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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

1094 missions

Missions

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Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems IV: Online Stochastic Mirror Descent for Combinatorial Semi-BanditsTextbook

Motivation

Many sequential decision problems ask a learner to choose, round after round, a combination of items: a set of mmm ads out of ddd, a path in a network, a matching. After each choice the learner sees the loss of the items it used, not of those it did not. This is online combinatorial optimization with semi-bandit feedback. It contains the classical adversarial multi-armed bandit (choose one of ddd arms) and is a standard model in online advertising, routing and ranking.

Chapter 5 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph arXiv:1204.5721v2 treats this problem with one algorithm, Online Stochastic Mirror Descent (OSMD). Every regret bound in the chapter comes from a single mirror-descent inequality, specialized through the choice of a convex "regularizer". The chapter's capstone, Theorem 5.7, shows that a polynomial regularizer gives pseudo-regret O(mdn)O(\sqrt{mdn})O(mdn​) with no logarithmic factor. For m=1m=1m=1 this is the minimax-optimal rate of the adversarial bandit, first attained by the INF strategy of Audibert and Bubeck (2009). The semi-bandit version is due to Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi (2014).

Setting

Vectors live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd. The arm set is a nonempty C⊆{0,1}d\mathcal C\subseteq\{0,1\}^dC⊆{0,1}d with ∥v∥1=m\|v\|_1=m∥v∥1​=m for every v∈Cv\in\mathcal Cv∈C, and K=Conv(C)\mathcal K=\mathrm{Conv}(\mathcal C)K=Conv(C). An oblivious adversary fixes loss vectors ℓ1,…,ℓn∈[0,1]d\ell_1,\dots,\ell_n\in[0,1]^dℓ1​,…,ℓn​∈[0,1]d. In round ttt the learner plays a random arm vt∈Cv_t\in\mathcal Cvt​∈C, pays ℓt⊤vt\ell_t^\top v_tℓt⊤​vt​, and observes (ℓt(1)vt(1),…,ℓt(d)vt(d))(\ell_t(1)v_t(1),\dots,\ell_t(d)v_t(d))(ℓt​(1)vt​(1),…,ℓt​(d)vt​(d)). The pseudo-regret is

Rˉn=E∑t=1nℓt⊤vt−min⁡x∈K∑t=1nℓt⊤x.\bar R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t^\top v_t-\min_{x\in\mathcal K}\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t^\top x .Rˉn​=Et=1∑n​ℓt⊤​vt​−x∈Kmin​t=1∑n​ℓt⊤​x.

A Legendre function on Dˉ\bar DDˉ, for a nonempty open convex DDD, is a continuous F:Dˉ→RF:\bar D\to\mathbb RF:Dˉ→R that is strictly convex and C1C^1C1 on DDD and whose gradient norm tends to +∞+\infty+∞ at Dˉ∖D\bar D\setminus DDˉ∖D. Its Bregman divergence is DF(x,y)=F(x)−F(y)−(x−y)⊤∇F(y)D_F(x,y)=F(x)-F(y)-(x-y)^\top\nabla F(y)DF​(x,y)=F(x)−F(y)−(x−y)⊤∇F(y), and its Legendre–Fenchel transform is F∗(u)=sup⁡x∈Dˉ(x⊤u−F(x))F^*(u)=\sup_{x\in\bar D}(x^\top u-F(x))F∗(u)=supx∈Dˉ​(x⊤u−F(x)).

Online Mirror Descent with learning rate η>0\eta>0η>0 and vectors gtg_tgt​ starts at x1∈arg⁡min⁡KFx_1\in\arg\min_{\mathcal K}Fx1​∈argminK​F. It then sets ∇F(wt+1)=∇F(xt)−ηgt\nabla F(w_{t+1})=\nabla F(x_t)-\eta g_t∇F(wt+1​)=∇F(xt​)−ηgt​ and xt+1=arg⁡min⁡y∈KDF(y,wt+1)x_{t+1}=\arg\min_{y\in\mathcal K}D_F(y,w_{t+1})xt+1​=argminy∈K​DF​(y,wt+1​). OSMD uses a random estimate gt=ℓ~tg_t=\tilde\ell_tgt​=ℓ~t​ of the loss. In the semi-bandit case it plays vtv_tvt​ with E[vt∣xt]=xt\mathbb E[v_t\mid x_t]=x_tE[vt​∣xt​]=xt​ and uses

ℓ~t(i)=ℓt(i) vt(i)xt(i).(5.5)\tilde\ell_t(i)=\frac{\ell_t(i)\,v_t(i)}{x_t(i)}. \tag{5.5}ℓ~t​(i)=xt​(i)ℓt​(i)vt​(i)​.(5.5)

A 000-potential is a convex, C1C^1C1, increasing ψ:(−∞,a)→(0,∞)\psi:(-\infty,a)\to(0,\infty)ψ:(−∞,a)→(0,∞) with ψ(−∞)=0\psi(-\infty)=0ψ(−∞)=0, ψ(a−)=+∞\psi(a^-)=+\inftyψ(a−)=+∞ and ∫01∣ψ−1∣<∞\int_0^1|\psi^{-1}|<\infty∫01​∣ψ−1∣<∞. It defines the Legendre function Fψ(x)=∑i∫0xiψ−1(s) dsF_\psi(x)=\sum_i\int_0^{x_i}\psi^{-1}(s)\,dsFψ​(x)=∑i​∫0xi​​ψ−1(s)ds on [0,∞)d[0,\infty)^d[0,∞)d. With ψ=exp⁡\psi=\expψ=exp this is the negative entropy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.7 (p. 80)

For every 000-potential ψ\psiψ and non-negative unbiased estimates,

Rˉn≤sup⁡KFψ−Fψ(x1)η+η2∑t=1n∑i=1dE[ℓ~t(i)2(ψ−1)′(xt(i))].\bar R_n\le\frac{\sup_{\mathcal K}F_\psi-F_\psi(x_1)}{\eta}+\frac\eta2\sum_{t=1}^n\sum_{i=1}^d\mathbb E\left[\frac{\tilde\ell_t(i)^2}{(\psi^{-1})'(x_t(i))}\right].Rˉn​≤ηsupK​Fψ​−Fψ​(x1​)​+2η​t=1∑n​i=1∑d​E[(ψ−1)′(xt​(i))ℓ~t​(i)2​].

For ψ(x)=(−x)−q\psi(x)=(-x)^{-q}ψ(x)=(−x)−q with q>1q>1q>1, the estimate (5.5) and η=2q−1 m1−2/q/(n d1−2/q)\eta=\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{q-1}\,m^{1-2/q}/(n\,d^{1-2/q})}η=q−12​m1−2/q/(nd1−2/q)​,

Rˉn≤q2q−1 mdn,and  Rˉn≤22mdn  at q=2.\bar R_n\le q\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{q-1}\,mdn},\qquad\text{and }\ \bar R_n\le2\sqrt{2mdn}\ \text{ at }q=2.Rˉn​≤qq−12​mdn​,and  Rˉn​≤22mdn​  at q=2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5.1: F∗∗=FF^{**}=FF∗∗=F, ∇F∗=(∇F)−1\nabla F^*=(\nabla F)^{-1}∇F∗=(∇F)−1 on D∗D^*D∗, and DF(x,y)=DF∗(∇F(y),∇F(x))D_F(x,y)=D_{F^*}(\nabla F(y),\nabla F(x))DF​(x,y)=DF∗​(∇F(y),∇F(x)).
  2. Lemma 5.2: existence, uniqueness and the Pythagorean inequality of Bregman projections.
  3. Theorem 5.3: ∑tℓt(xt)−∑tℓt(x)≤F(x)−F(x1)η+1η∑tDF∗(∇F(xt)−η∇ℓt(xt),∇F(xt))\sum_t\ell_t(x_t)-\sum_t\ell_t(x)\le\frac{F(x)-F(x_1)}\eta+\frac1\eta\sum_tD_{F^*}(\nabla F(x_t)-\eta\nabla\ell_t(x_t),\nabla F(x_t))∑t​ℓt​(xt​)−∑t​ℓt​(x)≤ηF(x)−F(x1​)​+η1​∑t​DF∗​(∇F(xt​)−η∇ℓt​(xt​),∇F(xt​)).
  4. Theorem 5.5, linear losses, and its corrected general form.
  5. Lemma 5.3: FψF_\psiFψ​ is Legendre and DFψ∗(u,v)≤12∑iψ′(vi)(ui−vi)2D_{F_\psi^*}(u,v)\le\frac12\sum_i\psi'(v_i)(u_i-v_i)^2DFψ∗​​(u,v)≤21​∑i​ψ′(vi​)(ui​−vi​)2 for u≤vu\le vu≤v.
  6. Theorem 5.6: with the negative entropy, Rˉn≤2mdnln⁡(d/m)\bar R_n\le\sqrt{2mdn\ln(d/m)}Rˉn​≤2mdnln(d/m)​.

Significance

Theorem 5.7 is the sharpest semi-bandit bound in the monograph. It shows that removing the ln⁡(d/m)\sqrt{\ln(d/m)}ln(d/m)​ factor of the exponential-weights analysis (Theorem 5.6) is a matter of the regularizer, not of a new algorithm. The same OSMD template gives the Euclidean-ball bound of Theorem 5.8 and is reused for bandit convex optimization in Chapter 6. Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 are the standard mirror-descent toolkit, used throughout online learning and optimization.

All results of the chapter are proved in the book. Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 are cited from Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006). None of them is formalized on Prove2Me. The published mirror-descent bound of Bandit Algorithms XII treats linear losses with a comparator inside DDD and Euclidean-space vectors; it is not Theorem 5.3. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the whole chain, from Legendre duality to the explicit constant q2mdn/(q−1)q\sqrt{2mdn/(q-1)}q2mdn/(q−1)​, with two of the printed statements corrected (below).

Difficulty

The pathwise mirror-descent inequality is a telescoping argument, but several of its steps rest on convex analysis that Mathlib does not package. One is the existence and interior location of Bregman projections onto a set that touches the boundary of DDD. Another is the differentiability of F∗F^*F∗ on the open dual space and the identity ∇F∗=(∇F)−1\nabla F^*=(\nabla F)^{-1}∇F∗=(∇F)−1. A third is the closed form of Fψ∗F_\psi^*Fψ∗​ for a potential defined through an improper integral of ψ−1\psi^{-1}ψ−1.

The probabilistic step is not a martingale argument. Only conditioning on the current iterate xtx_txt​ is available. The estimate (5.5) divides by xt(i)x_t(i)xt​(i), so its integrability and unbiasedness have to be derived from the fact that the iterates stay in the open orthant. Finally, the explicit constant requires a Hölder step, ∑ix1(i)1−1/q≤m(q−1)/qd1/q\sum_ix_1(i)^{1-1/q}\le m^{(q-1)/q}d^{1/q}∑i​x1​(i)1−1/q≤m(q−1)/qd1/q, and the matching bound ∑ixt(i)1/q≤m1/qd1−1/q\sum_ix_t(i)^{1/q}\le m^{1/q}d^{1-1/q}∑i​xt​(i)1/q≤m1/qd1−1/q.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin d → ℝ. The arm set is a Set of 0/10/10/1 vectors with coordinate sum mmm, and K\mathcal KK is convexHull ℝ C. Rounds are t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n, sums run over Finset.Icc 1 n, and index 000 is unused. A randomized run is a family of measurable processes xt,vt,ℓ~t,wtx_t, v_t, \tilde\ell_t, w_txt​,vt​,ℓ~t​,wt​ on a probability space, with the deterministic OMD recursion holding on every sample path. E[⋅∣xt]\mathbb E[\cdot\mid x_t]E[⋅∣xt​] is the coordinatewise conditional expectation given σ(xt)\sigma(x_t)σ(xt​), which is exactly what the book's proofs use. Losses are oblivious, so Rˉn≤B\bar R_n\le BRˉn​≤B is stated as "for every x∈Kx\in\mathcal Kx∈K, E∑tℓt⊤vt−∑tℓt⊤x≤B\mathbb E\sum_t\ell_t^\top v_t-\sum_t\ell_t^\top x\le BE∑t​ℓt⊤​vt​−∑t​ℓt⊤​x≤B". F∗F^*F∗ is valued in EReal, and DF∗D_{F^*}DF∗​ is evaluated only on the open dual space, where F∗F^*F∗ is finite. Wherever an expectation of a possibly non-integrable quantity appears on a right-hand side, its integrability is assumed: the book's bound is then +∞+\infty+∞ and trivial, while Lean's integral would be 000.

Corrections and instantiations, each labelled in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Theorem 5.7, corrected misprint. The book prints η=2q−1m1−2/qd1−2/q\eta=\sqrt{\frac2{q-1}\frac{m^{1-2/q}}{d^{1-2/q}}}η=q−12​d1−2/qm1−2/q​​. The proof (p. 81) gives the stated bound only for η=2q−1m1−2/qn d1−2/q\eta=\sqrt{\frac2{q-1}\frac{m^{1-2/q}}{n\,d^{1-2/q}}}η=q−12​nd1−2/qm1−2/q​​, which is stated. At q=2q=2q=2 this is η=2/n\eta=\sqrt{2/n}η=2/n​.
  • Theorem 5.5, corrected misprint. In the first bound the book prints E[∥xt−x~t∥ ∥g~t∥∗]\mathbb E[\|x_t-\tilde x_t\|\,\|\tilde g_t\|_*]E[∥xt​−x~t​∥∥g~​t​∥∗​]. That statement fails for ℓt(x)=x2\ell_t(x)=x^2ℓt​(x)=x2 on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] with F=x2/2F=x^2/2F=x2/2 and x~t=±1\tilde x_t=\pm1x~t​=±1. The version stated uses ∥∇ℓt(x~t)∥∗\|\nabla\ell_t(\tilde x_t)\|_*∥∇ℓt​(x~t​)∥∗​, as the proof's first inequality does. The linear-loss bound is stated as printed.
  • Lemma 5.2. "For all z∈K∩Dz\in K\cap Dz∈K∩D" is read as "for the projection zzz", which lies in K∩DK\cap DK∩D.
  • Hypotheses made explicit: q>1q>1q>1; non-negativity of the estimates in Theorem 5.6 (used in its proof); unbiasedness E[ℓ~t∣xt]=ℓt\mathbb E[\tilde\ell_t\mid x_t]=\ell_tE[ℓ~t​∣xt​]=ℓt​ in the general parts of Theorems 5.6 and 5.7; K∩(0,∞)d≠∅\mathcal K\cap(0,\infty)^d\ne\emptysetK∩(0,∞)d=∅ (OMD's requirement K∩D≠∅K\cap D\ne\emptysetK∩D=∅); a subgradient selection as an explicit input.
  • Theorem 5.6's particular bound uses the book's η=2mndln⁡dm\eta=\sqrt{\frac{2m}{nd}\ln\frac dm}η=nd2m​lnmd​​ as printed. There are no O(·) constants in the chapter's statements.

A trivializing formalization would let η\etaη, xtx_txt​ or the estimate be junk values: an OSMD step at η=0\eta=0η=0, a Lean division x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0, or a regret written as a real infimum over an unbounded set. Here every run is the book's algorithm on the open orthant, and each bound is stated against every comparator in K\mathcal KK.

Reusable beyond this mission: the Legendre/Bregman layer, the OMD run predicate and the ω\omegaω-potential layer. Proofs of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 in this generality would be welcome additions to the library.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012; arXiv:1204.5721v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
  • N. Cesa-Bianchi, G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games, Cambridge University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511546921
  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, Regret bounds and minimax policies under partial monitoring, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v11/audibert10a.html
  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, G. Lugosi, Regret in online combinatorial optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0598
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Dimensioning Large Call Centers I: The Rationalized Staffing Function Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A call center with NNN agents facing Poisson arrivals at rate λ\lambdaλ and exponential service at rate μ\muμ is the M/M/N (Erlang-C) queue. Choosing NNN trades the cost of agents against the cost of customers waiting, and in practice it is done with the square-root safety-staffing rule N≈R+yRN \approx R + y\sqrt RN≈R+yR​, where R=λ/μR = \lambda/\muR=λ/μ is the offered load. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; published in Operations Research 52(1), 2004, doi:10.1287/opre.1030.0081) turned that rule of thumb into an optimization result: for a general convex staffing cost and a general waiting-cost function, they identify the safety factor yyy that makes the rule asymptotically optimal as the arrival rate grows.

Timeline of the asymptotic regime the paper builds on:

  • 1917. Erlang's delay formula π(N,ν)\pi(N,\nu)π(N,ν) for the M/M/N queue.
  • 1981. Halfin and Whitt (Oper. Res. 29(3)) show that with N=R+βRN = R + \beta\sqrt RN=R+βR​ servers the probability of waiting converges to a limit P(β)∈(0,1)P(\beta) \in (0,1)P(β)∈(0,1), the quality-and-efficiency-driven regime.
  • 2000/2004. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman classify cost structures into a rationalized, an efficiency-driven and a quality-driven regime, and prove asymptotic optimality of an explicit staffing rule in each.

This mission is the first of a series of four on that paper and covers the rationalized regime (Section 5), where staffing and waiting costs are of the same order.

Setting

The service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 is fixed and the arrival rate λ\lambdaλ grows. A staffing cost FFF, defined on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), is convex and strictly increasing; it does not depend on λ\lambdaλ. For each λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 a waiting-cost function DλD_\lambdaDλ​ satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0, is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and makes

G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t) e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)\,e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt

finite for every N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ. With the Erlang-C formula

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−νN)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\{\big(1-\tfrac{\nu}{N}\big)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!}+\frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\}^{-1},π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−Nν​)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,

the expected total cost of staffing N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ agents is C(N,λ)=F(N)+λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ)C(N,\lambda) = F(N) + \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda)C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ), and Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ is any integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ minimizing it (7).

In normalized units Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​ the paper defines Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x) = F(N_\lambda(x)) - F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), the continuous delay probability πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ) with

H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αt t (1+t)M−1 dt}−1,H(M,\alpha) = \Big\{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}\,t\,(1+t)^{M-1}\,dt\Big\}^{-1},H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1,

and Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x) = F_\lambda(x) + \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x), minimized at xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ (8). A surrogate C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z)C[z;\hat F,\hat\pi,\hat G] = \hat F(z)+\hat\pi(z)\hat G(z)C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z) approximates it. Rounding is measured by

Sλ(x)=min⁡{C(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ), C(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)}.(10)S_\lambda(x) = \min\{C(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda),\,C(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda)\}. \tag{10}Sλ​(x)=min{C(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)}.(10)

The Halfin–Whitt delay function is P(x)=(1+x/h(−x))−1P(x) = \big(1 + x/h(-x)\big)^{-1}P(x)=(1+x/h(−x))−1, with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate (11). Asymptotic equality aλ≈∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} b_\lambdaaλ​≈∞bλ​ means aλ/bλ→1a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 1aλ​/bλ​→1 as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

Assume the rationalized condition (18): for some κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0, Fλ(κ)/Gλ(κ)→γ∈(0,∞)F_\lambda(\kappa)/G_\lambda(\kappa) \to \gamma \in (0,\infty)Fλ​(κ)/Gλ​(κ)→γ∈(0,∞). Let yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ minimize Fλ(y)+P(y)Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y) + P(y)G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+P(y)Gλ​(y) over y>0y>0y>0 (19). Then

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)}{C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)} = 1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The goal fixes no constant and no rate: it asserts only that the excess cost of the explicit rule is asymptotically the optimal excess cost.

Milestones

  • Lemma C.1: GλG_\lambdaGλ​ is strictly convex and strictly decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  • Section 3, p. 12: H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integers N>ν>0N > \nu > 0N>ν>0.
  • Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Corollary 3.3: the approximation principle. If the surrogate approximates CλC_\lambdaCλ​ at both xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ and its own minimizer zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, then rounding Nλ(zλ∗)N_\lambda(z^*_\lambda)Nλ​(zλ∗​) is asymptotically optimal.
  • Eqs. (13)–(14): FλF_\lambdaFλ​ preserves lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup-separation of ratios.
  • Lemma 4.1 (Halfin & Whitt): for bounded xλx_\lambdaxλ​, πλ(xλ)/P(xλ)→1\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)/P(x_\lambda) \to 1πλ​(xλ​)/P(xλ​)→1.

Significance

The theorem justifies the square-root staffing rule from first principles for a broad cost class. In Example 5.3 of the paper (linear staffing cost ccc per agent, linear waiting cost aaa per unit time) it gives N∗≈R+y∗(a/c)RN^* \approx R + y^*(a/c)\sqrt RN∗≈R+y∗(a/c)R​, with y∗(r)y^*(r)y∗(r) the minimizer of y+rP(y)/yy + rP(y)/yy+rP(y)/y, a one-dimensional rule computable once for all loads. Corollary 3.3 is reused verbatim by the efficiency-driven and quality-driven theorems of the paper (missions II and III of this series), and Lemma 4.1 is the analytic input of all three.

The result has been proved since 2000; no machine-checked proof of it, or of the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, is known to exist. The mission produces a formal proof of the regime theorem together with reusable formal statements of the Erlang-C function, its integral representation, and the Halfin–Whitt limit.

Difficulty

The reduction from discrete to continuous staffing (Lemmas 3.1–3.2) is elementary once unimodality of CλC_\lambdaCλ​ is available, but unimodality rests on convexity of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, which the paper cites rather than proves, and on Lemma C.1, which needs differentiation under an improper integral. The central difficulty is Lemma 4.1: the paper derives it from Halfin and Whitt's limit theorem, which is stated for integer server counts, while πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ is evaluated at non-integer Nλ(xλ)N_\lambda(x_\lambda)Nλ​(xλ​); a proof needs a uniform Laplace-type asymptotic for the integral defining HHH. A further obstacle is bounding xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​: the obvious route through continuity of the optimizer fails because nothing converges, and the paper instead argues by contradiction via (14).

Formalization scope

All objects live in DimCallCenters.Rationalized. The arrival rate is a real lam, and every limit is Filter.atTop on R\mathbb RR with μ\muμ fixed. The queue itself is not modelled; the paper's theorems are statements about the closed-form cost C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ), and so are these. Committed conventions:

  1. The standing assumptions are a structure WaitModel (μ>0\mu>0μ>0; Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0; DλD_\lambdaDλ​ strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); t↦Dλ(t)e−θtt\mapsto D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}t↦Dλ​(t)e−θt integrable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for every θ>0\theta>0θ>0, which is the paper's finiteness of GGG). FFF is convex and strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  2. Staffing levels in C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ) are natural numbers; GGG and HHH take real NNN.
  3. Argmins (Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​, zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are hypotheses that a given function is a minimizer, for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; ties are allowed and the theorems hold for every choice.
  4. In SλS_\lambdaSλ​ the floor term is omitted when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ, where CCC is undefined.
  5. lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup and lim inf⁡\liminfliminf relations are written with ∃ᶠ/∀ᶠ, not Filter.limsup on R\mathbb RR.
  6. Added hypothesis. The goal assumes G(N,λ)→∞G(N,\lambda)\to\inftyG(N,λ)→∞ as N↓λ/μN\downarrow\lambda/\muN↓λ/μ. The paper asserts this limit on p. 12, but it does not follow from its assumptions (it fails for bounded DλD_\lambdaDλ​); it is equivalent to DλD_\lambdaDλ​ being unbounded and is what makes the continuous optimum exist.

The hypotheses are met by linear staffing and waiting costs (F(N)=cNF(N)=cNF(N)=cN, Dλ(t)=atD_\lambda(t)=atDλ​(t)=at), for which (18) holds with γ=cκ2/a\gamma = c\kappa^2/aγ=cκ2/a, so the goal is not vacuous. It is not trivialized by junk values either: the ratio's denominator is positive at every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, and SλS_\lambdaSλ​ never evaluates CCC at an unstable level.

Needed infrastructure: Laplace asymptotics for ∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt, differentiation under the integral sign for GGG, and convexity of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​. All of these are reusable for missions II–IV. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are proofs of the convexity facts the paper cites from its references [9], [10].

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • A. K. Erlang, Solution of some problems in the theory of probabilities of significance in automatic telephone exchanges, Elektroteknikeren 13, 1917.
21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems V: Bandit Convex Optimization with One-Point FeedbackTextbook

Motivation

In bandit convex optimization a forecaster repeatedly picks a point xtx_txt​ of a convex set K⊆Rd\mathcal K\subseteq\mathbb R^dK⊆Rd, and an adversary picks a convex loss ℓt\ell_tℓt​. The forecaster pays ℓt(xt)\ell_t(x_t)ℓt​(xt​) and observes only that number: it never sees the function, its gradient, or its value elsewhere. This is the model of online optimization with only function-value access, as in tuning a system online from measured costs, dynamic pricing with an unknown convex demand-cost curve, or routing with path costs observed only on the route taken. The question is how fast the forecaster can approach the best fixed point in hindsight.

Chapter 6 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph (arXiv:1204.5721v2, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012) treats the problem through spherical gradient estimates fed to projected gradient descent. The one-point method is due to Flaxman, Kalai and McMahan (SODA 2005, arXiv:cs/0408007), who obtained an O(n3/4)\mathcal O(n^{3/4})O(n3/4) regret bound. Agarwal, Dekel and Xiao (COLT 2010) showed that two function evaluations per round allow O(n)\mathcal O(\sqrt n)O(n​). Whether one-point feedback admits n\sqrt nn​ regret was open when the monograph was written (p. 94); Bubeck, Eldan and Lee (STOC 2017, arXiv:1607.03084) later obtained n\sqrt nn​ regret up to logarithmic and polynomial-in-ddd factors for convex losses, with a different and much more involved algorithm.

Setting

Let B={x∈Rd:∥x∥≤1}\mathbb B=\{x\in\mathbb R^d:\|x\|\le1\}B={x∈Rd:∥x∥≤1} be the closed Euclidean unit ball and S={x:∥x∥=1}\mathbb S=\{x:\|x\|=1\}S={x:∥x∥=1} the unit sphere, with unnormalized spherical measure σ\sigmaσ, so that σ(S)=d Vol(B)\sigma(\mathbb S)=d\,\mathrm{Vol}(\mathbb B)σ(S)=dVol(B). Fix δ>0\delta>0δ>0. For a loss ℓ\ellℓ, the smoothed loss is ℓ~(x)=E ℓ(x+δB)\widetilde\ell(x)=\mathbb E\,\ell(x+\delta B)ℓ(x)=Eℓ(x+δB) with BBB uniform on B\mathbb BB.

The set K\mathcal KK is closed and convex with rB⊆K⊆RBr\mathbb B\subseteq\mathcal K\subseteq R\mathbb BrB⊆K⊆RB. The losses ℓ1,ℓ2,⋯:Rd→R\ell_1,\ell_2,\dots:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb Rℓ1​,ℓ2​,⋯:Rd→R are GGG-Lipschitz, differentiable and convex, and are fixed before the game (an oblivious adversary).

