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Control Theory

214 missions · 87 completed

Missions

Open127Completed87All214
Dynamical SystemsMathematical LogicTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Global asymptotic stability of homogeneous polynomial vector fields is undecidableResearch Paper

A differential equation can have a simple finite description while its solutions have complicated long-term behavior. In control theory, one basic question is whether every state eventually approaches an equilibrium and whether starting close to it guarantees remaining close. An algorithm answering that question for every polynomial vector field would…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamical Systems·Captain: iris

On Convergence of the Nonlinear Active Disturbance Rejection Control for MIMO Systems: global convergence of nonlinear ADRC, eventual O(ε) tracking and extended-state-observer errorsResearch Paper

Active disturbance rejection control (ADRC) is a feedback design in which an observer estimates, in real time, not only the state of an uncertain plant but also its total disturbance: the combined effect of unmodelled dynamics, external disturbances and the mismatch between the true and the nominal control gains. The controller cancels this estimate and…

34 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: iris

Dynamic Programming Principles for Mean-Field Controls with Learning: the IQ function satisfies the Bellman equation on the lifted space of state distributions and local policiesResearch Paper

Mean-field control (MFC) models a large population of identical, cooperating agents through a single representative agent whose transitions and rewards depend on the distribution of the whole population. It is the limit of cooperative NNN-agent problems as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, and it is used for systems such as ride-sharing fleets, resource allocation and equilibrium…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Probability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Entropy Regularization for Mean Field Games with Learning: Explicit Nash equilibrium with enhanced entropyResearch Paper

A large population of interacting agents can make individual decisions depend on the distribution of everyone else's states and actions. A mean field game describes this interaction through a representative agent and population distributions. Randomizing actions allows an agent to explore while still responding to the population. Entropy regularization…

6 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Probabilistic Approach to Extended Finite State Mean Field Games: With Lipschitz Rates and Costs and a Unique Hamiltonian Minimizer, a Nash Equilibrium in Closed-Loop Strategies ExistsResearch Paper

Mean field games describe the limit of stochastic differential games with a large number of statistically identical players, each interacting with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states (Lasry and Lions, Mean field games, 2007; Huang, Malhamé and Caines, 2006). Models whose players move among finitely many states (an infection…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Terminal Ranking Games: The Rank-Based Mean Field Tournament Has an Equilibrium, Characterized by an Explicit Quantile Formula, a Fixed-Point Equation for the Mean and an Explicit Game ValueResearch Paper

Tournaments and contests reward agents by their relative standing: sales bonuses for the top performers, promotions, prizes for the first to finish, research competitions. Since Lazear and Rosen (Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, 1981) such rank-order incentives have been a standard object in economics and operations research, and the…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Set Values for Nonzero-Sum Games with Multiple Equilibriums: The Set Value of a Continuous-Time Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Game Satisfies the Dynamic Programming PrincipleResearch Paper

A nonzero-sum game can have several Nash equilibria with different cost vectors. Selecting one equilibrium before asking how the game behaves over time loses information and may make a proposed dynamic rule depend on that selection. Feinstein, Rudloff and Zhang study the entire set of equilibrium cost vectors and ask whether it can be evaluated consistently…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

McKean–Vlasov Optimal Control: Limit Theory and Equivalence Between Different Formulations: The N-Player Common-Noise Control Value Converges to the McKean–Vlasov ValueResearch Paper

A controller of a large population may choose a separate action for each participant while all participants experience the same random environment. The resulting optimization problem has a growing state space: with NNN participants, the state records NNN paths and NNN controls. A McKean–Vlasov control problem replaces the empirical distribution of those…

10 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost I: Condition 1, High Switching Cost, Not-Hiring Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships let a firm pause an agent instead of firing them: a sales representative who brings in no customers for a while is suspended, a contractor is laid off for a season and recalled. Pausing is not free. Every restart carries a switching cost KKK (re-training, re-establishing a territory, setting up the work environment), so a principal…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Principal Agent Problem with One-sided Commitment: The Principal's Value Function Is the Minimal Continuous Viscosity Solution of the Type-Indexed HJB SystemResearch Paper

