary problem is the simplest model of capacity allocation under uncertainty: a decision maker sees nnn candidates one at a time and may hire at most kkk of them, with every decision final. The same structure underlies single-resource revenue management (accepting or rejecting booking requests against a fixed inventory; see Talluri and van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, 2004), online knapsack and packing problems, and dynamic assortment of limited stock.

The performance of an online policy is measured against the offline benchmark, the value of the best kkk candidates chosen with full hindsight. The gap between the two is the regret.

  • In the version where the values arrive as a uniform random permutation, Kleinberg (2005) proved that the minimal regret is of order k\sqrt kk​ and gave an algorithm attaining it (as summarized in Remark 1 of the paper below).
  • Arlotto and Gurvich (arXiv:1710.07719, 2017; Stochastic Systems 2019) showed that when the values have a finite support, the optimal online policy, and an explicit simple policy, have regret bounded by a constant that does not depend on nnn or kkk. The constant depends only on the smallest probability mass.

This mission formalizes that upper bound.

Setting

Abilities take values in a finite set A={am<am−1<⋯<a1}\mathcal A=\{a_m<a_{m-1}<\dots<a_1\}A={am​<am−1​<⋯<a1​} of distinct positive reals, with probabilities fj=P(X=aj)>0f_j=\mathbb P(X=a_j)>0fj​=P(X=aj​)>0, ∑jfj=1\sum_j f_j=1∑j​fj​=1. Write Fˉ(aj)=f1+⋯+fj−1\bar F(a_j)=f_1+\dots+f_{j-1}Fˉ(aj​)=f1​+⋯+fj−1​ for the mass strictly above aja_jaj​, and

ϵ=12min⁡{fm,…,f1}.\epsilon=\tfrac12\min\{f_m,\dots,f_1\}.ϵ=21​min{fm​,…,f1​}.

The abilities X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are independent with this distribution. Budget pairs range over the triangle T={(n,k):0≤k≤n}\mathcal T=\{(n,k):0\le k\le n\}T={(n,k):0≤k≤n}.

  • Offline value. Voff∗(n,k)=E[max⁡{∑tXtσt:σ∈{0,1}n, ∑tσt≤k}]V^*_{\mathrm{off}}(n,k)=\mathbb E\big[\max\{\sum_t X_t\sigma_t:\sigma\in\{0,1\}^n,\ \sum_t\sigma_t\le k\}\big]Voff∗​(n,k)=E[max{∑t​Xt​σt​:σ∈{0,1}n, ∑t​σt​≤k}].
  • Online policies. A policy decides σt∈{0,1}\sigma_t\in\{0,1\}σt​∈{0,1} using only X1,…,XtX_1,\dots,X_tX1​,…,Xt​ and must select at most kkk candidates on every realization. Π(n,k)\Pi(n,k)Π(n,k) is the set of such policies, Vonπ(n,k)=E[∑tXtσtπ]V^\pi_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)=\mathbb E[\sum_t X_t\sigma^\pi_t]Vonπ​(n,k)=E[∑t​Xt​σtπ​], and Von∗(n,k)=max⁡π∈Π(n,k)Vonπ(n,k)V^*_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)=\max_{\pi\in\Pi(n,k)}V^\pi_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)Von∗​(n,k)=maxπ∈Π(n,k)​Vonπ​(n,k).
  • Counts. ZjrZ^r_jZjr​ is the number of aja_jaj​-candidates among the first rrr. The offline sort selects Sjr=min⁡{Zjr,(k−∑i<jZir)+}\mathfrak S^r_j=\min\{Z^r_j,(k-\sum_{i<j}Z^r_i)_+\}Sjr​=min{Zjr​,(k−∑i<j​Zir​)+​} of them. Sjπ,rS^{\pi,r}_jSjπ,r​ counts those selected by π\piπ.
  • Action index. j0(n,k)j_0(n,k)j0​(n,k) is the largest jjj with Fˉ(aj)+12fj≤k/n\bar F(a_j)+\tfrac12f_j\le k/nFˉ(aj​)+21​fj​≤k/n, or 111 if there is none.
  • Thresholds. T1=0T_1=0T1​=0, Tj=Fˉ(aj)+12fjT_j=\bar F(a_j)+\tfrac12 f_jTj​=Fˉ(aj​)+21​fj​ for 2≤j≤m2\le j\le m2≤j≤m, and Tm+1=+∞T_{m+1}=+\inftyTm+1​=+∞.
  • Budget-Ratio (BR) policy. With remaining budget KtK_tKt​ (K0=kK_0=kK0​=k), at time t+1t+1t+1 the policy finds jjj with Tj≤Kt/(n−t)<Tj+1T_j\le K_t/(n-t)<T_{j+1}Tj​≤Kt​/(n−t)<Tj+1​. It selects Xt+1X_{t+1}Xt+1​ if and only if Kt>0K_t>0Kt​>0 and Xt+1≥ajX_{t+1}\ge a_jXt+1​≥aj​.
  • Stopping times. For 0<δ<ϵ0<\delta<\epsilon0<δ<ϵ, τ0\tau_0τ0​ is the first time the budget ratio comes within δ/2\delta/2δ/2 of a threshold, or the cut-off n−2δ−1−1n-2\delta^{-1}-1n−2δ−1−1. The time τ\tauτ of (20) is the first later time the ratio leaves the δ\deltaδ-band around that threshold, or the cut-off.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (first display)

For every ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 there is a constant MMM such that for every instance with 12min⁡jfj=ϵ\tfrac12\min_jf_j=\epsilon21​minj​fj​=ϵ and all (n,k)∈T(n,k)\in\mathcal T(n,k)∈T, br∈Π(n,k)\mathrm{br}\in\Pi(n,k)br∈Π(n,k) and

Voff∗(n,k)−Von∗(n,k)≤Voff∗(n,k)−Vonbr(n,k)≤a1M.V^*_{\mathrm{off}}(n,k)-V^*_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)\le V^*_{\mathrm{off}}(n,k)-V^{\mathrm{br}}_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)\le a_1M.Voff∗​(n,k)−Von∗​(n,k)≤Voff∗​(n,k)−Vonbr​(n,k)≤a1​M.

No constant is fixed. Only the shape is asserted: a bound uniform in nnn, kkk, the support size and the distribution, given ϵ\epsilonϵ.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • The benchmark inequality Vonπ≤Voff∗V^\pi_{\mathrm{on}}\le V^*_{\mathrm{off}}Vonπ​≤Voff∗​ (p. 5).
  • The sort identity Voff∗=∑jajE[Sjn]V^*_{\mathrm{off}}=\sum_ja_j\mathbb E[\mathfrak S^n_j]Voff∗​=∑j​aj​E[Sjn​] (4).
  • The binomial overshoot bound E[(B−k)+]≤1/(4ε)\mathbb E[(B-k)_+]\le1/(4\varepsilon)E[(B−k)+​]≤1/(4ε) (Lemma 2).
  • The offline decomposition Voff∗=∑i<jaiE[Zin]+ajE[Sjn]+aj+1E[Sj+1n]±a1/(4ϵ)V^*_{\mathrm{off}}=\sum_{i<j}a_i\mathbb E[Z^n_i]+a_j\mathbb E[\mathfrak S^n_j]+a_{j+1}\mathbb E[\mathfrak S^n_{j+1}]\pm a_1/(4\epsilon)Voff∗​=∑i<j​ai​E[Zin​]+aj​E[Sjn​]+aj+1​E[Sj+1n​]±a1​/(4ϵ) (Proposition 1).
  • The sufficient condition: four properties (i)–(iv) of a policy up to a stopping time imply regret at most 3a1M+a1/(4ϵ)3a_1M+a_1/(4\epsilon)3a1​M+a1​/(4ϵ) (Proposition 2).
  • The identification j0(n,k)=jj_0(n,k)=jj0​(n,k)=j on k/n∈[Tj,Tj+1)k/n\in[T_j,T_{j+1})k/n∈[Tj​,Tj+1​) (p. 17).
  • The BR selection probability and the jump bound ∣Kt/(n−t)−Kt+1/(n−t−1)∣≤δ/2|K_t/(n-t)-K_{t+1}/(n-t-1)|\le\delta/2∣Kt​/(n−t)−Kt+1​/(n−t−1)∣≤δ/2 (p. 13).
  • E[τ]≥n−M\mathbb E[\tau]\ge n-ME[τ]≥n−M (Theorem 2).
  • BR and τ\tauτ satisfy (i)–(iv) (Corollary 1).
  • The state-space reduction vℓ(w,κ)=w+gℓ(κ)v_\ell(w,\kappa)=w+g_\ell(\kappa)vℓ​(w,κ)=w+gℓ​(κ) of the Bellman recursion (Proposition 5).

Significance

The result. Bounded regret means that the loss from not knowing the future is a fixed number of candidates' worth of value, however long the horizon and however large the budget. The bound holds uniformly over all distributions with the same ϵ\epsilonϵ. It is attained by an explicit, adaptive, non-randomized rule that compares one ratio with mmm fixed thresholds. The companion result of the same paper shows that every non-adaptive policy suffers regret of order n\sqrt nn​ in the interior regime. Together they quantify the value of adapting to the remaining budget. Lemma 1 of the paper shows the dependence on ϵ\epsilonϵ cannot be removed.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, but no part of it is machine-checked; there is no multi-secretary or bounded-regret development on the platform. The mission produces several pieces of machinery: a reusable finite model of sequential selection with online policies and the offline benchmark; an explicit online policy with its stopping-time analysis; and a binomial overshoot bound usable elsewhere. The constant MMM is not made explicit in the paper. A formal proof would give one, and sharper constants are welcome.

Difficulty

The offline decomposition and the sufficient condition are bookkeeping with counts and one concentration bound. The hard step is Theorem 2: showing that the budget ratio Kt/(n−t)K_t/(n-t)Kt​/(n−t) stays within δ\deltaδ of its attracting threshold until a bounded expected number of periods before the end. Near the horizon a single selection moves the ratio by about 1/(n−t)1/(n-t)1/(n−t), so the band becomes easy to leave. Equivalently, the target δ(n−τ0−u)\delta(n-\tau_0-u)δ(n−τ0​−u) that the deviation process must exceed shrinks to zero. A standard martingale or drift argument with a fixed band therefore does not give a bound uniform in nnn. The paper combines the mean-reverting drift of the deviation process with an exponential tail bound (its Proposition 4) and a Lyapunov argument. A second subtlety is uniformity: every constant must depend on ϵ\epsilonϵ (and δ\deltaδ) only, never on mmm, the aja_jaj​, nnn or kkk.

Formalization scope

The source is arXiv:1710.07719v2; its printed page numbers equal the PDF page numbers.

Representation.

  • Ability levels are Fin m, with index 0 the largest value a1a_1a1​; Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1.
  • Each instance carries aaa strictly decreasing and positive, fff positive with ∑f=1\sum f=1∑f=1.
  • Expectations are finite sums over sequences x:Fin n→Fin mx:\mathrm{Fin}\,n\to\mathrm{Fin}\,mx:Finn→Finm weighted by ∏tf(xt)\prod_tf(x_t)∏t​f(xt​), so no measure theory is needed.
  • Policies are deterministic selection rules σ(x,t)\sigma(x,t)σ(x,t) that are non-anticipating and feasible. Von∗V^*_{\mathrm{on}}Von∗​ is a maximum over this finite set. The paper allows randomized policies; for this finite problem the optimal values coincide (p. 39). In any case, restricting to deterministic policies can only lower Von∗V^*_{\mathrm{on}}Von∗​ and so does not weaken the goal.
  • Voff∗V^*_{\mathrm{off}}Voff∗​ is defined as an expected maximum over selection vectors, not by the sort formula. The sort formula is a milestone.

Quantifiers. The constant MMM in the goal is chosen after ϵ\epsilonϵ and before mmm, the instance, nnn and kkk. A statement with MMM chosen after the instance, or after nnn, is trivial (regret ≤a1n\le a_1n≤a1​n) and is excluded.

Corrections to the printed text, disclosed in the items.

  1. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, MMM depends on the auxiliary δ∈(0,ϵ)\delta\in(0,\epsilon)δ∈(0,ϵ) as well, because τ\tauτ does. δ\deltaδ is quantified before MMM. The goal itself is δ\deltaδ-free.
  2. Lemma 2's conditions p+ε≤k/np+\varepsilon\le k/np+ε≤k/n, k/n≤p−εk/n\le p-\varepsilonk/n≤p−ε are stated as (p+ε)n≤k(p+\varepsilon)n\le k(p+ε)n≤k, k≤(p−ε)nk\le(p-\varepsilon)nk≤(p−ε)n, the form used in its proof. This avoids a false case at n=0n=0n=0.
  3. The BR rule is applied at every time t+1∈{1,…,n}t+1\in\{1,\dots,n\}t+1∈{1,…,n}; p. 11 writes {1,…,n−1}\{1,\dots,n-1\}{1,…,n−1}.
  4. τ\tauτ is capped at nnn, which matters only when n=0n=0n=0.
  5. In Proposition 5 the recursions are imposed for κ≥1\kappa\ge1κ≥1 (boundary conditions at κ=0\kappa=0κ=0), and only identity (49) is stated.