OSGD (Online Stochastic Gradient Descent) on a set K′\mathcal K'K′ with learning rate η\etaη starts at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0 and sets xt+1=argmin⁡y∈K′∥y−(xt−ηg~t(xt))∥x_{t+1}=\operatorname{argmin}_{y\in\mathcal K'}\|y-(x_t-\eta\widetilde g_t(x_t))\|xt+1​=argminy∈K′​∥y−(xt​−ηg​t​(xt​))∥, where g~t\widetilde g_tg​t​ is a gradient estimate. With S1,S2,…S_1,S_2,\dotsS1​,S2​,… independent and uniform on S\mathbb SS:

  • the two-point estimate (6.1) is g~t(xt)=d2δ(ℓt(Xt+)−ℓt(Xt−))St\widetilde g_t(x_t)=\frac d{2\delta}\big(\ell_t(X_t^+)-\ell_t(X_t^-)\big)S_tg​t​(xt​)=2δd​(ℓt​(Xt+​)−ℓt​(Xt−​))St​ with Xt±=xt±δStX_t^\pm=x_t\pm\delta S_tXt±​=xt​±δSt​; the played point is Xt+X_t^+Xt+​ or Xt−X_t^-Xt−​ by a fair coin;
  • the one-point estimate (6.3) is g~t(xt)=dδ ℓt(X~t)St\widetilde g_t(x_t)=\frac d\delta\,\ell_t(\widetilde X_t)S_tg​t​(xt​)=δd​ℓt​(Xt​)St​ with played point X~t=xt+δSt\widetilde X_t=x_t+\delta S_tXt​=xt​+δSt​.

OSGD runs on the shrunken set K′=(1−δ/r)K\mathcal K'=(1-\delta/r)\mathcal KK′=(1−δ/r)K, so that the perturbed points stay in K\mathcal KK. The pseudo-regret is

R‾n=E∑t=1nℓt(X~t)−min⁡x∈K∑t=1nℓt(x).\overline R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t(\widetilde X_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal K}\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t(x).Rn​=Et=1∑n​ℓt​(Xt​)−x∈Kmin​t=1∑n​ℓt​(x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2, tuned

If in addition ∣ℓt∣≤L|\ell_t|\le L∣ℓt​∣≤L on K\mathcal KK, and δ=(2n)−1/4RdL/((3+R/r)G)\delta=(2n)^{-1/4}\sqrt{RdL/((3+R/r)G)}δ=(2n)−1/4RdL/((3+R/r)G)​, η=(2n)−3/4R3/(dL(3+R/r)G)\eta=(2n)^{-3/4}\sqrt{R^3/(dL(3+R/r)G)}η=(2n)−3/4R3/(dL(3+R/r)G)​, then one-point OSGD satisfies

R‾n≤4n3/4RdL (3+R/r) G.\overline R_n\le 4n^{3/4}\sqrt{RdL\,(3+R/r)\,G}.Rn​≤4n3/4RdL(3+R/r)G​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 6.1: ∇∫Bℓ(x+δb) db=1δ∫Sℓ(x+δs)s dσ(s)\nabla\int_{\mathbb B}\ell(x+\delta b)\,db=\frac1\delta\int_{\mathbb S}\ell(x+\delta s)s\,d\sigma(s)∇∫B​ℓ(x+δb)db=δ1​∫S​ℓ(x+δs)sdσ(s).
  2. Lemma 6.2: dδE[ℓ(x+δS)S]=∇E ℓ(x+δB)\frac d\delta\mathbb E[\ell(x+\delta S)S]=\nabla\mathbb E\,\ell(x+\delta B)δd​E[ℓ(x+δS)S]=∇Eℓ(x+δB).
  3. Eq. (6.2): ∣ℓ(x)−ℓ~(x)∣≤δG|\ell(x)-\widetilde\ell(x)|\le\delta G∣ℓ(x)−ℓ(x)∣≤δG.
  4. Lemma 6.3: the queried points' regret against xxx is at most the smoothed regret of the iterates against (1−ξ)x(1-\xi)x(1−ξ)x, plus 3δGn+ξGRn3\delta Gn+\xi GRn3δGn+ξGRn.
  5. Theorem 6.1: two-point OSGD has R‾n≤R2/η+η(Gd)2n+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le R^2/\eta+\eta(Gd)^2n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤R2/η+η(Gd)2n+δ(3+R/r)Gn, and R‾n≤2RGdn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le 2RGd\sqrt n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤2RGdn​+δ(3+R/r)Gn for η=R/(Gdn)\eta=R/(Gd\sqrt n)η=R/(Gdn​).
  6. Theorem 6.2, first display: one-point OSGD has R‾n≤R2/η+(dL)2δ2ηn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le R^2/\eta+\frac{(dL)^2}{\delta^2}\eta n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤R2/η+δ2(dL)2​ηn+δ(3+R/r)Gn for every 0<δ≤r0<\delta\le r0<δ≤r and η>0\eta>0η>0.

Significance

The n3/4n^{3/4}n3/4 bound shows that a single function value per round suffices for sublinear regret against any oblivious sequence of Lipschitz convex losses, with a forecaster whose only operations are a random perturbation and a Euclidean projection. The smoothing identity of Lemmas 6.1–6.2 is the basic tool of zeroth-order (derivative-free) optimization, used well beyond bandits, and Theorem 6.1 is the n\sqrt nn​ benchmark for two-point methods.

All results are proved in the source. To the best of current knowledge none is formalized: the related items of the Introduction to Online Convex Optimization series on Prove2Me (Hazan's Lemma 6.7 and Theorem 6.9) were formalized with missing hypotheses and are recorded as disproved. This mission produces machine-checked statements with every hypothesis explicit, and the formal infrastructure (sphere measure calculus, a projected stochastic gradient analysis) for later zeroth-order results.

Difficulty

Two steps resist a direct formal treatment. First, Lemma 6.1 is a divergence-theorem identity on the ball; Mathlib has the sphere measure and polar coordinates, but its divergence theorem covers boxes rather than balls, so differentiating the ball average in xxx requires either such a theorem or a direct argument about translates of the ball. Second, the regret analysis takes expectations of quantities that depend on the whole past: the iterate xtx_txt​ is a function of S1,…,St−1S_1,\dots,S_{t-1}S1​,…,St−1​, and unbiasedness E[g~t∣xt]=∇ℓ~t(xt)\mathbb E[\widetilde g_t\mid x_t]=\nabla\widetilde\ell_t(x_t)E[g​t​∣xt​]=∇ℓt​(xt​) holds only conditionally, via independence of StS_tSt​ from the past. A pathwise gradient-descent inequality must be combined with this conditional expectation round by round, with measurability of the projected iterates established along the way. The naive approach of treating the estimate as the true gradient of ℓt\ell_tℓt​ fails: it is a gradient of ℓ~t\widetilde\ell_tℓt​, and the gap is handled only by Eq. (6.2) and Lemma 6.3.

Formalization scope

Points are in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with d≥1d\ge1d≥1; rounds are t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,…, sums run over Finset.Icc 1 n. σ\sigmaσ is Mathlib's Measure.toSphere of Lebesgue measure; the uniform laws are normalized restrictions. Randomness lives on an arbitrary probability space; the directions StS_tSt​ are measurable, mutually independent (iIndepFun) and uniform on S\mathbb SS, and in Theorem 6.1 the pairs (St,Ct)(S_t,C_t)(St​,Ct​) are independent with CtC_tCt​ a fair sign independent of StS_tSt​. A run of OSGD is a predicate (start at 000, each iterate a Euclidean projection onto (1−δ/r)K(1-\delta/r)\mathcal K(1−δ/r)K), which determines the run uniquely, so the forecaster uses only observed values and its own randomness. The losses are Lipschitz, differentiable and convex on all of Rd\mathbb R^dRd; the bound ∣ℓt∣≤L|\ell_t|\le L∣ℓt​∣≤L is on K\mathcal KK, because a convex function bounded on Rd\mathbb R^dRd is constant. The minimum over K\mathcal KK is an infimum over the subtype K\mathcal KK, attained in every theorem.

Conventions and corrections, each stated in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Lemma 6.1 carries the factor 1/δ1/\delta1/δ that the printed statement omits and the proof contains (corrected misprint).
  • Theorem 6.1's second display prints η=R/(GDn)\eta=R/(GD\sqrt n)η=R/(GDn​) and a limit "for δ→0\delta\to0δ→0"; the item states R‾n≤2RGdn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le 2RGd\sqrt n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤2RGdn​+δ(3+R/r)Gn for η=R/(Gdn)\eta=R/(Gd\sqrt n)η=R/(Gdn​) and every admissible δ\deltaδ, which implies the limit (corrected misprint).
  • Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 add 0<δ≤r0<\delta\le r0<δ≤r, which the proofs need for Xt±,X~t∈KX_t^\pm,\widetilde X_t\in\mathcal KXt±​,Xt​∈K; for the tuned δ\deltaδ of the goal it is a condition on nnn.
  • The goal adds G,L>0G,L>0G,L>0 and n≥1n\ge1n≥1, which its formulas for δ,η\delta,\etaδ,η need; the constant 444 is the book's rounding of 2⋅23/42\cdot2^{3/4}2⋅23/4 and is kept, as is the form R2/ηR^2/\etaR2/η.

The statements cannot be satisfied trivially: the run is pinned by its recursion, the losses are fixed before the randomness, the expectations are of bounded measurable functions (no zero-valued Bochner integrals), and the minimum is over the nonempty compact K\mathcal KK. Section 6.3 (Lemma 6.4, Theorem 6.3) is not included, because its algorithm box and proof use different stage lengths and its unimodality condition is stated on a smaller set than the proof uses.

Needed infrastructure: calculus of ball averages and sphere integrals, symmetry of the uniform sphere law, nonexpansiveness of projections onto closed convex sets, and conditional-expectation bookkeeping for adapted iterates. Each is reusable for zeroth-order optimization; contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2, doi:10.1561/2200000024
  • A. Flaxman, A. Kalai, H. B. McMahan, Online convex optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient, SODA 2005. arXiv:cs/0408007
  • A. Agarwal, O. Dekel, L. Xiao, Optimal algorithms for online convex optimization with multi-point bandit feedback, COLT 2010. link
  • S. Bubeck, R. Eldan, Y. T. Lee, Kernel-based methods for bandit convex optimization, STOC 2017. arXiv:1607.03084
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources VII: A Locally Quasiconcave Objective Always Has a Quasistable Optimal ScheduleTextbook

Motivation

Resource-constrained project scheduling asks for start times of the activities of a project that respect precedence-type time lags and the capacities of renewable resources (machines, crews, equipment). Classical project scheduling minimizes the project duration, a regular objective: delaying an activity never helps. Many objectives met in practice are not regular. The resource investment problem minimizes the cost of the resource capacities that must be procured; resource levelling problems minimize fluctuations of resource usage over time; the resource renting problem trades fixed procurement against time-dependent renting costs; net present value and earliness–tardiness objectives reward late as well as early starts. For such objectives the familiar fact that "some active schedule is optimal" fails, and algorithms need another finite set of candidate schedules that is guaranteed to contain an optimum.

Chapter 3 of Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (2nd ed., Springer 2003, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2), organizes the objective functions of project scheduling into seven classes and pairs each class with a class of schedules that contains an optimal schedule. This mission formalizes §3.3 of that chapter. The classification goes back to Neumann, Nübel and Schwindt (2000) and Zimmermann (2001); the two locally defined classes, and the matching schedule classes of quasiactive and quasistable schedules, are the book's device for covering discontinuous resource-based objectives.

Setting

A project consists of activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1}, n≥1n\ge 1n≥1, where 000 and n+1n+1n+1 are fictitious activities marking the project beginning and completion. Activity iii has an integer duration pip_ipi​ (p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0, pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 otherwise). The project network has an arc set EEE with integer weights δij\delta_{ij}δij​; a schedule is a vector S=(S0,…,Sn+1)S=(S_0,\dots,S_{n+1})S=(S0​,…,Sn+1​) of real start times with S0=0S_0=0S0​=0, S≥0S\ge 0S≥0, and it is time-feasible if Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​ for all ⟨i,j⟩∈E\langle i,j\rangle\in E⟨i,j⟩∈E. A maximum project duration dˉ∈N\bar d\in\mathbb Ndˉ∈N is prescribed through a backward arc ⟨n+1,0⟩\langle n+1,0\rangle⟨n+1,0⟩ of weight −dˉ-\bar d−dˉ, so Sn+1≤dˉS_{n+1}\le\bar dSn+1​≤dˉ. Each renewable resource kkk has capacity RkR_kRk​, activity iii uses rikr_{ik}rik​ units while in progress, and rk(S,t)r_k(S,t)rk​(S,t) is the total usage at time ttt. The feasible region S\mathcal SS consists of the time-feasible schedules with rk(S,t)≤Rkr_k(S,t)\le R_krk​(S,t)≤Rk​ for all kkk and ttt.

For an objective function f:R≥0n+2→Rf:\mathbb R^{n+2}_{\ge 0}\to\mathbb Rf:R≥0n+2​→R, problem PS∣temp,dˉ∣fPS|temp,\bar d|fPS∣temp,dˉ∣f asks for an optimal schedule: some S∈SS\in\mathcal SS∈S with f(S)≤f(S′)f(S)\le f(S')f(S)≤f(S′) for all S′∈SS'\in\mathcal SS′∈S.

A schedule induces the strict order O(S)={(i,j)∣i≠j, Sj≥Si+pi}O(S)=\{(i,j)\mid i\ne j,\ S_j\ge S_i+p_i\}O(S)={(i,j)∣i=j, Sj​≥Si​+pi​} of precedences it realizes. The equal-order set of SSS is

ST=(O(S))={S′ time-feasible∣Sj′≥Si′+pi ∀(i,j)∈O(S), O(S′)=O(S)},\mathcal S_T^{=}(O(S))=\{S'\text{ time-feasible}\mid S'_j\ge S'_i+p_i\ \forall (i,j)\in O(S),\ O(S')=O(S)\},ST=​(O(S))={S′ time-feasible∣Sj′​≥Si′​+pi​ ∀(i,j)∈O(S), O(S′)=O(S)},

a polytope with part of its boundary removed. The distinct equal-order sets partition S\mathcal SS into finitely many pieces.

Schedule classes are defined through shifts. A shift from a feasible SSS to a feasible S′≠SS'\ne SS′=S is order-preserving if O(S)⊆O(S′)O(S)\subseteq O(S')O(S)⊆O(S′); it is a left-shift if S′≤SS'\le SS′≤S. Two shifts from SSS to S′S'S′ and S′′S''S′′ are opposite if S′′−S=λ(S′−S)S''-S=\lambda(S'-S)S′′−S=λ(S′−S) with λ<0\lambda<0λ<0. A feasible schedule is active if no feasible left-shift exists, quasiactive if no order-preserving left-shift exists, stable if no pair of opposite shifts to feasible schedules exists, and quasistable if no pair of opposite order-preserving shifts exists.

Objective classes: fff is regular if S≤S′S\le S'S≤S′ implies f(S)≤f(S′)f(S)\le f(S')f(S)≤f(S′); quasiconcave on a set MMM if f(λS+(1−λ)S′)≥min⁡[f(S),f(S′)]f(\lambda S+(1-\lambda)S')\ge\min[f(S),f(S')]f(λS+(1−λ)S′)≥min[f(S),f(S′)] for S,S′∈MS,S'\in MS,S′∈M, λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1]; lower semicontinuous if f(S)≤lim inf⁡S′→Sf(S′)f(S)\le\liminf_{S'\to S}f(S')f(S)≤liminfS′→S​f(S′) on R≥0n+2\mathbb R^{n+2}_{\ge 0}R≥0n+2​. Then fff is locally regular (class 6) if it is lower semicontinuous and regular on every equal-order set ST=(O(S))\mathcal S_T^{=}(O(S))ST=​(O(S)), S∈SS\in\mathcal SS∈S, and locally quasiconcave (class 7) if it is lower semicontinuous and quasiconcave on every such set.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3.13

For every locally quasiconcave fff,

S≠∅ ⟹ ∃ S quasistable with f(S)=min⁡S′∈Sf(S′).\mathcal S\ne\emptyset\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,S\ \text{quasistable with}\ f(S)=\min_{S'\in\mathcal S}f(S').S=∅ ⟹ ∃S quasistable with f(S)=S′∈Smin​f(S′).

Milestones

  • Class 1 (§3.3.2): every regular fff has an active optimal schedule when S≠∅\mathcal S\ne\emptysetS=∅.
  • Class 5 (§3.3.6): every quasiconcave fff has a stable optimal schedule when S≠∅\mathcal S\ne\emptysetS=∅.
  • Eq. (3.3.11): the equal-order sets form a finite partition of S\mathcal SS.
  • Propositions 3.3.5 and 3.3.6: the resource investment objective ∑kckmax⁡trk(S,t)\sum_k c_k\max_t r_k(S,t)∑k​ck​maxt​rk​(S,t) with ck≥0c_k\ge 0ck​≥0 is constant on each equal-order set and lower semicontinuous, hence locally regular.
  • Theorem 3.3.9: every locally regular fff has a quasiactive optimal schedule when S≠∅\mathcal S\ne\emptysetS=∅.

Significance

Quasiactive and quasistable schedules are finite in number: they are the minimal points and the vertices of the finitely many schedule polytopes. Theorem 3.3.13 therefore turns the minimization of any locally quasiconcave objective over a disconnected, non-convex feasible region into a finite search. Class 7 contains the resource levelling objectives ∑ck∑rkt2\sum c_k\sum r_{kt}^2∑ck​∑rkt2​ and ∑ck∑okt\sum c_k\sum o_{kt}∑ck​∑okt​, the total variation of the resource profiles, and the resource renting objective (Propositions 3.3.10 and 3.3.12, and Nübel 2001). The enumeration schemes and decision sets of §3.5–3.7 rest on this result, and Theorem 3.3.9 plays the same role for class 6 (resource investment, changeover times).

The results are proved in the book and the cited papers. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of them, and none of the schedule classes, has a machine-checked formalization; Mathlib supplies lower semicontinuity and quasiconcavity but nothing about schedules. The mission produces a checked version of the classification theorems in the book's exact generality: general time lags (cycles in the network allowed), real start times, and arbitrary objectives given only by their class.

Difficulty

The optimum need not exist a priori: objectives of classes 6 and 7 are discontinuous, and the feasible region is a finite union of polytopes that is in general disconnected. Existence of a minimizer needs compactness of S\mathcal SS (which depends on the deadline arc and the network's path structure) together with lower semicontinuity.

The main obstacle is that the objective is only controlled piecewise. Quasiconcavity holds on each equal-order set separately, and an equal-order set is not closed: a schedule polytope ST(O(S))\mathcal S_T(O(S))ST​(O(S)) also contains schedules inducing strictly larger orders, where the hypothesis on fff says nothing about its relation to the values on ST=(O(S))\mathcal S_T^{=}(O(S))ST=​(O(S)). The obvious argument, taking an optimal schedule and invoking quasiconcavity along the segment of a pair of opposite order-preserving shifts, only relates fff at points of one equal-order set, and it does not by itself produce a schedule that admits no such pair at all. The same issue arises for Theorem 3.3.9 with order-preserving left-shifts, which may cross from one equal-order set into another.

Formalization scope

Activities are Fin (n + 2), with 0 and Fin.last (n + 1) fictitious. Start times are real; objective functions are total functions (Fin (n + 2) → ℝ) → ℝ whose regularity, quasiconcavity and lower semicontinuity are required only on the nonnegative orthant (lower semicontinuity is Mathlib's LowerSemicontinuousOn on the orthant). The deadline Sn+1≤dˉS_{n+1}\le\bar dSn+1​≤dˉ is the network's backward arc, as in §3.1. The project structure records the book's standing property (p. 8) that from each node iii there is a path to n+1n+1n+1 of length at least pip_ipi​; this bounds every activity by dˉ\bar ddˉ. The resource constraints are imposed for all t≥0t\ge 0t≥0, which under that property is the book's 0≤t≤dˉ0\le t\le\bar d0≤t≤dˉ. The peak max⁡trk(S,t)\max_t r_k(S,t)maxt​rk​(S,t) in the resource investment objective is a supremum in N\mathbb NN over t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 of a nonempty finite set, hence attained.

"Optimal" always means minimizing fff over the whole feasible region S\mathcal SS, and the theorems quantify over every function in the class; a formalization with a fixed objective, or with optimality over a single polytope or a single equal-order set, would be a different and weaker statement. The schedule classes are defined through shifts, never as minimal or extreme points, so no statement is true by definition. The only hypothesis besides the class of fff is S≠∅\mathcal S\ne\emptysetS=∅.

The mission restates locally the project model, the induced orders and the shift classes also drafted by the companion missions on schedule classes of this series. Useful contributions beyond the milestones: compactness of S\mathcal SS and closedness of the schedule polytopes, the representation of S\mathcal SS as a finite union of feasible order polytopes, and the finiteness of the sets of quasiactive and quasistable schedules.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, §3.3. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • K. Neumann, H. Nübel, C. Schwindt, Active and stable project scheduling, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 52 (2000), cited in the book as Neumann et al. (2000).
  • J. Zimmermann, Ablauforientiertes Projektmanagement: Modelle, Verfahren und Anwendungen, Gabler, 2001.
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Dynamic ProgrammingLinear OptimizationMarkov Chain+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 2: Under Irreducibility, an Optimal Solution of a Linear Program over State-Action Frequencies Yields an Optimal Stationary ProcedureResearch Paper

Linear programming for Markov decision problems

A Markov decision problem asks how to control a system that moves at random between finitely many states, where each decision changes the probabilities of the next move and incurs a cost. Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (Management Science 9(1):16–24) treats two criteria: the long-run average cost per period, and the total cost of driving the system into an absorbing state. Its Theorem 2 shows that, once attention is restricted to stationary procedures, each problem can be solved as a linear program over the state-action frequencies of the procedure. This mission formalizes that theorem, its supporting displays (3)–(10) and its Lemma on linear-fractional programs.

The linear programming formulation is now the standard computational and theoretical tool for constrained Markov decision processes, and its variables, the occupation measures, are the objects of most later work on that topic. Derman's paper is among the first to state it for the average-cost criterion. Manne (Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science, 1960) gave an earlier average-cost formulation for an inventory model. The reduction of a ratio of linear functions to a linear program in Derman's Lemma is the transformation published in the same year by Charnes and Cooper (Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1962).

Setting

There are finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​, all available in every state. Making decision dkd_kdk​ in state iii sends the system to state jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1, and costs wikw_{ik}wik​.

A procedure of class C′C'C′ is stationary randomized: in state iii it makes decision dkd_kdk​ with probability DikD_{ik}Dik​, where Dik≥0D_{ik} \ge 0Dik​≥0 and ∑kDik=1\sum_k D_{ik} = 1∑k​Dik​=1, independently of the past and of the time. Under such a procedure the states form a Markov chain with transition probabilities pij=∑kqij(k)Dikp_{ij} = \sum_k q_{ij}(k) D_{ik}pij​=∑k​qij​(k)Dik​. Write WtW_tWt​ for the expected cost at time ttt when X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i.

  • Problem 1 (average cost): minimize QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWtQ_R(i) = \limsup_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=0}^{T} W_tQR​(i)=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=0T​Wt​. Here wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0, and Assumption A says that under every procedure of C′C'C′ all states belong to one class.
  • Problem 2 (total cost): the state LLL is absorbing under every decision and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0. Minimize SR(i)=∑t=0∞WtS_R(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} W_tSR​(i)=∑t=0∞​Wt​, the expected cost of reaching LLL. Assumption B says that under every procedure of C′C'C′, LLL is reached from every state with probability one.

The state-action frequencies of a procedure D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ with stationary distribution π\piπ are xjk=πjDjkx_{jk} = \pi_j D_{jk}xjk​=πj​Djk​. They satisfy the linear constraints

(10)xjk≥0,∑kxjk−∑i∑kxik qij(k)=0  (j),∑j∑kxjk=1.\text{(10)}\qquad x_{jk} \ge 0,\qquad \sum_k x_{jk} - \sum_{i}\sum_k x_{ik}\, q_{ij}(k) = 0 \ \ (j),\qquad \sum_j\sum_k x_{jk} = 1 .(10)xjk​≥0,k∑​xjk​−i∑​k∑​xik​qij​(k)=0  (j),j∑​k∑​xjk​=1.

For Problem 2, Derman adjoins a state −1-1−1 that restarts the chain uniformly on 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and is entered from LLL. The expected total cost then becomes a ratio of two linear functions of the frequencies of this augmented chain, (9).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, pinned-down reading

The printed statement, "If Assumption A (B) holds, then problem 1 (2) can be formulated as a linear programming problem", is not a mathematical statement as it stands. The goal is the reading established by its proof (pp. 20–23).

Under Assumption A with w>0w > 0w>0, the program

min⁡ ∑j,kxjkwjksubject to (10)\min \ \sum_{j,k} x_{jk} w_{jk} \quad \text{subject to (10)}min j,k∑​xjk​wjk​subject to (10)

has an optimal solution. For every optimal x∗x^*x∗, every row sum ∑kxjk∗\sum_k x^*_{jk}∑k​xjk∗​ is positive, and Djk∗=xjk∗/∑kxjk∗D^*_{jk} = x^*_{jk}/\sum_k x^*_{jk}Djk∗​=xjk∗​/∑k​xjk∗​ satisfies QD∗(i)≤QD(i)Q_{D^*}(i) \le Q_D(i)QD∗​(i)≤QD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Under Assumption B with the Problem 2 costs, the linear program obtained from (9) by the Lemma's transformation, min⁡∑wjkzjk\min \sum w_{jk} z_{jk}min∑wjk​zjk​ subject to (12), has an optimal solution. For every optimal (z∗,zn+1∗)(z^*, z^*_{n+1})(z∗,zn+1∗​) one has zn+1∗>0z^*_{n+1} > 0zn+1∗​>0, and the procedure decoded from x∗=z∗/zn+1∗x^* = z^*/z^*_{n+1}x∗=z∗/zn+1∗​ satisfies SD∗(i)≤SD(i)S_{D^*}(i) \le S_D(i)SD∗​(i)≤SD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: the Cesàro limit and the unique positive stationary distribution of a one-class chain ((3), (5)); the taboo-probability identity (4); the formula (6) for QRQ_RQR​; the cycle formula (7) for the averaged total cost; the remark that minimizing the average of the SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) minimizes each one; the correspondence between C′C'C′ and the solutions of (10); and the Lemma reducing a linear-fractional program under conditions (i) and (ii) to the linear program (12).

Significance

The theorem replaces a search over infinitely many randomized procedures by a single finite linear program. It also yields the structural fact that an optimal stationary procedure can be read off from any optimal solution. The variables xjkx_{jk}xjk​ make constraints on long-run frequencies of actions expressible as linear constraints. That is the origin of the theory of constrained Markov decision processes, and of the dual linear programs whose variables are value functions. The Lemma is the classical linear-fractional reduction, used well beyond this setting.