In a principal–agent problem with moral hazard, a principal (an employer) pays an agent whose effort she cannot observe; she sees only an output process whose drift the effort controls. Continuous-time versions of the problem, starting with Holmström–Milgrom (1987) and Sannikov (2008), are solved by turning the agent's continuation utility into a state…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Comparison Between Mean-Variance and Monotone Mean-Variance Preferences Under Jump Diffusion and Stochastic Factor Model: Optimal MMV and MV Utilities Coincide If and Only If Assumption 1 HoldsResearch Paper

Mean-variance (MV) preferences, Uθ(X)=E[X]−θ2Var(X)U_\theta(X)=\mathbb E[X]-\frac\theta2\mathrm{Var}(X)Uθ​(X)=E[X]−2θ​Var(X), are the standard objective of portfolio selection since Markowitz. They are not monotone: an investor can prefer a terminal wealth XXX to a wealth X′≥XX'\ge XX′≥X that is larger in every state, because the extra upside raises the variance. Monotone mean-variance (MMV) preferences (Ma…

15 thms1 active userReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Control Problems with State Reflections Arising from Relaxed Benchmark Tracking: Verification Theorem for the Optimal Feedback Investment-Consumption StrategyResearch Paper

A fund manager who tracks a benchmark (a stock index, a price index, the cost of higher education) wants the managed wealth to stay above the benchmark at all times. Under a strict floor constraint Vt≥MtV_t\ge M_tVt​≥Mt​ the set of admissible strategies can be empty when the benchmark is random. Bo, Huang and Yu (arXiv:2302.08302, Math. Oper. Res.) relax the…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Viscosity Solutions to Parabolic Master Equations and McKean–Vlasov SDEs with Closed-Loop Controls 3: The Closed-Loop McKean–Vlasov Value Function Is a Viscosity Solution of the HJB Master EquationResearch Paper

Mean field control asks a central planner to steer a large population of interacting agents. Each agent's state follows a stochastic differential equation whose coefficients depend on the agent's own state and on the empirical distribution of the population; as the population grows, the system is described by a single McKean–Vlasov equation whose…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Viscosity Solutions to Parabolic Master Equations and McKean–Vlasov SDEs with Closed-Loop Controls 2: Comparison Principle and Uniqueness for Viscosity Solutions of Parabolic Master EquationsResearch Paper

Master equations are partial differential equations whose state variable is a probability measure. They arise as the dynamic programming equations of mean-field control problems, as the limits of large particle systems, and as the pricing equations of options on a whole population. Their coefficients and solutions are functions on a Wasserstein space, which…

15 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Solvabilities for Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems 1: The Cost Is Uniformly Convex iff the Riccati Equation Has a Strongly Regular SolutionResearch Paper

The stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem asks to steer a linear stochastic differential equation by a control so as to minimize a quadratic cost. It is the basic model of stochastic control: Wonham studied it in 1968 (Wonham 1968), and it is the model on which feedback design, mean-field control and LQ differential games are built (Yong–Z…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamical SystemsPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Local Exponential H² Stabilization of a 2 × 2 Quasilinear Hyperbolic System Using Backstepping 3: The Feedback with Dynamic Extension Locally Exponentially Stabilizes the Quasilinear System in H²Research Paper

First-order hyperbolic systems of balance laws zt+Λ(z,x)zx+f(z,x)=0z_t+\Lambda(z,x)z_x+f(z,x)=0zt​+Λ(z,x)zx​+f(z,x)=0 model open-channel flow (the Saint-Venant equations), gas pipelines, traffic and heat exchangers. In most of these applications the state can be acted on only at one end of the domain, so stabilizing an equilibrium is a boundary control problem. For 2×22\times22×2 systems without source…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

McKean–Vlasov Optimal Control: The Dynamic Programming Principle 1: The Weak Formulation's Value Function Is Upper Semi-Analytic and Satisfies the DPPResearch Paper