Infrastructure. The model definitions (instance, offline value, online policies, counts, thresholds, action index) and the binomial overshoot lemma are reusable for other finite-support online selection and revenue-management results. All of the following are welcome:

  • proofs of individual milestones;
  • an explicit constant;
  • a formal derivation of Von∗(n,k)=vn(0,k)V^*_{\mathrm{on}}(n,k)=v_n(0,k)Von∗​(n,k)=vn​(0,k) connecting Proposition 5 to Von∗V^*_{\mathrm{on}}Von∗​.

Selected references

  • A. Arlotto, I. Gurvich, Uniformly Bounded Regret in the Multi-Secretary Problem, arXiv:1710.07719v2, 2018; Stochastic Systems 9(3), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.07719
  • R. Kleinberg, A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions, SODA 2005. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1070432.1070519
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978.
  • S. Boucheron, G. Lugosi, P. Massart, Concentration Inequalities, Oxford University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535255.001.0001
14 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 4: With Dissimilarity Parameters at Most One, the Knapsack-Relaxation and Singleton LP Optimum Scaled by 2 Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which set of products a firm should offer when customers choose among the offered products according to a discrete choice model; it underlies shelf-space planning in retail and fare-class control in airline revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). Under the nested logit model products are grouped into nests, and a customer first picks a nest and then a product inside it. Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Operations Research, 2014; DOI 10.1287/opre.2014.1256) map out how hard this problem is across variants of the model.

When every nest dissimilarity parameter is at most one and a customer who chose a nest always buys there, offering the top-revenue products of each nest is optimal (Theorem 4 of the paper, the subject of an earlier mission of this series). Once a customer may leave a nest without buying — a partially-captured nest — that structure breaks and the problem becomes NP-hard (Theorem 8). This mission targets the paper's response: a small, explicitly constructed family of candidate assortments per nest from which a linear program recovers a solution within a factor of two of optimal.

Setting

There are mmm nests MMM and, in each nest, nnn products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n}. Product jjj of nest iii has a revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and a preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, with ri1≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 and a within-nest no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0; v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of choosing no nest. For an assortment Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N,

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Ri(∅)=0,V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)},\quad R_i(\emptyset)=0,Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Ri​(∅)=0,

and the expected revenue of (S1,…,Sm)(S_1, \dots, S_m)(S1​,…,Sm​) is Π=∑iVi(Si)γiRi(Si)/(v0+∑iVi(Si)γi)\Pi = \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i) / (v_0 + \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i})Π=∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)/(v0​+∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​). The optimal expected revenue Z∗Z^*Z∗ is the optimal value of the linear program

(3)min⁡ xs.t.v0x≥∑i∈Myi,yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)  ∀Si⊆N, i∈M,\text{(3)}\quad \min\ x \quad\text{s.t.}\quad v_0 x \ge \sum_{i \in M} y_i,\qquad y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}\big(R_i(S_i) - x\big)\ \ \forall S_i \subseteq N,\ i \in M,(3)min xs.t.v0​x≥i∈M∑​yi​,yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x)  ∀Si​⊆N, i∈M,

and problem (4) is the same program with the second family of constraints imposed only for a chosen collection of candidate assortments in each nest.

Throughout, γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 for every nest and the vi0v_{i0}vi0​ are arbitrary. For a capacity ϵi≥0\epsilon_i \ge 0ϵi​≥0, the knapsack value Ki(ϵi)K_i(\epsilon_i)Ki​(ϵi​) is the largest ∑j∈Srijvij\sum_{j \in S} r_{ij} v_{ij}∑j∈S​rij​vij​ over assortments SSS with ∑j∈Svij≤ϵi\sum_{j \in S} v_{ij} \le \epsilon_i∑j∈S​vij​≤ϵi​ (display (9)). Its continuous relaxation (11) allows fractional zij∈[0,1(vij≤ϵi)]z_{ij} \in [0, \mathbf 1(v_{ij} \le \epsilon_i)]zij​∈[0,1(vij​≤ϵi​)] under the same capacity. The greedy solution z^i(ϵi)\hat z_i(\epsilon_i)z^i​(ϵi​) of (11) fills the capacity with the products of weight at most ϵi\epsilon_iϵi​ in revenue order, each fully while it fits and the next one fractionally, and

S^i(ϵi)={j∈N:z^ij(ϵi)=1}.\hat S_i(\epsilon_i) = \{ j \in N : \hat z_{ij}(\epsilon_i) = 1 \}.S^i​(ϵi​)={j∈N:z^ij​(ϵi​)=1}.

Problem (10) replaces the per-assortment constraints of (3) by yi≥max⁡ϵi≥0(vi0+ϵi)γi[Ki(ϵi)/(vi0+ϵi)−x]y_i \ge \max_{\epsilon_i \ge 0} (v_{i0}+\epsilon_i)^{\gamma_i}[K_i(\epsilon_i)/(v_{i0}+\epsilon_i) - x]yi​≥maxϵi​≥0​(vi0​+ϵi​)γi​[Ki​(ϵi​)/(vi0​+ϵi​)−x].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 24)

Let (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) be an optimal solution of (4) with candidate collections {S^i(ϵi):ϵi∈[0,∞]}∪{{j}:j∈N}\{\hat S_i(\epsilon_i) : \epsilon_i \in [0,\infty]\} \cup \{\{j\} : j \in N\}{S^i​(ϵi​):ϵi​∈[0,∞]}∪{{j}:j∈N}. Then

(2x^, 2y^)  is feasible for (3).(2\hat x,\ 2\hat y) \ \text{ is feasible for (3).}(2x^, 2y^​)  is feasible for (3).

Milestones

  1. Per-nest identity (proof of Lemma 9, p. 23). For x≥0x \ge 0x≥0, max⁡SiVi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)=max⁡ϵi≥0(vi0+ϵi)γi[Ki(ϵi)/(vi0+ϵi)−x]\max_{S_i} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x) = \max_{\epsilon_i \ge 0}(v_{i0}+\epsilon_i)^{\gamma_i}[K_i(\epsilon_i)/(v_{i0}+\epsilon_i) - x]maxSi​​Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x)=maxϵi​≥0​(vi0​+ϵi​)γi​[Ki​(ϵi​)/(vi0​+ϵi​)−x].
  2. Lemma 9 (p. 23). Problems (3) and (10) have the same optimal solutions.
  3. Relaxation (p. 23). Every feasible point of (9) is feasible for (11), so K^i(ϵi)≥Ki(ϵi)\hat K_i(\epsilon_i) \ge K_i(\epsilon_i)K^i​(ϵi​)≥Ki​(ϵi​).
  4. Greedy solution (pp. 23–24). z^i(ϵi)\hat z_i(\epsilon_i)z^i​(ϵi​) is optimal for (11) and has at most one fractional component.
  5. Sign (A.3, p. 45). x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  6. Inequalities (28) and (29) (A.3, pp. 45–46). In both cases — z^i(ϵ)\hat z_i(\epsilon)z^i​(ϵ) with and without a fractional component — 2y^i≥(vi0+ϵ)γi[Ki(ϵ)/(vi0+ϵ)−2x^]2\hat y_i \ge (v_{i0}+\epsilon)^{\gamma_i}[K_i(\epsilon)/(v_{i0}+\epsilon) - 2\hat x]2y^​i​≥(vi0​+ϵ)γi​[Ki​(ϵ)/(vi0​+ϵ)−2x^].

Two further statements accompany the goal: the factor-two revenue guarantee obtained from Theorem 10 and Theorem 1 of the paper, and the fact that every S^i(ϵi)\hat S_i(\epsilon_i)S^i​(ϵi​) is one of the at most 1+n21 + n^21+n2 assortments NijkN^k_{ij}Nijk​, the first jjj products by revenue among the kkk lightest.

Significance

Theorem 10 turns an NP-hard assortment problem into a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and 1+m(1+n+n2)1 + m(1 + n + n^2)1+m(1+n+n2) constraints whose solution is within a factor of two of optimal. The construction is explicit: the candidates are defined by a greedy rule, not by an optimization oracle. The same template, a restricted linear program whose doubled optimum is feasible for the full one, is reused in §6 of the paper for the most general instances, and Lemma 9's knapsack reformulation is the link to the classical approximation theory of knapsack problems (Williamson and Shmoys, 2011).

The theorem is proved in the paper. No machine-checked proof of it, of Lemma 9, or of greedy optimality for the continuous knapsack with an eligibility bound exists on the platform. Formalizing it yields a checked factor-two guarantee and a reusable fractional-knapsack development.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would compare the restricted program (4) with (3) constraint by constraint. That fails: (3) has one constraint per subset of products, and most subsets are not candidates. The comparison has to pass through the knapsack reformulation (10), which requires showing that a maximum over all subsets equals a maximum over a one-dimensional capacity parameter, using γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 and x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 in an essential way. The second obstacle is that the greedy assortment S^i(ϵi)\hat S_i(\epsilon_i)S^i​(ϵi​) keeps only the fully taken products, so its value can fall short of the continuous knapsack value, and no single candidate assortment need attain the knapsack bound. With dissimilarity parameters above one the monotonicity behind the reformulation is lost, and §6 of the paper needs a different factor.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (indices 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1), nests a finite type, and every quantity is real. Powers are Real.rpow; x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. An optimal solution of a linear program is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs. The constraint "yi≥max⁡ϵi≥0(… )y_i \ge \max_{\epsilon_i \ge 0}(\dots)yi​≥maxϵi​≥0​(…)" of (10) is stated in constraint form, for every ϵi≥0\epsilon_i \ge 0ϵi​≥0, so no real supremum is taken. Ki(ϵ)K_i(\epsilon)Ki​(ϵ) is defined for ϵ≥0\epsilon \ge 0ϵ≥0 only; its placeholder value for ϵ<0\epsilon < 0ϵ<0 is never used. Ties in revenue (and, for NijkN^k_{ij}Nijk​, in weight) are broken by index. The candidate collection is taken over real ϵi≥0\epsilon_i \ge 0ϵi​≥0; ϵi=∞\epsilon_i = \inftyϵi​=∞ adds nothing, since every capacity of at least ∑jvij\sum_j v_{ij}∑j​vij​ already gives S^i=N\hat S_i = NS^i​=N.

Standing assumptions and added hypotheses: γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 for every nest (the section's assumption) on the goal and on every model milestone; the pins vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0, γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 and the revenue ordering, shared by the series; n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 on Lemma 9, on x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0 and on (28)/(29), the paper's nonempty NNN; and v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0 on the factor-two revenue guarantee, where Theorem 1 of the paper fails without it.

The greedy assortments S^i(ϵi)\hat S_i(\epsilon_i)S^i​(ϵi​) are defined explicitly. Quantifying over arbitrary optimal solutions of (11) instead would change the candidate collection and is not the paper's theorem. The goal states feasibility for the full program (3) and does not mention knapsack values, the greedy solution or the case split. A formalization that weakens the conclusion to feasibility for (10), or that drops the singletons from the candidate collection, is not a solution.

Needed infrastructure: fractional knapsack optimality of the greedy rule with an eligibility bound, monotonicity of t↦tγt \mapsto t^{\gamma}t↦tγ and t↦tγ−1t \mapsto t^{\gamma - 1}t↦tγ−1 for γ≤1\gamma \le 1γ≤1, and finite maximization over subsets. The fractional-knapsack lemmas are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative decompositions of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014 (revised manuscript of June 18, 2013, cited here). DOI 10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 15–33, 2004. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • D. P. Williamson, D. B. Shmoys, The Design of Approximation Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2011. DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511921735
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

Discrete-Time Controlled Markov Processes with Average Cost Criterion: A Survey 1: Uniformly Bounded Differential Discounted Values Give a Bounded Solution of the Average Cost Optimality EquationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many control problems in queueing, inventory and communication systems run indefinitely, and the quantity of interest is the long-run cost per unit time rather than a discounted total. The average cost criterion is harder to analyse than the discounted one: the discounted dynamic programming operator is a contraction, while the average cost problem has no contraction, and on an infinite state space its behaviour depends on the recurrence structure of the controlled chain. The survey of Arapostathis, Borkar, Fernández-Gaucherand, Ghosh and Marcus (SIAM J. Control Optim. 31 (1993)) organises the theory around the average cost optimality equation (ACOE) and the conditions under which it has a solution.

Timeline (as recorded in the survey's §3 and §5). Derman studied the ACOE and characterized optimal stationary policies by its solutions (Derman, On sequential decisions and Markov chains, Management Sci. 1962; Denumerable state Markovian decision processes — average cost criterion, Ann. Math. Statist. 1966). Taylor introduced a vanishing discount argument for a replacement problem (Ann. Math. Statist. 1965). Ross extended it to general countable models, showing that uniformly bounded differential discounted value functions yield a bounded solution of the ACOE (Ann. Math. Statist. 1968, two papers; Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming, 1983). Sennott replaced the uniform bound by one-sided bounds and obtained the average cost optimality inequality (Oper. Res. 1989). The survey presents Ross's result as Theorem 5.2, following the 1983 book; this mission formalizes it.