All of these results are proved in the paper and in later textbooks (for example Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, 1994, §8.8 and §9.5). None of them has been formalized: Mathlib has Perron–Frobenius-type facts for irreducible matrices but no linear programming theory, no taboo probabilities and no Markov decision model. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the proof's chain of equalities and of the decoding step, written so that they can be reused for occupation-measure arguments.

Difficulty

Several steps fail in the naive argument. The correspondence between procedures and solutions of (10) needs every row sum ∑kxjk\sum_k x_{jk}∑k​xjk​ to be positive. That uses Assumption A for a procedure obtained by completing the decoded rows arbitrarily, together with the uniqueness and positivity of the stationary distribution. Positivity of the stationary vector of an irreducible but possibly periodic chain, and the Cesàro (not ordinary) convergence of PtP^tPt, have no ready-made form in Mathlib. The total-cost identity (7) needs the regenerative identity (4), whose sums must first be shown to converge, and needs the augmented chain to be irreducible, which follows from Assumption B but is not assumed. Problem 2 needs one more step: a minimizer of the averaged total cost is optimal from every starting state, which uses the finiteness of all SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i).

Formalization scope

States and decisions are finite Lean types S and Act. Probabilities and costs are real numbers, a procedure of C′C'C′ is a nonnegative real matrix with unit row sums, and the chain is chainMatrix q D. Assumption A is irreducibility (Matrix.IsIrreducible) of every such chain matrix. Assumption B is reachability of LLL from every state; for a finite chain in which LLL is absorbing, this is equivalent to absorption with probability one. QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) is a real limsup of a bounded sequence, with the paper's sum over t=0,…,Tt = 0, \dots, Tt=0,…,T. SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) takes values in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. The paper requires wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 on p. 17 and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0 in Problem 2. The formalization uses wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 for i≠Li \ne Li=L in Problem 2, and keeps the two problems as separate implications. The adjoined state −1-1−1 is none : Option S, with the transition law that produces Derman's p−1,i=1/(L+1)p_{-1,i} = 1/(L+1)p−1,i​=1/(L+1), pL,−1=1p_{L,-1} = 1pL,−1​=1 for every procedure. The published JewellMRP.InfiniteStep definitions of an ergodic matrix and of a stationary vector are reused.

The goal states optimality of the decoded procedure against every competitor in C′C'C′, for every optimal solution of the linear program, with existence of an optimal solution as a separate clause. A statement that only identifies feasible sets, or that only asserts that some optimal procedure exists, does not count as Theorem 2. Optimality over all history-dependent procedures is Theorem 1, a separate mission of this series.

Welcome contributions: the stationary-distribution facts for irreducible finite stochastic matrices (reusable across Markov chain work), a small linear-programming existence lemma (a linear function attains its minimum on a nonempty compact polytope), and the Lemma's transformation, which is self-contained.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9(3–4):181–186, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090303
  • K. L. Chung, Markov Chains with Stationary Transition Probabilities, Springer, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49686-8
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 3: A Deterministic Stationary Procedure Minimizes the Ratio of Two Long-Run Average CostsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many controlled systems are judged by a ratio of two long-run quantities rather than by a single one: cost per unit of output, cost per unit of time when the time spent in a state depends on the decision, cost per customer served, or expected cost per cycle of a renewal process. In a finite Markov decision model each of these is a quotient of two average costs per unit time. Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (DOI 10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16) introduced this ratio-of-costs criterion in its §4, prompted by the fractional linear program that its §3 uses to solve the total-cost problem as a linear program, and pointed to Klein's work on maintenance policies as an example of the problem.

The paper's §4 first observes that, restricted to stationary randomized procedures, the ratio criterion is a ratio of two linear functions of the stationary state-decision frequencies, so it can be minimized by the fractional linear programming lemma of §3. The question it then raises is the one this mission formalizes: is the procedure optimal over stationary procedures also optimal over all procedures, including history-dependent and randomized ones? Derman's Theorem 3 answers yes under an irreducibility assumption, by reducing the ratio problem to a family of ordinary average-cost problems with costs of either sign.

Timeline, as far as it bears on this mission:

  • 1960: Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, shows that linear programming applies to the average-cost problem, in the context of an inventory problem; Wagner, On the Optimality of Pure Strategies, shows by linear programming that a deterministic stationary procedure is optimal for it.
  • 1960: Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, gives policy iteration for the average-cost problem over stationary procedures.
  • 1962: Derman proves that a deterministic stationary procedure is optimal over all procedures for the average-cost criterion (Theorem 1), formulates the average and total cost problems as linear programs under irreducibility assumptions (Theorem 2), and extends the optimality of deterministic stationary procedures to the ratio criterion (Theorem 3).
  • 1962: Klein, Inspection-Maintenance-Replacement Schedules Under Markovian Deterioration, gives a problem of the ratio type (cited by Derman, p. 18).
  • 1963: Jewell, Markov-renewal programming, treats the gain rate (reward per unit sojourn time) of semi-Markov decision processes, over stationary policies.

Setting

A system is observed at times t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,… in one of finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L. After each observation one of the decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​ is made, all of them available in every state. If the system is in state iii and decision dkd_kdk​ is made, the next state is jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1.

A procedure RRR chooses the decision at time ttt at random, with probabilities Dk(X0,Δ0,…,Xt)D_k(X_0, \Delta_0, \dots, X_t)Dk​(X0​,Δ0​,…,Xt​) that may depend on the whole past; the class of all procedures is CCC. The class C′C'C′ consists of the stationary randomized procedures, for which the probability of dkd_kdk​ in state iii is a fixed number DikD_{ik}Dik​, whatever the past and the time. The class C′′C''C′′ consists of the deterministic stationary procedures, those of C′C'C′ with every Dik∈{0,1}D_{ik} \in \{0, 1\}Dik​∈{0,1}; it is finite. A procedure of C′C'C′ turns the states into a Markov chain with transition probabilities pij=∑kqij(k)Dikp_{ij} = \sum_k q_{ij}(k) D_{ik}pij​=∑k​qij​(k)Dik​.

Let wik′>0w'_{ik} > 0wik′​>0 and wik′′>0w''_{ik} > 0wik′′​>0 be two sets of costs incurred when decision dkd_kdk​ is made in state iii. For a fixed procedure RRR started at X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i, let Wt′W'_tWt′​ and Wt′′W''_tWt′′​ be the expected costs at time ttt. The ratio criterion is

ψR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞∑t=0TWt′∑t=0TWt′′.\psi_R(i) = \limsup_{T\to\infty} \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T} W'_t}{\sum_{t=0}^{T} W''_t}.ψR​(i)=T→∞limsup​∑t=0T​Wt′′​∑t=0T​Wt′​​.

For a single cost set www with expected costs WtW_tWt​, the average cost per unit time is QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWtQ_R(i) = \limsup_{T\to\infty} \frac1T \sum_{t=0}^{T} W_tQR​(i)=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=0T​Wt​.

Assumption A says that for every procedure of C′C'C′ all states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L belong to the same class of the induced Markov chain.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 23)

Under Assumption A, for every initial state iii there is a deterministic stationary procedure R3∈C′′R_3 \in C''R3​∈C′′ with

ψR3(i)=min⁡R∈CψR(i),\psi_{R_3}(i) = \min_{R \in C} \psi_R(i),ψR3​​(i)=R∈Cmin​ψR​(i),

that is, ψR3(i)≤ψR(i)\psi_{R_3}(i) \le \psi_R(i)ψR3​​(i)≤ψR​(i) for every procedure R∈CR \in CR∈C.

Steps of the proof (milestones)

  1. Theorem 1 (1) for costs of either sign: for every real cost www there is R1∈C′′R_1 \in C''R1​∈C′′ with QR1(i)≤QR(i)Q_{R_1}(i) \le Q_R(i)QR1​​(i)≤QR​(i) for all R∈CR \in CR∈C and all iii.
  2. For any procedure RRR, ψR(i)≤m\psi_R(i) \le mψR​(i)≤m implies QR(i)≤0Q_R(i) \le 0QR​(i)≤0 for the costs wik=wik′−m wik′′w_{ik} = w'_{ik} - m\, w''_{ik}wik​=wik′​−mwik′′​.
  3. Under Assumption A, for R∗∈C′′R^* \in C''R∗∈C′′, QR∗(i)≤0Q_{R^*}(i) \le 0QR∗​(i)≤0 for those costs implies ψR∗(i)≤m\psi_{R^*}(i) \le mψR∗​(i)≤m.
  4. For R∈C′R \in C'R∈C′ under Assumption A, ψR(i)=∑s∑kπsDskwsk′∑s∑kπsDskwsk′′\psi_R(i) = \dfrac{\sum_{s}\sum_k \pi_s D_{sk} w'_{sk}}{\sum_s\sum_k \pi_s D_{sk} w''_{sk}}ψR​(i)=∑s​∑k​πs​Dsk​wsk′′​∑s​∑k​πs​Dsk​wsk′​​, with π\piπ the stationary distribution of (psj)(p_{sj})(psj​).

Significance

Theorem 3 justifies solving ratio problems over stationary procedures only. Combined with the display of milestone 4 it shows that the fractional linear program over stationary state-decision frequencies yields a procedure optimal against every procedure, including those that remember the past or randomize. The same reduction, minimizing w′−mw′′w' - m w''w′−mw′′ and adjusting mmm, underlies later parametric methods for fractional Markov decision problems and the analysis of semi-Markov decision processes, where the denominator is the expected sojourn time.

All four steps and the theorem are classical and proved on paper. None of them is formalized on Prove2Me: the platform has average-cost optimality statements with nonnegative costs (Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3) and Jewell's gain-rate results restricted to stationary policies, but no statement of a ratio criterion over history-dependent procedures. This mission produces the statement of Theorem 3, the signed-cost version of Theorem 1 that it uses, and the two translation steps between the ratio criterion and the average-cost criterion.

Difficulty

The obvious argument restricts to stationary procedures, where all Cesàro limits exist and the ratio criterion is a ratio of two linear functionals of a stationary distribution. It says nothing about a history-dependent procedure, whose averages 1T∑t≤TWt′\frac1T\sum_{t\le T} W'_tT1​∑t≤T​Wt′​ and 1T∑t≤TWt′′\frac1T\sum_{t \le T} W''_tT1​∑t≤T​Wt′′​ need not converge, and for which the limit superior of the ratio is not the ratio of the limits superior. The translation from the ratio to an average cost therefore works in one direction for every procedure (milestone 2) and in the other direction only for stationary ones (milestone 3). The other ingredient, optimality of a deterministic stationary procedure for the average-cost criterion against all procedures with costs of either sign (milestone 1), is the substance of Derman's Theorem 1 and requires a vanishing-discount or equivalent argument over history-dependent procedures.

Formalization scope

The dynamics and the procedures come from the published definitions SennottDP_AvgFinite_Model: the system is an MDC S Act with [Fintype S] [Fintype Act] and the hypothesis ∀ s, M.A s = Finset.univ (all decisions available); the class CCC is Policy M, history-dependent and randomized; C′′C''C′′ is StationaryPolicy M through .toPolicy; the law of the history is histProb. The cost field M.C of that structure plays no role: the costs w′w'w′, w′′w''w′′ and the signed cost of milestone 1 are explicit real arguments S → Act → ℝ.

The local definitions are: the expected cost at time ttt for a real cost, as a finite sum over histories of length t+1t+1t+1; QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) with Derman's normalization (T+1T+1T+1 terms divided by TTT); ψR(i)\psi_R(i)ψR​(i) as the limit superior of the ratio of partial sums; the induced matrix pijp_{ij}pij​; Assumption A as Matrix.IsIrreducible of ppp for every row-stochastic D≥0D \ge 0D≥0; and membership of a procedure in C′C'C′ with probabilities DDD. All limits superior are real, of bounded sequences; positivity of w′w'w′ and w′′w''w′′ is a hypothesis of every statement involving ψ\psiψ, which keeps the denominators positive.

The goal quantifies "for every initial state there is R3R_3R3​", following the proof. The competitors in the goal and in milestone 1 range over all of Policy M; a version comparing only with stationary procedures is a different and easier theorem and does not close this mission. Assumption A is kept in the goal although the proof does not visibly use it, because the theorem states it.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, in particular the signed-cost Theorem 1 (which may reduce to Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3 by shifting costs by a constant), Cesàro limits for stationary procedures on finite chains (reusable for milestones 3 and 4), and the final compactness argument over the finite class C′′C''C′′.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • M. Klein, Inspection-Maintenance-Replacement Schedules Under Markovian Deterioration, Management Science 9(1), 1962.
  • H. M. Wagner, On the Optimality of Pure Strategies, Management Science 6(3), 1960.
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • W. S. Jewell, Markov-Renewal Programming. I: Formulation, Finite Return Models, Operations Research 11(6):938–948, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.6.938
  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems III: Contextual Bandits and the Banditron Mistake BoundTextbook

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems the learner sees side information before acting. A news site chooses an article for a visitor whose history and location it knows; an ad server chooses an advertisement for a query. Only the reward of the chosen action is observed. These are contextual bandit problems, and Chapter 4 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems (arXiv:1204.5721v2) surveys several of their formal versions. In a contextual problem the learner is compared with the best policy, a map from contexts to arms, rather than with the best single arm.

This mission covers three of the chapter's models. The first marks each round with a context from a finite set. In the second, NNN experts give advice, as in prediction with expert advice. The third is the bandit multiclass problem: a linear classifier predicts one of KKK labels and then learns only whether its prediction was right. The goal is the mistake bound of the Banditron (Kakade, Shalev-Shwartz and Tewari, ICML 2008). The bound shows that one bit of feedback per round suffices to compete with every linear classifier, at regret O(n2/3)O(n^{2/3})O(n2/3).

Setting

There are K≥2K \ge 2K≥2 arms (or labels) {1,…,K}\{1,\dots,K\}{1,…,K} and rounds t=1,…,nt = 1, \dots, nt=1,…,n.

Adversarial losses. At round ttt an adversary assigns losses ℓi,t∈[0,1]\ell_{i,t} \in [0,1]ℓi,t​∈[0,1] to the arms and may adapt to the forecaster's past plays I1,…,It−1I_1, \dots, I_{t-1}I1​,…,It−1​. The forecaster draws ItI_tIt​ at random from a distribution ptp_tpt​ that depends on what it has observed, and it observes only ℓIt,t\ell_{I_t,t}ℓIt​,t​. Expectations E\mathbb EE are over the forecaster's draws.

Side information. Each round carries a context sts_tst​ from a finite set S\mathcal SS, and the sequence s1,s2,…s_1, s_2, \dotss1​,s2​,… is fixed in advance. The pseudo-regret against context-to-arm maps is

R‾nS=max⁡g:S→{1,…,K}E[∑t=1nℓIt,t−∑t=1nℓg(st),t].\overline R^{\mathcal S}_n = \max_{g:\mathcal S\to\{1,\dots,K\}} \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t,t} - \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{g(s_t),t}\Big].RnS​=g:S→{1,…,K}max​E[t=1∑n​ℓIt​,t​−t=1∑n​ℓg(st​),t​].

The S-Exp3 forecaster runs one instance of Exp3 (Section 3.1 of the book) on each context.

Expert advice. At each round each of NNN experts jjj proposes a distribution ξtj\xi^j_tξtj​ over arms, which may depend on the forecaster's past plays. The contextual pseudo-regret is

R‾nctx=max⁡k=1,…,NE[∑t=1nℓIt,t−∑t=1nEi∼ξtkℓi,t].\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n = \max_{k=1,\dots,N}\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t,t} - \sum_{t=1}^n \mathbb E_{i\sim\xi^k_t}\ell_{i,t}\Big].Rnctx​=k=1,…,Nmax​E[t=1∑n​ℓIt​,t​−t=1∑n​Ei∼ξtk​​ℓi,t​].

Exp4 (Fig. 4.1) runs exponential weights over the experts with importance-weighted loss estimates.

Bandit multiclass. The examples (xt,yt)∈Rd×{1,…,K}(x_t, y_t) \in \mathbb R^d \times \{1,\dots,K\}(xt​,yt​)∈Rd×{1,…,K} are fixed in advance, with ∥xt∥=1\|x_t\| = 1∥xt​∥=1 (Euclidean). A K×dK\times dK×d matrix UUU classifies xxx by arg⁡max⁡i(Ux)i\arg\max_i (Ux)_iargmaxi​(Ux)i​. Its multiclass hinge loss on round ttt is ℓt(U)=[1−(Uxt)yt+max⁡i≠yt(Uxt)i]+\ell_t(U) = [1 - (Ux_t)_{y_t} + \max_{i\neq y_t}(Ux_t)_i]_+ℓt​(U)=[1−(Uxt​)yt​​+maxi=yt​​(Uxt​)i​]+​. Write Ln(U)=∑t≤nℓt(U)L_n(U) = \sum_{t\le n}\ell_t(U)Ln​(U)=∑t≤n​ℓt​(U) for the cumulative hinge loss, Lˉn(U)=Ln(U)/n\bar L_n(U) = L_n(U)/nLˉn​(U)=Ln​(U)/n for its average, and ∥U∥\|U\|∥U∥ for the Frobenius norm. The multiclass Perceptron predicts y^t=arg⁡max⁡i(Wtxt)i\hat y_t = \arg\max_i (W_tx_t)_iy^​t​=argmaxi​(Wt​xt​)i​ and, after seeing yty_tyt​, adds xtx_txt​ to row yty_tyt​ and subtracts it from row y^t\hat y_ty^​t​. The Banditron (p. 58) predicts YtY_tYt​ from pi,t=(1−γ)1y^t=i+γ/Kp_{i,t} = (1-\gamma)\mathbb 1_{\hat y_t = i} + \gamma/Kpi,t​=(1−γ)1y^​t​=i​+γ/K. It observes only 1Yt=yt\mathbb 1_{Y_t = y_t}1Yt​=yt​​ and updates Wt+1=Wt+X~tW_{t+1} = W_t + \widetilde X_tWt+1​=Wt​+Xt​, where (X~t)i,j=xt,j(1Yt=yt1Yt=i/pi,t−1y^t=i)(\widetilde X_t)_{i,j} = x_{t,j}\big(\mathbb 1_{Y_t=y_t}\mathbb 1_{Y_t=i}/p_{i,t} - \mathbb 1_{\hat y_t=i}\big)(Xt​)i,j​=xt,j​(1Yt​=yt​​1Yt​=i​/pi,t​−1y^​t​=i​). Its number of mistakes is Mn=∑t≤n1Yt≠ytM_n = \sum_{t\le n}\mathbb 1_{Y_t\neq y_t}Mn​=∑t≤n​1Yt​=yt​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.7 (Banditron)

For n≥8Kn \ge 8Kn≥8K, γ=(K/n)1/3\gamma = (K/n)^{1/3}γ=(K/n)1/3, every example sequence as above and every K×dK\times dK×d matrix UUU,

E Mn≤Ln(U)+(1+∥U∥2Lˉn(U))K1/3n2/3+2∥U∥2K2/3n1/3+2 ∥U∥K1/6n1/3.\mathbb E\,M_n \le L_n(U) + \Big(1 + \|U\|\sqrt{2\bar L_n(U)}\Big)K^{1/3}n^{2/3} + 2\|U\|^2K^{2/3}n^{1/3} + \sqrt2\,\|U\|K^{1/6}n^{1/3}.EMn​≤Ln​(U)+(1+∥U∥2Lˉn​(U)​)K1/3n2/3+2∥U∥2K2/3n1/3+2​∥U∥K1/6n1/3.

Milestones

  1. Multiclass Perceptron bound (Section 4.4, p. 57). For every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 and UUU, ∑t≤n1y^t≠yt≤Ln(U)+2∥U∥2+∥U∥2nLˉn(U)\sum_{t\le n}\mathbb 1_{\hat y_t\ne y_t} \le L_n(U) + 2\|U\|^2 + \|U\|\sqrt{2n\bar L_n(U)}∑t≤n​1y^​t​=yt​​≤Ln​(U)+2∥U∥2+∥U∥2nLˉn​(U)​.
  2. Theorem 4.1 (p. 44). S-Exp3 satisfies R‾nS≤2n∣S∣Kln⁡K\overline R^{\mathcal S}_n \le \sqrt{2n|\mathcal S|K\ln K}RnS​≤2n∣S∣KlnK​.
  3. Theorem 4.2 (p. 46), with corrected constants. Exp4 without mixing satisfies R‾nctx≤2nKln⁡N\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n \le \sqrt{2nK\ln N}Rnctx​≤2nKlnN​ for ηt=2ln⁡N/(nK)\eta_t = \sqrt{2\ln N/(nK)}ηt​=2lnN/(nK)​, and R‾nctx≤2nKln⁡N\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n \le 2\sqrt{nK\ln N}Rnctx​≤2nKlnN​ for ηt=ln⁡N/(tK)\eta_t = \sqrt{\ln N/(tK)}ηt​=lnN/(tK)​.
  4. Theorem 4.3 (p. 50), with corrected learning rate. Let the plays be drawn from distributions qtq_tqt​ with qi,t≥ε>0q_{i,t}\ge\varepsilon > 0qi,t​≥ε>0, and let Exp3 run on the estimates ℓi,t1It=i/qi,t\ell_{i,t}\mathbb 1_{I_t=i}/q_{i,t}ℓi,t​1It​=i​/qi,t​ with η=2εln⁡K/n\eta = \sqrt{2\varepsilon\ln K/n}η=2εlnK/n​. Then max⁡kE[∑tEi∼ptℓi,t−∑tℓk,t]≤(2n/ε)ln⁡K\max_k \mathbb E\big[\sum_t \mathbb E_{i\sim p_t}\ell_{i,t} - \sum_t\ell_{k,t}\big] \le \sqrt{(2n/\varepsilon)\ln K}maxk​E[∑t​Ei∼pt​​ℓi,t​−∑t​ℓk,t​]≤(2n/ε)lnK​.

Significance

Theorem 4.7 shows that, on any sequence of examples, the bandit version of online multiclass classification costs at most O(K1/3n2/3)O(K^{1/3}n^{2/3})O(K1/3n2/3) mistakes beyond the hinge loss of the best linear classifier. The full-information Perceptron, by comparison, pays O(n)O(\sqrt n)O(n​). The bound has no stochastic assumption and has explicit constants. Theorems 4.1–4.3 are the basic regret guarantees for side information and expert advice. Theorem 4.3 in particular lets learning algorithms serve as experts inside Exp4, which is the construction behind Theorem 4.5.

The mission produces machine-checked statements, and eventually proofs, of these results with fully explicit constants and an explicit model of adaptive adversaries and adaptive advice. To the curators' knowledge none of the Banditron, the multiclass Perceptron bound, S-Exp3 or Theorem 4.3 is formalized anywhere. The platform's Bandit Algorithms series has a proved Exp4 bound, but only for advice and rewards fixed in advance. The book proves all four milestones and the goal; two printed statements (4.2 and 4.3) contain misprints that this mission corrects.

Difficulty

The Banditron bound concerns a randomized process whose weight matrix depends on all earlier random predictions. The Perceptron argument tracks ⟨U,Wn+1⟩\langle U, W_{n+1}\rangle⟨U,Wn+1​⟩ and ∥Wn+1∥2\|W_{n+1}\|^2∥Wn+1​∥2. It carries over only in conditional expectation, and the second moment of the importance-weighted update is of order K/γK/\gammaK/γ on rounds where y^t≠yt\hat y_t \neq y_ty^​t​=yt​ and of order γ\gammaγ otherwise. Combining these into one inequality for ∑tP(y^t≠yt)\sum_t\mathbb P(\hat y_t\neq y_t)∑t​P(y^​t​=yt​) and then for EMn\mathbb E M_nEMn​ requires solving a quadratic inequality in the presence of expectations, and the constants must come out as printed. For the Exp3/Exp4 results, the obstacle is that losses and advice adapt to past plays. The standard potential argument has to be run conditionally on the history, and a version that fixes the losses in advance proves a weaker theorem.

Formalization scope

  • Rounds and laws. Rounds are numbered from 000 in Lean (Lean round ttt is the book's round t+1t+1t+1). Every forecaster is a sampling rule from past plays to weights on Fin K. The law of the first nnn plays is the product ∏tpt(ωt∣ω<t)\prod_t p_t(\omega_t\mid\omega_{<t})∏t​pt​(ωt​∣ω<t​) over sequences ω:Fin n→Fin K\omega : \mathrm{Fin}\,n\to\mathrm{Fin}\,Kω:Finn→FinK, and expectations are finite sums against it. The adversary and the experts are deterministic functions of past plays; an independent randomized adversary is a mixture of these. The examples of the Banditron are fixed.
  • Argmax. y^t\hat y_ty^​t​ uses any argmax selector; all tie-breaking rules are covered.
  • Norms. ∥xt∥=1\|x_t\| = 1∥xt​∥=1 is the Euclidean condition ∑jxt,j2=1\sum_j x_{t,j}^2 = 1∑j​xt,j2​=1; ∥U∥\|U\|∥U∥ is the Frobenius norm written out explicitly.
  • Infima and maxima. Each "inf⁡U\inf_UinfU​" and "max⁡k\max_kmaxk​" of the book is stated as "for every UUU" or "for every kkk", which is equivalent.
  • Explicit constants. Every bound is the one printed or, for the corrected items, the one the proof yields. No O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) appears.
  • Corrected misprints. Theorem 4.7 prints the examples in Rd×{−1,+1}\mathbb R^d\times\{-1,+1\}Rd×{−1,+1}; labels are in {1,…,K}\{1,\dots,K\}{1,…,K}. Theorem 4.2 prints 2nNln⁡K\sqrt{2nN\ln K}2nNlnK​ and 2nNln⁡K2\sqrt{nN\ln K}2nNlnK​; the proof gives 2nKln⁡N\sqrt{2nK\ln N}2nKlnN​ and 2nKln⁡N2\sqrt{nK\ln N}2nKlnN​. Theorem 4.3 prints η=2ln⁡K/(nK)\eta = \sqrt{2\ln K/(nK)}η=2lnK/(nK)​; (4.7) follows from the proof with η=2εln⁡K/n\eta = \sqrt{2\varepsilon\ln K/n}η=2εlnK/n​.
  • Parameter range. At n=8Kn = 8Kn=8K the Banditron's γ\gammaγ equals 1/21/21/2, outside the box's open interval (0,1/2)(0,1/2)(0,1/2). The proof uses only γ≤1/2\gamma\le 1/2γ≤1/2, so n=8Kn = 8Kn=8K is included.
  • Ruling out trivial forms. Theorem 4.1 is stated for the explicit S-Exp3 forecaster, not as an existence claim, so no forecaster tuned to the losses can witness it. The losses and the advice are allowed to adapt, so a proof for oblivious sequences does not suffice.
  • Left out. Theorem 4.4 (Exp4 with mixing) is proved in the book only by reference. The argument that reference suggests yields 32γn+Kln⁡N/γ\tfrac32\gamma n + K\ln N/\gamma23​γn+KlnN/γ, not the printed γn/2+Kln⁡N/γ\gamma n/2 + K\ln N/\gammaγn/2+KlnN/γ. Theorem 4.5 is stated with O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), Theorem 4.6 "for some constant ccc", and Eq. (4.8) is left to the reader.

