A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.
Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.
Off-Platform Threats in On-Demand Services: At the Optimal Payout Ratios, a Provider Type Leaks Off the Platform if and only if the Counterparty Risk Lies in the Leakage Interval (a^j, b^j)Research Paper
On-demand service platforms (home cleaning, tutoring, handyman and care services) match customers with independent providers and keep a commission on every transaction. Once a customer and a provider have met through the platform, both can save the commission by transacting directly the next time. This platform leakage (also called disintermediation) is a…
“Zero Cost” Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains: Under Congestion, a Miner With Less Than Half the Hash Power Gains From a Majority Attack Even With Nothing to Double-SpendResearch Paper
A majority attack lets a miner create blocks on a private branch of a permissionless blockchain and later publish that branch as the accepted transaction history. The familiar motive is a private benefit from changing the record, such as a double-spend. Gans and Halaburda show that this motive need not be present: when transactions compete for limited block…
Experimental Choice and Disruptive Technologies: The Optimal Experiment Is Biased Toward the Firm's Own Predisposition — w-Biased If the Prior Exceeds p̂, n-Biased If It Falls BelowResearch Paper
Firms facing a new technology rarely decide in the dark: they run pilots, prototypes and market tests before committing. The management literature on disruptive technologies (Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 1997) argues that incumbents fail because they evaluate new opportunities with tests tuned to their existing business, and that entrants succeed…
Infinite Horizon Stochastic Impulse Control with Delay and Random Coefficients: The Strategy Built from Iterated Snell Envelopes Is Optimal over All Admissible Delayed Impulse StrategiesResearch Paper
Impulse control models a decision maker who acts on a system by discrete interventions rather than continuously: a central bank adjusting a rate, a firm switching production capacity, a portfolio manager rebalancing with fixed transaction costs. Each intervention has a fixed cost, so the controller chooses both when to act and how much. In many applications…
Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games: Under the Conservation Law, Element Marginals and Maximal-Chain Hitting Bounds Are Jointly AchievableResearch Paper
Network interdiction asks how an inspector should randomize over sets of links when a router can choose a path through a network. Link inspection probabilities and path interception probabilities describe different features of the same random choice. Specifying both sets of numbers separately does not guarantee that one distribution over inspection sets…
Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions: Under a Binding Wage Floor the Optimal Leadership Style Is Pure Monetary Incentives, Friendly, Unfriendly, or Carrot-and-Stick by Explicit ThresholdsResearch Paper
A firm may motivate a worker with pay, with a supervisor's praise, or with the threat of a supervisor's disapproval. A wage floor changes the mix: when base pay cannot fall, a worker can receive a rent above the value of an outside job. That rent affects whether the firm finds praise or scolding cheaper than a bonus. Dur, Kvaløy, and Schöttner study this…
Suboptimal Local Minima Exist for Wide Neural Networks with Smooth Activations: For Generic Inputs and Any Depth and Width, Some Output Data Gives the Squared Loss a Sub-Optimal Local MinimumResearch Paper
Training a neural network means minimizing a non-convex loss over its weights. Local search methods can only certify local optimality, so a recurring question in the theory of neural network optimization is whether every local minimum of the training loss is a global minimum. A local minimum that is not global is called a sub-optimal (or bad) local minimum.
Information Spillovers in Experience Goods Competition: In Every Symmetric Equilibrium Each Firm Earns Exactly the Discounted Second-Period Profit from Switching ConsumersResearch Paper
An experience good is a product whose value a consumer learns only by consuming it: a new streaming service, a meal-kit brand, a novel drug. When two firms launch competing experience goods in a new product category, every first-period sale does two things. It earns a first-period margin, and it creates a repeat consumer whom the firm can price to in the…
Directional Necessary Optimality Conditions for Bilevel Programs: A Local Minimizer Satisfies the Directional KKT Condition Under Directional Calmness of the Value-Function ReformulationResearch Paper
A bilevel program is an optimization problem in which one of the constraints is itself an optimization problem. An upper-level decision maker (a leader) chooses x; a lower-level decision maker (a follower) responds with an optimal solution y of a problem parameterized by x; the leader's cost F(x,y) depends on both. Stackelberg games, toll setting on…
Only the Ugly Face? A Theoretical Model of Brand Dilution: At the Intensive Margin, Switching from In-House Development to Licensing Raises Extension Quality and Lowers the Risk of Brand DilutionResearch Paper
A firm that owns a strong brand can use the brand name on a new product outside its core business. This brand extension can be produced in-house or licensed to a specialized firm against a royalty. Brand licensing is a large business: its revenues reached US$315.5 billion in 2022 (Licensing International, cited in the paper's endnote 2). The marketing…
Order Protection through Delayed Messaging: Unique Market Equilibrium with Closed-Form Shares of Pegged Orders, Market Makers and Snipers when Midpoint Pegs Are ProtectedResearch Paper
Continuous limit-order markets reward speed. When the fundamental value of an asset moves, a trader with a faster connection can trade against stale quotes before the quoting liquidity provider can cancel them. This practice, sniping, is a direct transfer from liquidity providers to fast traders, and it has been documented and analysed as a cost of the…
Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards: Loan Insurance Raises the Price of Uninsured Loans and Lowers Screening in the Liquid EquilibriumResearch Paper
Mortgage lenders in the United States and Canada can insure a loan against default when it is originated. In the US the guarantee is typically provided by government-sponsored enterprises, in Canada by government-backed mortgage insurers. Such guarantees are usually discussed as risk-sharing devices, or criticized because they weaken lenders' incentives to…
Delegation of Stocking Decisions Under Asymmetric Demand Information: With Two Demand States, Early Stock-Out Inspection Makes the Store Manager Order the Principal's Optimal QuantityResearch Paper
