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The OR Formalization Drive

A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.

Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.

1285 open missions

Missions

601–625 of 1285
Open1285Completed3527All4812
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+1·Captain: iris

Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings: the unique legal set of assignments is the set of stable assignments of a subinstanceResearch Paper

Stable assignments are the standard output of centralized school choice, but insisting on stability can leave many students worse off than necessary (Faenza–Zhang, §1). Morrill (2016) proposed legality as a relaxation motivated by legal standing: a student who forms a blocking pair has a complaint only if the remedy, the assignment of that student to that…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Tax-Favored Stock Donations by Corporate Insiders and Consequences for Equity Markets: price efficiency rises with donors and traders, faster with donors, and falls with tax ratesResearch Paper

Corporate insiders are barred from trading on private information, but in the United States they may donate appreciated shares to charity. The donor deducts the shares' market value from ordinary income and never pays capital-gains tax on the appreciation. Empirical work documents that such gifts are well timed: donations by insiders predict poor future…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences: the joint review policy attains the full-information optimum and strictly beats both the association and global policiesResearch Paper

A customer who is about to buy a new product usually reads the reviews of earlier buyers. Those reviews say something about the product's quality, which all customers share, and something about its fit with the reviewer's own taste, which only similar customers share. A platform decides how much of this to show. In the paper's examples, Apple's App Store…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users: when a firm strictly prefers a transparent hiring algorithm, region by region in the agents' cost planeResearch Paper

Firms increasingly screen job applicants, borrowers and customers with algorithms built on observable features. Regulators and the public ask for these algorithms to be made transparent, and firms often resist, arguing that agents who know the algorithm will game it. Wang, Huang, Jasin and Singh (arXiv:2008.09283, 2020; published in Management Science,…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Marketplace Scalability and Strategic Use of Platform Investment: when sellers can scale, the platform is less likely to offer the ancillary service, and its price and profit are no higherResearch Paper

Marketplace platforms often sell their sellers a service that those sellers could otherwise buy or build. Order fulfillment is the standard example: Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba offer logistics and distribution services to third-party sellers, while other platforms have delayed or declined to offer them. Li, Pisano, Xu and Zhu (SSRN 3310484; published in Mana…

30 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Strategic Role of Supplier Learning: the optimal two-period procurement contract under private cost and private learning outcomesResearch Paper

Learning curves are a standard fact of manufacturing: unit cost falls with cumulative output, so a buyer who orders more today buys cheaper tomorrow (Yelle 1979). Procurement contracts with an outside supplier then face a second problem: the supplier knows its own cost and learning ability better than the buyer does, and it also observes privately how…

70 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: iris

A Characterization of Simultaneous Optimization, Majorization, and (Bi-)Submodular Polyhedra: Compact Convex Sets with Least (a, b)-Majorized Elements for All (a, b) Are Exactly Base PolyhedraResearch Paper

Many resource allocation problems ask for a vector xxx in a feasible set C⊆RnC\subseteq\mathbb R^nC⊆Rn that minimizes a symmetric convex cost: the variance of a load profile in energy scheduling, the makespan of a schedule, an egalitarian division of a joint gain. Different symmetric objectives usually have different minimizers, so the choice of objective matters.…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Strategic Bank Liability Structure Under Capital Requirements: the value-maximizing bank sets its endogenous default boundary equal to the regulatory total capital boundary, in closed formResearch Paper

A bank funds its assets with two kinds of debt that a nonbank firm does not mix in the same way: insured deposits, which earn the bank a service profit but cost a risk-based insurance premium, and nondeposit debt (bonds), which carries a credit spread. Regulators close a bank whose total capital falls below a fixed fraction of its assets, and the deposit…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Dynamic Programming Deconstructed: Transformations of the Bellman Equation and Computational Efficiency: Refactored Value Iteration Converges to g* and g*-Greedy Policies Are OptimalResearch Paper

Many dynamic programs are solved faster after the Bellman equation has been rewritten. The Q-factor form of reinforcement learning moves the maximization inside an expectation over state-action pairs; Rust's expected value function for discrete choice models (Rust 1987) integrates out the next state before maximizing; optimal stopping problems are routinely…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Managing Competition from Within and Outside: Using Strategic Inventory and Network Externality to Combat Copycats: equilibria of both contracts and the strategic-inventory cutoff h1Research Paper

A brand-name product sold through a supplier and a retailer suffers from double marginalization: each firm adds its own margin, so the retail price is too high and both firms earn less than an integrated firm would. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that, in a two-period channel where the supplier sets each period's wholesale price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice: below w*_f the unique symmetric bonus-and-commission equilibrium has advice cutoffs independent of liabilityResearch Paper

Financial products, insurance and many other goods are sold through advisors whose pay comes from the product providers. A large policy literature asks whether such advice is biased and how regulation should respond; a common answer is liability: make the advisor bear more of the cost of an unsuitable recommendation, through penalties, fiduciary duties or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Geometrically Convergent Simulation of the Extrema of Lévy Processes: the stick-breaking errors of the supremum and its time decay geometrically in L^p, at rate η_p ∈ [3/2, 2] with explicit constantsResearch Paper

The supremum of a Lévy process over a finite horizon, and the time at which it is attained, enter the prices of lookback and barrier options, ruin probabilities in insurance, and the workload of queues and storage systems. Their law is explicit only in special cases, so in practice they are computed by Monte Carlo simulation. The classical method, the…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks: the commit-reveal protocol has an equilibrium without front running iff βπ ≤ c, and otherwise every equilibrium carries a front-running threatResearch Paper