Useful reusable infrastructure: the path-law expectation for history-dependent sampling, the exponential-weights potential argument under adaptive losses, and Perceptron-type inner-product arguments for matrices. Proofs of any milestone and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721 ; https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000024
  • S. M. Kakade, S. Shalev-Shwartz, A. Tewari, Efficient Bandit Algorithms for Online Multiclass Prediction, ICML 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1390156.1390212
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 32(1), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539701398375
  • O.-A. Maillard, R. Munos, Adaptive Bandits: Towards the Best History-Dependent Strategy, AISTATS 2011. https://proceedings.mlr.press/v15/maillard11a.html
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Functional AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Variational Principle II: Under Linearly Independent Active Constraint Gradients, a Bounded-Below Problem Has ε²-Optimal Feasible Points Satisfying the Lagrange Multiplier Rule up to εResearch Paper

Motivation

The classical Lagrange multiplier rule and its inequality-constrained form, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, are necessary conditions satisfied at a minimizer of a constrained problem. In finite dimensions, a continuous function bounded below on a closed bounded feasible set attains its minimum, so the rule describes an actual point. In an infinite-dimensional Banach space this fails: closed bounded sets are not compact, minimizing sequences need not converge, and a smooth function bounded below on a smooth constraint set can have no minimizer at all. The multiplier rule then has nothing to describe.

Ekeland's 1974 paper On the Variational Principle (DOI) introduced a principle (its Theorem 1.1) that replaces "a minimizer exists" with "near every almost-minimizer there is a point that strictly minimizes a slightly perturbed function". Section 3 of the paper uses this to prove that, for a problem with finitely many smooth equality and inequality constraints satisfying a linear-independence regularity condition, nearly optimal feasible points satisfy the KKT conditions up to a small error, with no compactness and no existence of a minimizer. This is the first appearance of what is now called an approximate or asymptotic KKT condition, a notion central to the convergence theory of nonlinear programming algorithms.

Setting

Let VVV be a real Banach space with dual V∗V^*V∗ (continuous linear functionals) and dual norm ∥x∗∥∗=sup⁡∥h∥≤1⟨x∗,h⟩\|x^*\|_*=\sup_{\|h\|\le1}\langle x^*,h\rangle∥x∗∥∗​=sup∥h∥≤1​⟨x∗,h⟩. Let F:V→RF:V\to\mathbb RF:V→R be Fréchet-differentiable, with derivative F′(v)∈V∗F'(v)\in V^*F′(v)∈V∗, and let G1,…,Gm:V→RG_1,\dots,G_m:V\to\mathbb RG1​,…,Gm​:V→R be C1C^1C1 (continuously Fréchet-differentiable). Fix 0≤p≤m0\le p\le m0≤p≤m and consider

inf⁡F(v)subject toGi(v)=0 (1≤i≤p),Gi(v)≥0 (p+1≤i≤m).(3.1)\inf F(v)\quad\text{subject to}\quad G_i(v)=0\ (1\le i\le p),\qquad G_i(v)\ge0\ (p+1\le i\le m). \tag{3.1}infF(v)subject toGi​(v)=0 (1≤i≤p),Gi​(v)≥0 (p+1≤i≤m).(3.1)

The feasible set is C={v∈V:Gi(v)=0 for i≤p, Gi(v)≥0 for i>p}\mathcal C=\{v\in V : G_i(v)=0 \text{ for } i\le p,\ G_i(v)\ge0 \text{ for } i>p\}C={v∈V:Gi​(v)=0 for i≤p, Gi​(v)≥0 for i>p} (3.2). At v∈Cv\in\mathcal Cv∈C the saturated constraints are I(v)={i:Gi(v)=0}I(v)=\{i : G_i(v)=0\}I(v)={i:Gi​(v)=0} (3.3). The regularity assumption (3.4) is: for every v∈Cv\in\mathcal Cv∈C, the derivatives Gi′(v)G_i'(v)Gi′​(v), i∈I(v)i\in I(v)i∈I(v), are linearly independent in V∗V^*V∗.

In the Lean development these are EkelandVP.Constraints.feasibleSet p G and EkelandVP.Constraints.IsRegular p G, with constraints indexed by Fin m.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 330)

Assume (3.4), C≠∅\mathcal C\ne\emptysetC=∅, and that FFF is bounded below on C\mathcal CC (3.5). Then for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are vε∈Cv_\varepsilon\in\mathcal Cvε​∈C and λ1,…,λm∈R\lambda_1,\dots,\lambda_m\in\mathbb Rλ1​,…,λm​∈R with

F(vε)≤inf⁡CF+ε2,λi≥0 (i>p),λi=0 if Gi(vε)≠0,F(v_\varepsilon)\le\inf_{\mathcal C}F+\varepsilon^2,\qquad \lambda_i\ge0\ (i>p),\qquad \lambda_i=0 \text{ if } G_i(v_\varepsilon)\ne0,F(vε​)≤Cinf​F+ε2,λi​≥0 (i>p),λi​=0 if Gi​(vε​)=0, ∥F′(vε)−∑i=1mλiGi′(vε)∥∗≤ε.\Big\|F'(v_\varepsilon)-\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_iG_i'(v_\varepsilon)\Big\|_*\le\varepsilon.​F′(vε​)−i=1∑m​λi​Gi′​(vε​)​∗​≤ε.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. (3.8)–(3.12): a feasible vvv with F(v)≤inf⁡CF+ε2F(v)\le\inf_{\mathcal C}F+\varepsilon^2F(v)≤infC​F+ε2 and F(w)≥F(v)−ε∥w−v∥F(w)\ge F(v)-\varepsilon\|w-v\|F(w)≥F(v)−ε∥w−v∥ for all w∈Cw\in\mathcal Cw∈C (the variational principle applied to FFF restricted to C\mathcal CC; no regularity needed).
  2. (3.16): at a regular feasible point vvv, every hhh with ⟨Gi′(v),h⟩=0\langle G_i'(v),h\rangle=0⟨Gi′​(v),h⟩=0 (i≤pi\le pi≤p) and ⟨Gi′(v),h⟩≥0\langle G_i'(v),h\rangle\ge0⟨Gi′​(v),h⟩≥0 (i>pi>pi>p, i∈I(v)i\in I(v)i∈I(v)) is the initial velocity of a C1C^1C1 curve u:[0,τ]→Cu:[0,\tau]\to\mathcal Cu:[0,τ]→C with u(0)=vu(0)=vu(0)=v.
  3. Lemma 3.2: at a point with the property of milestone 1, ⟨F′(v),h⟩≥−ε∥h∥\langle F'(v),h\rangle\ge-\varepsilon\|h\|⟨F′(v),h⟩≥−ε∥h∥ for every such hhh.
  4. Lemma 3.3: an ε\varepsilonε-Farkas–Minkowski lemma in V∗V^*V∗: if ⟨w∗,h⟩≥−ε∥h∥\langle w^*,h\rangle\ge-\varepsilon\|h\|⟨w∗,h⟩≥−ε∥h∥ whenever ⟨ui∗,h⟩=0\langle u_i^*,h\rangle=0⟨ui∗​,h⟩=0 and ⟨vj∗,h⟩≥0\langle v_j^*,h\rangle\ge0⟨vj∗​,h⟩≥0, then ∥w∗−∑λiui∗−∑μjvj∗∥∗≤ε\|w^*-\sum\lambda_iu_i^*-\sum\mu_jv_j^*\|_*\le\varepsilon∥w∗−∑λi​ui∗​−∑μj​vj∗​∥∗​≤ε for some λi∈R\lambda_i\in\mathbb Rλi​∈R and μj≥0\mu_j\ge0μj​≥0.

An additional item states Corollary 3.4 (p. 333), the one-constraint case: if G(v)=0⇒G′(v)≠0G(v)=0\Rightarrow G'(v)\ne0G(v)=0⇒G′(v)=0, {G=0}≠∅\{G=0\}\neq\emptyset{G=0}=∅ and FFF is bounded below on {G=0}\{G=0\}{G=0}, then for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are vεv_\varepsilonvε​ with G(vε)=0G(v_\varepsilon)=0G(vε​)=0 and λε∈R\lambda_\varepsilon\in\mathbb Rλε​∈R with ∥F′(vε)−λεG′(vε)∥∗≤ε\|F'(v_\varepsilon)-\lambda_\varepsilon G'(v_\varepsilon)\|_*\le\varepsilon∥F′(vε​)−λε​G′(vε​)∥∗​≤ε.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 is an existence theorem for approximate KKT points that needs neither compactness nor attainment of the infimum. It shows that every bounded-below problem with regular constraints has a sequence of feasible points whose objective values converge to the infimum and along which the KKT residual tends to zero. This is the property that later work calls approximate KKT or asymptotic KKT (AKKT) and uses as a stopping criterion and as a sequential optimality condition for nonlinear programming. Corollary 3.4 is the corresponding nonlinear eigenvalue statement: on a regular level set, F′F'F′ is approximately proportional to G′G'G′ at almost-minimizing points.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. Mathlib has the Fréchet derivative, the implicit function theorem for strictly differentiable maps, Banach–Alaoglu and the Hahn–Banach separation theorems, but no Ekeland principle in this form, no Lyusternik-type tangent-curve theorem for mixed equality–inequality constraints, and no Farkas lemma in a dual Banach space. Each milestone is a reusable piece of nonlinear optimization theory in Banach spaces.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "take a minimizer and apply the Lagrange multiplier rule", fails at the first step because no minimizer need exist. The variational principle supplies a point vεv_\varepsilonvε​ that minimizes F+ε∥⋅−vε∥F+\varepsilon\|\cdot-v_\varepsilon\|F+ε∥⋅−vε​∥ on C\mathcal CC, but that function is not differentiable at vεv_\varepsilonvε​, so the multiplier rule cannot be applied to it directly either. Two further gaps remain. Linearized feasible directions (those satisfying the derivative conditions on the active constraints) need not be directions along which one can actually move inside C\mathcal CC; closing this gap requires the regularity assumption and completeness of VVV, and must keep the active inequality constraints nonnegative, not just the equalities. And the resulting first-order inequality, which holds only up to ε∥h∥\varepsilon\|h\|ε∥h∥, must be turned into an approximate multiplier representation in V∗V^*V∗, an infinite-dimensional dual space in which the usual finite-dimensional Farkas lemma does not apply as stated.

Formalization scope

  • VVV is a real Banach space: [NormedAddCommGroup V] [NormedSpace ℝ V] [CompleteSpace V]. V∗V^*V∗ is V →L[ℝ] ℝ with the operator norm; F′(v)F'(v)F′(v) is fderiv ℝ F v.
  • Constraints are one family G : Fin m → V → ℝ, 0-based: the paper's constraint iii is Lean index i−1i-1i−1, an equality constraint iff its index is <p<p<p. p ≤ m is assumed in the goal.
  • C1C^1C1 is ContDiff ℝ 1; FFF is Differentiable ℝ F (Fréchet-differentiable everywhere).
  • No infimum over C\mathcal CC is formed: "bounded below" is BddBelow (F '' 𝒞) and "F(v)≤inf⁡CF+ε2F(v)\le\inf_{\mathcal C}F+\varepsilon^2F(v)≤infC​F+ε2" is "F(v)≤F(w)+ε2F(v)\le F(w)+\varepsilon^2F(v)≤F(w)+ε2 for all w∈Cw\in\mathcal Cw∈C". A real infimum over an empty or unbounded set would be a junk value.
  • Added hypotheses, disclosed in each item: C≠∅\mathcal C\ne\emptysetC=∅ (goal and milestone 1) and {G=0}≠∅\{G=0\}\ne\emptyset{G=0}=∅ (Corollary 3.4). Without them the paper's hypotheses hold vacuously (inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞) while the conclusion asks for a feasible point.
  • Lemma 3.3 is stated with ≤ε\le\varepsilon≤ε. The paper prints <ε<\varepsilon<ε in (3.20), which fails for V=RV=\mathbb RV=R, no constraints and w∗=ε idw^*=\varepsilon\,\mathrm{id}w∗=εid; its proof gives ≤\le≤, and Theorem 3.1 uses ≤\le≤.
  • Lemma 3.2 and milestone 2 assume the linear independence (3.4) only at the point vvv under consideration, and Lemma 3.2 is stated for any feasible vvv with property (3.12); this is exactly what the paper's proof uses.
  • Regularity is a linear independence of the indexed family (Gi′(v))i∈I(v)(G_i'(v))_{i\in I(v)}(Gi′​(v))i∈I(v)​, so a repeated saturated constraint violates it; the constraint qualification cannot be trivialized by collapsing duplicates.

Contributions welcome: a general Ekeland principle with the strict-minimizer conclusion, a Lyusternik–Graves tangent-curve theorem for C1C^1C1 maps with surjective derivative onto Rk\mathbb R^kRk, and a closedness result for finitely generated cones in V∗V^*V∗.

Selected references

  • I. Ekeland, On the Variational Principle, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 47 (1974) 324–353. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(74)90025-0
  • I. Ekeland, Nonconvex minimization problems, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. (N.S.) 1 (1979) 443–474. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-1979-14595-6
  • R. Andreani, G. Haeser, J. M. Martínez, On sequential optimality conditions for smooth constrained optimization, Optimization 60 (2011) 627–641. https://doi.org/10.1080/02331930903578700
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Machine Sequencing to Minimize Certain Functions of Job Tardiness I: SPT Order Minimizes Total Tardiness When Each Due Date Plus Processing Time Is at Most the Next SPT Completion TimeResearch Paper

Why total tardiness on one machine

A shop that promises delivery dates is judged by how late its orders are, not by how early. For a single machine processing nnn jobs that are all available at time 000, the total tardiness of a processing order,

T=∑i∈Jmax⁡(0, Ci−di),T=\sum_{i\in J}\max(0,\,C_i-d_i),T=i∈J∑​max(0,Ci​−di​),

charges each job the amount by which its completion time CiC_iCi​ exceeds its due date did_idi​, and nothing for finishing early. It is one of the basic criteria of deterministic scheduling (Conway, Maxwell and Miller, Theory of Scheduling, 1967), and the single-machine problem of minimizing it is the core subproblem of many dispatching and decomposition methods.

Two contrasting rules are classical. Sequencing in order of shortest processing time (SPT) minimizes total lateness ∑i(Ci−di)\sum_i (C_i-d_i)∑i​(Ci​−di​) and total completion time (Smith, 1956), and it minimizes total tardiness when every job is tardy under it. Sequencing by earliest due date (EDD) minimizes total tardiness when at most one job is tardy under it. Between these extremes no simple rule is optimal, and before 1969 the proposed exact methods (Held and Karp, 1962; Lawler, 1964; Elmaghraby, 1968) searched subsets of schedules.

Timeline.

  • 1956: Smith's ratio rule for weighted completion time; SPT for flow time and lateness.
  • 1965: Root notes that SPT is optimal for total tardiness when all due dates are equal.
  • 1969: Emmons (Operations Research 17(4)) proves dominance theorems that fix the relative order of pairs of jobs in some optimal schedule, and derives from them general sufficient conditions for SPT and EDD optimality.
  • 1977: Lawler gives a pseudopolynomial algorithm, built on Emmons's dominance results (Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1).
  • 1990: Du and Leung prove the problem NP-hard (Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3)), so sufficient conditions of Emmons's kind are the most one can expect from a simple rule.

This mission formalizes Emmons's SPT side: the pairwise dominance theorem for a shorter job before a longer one, and its corollary that the SPT schedule is optimal under a condition far weaker than "every job is tardy".

Setting

A finite set JJJ of jobs is processed on one machine. Job iii has a processing time pi≥0p_i\ge 0pi​≥0 and a due date di∈Rd_i\in\mathbb Rdi​∈R. A schedule of JJJ is an ordering of the jobs of JJJ; the machine starts at time 000, never idles, and processes the jobs in that order, so a job's completion time CiC_iCi​ is the sum of the processing times of the jobs up to and including it. Its tardiness is Ti=max⁡(0,Ci−di)T_i=\max(0, C_i-d_i)Ti​=max(0,Ci​−di​), and the schedule's total tardiness is T=∑i∈JTiT=\sum_{i\in J}T_iT=∑i∈J​Ti​. A schedule is optimal if no schedule of JJJ has smaller total tardiness.

Following Emmons, jobs are SPT-indexed: J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ are numbered so that j<kj<kj<k implies pj<pkp_j<p_kpj​<pk​, or pj=pkp_j=p_kpj​=pk​ and dj≤dkd_j\le d_kdj​≤dk​. The SPT schedule processes J1,J2,…,JnJ_1,J_2,\dots,J_nJ1​,J2​,…,Jn​ in this order.

Emmons's notation j←kj\leftarrow kj←k ("JjJ_jJj​ precedes JkJ_kJk​ in an optimal schedule") means that there exists an optimal schedule having all properties already established and in which JjJ_jJj​ comes before JkJ_kJk​. The set BkB_kBk​ collects the jobs already known to precede JkJ_kJk​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1.4 (p. 705)

dj+pj≤∑i=1j+1pi(j=1,…,n−1)⟹the SPT schedule minimizes ∑i∈Jmax⁡(0,Ci−di).d_j+p_j\le\sum_{i=1}^{j+1}p_i\quad(j=1,\dots,n-1)\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\text{the SPT schedule minimizes } \sum_{i\in J}\max(0,C_i-d_i).dj​+pj​≤i=1∑j+1​pi​(j=1,…,n−1)⟹the SPT schedule minimizes i∈J∑​max(0,Ci​−di​).

The condition can be read as dj≤Cj+(pj+1−pj)d_j\le C_j+(p_{j+1}-p_j)dj​≤Cj​+(pj+1​−pj​) with CjC_jCj​ the SPT completion time of JjJ_jJj​, so it allows jobs to be early. It is the paper's sufficient condition for SPT optimality, and the conclusion is optimality against every schedule of JJJ.

Milestones

  1. Interchange claim (proof of Theorem 1, p. 703): in a schedule where all of BBB precede JkJ_kJk​ and JkJ_kJk​ precedes JjJ_jJj​, with j<kj<kj<k and dj≤max⁡(∑Bpi+pk, dk)d_j\le\max(\sum_{B}p_i+p_k,\,d_k)dj​≤max(∑B​pi​+pk​,dk​), interchanging JjJ_jJj​ and JkJ_kJk​ does not increase total tardiness.
  2. Theorem 1 (p. 703): if some optimal schedule has all of BBB before JkJ_kJk​ and dj≤max⁡(∑Bpi+pk, dk)d_j\le\max(\sum_{B}p_i+p_k,\,d_k)dj​≤max(∑B​pi​+pk​,dk​), then some optimal schedule has all of BBB before JkJ_kJk​ and also JjJ_jJj​ before JkJ_kJk​.
  3. Corollary 1.1 (p. 704): if d1≤max⁡(pi,di)d_1\le\max(p_i,d_i)d1​≤max(pi​,di​) for all i>1i>1i>1, then J1J_1J1​ is first in an optimal schedule.
  4. Time re-referencing (p. 705): processing JkJ_kJk​ first leaves the problem on J∖{Jk}J\setminus\{J_k\}J∖{Jk​} with due dates di−pkd_i-p_kdi​−pk​.
  5. First-job reduction (p. 705): JkJ_kJk​ followed by an optimal schedule of that reduced problem is optimal, whenever some optimal schedule starts with JkJ_kJk​.

Two further results are included as supporting statements: Corollary 1.2 (p. 705, JnJ_nJn​ last) and Corollary 2.3 (p. 707, the adjacent-pair rule j←kj\leftarrow kj←k iff dj≤max⁡(W+pk,dk)d_j\le\max(W+p_k,d_k)dj​≤max(W+pk​,dk​) after a waiting time WWW).

Significance

Corollary 1.4 turns an NP-hard problem into a closed-form answer on a recognizable class of instances: one pass over the SPT order checks the condition, and if it holds no search is needed. Theorem 1 is the more general tool. It orders pairs of jobs in an optimal schedule, and together with Emmons's companion theorems it underlies later exact methods for total tardiness, including Lawler's decomposition and the branch-and-bound algorithms that use Emmons's dominance rules for pruning.

The results are proved in the paper. What a formalization adds is a checked account of the step that the paper treats informally: dominance statements are existential ("some optimal schedule has JjJ_jJj​ before JkJ_kJk​"), and the paper argues on p. 702 that such statements can be accumulated. Each statement here makes explicit which previously established properties the new optimal schedule keeps. No machine-checked proof of these results was found on Prove2Me or in Mathlib at the time of drafting.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is a pairwise interchange, but the interchanged jobs are not adjacent. Moving JkJ_kJk​ from before JjJ_jJj​ to JjJ_jJj​'s position shifts every job in between, changes two tardiness terms in different directions, and the comparison depends on where the due dates fall relative to the start of JkJ_kJk​ and the end of JjJ_jJj​. The hypothesis involving ∑Bkpi\sum_{B_k}p_i∑Bk​​pi​ only controls the start time of JkJ_kJk​ through the information that BkB_kBk​ precedes it, so the existence statement must carry that information along.

The goal is not a direct consequence of Theorem 1 applied pairwise: existential conclusions for different pairs need not hold in a common optimal schedule. Optimality of one fixed order requires all the pairwise decisions to be realized simultaneously, and the problem changes (due dates shift) once a job is fixed in place.

Formalization scope

Jobs are elements of a type ι\iotaι with a linear order that plays the role of the paper's index, and the job set is a Finset ι; this lets the reduction remove a job and keep the remaining labels. Schedules and completion times are the published definitions MooreLateJobs.Shared.IsSchedule and MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime (duplicate-free lists containing exactly the jobs of JJJ; prefix sums of processing times from time 000). Tardiness, total tardiness, optimality (against every schedule of JJJ), "precedes" (comparison of positions), the SPT indexing convention and the SPT schedule (the jobs sorted by index) are defined in EmmonsTardiness.SPT.Model. Processing times and due dates are real.

Conventions and deviations from the page:

  • Added: processing times are nonnegative, pi≥0p_i\ge0pi​≥0 for i∈Ji\in Ji∈J. They are durations; the proof of Theorem 1 uses that the start time of JkJ_kJk​ is at least ∑Bkpi\sum_{B_k}p_i∑Bk​​pi​, and Corollary 2.3's second direction is false without it.
  • Not imposed: the reduction di<∑Jpid_i<\sum_J p_idi​<∑J​pi​ of p. 703. It is a without-loss-of-generality preprocessing step that no statement needs, so dropping it makes the statements stronger.
  • Kept: the SPT indexing convention of p. 703 is a hypothesis of every statement that refers to job indices.
  • j←kj\leftarrow kj←k: the "properties already established" are the precedences named in hypothesis (1); the broader cumulative reading of p. 702 is not formalized.

A formalization of the goal as "some optimal schedule starts with J1J_1J1​", or of Theorem 1 with an arbitrary set BBB unrelated to optimal schedules, would be a different and weaker (or false) statement; the targets above state optimality of the SPT schedule itself and tie BBB to an optimal schedule.

Needed infrastructure: lemmas on prefix sums of lists, on the effect of a transposition on positions in a duplicate-free list, on removing the head of a schedule, and existence of an optimal schedule among the finitely many permutations of JJJ. These list-scheduling lemmas are reusable for other single-machine results (Moore 1968, and the EDD mission of this series). Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments, and general interchange lemmas are all welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Emmons, One-Machine Sequencing to Minimize Certain Functions of Job Tardiness, Operations Research 17(4):701–715, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.17.4.701
  • R. W. Conway, W. L. Maxwell, L. W. Miller, Theory of Scheduling, Addison-Wesley, 1967.
  • W. E. Smith, Various Optimizers for Single-Stage Production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3:59–66, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
  • J. G. Root, Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions on k Parallel Machines, Management Science 11:460–475, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.4.460
  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1):102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • E. L. Lawler, A "Pseudopolynomial" Algorithm for Sequencing Jobs to Minimize Total Tardiness, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1:331–342, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70742-8
  • J. Du, J. Y.-T. Leung, Minimizing Total Tardiness on One Machine is NP-Hard, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3):483–495, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.15.3.483
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Nonlinear Programming Algorithm for Solving Semidefinite Programs via Low-rank Factorization: A Regular Local Minimum That Stays Locally Minimal After Adding a Zero Column Solves the SDPResearch Paper

Motivation

Semidefinite programs (SDPs) arise as convex relaxations of combinatorial problems such as maximum cut and the Lovász theta function, and in control and eigenvalue optimization. Interior-point methods solve them reliably but manipulate dense n×nn\times nn×n matrices, which limits the size of the instances they can handle. Burer and Monteiro (Math. Program. 95 (2003)) proposed replacing the matrix variable X⪰0X\succeq 0X⪰0 by a factorization X=RRTX=RR^{T}X=RRT with RRR having only rrr columns, and solving the resulting nonconvex program by a first-order augmented Lagrangian method. The approach rests on a theorem of Barvinok (1995) and Pataki (1998): an SDP with mmm linear constraints has an optimal solution of rank rrr with r(r+1)/2≤mr(r+1)/2\le mr(r+1)/2≤m, so a small number of columns suffices.

Because the factorized problem is nonconvex, a local minimum it returns is not automatically a solution of the SDP. Section 2 of the paper gives conditions under which it is. This mission formalizes those conditions, culminating in Proposition 2.5, which justifies the paper's strategy of increasing the rank one column at a time.

Setting

For real p×qp\times qp×q matrices, the trace inner product is A∙B=trace⁡(ATB)A\bullet B=\operatorname{trace}(A^{T}B)A∙B=trace(ATB). The data are symmetric matrices C,A1,…,Am∈SnC, A_1,\dots,A_m\in\mathcal S^nC,A1​,…,Am​∈Sn and a vector b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The primal SDP and dual SDP are

(1)min⁡{C∙X:Ai∙X=bi, i=1,…,m, X⪰0},(3)max⁡{bTy:S=C−∑i=1myiAi, S⪰0}.\text{(1)}\quad \min\{C\bullet X : A_i\bullet X=b_i,\ i=1,\dots,m,\ X\succeq0\},\qquad \text{(3)}\quad \max\Big\{b^{T}y : S=C-\sum_{i=1}^m y_iA_i,\ S\succeq0\Big\}.(1)min{C∙X:Ai​∙X=bi​, i=1,…,m, X⪰0},(3)max{bTy:S=C−i=1∑m​yi​Ai​, S⪰0}.

