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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

1094 missions

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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems I: Using the EOQ Order Quantity in the Stochastic (Q, r) Model Raises Costs by at Most 1/8Research Paper

Motivation

The economic order quantity (EOQ) is the most widely used formula in inventory management. It assumes that demand is a deterministic constant stream. Real demand is random, and the model that accounts for this, the continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy with stochastic demand, has no closed-form optimum: for decades its optimal parameters were computed numerically, one instance at a time, which gave little insight into how the stochastic system behaves. Practitioners nevertheless kept using the EOQ quantity in stochastic systems and observed that the cost penalty was small (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978), without an analytical explanation.

Zheng (Management Science 38(1), 1992) supplied that explanation. By minimising the average cost first over the reorder point and then over the order quantity, he obtained two simple optimality equations and compared the stochastic model with the EOQ model under the same cost structure. One of the results is the goal of this mission: for every leadtime-demand distribution, using the EOQ order quantity in the stochastic system raises the average cost by at most one eighth. The paper extends Federgruen and Zheng (1988), who treated the discrete-demand version of the cost function.

Setting

A single item faces demand at rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Orders are delivered after a fixed leadtime L>0L > 0L>0, and stockouts are backordered. Each order costs a fixed K>0K > 0K>0. Inventory is held at cost rate h>0h > 0h>0 per unit and backorders are penalised at cost rate p>0p > 0p>0 per unit. Let D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 be the demand during a leadtime, with mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL. The newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+]G(y) = E\big[h(y - D)^+ + p(D - y)^+\big]G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+]

is the rate at which expected inventory costs accrue at time t+Lt + Lt+L when the inventory position at time ttt is yyy. It is convex, and it is assumed, as in the paper, to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0.

A (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy orders QQQ units whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr. Its long-run average cost is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.(1)c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}. \qquad (1)c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.(1)

For a fixed Q>0Q > 0Q>0 let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be an optimal reorder point, and set

H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QH(y) dy.H(Q) = G(r(Q)) \ (Q > 0),\quad H(0) = G(y^0),\quad C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q)),\quad A(Q) = Q H(Q) - \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy .H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H(y)dy.

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is the average cost when the reorder point is chosen optimally for QQQ; an order quantity Q∗>0Q^* > 0Q∗>0 minimising CCC over Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is the optimal order quantity, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^* = C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗) is the optimal cost.

The EOQ model is the special case in which the leadtime demand is the constant λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y - \lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L - y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and its optimal order quantity is

Qd∗=2λK(h+p)hp.Q^*_d = \sqrt{\frac{2\lambda K(h+p)}{hp}} .Qd∗​=hp2λK(h+p)​​.

The subscript ddd marks every object of the EOQ model (rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, AdA_dAd​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

R=C(Qd∗)−C∗C∗  ≤  18−12(12−Qd∗Q∗)2  ≤  18.R = \frac{C(Q^*_d) - C^*}{C^*} \;\le\; \frac18 - \frac12\left(\frac12 - \frac{Q^*_d}{Q^*}\right)^2 \;\le\; \frac18 .R=C∗C(Qd∗​)−C∗​≤81​−21​(21​−Q∗Qd∗​​)2≤81​.

C(Qd∗)C(Q^*_d)C(Qd∗​) is the stochastic cost at the EOQ quantity with the reorder point re-optimised for it. The bound holds for every leadtime-demand distribution and every value of the parameters.

Milestones

In the order the goal's proof uses them:

  • Lemma 1 (joint convexity of ccc), Lemma 2 (r=r(Q)  ⟺  G(r)=G(r+Q)r = r(Q) \iff G(r) = G(r+Q)r=r(Q)⟺G(r)=G(r+Q)), Lemma 3 (properties of r(Q)r(Q)r(Q)), Corollary 1 (G(r(Q))≤max⁡(G(r),G(r+Q))G(r(Q)) \le \max(G(r), G(r+Q))G(r(Q))≤max(G(r),G(r+Q)));
  • Eq. (7) (C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH)/QC(Q) = (\lambda K + \int_0^Q H)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H)/Q), Lemma 4 (HHH increasing, convex, asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)), Lemma 5 (CCC convex), Eq. (8) (H(Q∗)=C(Q∗)H(Q^*) = C(Q^*)H(Q∗)=C(Q∗)), Theorem 1 ((Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) optimal iff c(Q,r)=G(r)=G(r+Q)c(Q,r) = G(r) = G(r+Q)c(Q,r)=G(r)=G(r+Q)), Lemma 6 (AAA increasing convex, Q=Q∗  ⟺  A(Q)=λKQ = Q^* \iff A(Q) = \lambda KQ=Q∗⟺A(Q)=λK, comparative statics in KKK);
  • Eqs. (18), (20) (the EOQ model: Hd(Q)=hpQ/(h+p)H_d(Q) = hpQ/(h+p)Hd​(Q)=hpQ/(h+p) and the formula for Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​), Eq. (22) (Gd≤GG_d \le GGd​≤G), Lemma 7 (H0≤Hd≤HH_0 \le H_d \le HH0​≤Hd​≤H, A≤AdA \le A_dA≤Ad​), and the first inequality of Theorem 2, Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗.

Significance

The theorem is a distribution-free worst-case guarantee for the most common heuristic in inventory practice. It says that the EOQ formula, which needs only the mean demand rate and three cost parameters, loses at most 12.5%12.5\%12.5% against the true optimum, and that the loss is smaller when Qd∗/Q∗Q^*_d/Q^*Qd∗​/Q∗ is close to 12\frac1221​ or to 111. Combined with the paper's Theorem 2 (the gap Q∗−Qd∗Q^* - Q^*_dQ∗−Qd∗​ is bounded as KKK grows), it implies that the relative loss vanishes as the fixed ordering cost grows. The milestones along the way (the optimality conditions of Theorem 1, the monotonicity of the optimal reorder point, the comparison of HHH with its EOQ counterpart) are the standard structural facts about continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) systems and are reused throughout the inventory literature.

The result is proved in the paper. No machine-checked version of it, or of the (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) optimality conditions for the continuous cost (1), is known to exist. The platform has related but different formalizations: the discrete cost function with integer QQQ (InventoryControl_rqDiscrete), the (R,Q)(R, Q)(R,Q) cost under normal demand (InventoryControl_rq), and the EOQ without backorders (InventoryControl_eoq). A complete development here provides the continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) machinery for an arbitrary leadtime-demand distribution.

Difficulty

The paper's proofs differentiate r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and H(Q)H(Q)H(Q) twice (Eqs. (4), (5)), which presupposes a leadtime demand with a smooth density. The formalization does not assume one, so that discrete demand, such as the Poisson demand of the paper's own numerical study, is covered. Every step that the paper takes through derivatives, in particular the convexity of HHH and the slope bound H′≤hp/(h+p)H' \le hp/(h+p)H′≤hp/(h+p), has to be established by other means: through one-sided derivatives or chord arguments for the convex function GGG, whose kinks are where the derivative-based argument breaks. The definition of r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) as a minimiser also means its existence and uniqueness must be proved before any property of HHH, CCC or AAA can be used.