Setting

A controlled Markov process on the countable state space S={0,1,2,… }S=\{0,1,2,\dots\}S={0,1,2,…} consists of a metric space A\mathbf AA of actions; for each state iii a nonempty compact set U(i)⊆AU(i)\subseteq\mathbf AU(i)⊆A of admissible actions; a cost c(i,a)≥0c(i,a)\ge0c(i,a)≥0; and transition probabilities P(j∣i,a)P(j\mid i,a)P(j∣i,a). For fixed i,ji,ji,j, the maps a↦c(i,a)a\mapsto c(i,a)a↦c(i,a) and a↦P(j∣i,a)a\mapsto P(j\mid i,a)a↦P(j∣i,a) are continuous on U(i)U(i)U(i).

An admissible policy π\piπ chooses, at each time ttt, a probability distribution on U(Xt)U(X_t)U(Xt​) that may depend on the whole past (X0,A0,…,Xt)(X_0,A_0,\dots,X_t)(X0​,A0​,…,Xt​). The class of all of them is Π\PiΠ, and ΠSD\Pi_{SD}ΠSD​ is the class of stationary deterministic policies, maps fff with f(i)∈U(i)f(i)\in U(i)f(i)∈U(i). Each initial state iii and policy π\piπ define a law PiπP^\pi_iPiπ​ of the trajectory, with expectation EiπE^\pi_iEiπ​. For a discount factor 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1,

Jβ(i,π)=Eiπ∑t=0∞βtc(Xt,At),J(i,π)=lim sup⁡N→∞1NEiπ∑t=0N−1c(Xt,At),J_\beta(i,\pi)=E^\pi_i\sum_{t=0}^\infty\beta^tc(X_t,A_t),\qquad J(i,\pi)=\limsup_{N\to\infty}\frac1N E^\pi_i\sum_{t=0}^{N-1}c(X_t,A_t),Jβ​(i,π)=Eiπ​t=0∑∞​βtc(Xt​,At​),J(i,π)=N→∞limsup​N1​Eiπ​t=0∑N−1​c(Xt​,At​),

and Jβ∗(i)=inf⁡π∈ΠJβ(i,π)J^*_\beta(i)=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}J_\beta(i,\pi)Jβ∗​(i)=infπ∈Π​Jβ​(i,π), J∗(i)=inf⁡π∈ΠJ(i,π)J^*(i)=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}J(i,\pi)J∗(i)=infπ∈Π​J(i,π). The differential discounted value function is hβ(i)=Jβ∗(i)−Jβ∗(0)h_\beta(i)=J^*_\beta(i)-J^*_\beta(0)hβ​(i)=Jβ∗​(i)−Jβ∗​(0). A pair (ρ,h)(\rho,h)(ρ,h), ρ∈R\rho\in\mathbb Rρ∈R, h:S→Rh:S\to\mathbb Rh:S→R, solves the ACOE if

ρ+h(i)=min⁡a∈U(i){c(i,a)+∑j∈SP(j∣i,a)h(j)},i∈S.(5.1)\rho+h(i)=\min_{a\in U(i)}\Big\{c(i,a)+\sum_{j\in S}P(j\mid i,a)h(j)\Big\},\qquad i\in S.\tag{5.1}ρ+h(i)=a∈U(i)min​{c(i,a)+j∈S∑​P(j∣i,a)h(j)},i∈S.(5.1)

In the Lean development these objects are CMP, Policy, StationaryPolicy, pathMeasure, discCost, avgCost, discValue (Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​), optAvg (J∗J^*J∗), hRel (hβh_\betahβ​) and ACOE.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.2 (p. 301)

Assume Jβ∗(i)<∞J^*_\beta(i)<\inftyJβ∗​(i)<∞ for all β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and i∈Si\in Si∈S, and that there is K>0K>0K>0 with ∣hβ(i)∣≤K|h_\beta(i)|\le K∣hβ​(i)∣≤K for all such β\betaβ and iii. Then there are ρ∈R\rho\in\mathbb Rρ∈R, a bounded h:S→Rh:S\to\mathbb Rh:S→R and a sequence βn∈(0,1)\beta_n\in(0,1)βn​∈(0,1), βn→1\beta_n\to1βn​→1, with

(ρ,h) solves (5.1),h(i)=lim⁡n→∞hβn(i),lim⁡β↑1(1−β)Jβ∗(i)=ρ(i∈S).(\rho,h)\text{ solves (5.1)},\qquad h(i)=\lim_{n\to\infty}h_{\beta_n}(i),\qquad \lim_{\beta\uparrow1}(1-\beta)J^*_\beta(i)=\rho\qquad(i\in S).(ρ,h) solves (5.1),h(i)=n→∞lim​hβn​​(i),β↑1lim​(1−β)Jβ∗​(i)=ρ(i∈S).

The goal does not assert that ρ\rhoρ is the optimal average cost; that follows from Theorem 5.1 and Remark 5.1(a), which are milestones.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (p. 289): the dynamic programming map T(v)(i)=inf⁡a∈U(i){c(i,a)+∑jP(j∣i,a)v(j)}T(v)(i)=\inf_{a\in U(i)}\{c(i,a)+\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)v(j)\}T(v)(i)=infa∈U(i)​{c(i,a)+∑j​P(j∣i,a)v(j)} satisfies T(v+k)=T(v)+kT(v+k)=T(v)+kT(v+k)=T(v)+k and is monotone.
  2. Theorem 2.1 (i), (iii) (p. 289), in the countable model: Jβ∗=TβJβ∗J^*_\beta=T_\beta J^*_\betaJβ∗​=Tβ​Jβ∗​ and a β\betaβ-discount optimal f∈ΠSDf\in\Pi_{SD}f∈ΠSD​ exists.
  3. Equation (5.6) (p. 301): (1−β)Jβ∗(0)+hβ(i)=min⁡a∈U(i){c(i,a)+β∑jP(j∣i,a)hβ(j)}(1-\beta)J^*_\beta(0)+h_\beta(i)=\min_{a\in U(i)}\{c(i,a)+\beta\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)h_\beta(j)\}(1−β)Jβ∗​(0)+hβ​(i)=mina∈U(i)​{c(i,a)+β∑j​P(j∣i,a)hβ​(j)}.
  4. Theorem 5.1 (p. 299): a solution of (5.1) with lim⁡t1tEiπh(Xt)=0\lim_t\frac1tE^\pi_ih(X_t)=0limt​t1​Eiπ​h(Xt​)=0 gives ρ=J(i,f)=J∗(i)\rho=J(i,f)=J^*(i)ρ=J(i,f)=J∗(i) for a minimizing selector fff; minimizing selectors are average optimal; conversely, an average optimal fff with an irreducible positive recurrent chain is a minimizing selector.
  5. Remark 5.1(a) (p. 300): a bounded solution of (5.1) satisfies the growth condition of Theorem 5.1.

Significance

Theorem 5.2 is the template of the vanishing discount method. Under its hypothesis the average cost problem has a bounded solution of the ACOE, so (through Theorem 5.1) the optimal average cost is a constant ρ\rhoρ independent of the initial state, it is attained by a stationary deterministic policy, and it is the Abelian limit of the scaled discounted values. Recurrence conditions on the controlled chain, such as uniformly bounded mean return times to a fixed state (Theorem 5.3 of the survey), are verified by checking the hypothesis of Theorem 5.2; the later results of §5 refine its conclusion under weaker hypotheses.

The theorem itself is classical. What this mission adds is a machine-checked statement and, eventually, proof, on a model with history-dependent randomized policies, compact action sets and unbounded costs, together with the supporting verification theorem (Theorem 5.1) and the discounted optimality equation. To our knowledge none of these results has been formalized in Lean; Mathlib has the Ionescu-Tulcea construction of the path measure but no controlled Markov processes.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fixes a sequence βn↑1\beta_n\uparrow1βn​↑1, extracts a pointwise convergent subsequence of the bounded functions hβnh_{\beta_n}hβn​​ and of the bounded numbers (1−βn)Jβn∗(0)(1-\beta_n)J^*_{\beta_n}(0)(1−βn​)Jβn​∗​(0), and passes to the limit in (5.6). Two steps resist this. First, the limit of a minimum over U(i)U(i)U(i) is not in general the minimum of the limits: the convergence of a↦∑jP(j∣i,a)hβn(j)a\mapsto\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)h_{\beta_n}(j)a↦∑j​P(j∣i,a)hβn​​(j) must be shown to be uniform on the compact set U(i)U(i)U(i), which requires more than pointwise continuity of each P(j∣i,⋅)P(j\mid i,\cdot)P(j∣i,⋅). Second, the subsequential limit ρ\rhoρ could depend on the subsequence, so part (iii), a limit along all β↑1\beta\uparrow1β↑1, needs an independent identification of ρ\rhoρ, here as the optimal average cost through Theorem 5.1, which in turn needs the comparison with arbitrary history-dependent policies. The discounted optimality equation behind (5.6) also has to be established for unbounded costs, where Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​ is not the unique fixed point of TβT_\betaTβ​.

Formalization scope

The state space is ℕ; state 0 is the reference state of hβh_\betahβ​. Policies are history-dependent randomized stochastic kernels with the admissibility constraint πt(U(xt)∣ht)=1\pi_t(U(x_t)\mid h_t)=1πt​(U(xt​)∣ht​)=1, and J∗J^*J∗, Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​ are infima over all of them. Costs are lower Lebesgue integrals with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], built from Mathlib's Kernel.trajMeasure. The following choices make implicit hypotheses explicit:

  • Finiteness of Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​. The paper's bound ∣hβ∣≤K|h_\beta|\le K∣hβ​∣≤K presupposes finite values; the goal assumes Jβ∗(i)<∞J^*_\beta(i)<\inftyJβ∗​(i)<∞, and (5.6) assumes it for its β\betaβ.
  • Convergent series in the ACOE. A solution of (5.1) requires every series ∑jP(j∣i,a)h(j)\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)h(j)∑j​P(j∣i,a)h(j), a∈U(i)a\in U(i)a∈U(i), to converge, and the minimum to be attained.
  • (5.2) over all policies. The paper prints the growth condition of Theorem 5.1 for π∈ΠSD\pi\in\Pi_{SD}π∈ΠSD​, but its conclusion ρ=J∗(i)\rho=J^*(i)ρ=J∗(i) concerns all policies, and the proof uses the condition for arbitrary π\piπ. It is stated for every π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π, with integrability of h(Xt)h(X_t)h(Xt​) explicit.
  • Theorem 2.1 is cited without proof in the survey for Borel models; in the countable model its Assumptions 2.2–2.3 follow from the continuity assumptions of §5. Only parts (i) and (iii) are stated.
  • Lemma 2.1 is stated for functions bounded below (on discrete ℕ these are the lower semicontinuous functions bounded below), with convergent series.
  • Irreducible, positive recurrent (converse of Theorem 5.1): every state is reached with positive probability from every state, and every state has finite expected return time.

A formalization in which J∗J^*J∗ is an infimum over stationary policies only, in which the ACOE is an inequality or holds for one fixed action, or in which hβh_\betahβ​ is computed from +∞+\infty+∞ values through a junk conversion, would trivialize the goal; all three are excluded by the definitions above.

A complete development needs the Ionescu-Tulcea path measure for history-dependent policies, the discounted optimality equation for nonnegative unbounded costs, Scheffé-type uniform convergence on compact action sets, and the martingale identity behind Theorem 5.1. The model file is reusable by the other missions of this series and by any countable-state average cost result; proofs of the milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • A. Arapostathis, V. S. Borkar, E. Fernández-Gaucherand, M. K. Ghosh, S. I. Marcus, Discrete-time controlled Markov processes with average cost criterion: a survey, SIAM J. Control Optim. 31(2) (1993) 282–344. https://doi.org/10.1137/0331018
  • C. Derman, On sequential decisions and Markov chains, Management Sci. 9 (1962) 16–24 (reference [38] of the survey).
  • C. Derman, Denumerable state Markovian decision processes — average cost criterion, Ann. Math. Statist. 37 (1966) 1545–1553 (reference [39]).
  • H. M. Taylor, Markovian sequential replacement processes, Ann. Math. Statist. 36 (1965) 1677–1694 (reference [177]).
  • S. M. Ross, Non-discounted denumerable Markovian decision models, Ann. Math. Statist. 39 (1968) 412–423, and Arbitrary state Markovian decision processes, Ann. Math. Statist. 39 (1968) 2118–2122 (references [147], [148]).
  • S. M. Ross, Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Academic Press, New York, 1983 (reference [150]).
  • L. I. Sennott, Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs, Oper. Res. 37 (1989) 626–633 (reference [156]).
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 2: With Dissimilarity Parameters at Most One and Fully-Captured Nests, a Nested-by-Revenue Assortment in Every Nest Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer choosing which products to display, or an airline choosing which fare classes to open, solves an assortment optimization problem: pick the set of offered products that maximizes expected revenue when customers choose among what is offered according to a discrete choice model. Under the multinomial logit model the answer has a simple form: an optimal assortment consists of the few highest-revenue products (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). The multinomial logit model, however, forces every pair of products to compete in the same way. The nested logit model relaxes this by grouping products into nests (brands, store sections, departure times) and letting a customer first choose a nest and then a product inside it.

Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Operations Research, 2014; DOI 10.1287/opre.2014.1256) study how much of the multinomial logit structure survives under the nested logit model. Their first answer is the theorem this mission targets: when the nest dissimilarity parameters are at most one and no customer who chose a nest leaves it without buying, offering the top products of each nest is still optimal. The other missions of this series treat the cases where this fails: dissimilarity parameters above one (the problem becomes NP-hard) and nests with their own no-purchase option.

Setting

There are mmm nests M={1,…,m}M = \{1, \dots, m\}M={1,…,m} and, in each nest, nnn products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n}. Product jjj of nest iii has a revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and a preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0; products are ordered so that ri1≥ri2≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge r_{i2} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥ri2​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii carries a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 and a within-nest no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of choosing no nest at all.

An assortment is a tuple (S1,…,Sm)(S_1, \dots, S_m)(S1​,…,Sm​) of subsets Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Write

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Ri(∅)=0.V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \quad R_i(\emptyset) = 0.Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Ri​(∅)=0.

A customer picks nest iii with probability Qi=Vi(Si)γi/(v0+∑l∈MVl(Sl)γl)Q_i = V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} / (v_0 + \sum_{l \in M} V_l(S_l)^{\gamma_l})Qi​=Vi​(Si​)γi​/(v0​+∑l∈M​Vl​(Sl​)γl​) and then, inside the nest, product jjj with probability vij/Vi(Si)v_{ij}/V_i(S_i)vij​/Vi​(Si​). The expected revenue is

Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑i∈MQi Ri(Si)=∑i∈MVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑i∈MVi(Si)γi,\Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \sum_{i \in M} Q_i\, R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}},Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=i∈M∑​Qi​Ri​(Si​)=v0​+∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​,

and problem (2) asks for Z∗=max⁡Π(S1,…,Sm)Z^* = \max \Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m)Z∗=maxΠ(S1​,…,Sm​) over all assortments. The nested-by-revenue assortment Nij={1,…,j}N_{ij} = \{1, \dots, j\}Nij​={1,…,j} collects the jjj highest-revenue products of nest iii, with Ni0=∅N_{i0} = \emptysetNi0​=∅ and N+={0,1,…,n}N_+ = \{0, 1, \dots, n\}N+​={0,1,…,n}.

This mission works under the standing assumptions of §3 of the paper: competitive products, γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1, and fully-captured nests, vi0=0v_{i0} = 0vi0​=0, for every nest iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 15)

If γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 and vi0=0v_{i0} = 0vi0​=0 for all i∈Mi \in Mi∈M, there exists an optimal solution (S1∗,…,Sm∗)(S^*_1, \dots, S^*_m)(S1∗​,…,Sm∗​) of problem (2) such that

Si∗=Nij  for some j∈N+,for all i∈M.S^*_i = N_{ij} \ \text{ for some } j \in N_+, \qquad \text{for all } i \in M.Si∗​=Nij​  for some j∈N+​,for all i∈M.

Milestones

  1. The case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 (p. 14). Offering only the single product with the largest revenue max⁡iri1\max_{i} r_{i1}maxi​ri1​ is optimal.
  2. Proposition 2 (p. 14). If S∗S^*S∗ is optimal and Si∗≠∅S^*_i \ne \emptysetSi∗​=∅, then Ri(Si∗)≥Z∗R_i(S^*_i) \ge Z^*Ri​(Si∗​)≥Z∗.
  3. Lemma 3 (p. 14). If Z=Π(S)Z = \Pi(S)Z=Π(S), Ri(Si)≥ZR_i(S_i) \ge ZRi​(Si​)≥Z and some j∈Sij \in S_ij∈Si​ has rij<γiZ+(1−γi)Ri(Si)r_{ij} < \gamma_i Z + (1-\gamma_i) R_i(S_i)rij​<γi​Z+(1−γi​)Ri​(Si​), removing jjj strictly increases the expected revenue.
  4. g(α)≤γg(\alpha) \le \gammag(α)≤γ (p. 15). For 0<γ≤10 < \gamma \le 10<γ≤1 and 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1: (1−αγ)/(αγ−1−αγ)≤γ(1 - \alpha^{\gamma})/(\alpha^{\gamma-1} - \alpha^{\gamma}) \le \gamma(1−αγ)/(αγ−1−αγ)≤γ.
  5. Revenue threshold (p. 15). Every j∈Si∗j \in S^*_ij∈Si∗​ of an optimal S∗S^*S∗ has rij≥γiZ∗+(1−γi)Ri(Si∗)r_{ij} \ge \gamma_i Z^* + (1-\gamma_i) R_i(S^*_i)rij​≥γi​Z∗+(1−γi​)Ri​(Si∗​).
  6. h(α)≥γh(\alpha) \ge \gammah(α)≥γ (p. 16). For 0<γ≤10 < \gamma \le 10<γ≤1 and 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1: (1−αγ)/(1−α)≥γ(1 - \alpha^{\gamma})/(1 - \alpha) \ge \gamma(1−αγ)/(1−α)≥γ.
  7. Exchange step (p. 15). If S∗S^*S∗ is optimal, j∈Si∗j \in S^*_ij∈Si∗​, k∉Si∗k \notin S^*_ik∈/Si∗​ and k<jk < jk<j, then adding kkk to Si∗S^*_iSi∗​ keeps the assortment optimal.

A companion item (not a milestone) states the algorithmic consequence at the end of §3: solving the linear program (4) over the candidates {Nij:j∈N+}\{N_{ij} : j \in N_+\}{Nij​:j∈N+​} and choosing in each nest a maximizer of problem (5) gives an optimal solution of (2).

Significance

Theorem 4 reduces problem (2), a search over 2mn2^{mn}2mn assortments, to (n+1)m(n+1)^m(n+1)m nested-by-revenue combinations, and the paper then finds the best one with a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and 1+m(1+n)1 + m(1+n)1+m(1+n) constraints. It marks the exact boundary of the classical multinomial logit structure inside the nested logit model: the paper's §4 shows that a single nest with γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 already breaks it, and that the general problem is NP-hard. The structural statement is also the base case for the approximation guarantees of §§5–6, which compare against nested-by-revenue assortments.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. A formal proof would supply a verified reduction from a combinatorial revenue maximization over the nested logit model to a polynomial-size search, with every boundary case (empty nests, v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0, ties in revenues) handled explicitly.

Difficulty

The obvious argument copies the multinomial logit proof: take an optimal assortment and swap a low-revenue product for a missing higher-revenue one. Under the nested logit model this exchange changes the nest's attraction Vi(Si)γiV_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}Vi​(Si​)γi​ non-linearly, so the revenue of the modified assortment is not an affine function of the change, and a simple swap can lower the expected revenue. The argument must instead control how adding or removing one product moves the nest weight relative to the nest revenue, and this is exactly where γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 enters, through two scalar inequalities in the ratio α\alphaα of nest weights. With γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 these inequalities fail and so does the theorem.

A second subtlety is ties: several optimal assortments may exist, and only some of them are nested by revenue. The statement asserts existence, not that every optimum has this form.

Formalization scope

All statements live in the namespace NestedLogitVariants.Competitive and share one definition file. Nests form a finite type ι with decidable equality; products are Fin n, indexed 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1, so NijN_{ij}Nij​ is nbr n j ={k:k<j}= \{k : k < j\}={k:k<j} with j≤nj \le nj≤n, and j=0j = 0j=0 gives ∅\emptyset∅. Powers are Real.rpow, and x/0=0x / 0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. Optimality of an assortment means its revenue is at least that of every assortment.

Standing assumptions carried as hypotheses: v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0, vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0, revenues ordered within each nest, and §3's γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 and vi0=0v_{i0} = 0vi0​=0. Three pins are disclosed: vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0 (the paper allows zero-weight padding products, under which Proposition 2 fails), rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0, and γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 (the paper's γi≥0\gamma_i \ge 0γi​≥0; its convention Vi(∅)γi=0V_i(\emptyset)^{\gamma_i} = 0Vi​(∅)γi​=0 fails at γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0). The section's "without loss of generality v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0" is a hypothesis of Proposition 2, Lemma 3, the threshold, the exchange step and the LP item; the goal itself only assumes v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0, and the case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 is milestone 1. The two scalar inequalities are stated as inequalities, not as monotonicity claims.

The goal is not trivialized by any hypothesis: it assumes none of the milestones, and stating "some nested-by-revenue assortment exists" (always true) or "every optimal assortment is nested by revenue" (false under ties) would be a different theorem.

Needed infrastructure is light: finite sums, real powers, and concavity of x↦xγx \mapsto x^{\gamma}x↦xγ for γ≤1\gamma \le 1γ≤1. The scalar lemmas are reusable for other nested logit results. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 250–273, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256 (cited from the authors' revised manuscript of June 18, 2013)
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • D. McFadden, Modelling the choice of residential location, in A. Karlqvist et al. (eds.), Spatial Interaction Theory and Planning Models, North-Holland, 75–96, 1978.
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization IV: When A ≥ 0 the Best Affine Policy Costs at Most 3√m Times the Fully Adaptable OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions taken in two steps: a first-stage decision xxx is fixed before an uncertain right-hand side bbb is revealed, and a second-stage decision y(b)y(b)y(b) is chosen after it, as a function of bbb. The objective protects against the worst bbb in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU. Computing an optimal fully adaptable solution is intractable in general (Feige, Jain, Mahdian and Mirrokni, IPCO 2007), so practitioners restrict the second stage to affine policies y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q, introduced in robust optimization by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (Math. Program. 2004). An optimal affine policy is computed by a single convex program, but its cost may exceed the adaptive optimum.

Bertsimas and Goyal (Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012) quantify this loss. Earlier, Bertsimas, Iancu and Parrilo (Math. Oper. Res. 2010) proved affine policies optimal for a class of one-dimensional multistage problems. The present paper shows that affine policies are optimal when U\mathcal UU is a simplex (Theorem 1), that they can lose a factor Ω(m1/2−δ)\Omega(m^{1/2-\delta})Ω(m1/2−δ) in general (Theorem 3), and — the subject of this mission — that when the first-stage constraint matrix is nonnegative they never lose more than 3m3\sqrt m3m​ (Theorem 4). Nonnegative first-stage matrices occur in network design, facility location, capacity planning and other covering problems.

Setting

Let A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​, c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​, d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​, and let U⊆R+m\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^m_+U⊆R+m​ be convex, compact and full-dimensional. The problem ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) is

zAdapt(U)=min⁡  cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)=\min\; c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(b)\ge b,\ \ x\ge0,\ \ y(b)\ge0\quad\forall b\in\mathcal U,zAdapt​(U)=mincTx+b∈Umax​dTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,

where the minimum is over first-stage vectors xxx and arbitrary maps b↦y(b)b\mapsto y(b)b↦y(b). The problem is assumed feasible. The value zAff(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U) is the same minimum restricted to affine second stages y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q, which must still satisfy Pb+q≥0Pb+q\ge0Pb+q≥0 on U\mathcal UU.

For each coordinate jjj put μj=max⁡{bj:b∈U}\mu_j=\max\{b_j : b\in\mathcal U\}μj​=max{bj​:b∈U} and fix a maximizer βj∈U\beta^j\in\mathcal Uβj∈U with βjj=μj\beta^j_j=\mu_jβjj​=μj​ (display (38)). The scaled sum of bbb over an index set JJJ is ∑j∈Jbj/μj\sum_{j\in J}b_j/\mu_j∑j∈J​bj​/μj​.

Algorithm A\mathcal AA (Fig. 1 of the paper) starts with J1={1,…,m}J_1=\{1,\dots,m\}J1​={1,…,m} and b0=0b^0=0b0=0. While some b∈Ub\in\mathcal Ub∈U has scaled sum over J1J_1J1​ larger than m\sqrt mm​, it picks a maximizer uk∈Uu^k\in\mathcal Uuk∈U of that scaled sum, adds uku^kuk to the running vector on the coordinates of J1J_1J1​, and moves to J2J_2J2​ every coordinate jjj whose running value has reached μj\mu_jμj​. It returns the number of iterations KKK, the vectors u1,…,uKu^1,\dots,u^Ku1,…,uK, their sum β=u1+⋯+uK\beta=u^1+\dots+u^Kβ=u1+⋯+uK, and the partition J1,J2J_1,J_2J1​,J2​.