The standing assumptions of the paper are that A1,…,AmA_1,\dots,A_mA1​,…,Am​ are linearly independent and that there are feasible X∗X^*X∗ and (S∗,y∗)(S^*,y^*)(S∗,y∗) with C∙X∗=bTy∗C\bullet X^*=b^{T}y^*C∙X∗=bTy∗.

For a positive integer r≤nr\le nr≤n, the low-rank program is

(Nr)min⁡{C∙(RRT):Ai∙(RRT)=bi, i=1,…,m, R∈Rn×r}.(N_r)\qquad \min\{C\bullet(RR^{T}) : A_i\bullet(RR^{T})=b_i,\ i=1,\dots,m,\ R\in\mathbb R^{n\times r}\}.(Nr​)min{C∙(RRT):Ai​∙(RRT)=bi​, i=1,…,m, R∈Rn×r}.

Its Lagrangian is L(R,y)=C∙(RRT)−∑iyi(Ai∙(RRT)−bi)L(R,y)=C\bullet(RR^{T})-\sum_i y_i(A_i\bullet(RR^{T})-b_i)L(R,y)=C∙(RRT)−∑i​yi​(Ai​∙(RRT)−bi​), and S(y)=C−∑iyiAiS(y)=C-\sum_i y_iA_iS(y)=C−∑i​yi​Ai​. A feasible RRR is a local minimum if it minimizes the objective among nearby feasible points; it is a regular point if A1R,…,AmRA_1R,\dots,A_mRA1​R,…,Am​R are linearly independent; it is a stationary point with multiplier yyy if ∇RL(R,y)=0\nabla_RL(R,y)=0∇R​L(R,y)=0. The injection of R∈Rn×rR\in\mathbb R^{n\times r}R∈Rn×r is R^=[ R  0 ]∈Rn×(r+1)\hat R=[\,R\ \ 0\,]\in\mathbb R^{n\times(r+1)}R^=[R  0]∈Rn×(r+1), obtained by appending a zero column.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.5

Let r<nr<nr<n and let R∗R^*R∗ be a regular local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) with multiplier y∗y^*y∗, S∗=S(y∗)S^*=S(y^*)S∗=S(y∗), S∗R∗=0S^*R^*=0S∗R∗=0. If R^\hat RR^ is a local minimum of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​), then

X∗=R∗(R∗)T solves (1)and(S∗,y∗) solves (3).X^*=R^*(R^*)^{T}\ \text{solves (1)}\quad\text{and}\quad (S^*,y^*)\ \text{solves (3)}.X∗=R∗(R∗)T solves (1)and(S∗,y∗) solves (3).

Milestones

  1. The derivative formulas (9): ∇R(Ai∙(RRT)−bi)=2AiR\nabla_R(A_i\bullet(RR^T)-b_i)=2A_iR∇R​(Ai​∙(RRT)−bi​)=2Ai​R, ∇RL(R,y)=2SR\nabla_RL(R,y)=2SR∇R​L(R,y)=2SR, and LRR′′(R,y)[D,D]=2S∙(DDT)L''_{RR}(R,y)[D,D]=2S\bullet(DD^T)LRR′′​(R,y)[D,D]=2S∙(DDT).
  2. Proposition 2.3: at a regular local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) there is a unique y∗y^*y∗ with S∗R∗=0S^*R^*=0S∗R∗=0, and S∗∙(DDT)≥0S^*\bullet(DD^T)\ge0S∗∙(DDT)≥0 for every DDD with AiR∗∙D=0A_iR^*\bullet D=0Ai​R∗∙D=0 for all iii.
  3. Proposition 2.1: feasible XXX and (S,y)(S,y)(S,y) are simultaneously optimal if and only if X∙S=0X\bullet S=0X∙S=0.
  4. Proposition 2.4: a stationary point of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) whose S∗S^*S∗ is positive semidefinite gives optimal X∗=R∗R∗TX^*=R^*R^{*T}X∗=R∗R∗T and (S∗,y∗)(S^*,y^*)(S∗,y∗).

Significance

Proposition 2.5 is a certificate of global optimality for a nonconvex problem obtained from local information alone. It is the basis of the rank-increase scheme described on p. 8 of the paper: compute a local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) for a small rrr; if the zero-column extension is still a local minimum of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​), the current point solves the SDP; otherwise a better point of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​) exists and rrr is increased. Proposition 2.4 gives the companion test, valid for every rrr: positive semidefiniteness of the multiplier matrix at a stationary point. These statements underlie the later convergence analysis of the method (Burer & Monteiro 2005) and the literature on benign landscapes of low-rank SDP formulations (Boumal, Voroninski & Bandeira 2016).

The results are proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version of the full chain from the standard-form SDP to the rank-increase certificate, including the matrix calculus (9), the first- and second-order necessary conditions for an equality-constrained program over rectangular matrices, and SDP complementary slackness in standard form. No machine-checked proof of these results is recorded in Mathlib or on the platform.

Difficulty

The SDP side (Propositions 2.1 and 2.4) is linear algebra: weak duality and the fact that the trace inner product of two positive semidefinite matrices is nonnegative. The substance lies in Proposition 2.3. The feasible set of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) is a variety cut out by mmm quadratic equations, and the multiplier rule and, especially, the second-order necessary condition require a constraint qualification and a curve in the feasible set realizing every tangent direction. Mathlib provides a first-order Lagrange multiplier rule, but not the second-order condition on the tangent space. A naive attempt to read Proposition 2.5 off Proposition 2.4 fails: local minimality of R∗R^*R∗ alone does not make S∗S^*S∗ positive semidefinite (when rrr is below the minimal optimal rank, it is not); the hypothesis on (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​) is indispensable.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin r) ℝ with 0-based indices. The trace inner product is frob A B = trace(Aᵀ * B), defined for rectangular matrices. The data carry explicit symmetry hypotheses C.IsSymm and (A i).IsSymm; without them the formulas (9) are false. Primal feasibility uses Mathlib's PosSemidef, which over R\mathbb RR includes symmetry. Optimality for (1) and (3) is defined relative to their entire feasible sets. The standing assumptions are a separate predicate carried as a hypothesis by Propositions 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, and every statement about (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) carries 0<r0<r0<r and r≤nr\le nr≤n (or r<nr<nr<n). Gradients are Fréchet derivatives under the Frobenius norm, identified with matrices through the trace inner product; local minima use IsLocalMinOn on the feasible set of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) together with feasibility. The injection appends the zero column as the last column.

The statement admits several trivializing encodings, all excluded here: optimality defined relative to the factorized feasible set instead of the whole SDP, an empty or unconstrained (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) (an unconstrained local minimum or a local minimum without feasibility), a stationarity notion that already includes S⪰0S\succeq0S⪰0, and an injection other than the zero-column extension.

A complete development needs the matrix calculus of R↦RRTR\mapsto RR^{T}R↦RRT, a second-order necessary optimality condition under linear independence of the constraint gradients, and standard-form SDP weak duality and complementary slackness; all of these are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, in particular the derivative formulas and Proposition 2.4, are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • S. Burer and R. D. C. Monteiro, A nonlinear programming algorithm for solving semidefinite programs via low-rank factorization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003), 329–357. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0352-8 (statements cited from the authors' manuscript of March 9, 2001)
  • A. Barvinok, Problems of distance geometry and convex properties of quadratic maps, Discrete & Computational Geometry 13 (1995), 189–202. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02574037
  • G. Pataki, On the rank of extreme matrices in semidefinite programs and the multiplicity of optimal eigenvalues, Mathematics of Operations Research 23 (1998), 339–358. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.2.339
  • R. D. C. Monteiro and M. Todd, Path-following methods for semidefinite programming, in Handbook of Semidefinite Programming, Kluwer, 2000 (source of Proposition 2.1).
  • S. Burer and R. D. C. Monteiro, Local minima and convergence in low-rank semidefinite programming, Mathematical Programming 103 (2005), 427–444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-004-0564-1
  • N. Boumal, V. Voroninski and A. S. Bandeira, The non-convex Burer–Monteiro approach works on smooth semidefinite programs, NeurIPS 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04970
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 1: Sequential Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Why posted prices

A seller who must decide whom to serve among several buyers with private values can, in principle, run Myerson's revenue-optimal mechanism: collect bids, compute virtual values, serve the feasible set of largest virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments (Myerson 1981). In practice sellers rarely do this. Retail, ticketing and online platforms mostly use posted prices: each buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and accepts if and only if the price does not exceed the buyer's value. Posted prices are simple to explain, are trivially truthful, and do not require buyers to reveal their values.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) asked how much revenue is lost by this simplification, and showed that for a wide range of feasibility constraints a sequential posted-price mechanism recovers a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. The matroid case, a factor of 2, is the first and most widely cited of their results. It is a revenue analogue of the prophet inequality and was one of the starting points of the literature on "simple versus optimal" mechanisms.

Setting

There are nnn single-parameter agents, indexed by [n][n][n], and one seller. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual valuation of agent iii is

ϕi(vi)=vi−1−Fi(vi)fi(vi),\phi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)},ϕi​(vi​)=vi​−fi​(vi​)1−Fi​(vi​)​,

and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing.

The seller faces a feasibility constraint: a downward-closed family J\mathcal JJ of subsets of [n][n][n], the sets of agents that can be served together. The rank of a set SSS is rank⁡(S)=max⁡S′⊆S, S′∈J∣S′∣\operatorname{rank}(S) = \max_{S' \subseteq S,\, S' \in \mathcal J} |S'|rank(S)=maxS′⊆S,S′∈J​∣S′∣. The constraint is a matroid if it satisfies the augmentation axiom: whenever A,B∈JA, B \in \mathcal JA,B∈J and ∣A∣>∣B∣|A| > |B|∣A∣>∣B∣, some e∈A∖Be \in A \setminus Be∈A∖B has B∪{e}∈JB \cup \{e\} \in \mathcal JB∪{e}∈J. Examples are kkk identical units (kkk-uniform matroids) and disjoint markets with separate capacities (partition matroids).

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J of served agents and a payment πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v) for each agent. It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ends with negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i = \Pr[i \in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is the probability that it serves agent iii.

A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) with ordering σ\sigmaσ and prices p\mathbf pp approaches the agents in the order σ\sigmaσ. When agent iii's turn comes, if adding iii to the set AAA of agents served so far keeps AAA feasible, iii is offered price pip_ipi​ and is served (and pays pip_ipi​) if pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; otherwise iii is blocked. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

The mechanism S\mathcal SS of the paper sets pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​), so that agent iii accepts an offer with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​, and approaches the agents in decreasing order of price.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For regular, independent values and a matroid constraint, for every truthful mechanism MMM and the SPM S\mathcal SS built from its service probabilities,

RM≤2 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤2Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's optimal mechanism gives the paper's statement that S\mathcal SS 2-approximates the optimal revenue.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)].
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 5): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M \le \sum_i p^M_i q^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  3. Revenue of an SPM (§2.2, p. 4): Rpσ=∑iciqipi\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p} = \sum_i c_i q_i p_iRpσ​=∑i​ci​qi​pi​, where cic_ici​ is the probability that agent iii is offered service and qi=1−Fi(pi)q_i = 1 - F_i(p_i)qi​=1−Fi​(pi​).
  4. Rank bound (§4, p. 6): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i \in S} q^M_i \le \operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS.
  5. Lost revenue (proof of Theorem 5, p. 7): in any run under a matroid, with prices in decreasing order and weights qqq satisfying the rank bound, ∑i blockedpiqi≤∑i servedpi\sum_{i \text{ blocked}} p_i q_i \le \sum_{i \text{ served}} p_i∑i blocked​pi​qi​≤∑i served​pi​.
  6. Half of the benchmark (p. 7): under the same conditions, ∑ipiqi≤2Rpσ\sum_i p_i q_i \le 2 \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}∑i​pi​qi​≤2Rpσ​.

Significance

The theorem shows that under a matroid constraint the optimal mechanism's advantage over a single round of posted prices is at most a factor of 2, uniformly over all regular distributions. Prices, rather than an auction, then suffice up to a constant, which justifies posted pricing in settings where an auction is impractical. The same argument, with the matroid replaced by an intersection of mmm matroids, gives the paper's Theorems 7 and 8, and the bound underlies the analysis of VCG with reserve prices (Theorem 32). Lemma 2's benchmark ∑ipiMqiM\sum_i p^M_i q^M_i∑i​piM​qiM​ became a standard tool for "ex ante relaxation" arguments.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires Myerson's revenue characterization in a multi-agent, dominant-strategy setting with a general feasibility constraint, which Lean's libraries do not have, and a probabilistic analysis of a sequential process over a product measure. Related formalizations exist for narrower models: the single-unit, Bayesian incentive compatible revenue identity MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus (Börgers' textbook, common support) and the i.i.d. multi-unit RevenueManagement.revenue_equivalence. Neither covers per-agent supports, set-system constraints or dominant-strategy truthfulness.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the SPM with the hypothetical mechanism that ignores the feasibility constraint, whose revenue is exactly ∑ipiqi\sum_i p_i q_i∑i​pi​qi​. The SPM loses the revenue of agents who would have accepted but are blocked. The difficulty is that blocking is correlated with the values of earlier agents, and the lost revenue must be bounded by revenue actually collected. A naive per-agent charge fails in a general matroid, because one served agent can block many others; the bound has to use the matroid's rank structure together with the decreasing price order.

On the mechanism side, Lemma 2 needs the full Myerson theory: monotonicity of truthful allocations, the payment identity, and an optimization over interim allocation rules with a fixed service probability, where regularity is used.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CHMSPricing.SpmMatroid. Agents are Fin n. The following conventions are fixed.

  • Distributions. Each FiF_iFi​ is given by a measurable density, strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i<v‾i0 \le \underline v_i < \overline v_i0≤v​i​<vi​, integrating to 111 there, with no mass outside. There are no point masses, so the randomized variant of S\mathcal SS in §4 does not arise. The prior is the product measure.
  • Regularity. Monotone non-decreasing virtual values on the support (Definition 2). All goals assume regular distributions, as the body's analyses do; the non-regular case (the second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) uses randomized prices and is out of scope.
  • Truthfulness. Deterministic mechanisms, dominant-strategy incentive compatible with deviations within the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to zero.
  • Benchmark. The goal is stated for every truthful MMM, with S\mathcal SS built from MMM's own service probabilities; this is stronger than comparing with Myerson's mechanism alone and avoids constructing it.
  • Prices. pi=Fi−1(1−qi)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qi​) is passed as an argument with the hypotheses pi∈[v‾i,v‾i]p_i \in [\underline v_i, \overline v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiF_i(p_i) = 1 - q_iFi​(pi​)=1−qi​, rather than through a generalized inverse.
  • SPM. Positions are 000-based; the price belongs to the agent; acceptance is pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; ties in the decreasing price order are arbitrary, and the goal holds for every such order.
  • Proposition 1 additionally assumes the normalization that an agent with value v‾i\underline v_iv​i​ has zero utility, which is how the paper's payments are pinned down.

The goal cannot be trivialized by a free choice of prices: the prices are tied to the mechanism's service probabilities, and the SPM uses the same matroid as the mechanism. Individual rationality is essential, since without it a "truthful" mechanism can extract unbounded revenue.

A complete development needs Myerson's lemma for dominant-strategy single-parameter mechanisms, a quantile/revenue-curve argument under regularity, matroid span and rank facts for the paper's finite set systems, and independence arguments for a sequential process on a product measure. The rank bound and the deterministic lost-revenue inequality are independent of the probabilistic parts and are good first contributions; the Myerson-side lemmas are reusable for the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010; STOC 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Bulow, J. Roberts, The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, Journal of Political Economy 97(5):1060–1090, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1086/261643
  • R. Kleinberg, S. M. Weinberg, Matroid Prophet Inequalities, STOC 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4764
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 2: Sequential Posted Prices e/(e−1)-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Partition Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who knows the distributions of buyers' values can maximise expected revenue with Myerson's optimal mechanism (Myerson 1981): collect bids, compute virtual values, serve a feasible set of maximum virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments. Real sellers seldom run such auctions. They post prices: a buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and either accepts or walks away. Posted prices need no bidding, involve no competition between buyers, and are trivially truthful. The question is how much revenue they give up.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) answer this for a range of feasibility constraints with a single construction, the sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) S\mathcal SS. For general matroids it loses at most a factor 222 (Theorem 5). For uniform and partition matroids, that is, multi-unit sales and unions of multi-unit sales, it loses at most a factor e/(e−1)≈1.58e/(e-1)\approx1.58e/(e−1)≈1.58 (Theorem 6), and the paper shows this factor is tight for its mechanism. This mission targets Theorem 6.

Timeline. Myerson (1981) characterised the optimal single-parameter mechanism. Blumrosen and Holenstein (2008) showed that the best single-unit SPM can be a factor π/2\sqrt{\pi/2}π/2​ below Myerson's revenue even with i.i.d. buyers. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg (EC 2007) used posted prices to approximate multi-parameter unit-demand pricing. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (2010) gave the matroid, partition-matroid and matroid-intersection bounds. Yan (SODA 2011) explained the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) factor through the correlation gap of submodular functions and sharpened it for kkk units to 1−kke−k/k!1-k^ke^{-k}/k!1−kke−k/k!.

Setting

There are nnn agents. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual value is φi(v)=v−1−Fi(v)fi(v)\varphi_i(v)=v-\frac{1-F_i(v)}{f_i(v)}φi​(v)=v−fi​(v)1−Fi​(v)​, and FiF_iFi​ is regular if φi\varphi_iφi​ is non-decreasing. The seller may serve any set in a downward-closed family J⊆2[n]\mathcal J\subseteq2^{[n]}J⊆2[n].

A partition matroid assigns each agent iii to a part part(i)\mathrm{part}(i)part(i) and each part bbb a capacity cap(b)∈N\mathrm{cap}(b)\in\mathbb Ncap(b)∈N. A set is feasible iff it contains at most cap(b)\mathrm{cap}(b)cap(b) agents of every part bbb. With one part of capacity kkk this is the kkk-uniform matroid: at most kkk agents are served.

A truthful mechanism MMM maps a value vector v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)M(\mathbf v)M(v) and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and individually rational. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M=\mathbb E[\sum_i\pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i=\Pr[i\in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is its service probability for agent iii.

The sequential posted-price mechanism S\mathcal SS built from MMM sets the price pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​) for agent iii, so that agent iii accepts with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​. It approaches the agents one at a time in decreasing order of price (σ\sigmaσ is the ordering). It offers agent iii the price pip_ipi​ if adding iii to the agents already served keeps the set feasible. The agent accepts iff pi≤vip_i\le v_ipi​≤vi​. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6, partition matroids

For every partition matroid, every truthful MMM, and S\mathcal SS built from MMM as above,

RM≤ee−1 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M\le\frac{e}{e-1}\,\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤e−1e​Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's mechanism gives the paper's statement.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (regular case): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M\le\sum_ip^M_iq^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  2. Rank bound (§4): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i\in S}q^M_i\le\operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS; for a part bbb this reads ∑part(i)=bqiM≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q^M_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qiM​≤cap(b).
  3. Single-unit revenue formula (App. C.2): RS=∑kckpkqk\mathcal R^{\mathcal S}=\sum_kc_kp_kq_kRS=∑k​ck​pk​qk​ with ck=∏j<k(1−qj)c_k=\prod_{j<k}(1-q_j)ck​=∏j<k​(1−qj​), positions in offer order.
  4. Lemma 20: with ppp defined by ∑kpkqk=p∑kqk\sum_kp_kq_k=p\sum_kq_k∑k​pk​qk​=p∑k​qk​ (equation (2)) and prices decreasing, p∑kckqk≤∑kckpkqkp\sum_kc_kq_k\le\sum_kc_kp_kq_kp∑k​ck​qk​≤∑k​ck​pk​qk​.
  5. Display (3): if ∑kqk=s≤1\sum_kq_k=s\le1∑k​qk​=s≤1, then p∑kckqk=p(1−∏k(1−qk))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)psp\sum_kc_kq_k=p(1-\prod_k(1-q_k))\ge p(1-(1-s/n)^n)\ge(1-1/e)psp∑k​ck​qk​=p(1−∏k​(1−qk​))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)ps.
  6. Theorem 21: the goal for the 111-uniform matroid.
  7. Theorem 22: the goal for the kkk-uniform matroid, every kkk.

Significance

The theorem shows that a mechanism with no bidding loses at most about 37%37\%37% of the optimal revenue when the constraint is a union of multi-unit supplies. That covers selling several kinds of goods, each in limited stock, to single-minded buyers. The prices are computed once from the distributions. The order is fixed before any value is seen. No agent's payment depends on another agent's report. The factor is tight for this mechanism (App. C.2), and the same template (prices from service probabilities, decreasing order) gives factor 222 for all matroids and m+1m+1m+1 for intersections of mmm matroids.

On the formal side, the paper's results are proved but none is machine-checked as far as we know. The platform has Myerson-type results for a single unit with Bayesian incentive compatibility and a common support (Börgers), and for i.i.d. buyers with a fixed number of units (Talluri and van Ryzin). Neither covers independent, non-identical buyers under a set-system constraint with dominant-strategy truthfulness. A complete development would include the ex-ante revenue bound of Lemma 2 for regular distributions, which is reusable for any posted-price or prophet-inequality argument, and the 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e correlation-gap inequality.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares S\mathcal SS with Myerson's mechanism one agent at a time. That fails, because S\mathcal SS may stop offering to an agent once the units of its part are gone, and the agents blocked this way can be the ones Myerson's mechanism serves. The loss has to be bounded in aggregate, using only the ex-ante constraint ∑part(i)=bqi≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qi​≤cap(b). The single-unit case reduces to an inequality about products ∏(1−qj)\prod(1-q_j)∏(1−qj​). For kkk units, the printed proof (pp. 15–16) is an induction that compares the run with a hypothetical single-unit instance with probabilities qi/kq_i/kqi​/k. Its second case is informal, so a formal proof needs its own argument for the kkk-unit bound. Passing from uniform to partition matroids needs the observation that with a global order the run inside each part depends only on that part's agents. Lemma 2 needs the revenue-curve concavity that regularity gives, stated through densities rather than derivatives.

Formalization scope

  • Values. Each FiF_iFi​ has a density that is measurable and strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,vˉi][\underline v_i,\bar v_i][v​i​,vˉi​] with 0≤v‾i0\le\underline v_i0≤v​i​, integrates to 111 there, and has no mass outside. The paper says only "with density fif_ifi​". This pin rules out point masses, so the randomised-price variant of S\mathcal SS never arises. The prior is the product of these laws.
  • Regularity is φi\varphi_iφi​ non-decreasing on the support, assumed for every agent in the goal, as in the paper's §4 analyses. The non-regular extension (second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) is out of scope.
  • Truthful means deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible over the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible, with measurable allocations and integrable payments.
  • Prices are arguments tied to MMM by pi∈[v‾i,vˉi]p_i\in[\underline v_i,\bar v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vˉi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiMF_i(p_i)=1-q^M_iFi​(pi​)=1−qiM​. No inverse distribution function is defined.
  • Order. The order σ\sigmaσ is a permutation with σ(0)\sigma(0)σ(0) first, decreasing in price, and ties are arbitrary. It is global across parts. Parts of capacity 000 are allowed.
  • Constant. The constant is exactly e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1).
  • No free prices. The theorem is not stated with free or existentially chosen prices. Prices are pinned to MMM's service probabilities, and S\mathcal SS uses the same constraint as MMM. A statement in which the prices could be chosen after the fact, or in which MMM were not required to be individually rational, would be a different or false theorem.
  • Every truthful MMM. The comparison is with every truthful MMM, not with a constructed Myerson mechanism. This form is at least as strong as the paper's, and it is what the paper's proof shows.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the algebraic milestones (Lemma 20, display (3)), the revenue formula, Lemma 2 (reusable payment-identity infrastructure for dominant-strategy mechanisms), and a correlation-gap argument for kkk units.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, STOC 2010; arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • L. Blumrosen, T. Holenstein, Posted Prices vs. Negotiations: An Asymptotic Analysis, ACM EC 2008.
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap, ACM-SIAM SODA 2011.
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources VIII: A Vertex Schedule Maximizes the Net Present Value iff Its Spanning-Tree Subprojects Have the Right SignsTextbook

Motivation

Long-running projects such as construction, plant engineering or software development involve payments to and from the contractor at many points in time: disbursements when activities are carried out, progress payments when milestones are reached. When the planning horizon is long, money received later is worth less, and the natural financial objective is the net present value of all cash flows. Scheduling a project to maximize its net present value subject to minimum and maximum time lags was studied by Russell (1970) and Grinold (1972), and the problem is the prototype of a nonregular objective: delaying an activity can be profitable, because disbursements lose value when they are postponed.

This mission follows Chapter 3 of Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (2nd ed., Springer 2003). The book shows that the net present value objective belongs to the class of binary-monotone objective functions (§3.3.5), and it uses this in §3.9.1 to give a combinatorial optimality criterion for the resource-free problem: a vertex schedule is optimal exactly when the subprojects cut off by the arcs of a spanning tree have net present values of the right sign (Proposition 3.9.2). That criterion drives the book's parametric analysis of the net present value as a function of the discount rate and the deadline.

Setting

A project consists of activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1}, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, where 000 is the project beginning and n+1n+1n+1 the project completion. Activity iii has an integer duration pip_ipi​, with p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0 and pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 otherwise. Temporal constraints are the arcs of a project network N=⟨V,E;δ⟩N=\langle V,E;\delta\rangleN=⟨V,E;δ⟩: an arc ⟨i,j⟩\langle i,j\rangle⟨i,j⟩ with integer weight δij\delta_{ij}δij​ requires Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​ for the start times SiS_iSi​. A maximum project duration dˉ\bar ddˉ is the arc ⟨n+1,0⟩\langle n+1,0\rangle⟨n+1,0⟩ with weight −dˉ-\bar d−dˉ. The time-feasible region is

ST={S∈R≥0n+2∣S0=0, Sj−Si≥δij (⟨i,j⟩∈E)}.\mathcal S_T=\{S\in\mathbb R^{n+2}_{\ge0}\mid S_0=0,\ S_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}\ (\langle i,j\rangle\in E)\}.ST​={S∈R≥0n+2​∣S0​=0, Sj​−Si​≥δij​ (⟨i,j⟩∈E)}.