Formalization scope

  • The model is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R (the law of DDD), concentrated on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), integrable, with mean λL\lambda LλL; GGG is the integral of hmax⁡(y−x,0)+pmax⁡(x−y,0)h\max(y-x,0) + p\max(x-y,0)hmax(y−x,0)+pmax(x−y,0) against μ\muμ. The standing assumptions are bundled in IsQRModel: λ,L,h,p>0\lambda, L, h, p > 0λ,L,h,p>0, the conditions on μ\muμ, and the unique minimiser of GGG (paper, p. 90). K>0K > 0K>0 is a separate hypothesis. No density is assumed.
  • ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, H0H_0H0​, CCC, AAA and optimality of an order quantity are defined for an arbitrary cost rate GGG and applied both to the newsvendor cost and to GdG_dGd​; the EOQ objects rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, AdA_dAd​ are these definitions at GdG_dGd​, and Eqs. (18), (20) are theorems.
  • r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is a chosen minimiser of c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅) (never defined by G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q), which is Lemma 2). H(0):=G(y0)H(0) := G(y^0)H(0):=G(y0); right-continuity of HHH at 000 is part of the Lemma 4 milestone. Order quantities range over (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for ccc and CCC and over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) for HHH, H0H_0H0​, AAA.
  • Q∗Q^*Q∗ in the goal is any Q>0Q > 0Q>0 with C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q) \le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q' > 0Q′>0; Lemma 6 asserts that exactly one exists, so the goal is not vacuous. Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is the explicit square-root formula.
  • Readings of informal words: "increasing" in Lemmas 4 and 6 means strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); "Q∗Q^*Q∗ increasing, r∗r^*r∗ decreasing in KKK" means strictly; "asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" means that every chord of HHH on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) has slope at most hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p) and H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q \to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p); Lemma 3 part 3 is stated as strict monotonicity of r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and r(Q)+Qr(Q) + Qr(Q)+Q, and its derivative clause −1<r′(Q)<0-1 < r'(Q) < 0−1<r′(Q)<0 is omitted because rrr need not be differentiable without a density; "the optimal order quantity" means existence and uniqueness; Lemma 7 is stated for Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: C(Qd∗)C(Q^*_d)C(Qd∗​) is the stochastic cost with the reorder point re-optimised in the stochastic model (not the EOQ reorder point rd∗r^*_drd∗​), and no positivity of C∗C^*C∗ is assumed (it follows from the model).
  • Out of scope: the discrete cost (2), the §4 numerical study, and the unnumbered remarks after Theorem 5.
  • Needed infrastructure: interval integrals of convex functions, partial minimisation of jointly convex functions, Jensen's inequality for μ\muμ, and one-sided derivatives of convex functions. The generic (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) machinery (optimality conditions for arbitrary convex GGG) is reusable for other continuous-review models. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs that avoid the paper's differentiability assumptions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu-Sheng Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Paul H. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • George Hadley and Thomson M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • Daniel P. Heyman and Matthew J. Sobel, Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II, McGraw-Hill, 1984.
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems II: The Optimal Order Quantity of the Stochastic (Q, r) Model Exceeds the EOQ by a Bounded GapResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard control rule for a single stocked item with random demand: whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr, an order of fixed size QQQ is placed. It is implemented in a large share of commercial inventory systems. Choosing the two parameters jointly has traditionally required numerical search (Hadley and Whitin, 1963; Federgruen and Zheng, 1992). In practice the order quantity is therefore often taken from the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) formula with backorders, and the reorder point is then set for the random demand.

Zheng (1992) turned this practice into a question with an exact answer: how does the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ of the stochastic model compare with the EOQ quantity Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ computed from the same cost data and the same mean demand? Its Theorem 2 answers it with a two-sided bound. This mission formalizes that theorem. Companion missions of the same series formalize the paper's cost bounds (Theorem 3), the flatness of the cost curve (Theorem 4) and the 1/81/81/8 bound on the cost of using the EOQ quantity (Theorem 5).

Setting

Demand arrives at rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and replenishment orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L > 0L>0. Shortages are backordered. Holding costs accrue at rate h>0h > 0h>0 per unit held, backorder penalties at rate p>0p > 0p>0 per unit short, and every order costs K>0K > 0K>0. The leadtime demand DDD is a nonnegative random variable with law μ\muμ and mean E(D)=λL\mathbb{E}(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL. The expected inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is the newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[h(y - D)^+ + p(D - y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed, as in the paper, to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.

For each Q>0Q > 0Q>0, let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be an optimal reorder point, i.e. a minimizer of c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅). The analysis runs through the curves

H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QH(y) dy,H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q > 0),\quad H(0) = G(y^0),\qquad H_0(Q) = H(Q) - G(y^0),\qquad A(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy,H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0​(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H(y)dy,

and through the cost C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)) of order quantity QQQ with the reorder point set optimally. The optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ is the minimizer of CCC over Q>0Q > 0Q>0.

The EOQ model is the case of a constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y - \lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L - y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and the same construction gives rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, AdA_dAd​ and the optimal quantity

Qd∗=2λK(h+p)hp.Q^*_d = \sqrt{\frac{2\lambda K(h+p)}{hp}}.Qd∗​=hp2λK(h+p)​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 96)

For K>0K > 0K>0, let Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ be the positive solutions of

QH0(Q)=2λK,H0(Q)=Hd(Qd∗),∫0QH0(y) dy=λK.Q H_0(Q) = 2\lambda K,\qquad H_0(Q) = H_d(Q^*_d),\qquad \int_0^Q H_0(y)\,dy = \lambda K.QH0​(Q)=2λK,H0​(Q)=Hd​(Qd∗​),∫0Q​H0​(y)dy=λK.

Each has exactly one positive solution, and

Qd∗≤Q∗≤Qˉ,Qˉ≤Qˉ1,Qˉ≤Qˉ2.Q^*_d \le Q^* \le \bar Q,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_1,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_2.Qd∗​≤Q∗≤Qˉ​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​1​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​2​.

Moreover, with λ,L,h,p\lambda, L, h, pλ,L,h,p and the demand law fixed, K↦Qˉ1(K)−Qd∗(K)K \mapsto \bar Q_1(K) - Q^*_d(K)K↦Qˉ​1​(K)−Qd∗​(K) is nondecreasing on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞) and converges to a finite constant as K→∞K \to \inftyK→∞.

Milestones

The milestones are the paper's own numbered results that feed Theorem 2, listed in the order the argument uses them:

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 90): for Q>0Q > 0Q>0, rrr is optimal iff G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r + Q)G(r)=G(r+Q).
  2. Eq. (7) (p. 91): C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y) dy)/QC(Q) = (\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q.
  3. Lemma 4 (p. 91): HHH is increasing and convex with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 92): AAA is increasing and convex, and Q=Q∗Q = Q^*Q=Q∗ iff A(Q)=λKA(Q) = \lambda KA(Q)=λK.
  5. Eqs. (18), (20) (p. 94): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is optimal for the EOQ model.
  6. Lemma 7 (p. 95): H0≤Hd≤HH_0 \le H_d \le HH0​≤Hd​≤H and A≤AdA \le A_dA≤Ad​.
  7. Lemma 8 (p. 95): ∫0QH≥12QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥12QH0(Q)≥∫0QH0\int_0^Q H \ge \tfrac12 QH(Q) \ge A(Q) \ge \tfrac12 QH_0(Q) \ge \int_0^Q H_0∫0Q​H≥21​QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥21​QH0​(Q)≥∫0Q​H0​, with equalities for deterministic demand.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 says that the EOQ formula always underestimates the optimal order quantity when leadtime demand is random. The underestimate is bounded by Qˉ1−Qd∗\bar Q_1 - Q^*_dQˉ​1​−Qd∗​, a quantity that stays bounded however large the ordering cost is. So the relative error of the EOQ quantity vanishes as KKK grows. The first inequality, Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗, is also an ingredient of the paper's Theorem 3 (cost bounds) and Theorem 5 (the EOQ quantity raises costs by at most 1/81/81/8). The explicit bounds Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ bracket Q∗Q^*Q∗ and give a search interval for it.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved on paper since 1992. No machine-checked version of it, or of the continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost of Eq. (1), exists on this platform. The inventory items already here treat the discrete cost with integer order quantities, a normally distributed demand, or the EOQ without backorders. This mission provides a machine-checked version of the paper's optimality conditions for a general demand distribution. The paper's argument differentiates GGG twice, i.e. it tacitly assumes a density. The formal statements do not, so a formal proof must redo those steps with one-sided (convexity) arguments. The printed argument for the limit in part (b) shows only that a derivative tends to zero. A complete proof of convergence is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗ compares the two cost curves CCC and CdC_dCd​ directly. It fails because C≥CdC \ge C_dC≥Cd​ pointwise, and a pointwise inequality between two convex functions says nothing about the order of their minimizers. The stochastic curve HHH is defined only implicitly, as GGG evaluated at a minimizer of a parametric integral, so its growth relative to the linear HdH_dHd​ has to be established before any comparison of order quantities. For part (b), a vanishing derivative does not imply convergence (log⁡K\log KlogK also has a vanishing derivative), so the printed proof of the limit does not go through as written.

Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) need not be differentiable. Every derivative in the paper's proofs (of rrr, HHH and AAA) must be replaced by monotonicity or chord arguments.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses the namespace ZhengQR.OrderQty. Its conventions:

  • Parameters. λ,L,K,h,p\lambda, L, K, h, pλ,L,K,h,p are reals, all assumed strictly positive. K>0K > 0K>0 is implicit in the paper; at K=0K = 0K=0 the optimal quantity degenerates.
  • Demand. The law μ\muμ of DDD is a probability measure on R\mathbb{R}R that is integrable, has mean λL\lambda LλL and is carried by [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). No density is assumed, so discrete laws such as the Poisson of the paper's §4 are allowed.
  • Standing assumption. GGG has a unique global minimizer (p. 90). It is a hypothesis of every statement about the stochastic model.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, CCC, AAA, H0H_0H0​ and optimality of QQQ are defined for an arbitrary cost rate GGG and applied to both the newsvendor cost and GdG_dGd​. So Eqs. (18) and (20) are theorems, not definitions. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers, never solutions of Lemma 2's equation. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) minimizes ∫rr+QG\int_r^{r+Q}G∫rr+Q​G, which for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 has the same minimizers as c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅), so HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA do not depend on KKK.
  • Domains. HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA are used on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), ccc and CCC for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 only, and Q∗Q^*Q∗ is a Q>0Q > 0Q>0 minimizing CCC over (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞).
  • Readings of informal words.
    • Lemma 4's "increasing" and Lemma 6's "increasing/decreasing" mean strictly.
    • Lemma 4's "asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" means H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q \to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q′)−H(Q)≤hph+p(Q′−Q)H(Q') - H(Q) \le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q' - Q)H(Q′)−H(Q)≤h+php​(Q′−Q) for 0≤Q<Q′0 \le Q < Q'0≤Q<Q′.
    • "Qˉ=def{Q:… }\bar Q \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{Q : \dots\}Qˉ​=def{Q:…}" means the unique positive solution. The goal quantifies over every positive solution and separately asserts that exactly one exists.
    • Theorem 2's "increasing function of KKK" means nondecreasing, which is what the paper's proof establishes (a nonnegative derivative).
    • "Converges to a constant" means a finite real limit.
    • Lemma 8's "the leadtime demand is deterministic" means the EOQ model with cost rate GdG_dGd​.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The goal's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example by a deterministic leadtime demand). Existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗ (Lemma 6) and of Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ (the goal itself) is asserted, so neither the bounds nor the limit hold vacuously.

Infrastructure needed includes the following. Much of it is reusable for any single-item inventory model:

  • differentiation under the expectation, or one-sided substitutes, for GGG;
  • convexity of HHH as the inverse of the width of the sublevel sets of GGG;
  • the envelope identity behind Eq. (7);
  • elementary convex-analysis facts about chords.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, general lemmas on the newsvendor cost, and a complete convergence argument for part (b).

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • A. Federgruen, Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems III: Bounds between the Optimal Costs of the Stochastic (Q, r) Model and the EOQ ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy — order a fixed quantity QQQ whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr — is the textbook policy for a single item with random demand and a positive replenishment leadtime (Hadley and Whitin 1963). Its optimal parameters have no closed form, so practice routinely falls back on the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model with backorders, whose optimum is explicit. How much the deterministic model misjudges the stochastic system's cost is therefore a practical question, and before Zheng (1992) it had been studied only numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978).

Zheng's paper answers it analytically. This mission targets its Theorem 3, which brackets the optimal cost of the stochastic model by the optimal cost of the EOQ model with the same parameters.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding and backorder costs accrue at rates h>0h>0h>0 and p>0p>0p>0 per unit per unit time. The leadtime demand DDD is a nonnegative random variable with E(D)=λLE(D)=\lambda LE(D)=λL. The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is the newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y)=E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0.

For order quantity Q>0Q>0Q>0 and reorder point rrr, the long-run average cost is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.c(Q,r)=\frac{\lambda K+\int_r^{r+Q}G(y)\,dy}{Q}.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.

Let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and define H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) for Q>0Q>0Q>0, H(0)=G(y0)H(0)=G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0), and C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)). The optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^*=C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗). Write H0(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0)H_0(Q)=H(Q)-G(y^0)H0​(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0) and

C0(Q)=λK+∫0QH0(y) dyQ,C_0(Q)=\frac{\lambda K+\int_0^Q H_0(y)\,dy}{Q},C0​(Q)=QλK+∫0Q​H0​(y)dy​,

the controllable cost, so that C(Q)=G(y0)+C0(Q)C(Q)=G(y^0)+C_0(Q)C(Q)=G(y0)+C0​(Q); C0∗=C0(Q∗)C^*_0=C_0(Q^*)C0∗​=C0​(Q∗). The constant G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0) is the newsboy cost.

The EOQ model is the same construction with demand constant at λL\lambda LλL: Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y)=h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, with functions HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​, optimal quantity Qd∗=2λK(h+p)/(hp)Q^*_d=\sqrt{2\lambda K(h+p)/(hp)}Qd∗​=2λK(h+p)/(hp)​ and optimal cost Cd∗=Cd(Qd∗)C^*_d=C_d(Q^*_d)Cd∗​=Cd​(Qd∗​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 97)

C0∗≤Qd∗Q∗ Cd∗,Cd∗≤C∗≤G(y0)+Qd∗Q∗ Cd∗.C^*_0\le\frac{Q^*_d}{Q^*}\,C^*_d,\qquad C^*_d\le C^*\le G(y^0)+\frac{Q^*_d}{Q^*}\,C^*_d.C0∗​≤Q∗Qd∗​​Cd∗​,Cd∗​≤C∗≤G(y0)+Q∗Qd∗​​Cd∗​.

All three inequalities are part of the goal. The weaker remark after the proof, Cd∗≤C∗≤Cd∗+G(y0)C^*_d\le C^*\le C^*_d+G(y^0)Cd∗​≤C∗≤Cd∗​+G(y0), drops the factor Qd∗/Q∗Q^*_d/Q^*Qd∗​/Q∗ and is not the goal.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (7): C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y) dy)/QC(Q)=\big(\lambda K+\int_0^Q H(y)\,dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Eq. (8): Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  3. Eqs. (13)–(15): C(Q)=G(y0)+C0(Q)C(Q)=G(y^0)+C_0(Q)C(Q)=G(y0)+C0​(Q), and H0(Q∗)=C0(Q∗)H_0(Q^*)=C_0(Q^*)H0​(Q∗)=C0​(Q∗).
  4. Lemma 6: A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q)=QH(Q)-\int_0^QHA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H is increasing and convex; Q=Q∗Q=Q^*Q=Q∗ iff A(Q)=λKA(Q)=\lambda KA(Q)=λK; Q∗Q^*Q∗ increases and r∗r^*r∗ decreases in KKK.
  5. Eqs. (18), (20): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q)=\frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is the EOQ optimum.
  6. Lemma 8: ∫0QH≥12QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥12QH0(Q)≥∫0QH0\int_0^QH\ge\tfrac12QH(Q)\ge A(Q)\ge\tfrac12QH_0(Q)\ge\int_0^QH_0∫0Q​H≥21​QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥21​QH0​(Q)≥∫0Q​H0​, with equalities for deterministic demand.
  7. Eq. (22): Gd(y)≤G(y)G_d(y)\le G(y)Gd​(y)≤G(y) for all yyy.

Significance

Theorem 3 says that randomness of leadtime demand raises the total optimal cost above the EOQ's, yet the controllable part of that cost — the part the order quantity actually trades off — is smaller than the EOQ's cost, scaled by Qd∗/Q∗Q^*_d/Q^*Qd∗​/Q∗. Combined with Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d\le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗ (Theorem 2 of the paper), the gap C∗−Cd∗C^*-C^*_dC∗−Cd∗​ is at most the newsboy cost G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0), independent of KKK, so the EOQ cost is a good proxy when KKK is large relative to G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0). The same machinery yields the paper's Theorem 5, that using Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ in the stochastic model costs at most 1/81/81/8 more than the optimum.