Retail chains routinely delegate replenishment decisions to store managers. The manager sees signals the head office does not: local events, weather, the mood of the neighbourhood. The head office (the principal) knows only the probabilities of these demand states. It also cannot observe lost sales directly, because unmet demand leaves no record, so it…
A Theory of Collateral Requirements for Central Counterparties: Members Hedge Exactly Above a Strictly Decreasing, Convex Default-Fund Threshold in Initial MarginResearch Paper
After the financial crisis of 2007–2009, standardized over-the-counter derivatives were moved to mandatory central clearing: a central counterparty (CCP) becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer, so that the original counterparties are insulated from each other's default. The CCP in turn protects itself by a default waterfall and…
How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level: Squeezing the Complementor Makes Launching an Integrated System Profitable Even When the System Itself Loses MoneyResearch Paper
Customers often need several complementary products, such as hardware and software, cars and financing, or jet engines and maintenance, sold by specialist firms that are complementors to one another. A recurring strategic move is for one complementor to launch an integrated system: a single offering that competes with the multi-component system its…
Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning: For Small Repositioning Costs, the Thresholds Rise Infinitely Fast, Increase with σ², Decrease with δ, and Become Independent of rResearch Paper
Firms reposition their products as consumer tastes drift: car makers redesign models, retailers change assortments, media outlets shift their editorial line. Each move costs money, and competitors respond to it. Ning and Villas-Boas (2020) study when two competing firms should incur a fixed cost to move toward consumers whose preferred position follows a…
Ranking Distributions When Only Means and Variances Are Known: Y Dominates X by First-Order Almost Stochastic Dominance for γ ≥ 1/(1 + 2t(t + √(t² + 1))), t = (μ_Y − μ_X)/(σ_Y + σ_X)Research Paper
Decision analysts routinely have to rank two risky prospects, with returns X and Y, when nothing is known about them beyond a mean and a standard deviation for each. The classical tools are of two kinds. First-order stochastic dominance (FSD) ranks Y above X for every increasing utility, but it can never be certified from means and variances alone: with…
Consumer Equilibrium, Demand Effects, and Efficiency in Group Buying: Existence and Uniqueness of the Dynamic Threshold Sign-Up Equilibrium of a Two-Threshold Group Buying EventResearch Paper
In a group-buying event a retailer offers a product at a discount that materializes only if enough customers sign up before a deadline. Platforms such as Taobao and JD run such events with several deal levels: the more customers join, the lower the final price. Each arriving customer must decide whether to join without knowing how many others will follow,…
Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations: Homogeneous Organization Optimal for Weak Signals, Heterogeneous Optimal Above a Threshold in k for Strong SignalsResearch Paper
In most organizations the person who decides is not the person who carries the decision out. A board ratifies a product and engineers build it; a studio approves a film and a director makes it. The implementer usually also knows more, or can learn more, about which course of action will work. A long literature in organizational economics asks whether such…
Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging: The Principal's Value Solves a Concave Free-Boundary HJB Problem and the Contract Reflected at the Payment Boundary Is OptimalResearch Paper
A manager can influence a project's output through effort, but the owner observes output rather than effort. When the manager can also trade privately in a financial market, a contract based on output and market returns changes both effort incentives and the manager's ability to hedge risk. The owner must decide what the contract pays, how sensitive it is…
Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets: Horizontal Negotiation Unifies a Split Market at the Exact Global Standard and Lowers Total EmissionsResearch Paper
Energy-efficiency and emission standards for products such as vehicles and appliances are set by regulators whose jurisdictions overlap a single manufacturer's markets. The best-known case is United States fuel-economy regulation. California has long been allowed to set stricter vehicle standards than the federal government, and the 2019 dispute between…
Endogenous Credit, Business Cycle, and Portfolio Selection: Under Limited Commitment the Credit Limit Is a Closed-Form Multiple m* of Income, and Below It the Household Defaults at OnceResearch Paper
A household can borrow against expected future income only while repayment remains preferable to default. In the baseline model of Choi, Koo, Lim and Yoo, this choice is imposed through a participation condition at every date: the household's remaining utility from its planned consumption must be at least its remaining utility after default. The constraint…
Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships: Effort and Bonus Weakly Decrease and the Upfront Wage Weakly Increases over the Course of EmploymentResearch Paper
Most employment relationships rely on incentives that no court enforces. A relational contract is a self-enforcing promise: the employer pays a discretionary bonus after observing effort, and keeps the promise because reneging would destroy the value of the future relationship (Bull 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Levin 2003). This mechanism has a…
Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-trade Fees on Trading and Welfare: Neither Uniform nor Trade-Specific Post-Trade Fees Maximize Welfare at Every Post-Trade CostResearch Paper
Securities traders commonly pay for clearing and settlement after a trade is executed. A fee that is the same for every transaction is simple to administer, but processing a transaction between customers of the same broker can cost less than processing one between brokers. Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts ask whether charging everyone the same fee, or…
Fast Hybrid Schemes for Fractional Riccati Equations (Rough Is Not So Tough): Explicit Lower and Upper Bounds on the Convergence Radius of the Fractional Power-Series SolutionResearch Paper
In the rough Heston model of El Euch and Rosenbaum, the variance of an asset is driven by a fractional kernel with Hurst exponent H<21, which matches the roughness observed in realized volatility. The model keeps one feature of the classical Heston model: the characteristic function of the log-price is explicit up to the solution of a deterministic…