A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.
Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.
Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition II: Unconstrained R&D Race: Best Responses Rise on Accelerable Projects and a Symmetric Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper
Two firms developing competing innovations face a decision that a single firm does not: a rival's discovery can end the value of continuing the project. If the first discovery wins the payoff, each firm chooses how much to spend per period while knowing that greater spending may change both its payoff on success and its speed of discovery. The investment…
Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper
Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which…
Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 3: Under Topics-Style Category Tracking Both Advertisers Bid on ADX1 Exactly When the Inaccuracy τ Is Below an Explicit Threshold τ̃ > 1Research Paper
Online display advertising is sold through ad exchanges, and much of its value comes from targeting: showing an ad to consumers known to be interested in the advertised product. For two decades the main tracking technology was the third-party cookie, under which an exchange can follow a consumer only after an advertiser agrees to share the data from its own…
Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 3: The Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of the Liability GameResearch Paper
When one breached contract forces the next party to breach its own contract, a single failure travels down a loss chain: agent 1 (the initiator) causes a loss ℓ1 to agent 2, which can then no longer honour its agreement with agent 3 and causes it a loss ℓ2, and so on until agent n causes a loss ℓn to a final victim. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (…
Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 3: In Simultaneous Offering With Values at Least τ, a Truncated-LP Value-Ordered Policy Earns ≥ α^τ_k Times the LP BoundResearch Paper
A firm that fills a fixed number of positions from a pool of applicants faces uncertainty at every stage: applicants differ in value, and an offer may be declined. When offers must go out at once, as in a recruiting season with a common deadline, the firm decides a single offer set and lives with however many candidates accept. Sending too few offers leaves…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper
Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from…
Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality III: The Explicit Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio Is at Least α* Times pResearch Paper
Optimal stopping with partial information sits between two classical problems. In the secretary problem a decision maker sees values in random order, knows nothing about how they are generated, and must stop on the best one; the optimal guarantee is 1/e. In the i.i.d. prophet inequality the values are independent draws from a known distribution, and the…
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper
In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…
Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? II: With a Single Voter, Voting for the k Candidates Most Likely to Be Honest Is OptimalResearch Paper
Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every token holder take part in consensus. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol. EOS, for instance, elects 21 producers by an up-to-30-vote approval ballot (paper, p. 9, citing EOS voting guide 2018). Byzantine agreement protocols…
Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper
Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…
Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 1: On Proportionally Sparse Subcritical Compatibility Graphs, JSQ(d) Has the Fully Flexible Mean-Field Limit and Steady StateResearch Paper
In large server farms and cloud platforms, not every server can process every task. Data locality, licences, hardware and security rules restrict each task type to a subset of servers. Such compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite compatibility graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. Classical mean-field results for load balancing,…
Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 1: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration Under Triangular Valuations When Independent or Herding Backers DominateResearch Paper
Reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter let a project creator collect pledges from the public for a fixed period. Two numbers are fixed before launch and cannot be changed afterwards: the pledge levelp each backer pays, and the campaign durationT. A high pledge level earns more per backer but deters backers with low valuations; a long…
Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 1: For Odd Composite M, Every Optimal Plan of an Explicit Two-Item Aperiodic JRP Instance Has q₂ = M and 1 < gcd(q₁, M) < MResearch Paper
The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is one of the basic models of multi-item inventory control. Each item follows the economic order quantity (EOQ) model of Harris (1913): ordering costs a fixed amount, holding stock costs a rate proportional to the stock, and the classical trade-off between the two determines how often to reorder. In a JRP, items…
Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition I: Comparative Statics of an Unconstrained Monopoly's Optimal R&D IntensityResearch Paper
Firms deciding how much to spend on research and development face two different kinds of return to spending. More money can make the eventual innovation more valuable, or it can make the innovation arrive sooner. Lin (Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4503) calls these two properties scalability and accelerability, and shows that they predict…
Quantifying the Impact of Impact Investing I: Mean and Variance of an Impact-Ranked Portfolio's Excess Return under IID Bivariate-Normal Impact Factors and AlphasResearch Paper
Impact investing selects securities by a non-financial characteristic: an ESG rating, a carbon-intensity metric, a "sin stock" flag. A recurring question in finance is whether such a selection costs or earns the investor anything, and by how much. Lo and Zhang (SSRN 3944367; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01168) give a closed-form answer in a…
Lightning Network Economics: Channels I: The Expected Discounted Cost of a Bidirectional Payment Channel in Closed FormResearch Paper
Blockchains such as Bitcoin settle every transaction on a public ledger. Each on-chain transaction pays a fee and waits for confirmation, so frequent small payments are expensive. The Lightning Network moves such payments off-chain: two parties lock funds in a shared payment channel and pay each other by updating the channel's balance, touching the…
Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 1: A Non-Adaptive, Committed LP-Rounding Policy for ProbeTop-k Earns at Least (1 − e^{−k}k^k/k!) Times the LP BoundResearch Paper
Hiring is a pipeline: a firm with k openings and a large pool of applicants cannot interview everyone, so it must decide whom to interview, in what order, and whether to hire on the spot. The ProbeTop-k problem models this. Each applicant has a random value with a known distribution, an interview reveals the value, at most T interviews may be conducted, and…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper
Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper
In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…
Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper
Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…
Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret II: In (SPP)-Acyclic Networks the Static Planning Solution Is Given by Surplus Vectors in {−1, 0, 1}ⁿResearch Paper
Centralized markets such as kidney exchanges, ride-sharing platforms and online labor markets match agents who arrive over time. Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) study such a market with n agent types and d feasible multi-way matches. Their main result is that, when a fluid linear program…
Offline Multi-Action Policy Learning: Generalization and Optimization 2: Depth-L Decision Trees Satisfy log N_H(ε,Π_L) ≤ (2^L−1)log p + 2^L log d + (2^L−1)log(L/ε+1)Research Paper
Offline policy learning chooses a treatment rule from logged data: given n observations of features Xi, the action Ai taken and the reward obtained, pick a policy π:X→{1,…,d} from a class Π whose expected reward is close to the best in the class. Zhou, Athey and Wager (arXiv:1810.04778v2) bound the regret of their cross-fitted…