The result was proved in 1992; no machine-checked proof is known to exist. Formalizing it requires the continuous (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) model as a whole — optimal reorder points, the one-variable reduction through HHH, and the area function AAA — none of which is in Mathlib. The companion missions of this series formalize Theorems 2, 4 and 5 of the same paper on the same model.

Difficulty

The middle inequality compares minima of two different functions: Cd≤CC_d\le CCd​≤C pointwise follows from Jensen's inequality, but only after the reorder point of each model is chosen optimally, so the comparison has to pass through the definition of CCC as a minimum over rrr. The outer inequalities depend on Lemma 8, whose proof uses convexity of HHH and a slope comparison H′≤Hd′H'\le H_d'H′≤Hd′​ (Lemmas 4 and 7). The paper argues these through first and second derivatives of r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and GGG, which exist only when the leadtime demand has a smooth distribution; the formal statements assume no density, so a proof must either avoid derivatives or handle one-sided ones. Existence of optimal reorder points and of Q∗Q^*Q∗ is asserted in the paper without a separate argument.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace ZhengQR.CostBounds. The machinery (qrCost, reorderPt, idealPt, Hfun, Cfun, Afun, H0fun, C0fun, IsOptQty) is defined for an arbitrary G:R→RG:\mathbb R\to\mathbb RG:R→R and instantiated at the stochastic GGG and at GdG_dGd​. A structure QRModel holds the parameters, the demand distribution μ\muμ (a probability measure on R\mathbb RR) and the standing assumptions.

Conventions committed to:

  • Positivity of λ,L,K,h,p\lambda,L,K,h,pλ,L,K,h,p; D≥0D\ge0D≥0 almost surely; DDD integrable with E(D)=λLE(D)=\lambda LE(D)=λL; GGG has a unique minimizer (p. 90). No density is assumed.
  • r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is a chosen minimizer of c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅) over R\mathbb RR, not a solution of G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q); y0y^0y0 is a chosen minimizer of GGG. Both use junk value 000 when no minimizer exists, which never happens under the assumptions.
  • H(0)=G(y0)H(0)=G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0); statements about HHH and AAA are on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), about ccc, CCC, C0C_0C0​ for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  • "Optimal order quantity" means Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0; the goal takes any such Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Lemma 6 states that exactly one exists, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​ is Cd(Qd∗)C_d(Q^*_d)Cd​(Qd∗​), with Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ the explicit formula (20); milestone 5 proves it is the EOQ optimum. C0∗C^*_0C0∗​ is C0(Q∗)C_0(Q^*)C0​(Q∗), which equals min⁡Q>0C0\min_{Q>0}C_0minQ>0​C0​ by (13).
  • "Increasing" in Lemma 6 is read strictly, as the proof gives. Lemma 8 is stated for Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0; "deterministic" means μ\muμ is the Dirac mass at λL\lambda LλL.

A formalization in which Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​ were an arbitrary number, or Q∗Q^*Q∗ an arbitrary positive real, would make the goal false or empty; both are tied to the model above.

Needed infrastructure: existence of minimizers of convex coercive functions on R\mathbb RR, differentiation of parametric integrals ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q}G∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G, and properties of the newsvendor cost (convexity, coercivity, Jensen). Most of it is reusable for any continuous-review inventory model. Proofs of any milestone, and of lemmas the paper uses but this mission does not list (Lemmas 2–5, 7), are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • P. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems IV: The (Q, r) Cost Is Flatter in the Order Quantity than the EOQ CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard replenishment rule of inventory theory: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, order a fixed order quantity QQQ. It is used in practice and taught in every operations management course, usually after the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model, which is the same system with a constant demand stream.

Practitioners and textbooks rely on a robustness property of the EOQ: its cost is very insensitive to the choice of order quantity. If the order quantity is off by a factor α\alphaα, the cost rises only by the factor 12(α+1/α)\tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)21​(α+1/α); ordering 50% too much costs about 8% extra. The insensitivity of the stochastic (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) system to its control parameters had been observed numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978), but, as Zheng notes, no analytical result on it was known.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Hadley and Whitin derive the (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost for Poisson demand.
  • 1986: Zipkin proves that the average backorders of a (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) policy are jointly convex in (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) under continuous demand (Zipkin 1986).
  • 1992: Zheng derives simple optimality conditions for the continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) model and compares it with the EOQ model under the same cost structure. One of the results is that the stochastic cost curve is flatter in the order quantity than the EOQ curve (Zheng 1992). This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0; all stockouts are backordered. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding costs accrue at rate h>0h>0h>0 per unit in stock and penalty costs at rate p>0p>0p>0 per unit backordered. The leadtime demand D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 has distribution μ\muμ with finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL.

The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ,Q>0.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}, \qquad Q>0.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​,Q>0.

For fixed Q>0Q>0Q>0 let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and let

C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q)), \qquad H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q>0), \quad H(0) = G(y^0).C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).

CCC is the cost of the order quantity QQQ when the reorder point is always chosen optimally for it. An optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^* = C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗).

The EOQ model is the same system with the constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​ are the objects above at GdG_dGd​, with optimum Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ and Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

C(αQ∗)C∗≤12(α+1α)∀α>0.\frac{C(\alpha Q^*)}{C^*} \le \frac12\left(\alpha + \frac1\alpha\right) \qquad \forall \alpha>0.C∗C(αQ∗)​≤21​(α+α1​)∀α>0.

The goal holds for every demand distribution satisfying the standing assumptions and every optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗. Both regimes, α<1\alpha<1α<1 and α>1\alpha>1α>1, are included.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Eq. (7): ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG=∫0QH\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q} G = \int_0^Q H∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G=∫0Q​H, hence C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y)dy)/QC(Q) = \big(\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Lemma 4: HHH is increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  3. Eq. (8): an optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗ exists, and Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q) = C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  4. Eq. (18): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, with rd(Q)=λL−hh+pQr_d(Q) = \lambda L - \frac{h}{h+p}Qrd​(Q)=λL−h+ph​Q.
  5. Lemma 7: H0(Q)≤Hd(Q)≤H(Q)H_0(Q) \le H_d(Q) \le H(Q)H0​(Q)≤Hd​(Q)≤H(Q) and A(Q)≤Ad(Q)A(Q)\le A_d(Q)A(Q)≤Ad​(Q), where H0=H−G(y0)H_0 = H - G(y^0)H0​=H−G(y0) and A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q HA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H.
  6. Eqs. (26)–(27): H(αQ)≤αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\le \alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≤αH(Q) for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and H(αQ)≥αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\ge\alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≥αH(Q) for 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1.
  7. Lemma 9: ∫QαQH(y) dy≤α2−12 QH(Q)\int_Q^{\alpha Q} H(y)\,dy \le \frac{\alpha^2-1}{2}\,Q H(Q)∫QαQ​H(y)dy≤2α2−1​QH(Q) for all α>0\alpha>0α>0, Q>0Q>0Q>0.

Significance

In the EOQ model the relative cost of a scaled order quantity is exactly Cd(αQd∗)/Cd∗=12(α+1/α)C_d(\alpha Q^*_d)/C^*_d = \tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)Cd​(αQd∗​)/Cd∗​=21​(α+1/α) (Eq. (25) of the paper). Theorem 4 shows that the stochastic system is at least as forgiving. The bound holds for every leadtime-demand distribution with a unique newsvendor minimizer, and it does not depend on the parameters KKK, hhh, ppp, λ\lambdaλ or LLL. Because the reorder point is re-optimized for each quantity, the bound applies to the practical question of how much a misestimated lot size costs when the safety stock is set correctly.

Together with the other results of the paper (the 1/81/81/8 bound for the EOQ heuristic and the bounds between Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​, which are separate missions of this series), it gives a closed-form account of why the EOQ is a good heuristic for stochastic systems.