A McKean–Vlasov control problem asks a planner to steer a stochastic differential equation whose coefficients depend not only on the current path of the state but also on its (conditional) distribution. Such problems describe the cooperative optimum of a large population of interacting agents: when each agent reacts to the empirical distribution of all…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

McKean–Vlasov Optimal Control: The Dynamic Programming Principle 2: Under Lipschitz Coefficients the Common-Noise-Adapted Strong Formulation Satisfies the DPPResearch Paper

A controller may act on a large population of interacting particles while all particles also experience a shared random disturbance. In the population limit, the state of a representative particle depends on the distribution of states conditional on the common noise. The controller therefore influences both its own state and the conditional population law.…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamical SystemsPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Local Exponential H² Stabilization of a 2 × 2 Quasilinear Hyperbolic System Using Backstepping 2: Backstepping Feedback Makes a 2 × 2 Linear Hyperbolic System Vanish in Finite TimeResearch Paper

Systems of two first-order hyperbolic equations with opposite transport speeds model open-channel flow (the Saint-Venant equations), gas pipelines, heat exchangers and traffic. In such systems one boundary is actuated, the other boundary reflects, and the coupling terms move energy between the two families of waves. Boundary feedback design for them is a…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
Partial Differential EquationsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reflected Solutions of Backward SDE's, and Related Obstacle Problems for PDE's 3: Uniqueness for the Parabolic Obstacle ProblemResearch Paper

Reflected backward stochastic differential equations describe processes that must remain above a prescribed obstacle. El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez connect that probabilistic construction to a parabolic partial differential equation with an obstacle in their 1997 paper. A representation by a stochastic process is useful only if the…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 4: In the Mean-Sign Game the Sign Feedback Is an ε_n-Nash Equilibrium and the Mean Converges in Law to ½δ_{H⁺}+½δ_{H⁻}Research Paper

Mean field games describe the limit of symmetric stochastic differential games with nnn players as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. A basic question of the theory is which mean field equilibria are limits of Nash equilibria of the nnn-player games. For closed-loop equilibria, in which each player's control may depend on the states of all players, this question was open in general…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 2: Every Strong MFE Is the Limit in Law of Markovian ε_n-Nash Equilibria of the n-Player GamesResearch Paper

Mean field games (Lasry–Lions 2006, Huang–Malhamé–Caines 2006) describe Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with very many symmetric players. In this description each player interacts with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. The mean field game is meant to be the limit of the nnn-player games as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. Making…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 1: Empirical Measure Flows of Closed-Loop ε_n-Nash Equilibria Are Tight and Every Limit in Law Is a Weak MFEResearch Paper

Mean field games (MFG) were introduced by Lasry and Lions (2007) and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006) as limits of stochastic differential games with many symmetric players. The model is only meaningful if equilibria of the nnn-player games actually converge to equilibria of the limit game. That convergence depends on what information the players use. For o…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria to the Mean Field Game Limit 3: Under Convexity Every Markovian ε-Nash Equilibrium Is a Closed-Loop ε-Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an nnn-player stochastic differential game each player controls the drift of its own diffusion and is rewarded through a running and a terminal payoff that depend on its own state and on the empirical distribution of all states. A player's strategy can be closed-loop (path-dependent), reacting to the whole observed history of all states, or Markovian (in…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Mean Field Game of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation 2: The Value Functions of the Penalized Mean Field Games Converge in L¹ to the Value Function of the Liquidation-Constrained GameResearch Paper

Optimal portfolio liquidation asks how a trader should unwind a position of X\mathcal XX shares over a horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T] when trading moves prices. Since Almgren and Chriss (2001) the standard model charges a quadratic cost ηtξt2\eta_t\xi_t^2ηt​ξt2​ for trading at rate ξt\xi_tξt​ (temporary impact) and a risk penalty λtXt2\lambda_tX_t^2λt​Xt2​ on the open position, and imposes the liquidation…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
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