Let 0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1 be the discount rate (β=1/(1+I)\beta=1/(1+I)β=1/(1+I) for an interest rate III) and ciF∈Rc_i^F\in\mathbb RciF​∈R the cash flow of activity iii, paid at its completion time Ci=Si+piC_i=S_i+p_iCi​=Si​+pi​. The problem (3.9.1) is

minimize f(S)=−∑i∈VciFβSi+pisubject to S∈ST,\text{minimize } f(S)=-\sum_{i\in V}c_i^F\beta^{S_i+p_i}\quad\text{subject to } S\in\mathcal S_T,minimize f(S)=−i∈V∑​ciF​βSi​+pi​subject to S∈ST​,

and a minimizer is a time-optimal schedule. A vertex of ST\mathcal S_TST​ is an extreme point. A spanning tree G=⟨V,EG⟩G=\langle V,E^G\rangleG=⟨V,EG⟩ is associated with SSS if EG⊆EE^G\subseteq EEG⊆E, EGE^GEG has n+1n+1n+1 arcs and a connected underlying undirected graph, and SSS is the unique solution of S0=0S_0=0S0​=0, Sj−Si=δijS_j-S_i=\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​=δij​ for ⟨i,j⟩∈EG\langle i,j\rangle\in E^G⟨i,j⟩∈EG. Deleting a tree arc ⟨i,j⟩\langle i,j\rangle⟨i,j⟩ splits GGG into two subtrees; VijV_{ij}Vij​ is the node set of the one not containing 000. The arc is forward if the tree path from 000 passes it from iii to jjj and backward otherwise, and

npvij(S)=∑h∈VijchFβSh+phnpv^{ij}(S)=\sum_{h\in V_{ij}}c_h^F\beta^{S_h+p_h}npvij(S)=h∈Vij​∑​chF​βSh​+ph​

is the net present value of the subproject VijV_{ij}Vij​. Finally, fff is binary-monotone if it is monotone on every line {S+λz≥0∣λ∈R}\{S+\lambda z\ge0\mid\lambda\in\mathbb R\}{S+λz≥0∣λ∈R} with direction z∈{0,1}n+2z\in\{0,1\}^{n+2}z∈{0,1}n+2 (Definition 3.3.2).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.9.2, pinned reading

Assume every node is reached from 000 by a path of nonnegative length (the standing convention of §1.2) and let SSS be a vertex of ST\mathcal S_TST​.

(sufficiency)G associated with S,  npvij(S)≥0 on forward arcs, npvij(S)≤0 on backward arcs ⟹ S time-optimal;\text{(sufficiency)}\quad G \text{ associated with } S,\ \ npv^{ij}(S)\ge0 \text{ on forward arcs},\ npv^{ij}(S)\le0 \text{ on backward arcs}\ \Longrightarrow\ S \text{ time-optimal};(sufficiency)G associated with S,  npvij(S)≥0 on forward arcs, npvij(S)≤0 on backward arcs ⟹ S time-optimal; (necessity, β<1)S time-optimal ⟹ ∃ G associated with S satisfying the sign conditions.\text{(necessity, } \beta<1)\quad S \text{ time-optimal}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\, G \text{ associated with } S \text{ satisfying the sign conditions}.(necessity, β<1)S time-optimal ⟹ ∃G associated with S satisfying the sign conditions.

The book states "if and only if … for each arc of the corresponding spanning tree", where the corresponding tree is chosen using optimality. The two directions above are the reading that makes the statement well defined: sufficiency for every associated tree, necessity for some associated tree.

Milestones

  1. §3.3.5: the net present value objective is binary-monotone and sum-separable.
  2. §3.9.1: if ST\mathcal S_TST​ is nonempty and bounded, some vertex of ST\mathcal S_TST​ is time-optimal.
  3. Proposition 3.2.16: every vertex of ST\mathcal S_TST​ has an associated spanning tree, an outtree rooted at 000 if the vertex is a minimal point.
  4. Proposition 3.5.4: a directed forest with at least one node has a source with at most one successor or a sink with exactly one predecessor.

Significance

Proposition 3.9.2 turns a nonconvex continuous optimization problem into a finite check on a spanning tree. Read as an economic statement, it says that at an optimal schedule no subproject with positive net present value can be started earlier and no subproject with negative net present value can be postponed. The book builds on it the parametric procedure of §3.9.1, which tracks the optimal tree as the discount rate or the deadline varies (Propositions 3.9.3 and 3.9.4), and the steepest descent method of §3.5.2 terminates exactly when the criterion holds.

The results are proved in the book, partly by reference to network optimization (Ahuja et al., 1993) and to Schwindt and Zimmermann (2001, 2002). None of them is formalized on the platform or, as far as is known, anywhere else. A formal proof would give the first machine-checked optimality certificate for a nonregular project scheduling objective, and the spanning-tree description of vertices (Proposition 3.2.16) is shared with Mission VI of this series.

Difficulty

The objective fff is neither convex nor concave when cash flows of both signs occur, so local optimality at a vertex does not imply global optimality by a convexity argument, and a first-order check along the edges of ST\mathcal S_TST​ is not obviously enough. The criterion is also not a statement about one tree: a degenerate vertex, where more than n+1n+1n+1 temporal constraints are binding, has several associated trees, and the sign conditions may hold on some and fail on others. Necessity therefore requires producing a suitable tree, not checking a given one. Finally, the combinatorial objects (the subtree VijV_{ij}Vij​, forward and backward orientation relative to the root) have to be connected to the geometry of ST\mathcal S_TST​ through Proposition 3.2.16, whose proof in the book is a citation.

Formalization scope

Activities are Fin (n + 2) with 0 the project beginning and Fin.last (n+1) the project completion; start times are real; durations are natural numbers and arc weights integers. The deadline is a structure field together with the backward arc ⟨n+1,0⟩\langle n+1,0\rangle⟨n+1,0⟩ of weight −dˉ-\bar d−dˉ. βx\beta^xβx is Real.rpow, and every statement assumes 0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1 as the book does (p. 203). Vertices are Set.extremePoints ℝ. A spanning tree is a Finset of n+1n+1n+1 arcs whose SimpleGraph.fromRel is connected; VijV_{ij}Vij​ is the set of nodes not reachable from 000 once the arc is deleted.

Three readings are committed and disclosed in the item statements. Necessity is stated only for β<1\beta<1β<1: at β=1\beta=1β=1 the objective is constant, every schedule is optimal, and the sign conditions can fail on every tree. The standing convention of §1.2 (a path of nonnegative length from 000 to every node) is a hypothesis of Proposition 3.2.16 and of the goal; without it a vertex can be fixed by Si≥0S_i\ge0Si​≥0 rather than by arcs of NNN, and necessity fails. The existence of an optimal vertex assumes ST\mathcal S_TST​ nonempty and bounded, which the book asserts in §3.1. Chapter 3's resource constraints do not occur in this mission, which concerns PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣fPS\infty|temp,\bar d|fPS∞∣temp,dˉ∣f only.

The goal cannot be discharged by choosing the tree freely: associated trees must consist of arcs of NNN that are binding at SSS and determine SSS uniquely, and sufficiency must hold for every such tree. Contributions welcome beyond the milestones: a proof of Proposition 3.2.16 reusable by Mission VI, and a general lemma relating binding spanning trees of difference constraints to extreme points.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, §3.1 (p. 203), §3.3.5 (pp. 224–225), §3.5.2 (p. 252), §3.9.1 (pp. 333–334). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • A. H. Russell, "Cash flows in networks", Management Science 16 (1970), 357–373. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.16.5.357
  • R. C. Grinold, "The payment scheduling problem", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 19 (1972), 123–136.
  • C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, "A steepest ascent approach to maximizing the net present value of projects", Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 53 (2001), 435–450.
  • C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, "Parametrische Optimierung als Instrument zur Bewertung von Investitionsprojekten", Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 72 (2002), 593–617.
  • R. K. Ahuja, T. L. Magnanti, J. B. Orlin, Network Flows, Prentice Hall, 1993.
  • C. Berge, Graphs and Hypergraphs, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 3: Order-Oblivious Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Uniform Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) maximizes a seller's expected revenue when buyers have independent private values, but it is a sealed-bid mechanism: every buyer reports a value, and the allocation and payments are computed from all reports at once. Real sellers more often post prices: buyers arrive, each sees a take-it-or-leave-it price, and buys or leaves. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435) ask how much revenue such simple mechanisms lose. Their strongest notion is the order-oblivious posted-price mechanism (OPM): the prices are fixed in advance, and the guarantee must hold whatever order the buyers arrive in, even an adversarial one.

The tool behind the guarantee for sellers of kkk identical units is a prophet inequality. In the single-choice version, a gambler inspects independent random rewards one at a time and must accept or reject each on the spot; Krengel and Sucheston, and Samuel-Cahn (Ann. Probab. 1984), showed that a single fixed threshold earns at least half of what a prophet who sees all rewards earns. The paper extends Samuel-Cahn's threshold rule to kkk choices (Appendix D.2) and turns it into a revenue guarantee (Theorem 10).

Setting

There are nnn agents [n][n][n]. Agent iii's value viv_ivi​ for being served is drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​; the virtual valuation is ϕi(v)=v−(1−Fi(v))/fi(v)\phi_i(v) = v - (1 - F_i(v))/f_i(v)ϕi​(v)=v−(1−Fi​(v))/fi​(v) (Definition 1), and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing (Definition 2). The seller may serve any set of agents in a downward-closed set system J\mathcal JJ; this mission uses the kkk-uniform matroid, where a set is feasible exactly when it has at most kkk members.

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to an allocation M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ever gets negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=Ev[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v}[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=Ev​[∑i​πi​(v)], and RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM denotes the revenue of Myerson's mechanism, the largest over truthful mechanisms (Theorem 19).

Given prices p\mathbf pp and values v\mathbf vv, agent iii desires service if vi≥piv_i \ge p_ivi​≥pi​. Let Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​ be the class of maximal feasible sets of desiring agents. When agents arrive in an arbitrary order and each buys if it desires service and can still be feasibly served, the set of buyers lies in Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​. The paper's pessimistic revenue estimate is

Rpobl=Ev∼F min⁡S∈Sv∑i∈Spi.\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p} = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v \sim \mathbf F}\ \min_{S \in \mathcal S_{\mathbf v}} \sum_{i \in S} p_i .Rpobl​=Ev∼F​ S∈Sv​min​i∈S∑​pi​.

For the prophet inequality, X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are independent nonnegative random variables with order statistics X(1)≥⋯≥X(n)X_{(1)} \ge \dots \ge X_{(n)}X(1)​≥⋯≥X(n)​, and (x)+=max⁡(0,x)(x)^+ = \max(0, x)(x)+=max(0,x). The threshold rule with threshold ccc picks indices t1(c),…,tk(c)t_1(c), \dots, t_k(c)t1​(c),…,tk​(c), where ti(c)t_i(c)ti​(c) is the lesser of n−k+in-k+in−k+i and the iii-th smallest index jjj with Xj≥cX_j \ge cXj​≥c (or n−k+in - k + in−k+i if there is none). The numbers a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are the unique solutions of

a=∑i=1kE(X(i)−a/k)+,b=∑i=1nE(Xi−b/k)+.a = \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big(X_{(i)} - a/k\big)^+, \qquad b = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb E\big(X_i - b/k\big)^+ .a=i=1∑k​E(X(i)​−a/k)+,b=i=1∑n​E(Xi​−b/k)+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 9)

∃ p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2 Rpobl\exists\, \mathbf p\ \ \forall M \text{ truthful}:\qquad \mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}∃p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2Rpobl​

for every instance with regular distributions and a kkk-uniform matroid constraint. The prices are chosen once, before the mechanism it is compared with; this is the paper's "Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ 2-approximates RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM".

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): under regularity, the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)] (with the lowest type receiving zero utility).
  2. a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ exist and are unique (App. D.2, p. 18).
  3. The claim a∗≤b∗a^* \le b^*a∗≤b∗ (App. D.2, p. 18).
  4. Theorem 24 (p. 18), the kkk-choice prophet inequality: for a∗≤kc≤b∗a^* \le k c \le b^*a∗≤kc≤b∗,
∑i=1kE[X(i)]≤2∑i=1kE[Xti(c)].\sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{(i)}\big] \le 2 \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{t_i(c)}\big].i=1∑k​E[X(i)​]≤2i=1∑k​E[Xti​(c)​].

Significance

The theorem says that a seller of kkk identical units can fix one price per buyer, ignore the arrival order entirely, and still collect half of the optimal revenue. The factor 2 is tight: Appendix D.2 gives a single-item example with two buyers where no order-oblivious pricing does better. Corollary 11 extends the result to partition matroids, and Theorem 24 is reused for the graphical-matroid result (Theorem 12, App. D.3). Theorem 24 is a statement in optimal stopping independent of mechanism design, and kkk-choice prophet inequalities are now a standard tool for online allocation.

The results are proved in the paper (preprint arXiv:0907.2435v2; a conference version appeared at STOC 2010). To our knowledge none of them, nor any prophet inequality, has a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has independence of random variables but no order statistics, stopping-rule prophet inequalities, or Myerson's revenue characterization in this multi-agent dominant-strategy form. A related single-unit, Bayesian-incentive-compatible form of Proposition 1 exists on the platform (MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus), in a different model.

Difficulty

The threshold rule picks the first values above ccc, not the largest, and its picks are dependent random indices; the expectation E[Xti(c)]\mathbb E[X_{t_i(c)}]E[Xti​(c)​] does not factor. The obvious comparison of the gambler with the prophet term by term fails, because the gambler can exhaust its kkk picks on early, small values. The bound has to balance two events: either at least kkk values reach ccc, or a value is picked whenever it exceeds ccc; independence enters exactly in the second. The rule also has forced picks at the end of the sequence, which must be handled as stated.

On the mechanism side, Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a minimum over an adversarially chosen family, not the revenue of one run, so it cannot be read off from a single sequential mechanism. Proposition 1 needs the full revenue-equivalence argument: monotone allocations, the payment identity, and an integration by parts against the density.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions: each FiF_iFi​ has a bounded support [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i0 \le \underline v_i0≤v​i​, and a measurable density positive on it (a pinned convention; the paper says only "with density fif_ifi​"). Regularity is required on the support. The prior is the product of the marginals.
  • Mechanisms: deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable, integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to be zero.
  • RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM is not constructed. The goal is stated against every truthful mechanism, which by Theorem 19 is equivalent. Quantifier order matters: "for every mechanism there are prices" is a weaker statement and is not the goal.
  • Proposition 1 carries the normalization that an agent of the lowest type gets zero utility, which the paper presupposes on p. 12.
  • Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a genuine minimum over the finite, nonempty family Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​; maximality is essential, since without it the empty set makes the estimate 000 and the goal false. Prices are arbitrary reals.
  • a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are characterised by their equations as hypotheses, not defined by an infimum. Order statistics count multiplicity. Lean indices are 0-based. The threshold rule includes the page's forced picks ti(c)=n−k+it_i(c) = n - k + iti​(c)=n−k+i; it is not replaced by a pure threshold rule. Theorem 24 and the claims about a∗,b∗a^*, b^*a∗,b∗ assume 1≤k≤n1 \le k \le n1≤k≤n; the goal assumes nothing about kkk.
  • Out of scope: non-regular distributions (ironing), Corollary 11, and the p. 19 identity rewriting Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ as a sum of virtual values (a proof step, not a milestone).

Useful reusable infrastructure: order statistics and their measurability, Samuel-Cahn-type threshold rules, and Myerson's payment identity for dominant-strategy mechanisms. Proofs of any milestone, and supporting lemmas on these objects, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010 (STOC 2010). https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables, Annals of Probability 12(4), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems: Algorithm OPT Returns an Optimal Reorder Point and Order QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

(r, Q) policies are the standard replenishment rule for a single item under continuous review: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, an order of size QQQ is placed. They are known to be optimal in the classical models with Poisson or compound renewal demand, constant or exogenous lead times and full backlogging, and they are used widely in practice and in multi-item and multi-echelon systems where they are applied item by item.

For decades, computing an optimal pair (r,Q)(r, Q)(r,Q) exactly was not routine. The textbook treatment of Hadley and Whitin (1963) gives approximations; as Browne and Zipkin (1991) put it, "until recently, there was no reliable, straightforward method for computing an optimal (r, Q) policy, even in the simple case of Poisson demand processes." Many heuristics were proposed (surveyed by Lee and Nahmias, 1989); the only exact procedure in circulation was in Zipkin's classnotes, based on a result of Sahin (1982).

Federgruen and Zheng (1992) give a short exact algorithm, Algorithm OPT, whose work is linear in the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗. It rests only on the form of the cost, not on a particular demand model.

Setting

Inventory positions are integers (demand arrives unit by unit). A fixed cost κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is charged per order, and G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R is the expected holding and backlogging cost rate as a function of the inventory position yyy. In all the models of the paper the long-run average cost of the (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policy, for an integer rrr and an integer Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1, has the form

C(r,Q)=[κ+∑y=r+1r+QG(y)]/Q.(1)C(r,Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{y=r+1}^{r+Q}G(y)\Big]\Big/Q. \tag{1}C(r,Q)=[κ+y=r+1∑r+Q​G(y)]/Q.(1)

The paper's standing assumptions on GGG are:

  1. −G-G−G is unimodal: there is an integer mmm with GGG nonincreasing on {y≤m}\{y\le m\}{y≤m} and nondecreasing on {y≥m}\{y\ge m\}{y≥m} (flat stretches allowed);
  2. lim⁡∣y∣→∞G(y)=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G(y)=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G(y)=∞.

The sequence yQy_QyQ​. Let y1y_1y1​ be an integer minimizing GGG. Given y1,…,yQy_1,\dots,y_Qy1​,…,yQ​, let L(Q)=min⁡{y1,…,yQ}L(Q)=\min\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}L(Q)=min{y1​,…,yQ​} and R(Q)=max⁡{y1,…,yQ}R(Q)=\max\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}R(Q)=max{y1​,…,yQ​}, and set

yQ+1={L(Q)−1if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),R(Q)+1otherwise.y_{Q+1}=\begin{cases}L(Q)-1 & \text{if } G(L(Q)-1)\le G(R(Q)+1),\\ R(Q)+1 & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}yQ+1​={L(Q)−1R(Q)+1​if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),otherwise.​

So the window [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] grows by one point at a time towards the smaller neighbouring value, ties going left. Write r∗(Q)r^*(Q)r∗(Q) for an optimal reorder point for a given QQQ, and

C∗(Q)=[κ+∑i=1QG(yi)]/Q.C^*(Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{i=1}^{Q}G(y_i)\Big]\Big/Q .C∗(Q)=[κ+i=1∑Q​G(yi​)]/Q.

Algorithm OPT, Step 1. Variables S,Q,C∗,r,RS,Q,C^*,r,RS,Q,C∗,r,R start at S=κ+G(y1)S=\kappa+G(y_1)S=κ+G(y1​), Q=1Q=1Q=1, C∗=SC^*=SC∗=S, r=y1−1r=y_1-1r=y1​−1, R=y1+1R=y_1+1R=y1​+1. Each pass compares G(r)G(r)G(r) and G(R)G(R)G(R); on the smaller side (left on ties) it stops if C∗C^*C∗ is at most that value, and otherwise adds the value to SSS and moves rrr one step left or RRR one step right; then Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1 and C∗:=S/QC^*:=S/QC∗:=S/Q. The output is the final (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Under the standing assumptions, Step 1 of Algorithm OPT, started from any global minimizer y1y_1y1​ of GGG, stops after finitely many passes, and its output (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) satisfies Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 and

C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.C(r,Q)\le C(r',Q')\qquad\text{for all integers } r' \text{ and all integers } Q'\ge 1 .C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.

The goal fixes no constants and no demand model: it is a statement about every GGG satisfying the standing assumptions.

Milestones, in proof order

  • §2, p. 811: {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​} is the contiguous block [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] of QQQ integers and carries the QQQ smallest values of GGG.
  • Figure 1 (p. 809): yQ+1y_{Q+1}yQ+1​ has the least GGG-value outside the window; in particular G(y1)≤G(y2)≤⋯G(y_1)\le G(y_2)\le\cdotsG(y1​)≤G(y2​)≤⋯.
  • Lemma 1: L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point for QQQ.
  • Corollary 1: r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q)r^*(Q)-1\le r^*(Q+1)\le r^*(Q)r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q).
  • Display before (6): min⁡rC(r,Q)=C∗(Q)\min_r C(r,Q)=C^*(Q)minr​C(r,Q)=C∗(Q).
  • (6): C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1)]/(Q+1)C^*(Q+1)=[QC^*(Q)+G(y_{Q+1})]/(Q+1)C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1​)]/(Q+1), and C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q)C^*(Q+1)<C^*(Q)C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q) iff G(yQ+1)<C∗(Q)G(y_{Q+1})<C^*(Q)G(yQ+1​)<C∗(Q).
  • Lemma 2: the smallest qqq with C∗(q)≤G(yq+1)C^*(q)\le G(y_{q+1})C∗(q)≤G(yq+1​) exists and is an optimal order size.
  • Step 1 tracks the sequence: from the state (κ+∑i≤QG(yi), Q, C∗(Q), L(Q)−1, R(Q)+1)(\kappa+\sum_{i\le Q}G(y_i),\,Q,\,C^*(Q),\,L(Q)-1,\,R(Q)+1)(κ+∑i≤Q​G(yi​),Q,C∗(Q),L(Q)−1,R(Q)+1) one pass stops with (L(Q)−1,Q)(L(Q)-1,Q)(L(Q)−1,Q) exactly when C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1)C^*(Q)\le G(y_{Q+1})C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1​) and otherwise moves to the same state for Q+1Q+1Q+1.

Significance

The result turns the joint minimization of (1) over (r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1(r,Q)\in\mathbb Z\times\mathbb Z_{\ge1}(r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1​, an unbounded two-dimensional integer problem, into a single scan whose length is Q∗Q^*Q∗ plus the distance to the minimizer of GGG. Because it uses only the form (1) and the unimodality of −G-G−G, it applies at once to Poisson and compound Poisson demand, to stochastic lead times with an equilibrium lead-time demand, and to cost structures with stockout penalties; the paper also notes extensions to (r,nQ)(r,nQ)(r,nQ) policies. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 additionally give the structure of the optimal reorder point as a function of QQQ.

The result has been proved on paper since 1992. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the algorithm's correctness for general GGG under exactly the paper's hypotheses. The platform already has the linear-cost special case of the underlying lemmas for one discrete demand model (InventoryControl.rq_discrete_recursion, rq_discrete_joint_optimal), but with C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) and Q∗Q^*Q∗ given as hypotheses and no algorithm; nothing on the platform states the algorithm or treats general unimodal −G-G−G.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: for fixed QQQ the sum in (1) should cover the QQQ smallest values of GGG, and the greedy window collects exactly those. Both halves need care on the integers with flat stretches of GGG: "the QQQ smallest values" is ambiguous under ties, and the claim that a greedy window holds them relies on y1y_1y1​ being a global minimizer together with the unimodality of −G-G−G, not on convexity.

The stopping rule is the second point. Lemma 2 looks like a first-order condition, but C∗(⋅)C^*(\cdot)C∗(⋅) need not be convex; optimality of the first stopping qqq for all larger QQQ uses that the values G(yi)G(y_i)G(yi​) are nondecreasing along the sequence, which the paper uses without stating. Termination of the algorithm is not discussed on the page; it needs G→∞G\to\inftyG→∞, and fails for constant GGG.

Finally, the goal is about an imperative loop. Connecting its five variables to yQy_QyQ​, C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) and L(Q)L(Q)L(Q) is an invariant argument that has to match the tie-breaking and the non-strict stopping tests exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Types. G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R, κ∈R\kappa\in\mathbb Rκ∈R with κ>0\kappa>0κ>0, reorder points in Z\mathbb ZZ, order quantities in N\mathbb NN with Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 required wherever a cost appears. Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 makes C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0, so optimality is always quantified over Q′≥1Q'\ge1Q′≥1 and the goal asserts that the returned QQQ is ≥1\ge1≥1.
  • Assumptions. "−G-G−G unimodal" is NegUnimodal G: ∃m\exists m∃m, GGG antitone on (−∞,m](-\infty,m](−∞,m] and monotone on [m,∞)[m,\infty)[m,∞). "lim⁡∣y∣→∞G=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G=∞" is Coercive G: G→+∞G\to+\inftyG→+∞ along atBot and atTop. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn ℤ is not used: over Z\mathbb ZZ-weights it holds for every function.
  • The sequence. L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q) are defined by recursion on the window, and yyy is 1-based with an unused value at index 0; that L,RL,RL,R are the minimum and maximum of {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​}, as the paper defines them, is the first milestone.
  • The algorithm. Step 1 is transcribed literally, including G(r)≤G(R)G(r)\le G(R)G(r)≤G(R) → left and the non-strict tests C∗≤G(r)C^*\le G(r)C∗≤G(r), C∗≤G(R)C^*\le G(R)C∗≤G(R); GGG is evaluated directly instead of through the ΔG\Delta GΔG bookkeeping. The loop runs with a pass budget and returns nothing when the budget runs out; the goal states that for every large enough budget it returns an optimal pair.
  • Step 0 is not formalized. It scans L=0,1,…L=0,1,\dotsL=0,1,… for the first LLL with ΔG(L)≥0\Delta G(L)\ge0ΔG(L)≥0, under the paper's simplification y1>0y_1>0y1​>0; under unimodality alone it can stop on a plateau before the minimum. The goal starts Step 1 from a given global minimizer y1y_1y1​, which is the paper's own §2 setup and matches its p. 812 remark that Step 0 may be replaced by a bisection search.
  • Not formalized: Theorem 1's second sentence (the operation count), the derivations of (1) for specific demand models, and (5).
  • Corrected slips. The printed proof of Lemma 2 writes C(Q)−C(Q∗)C(Q)-C(Q^*)C(Q)−C(Q∗) with C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) inside the bracket; the correct identity has C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q)-C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗) and C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q∗). Lemma 2's "Q∗Q^*Q∗" is formalized as existence of the smallest qqq with the property plus its optimality, since minimizers need not be unique; likewise "r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1r^*(Q)=L(Q)-1r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1" means L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point.
  • Ruled out. Defining the algorithm's output as an argmin of CCC, or by searching for Lemma 2's qqq, would make the goal trivial; the algorithm is defined by its steps. A statement of the form "if the run returns a pair, it is optimal" would be vacuous for a loop that never stops; termination is part of the goal.

Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas on windows of unimodal integer sequences, which are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • S. Browne and P. Zipkin, Inventory Models with Continuous, Stochastic Demands, Annals of Applied Probability 1(3):419–435, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005875
  • H. L. Lee and S. Nahmias, Single-Product, Single-Location Models, in Handbooks in OR & MS vol. 4, 1993 (cited by the paper as a 1989 working paper).
  • I. Sahin, On the Objective Function Behavior in (s, S) Inventory Models, Operations Research 30(4):709–724, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.709
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A Simple Forward Algorithm to Solve General Dynamic Lot Sizing Models with n Periods in O(n log n) or O(n) Time: Minimal Optimal Predecessor Lists Are Characterized by Strictly Increasing BreakpointsResearch Paper

Motivation

The dynamic lot size model asks when, and how much, to order of a single item over a planning horizon of nnn periods with known, time-varying demands, setup costs, unit order costs and holding costs. It is the textbook model of production planning and the building block of material requirements planning, multi-item scheduling and many decomposition schemes for larger supply-chain problems.