The result has a complete published proof. It has not been machine-checked. The work that remains is a formal proof for general distributions: the paper differentiates GGG and r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) twice, and a formal proof has to replace those derivatives with arguments that need no density.

Difficulty

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is defined through an inner minimization over the reorder point, so its shape in QQQ is controlled by the implicitly defined function H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q) = G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) rather than by GGG directly. The obvious approach would bound C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) with the reorder point fixed at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗). That approach is the wrong comparison: it bounds a larger quantity, and the resulting bound depends on the distribution.

The paper's proof uses three properties of HHH: that it is convex, that its slope never exceeds the EOQ slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p), and that it dominates HdH_dHd​. The paper obtains these from the derivatives r′(Q)r'(Q)r′(Q) and H′(Q)H'(Q)H′(Q) under a smooth demand distribution. Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is only an argmin and HHH need not be differentiable, so none of these three properties can be read off a derivative formula; the asymptotic slope in particular depends on the finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL and on the behaviour of GGG at ±∞\pm\infty±∞.

Formalization scope

The mission is set in Lean 4 with Mathlib. All objects are real valued.

  • Model. The structure QRModel bundles λ,L,K,h,p>0\lambda, L, K, h, p>0λ,L,K,h,p>0, a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R with integrable identity, ∫x dμ=λL\int x\,d\mu = \lambda L∫xdμ=λL, D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 almost surely, and the unique-minimizer hypothesis on GGG. K>0K>0K>0 is implicit in the paper and made explicit here. No density is assumed; deterministic and discrete demands are allowed, and the paper's own numerical study uses Poisson demand.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, H0H_0H0​, CCC and AAA are defined for an arbitrary cost rate and instantiated at GGG and at GdG_dGd​. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers; they are never defined by the equation G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q), which is a lemma of the paper. H(0)=G(y0)H(0) = G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0). Values at Q<0Q<0Q<0 (and of ccc, CCC at Q≤0Q\le 0Q≤0) are junk, and every statement restricts to Q>0Q>0Q>0 or Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0.
  • Readings of informal words. "Increasing" in Lemma 4 is strict on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), since the proof shows H′>0H'>0H′>0. "Asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" is stated as H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q\to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q2)−H(Q1)≤hph+p(Q2−Q1)H(Q_2)-H(Q_1)\le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q_2-Q_1)H(Q2​)−H(Q1​)≤h+php​(Q2​−Q1​) for 0≤Q1≤Q20\le Q_1\le Q_20≤Q1​≤Q2​. The chord bound is the derivative-free form of H′≤hp/(h+p)H'\le hp/(h+p)H′≤hp/(h+p) that the proofs of Lemmas 7–9 use. "The optimal order quantity" is IsOptQty Q, meaning Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0. Its existence is asserted in the Eq. (8) milestone, so the goal is not vacuous. "∀α>0\forall\alpha>0∀α>0" is a real α>0\alpha>0α>0 with real division 1/α1/\alpha1/α. In Lemma 9 the integral ∫QαQ\int_Q^{\alpha Q}∫QαQ​ is oriented, as on the page.
  • Ruling out trivializations. C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) re-optimizes the reorder point for αQ∗\alpha Q^*αQ∗; holding it at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗) would be a different theorem. C∗>0C^*>0C∗>0 is a consequence of the model, not a hypothesis.

A complete development needs the following:

  • integrability and continuity of GGG;
  • existence of the optimal reorder point;
  • convexity of HHH;
  • the asymptotics G−Gd→0G - G_d\to 0G−Gd​→0 at ±∞\pm\infty±∞;
  • Jensen's inequality Gd≤GG_d\le GGd​≤G (Eq. (22));
  • existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗.

These facts about newsvendor cost functions are reusable in the other missions of this series. Contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • P. H. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • H. M. Wagner, M. O'Hagan and B. Lundh, An Empirical Study of Exactly and Approximately Optimal Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(7):690–723, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.7.690
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions II: A Nonadaptive Algorithm Achieves 1/3 of the OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Maximizing a submodular set function without constraints contains Max Cut, Max Directed Cut, maximum facility location and several graph and hypergraph cut problems as special cases, and it appears in operations research wherever a value exhibits diminishing returns but is not monotone (profit that combines coverage with a cost, for example). These problems are NP-hard, so the question is which fraction of the optimum an efficient algorithm can guarantee when the function is accessible only through a value oracle that returns f(S)f(S)f(S) for a queried set SSS.

Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011) gave the first constant-factor approximation algorithms for maximizing a general nonnegative submodular function. The simplest of them returns a uniformly random set and achieves 1/41/41/4 of the optimum; this mission is about the next one, a nonadaptive algorithm: it decides all of its oracle queries before seeing any answer, then computes a set from the answers. Such an algorithm can be run in one round of parallel queries. The paper shows that this restricted access already beats 1/41/41/4 and reaches 1/31/31/3.

Timeline. For Max Directed Cut, a random cut achieves 1/41/41/4. Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (FOCS 2007; journal version 2011) proved 1/41/41/4 for a random set and 1/31/31/3 nonadaptively for general nonnegative submodular functions, 1/31/31/3 and 2/52/52/5 by adaptive local search, and that 1/21/21/2 requires exponentially many queries. Buchbinder, Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (FOCS 2012, SIAM J. Comput. 2015) later reached the optimal 1/21/21/2 with a randomized double-greedy algorithm.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite ground set with n=∣X∣≥1n = |X| \ge 1n=∣X∣≥1 elements. A function f:2X→Rf : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}f:2X→R is submodular (Definition 1.1) if

f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X.f(S \cup T) + f(S \cap T) \le f(S) + f(T) \qquad \text{for all } S, T \subseteq X .f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X.

Throughout, fff is nonnegative, the paper's standing assumption, and OPT=max⁡S⊆Xf(S)OPT = \max_{S \subseteq X} f(S)OPT=maxS⊆X​f(S).

For p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1], X(p)X(p)X(p) denotes the random subset of XXX containing each element independently with probability ppp; R=X(1/2)R = X(1/2)R=X(1/2) is a uniformly random subset. For a set A⊆XA \subseteq XA⊆X, A(p)A(p)A(p) is the analogous random subset of AAA. The averaged marginal value of an element (Definition 2.4) is

ω(x)=E[f(R∪{x})−f(R∖{x})],R=X(1/2).\omega(x) = \mathbf{E}\big[f(R \cup \{x\}) - f(R \setminus \{x\})\big], \qquad R = X(1/2).ω(x)=E[f(R∪{x})−f(R∖{x})],R=X(1/2).

Algorithm NA (p. 1139):

  1. by random sampling, compute estimates ω~(x)\tilde\omega(x)ω~(x) with ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 for all xxx, with high probability;
  2. independently, sample R=X(1/2)R = X(1/2)R=X(1/2);
  3. with probability 8/98/98/9 return RRR;
  4. with probability 1/91/91/9 return A={x∈X:ω~(x)>0}A = \{x \in X : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}A={x∈X:ω~(x)>0}.

Given the estimates, the expected value NA returns is 89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19f(A)\tfrac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \tfrac19 f(A)98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f(A).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.6 in the explicit form of its proof

For every nonnegative submodular fff and every estimate ω~\tilde\omegaω~ with ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 for all xxx,

89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19 f({x:ω~(x)>0}) ≥ (13−49n) OPT.\frac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \frac19\, f\big(\{x : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}\big) \ \ge\ \Big(\frac13 - \frac{4}{9n}\Big)\, OPT .98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f({x:ω~(x)>0}) ≥ (31​−9n4​)OPT.