In the kkk-uncertain variant (60)–(63), only kkk right-hand sides b∈U⊆R+kb\in\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^k_+b∈U⊆R+k​ are uncertain and the remaining m−km-km−k are fixed at b0b^0b0; all data are nonnegative. Its values are zAdaptk(U)z^k_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAdaptk​(U) and zAffk(U)z^k_{Aff}(\mathcal U)zAffk​(U).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

If A≥0A\ge0A≥0 entrywise, then a feasible affine solution exists and

zAff(U)≤3m⋅zAdapt(U).z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le 3\sqrt m\cdot z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U).zAff​(U)≤3m​⋅zAdapt​(U).

Milestones

  1. μj>0\mu_j>0μj​>0 for every jjj (after (38)).
  2. Lemma 9. For every complete run of Algorithm A\mathcal AA: ∑j∈J1bj/μj≤m\sum_{j\in J_1}b_j/\mu_j\le\sqrt m∑j∈J1​​bj​/μj​≤m​ for all b∈Ub\in\mathcal Ub∈U, and bj≤βjb_j\le\beta_jbj​≤βj​ for all j∈J2j\in J_2j∈J2​ and b∈Ub\in\mathcal Ub∈U.
  3. Lemma 10. Algorithm A\mathcal AA executes at most K≤2mK\le2\sqrt mK≤2m​ iterations.
  4. Feasibility (48)–(55). For any feasible (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗), the solution x~=3m x∗\tilde x=3\sqrt m\,x^*x~=3m​x∗, y~(b)=∑j∈J1bjμjy∗(βj)+y^\tilde y(b)=\sum_{j\in J_1}\frac{b_j}{\mu_j}y^*(\beta^j)+\hat yy~​(b)=∑j∈J1​​μj​bj​​y∗(βj)+y^​ with y^=2mK∑k=1Ky∗(uk)\hat y=\frac{2\sqrt m}{K}\sum_{k=1}^Ky^*(u^k)y^​=K2m​​∑k=1K​y∗(uk) is feasible.
  5. Cost (56)–(59). If ttt bounds the worst-case cost of (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗), then 3m⋅t3\sqrt m\cdot t3m​⋅t bounds that of (x~,y~)(\tilde x,\tilde y)(x~,y~​).

Companion results

  • Algorithm A\mathcal AA has a complete run when U\mathcal UU is compact.
  • Lemma 11. z(Π1)≤zAdaptk(U)z(\Pi_1)\le z^k_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)z(Π1​)≤zAdaptk​(U) and z(Π2)≤zAdaptk(U)z(\Pi_2)\le z^k_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)z(Π2​)≤zAdaptk​(U) for the uncertain and deterministic parts of the kkk-uncertain problem.
  • Theorem 5. zAffk(U)≤(3k+1)⋅zAdaptk(U)z^k_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le(3\sqrt k+1)\cdot z^k_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAffk​(U)≤(3k​+1)⋅zAdaptk​(U), the paper's O(k)O(\sqrt k)O(k​) bound with its proof's constant.
  • Special case (39)–(45). If ∑j=1mbj/μj≤m\sum_{j=1}^m b_j/\mu_j\le\sqrt m∑j=1m​bj​/μj​≤m​ on U\mathcal UU, then zAff(U)≤m⋅zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le\sqrt m\cdot z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)≤m​⋅zAdapt​(U).

Significance

Theorem 4 is an upper bound on the price of restricting to affine policies, and Theorem 3 of the same paper shows it is tight up to a constant factor: for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are instances with A≥0A\ge0A≥0 where the gap is Ω(m1/2−δ)\Omega(m^{1/2-\delta})Ω(m1/2−δ). Together they settle the order of the approximation ratio of affine policies for covering-type two-stage problems. Theorem 5 refines the bound to O(k)O(\sqrt k)O(k​) when only kkk of the mmm right-hand sides are uncertain, which is the regime of many applications. The construction is also the template for the paper's Theorem 6, a 4m4\sqrt m4m​-approximation for general AAA obtained from a single dominating simplex.

The results are proved in the paper. To the knowledge of this mission, none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them produces a reusable model of two-stage adaptive linear programs with affine policies, a verified analysis of a greedy covering procedure (Algorithm A\mathcal AA), and an explicit-constant version of an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) statement.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt scales the fully adaptable solution at the extreme points βj\beta^jβj linearly in bbb: y~(b)=∑j(bj/μj) y∗(βj)\tilde y(b)=\sum_j (b_j/\mu_j)\,y^*(\beta^j)y~​(b)=∑j​(bj​/μj​)y∗(βj). This is feasible at cost factor m\sqrt mm​ only when the scaled sums ∑jbj/μj\sum_j b_j/\mu_j∑j​bj​/μj​ stay below m\sqrt mm​ on U\mathcal UU (condition (39)); in general they can reach mmm, and the linear rule then costs a factor mmm. The difficulty is to handle the coordinates where U\mathcal UU has large scaled mass. Algorithm A\mathcal AA isolates them, and the delicate point is the iteration count: each round must add scaled mass above m\sqrt mm​, while the total scaled mass that can be absorbed before every coordinate leaves J1J_1J1​ is at most 2m2m2m. A formal proof must also track the algorithm's state through its recursion, because the argmax choices are not unique and the statements must hold for every run.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin m → ℝ with the componentwise order, indices are 0-based, and matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. Nonnegativity of a matrix is stated entrywise. zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ are infima of the set of worst-case cost bounds achieved by feasible solutions; the goal and Theorem 5 assert the existence of a feasible affine solution, which rules out the trivializing reading in which zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ is the infimum of an empty set (Lean's junk value 000) and the inequality holds for free. The goal does not mention μ\muμ, βj\beta^jβj or Algorithm A\mathcal AA; these appear only in milestones.

μ\muμ and βj\beta^jβj are given with their defining properties (μj\mu_jμj​ is the greatest value of bjb_jbj​ on U\mathcal UU, and βj∈U\beta^j\in\mathcal Uβj∈U with βjj=μj\beta^j_j=\mu_jβjj​=μj​). Algorithm A\mathcal AA is encoded as a recursion on a choice sequence uuu, with step 2(d) read as J1k={j∈J1k−1:bjk<μj}J_1^k=\{j\in J_1^{k-1}: b^k_j<\mu_j\}J1k​={j∈J1k−1​:bjk​<μj​}. A complete run requires the loop test and the argmax property at each iteration and the failure of the loop test at the end. The milestones on the constructed policy are stated for every feasible (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗) and every cost bound ttt, so that no attainment of the optimum is assumed.

Standing assumptions of (1) carried by the goal: c,d≥0c,d\ge0c,d≥0; U⊆R+m\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^m_+U⊆R+m​ convex, compact, with nonempty interior; feasibility. Milestones drop the ones they do not use. Theorem 5 carries compactness and full-dimensionality of U\mathcal UU, which §5.1 does not repeat but its proof uses through Theorem 4. Lemma 11 assumes that zAdaptk(U)z^k_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAdaptk​(U) is finite, since the paper's inequality is between extended reals.

A complete development needs: finite-dimensional linear programming facts (existence of optimal solutions is not needed), compactness arguments for the argmax in Algorithm A\mathcal AA, and manipulation of finite sums over Finset. The model of (1) and the analysis of Algorithm A\mathcal AA are reusable by the companion mission on Theorem 6. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of supporting lemmas about the recursion of Algorithm A\mathcal AA, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas and V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer and A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Math. Program. 99(2), 351–376, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu and P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 363–394, 2010.
  • U. Feige, K. Jain, M. Mahdian and V. Mirrokni, Robust combinatorial optimization with exponential scenarios, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 4513, 439–453, 2007.
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization II: With m + 3 Extreme Points the Best Affine Policy Can Cost More Than (2 − δ) Times the OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions made in two steps: a first-stage decision is fixed before an uncertain parameter is revealed, and a second-stage (recourse) decision may then depend on the realized value. In the robust version, the uncertain parameter ranges over an uncertainty set and the objective is the worst-case cost. Such models arise in capacity planning, network design and inventory problems with uncertain demand, where the demand is the right-hand side of the constraints.

Computing an optimal fully adaptable second-stage policy is intractable in general: the recourse is an arbitrary function of the uncertain parameter. The standard tractable surrogate, introduced by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (Math. Program. 99, 2004), restricts the recourse to an affine policy y(b)=Pb+qy(b) = Pb + qy(b)=Pb+q, whose optimization is a finite convex program. Practitioners report that affine policies often perform well, which raises the question of when they are optimal and how much they can lose.

Bertsimas and Goyal (Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012) answer this for problems with an uncertain right-hand side. Their Theorem 1 shows that affine policies are optimal when the uncertainty set is a simplex, that is, the convex hull of m+1m+1m+1 affinely independent points of R+m\mathbb R^m_+R+m​. Their Theorem 2, the subject of this mission, shows that this is almost tight: one additional extreme point can make the best affine policy almost twice as expensive as the optimum.

Setting

Let A∈Rm×n1A \in \mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B \in \mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​, c∈R+n1c \in \mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​, d∈R+n2d \in \mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​ and let U⊆R+m\mathcal U \subseteq \mathbb R^m_+U⊆R+m​ be an uncertainty set. The problem ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) is

zAdapt(U)=min⁡ cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U.z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(\mathcal U)=\min\ c^{T}x+\max_{b\in\mathcal U} d^{T}y(b)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(b)\ge b,\ \ x\ge 0,\ \ y(b)\ge 0\quad\forall b\in\mathcal U .zAdapt​(U)=min cTx+b∈Umax​dTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U.

Here xxx is the first-stage decision and y:U→Rn2y : \mathcal U \to \mathbb R^{n_2}y:U→Rn2​ is the second-stage policy; all inequalities between vectors are componentwise. The value zAff(U)z_{\mathrm{Aff}}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U) is the same minimum restricted to affine policies y(b)=Pb+qy(b) = Pb + qy(b)=Pb+q with P∈Rn2×mP \in \mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m and q∈Rn2q \in \mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​; an affine policy must still satisfy Pb+q≥0Pb + q \ge 0Pb+q≥0 for every b∈Ub \in \mathcal Ub∈U. Always zAdapt(U)≤zAff(U)z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(\mathcal U) \le z_{\mathrm{Aff}}(\mathcal U)zAdapt​(U)≤zAff​(U).

The instance I\mathcal II of (6) is defined for δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 and an even integer m>200/δ2m > 200/\delta^2m>200/δ2. It has n1=n2=mn_1 = n_2 = mn1​=n2​=m, c=0c = 0c=0, d=(1,…,1)Td = (1,\dots,1)^Td=(1,…,1)T, A=0A = 0A=0, and

Bij={1,i=j,1/m,i≠j,U=conv⁡{b0,b1,…,bm+2},B_{ij}=\begin{cases}1,& i=j,\\ 1/\sqrt m,& i\ne j,\end{cases}\qquad \mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}\{b^0,b^1,\dots,b^{m+2}\},Bij​={1,1/m​,​i=j,i=j,​U=conv{b0,b1,…,bm+2},

where b0=0b^0 = 0b0=0, bj=ejb^j = e_jbj=ej​ is the jjj-th unit vector for j=1,…,mj = 1,\dots,mj=1,…,m, bm+1b^{m+1}bm+1 has entries 1/m1/\sqrt m1/m​ in its first m/2m/2m/2 coordinates and 000 in the others, and bm+2b^{m+2}bm+2 has 000 in its first m/2m/2m/2 coordinates and 1/m1/\sqrt m1/m​ in the others. Thus U\mathcal UU is generated by m+2m+2m+2 nonzero points. The last two are also extreme points when m≥6m\ge 6m≥6; for m=2m=2m=2 or 444 they lie in the convex hull of 0,e1,…,em0,e_1,\dots,e_m0,e1​,…,em​.