Wagner and Whitin (1958) showed that some optimal policy orders only when inventory is zero, which turns the problem into a shortest-path recursion with O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) running time. For more than thirty years this was the standard algorithm. In 1991 three groups independently reduced the complexity: Federgruen and Tzur (Management Science 37(8), 1991), Wagelmans, van Hoesel and Kolen (Operations Research 40, 1992) and Aggarwal and Park (Operations Research 41, 1993). Each obtained O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n)O(nlogn) in general and O(n)O(n)O(n) under special cost structures. The Federgruen–Tzur algorithm is a forward algorithm: at iteration jjj it keeps a short list of periods that could still be the best last setup period for some future horizon, and updates it by local tests on neighbouring entries. This mission formalizes the theorem that justifies those tests.

Setting

For periods i=1,2,…i = 1, 2, \dotsi=1,2,… let did_idi​ be the demand, KiK_iKi​ the setup cost, cic_ici​ the variable per unit order cost and hih_ihi​ the cost of carrying a unit of inventory at the end of period iii. Write D(i)=∑k=1idkD(i) = \sum_{k=1}^{i} d_kD(i)=∑k=1i​dk​ and H(i)=∑k=1ihkH(i) = \sum_{k=1}^{i} h_kH(i)=∑k=1i​hk​, so D(0)=H(0)=0D(0) = H(0) = 0D(0)=H(0)=0. For i<ji < ji<j let cij=ci+hi+⋯+hj−1c_{ij} = c_i + h_i + \dots + h_{j-1}cij​=ci​+hi​+⋯+hj−1​, let C~(i)=ci−H(i−1)\tilde C(i) = c_i - H(i-1)C~(i)=ci​−H(i−1), and let

S(i,j)=∑r=ij−1hr (D(j)−D(r))S(i, j) = \sum_{r=i}^{j-1} h_r\,\bigl(D(j) - D(r)\bigr)S(i,j)=r=i∑j−1​hr​(D(j)−D(r))

be the carrying cost of an order placed in period iii that covers the demands of periods i,…,ji, \dots, ji,…,j.

The costs are given by the zero-inventory recursion (2): F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0 and, for 1≤l≤t1 \le l \le t1≤l≤t,

F(l,t)=F(l−1)+Kl+S(l,t)+cl [D(t)−D(l−1)],F(t)=min⁡1≤l≤tF(l,t).F(l, t) = F(l-1) + K_l + S(l, t) + c_l\,[D(t) - D(l-1)], \qquad F(t) = \min_{1 \le l \le t} F(l, t).F(l,t)=F(l−1)+Kl​+S(l,t)+cl​[D(t)−D(l−1)],F(t)=1≤l≤tmin​F(l,t).

F(l,t)F(l, t)F(l,t) is the cost of the first ttt periods when the last setup is in period lll.

For two periods k<lk < lk<l the difference Δk,l(t)=F(k,t)−F(l,t)\Delta_{k,l}(t) = F(k,t) - F(l,t)Δk,l​(t)=F(k,t)−F(l,t) is affine in D(t)D(t)D(t), with intercept A(k,l)A(k,l)A(k,l) given by (4) and slope ck,l−cl=C~(k)−C~(l)c_{k,l} - c_l = \tilde C(k) - \tilde C(l)ck,l​−cl​=C~(k)−C~(l). Its root G(k,l)G(k,l)G(k,l) is defined by (5): A(k,l)/(C~(l)−C~(k))A(k,l)/(\tilde C(l) - \tilde C(k))A(k,l)/(C~(l)−C~(k)) when the slopes differ, and +∞+\infty+∞ or −∞-\infty−∞ according to the sign of A(k,l)A(k,l)A(k,l) when they agree. It is extended symmetrically, G(l,k)=G(k,l)G(l,k) = G(k,l)G(l,k)=G(k,l).

At iteration jjj the future demands are unknown, so a future horizon has a potential cumulative demand x≥D(j)x \ge D(j)x≥D(j). The jjjth Minimal Optimal Predecessors list Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is the set of periods l≤jl \le jl≤j that are the lowest-index optimal last setup period, among {1,…,j}\{1, \dots, j\}{1,…,j}, for every potential cumulative demand in some open interval above D(j)D(j)D(j).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1(a)

Let j≥1j \ge 1j≥1 and let S={i1,…,ir}S = \{i_1, \dots, i_r\}S={i1​,…,ir​} with Ω(j)⊆S⊆{1,…,j}\Omega(j) \subseteq S \subseteq \{1, \dots, j\}Ω(j)⊆S⊆{1,…,j}, ranked so that C~(i1)≥⋯≥C~(ir)\tilde C(i_1) \ge \dots \ge \tilde C(i_r)C~(i1​)≥⋯≥C~(ir​), with equal C~\tilde CC~-values in ascending order of index. Put g(1)=D(j)g(1) = D(j)g(1)=D(j) and g(l)=G(il,il−1)g(l) = G(i_l, i_{l-1})g(l)=G(il​,il−1​) for l=2,…,rl = 2, \dots, rl=2,…,r. Then

S=Ω(j)  ⟺  g(1)<g(2)<⋯<g(r)<∞.(6)S = \Omega(j) \iff g(1) < g(2) < \dots < g(r) < \infty. \tag{6}S=Ω(j)⟺g(1)<g(2)<⋯<g(r)<∞.(6)

Milestones

In attack order:

  • identity (1a) for the carrying costs;
  • Lemma 2(a)–(d), the linearity of Δk,l\Delta_{k,l}Δk,l​ and the sign test against its root G(k,l)G(k,l)G(k,l);
  • the claim that Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) contains an optimal last setup period for the horizon jjj;
  • the strict chains (7)–(8) of the Appendix;
  • Theorem 1(b), that under (6) the first entry i1i_1i1​ is an optimal last setup period l(j)l(j)l(j);
  • Theorem 1(c)(i)–(iii), the three elimination rules: g(2)≤D(j)g(2) \le D(j)g(2)≤D(j) removes i1i_1i1​, g(k+1)≤g(k)g(k+1) \le g(k)g(k+1)≤g(k) removes iki_kik​, and g(r)=∞g(r) = \inftyg(r)=∞ removes iri_rir​.

A supporting item potCost_spec certifies that the potential costs used to define Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) agree with the paper's F(l,t)F(l,t)F(l,t), up to a term that does not depend on lll.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what makes the forward algorithm correct. Part (a) reduces the minimality of a candidate list to a condition on consecutive pairs of a sorted list. Part (c) says which entry to delete when the condition fails. Part (b) says where to read off the optimal last setup period. With these, Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is maintained by deletions at the ends and in the interior of a list ordered by C~\tilde CC~, and each period is inserted and deleted at most once; the O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n)O(nlogn) bound, and the O(n)O(n)O(n) bound under the paper's special cost structures, follow from this bookkeeping. The same lower-envelope reasoning appears in the other 1991–1993 algorithms and in later extensions to backlogging and capacitated variants.

The result has a complete published proof. To our knowledge there is no machine-checked development of the Wagner–Whitin recursion or of any of the fast lot-sizing algorithms. This mission produces the model, the breakpoints and the Minimal Optimal Predecessors lists as reusable definitions, and a checked proof of the characterization. It also records two small corrections that a formal reading forces on the printed text (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Each piece in isolation is elementary algebra on affine functions. The difficulty is in the combinatorics of the lower envelope with ties. The natural argument "consecutive breakpoints increase, so each line owns an interval" must handle three things:

  • equal slopes, where G=±∞G = \pm\inftyG=±∞;
  • several lines meeting at one point;
  • the lowest-index tie-breaking that makes Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) minimal.

The "only if" direction needs every failure of (6) to be traced to an element that is never the unique lowest-index optimum on an interval. Ties are exactly where the printed definition of Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j), read literally at a single demand value, breaks the theorem. A proof that ignores ties proves a statement that is false.

Formalization scope

  • Data and costs. The data are four functions N→R\mathbb N \to \mathbb RN→R bundled in a structure; values at index 000 are unused, and no sign conditions are imposed. FFF is defined by the recursion (2) with F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0. Its identification with the minimum cost over all feasible policies is the paper's Lemma 1 (Wagner–Whitin), which is not part of this mission. The horizon nnn is not a parameter.
  • Breakpoints. GGG and the critical values g(⋅)g(\cdot)g(⋅) take values in EReal, so ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are kept distinct from every real number. The final "<∞< \infty<∞" of (6) is part of the condition.
  • Ranked lists. A ranked set is a duplicate-free List ℕ. Lean lists are 0-based, so the paper's im+1i_{m+1}im+1​ and g(m+1)g(m+1)g(m+1) are entry mmm and gval j L m.
  • Disclosed change 1, Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j). The page asks for a single potential cumulative demand D≥D(j)D \ge D(j)D≥D(j) at which lll is the lowest-index optimum. With that reading, Theorem 1(a) "only if" and Theorem 1(c) fail when two lines tie exactly at a breakpoint (an explicit five-period instance is in the definition's note). The formalization requires lll to be the lowest-index optimum on a nondegenerate open interval of potential demands above D(j)D(j)D(j). This is the paper's own description of the list on p. 915: "the unique optimal last setup period for any horizon … with potential cumulative demand g(k)<D<g(k+1)g(k) < D < g(k+1)g(k)<D<g(k+1)".
  • Disclosed change 2, Lemma 2(d). The printed hypothesis "ck,l<clc_{k,l} < c_lck,l​<cl​" duplicates part (c) and is read as "ck,l=clc_{k,l} = c_lck,l​=cl​". The equivalence "Δk,l≥0\Delta_{k,l} \ge 0Δk,l​≥0 iff D(t)≥G(k,l)D(t) \ge G(k,l)D(t)≥G(k,l)" is stated under A(k,l)≠0A(k,l) \ne 0A(k,l)=0, since A(k,l)=0A(k,l) = 0A(k,l)=0 gives G=+∞G = +\inftyG=+∞ by (5).
  • Ruling out trivial formalizations. The hypotheses of the goal are satisfiable for every j≥1j \ge 1j≥1: rank {1,…,j}\{1, \dots, j\}{1,…,j} itself. Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is nonempty (a milestone). F(t)F(t)F(t) for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1 is a minimum over the nonempty set {1,…,t}\{1, \dots, t\}{1,…,t}, never a default value. GGG is never replaced by a real-valued junk value at equal slopes.
  • Out of scope. Lemma 1, Lemma 3, Corollaries 1–5, Theorem 2, the Algorithm's pseudo-code and its complexity analysis, and the submodularity discussion of §5.
  • Reusable infrastructure. The model, the recursion (2), AAA, GGG and Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) can be reused for the paper's algorithmic results and for related lot-sizing papers. Proofs of the milestones, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and M. Tzur, A Simple Forward Algorithm to Solve General Dynamic Lot Sizing Models with n Periods in O(n log n) or O(n) Time, Management Science 37(8):909–925, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.8.909
  • H. M. Wagner and T. M. Whitin, Dynamic Version of the Economic Lot Size Model, Management Science 5(1):89–96, 1958. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.5.1.89
  • A. Wagelmans, S. van Hoesel and A. Kolen, Economic Lot-Sizing: An O(n log n) Algorithm That Runs in Linear Time in the Wagner-Whitin Case, Operations Research 40(1-supplement-1):S145–S156, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.1.S145
  • A. Aggarwal and J. K. Park, Improved Algorithms for Economic Lot Size Problems, Operations Research 41(3):549–571, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.3.549
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Algorithm 97: Shortest Path: Floyd's Procedure Computes the Shortest Path Length Between Every Pair of PointsResearch Paper

Motivation

Routing and network optimization often require the length of the best route between every ordered pair of points. Robert W. Floyd's Algorithm 97 gives a compact procedure for this task: it receives a matrix of direct-link lengths and changes the matrix in place until each entry is meant to represent a shortest-path length. The procedure is a small historical source for an algorithm now used as a standard all-pairs shortest-path routine. Its published text consists of the ALGOL code and a short explanatory comment, without a correctness proof.

The same page contains Floyd's Algorithm 96, a Boolean procedure for ancestor relations. Its output records whether a chain of parent links connects two individuals. Floyd cites Warshall's theorem on Boolean matrices in both comments. The Boolean procedure and the length procedure use the same order of three loops; together they expose the distinction between discovering that a route exists and determining its best length. This mission formalizes both claims from Floyd's published page, with the shortest-path statement as its goal.

Setting

A directed network has nnn numbered points. Its length matrix www assigns a real number w(i,j)w(i,j)w(i,j) to a direct link from iii to jjj. The value ∞\infty∞ means that the direct link is absent. Links may have negative lengths, and the initial diagonal entries w(i,i)w(i,i)w(i,i) are unrestricted. The paper's matrix index range is 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n; the Lean development uses 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1 in the same order.

A path from iii to jjj is a sequence p0=i,p1,…,pL=jp_0=i,p_1,\ldots,p_L=jp0​=i,p1​,…,pL​=j with L≥1L\ge1L≥1 links. The points p0,…,pL−1p_0,\ldots,p_{L-1}p0​,…,pL−1​ are distinct, as are p1,…,pLp_1,\ldots,p_Lp1​,…,pL​. Thus a path between different points has no repeated point, while a path from a point to itself is a simple closed path with at least one link. Its length is ℓw(p)=∑t=0L−1w(pt,pt+1)\ell_w(p)=\sum_{t=0}^{L-1}w(p_t,p_{t+1})ℓw​(p)=∑t=0L−1​w(pt​,pt+1​); a missing link gives length ∞\infty∞. Write dw(i,j)d_w(i,j)dw​(i,j) for the minimum length among these paths, taking dw(i,j)=∞d_w(i,j)=\inftydw​(i,j)=∞ when there is no finite-length path. Since L≤nL\le nL≤n, this is a minimum over a finite family.

The no-negative-cycle condition says that every closed path has nonnegative length. Individual links can still be negative. This condition matters because, in a network with a negative cycle, repeated travel around that cycle can keep reducing a walk's length. Floyd's comment does not state the condition, although the claimed output needs it.

Algorithm 97 scans a pivot iii, then row jjj, then column kkk, each in increasing order. It enters the column scan when the current m(j,i)m(j,i)m(j,i) is finite; if the current m(i,k)m(i,k)m(i,k) is also finite, it computes s=m(j,i)+m(i,k)s=m(j,i)+m(i,k)s=m(j,i)+m(i,k) and replaces m(j,k)m(j,k)m(j,k) when s<m(j,k)s<m(j,k)s<m(j,k). Every replacement affects subsequent reads of the same matrix. Algorithm 96 makes the corresponding Boolean update: when m(j,i)m(j,i)m(j,i) and m(i,k)m(i,k)m(i,k) are true, it sets m(j,k)m(j,k)m(j,k) to true.

Formalization targets

Reachability and missing paths

For Algorithm 96, let b+b^+b+ be the transitive closure of the initial parent relation bbb, using chains of one or more links. Its comment asserts

ancestor⁡(b)(i,j)=true⟺ib+j.\operatorname{ancestor}(b)(i,j)=\mathrm{true}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad i\mathrel{b^+}j.ancestor(b)(i,j)=true⟺ib+j.

For Algorithm 97, the separate unreachable-pair sentence asserts that, whenever no finite-length path runs from iii to jjj,

shortestPath⁡(w)(i,j)=∞.\operatorname{shortestPath}(w)(i,j)=\infty.shortestPath(w)(i,j)=∞.

This second target needs no condition on cycle lengths. Both statements are milestones because they are claims printed in the two algorithm comments, rather than lemmas invented for the formalization.

Complete shortest-path matrix

The goal is the whole output claim of Algorithm 97. For every nnn, every matrix www with no negative cycle, and all points i,ji,ji,j,

shortestPath⁡(w)(i,j)=dw(i,j).\operatorname{shortestPath}(w)(i,j)=d_w(i,j).shortestPath(w)(i,j)=dw​(i,j).

The equality includes paths with negative individual links, diagonal entries, and unreachable pairs. It fixes the entire final matrix, rather than only an upper or lower bound.

Significance

The goal connects an explicit in-place matrix program with a route-based definition of shortest length. Once established, it permits later formal developments to use the procedure as a justified all-pairs distance computation, including networks whose individual links have negative lengths. The Boolean milestone similarly identifies the final state of an ancestor procedure with the transitive closure of the initial relation. Neither assertion requires treating an implementation's output as the definition of the mathematical answer.

Floyd's 1962 paper states these outcomes but supplies no proof. This mission supplies precise Lean statements and definitions for a proof to target. A completed machine-checked development would establish the published procedure's correctness under the missing necessary premise. The statements in this proposal are currently open theorem targets; compiling their declarations checks syntax and types, not their proofs. Supporting work on finite paths, cycle decompositions, and matrix updates can be reused in other finite directed-network arguments.

Difficulty

The array is changed in place. During a pivot's sweep, an entry used in a later update may already differ from its value at the start of that pivot. The test on m(j,i)m(j,i)m(j,i) is evaluated before the column loop, but the same entry is read again within every column iteration. A proof based only on a simultaneous, out-of-place matrix recurrence does not directly describe these reads. Negative individual links also prevent arguments that rely on every update decreasing only through a nonnegative segment. The no-negative-cycle condition must control what happens when a proposed route returns to a point already visited.

Formalization scope

Points are Fin n, including the empty network at n=0n=0n=0 and the single-point network at n=1n=1n=1. Lengths are WithTop ℝ, where ⊤ represents the paper's ₁₀10 sentinel as mathematical infinity. The paper's literal sentinel is 101010^{10}1010; a finite bound cannot represent arbitrarily long paths, so this mission uses infinity in its goal. The ALGOL real operations are represented by exact real arithmetic. The printed procedure's loop order, strict comparison, two finiteness guards, and immediate assignments are part of the Lean definition.

The initial diagonal is not normalized. Therefore a path from iii to itself has at least one link, and the final diagonal denotes a shortest closed-path length when one exists. The Boolean comment's “is true if” is read as an equivalence, supported by its following explanation of the final matrix; chains have one or more links, matching Lean's Relation.TransGen.

The sole added hypothesis in the main goal is absence of negative cycles. It is necessary: with one point and self-link length −1-1−1, the procedure changes that entry to −2-2−2, although the shortest simple closed path has length −1-1−1. No nonnegative-link or zero-diagonal premise is imposed. The unreachable-pair milestone omits the cycle hypothesis because its claim holds without it. The benchmark dwd_wdw​ is a finite minimum of summed link lengths, defined independently of Algorithm 97; defining it from the procedure or its recurrence would empty the goal of its intended content. Contributions proving the printed algorithms' statements, or establishing reusable finite-path and update results needed for them, fit this scope.

Selected references

  • Robert W. Floyd, Algorithm 97: Shortest Path, Communications of the ACM 5(6), 1962, p. 345. DOI 10.1145/367766.368168.
  • Robert W. Floyd, Algorithm 96: Ancestor, Communications of the ACM 5(6), 1962, pp. 344–345, in the same published Algorithms department scan.
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Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem: The Two-Echelon Optimal Cost Splits into the Isolated Installation-1 Cost Plus a Function of Echelon StockResearch Paper

Motivation

Most physical supply chains hold stock at several levels: a factory warehouse feeds a regional depot, which feeds a retail outlet. Each level orders from the one above it, and a shortage upstream delays replenishment downstream. Optimizing such a multi-echelon system by dynamic programming looks hopeless, because the state is a vector of stock levels and stock in transit at every installation, and the value function of a two-installation system with a two-period shipping lag already depends on three continuous variables.

Andrew J. Clark and Herbert Scarf (Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960) showed that for a serial system this curse of dimensionality disappears. Working with echelon stock (the stock at a level plus everything below it or in transit to a lower level), the optimal system cost separates into the cost of the lowest installation, optimized as if it stood alone, plus a function of echelon stock only. The result is the foundation of multi-echelon inventory theory: the echelon base-stock policies used in practice, the stationary analyses of Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994), and textbook treatments (Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, 2000; Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory) all descend from it.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) and Arrow, Karlin and Scarf (1958) set up periodic-review inventory models with discounted costs. Karlin and Scarf (1958) treated a single installation with a delivery lag, reducing it to a problem without lag (the paper's facts 1–3). Clark and Scarf (1960) proved the decomposition for serial systems with linear shipping costs and a setup cost permitted only at the top. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) extended it to infinite horizons and Chen and Zheng (1994) gave a lower-bound proof that reaches more general structures.

Setting

Two installations are in series. Customer demand occurs only at installation 1; its demand in each period is non-negative with density φ\varphiφ on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), independent across periods, and excess demand is backlogged. Installation 2 ships to installation 1 with a two-period lead time at unit cost c1≥0c_1\ge0c1​≥0. The system orders z≥0z\ge0z≥0 units from outside at cost c(z)=K+czc(z)=K+czc(z)=K+cz for z>0z>0z>0 and c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0 (eq. (5)); these arrive at installation 2 one period later. Costs nnn periods ahead are discounted by αn\alpha^nαn, α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.

The state at the start of a period is (x1,w1,x2)(x_1,w_1,x_2)(x1​,w1​,x2​): x1x_1x1​ is the stock on hand at installation 1, w1w_1w1​ the stock that reaches installation 1 next period, and x2x_2x2​ the echelon-2 stock (on hand at both installations plus in transit), so x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​. Installation 1 pays the expected holding and shortage cost (1),

L(x)={hx+p∫x∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x>0,p∫0∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x≤0,L(x)=\begin{cases}hx+p\int_x^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x>0,\\ p\int_0^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x\le0,\end{cases}L(x)={hx+p∫x∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,p∫0∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,​x>0,x≤0,​

and echelon 2 pays a natural one-period cost L~(x2)\tilde L(x_2)L~(x2​) (Assumption 3).

With nnn periods remaining, the optimal system cost Cn(x1,w1,x2)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​) satisfies, with C0≡0C_0\equiv0C0​≡0,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=min⁡x1+w1≤y≤x20≤z{c(z)+c1(y−x1−w1)+L~(x2)+L(x1)+α∫0∞Cn−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1, x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}(14)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\min_{\substack{x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2\\0\le z}}\Big\{c(z)+c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+\tilde L(x_2)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1,\,x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}\qquad(14)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​0≤z​min​{c(z)+c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L~(x2​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​Cn−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​,x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}(14)

where yyy is installation 1's target (stock on hand plus in transit after shipping). Installation 1 in isolation, buying at unit cost c1c_1c1​ with a two-period lag, has optimal cost C^n(x1,w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​), C^0≡0\hat C_0\equiv0C^0​≡0:

C^n(x1,w1)=min⁡y≥x1+w1{c1(y−x1−w1)+L(x1)+α∫0∞C^n−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1)φ(t) dt}.(15)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=\min_{y\ge x_1+w_1}\Big\{c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty\hat C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}.\qquad(15)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=y≥x1​+w1​min​{c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​C^n−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​)φ(t)dt}.(15)

In Lean these are ClarkScarf.Serial.Model.sysCost and isoCost; the expressions in braces are sysObj and isoObj, indexed by nnn for the problem with n+1n+1n+1 periods remaining.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 482)

There are functions gng_ngn​ with g1=L~g_1=\tilde Lg1​=L~ such that, for all n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=C^n(x1,w1)+gn(x2),(16)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)+g_n(x_2),\qquad(16)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=C^n​(x1​,w1​)+gn​(x2​),(16)

and installation 1 acts optimally by aiming at an isolated-optimal target y^\hat yy^​ and taking min⁡(x2,y^)\min(x_2,\hat y)min(x2​,y^​), as much as installation 2 can supply. The goal fixes no form for gng_ngn​ and needs no critical numbers.

Milestones

  1. Convexity of y↦α∫ ⁣ ⁣∫L(y−t1−t2)φ(t1)φ(t2)y\mapsto\alpha\int\!\!\int L(y-t_1-t_2)\varphi(t_1)\varphi(t_2)y↦α∫∫L(y−t1​−t2​)φ(t1​)φ(t2​) (§2 item 2, p. 478).
  2. The isolated decomposition C^n(x1,w1)=L(x1)+α∫0∞L(x1+w1−t)φ(t) dt+fn(x1+w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty L(x_1+w_1-t)\varphi(t)\,dt+f_n(x_1+w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=L(x1​)+α∫0∞​L(x1​+w1​−t)φ(t)dt+fn​(x1​+w1​) for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, with fnf_nfn​ of (7) (p. 480).
  3. Convexity of every fnf_nfn​ (§2 item 3, p. 478).
  4. Eqs. (18)–(19) (p. 483): the system cost when echelon-2 stock is above or below the isolated critical number xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​.
  5. Eqs. (21)–(25) (pp. 483–484): the shortfall cost Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ depends on x2x_2x2​ alone,
Λn(x2)=c1(x2−xˉn)+α2∫0∞ ⁣ ⁣∫0∞[L(x2−t−y)−L(xˉn−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y) dy dt+α∫0∞[fn−1(x2−t)−fn−1(xˉn−t)]φ(t) dt.\Lambda_n(x_2)=c_1(x_2-\bar x_n)+\alpha^2\int_0^\infty\!\!\int_0^\infty[L(x_2-t-y)-L(\bar x_n-t-y)]\varphi(t)\varphi(y)\,dy\,dt+\alpha\int_0^\infty[f_{n-1}(x_2-t)-f_{n-1}(\bar x_n-t)]\varphi(t)\,dt.Λn​(x2​)=c1​(x2​−xˉn​)+α2∫0∞​∫0∞​[L(x2​−t−y)−L(xˉn​−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y)dydt+α∫0∞​[fn−1​(x2​−t)−fn−1​(xˉn​−t)]φ(t)dt.
  1. Theorem 2 (p. 484), the explicit form: given critical numbers, gng_ngn​ is computed by (26), gn(x2)=min⁡z≥0{c(z)+L~(x2)+Λn(x2)+α∫gn−1(x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}g_n(x_2)=\min_{z\ge0}\{c(z)+\tilde L(x_2)+\Lambda_n(x_2)+\alpha\int g_{n-1}(x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\}gn​(x2​)=minz≥0​{c(z)+L~(x2​)+Λn​(x2​)+α∫gn−1​(x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 replaces one three-dimensional dynamic program by two one-dimensional ones. Installation 1 solves its own problem (15), whose solution is a critical-number policy, and echelon 2 solves a single-installation problem in x2x_2x2​ with one-period cost L~+Λn\tilde L+\Lambda_nL~+Λn​. When L~\tilde LL~ is convex the augmented cost is convex (the paper remarks this for Expression (10)), so the echelon-2 policy is of (S,s)(S,s)(S,s) type by Scarf's theorem, and the whole system runs on echelon base-stock rules. Every later serial-system result, finite or infinite horizon, uses this decomposition or its proof idea, and the "induced penalty" Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ is the prototype of the penalty functions used in the multi-echelon literature.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and proved, but no machine-checked version exists. The published platform items on Clark–Scarf are a stationary single-period decomposition with normal demand and a disproved infinite-horizon base-stock recursion, neither of which is this finite-horizon dynamic program. A formal development produces the value functions (14)–(15) with real infima and set integrals, the measurability and integrability of value functions defined by infima, the convexity propagation through the recursion (7), and the decomposition itself, which are reusable for any finite-horizon inventory recursion with lead times.