The printed theorem says "at least (1/3−o(1)) OPT(1/3 - o(1))\,OPT(1/3−o(1))OPT"; the term 4/(9n)4/(9n)4/(9n) is what the proof establishes (p. 1140, last display).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2: E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p) g(∅)+p g(A)\mathbf{E}[g(A(p))] \ge (1-p)\,g(\emptyset) + p\,g(A)E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p)g(∅)+pg(A) for submodular ggg.
  2. Lemma 2.3: E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B)\mathbf{E}[f(A(p) \cup B(q))] \ge (1-p)(1-q) f(\emptyset) + p(1-q) f(A) + (1-p)q f(B) + pq f(A \cup B)E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B) for independently sampled, possibly overlapping A,BA, BA,B.
  3. For B=X∖AB = X \setminus AB=X∖A and any CCC: f(A)+f(B∩C)+f(B∪C)≥f(C)f(A) + f(B \cap C) + f(B \cup C) \ge f(C)f(A)+f(B∩C)+f(B∪C)≥f(C).
  4. If ω≤OPT/n2\omega \le OPT/n^2ω≤OPT/n2 on BBB: E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≤E[f(R)]+OPT/(2n)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup (B \cap C))] \le \mathbf{E}[f(R)] + OPT/(2n)E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≤E[f(R)]+OPT/(2n).
  5. E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≥14f(B∩C)+14f(C)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup (B \cap C))] \ge \tfrac14 f(B \cap C) + \tfrac14 f(C)E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≥41​f(B∩C)+41​f(C).
  6. If ω≥−OPT/n2\omega \ge -OPT/n^2ω≥−OPT/n2 on AAA and B=X∖AB = X \setminus AB=X∖A: E[f(R)]≥E[f(R∩(B∪C))]−OPT/(2n)\mathbf{E}[f(R)] \ge \mathbf{E}[f(R \cap (B \cup C))] - OPT/(2n)E[f(R)]≥E[f(R∩(B∪C))]−OPT/(2n).
  7. E[f(R∩(B∪C))]≥14f(C)+14f(B∪C)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cap (B \cup C))] \ge \tfrac14 f(C) + \tfrac14 f(B \cup C)E[f(R∩(B∪C))]≥41​f(C)+41​f(B∪C).

Milestones 3–7 are the displayed steps of the proof of Theorem 2.6, stated for arbitrary sets where the page's argument does not use the optimality of CCC.

Significance

The theorem shows that nonadaptive access, a fixed batch of polynomially many value queries followed by a computation, suffices for a 1/31/31/3-approximation of unconstrained nonnegative submodular maximization, strictly better than the 1/41/41/4 of any algorithm that must return one of its queried sets (the paper shows 1/41/41/4 is optimal in that class, §4.2). The quantity ω\omegaω generalizes the in-degree/out-degree test for Max Directed Cut to arbitrary submodular functions, and Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 are general sampling inequalities for submodular functions that the paper reuses for its adaptive smooth local search.

Formalizing it produces machine-checked versions of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 as statements about exact finite averages, a reusable expectation operator on product-distributed random subsets, and a checked version of the 1/31/31/3 argument with its explicit error term. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has been formalized in a proof assistant.

Difficulty

The two regimes the proof separates, "AAA is already good" and "one of f(B∩C)f(B \cap C)f(B∩C), f(B∪C)f(B \cup C)f(B∪C) is large", must be tied to the value of a uniformly random set, whereas the elements of AAA and BBB are chosen from estimated averages, not from the optimal set CCC. The natural attempt, comparing f(R)f(R)f(R) with f(C)f(C)f(C) element by element, fails because fff is not monotone: adding elements of CCC to RRR can decrease the value. The accuracy OPT/n2OPT/n^2OPT/n2 of the estimates must also be propagated through a sum over up to nnn elements, which is where the error term 4/(9n)4/(9n)4/(9n) comes from. The sampling lemmas require handling expectations over pairs of independent random subsets of possibly overlapping sets.

Formalization scope

  • The ground set is a Fintype X with DecidableEq, assumed Nonempty, so n=∣X∣≥1n = |X| \ge 1n=∣X∣≥1 and the divisions by nnn and n2n^2n2 are genuine; sets are Finset X; fff is real valued with nonnegativity ∀S, 0≤f(S)\forall S,\ 0 \le f(S)∀S, 0≤f(S) as an explicit hypothesis. Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 are stated for real fff with no sign condition, as printed.
  • OPTOPTOPT is Finset.univ.sup' _ f, the true maximum over all subsets.
  • Every expectation over an independently sampled random set is the exact finite sum F(x)=∑Sf(S)∏i∈Sxi∏i∉S(1−xi)F(x) = \sum_{S} f(S)\prod_{i \in S} x_i \prod_{i \notin S}(1 - x_i)F(x)=∑S​f(S)∏i∈S​xi​∏i∈/S​(1−xi​); X(1/2)X(1/2)X(1/2) is x≡1/2x \equiv 1/2x≡1/2. Expectations over two independent samples (Lemma 2.3) are the corresponding iterated sums. Sampling probabilities carry the hypotheses 0≤p,q≤10 \le p, q \le 10≤p,q≤1.
  • The goal quantifies over every estimate ω~\tilde\omegaω~ satisfying the printed accuracy ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 (strict), with A={x:ω~(x)>0}A = \{x : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}A={x:ω~(x)>0} (strict). The "with high probability" of NA's first step is this hypothesis; the sampling estimate that makes it likely (Lemma 2.5, a Chernoff-bound argument) is not part of the goal. When OPT=0OPT = 0OPT=0 the hypothesis is unsatisfiable, but then f≡0f \equiv 0f≡0 and nothing is lost.
  • The left-hand side is exactly the mixture 89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19f(A)\tfrac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \tfrac19 f(A)98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f(A). A statement with the maximum of the two terms, with exact values ω~=ω\tilde\omega = \omegaω~=ω, or with the o(1)o(1)o(1) replaced by an existential constant or a limit, is a different (and weaker or stronger) theorem and does not close this mission.
  • Printed slip corrected: in the second display on p. 1140, the "===" before −∣A∖C∣ OPT/(2n2)-|A \setminus C|\,OPT/(2n^2)−∣A∖C∣OPT/(2n2) should be "≥\ge≥"; milestone 6 states the inequality.

Welcome contributions: proofs of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 (reusable for mission IV of this series), the identity E[f(R∪{x})−f(R)]=12ω(x)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup \{x\}) - f(R)] = \tfrac12\omega(x)E[f(R∪{x})−f(R)]=21​ω(x), and general lemmas about the operator FFF (splitting a uniform random set along a partition).

Selected references

  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM J. Comput. 40(4):1133–1153, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM J. Comput. 44(5):1384–1402, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/130929205
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems: A Core Allocation Rule Whose Nash Equilibrium Is First-BestResearch Paper

Pooling inventory among independent retailers

Retailers that sell the same product can raise their joint profit by pooling: stock left over at one location is shipped to meet unmet demand at another, and stock can be held in shared warehouses until demand is known (Eppen 1979; Eppen and Schrage 1981). When the retailers are independent firms, pooling creates two questions at once. After demand is realized, the extra profit from shipping must be split in a way no group of retailers would reject. Before demand is realized, each retailer chooses its own stock, and that choice depends on how the split will be made. A split that is fair ex post may lead to stocking decisions that are poor for the system as a whole.

Anupindi, Bassok and Zemel (MSOM 2001) model the ex-post split as a cooperative game, the ex-ante stocking as a non-cooperative game, and ask whether a single allocation rule can serve both. Their framework is a standard reference for "coopetition" models in supply chains, where firms compete on stocking decisions and cooperate on redistribution.

Setting

There are retailers N={1,…,N}\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}N={1,…,N} and warehouses W={1,…,W}\mathcal W=\{1,\dots,W\}W={1,…,W}. Retailer nnn has unit cost cnc_ncn​, revenue rnr_nrn​ and salvage value vnv_nvn​; warehouse www has purchasing cost cwc_wcw​ and salvage value vwv_wvw​. Shipping from location iii to retailer nnn costs ti,nt_{i,n}ti,n​ per unit, and a fraction βi,n∈[0,1]\beta_{i,n}\in[0,1]βi,n​∈[0,1] of the customers at nnn accept service from iii.