For a permutation τ\tauτ of {1,…,m}\{1,\dots,m\}{1,…,m}, write xτ=(xτ(1),…,xτ(m))x^\tau = (x_{\tau(1)},\dots,x_{\tau(m)})xτ=(xτ(1)​,…,xτ(m)​). A set UUU is permutation-invariant with respect to τ\tauτ if x∈U  ⟺  xτ∈Ux \in U \iff x^\tau \in Ux∈U⟺xτ∈U (Definition 2), and Γ\GammaΓ is the set (10) of permutations with i≤m/2  ⟺  τ(i)≤m/2i \le m/2 \iff \tau(i) \le m/2i≤m/2⟺τ(i)≤m/2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

zAff(U)>(2−δ)⋅zAdapt(U)for the instance I of (6), every δ>0 and every even m>200/δ2.z_{\mathrm{Aff}}(\mathcal U)>(2-\delta)\cdot z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(\mathcal U)\qquad\text{for the instance }\mathcal I\text{ of (6), every }\delta>0\text{ and every even }m>200/\delta^2 .zAff​(U)>(2−δ)⋅zAdapt​(U)for the instance I of (6), every δ>0 and every even m>200/δ2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1. On I\mathcal II there is a feasible fully adaptable solution with worst-case cost 111, so zAdapt(U)≤1z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(\mathcal U) \le 1zAdapt​(U)≤1.
  2. Lemma 2. The set U\mathcal UU of (6) is permutation-invariant with respect to every τ∈Γ\tau \in \Gammaτ∈Γ.
  3. Lemma 3. There is an optimal affine solution y^(b)=P^b+q^\hat y(b) = \hat Pb + \hat qy^​(b)=P^b+q^​ whose intercept is constant: q^i=q^j\hat q_i = \hat q_jq^​i​=q^​j​ for all i,ji, ji,j.
  4. First Claim of the proof of Theorem 2. For any feasible affine solution with intercept q^≡β\hat q \equiv \betaq^​≡β and worst-case cost at most 2−δ2-\delta2−δ: β≤(2−δ)/m\beta \le (2-\delta)/mβ≤(2−δ)/m.
  5. Second Claim. Under the same assumption, P^jj≥1−2/m−2/m\hat P_{jj} \ge 1 - 2/\sqrt m - 2/mP^jj​≥1−2/m​−2/m for every jjj.
  6. Third Claim. Under the same assumption, P^ij≥−(2−δ)/m\hat P_{ij} \ge -(2-\delta)/mP^ij​≥−(2−δ)/m for all i,ji, ji,j.

Significance

Together with Theorem 1 of the same paper, Theorem 2 delimits exactly where affine policies are optimal for right-hand-side uncertainty: for a simplex they are, and with one more nonzero extreme point the gap can approach 222. The ratio is measured against the fully adaptable optimum, which is the quantity a practitioner gives up by choosing affine recourse. Later sections of the paper push the same construction to m1/2−δm^{1/2-\delta}m1/2−δ for sets with polynomially many extreme points and prove a matching O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​) upper bound; Theorem 2 is the simplest member of this family and isolates the mechanism.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal model of two-stage adaptive linear optimization with uncertain right-hand side, the values zAdaptz_{\mathrm{Adapt}}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{\mathrm{Aff}}zAff​, and a verified lower-bound instance. The symmetrization statement (Lemma 3) is an instance of a general principle, that a convex problem invariant under a group has an invariant optimum, which is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The upper bound zAdapt≤1z_{\mathrm{Adapt}} \le 1zAdapt​≤1 requires a feasible policy, which can be written down. The lower bound on zAffz_{\mathrm{Aff}}zAff​ is a statement about all affine policies, an m2+mm^2 + mm2+m dimensional family, and cannot be checked policy by policy. The obvious attempt, testing an arbitrary affine policy against a few extreme points, fails because an asymmetric policy can trade cost between coordinates. The argument needs an optimal policy that is symmetric, which in turn needs both the existence of an optimal affine solution (attainment of a minimum over a non-compact set of policies) and the invariance of the instance under the permutations of Γ\GammaΓ and the swap of the two halves. Without the attainment step, a contradiction for every policy of cost at most 2−δ2-\delta2−δ yields only zAff≥2−δz_{\mathrm{Aff}} \ge 2-\deltazAff​≥2−δ, not the strict inequality.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin m → ℝ with the componentwise order, matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, BxBxBx is B *ᵥ x and dTyd^TydTy is d ⬝ᵥ y. Indices are 0-based: the paper's coordinate iii is index i−1i - 1i−1, so "i≤m/2i \le m/2i≤m/2" is (i : ℕ) < m / 2, with natural-number division (exact since mmm is even). xτx^\tauxτ is x ∘ τ for τ : Equiv.Perm (Fin m).

zAdaptz_{\mathrm{Adapt}}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{\mathrm{Aff}}zAff​ are the infima of the sets of real numbers ttt for which some feasible (respectively feasible affine) solution satisfies cTx+dTy(b)≤tc^Tx + d^Ty(b) \le tcTx+dTy(b)≤t for all b∈Ub \in \mathcal Ub∈U. This epigraph form avoids a supremum of a possibly unbounded function; on an infeasible instance the infimum would be Lean's junk value 000, which is why Lemma 1 also asserts the existence of the feasible solution of cost 111. Optimal solutions are stated by IsOptimalAff: feasible, with worst-case cost bounded by every bound achieved by any feasible affine solution. Affine policies must be nonnegative on U\mathcal UU, as in (1).

The instance is concrete, so the standing assumptions of (1) (nonnegative costs, compact convex full-dimensional U⊆R+m\mathcal U \subseteq \mathbb R^m_+U⊆R+m​, feasibility) are properties of the data rather than hypotheses. The goal adds no hypothesis to the page: δ>0\delta > 0δ>0, mmm even and m>200/δ2m > 200/\delta^2m>200/δ2. For δ≥2\delta \ge 2δ≥2 the statement is easy but still true. The three Claims are stated for any feasible affine solution with constant intercept and worst-case cost at most 2−δ2-\delta2−δ, which is exactly what the paper's proof uses about the symmetric optimal solution under its contradiction hypothesis (12). Lemma 1 drops the unused hypothesis m>200/δ2m > 200/\delta^2m>200/δ2. Definition 2 prints "x∈P  ⟺  xτ∈Px \in P \iff x^\tau \in Px∈P⟺xτ∈P"; the formalization reads PPP as the set UUU.

Replacing zAffz_{\mathrm{Aff}}zAff​ by the cost of one particular affine policy, stating the goal with ≥\ge≥, or bounding only policies with constant intercept would not be Theorem 2, and is ruled out: the goal compares the two optimal values with a strict inequality.

A complete development needs convex hulls of finite point sets in Fin m → ℝ, the existence of a minimizer for the affine problem (a linear program in (x,P,q)(x, P, q)(x,P,q) with infinitely many constraints indexed by U\mathcal UU, reducible to the extreme points), averaging of optimal solutions over a permutation group, and elementary estimates with m\sqrt mm​. Contributions of general lemmas on attainment of semi-infinite linear programs and on symmetrization of convex programs are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Mathematical Programming Ser. A (online first 2011; received 31 Oct 2009, accepted 17 Jan 2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Mathematical Programming 99 (2004) 351–376. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu, P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010) 363–394. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0444
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization I: An Affine Policy Is Optimal When the Uncertainty Set Is a SimplexResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions taken in two rounds: a first-stage decision xxx is fixed before an uncertain parameter is revealed, and a second-stage decision y(b)y(b)y(b) is chosen after the parameter bbb is observed, so that the second stage may depend on bbb arbitrarily. The objective is the worst case over an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of possible parameters. Such models arise in robust network design, capacity planning and two-stage covering problems, and they generalize the two-stage robust combinatorial problems (set cover, facility location) studied by Dhamdhere, Goyal, Ravi and Singh.

Optimizing over all functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) is intractable in general: Bertsimas and Goyal note that the optimal second stage is piecewise linear in bbb with possibly exponentially many pieces (Bemporad, Borrelli and Morari, 2003). A standard remedy, introduced for robust linear programs by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (2004), restricts the second stage to affine policies (linear decision rules) y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q; the best affine policy is computable by a single convex program and performs well empirically. The question is when this restriction loses nothing.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 2004. Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski introduce affinely adjustable robust counterparts and show that the best affine policy is tractable for many uncertainty sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y).
  • 2010. Bertsimas, Iancu and Parrilo prove that affine policies are optimal for a class of multistage robust problems with one-dimensional uncertainty per stage and box uncertainty sets (doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444).
  • 2012. Bertsimas and Goyal, the source of this mission, prove that an affine policy is optimal for model (1) whenever U\mathcal UU is a simplex (Theorem 1), and show that this exactness breaks down for slightly larger sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4).

Setting

Let A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​, c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​ and d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​. The problem ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) of model (1) is

zAdapt(U)=min⁡ cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)=\min\ c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(b)\ge b,\ \ x\ge 0,\ \ y(b)\ge 0\quad\forall b\in\mathcal U,zAdapt​(U)=min cTx+b∈Umax​dTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,

where inequalities between vectors are componentwise. A pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) satisfying the constraints is feasible; its worst-case cost is cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)cTx+maxb∈U​dTy(b). A feasible pair is optimal when its worst-case cost equals zAdapt(U)z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAdapt​(U), and an affine policy is a second stage of the form y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q with P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m, q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​, still required to be nonnegative on U\mathcal UU. The value zAff(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U) is the same minimum restricted to affine policies.

A simplex in Rm\mathbb R^mRm is the convex hull

U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1)

of m+1m+1m+1 affinely independent points, that is, points for which b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1b^1-b^{m+1},\dots,b^m-b^{m+1}b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1 are linearly independent. The proof works with the m×mm\times mm×m matrix Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)]Q=[(b^1-b^{m+1})\cdots(b^m-b^{m+1})]Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)], the matrix Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))]Y=[(y^*(b^1)-y^*(b^{m+1}))\cdots(y^*(b^m)-y^*(b^{m+1}))]Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))] of display (2), and the affine rule y~(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1)\tilde y(b)=YQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})+y^*(b^{m+1})y~​(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1). In Lean these are Qmat v, Ymat v g and interpolant v g, with vertices v : Fin (m+1) → Fin m → ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

If U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1) with affinely independent bj∈R+mb^j\in\mathbb R^m_+bj∈R+m​ and ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) is feasible, then there exist x^\hat xx^, P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m and q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​ such that

(x^, y^),y^(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),(\hat x,\ \hat y),\qquad \hat y(b)=Pb+q\ \ (b\in\mathcal U),(x^, y^​),y^​(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),

is an optimal solution of ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U), optimal among all (not only affine) two-stage solutions. In particular zAff(U)=zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)=z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)=zAdapt​(U).

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 1 has no numbered lemma; the milestones are its displayed steps, in attack order:

  1. QQQ is invertible (PDF p. 6).
  2. For b=∑jαjbjb=\sum_j\alpha_jb^jb=∑j​αj​bj with ∑jαj=1\sum_j\alpha_j=1∑j​αj​=1: Q−1(b−bm+1)=(α1,…,αm)TQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=(\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_m)^TQ−1(b−bm+1)=(α1​,…,αm​)T (PDF p. 6).
  3. y~(∑jαjbj)=∑jαj y∗(bj)\tilde y\big(\sum_j\alpha_jb^j\big)=\sum_j\alpha_j\,y^*(b^j)y~​(∑j​αj​bj)=∑j​αj​y∗(bj) (PDF pp. 6–7).
  4. Displays (3)–(5): for any feasible (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗), the pair (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) is feasible and every bound on the worst-case cost of (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗) also bounds that of (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) (PDF p. 7).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 identifies a class of uncertainty sets on which the tractable affine restriction is exact, for every constraint matrix AAA and BBB and every nonnegative cost. It is the positive anchor of the paper: Sections 3 and 4 show that with m+3m+3m+3 extreme points the best affine policy can already be worse by a factor 2−δ2-\delta2−δ, and that on sets with exponentially many extreme points the gap can be Ω(m1/2−δ)\Omega(m^{1/2-\delta})Ω(m1/2−δ); Section 6 uses a dominating simplex, on which affine policies are exact, to build an O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​)-approximation for general U\mathcal UU. The theorem also says that on a simplex the whole adaptive problem reduces to m+1m+1m+1 scenario copies of a linear program.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known on Prove2Me. This mission produces the model (1) in Lean, the barycentric-coordinate identity for a simplex in matrix form, and a statement of optimality that asserts attainment of the minimum in (1), which the paper's proof takes for granted.

Difficulty

Two steps are not routine to formalize. First, the paper starts from "an optimal solution x∗,y∗(b)x^*,y^*(b)x∗,y∗(b)", that is, it assumes the minimum in (1) is attained. Over arbitrary functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) this is not automatic; on a simplex it follows because the problem reduces to a finite linear program on the vertices, whose optimum is attained, but Mathlib has no theory of linear-programming attainment, so this reduction has to be built. Second, the affine-independence step needs the passage from affine independence of m+1m+1m+1 points to invertibility of the m×mm\times mm×m matrix QQQ, and the identity Q−1(b−bm+1)=αQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=\alphaQ−1(b−bm+1)=α requires the barycentric coordinates and the inverse matrix to be matched index by index. The naive idea of comparing zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ and zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ as real infima does not prove the goal: equality of the two infima says nothing about the existence of an optimal solution.

Formalization scope

Vectors in Rm\mathbb R^mRm are Fin m → ℝ, with the componentwise order; matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The paper's indices start at 111, Lean's at 000: bjb^jbj is v (j-1) and bm+1b^{m+1}bm+1 is v (Fin.last m). The simplex is convexHull ℝ (Set.range v); it is compact, convex and, by affine independence, full-dimensional, so these standing assumptions of (1) are not stated separately. Nonnegativity of U\mathcal UU is the hypothesis that all m+1m+1m+1 vertices are nonnegative (the page writes j=1,…,mj=1,\dots,mj=1,…,m, a slip for m+1m+1m+1). Feasibility of (1) is a hypothesis, as the paper assumes. Optimality (IsOptimalAdapt) means: feasible, and every worst-case cost bound achieved by any feasible two-stage solution is achieved by this one. The values zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ are infima of the sets of achievable bounds; they are provided for reference and the goal does not depend on them.