Difficulty

The obvious induction on nnn substitutes (16) into (14) and separates the minimizations over yyy and zzz. The separation is immediate; the hard step is that the constrained minimum over x1+w1≤y≤x2x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​ differs from the unconstrained one by an amount that a priori depends on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). Showing that it depends on x2x_2x2​ alone is the content of Theorem 1; nothing in the separation step itself rules out a dependence on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). On the measure-theoretic side, every value function is defined by an infimum over an uncountable set and then integrated against φ\varphiφ. Its measurability and integrability are not automatic, and they must be established before any identity between integrals can be manipulated.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in ClarkScarf.Serial, one definition file Def_ClarkScarf_Serial_Model and seven theorem files. Conventions committed to:

  • The model is a structure Model whose fields carry the data and the standing hypotheses: h,p,α,c1,K,c≥0h,p,\alpha,c_1,K,c\ge0h,p,α,c1​,K,c≥0; φ≥0\varphi\ge0φ≥0 with ∫0∞φ=1\int_0^\infty\varphi=1∫0∞​φ=1; and two additions the page leaves implicit, disclosed in each statement: a finite demand mean (otherwise (1) is infinite for x≤0x\le0x≤0) and L~\tilde LL~ non-negative, continuous and of at most linear growth (Assumption 3 leaves L~\tilde LL~ unspecified; these make every expectation in (14) finite and measurable). No discount bound α<1\alpha<1α<1, no convexity of L~\tilde LL~, no K=0K=0K=0 and no sign condition on w1w_1w1​ is assumed.
  • Expectations are set integrals ∫(0,∞)F(t)φ(t) dt\int_{(0,\infty)}F(t)\varphi(t)\,dt∫(0,∞)​F(t)φ(t)dt; "Min" is a real infimum over a nonempty feasible set of a non-negative objective.
  • Every statement about CnC_nCn​ is restricted to the state domain x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​; outside it the feasible set of (14) is empty.
  • The horizon index counts periods remaining, C0≡C^0≡0C_0\equiv\hat C_0\equiv0C0​≡C^0​≡0, and fn≡0f_n\equiv0fn​≡0 for n≤2n\le2n≤2.

A formalization in which the feasible set of (14) is empty, in which the expectations are junk zeros of non-integrable integrands, or in which gng_ngn​ may depend on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​) would make (16) trivial; the domain restriction, the integrability conditions and the order ∃g ∀x1,w1,x2\exists g\,\forall x_1,w_1,x_2∃g∀x1​,w1​,x2​ rule these out. A sorry-free check (not part of the mission) verifies C1=L(x1)+L~(x2)C_1=L(x_1)+\tilde L(x_2)C1​=L(x1​)+L~(x2​) and C^1=L(x1)\hat C_1=L(x_1)C^1​=L(x1​) and exhibits a model with exponential demand satisfying all hypotheses.

Needed infrastructure: Fubini-type rearrangement of iterated set integrals against a density, integrability of functions of linear growth against a finite-mean density, convexity preserved under infimal projection u↦inf⁡y≥uu\mapsto\inf_{y\ge u}u↦infy≥u​ and under convolution with a density, and measurability of infimum-defined functions. Contributions of these general lemmas, of the base cases n=1,2n=1,2n=1,2, and of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory Models of the Arrow-Harris-Marschak Type with Time Lag, in Arrow, Karlin, Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower Bounds for Multi-Echelon Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 40(11):1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryDiscrete Geometry+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Exponential Lower Bounds for Polytopes in Combinatorial Optimization: The TSP Polytope Has Extension Complexity 2^Ω(√n)Research Paper

Motivation

Combinatorial optimization problems are routinely solved by writing the convex hull of their feasible solutions as the feasible region of a linear program. When that convex hull has exponentially many facets, a classical trick is to add auxiliary variables: a polytope with many facets may be the linear projection of a higher-dimensional polyhedron with few. The spanning tree polytope, the permutahedron and the parity polytope all have compact descriptions of this kind. This raises the question of whether every polytope of an NP-hard problem might also have one, which would yield a polynomial-size linear program for that problem.

In the late 1980s several papers claimed polynomial-size linear programs for the traveling salesman problem (TSP). Yannakakis (STOC 1988; JCSS 1991) refuted all such claims at once by showing that every symmetric extended formulation of the TSP polytope has exponential size. He asked whether the symmetry assumption could be removed. Fiorini, Massar, Pokutta, Tiwary and de Wolf (STOC 2012; J. ACM 2015) answered the question: every extended formulation of the TSP polytope, symmetric or not, has 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}2Ω(n​) inequalities.

Timeline.

  • 1990: De Simone shows that the correlation polytope is linearly isomorphic to the cut polytope.
  • 1991: Yannakakis proves the factorization theorem (extension complexity equals the nonnegative rank of a slack matrix) and the exponential lower bound for symmetric formulations of the TSP and perfect matching polytopes.
  • 1992: Razborov proves the distributional lower bound for set disjointness.
  • 2003: de Wolf shows that the support of M(n)ab=(1−a⊤b)2M(n)_{ab}=(1-a^\top b)^2M(n)ab​=(1−a⊤b)2 needs 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) rectangles to cover.
  • 2012/2015: Fiorini et al. prove xc(CUT(n))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{CUT}(n))=2^{\Omega(n)}xc(CUT(n))=2Ω(n), xc(TSP(n))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))=2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}xc(TSP(n))=2Ω(n​), and a 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}2Ω(n​) bound for stable set polytopes of some graphs on nnn vertices.
  • 2013: Kaibel and Weltge give a short combinatorial proof of the correlation-polytope bound, with constant C=log⁡2(3/2)C=\log_2(3/2)C=log2​(3/2).
  • 2014: Rothvoss proves 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) for the perfect matching polytope.

Setting

Let ι\iotaι be a finite index set. An extended formulation (EF) of a set P⊆RιP\subseteq\mathbb R^{\iota}P⊆Rι is a linear system E=x+F=y=g=E^{=}x+F^{=}y=g^{=}E=x+F=y=g=, E≤x+F≤y≤g≤E^{\le}x+F^{\le}y\le g^{\le}E≤x+F≤y≤g≤ in variables (x,y)∈Rι×Rk(x,y)\in\mathbb R^{\iota}\times\mathbb R^{k}(x,y)∈Rι×Rk such that x∈Px\in Px∈P exactly when some yyy satisfies it. Its size is the number of inequalities. The extension complexity xc(P)\mathrm{xc}(P)xc(P) is the least size of an EF of PPP.

A polytope is the convex hull of finitely many points. A face of PPP is PPP itself or its intersection with a valid hyperplane, and a facet is a maximal proper face. A polytope QQQ is an extension of PPP if π(Q)=P\pi(Q)=Pπ(Q)=P for some linear map π\piπ. Given P={x:Ax≤b}=conv(V)P=\{x : Ax\le b\}=\mathrm{conv}(V)P={x:Ax≤b}=conv(V), the slack matrix has entries Sij=bi−AivjS_{ij}=b_i-A_iv_jSij​=bi​−Ai​vj​. The nonnegative rank rank+(M)\mathrm{rank}_+(M)rank+​(M) is the least rrr with M=TUM=TUM=TU, where T≥0T\ge 0T≥0 has rrr columns and U≥0U\ge 0U≥0 has rrr rows.

For nnn-bit strings a,ba,ba,b, a⊤ba^\top ba⊤b is the number of common ones, and M(n)M(n)M(n) is the 2n×2n2^n\times 2^n2n×2n matrix Mab=(1−a⊤b)2M_{ab}=(1-a^\top b)^2Mab​=(1−a⊤b)2. A 1-monochromatic rectangle cover of its support is a family of products R1×R2R_1\times R_2R1​×R2​, each containing only entries with Mab≠0M_{ab}\ne 0Mab​=0, that together contain all of them.

On the complete graph Kn=(Vn,En)K_n=(V_n,E_n)Kn​=(Vn​,En​), χF∈REn\chi^F\in\mathbb R^{E_n}χF∈REn​ is the characteristic vector of an edge set FFF and δ(X)\delta(X)δ(X) is the cut of X⊆VnX\subseteq V_nX⊆Vn​. The polytopes are

CUT(n)=conv{χδ(X)},COR(n)=conv{bb⊤:b∈{0,1}n}⊆Rn×n,\mathrm{CUT}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{\chi^{\delta(X)}\},\qquad \mathrm{COR}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{bb^\top : b\in\{0,1\}^n\}\subseteq\mathbb R^{n\times n},CUT(n)=conv{χδ(X)},COR(n)=conv{bb⊤:b∈{0,1}n}⊆Rn×n, TSP(n)=conv{χF:F⊆En is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of Kn}.\mathrm{TSP}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{\chi^F : F\subseteq E_n \text{ is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of } K_n\}.TSP(n)=conv{χF:F⊆En​ is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of Kn​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12

∃ C>0 ∃ N ∀n≥N:xc(TSP(n)) ≥ 2Cn.\exists\,C>0\ \exists\,N\ \forall n\ge N:\qquad \mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))\ \ge\ 2^{C\sqrt n}.∃C>0 ∃N ∀n≥N:xc(TSP(n)) ≥ 2Cn​.

The constant is left unfixed, so the goal survives any improvement of it.

Milestones, in attack order

  • Razborov's distributional bound (displayed in the proof of Theorem 1) and Theorem 1: every 1-rectangle cover of the support of M(n)M(n)M(n) has 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) rectangles.
  • Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 (Yannakakis): rank+(S)≤r\mathrm{rank}_+(S)\le rrank+​(S)≤r   ⟺  \iff⟺ an extension with at most rrr facets   ⟺  \iff⟺ an EF with at most rrr inequalities.
  • Theorem 4: rank+(M)\mathrm{rank}_+(M)rank+​(M) is at least the rectangle covering bound of its support (already proved on the platform, referenced).
  • Theorem 5: COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n) is linearly isomorphic to CUT(n+1)\mathrm{CUT}(n+1)CUT(n+1). Lemma 6: ⟨2 diag(a)−aa⊤,x⟩≤1\langle 2\,\mathrm{diag}(a)-aa^\top,x\rangle\le 1⟨2diag(a)−aa⊤,x⟩≤1 is valid for COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n), with slack MabM_{ab}Mab​ at bb⊤bb^\topbb⊤.
  • Theorem 7: xc(CUT(n+1))=xc(COR(n))≥2Cn\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{CUT}(n+1))=\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{COR}(n))\ge 2^{Cn}xc(CUT(n+1))=xc(COR(n))≥2Cn.
  • Lemma 9: xc\mathrm{xc}xc does not increase under taking faces or linear images. Lemma 11: TSP(q)\mathrm{TSP}(q)TSP(q) with q=O(n2)q=O(n^2)q=O(n2) has a face that is an extension of COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n).
  • Stable sets: Lemma 8 and Theorem 10, xc(STAB(Gn))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{STAB}(G_n))=2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}xc(STAB(Gn​))=2Ω(n​) for some graph GnG_nGn​ on nnn vertices.

Significance

The theorem rules out every polynomial-size linear programming formulation of the TSP polytope, in any number of auxiliary variables, which settles Yannakakis's question. The cut polytope bound does the same for max-cut, and the stable set bound for the stable set problem on general graphs. The results do not depend on P vs NP: they concern one specific model of computation, linear programs whose feasible region projects onto the polytope. They started a line of work on extension complexity, including perfect matching (Rothvoss), approximate EFs and semidefinite lifts.

Formalizing the result would produce a machine-checked chain from a communication-complexity bound to a polyhedral one. The paper's results are proved; the input of Theorem 1, Razborov's bound, is only cited, and is posed here as a separate target. To our knowledge none of these statements has a formal proof in Lean or another proof assistant. The polyhedral layer (Yannakakis's theorem, faces and extensions) and the matrix layer (nonnegative rank, rectangle covers) can be reused for later extension-complexity results.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, bounding the number of facets of the TSP polytope, does not work: extended formulations exist precisely because a projection can have far more facets than the lifted polyhedron. Any lower bound must cover every lifting at once, which means working with the nonnegative rank of a slack matrix rather than with any concrete formulation. Ordinary rank is no help, because M(n)M(n)M(n) has rank O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2). The step that carries the weight is Razborov's distributional bound for disjointness, a nontrivial piece of communication complexity. On the polyhedral side, Lemma 11 needs a reduction from 3SAT to a directed and then an undirected Hamiltonian cycle problem, realized as a face of TSP(q)\mathrm{TSP}(q)TSP(q) with q=O(n2)q=O(n^2)q=O(n2). Theorem 12 also needs a monotonicity of xc(TSP(n))\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))xc(TSP(n)) in nnn that the paper only indicates.

Formalization scope

  • Everything is over R\mathbb RR. Points of Rd\mathbb R^dRd are functions ι→R\iota\to\mathbb Rι→R on a finite type. REn\mathbb R^{E_n}REn​ has one coordinate per unordered edge of KnK_nKn​ (non-diagonal elements of Sym2 (Fin n)). Rn×n\mathbb R^{n\times n}Rn×n is indexed by ordered pairs, and the Frobenius product is the dot product over ordered pairs. Bit strings are Fin n → Bool.
  • xc\mathrm{xc}xc and rank+\mathrm{rank}_+rank+​ are natural numbers (sInf of the attainable sizes), never ∞\infty∞, so no lower bound can hold through an infinite value. The size of an EF counts inequalities only.
  • Every 2Ω(f(n))2^{\Omega(f(n))}2Ω(f(n)) is ∃C>0 ∃N ∀n≥N\exists C>0\,\exists N\,\forall n\ge N∃C>0∃N∀n≥N, 2Cf(n)≤⋅2^{Cf(n)}\le\cdot2Cf(n)≤⋅ (real power). Every O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) is a constant ccc with ≤c n2\le c\,n^2≤cn2, uniform in nnn.
  • Theorem 7 and Lemma 11 carry an added n≥1n\ge 1n≥1: at n=0n=0n=0 the printed statements fail, since COR(0)\mathrm{COR}(0)COR(0) is a point with xc=0\mathrm{xc}=0xc=0 and no positive q≤c⋅0q\le c\cdot 0q≤c⋅0 exists.
  • "Linearly isomorphic" in Theorem 5 is an injective linear map carrying CUT(n+1)\mathrm{CUT}(n+1)CUT(n+1) onto COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n), because the two ambient spaces have different dimensions.
  • In Theorem 3, dim⁡P≥1\dim P\ge 1dimP≥1 is "PPP has two distinct points". Faces include ∅\emptyset∅ and PPP, facets are maximal proper faces, and facets are counted with an explicit finite family.
  • Ruled out: a TSP polytope over ordered pairs, all cycles or directed tours, a weakened isomorphism in Theorem 5, and an extension complexity valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} that is infinite on a broken EF definition.
  • Welcome contributions: proofs of any milestone, in particular Lemma 2 and the factorization theorem (reusable for every later extension-complexity result), Theorem 5, and the face construction of Lemma 11; a proof of the monotonicity of xc(TSP(n))\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))xc(TSP(n)) in nnn as a supporting lemma.

Selected references

  • S. Fiorini, S. Massar, S. Pokutta, H. R. Tiwary, R. de Wolf, Exponential lower bounds for polytopes in combinatorial optimization, J. ACM 62(2), Art. 17, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2716307
  • M. Yannakakis, Expressing combinatorial optimization problems by linear programs, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 43(3), 441–466, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(91)90024-Y
  • A. A. Razborov, On the distributional complexity of disjointness, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 106(2), 385–390, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(92)90260-M
  • R. de Wolf, Nondeterministic quantum query and communication complexities, SIAM J. Comput. 32(3), 681–699, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539702407345
  • C. De Simone, The cut polytope and the Boolean quadric polytope, Discrete Math. 79(1), 71–75, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(90)90056-N
  • V. Kaibel, S. Weltge, A short proof that the extension complexity of the correlation polytope grows exponentially, Discrete Comput. Geom. 53, 397–401, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-014-9655-9
  • T. Rothvoss, The matching polytope has exponential extension complexity, J. ACM 64(6), Art. 41, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3127497
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 4: A 6.75-Approximate Truthful Posted-Price Menu for Unit-Demand Buyers of Multiple ItemsResearch Paper

Motivation

A hotel sells rooms of several types, in limited numbers, to guests who each want one room. The revenue-optimal way to sell is known only in special cases: for buyers with several private values, optimal mechanisms can be randomized, involve lotteries, and lack a closed form (Manelli–Vincent 2007; Chawla, Hartline, Kleinberg 2007). In practice sellers post prices. The question is how much revenue posting prices gives up.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435v2, STOC 2010) answer it for a broad class of single- and multi-parameter problems. For unit-demand buyers of multiple copies of multiple items they show that a menu of posted prices, offered to the buyers in whatever order they arrive, earns at least 1/6.751/6.751/6.75 of the revenue of any deterministic truthful mechanism (Theorem 14). This mission formalizes that result together with the two steps it is built from: a reduction from the multi-parameter problem to a single-parameter one with "copies" of each buyer (Lemma 3, Theorem 4), and an order-oblivious pricing for the intersection of two partition matroids (Theorem 13).

Setting

Single-parameter problem (BSMD). Finitely many agents iii have independent private values vi∼Fiv_i \sim F_ivi​∼Fi​, each with a density on a bounded interval. A seller may serve any set in a downward-closed set system J\mathcal JJ. A deterministic mechanism MMM maps reported values vvv to a served set M(v)∈JM(v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J and payments πi(v)\pi_i(v)πi​(v); it is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ends with negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=Ev[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E_v[\sum_i \pi_i(v)]RM=Ev​[∑i​πi​(v)]. For prices ppp, agent iii desires service if pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​, and Sv\mathcal S_vSv​ is the class of maximal feasible sets of desiring agents. The order-oblivious revenue is

Rpobl=Ev[min⁡S∈Sv∑i∈Spi],\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p} = \mathbb E_{v}\Big[\min_{S \in \mathcal S_v} \sum_{i \in S} p_i\Big],Rpobl​=Ev​[S∈Sv​min​i∈S∑​pi​],

a lower bound on the revenue of posting the prices ppp to the agents in an adversarial order.

Multi-parameter unit-demand problem (BMUMD). There are mmm buyers and a finite set JJJ of services, partitioned into the groups JiJ_iJi​ of services targeted at buyer iii. Buyer iii has value vjv_jvj​ for each j∈Jij \in J_ij∈Ji​, all values independent with vj∼Fjv_j \sim F_jvj​∼Fj​, and the set system J⊆2J\mathcal J \subseteq 2^JJ⊆2J is unit-demand: ∣S∩Ji∣≤1|S \cap J_i| \le 1∣S∩Ji​∣≤1 for feasible SSS. A mechanism A\mathcal AA is truthful if no buyer gains by misreporting its whole vector (vj)j∈Ji(v_j)_{j \in J_i}(vj​)j∈Ji​​, and individually rational if a buyer receiving jjj pays at most vjv_jvj​ and a buyer receiving nothing pays 000.

Copies. The instance Icopies\mathcal I^{\mathrm{copies}}Icopies replaces each buyer iii by ∣Ji∣|J_i|∣Ji​∣ single-parameter agents, one per service j∈Jij \in J_ij∈Ji​ with value vjv_jvj​, under the same J\mathcal JJ.

Price menus. Given prices (pj)(p_j)(pj​) and an arrival order σ\sigmaσ, the price-menu mechanism approaches the buyers in order; buyer iii is offered the services of JiJ_iJi​ that can still be feasibly allocated, at prices pjp_jpj​, and buys a utility-maximizing one if some has pj≤vjp_j \le v_jpj​≤vj​.

Multiple copies of items. With items KKK and cap(k)\mathrm{cap}(k)cap(k) copies of item kkk, services are pairs (i,k)(i,k)(i,k) and a set of services is feasible if it gives each buyer at most one item and uses at most cap(k)\mathrm{cap}(k)cap(k) copies of kkk: the intersection of two partition matroids.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14

For regular distributions there are prices ppp such that, for every arrival order σ\sigmaσ, the price-menu mechanism Pσ\mathcal P_\sigmaPσ​ is truthful and

RA≤274 RPσ\mathcal R^{\mathcal A} \le \tfrac{27}{4}\,\mathcal R^{\mathcal P_\sigma}RA≤427​RPσ​

for every individually rational, truthful deterministic mechanism A\mathcal AA.

Milestones

  • Truthful BMUMD mechanisms are weakly monotone (p. 13), and the allocation of Acopies\mathcal A^{\mathrm{copies}}Acopies is monotone in each vjv_jvj​ (p. 13).
  • Lemma 3: RA≤RA′\mathcal R^{\mathcal A} \le \mathcal R^{\mathcal A'}RA≤RA′ for some truthful A′\mathcal A'A′ on Icopies\mathcal I^{\mathrm{copies}}Icopies.
  • The price-menu mechanism allocates a maximal feasible set of services (p. 14).
  • Theorem 4: if RM′≤α Rpobl\mathcal R^{M'} \le \alpha\,\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}RM′≤αRpobl​ for every truthful M′M'M′ on Icopies\mathcal I^{\mathrm{copies}}Icopies, then RA≤α RPσ\mathcal R^{\mathcal A} \le \alpha\,\mathcal R^{\mathcal P_\sigma}RA≤αRPσ​ for every σ\sigmaσ and every truthful IR A\mathcal AA.
  • Lemma 2 (regular part): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M \le \sum_i p^M_i q^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​, with qiMq^M_iqiM​ the probability that MMM serves iii and Fi(piM)=1−qiMF_i(p^M_i) = 1 - q^M_iFi​(piM​)=1−qiM​.
  • Theorem 19 (existence form): a revenue-optimal truthful mechanism exists.
  • The claim ci≥4/9c_i \ge 4/9ci​≥4/9 of App. D.4: under ∑i′∈Pqi′≤cap(P)/3\sum_{i' \in P} q_{i'} \le \mathrm{cap}(P)/3∑i′∈P​qi′​≤cap(P)/3 in every part, with probability at least 4/94/94/9 neither part of iii is full without iii.
  • Theorem 13: for two partition matroids there are prices with RM≤274 Rpobl\mathcal R^M \le \tfrac{27}{4}\,\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}RM≤427​Rpobl​ for every truthful MMM.

Significance

The result shows that for unit-demand buyers, a seller loses at most a constant factor by replacing the optimal, possibly opaque, truthful mechanism with a menu of prices that does not depend on the order in which buyers arrive. The reduction of Theorem 4 is generic: any order-oblivious pricing for the single-parameter instance with copies, under any unit-demand constraint, transfers to the multi-parameter instance with the same factor. Theorem 13 supplies one such pricing for the intersection of two partition matroids, which is exactly the shape of the multi-unit, multi-item constraint.

All results here are proved in the paper and none is formalized elsewhere; the platform has Myerson's single-unit optimal auction and weak monotonicity in an abstract quasilinear model (Börgers), but no posted-price approximation, no copies reduction, and no order-oblivious revenue. The formal development adds a machine-checked account of the reduction (in particular that the price-menu mechanism is truthful and allocates a maximal feasible set for every order), a precise version of the probabilistic claim behind the constant 6.756.756.75, and reusable definitions of order-oblivious revenue and of multi-parameter truthfulness with the paper's individual rationality.

Difficulty

Lemma 3 needs more than the observation that the copies instance has more competition: one must build a truthful single-parameter mechanism with at least the same revenue. The allocation is copied, but the payments must be threshold payments of the copies mechanism, and showing they dominate the original payments uses both weak monotonicity and the paper's individual rationality, through the taxation principle.

Theorem 13 compares order-oblivious revenue with Myerson's revenue through the bound of Lemma 2, at prices built from Myerson's service probabilities scaled by 1/31/31/3. The step that is easy to get wrong is the probability that an agent is considered: the events "part P1P_1P1​ is not full" and "part P2P_2P2​ is not full" depend on overlapping agents, so the product bound (2/3)(2/3)(2/3)(2/3)(2/3)(2/3) does not follow from Markov's inequality alone; it holds because both events are decreasing in the set of desiring agents (Harris' inequality). The comparison must also be uniform: one set of prices must serve against every truthful mechanism, which requires an optimal mechanism to exist.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions (P1): each FjF_jFj​ has a measurable density, strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾j,v‾j]⊆[0,∞)[\underline v_j, \overline v_j] \subseteq [0, \infty)[v​j​,vj​]⊆[0,∞), with no mass outside. Values are independent (product prior).
  • Regularity (P2): the virtual value ϕ(v)=v−(1−F(v))/f(v)\phi(v) = v - (1 - F(v))/f(v)ϕ(v)=v−(1−F(v))/f(v) is non-decreasing on the support. It is assumed in Lemma 2, Theorem 19, Theorem 13 and the goal. Theorem 14 does not state it, but its proof goes through Theorem 13, which the paper proves for regular distributions; the non-regular extension (App. E, randomized prices) is out of scope, as is the second paragraph of Lemma 2.
  • Mechanisms (P3): deterministic; dominant-strategy truthful with misreports in the support (a buyer misreports all coordinates of JiJ_iJi​ at once); single-parameter IR is ex-post nonnegative utility; multi-parameter IR is the paper's (πi≤vj\pi_i \le v_jπi​≤vj​ if served jjj, πi=0\pi_i = 0πi​=0 if unserved); allocation events and payments measurable, payments integrable.
  • Benchmarks (P4): Myerson's mechanism is not constructed. "Approximates RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM" is stated against every truthful mechanism, and Lemma 3 and Theorem 19 in existence form.
  • Price menus: ties between utility-maximizing services are broken by a fixed enumeration of JJJ; a service of utility 000 is bought. Theorem 4 assumes α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.
  • Dropped: the last sentence of Theorem 14 (polynomial-time computability of the prices) has no cost model here.
  • Constant: 6.756.756.75 is written 27/427/427/4 everywhere.
  • Not trivializable: the prices in Theorem 13 and the goal are chosen before the mechanism, and the benchmark includes every truthful mechanism, so a degenerate price vector cannot meet the bound; Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a genuine minimum over a nonempty finite class.

Needed infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: Myerson's characterization of truthful single-parameter mechanisms and the revenue–virtual-surplus identity for densities on intervals, Harris' inequality for product measures, and the taxation principle for deterministic multi-parameter mechanisms. Contributions on any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, STOC 2010; arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, R. Kleinberg, Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations, EC 2007. https://arxiv.org/abs/0711.3203
  • A. M. Manelli, D. R. Vincent, Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly, Journal of Economic Theory 137(1), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007
  • T. E. Harris, A lower bound for the critical probability in a certain percolation process, Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 56, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100034241
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