Before demand, retailer nnn chooses a position Z⃗n=(Xn,Y1,n,…,YW,n)\vec Z_n=(X_n,Y_{1,n},\dots,Y_{W,n})Zn​=(Xn​,Y1,n​,…,YW,n​): local stock XnX_nXn​ and claims Yw,nY_{w,n}Yw,n​ on warehouse stock, so warehouse www holds Yw=∑nYw,nY_w=\sum_nY_{w,n}Yw​=∑n​Yw,n​. A profile is [Z]=(Z⃗1,…,Z⃗N)[Z]=(\vec Z_1,\dots,\vec Z_N)[Z]=(Z1​,…,ZN​). Demand D⃗\vec DD is random with law μ\muμ. After demand, retailer nnn has local sales Sn=min⁡{Xn,Dn}S_n=\min\{X_n,D_n\}Sn​=min{Xn​,Dn​}, residual inventory Hn=max⁡{Xn−Dn,0}H_n=\max\{X_n-D_n,0\}Hn​=max{Xn​−Dn​,0} and residual demand En=max⁡{Dn−Xn,0}E_n=\max\{D_n-X_n,0\}En​=max{Dn​−Xn​,0}.

The snapshot allocation game SAG([Z],D⃗)([Z],\vec D)([Z],D) gives each coalition S⊆N\mathcal S\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N the value WS∗([Z],D⃗)W^*_{\mathcal S}([Z],\vec D)WS∗​([Z],D): the optimal value of the linear program (6), which ships qi,nq_{i,n}qi,n​ units from i∈S∪Wi\in\mathcal S\cup\mathcal Wi∈S∪W to n∈Sn\in\mathcal Sn∈S at profit rn−vi−ti,nr_n-v_i-t_{i,n}rn​−vi​−ti,n​ per unit, subject to ∑nqi,n≤Hi\sum_nq_{i,n}\le H_i∑n​qi,n​≤Hi​, ∑nqw,n≤∑n∈SYw,n\sum_nq_{w,n}\le\sum_{n\in\mathcal S}Y_{w,n}∑n​qw,n​≤∑n∈S​Yw,n​ and ∑iqi,n/βi,n≤En\sum_iq_{i,n}/\beta_{i,n}\le E_n∑i​qi,n​/βi,n​≤En​. Its core is the set of allocations α\alphaα with ∑j∈Sαj≥WS∗\sum_{j\in\mathcal S}\alpha_j\ge W^*_{\mathcal S}∑j∈S​αj​≥WS∗​ for every S\mathcal SS and ∑j∈Nαj=WN∗\sum_{j\in\mathcal N}\alpha_j=W^*_{\mathcal N}∑j∈N​αj​=WN∗​ (7).

An allocation rule AR-mmm assigns surplus αnm([Z],D⃗)\alpha^m_n([Z],\vec D)αnm​([Z],D); retailer nnn earns

Pnm([Z],D⃗)=rnSn+vnHn−cnXn−∑w(cw−vw)Yw,n+αnm([Z],D⃗)(9)P^m_n([Z],\vec D)=r_nS_n+v_nH_n-c_nX_n-\sum_w(c_w-v_w)Y_{w,n}+\alpha^m_n([Z],\vec D)\qquad(9)Pnm​([Z],D)=rn​Sn​+vn​Hn​−cn​Xn​−w∑​(cw​−vw​)Yw,n​+αnm​([Z],D)(9)

and expects Jnm([Z])=ED⃗PnmJ^m_n([Z])=E_{\vec D}P^m_nJnm​([Z])=ED​Pnm​. A Nash equilibrium (10) is a profile at which no retailer gains by changing its own position. The first-best profile [Z]c∗[Z]^{c*}[Z]c∗ maximizes the expected centralized profit JNc([Z])=ED⃗PNc([Z],D⃗)J^c_{\mathcal N}([Z])=E_{\vec D}P^c_{\mathcal N}([Z],\vec D)JNc​([Z])=ED​PNc​([Z],D), where PNc=∑n[rnSn+vnHn−cnXn]−∑w(cw−vw)Yw+WN∗P^c_{\mathcal N}=\sum_n[r_nS_n+v_nH_n-c_nX_n]-\sum_w(c_w-v_w)Y_w+W^*_{\mathcal N}PNc​=∑n​[rn​Sn​+vn​Hn​−cn​Xn​]−∑w​(cw​−vw​)Yw​+WN∗​.

The fractional rule AR-f (11) pays αnf=θnPNc−[ rnSn+vnHn−cnXn−∑w(cw−vw)Yw,n]\alpha^f_n=\theta_nP^c_{\mathcal N}-[\,r_nS_n+v_nH_n-c_nX_n-\sum_w(c_w-v_w)Y_{w,n}]αnf​=θn​PNc​−[rn​Sn​+vn​Hn​−cn​Xn​−∑w​(cw​−vw​)Yw,n​] with fixed shares θn∈(0,1)\theta_n\in(0,1)θn​∈(0,1), ∑nθn=1\sum_n\theta_n=1∑n​θn​=1. The dual allocation (8) is αnd=νnHn+∑wγwYw,n+δnEn\alpha^d_n=\nu_nH_n+\sum_w\gamma_wY_{w,n}+\delta_nE_nαnd​=νn​Hn​+∑w​γw​Yw,n​+δn​En​ for optimal dual prices (ν,γ,δ)(\nu,\gamma,\delta)(ν,γ,δ) of (6) for N\mathcal NN. The modified rule AR-c is αnc([Z],D⃗)=αnf([Z],D⃗)+wn([Z]c∗,D⃗)\alpha^c_n([Z],\vec D)=\alpha^f_n([Z],\vec D)+w_n([Z]^{c*},\vec D)αnc​([Z],D)=αnf​([Z],D)+wn​([Z]c∗,D) with wn=αnd([Z]c∗,⋅)−αnf([Z]c∗,⋅)w_n=\alpha^d_n([Z]^{c*},\cdot)-\alpha^f_n([Z]^{c*},\cdot)wn​=αnd​([Z]c∗,⋅)−αnf​([Z]c∗,⋅).

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 5.1 (p. 361)

For a first-best profile [Z]c∗[Z]^{c*}[Z]c∗ and a measurable choice of dual prices at [Z]c∗[Z]^{c*}[Z]c∗,

[Z]c∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium under AR-c, and  αc([Z]c∗,D⃗)∈Core⁡(SAG([Z]c∗,D⃗))  ∀D⃗,[Z]^{c*}\ \text{is a pure Nash equilibrium under AR-c, and}\ \ \alpha^c([Z]^{c*},\vec D)\in\operatorname{Core}\big(\mathrm{SAG}([Z]^{c*},\vec D)\big)\ \ \forall\vec D,[Z]c∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium under AR-c, and  αc([Z]c∗,D)∈Core(SAG([Z]c∗,D))  ∀D,

with integrable side payments.

Milestones

  • Examples 1 and 2 (pp. 358–359): a transfer-price allocation outside the core; the dual allocation (8,8,8,0)(8,8,8,0)(8,8,8,0) and the non-dual core allocation (0,0,0,24)(0,0,0,24)(0,0,0,24).
  • Theorem 4.1 (p. 358): if all inventory is claimed, the core of SAG([Z],D⃗)([Z],\vec D)([Z],D) is nonempty and contains the dual allocation (8) for every optimal dual.
  • Theorem 5.2 (p. 361): under AR-f every first-best profile is a Nash equilibrium.
  • Theorem 5.1 (p. 361): for any rule and any of its equilibria [Z]m∗[Z]^{m*}[Z]m∗ there are integrable demand-dependent side payments that leave the set of equilibria unchanged and put the allocations at [Z]m∗[Z]^{m*}[Z]m∗ in the core for every D⃗\vec DD.

Significance

The goal answers the paper's central question positively: there is an allocation mechanism under which the centrally optimal stock levels are an equilibrium of the decentralized stocking game, while every ex-post split of the pooling surplus is stable against all coalitions. Theorem 4.1 is the ex-post half: shadow prices of the shipping LP give a stable split for every realization, independently of who owns which units. The paper also shows (Proposition 5.1, not included here) that the dual allocation alone does not induce first-best stocking, which is why the side payments of Theorem 5.1 are needed.