The goal must not be replaced by zAff(U)≤zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)≤zAdapt​(U), by optimality among affine policies only, or by a version that assumes an optimal solution exists: each of these drops the content "there is an optimal solution and it is affine". The goal does not mention QQQ, YYY or the interpolant.

A complete development needs: linear-programming attainment for a finite system of linear inequalities with a cost bounded below (reusable well beyond this mission), the linear-algebra lemmas relating affine independence to an invertible edge matrix (reusable for barycentric coordinates in general), and the convex-hull representation of points of a simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012. doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Math. Program. 99(2), 351–376, 2004. doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu, P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 363–394, 2010. doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444
  • A. Bemporad, F. Borrelli, M. Morari, Min–max control of constrained uncertain discrete-time linear systems, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 48(9), 1600–1606, 2003. doi:10.1109/TAC.2003.816984
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Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Uncertain Linear Programs I: Under Constraint-wise Uncertainty and the Boundedness Assumption the Robust Counterpart Is No Worse Than the Worst InstanceResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear program is solved with data that, in practice, is rarely known exactly: coefficients come from measurements, estimates or forecasts. Robust optimization asks for a solution that remains feasible for every realization of the data in a prescribed uncertainty set, and among those the one with the best guaranteed objective value. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski introduced this framework for linear programming in Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs (Oper. Res. Lett. 25, 1999), following their treatment of robust convex optimization (Math. Oper. Res. 23, 1998) and Soyster's earlier work on inexact linear programming (Oper. Res. 21, 1973). The robust counterpart has since become the starting point of a large literature on uncertainty sets, budgets of uncertainty and adjustable policies.

A natural first objection is that the robust counterpart might be needlessly conservative: by demanding feasibility for all realizations simultaneously, it could be infeasible, or have a worse value, even when every individual realization is perfectly well behaved. This mission formalizes the paper's answer (§2.2): under two structural hypotheses, the robust counterpart is no worse than the worst realization.

Setting

Fix c,f∈Rnc, f \in \mathbb R^nc,f∈Rn and write a linear program in the homogeneous form (6)

(P)min⁡{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},(P)\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid Ax \ge 0,\ f^{T}x = 1\},(P)min{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},

where AAA is a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is componentwise. Every linear program can be put in this form. The matrix AAA is uncertain: it is only known to lie in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of m×nm\times nm×n matrices. Each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U gives an instance (P)(P)(P) with feasible set {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}\{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x = 1\}{x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1} and optimal value c∗(P)c^*(P)c∗(P); the family of instances is P\mathcal PP. The robust counterpart (7) is

(PU)min⁡{cTx∣x∈GU},GU={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},(P_{\mathcal U})\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid x \in G_{\mathcal U}\},\qquad G_{\mathcal U} = \{x\mid Ax\ge0\ \ \forall A\in\mathcal U;\ f^{T}x = 1\},(PU​)min{cTx∣x∈GU​},GU​={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},

and its optimal value is c∗c^*c∗. Since GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ does not change when U\mathcal UU is replaced by its closed convex hull, the paper assumes throughout that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed.

Let Ui⊆Rn\mathcal U_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nUi​⊆Rn be the set of all realizations of the iii-th row, the projection of U\mathcal UU onto the data of the iii-th constraint. The uncertainty is constraint-wise if U=U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U = \mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU=U1​×⋯×Um​: the rows vary independently. The Boundedness Assumption asks for a convex compact set Q⊆RnQ\subseteq\mathbb R^nQ⊆Rn that contains the feasible set of every instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.1 (p. 5)

If the uncertainty is constraint-wise and the Boundedness Assumption holds, then

  1. (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is infeasible if and only if some instance is infeasible:
GU=∅  ⟺  ∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;G_{\mathcal U} = \emptyset \iff \exists A\in\mathcal U:\ \{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1\}=\emptyset;GU​=∅⟺∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;
  1. if (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is feasible with optimal value c∗c^*c∗, then
c∗=sup⁡{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)c^* = \sup\{c^*(P)\mid (P)\in\mathcal P\}. \tag{9}c∗=sup{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: the row-wise description (8) of robust feasibility; the inclusion of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ in every instance's feasible set; the reduction of the semi-infinite system (8) on QQQ to a finite subsystem; the statement that the finite system (10) A1x≥0,…,ANx≥0, fTx=1A_1x\ge0,\dots,A_Nx\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1A1​x≥0,…,AN​x≥0, fTx=1 then has no solution at all; the Farkas certificate (11); the construction of one infeasible instance from it; and part (i) alone, which part (ii) uses for an augmented program.

Companions

The §2.2 example (every instance has optimal value 1, the robust counterpart is infeasible), and the two invariance remarks: GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ is unchanged under passing to the closed convex hull of U\mathcal UU (§2.1) or to the product U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU1​×⋯×Um​ of its projections (§2.2).

Significance

Proposition 2.1 says that, for constraint-wise uncertainty, robustness costs nothing beyond what the worst realization already costs: the robust counterpart is feasible exactly when every instance is, and its optimal value equals the worst instance value. The §2.2 example shows the hypothesis cannot be dropped: there, correlated uncertainty in two rows makes every instance solvable with value 1 while the robust counterpart is infeasible. Together with the invariance of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ under passing to the product of projections, this explains why row-wise (constraint-wise) uncertainty sets are the standard modelling choice in robust linear optimization.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. Formalizing it produces a reusable development of semi-infinite linear systems: the compactness reduction to finite subsystems, a homogeneous Farkas alternative, and the row-averaging argument that uses convexity and the product structure of U\mathcal UU.

Difficulty

The robust counterpart has a continuum of constraints, one for each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U, so Farkas' Lemma cannot be applied to it directly. The step that requires care is passing from infeasibility of this semi-infinite system to infeasibility of a single instance. Compactness yields only finitely many instances whose joint system has no solution in QQQ; those instances are in general all feasible individually, and the infeasible instance has to be manufactured from their rows. Without constraint-wise uncertainty the manufactured matrix need not lie in U\mathcal UU, which is exactly what the §2.2 example exploits. Part (ii) needs the optimal values of the instances to be attained on compact feasible sets, which is where the Boundedness Assumption enters again.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is 0 ≤ A *ᵥ x in the componentwise order. The iii-th row of AAA is A i and aTxa^{T}xaTx is a ⬝ᵥ x. The projections Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are the images of U\mathcal UU under A↦AiA\mapsto A_iA↦Ai​, not free sets, and constraint-wise uncertainty is the inclusion U1×⋯×Um⊆U\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_m\subseteq\mathcal UU1​×⋯×Um​⊆U (the reverse inclusion always holds). The Boundedness Assumption keeps both convexity and compactness of QQQ, as on the page.

Optimal values are infima: c∗c^*c∗ is the greatest lower bound (IsGLB) of cTxc^{T}xcTx over GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​, and (9) states that c∗c^*c∗ is the least upper bound (IsLUB) of the set of real optimal values of the instances. No real sInf/sSup is used, so no junk value can make the statement true.

The goal carries the paper's standing assumption that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed, and one disclosed addition: U\mathcal UU is nonempty. The paper takes this for granted; without it part (i) fails for f=0f = 0f=0 and the supremum in (9) ranges over the empty set. The goal does not assume that the robust counterpart or any instance attains its optimum, and it does not mention finite subsystems, multipliers or the averaged matrix; those appear only in the milestones. A formalization in which the uncertainty sets Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are arbitrary sets with U=∏iUi\mathcal U = \prod_i\mathcal U_iU=∏i​Ui​, or in which optimal values are taken as sInf without boundedness, would not be faithful and is ruled out.

A complete development needs: compactness arguments for families of closed half-spaces, a Farkas alternative for homogeneous systems with one normalizing equation, and elementary convexity of linear images. These pieces are general and reusable beyond robust optimization. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments (for instance via LP duality for part (ii)) and proofs of the companion statements are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1):1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(99)00016-4 (cited here by the pages of the authors' manuscript).
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • A. L. Soyster, Convex programming with set-inclusive constraints and applications to inexact linear programming, Operations Research 21(5):1154–1157, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1154
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CombinatoricsLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 5: The Seven-Element Fano Matroid Corresponds to No Real MatrixResearch Paper

Motivation

Whitney's 1935 paper On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence introduced matroids: finite sets equipped with a rank function, or equivalently a family of independent sets, obeying a few postulates abstracted from the linear dependence of the columns of a matrix. The obvious first question about such an abstraction is whether it is genuinely more general than its model, that is, whether there are matroids that do not arise from any matrix. Section 16 of the paper answers it with a seven-element example, now called the Fano matroid F7F_7F7​, and proves that no real matrix corresponds to it.

The question has had a long life. Representability of matroids over a given field is a central theme of matroid theory: Tutte (1958) characterized the matroids representable over the field with two elements by a single excluded minor, the four-point line U2,4U_{2,4}U2,4​, and the regular matroids by three excluded minors, U2,4U_{2,4}U2,4​, F7F_7F7​ and its dual; and Seymour's decomposition of regular matroids (1980) rests on the same objects. Whitney's §16 is the starting point of this line: the first proof that the abstract postulates admit matroids outside linear algebra over R\mathbb RR.

Timeline:

  • 1935. Whitney defines matroids, the circuit matrix of a matrix, and proves (§16) that the seven-element matroid M′M'M′ corresponds to no real matrix; in a footnote he credits Saunders MacLane with finding that M′M'M′ corresponds to no matrix and identifying it with a finite projective geometry. On p. 533 he exhibits a matrix of integers mod 2 for M′M'M′.
  • 1958. Tutte characterizes binary and regular matroids by excluded minors; F7F_7F7​ appears as an excluded minor for regularity (Tutte 1958).

Setting

Let M=(aij)\mathbf M=(a_{ij})M=(aij​) be an m×nm\times nm×n matrix with columns C1,…,CnC_1,\dots,C_nC1​,…,Cn​. For a set NNN of columns, let r(N)r(N)r(N) be the rank of the submatrix formed by those columns. Regarding the columns as abstract elements gives a matroid MMM on {C1,…,Cn}\{C_1,\dots,C_n\}{C1​,…,Cn​} with rank function rrr: the matroid of M\mathbf MM. A matroid corresponds to M\mathbf MM if it is the matroid of M\mathbf MM, with elements matched to columns.

A circuit of a matroid is a minimal dependent set. For a circuit P={i1,…,ip}P=\{i_1,\dots,i_p\}P={i1​,…,ip​} of the matroid of M\mathbf MM, there are numbers b1,…,bnb_1,\dots,b_nb1​,…,bn​ with ∑jaijbj=0\sum_j a_{ij}b_j=0∑j​aij​bj​=0 for every row iii, and bj≠0b_j\neq 0bj​=0 exactly for j∈Pj\in Pj∈P; the set of such vectors is written Zi1⋯ipZ_{i_1\cdots i_p}Zi1​⋯ip​​ when only the support condition is meant. Stacking one such row per circuit gives the circuit matrix M′\mathbf M'M′ of M\mathbf MM, determined up to nonzero factors on its rows.

A fundamental set of circuits of a matroid MMM with nullity n(M)=ρ(M)−r(M)n(M)=\rho(M)-r(M)n(M)=ρ(M)−r(M) (ρ\rhoρ the number of elements) is a family of circuits P1,…,PqP_1,\dots,P_qP1​,…,Pq​ with q=n(M)q=n(M)q=n(M) such that the elements can be ordered e1,…,ene_1,\dots,e_ne1​,…,en​ with en−q+i∈Pie_{n-q+i}\in P_ien−q+i​∈Pi​ and en−q+j∉Pie_{n-q+j}\notin P_ien−q+j​∈/Pi​ for j>ij>ij>i; it is strict if en−q+j∉Pie_{n-q+j}\notin P_ien−q+j​∈/Pi​ for every j≠ij\neq ij=i.

The matroid M′M'M′ of §16 has elements 1,…,71,\dots,71,…,7; its bases (maximal independent sets) are all three-element sets except

124,135,167,236,257,347,456.(16.1)124,\quad 135,\quad 167,\quad 236,\quad 257,\quad 347,\quad 456. \qquad (16.1)124,135,167,236,257,347,456.(16.1)

Formalization targets

Goal: §16, pp. 529–530

∃ M′and∀m ∀ M∈Rm×7: M′ is not the matroid of M.\exists\,M' \quad\text{and}\quad \forall m\ \forall\,\mathbf M\in\mathbb R^{m\times 7}:\ M' \text{ is not the matroid of } \mathbf M .∃M′and∀m ∀M∈Rm×7: M′ is not the matroid of M.

The number of rows is arbitrary; the existence clause makes the non-existence statement non-vacuous.