On public blockchains, pending transactions wait in a public mempool before a block includes them. Anyone who sees a profitable transaction there can send a competing one with a higher fee and have it executed first. This is front running. It is a large, measured source of losses on decentralized exchanges and in other smart contracts (Daian et al., 2020).…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: iris

A Stochastic Representation for Nonlocal Parabolic PDEs with Applications: the nonlocal terminal-boundary problem has a unique bounded solution, given by a Feynman-Kac formula with boundary jumpsResearch Paper

Classical Feynman–Kac theorems connect a parabolic equation with fixed boundary data to the expectation of a functional of a diffusion stopped at the boundary. Several models in finance and physics do not fit this frame, because the terminal and boundary values depend on the solution in the interior. Dai, Kou and Yang (SSRN 3541591, later in Mathematics of…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by Credit Default Swap Investors: an intervening CDS seller raises equilibrium firm value, with full hedging, no liquidation and a positive CDS premiumResearch Paper

A credit default swap (CDS) insures a lender against the default of a borrower: the protection buyer (the lender) pays an upfront premium, and the protection seller (a dealer) pays the insured amount if a credit event occurs. Because the payment depends on whether the firm is liquidated, both sides of the contract have a stake in how a distressed firm is…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Robustness in the Optimization of Risk Measures: Value-at-Risk is not robust against optimization for budget-constrained functional problemsResearch Paper

Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall are the two risk measures used in banking and insurance regulation. Their robustness has traditionally been studied as a property of the functional alone, applied to one fixed position. In that setting Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010) found VaR more robust than coherent risk measures, while later work such as Embre…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

Masking Anstreicher's linx Bound for Improved Entropy Bounds: The Identity Mask Lowers the Optimally Scaled linx Bound by at Least 0.024036·nResearch Paper

The maximum-entropy sampling problem (MESP) asks, for an n×nn\times nn×n covariance matrix CCC of Gaussian random variables and an integer 0<s<n0<s<n0<s<n, for the sss variables of largest joint differential entropy:

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: iris

Variational Inequalities on Unbounded Domains for Zero-Sum Singular Controller vs. Stopper Games: the game's value is the maximal solution of Problem A, and the stopper has an optimal stopping timeResearch Paper

A controller steers a diffusion and a stopper decides when the game ends. Such zero-sum games model, for example, a central bank that controls an exchange rate until a possible political veto, and the control of inflation (Hernandez-Hernandez, Simon, Zervos 2015, as cited in Bovo, De Angelis, Issoglio, p.3). When the controller may act singularly, in lumps…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

On the Diameter of the Stopped Spider Process: for n ≥ 3 rays, 2√U(0,0,0) is the best constant in E D_τ ≤ C √(E τ) for the British-rail diameter of stopped Walsh Brownian motionResearch Paper

A one-dimensional Brownian motion can be viewed as reflecting Brownian motion ∣B∣|B|∣B∣ whose excursions away from 000 receive independent random signs. The spider process, also called Walsh Brownian motion, replaces the sign by a uniformly random choice among nnn rays meeting at the origin (Walsh 1978; Barlow, Pitman and Yor 1988). It is the basic diffusion on a…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Warranty Matching in a Consumer Electronics Closed-Loop Supply Chain: a distribution-free bound on the expected mismatch cost of random assignmentResearch Paper

A wireless service provider (WSP) that sells phones with a customer warranty must replace a device that fails while that warranty is in force. Replacements come from an inventory of refurbished devices, each still carrying what is left of its OEM warranty, the manufacturer's warranty under which the WSP can return a failed device for free repair. When a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Capacity Games with Supply Function Competition: under submodularity, at-cost bids with marginal-contribution margins are a supply-chain-optimal Nash equilibriumResearch Paper

A buyer facing uncertain demand often secures supply in two stages: it first reserves capacity from several suppliers, and after demand is observed it decides how much of the reserved capacity to use. Electricity procurement (reserve markets), contract manufacturing and logistics all have this shape. In practice each supplier quotes a reservation price for…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsMechanism Design+1·Captain: iris

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation: every k-ticket lottery equilibrium allocation is (2 − 1/k)-trade efficientResearch Paper

Alaska allocates scarce big-game hunting permits through a draw in which each applicant may buy up to six tickets and spread them across the permit lotteries of her choice; an applicant drawn in several lotteries keeps the permit she ranks highest. Designs of this kind, parallel lotteries, are simple to run and give applicants freedom to express intensity…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Optimal Design of a Bipartite Matching Queueing System: Heavy-traffic waiting times from resource-pooling componentsResearch Paper

A service system can have enough capacity in total and still make one group of customers wait much longer than another. The distinction arises when servers can handle different customer classes. A flexible server may help several queues, while another server has only one eligible class. Which connections are present affects both how work is shared and how…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Portfolio Selection, Periodic Evaluations and Risk Taking: the value function is Ax^α, with A the unique fixed point of a ↦ e^(−βτ)F(a), attained by an optimal portfolio in four regimesResearch Paper

Fund managers, traders and employees with performance pay are judged period by period: a bonus, a fee or a loss of reputation follows each quarterly or annual review, not the value of the portfolio at some distant terminal date. Behavioral finance adds that such outcomes are felt as gains and losses relative to a reference point, with loss aversion and risk…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Competitive Investment with Bayesian Learning: Choice of Business Size and Timing: for large volatility the leader's equilibrium profit strictly decreases in the prior belief of a favorable marketResearch Paper

A firm that enters a new market first does not know how profitable that market is, and neither does its rival. The rival watches the first mover's earnings, learns from them, and decides when to follow and how large to enter. The first mover therefore controls not only its own profit but also what its competitor learns: a small investment caps its earnings…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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