Milestones

  1. §12. Every real matrix has a matroid: the ranks of column submatrices satisfy the rank postulates.
  2. §14, (14.1). Every real matrix has a circuit matrix.
  3. Theorem 29. The rows of a fundamental set of circuits form a base for the rows of the circuit matrix, so r(M′)=q=n(M)r(\mathbf M')=q=n(\mathbf M)r(M′)=q=n(M).
  4. Lemma 10. The support of a vector in the row space HHH of a circuit matrix is a union of circuits.
  5. Lemma 11. Two vectors of HHH with the same circuit as support are proportional.
  6. Theorem 32. For a circuit matrix normalised along a strict fundamental set, a minor DDD vanishes iff an associated q×qq\times qq×q minor D′D'D′ vanishes, iff some circuit avoids a prescribed set of columns.
  7. §16, rank of M′M'M′. The rank of a kkk-set is kkk for k≤2k\le 2k≤2, 333 for k≥4k\ge 4k≥4, and for k=3k=3k=3 it is 222 on (16.1) and 333 otherwise.
  8. p. 533. M′M'M′ is the matroid of an explicit 3×73\times 73×7 matrix of integers mod 2.

Significance

The result. The theorem separates the abstract notion of matroid from linear dependence over R\mathbb RR: some matroids are not real-representable. It also exhibits that representability depends on the field, because the same matroid is the matroid of a matrix over the integers mod 2 (milestone 8). Everything later written about representability over particular fields, excluded-minor characterizations, and the gap between abstract and linear matroids starts from this distinction. Theorem 32 is of independent interest: it translates statements about circuits of a represented matroid into the vanishing of minors of a normalised circuit matrix.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and its proof is short on paper, but it is not formalized in Mathlib, which has matroids (Matroid, circuits, ranks) but no column matroid of a matrix with a rank-of-submatrix characterization, no circuit matrix, and no Fano matroid. The mission produces those objects and the bridge lemmas (Theorem 29, Lemmas 10–11, Theorem 32) that connect matroid circuits with linear algebra of the circuit matrix. No machine-checked proof of the non-representability of the Fano matroid over R\mathbb RR in Lean is known to the curators.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is a direct search: suppose a real m×7m\times 7m×7 matrix has M′M'M′ as its matroid and derive a contradiction from the seven dependent triples. This does not work as stated. Each rank condition is a determinantal (nonlinear) condition on the entries, the number of rows mmm is unbounded, and a representation is determined only up to row operations and column scalings, so there is no finite case check and no single linear computation that settles the question. The contradiction has to come from an argument that is invariant under these symmetries, and the milestones (circuit vectors determined up to scaling, fundamental sets spanning, circuits detected by minors) are what such an argument needs to be stated in. The field also matters: the argument must use that 2≠02\neq 02=0 in R\mathbb RR, since over a field of characteristic 2 the statement is false (milestone 8).

Formalization scope

  • Elements and matrices. Matroids are Mathlib Matroids whose ground set is the whole (finite) type. The Fano matroid lives on Fin 7, Whitney's element kkk being k - 1; the seven triples are written out literally. Matrices are Matrix (Fin m) ι K; "the matroid of M\mathbf MM" means: ground set everything, and the rank M.eRk N of every finite set NNN of columns equals Matrix.rank of the column submatrix.
  • Field. The goal and Lemmas 10–11, Theorems 29 and 32 are stated over R\mathbb RR, as in the paper; the predicate "matroid of a matrix" is stated over any field so that the mod-2 milestone uses the same notion.
  • Circuit matrix. Rows are determined up to nonzero factors, so "circuit matrix" is a predicate on a matrix together with a bijection between its rows and the circuits; every theorem holds for every such choice.
  • Nullity and indices. q=n(M)q=n(M)q=n(M) is written q+r(M)=ρ(M)q+r(M)=\rho(M)q+r(M)=ρ(M) in extended naturals, with no truncated subtraction. In Theorem 32, n=p+qn=p+qn=p+q, the complement of i1,…,isi_1,\dots,i_si1​,…,is​ is given as an order embedding of Fin t with s+t=qs+t=qs+t=q, and determinants are of square submatrices in the paper's row and column order.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The goal includes the existence of M′M'M′; without it "every matroid with these bases has no real matrix" could hold vacuously. The goal quantifies over every number of rows; fixing m=3m=3m=3 would be a weaker statement.

Reusable beyond this mission: the matroid of a matrix over a field, the circuit matrix, fundamental sets of circuits, and the Fano matroid. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a proof of the goal by any route, including one that does not go through Theorem 32.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • W. T. Tutte, A homotopy theorem for matroids, I, II, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 88 (1958), 144–174. https://doi.org/10.2307/1993244
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
  • O. Veblen and J. W. Young, Projective Geometry, Vol. I, Ginn, 1910 (cited by Whitney for the finite projective geometry).
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CombinatoricsLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 6: Every Matroid Satisfying (C*) Is Represented by a Matrix of Integers Mod 2Research Paper

Motivation

Whitney's 1935 paper introduced matroids as an abstraction of linear dependence among the columns of a matrix. Most of the paper works over the real numbers; its appendix asks which matroids arise from matrices of integers mod 2, that is, matrices with entries 0 and 1 in which rank and dependence are computed over the two-element field. These are today's binary matroids. They include the cycle matroids of graphs (Whitney closes the paper by noting that graphs correspond to mod-2 matrices with exactly two ones in each column) and they are the setting of several later structure theorems: Tutte's excluded-minor characterization of binary matroids (Tutte 1958), Seymour's decomposition of regular matroids (Seymour 1980) and Seymour's theory of binary clutters and max-flow min-cut (Seymour 1977), which underlies parts of combinatorial optimization.

Whitney's answer is an intrinsic postulate, (C*), on the circuits of the matroid, stated without reference to any matrix, and a constructive representation theorem (Theorem 37): a matroid satisfying (C*) is the matroid of a mod-2 matrix, and the matrix is unique once the columns of one base are fixed.

Setting

A matroid MMM on elements e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ is given by its independent sets; its circuits are its minimal dependent sets, its rank r(M)r(M)r(M) is the size of a base, and its nullity is n(M)=n−r(M)n(M) = n - r(M)n(M)=n−r(M). Here MMM is a Mathlib Matroid (Fin n) whose ground set is all of Fin n.

Subsets of the elements are added mod 2: a sum of finitely many sets is the set of elements lying in an odd number of them (for two sets, the symmetric difference). A cycle is a sum mod 2 of circuits; the empty sum is the null cycle ∅\emptyset∅. A set is a true sum of sets that have no common elements and whose union it is. Postulate (C*) requires that each cycle be a true sum of circuits.

With n=r+qn = r + qn=r+q, a family P1,…,PqP_1, \dots, P_qP1​,…,Pq​ is a strict fundamental set of circuits with respect to en−q+1,…,ene_{n-q+1}, \dots, e_nen−q+1​,…,en​ if q=n(M)q = n(M)q=n(M), each PiP_iPi​ is a circuit, and PiP_iPi​ contains en−q+ie_{n-q+i}en−q+i​ but no other en−q+je_{n-q+j}en−q+j​.

For a matrix M\mathbf MM over the integers mod 2 with columns C1,…,CnC_1, \dots, C_nC1​,…,Cn​, columns are independent (mod 2) if no non-null subset of them sums to the zero column. The matroid corresponding to M\mathbf MM has the column indices as elements and these independent sets.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 37 (p. 533)

Let MMM satisfy (C*), with elements e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ and base {e1,…,en−q}\{e_1, \dots, e_{n-q}\}{e1​,…,en−q​}. For every matrix M1\mathbf M_1M1​ mod 2 (any number of rows) whose n−qn - qn−q columns are independent mod 2,

∃! M=(M1∣Cn−q+1⋯Cn)  whose corresponding matroid is M.\exists!\ \mathbf M = (\mathbf M_1 \mid C_{n-q+1} \cdots C_n) \ \text{ whose corresponding matroid is } M.∃! M=(M1​∣Cn−q+1​⋯Cn​)  whose corresponding matroid is M.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 9 (p. 517): if e1,…,en−qe_1, \dots, e_{n-q}e1​,…,en−q​ is a base, there is a unique strict fundamental set of circuits with respect to en−q+1,…,ene_{n-q+1}, \dots, e_nen−q+1​,…,en​.
  2. Appendix, p. 531: (C*) implies the circuit postulate (C₂), for any family of sets.
  3. Theorem 33: under (C*), the circuits are exactly the minimal non-null cycles.
  4. Theorem 34: under (C*), the cycles are exactly the 2q2^q2q sums mod 2 of a strict fundamental set.
  5. Theorem 35: two (C*)-matroids with a common strict fundamental set have the same circuits.
  6. Theorem 36: any P1,…,PqP_1, \dots, P_qP1​,…,Pq​ with en−q+i∈Pi⊆{e1,…,en−q,en−q+i}e_{n-q+i} \in P_i \subseteq \{e_1, \dots, e_{n-q}, e_{n-q+i}\}en−q+i​∈Pi​⊆{e1​,…,en−q​,en−q+i​} is the strict fundamental set of exactly one (C*)-matroid.
  7. Appendix, p. 532: the matroid of a matrix mod 2 exists, satisfies (C*), and its cycles are the supports of the mod-2 dependencies among the columns.

Milestone 7 and the goal together characterize binary matroids as the matroids satisfying (C*).

Significance

The result. Theorem 37 and the p. 532 claim give an intrinsic, matrix-free description of the matroids representable over the two-element field, and Theorem 36 parametrizes all of them by qqq arbitrary subsets of a base. Uniqueness in Theorem 37 says that a binary representation is determined by the columns of one base; in modern terms, binary matroids are uniquely representable over GF(2) up to row operations. Every later theory of binary matroids, including graphic and cographic matroids, Tutte's excluded-minor theorem and Seymour's decomposition, starts from this equivalence.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper and in textbooks (e.g. Oxley, Matroid Theory, Ch. 9) but, at the Mathlib revision used here, there is no notion of a matroid represented by a matrix over a field, and no binary-matroid theory. On Prove2Me, the existing binary objects (SeymourMFMC.Binary.*) are binary clutters defined through blockers, not matroids represented by mod-2 matrices. This mission produces the representation predicate for mod-2 matrices, the cycle space of a matroid, and the equivalence between (C*) and binary representability.

Difficulty

Writing down candidate columns is not the hard part; showing that the matroid of the completed matrix is MMM itself, and not merely a matroid sharing some of its circuits, is. Whitney's example at the end of §9 exhibits two different matroids with a common strict fundamental set, so agreement on fundamental circuits does not by itself identify a matroid; any argument must use (C*) on both the given matroid and the matroid of the matrix. A naive comparison of independent sets column by column does not close this gap. Uniqueness likewise depends on the independence mod 2 of the prescribed columns: without it, different completions can give the same matroid.

Formalization scope

  • Matroids are Mathlib Matroid (Fin (r + q)) with ground set Set.univ; Whitney's eke_kek​ is k - 1, his e1,…,en−qe_1, \dots, e_{n-q}e1​,…,en−q​ is the range of Fin.castAdd q, and en−q+ie_{n-q+i}en−q+i​ is Fin.natAdd r (i - 1). Writing n=r+qn = r + qn=r+q removes natural-number subtraction; qqq is not a free parameter, since {e1,…,er}\{e_1, \dots, e_r\}{e1​,…,er​} is required to be a base.
  • Sums mod 2 count parity of membership (sumMod2); cycles are sums over finite sets of circuits; true sums are unions over finite pairwise-disjoint sets of circuits; (C*) is SatisfiesCStar on the circuit family {C | M.IsCircuit C}. These definitions take the circuit family as a parameter, so that the (C₂) milestone is posed for an arbitrary family of sets, as Whitney poses it.
  • A strict fundamental set includes the nullity condition r(M)+q=ρ(M)r(M) + q = \rho(M)r(M)+q=ρ(M), stated in N∞\mathbb N_\inftyN∞​.
  • Matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) (ZMod 2) with any mmm; independence mod 2 of columns is LinearIndepOn (ZMod 2) of the columns (the rows of the transpose). IsMatroidOf M A compares all independent sets, not only bases.
  • Ruled out: the goal is not satisfied by any statement that compares only the bases of one size, by an existence-only statement without uniqueness, or by real (instead of mod-2) independence.
  • Tacit hypotheses made explicit: the matroid's ground set is exactly e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ (ρ(M)=n\rho(M) = nρ(M)=n); the elements and matroids are finite.

Contributions welcome: the general fact that the matroid of a vector family over a field exists (a reusable Matroid.ofFun-style construction over any field), the cycle-space lemmas, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • W. T. Tutte, A homotopy theorem for matroids, I, II, Transactions of the AMS 88 (1958), 144–174. https://doi.org/10.2307/1993244
  • P. D. Seymour, The matroids with the max-flow min-cut property, Journal of Combinatorial Theory Ser. B 23 (1977), 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(77)90031-4
  • P. D. Seymour, Decomposition of regular matroids, Journal of Combinatorial Theory Ser. B 28 (1980), 305–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(80)90075-1
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
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