The results are proved in the paper; Theorem 4.1 is proved there only by reference to the LP-game literature (Owen 1975; Samet and Zemel 1984). None of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission would produce the first formal treatment on Prove2Me of a linear-production (LP) game and its core, and of a model combining a cooperative second stage with a non-cooperative first stage.

Difficulty

Theorem 4.1 is an instance of Owen's theorem on LP games, but the instance is not a standard linear production game: coalition LPs have variables only on arcs inside the coalition, warehouse capacity is limited to the coalition's own claims, and the acceptance constraint divides by βi,n\beta_{i,n}βi,n​, which may be zero, so the general theorem cannot be quoted as it stands. The paper leaves the dual of (6) unwritten, and Mathlib has no ready-made LP duality in this form.

The stochastic layer is the other obstacle. Expected payoffs are integrals, and the side payment is built from a choice of dual prices for each demand realization. Its integrability requires measurability of that choice and of the LP value as a function of demand; neither is given by the paper, which treats the side payments as "constants".

Formalization scope

Retailers are Fin N, warehouses Fin W, locations Fin N ⊕ Fin W; quantities, prices and demands are real numbers; demand is a probability measure on Fin N → ℝ; expectations are Bochner integrals. WS∗W^*_{\mathcal S}WS∗​ is the real supremum of (6a) over the feasible set, and profiles are required to be nonnegative, which makes the feasible set nonempty and bounded. Arcs with βi,n=0\beta_{i,n}=0βi,n​=0 carry no shipment. The core is the platform definition Supermodularity.Cooperative.Core. The dual of (6) is written out explicitly (the paper does not state it). The paper's continuous-CDF assumption is not used and is dropped.

Pinned readings:

  1. "Dual prices" means any optimal solution of the dual of (6) for N\mathcal NN; Theorem 4.1 is stated for every such solution.
  2. "Induces the same equilibrium inventory levels as the first-best" (Theorem 5.2) and "the NE using αc\alpha^cαc is first-best" (Corollary 5.1) are stated as "every first-best profile is a Nash equilibrium", the direction the proofs give.
  3. "[Z]m~∗=[Z]m∗[Z]^{\tilde m*}=[Z]^{m*}[Z]m~∗=[Z]m∗" (Theorem 5.1) is stated as equality of the two sets of equilibria; the continuity and unimodality assumptions, which only guarantee existence of an equilibrium, are dropped because the equilibrium is a hypothesis.
  4. "An appropriate way of breaking ties" is a measurable choice of optimal dual prices; demand is almost surely nonnegative; the rule's payoffs in Theorem 5.1 are integrable.
  5. The shares γn\gamma_nγn​ of Theorem 5.2 are written θn\theta_nθn​, and Eq. (11) is used with +vnHn+v_nH_n+vn​Hn​ in the bracket (printed −vnHn-v_nH_n−vn​Hn​), as the proof on p. 367 requires.

Not acceptable: a core without the efficiency equation (7b); a feasible set that lets qi,n/0=0q_{i,n}/0=0qi,n​/0=0 sell to customers who balk; an arbitrary side payment instead of the constructed one; or a Nash equilibrium evaluated through non-integrable payoffs, whose Bochner integral is 000 and makes every profile an equilibrium.

Useful infrastructure: finite-dimensional LP duality in inequality form, measurable selection of LP optimal solutions, and continuity of LP values in the right-hand side. All of it can be reused in other LP-game and two-stage stochastic programming missions.

Selected references

  • R. Anupindi, Y. Bassok, E. Zemel, A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):349–368, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.349.9973
  • G. Owen, On the core of linear production games, Mathematical Programming 9:358–370, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01681356
  • D. Samet, E. Zemel, On the core and dual set of linear programming games, Mathematics of Operations Research 9(2):309–316, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.9.2.309
  • G. D. Eppen, Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem, Management Science 25(5):498–501, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Public school districts in many US cities let families rank schools and then assign seats by a centralized procedure. Each school has a limited number of seats, and state or local law gives some students priority at some schools, for example for a sibling already enrolled or for living within walking distance. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) framed this as a mechanism design problem and showed that the mechanism then used in Boston rewards families who misreport their preferences. They proposed two replacements with written proofs of their properties. This mission covers the second one, the top trading cycles mechanism, and its two properties: every outcome is Pareto efficient, and no student can gain by misreporting.

The paper drew on earlier results for simpler allocation problems:

  • 1974: Shapley and Scarf introduce housing markets and Gale's top trading cycles algorithm, in which each agent owns one house.
  • 1977: Roth and Postlewaite show the algorithm finds the unique core allocation of a housing market.
  • 1982: Roth proves the core mechanism for housing markets is strategy-proof.
  • 1999: Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez adapt the algorithm to house allocation with existing tenants and prove strategy-proofness.
  • 2000: Pápai introduces hierarchical exchange rules, a wider class that includes these mechanisms.
  • 2003: the paper formalized here extends the algorithm to schools with capacities and school-specific priorities (Propositions 3 and 4).

Setting

A school choice problem consists of a finite set III of students, a finite set SSS of schools, a capacity qs∈Nq_s \in \mathbb Nqs​∈N for each school, a strict preference PiP_iPi​ of each student over all schools, and a strict priority ordering ≻s\succ_s≻s​ of each school over all students. The standing assumption is that there is no shortage of seats:

∣I∣≤∑s∈Sqs.|I| \le \sum_{s\in S} q_s .∣I∣≤s∈S∑​qs​.

Preferences are rankings: Pi(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i(s)\in\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1} is the rank of sss for student iii, with rank 000 the favourite. Priorities are rankings of students in the same way, with rank 000 the highest priority. A matching is a map μ:I→S\mu : I\to Sμ:I→S with #{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs\#\{i:\mu(i)=s\}\le q_s#{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs​ for every school sss. A matching μ\muμ is Pareto efficient if no other matching ν\nuν gives every student a weakly better school (Pi(ν(i))≤Pi(μ(i))P_i(\nu(i))\le P_i(\mu(i))Pi​(ν(i))≤Pi​(μ(i))) and some student a strictly better one.

A direct mechanism maps the reported preference profile, together with the fixed priorities and capacities, to a matching. It is strategy-proof if no student can ever obtain a school she strictly prefers by changing her own report while the others keep theirs.

The top trading cycles algorithm keeps a counter csc_scs​ of free seats at each school, starting at qsq_sqs​. A school is remaining while cs>0c_s>0cs​>0. At each step every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school, and every remaining school points to the remaining student with the highest priority for it. A cycle is a list (s1,i1,…,sk,ik)(s_1,i_1,\dots,s_k,i_k)(s1​,i1​,…,sk​,ik​) of distinct schools and students in which s1s_1s1​ points to i1i_1i1​, i1i_1i1​ points to s2s_2s2​, and so on, and iki_kik​ points to s1s_1s1​. Every student on a cycle is assigned the school she points to and is removed. Each school on a cycle loses one seat. All cycles present at a step are cleared at that same step. The top trading cycles mechanism TTC(q,≻,P)\mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)TTC(q,≻,P) returns the resulting assignment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness)

For all capacities with no shortage, all priorities, every profile PPP, every student iii and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​, student iii is assigned schools s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i)s = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)(i)s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i) and s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi,P−i))(i)s' = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,(Q_i,P_{-i}))(i)s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi​,P−i​))(i), and

Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).P_i(s) \le P_i(s') .Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

Milestones

  1. At every step at which some student remains, there is a cycle (Section II.B, p. 15).
  2. After ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ steps no student remains, and the outcome is a matching (Section II.B, p. 16).
  3. Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29): if student iii is still remaining at the beginning of a step under two different reports of her own, the remaining students and the remaining schools at that point are the same under both reports.
  4. Proposition 3 (p. 17): the outcome is a Pareto efficient matching with respect to the reported profile.
  5. When all schools share one priority ordering π\piπ, the mechanism equals the serial dictatorship induced by π\piπ (Section II.B, p. 16).

Significance

Strategy-proofness means truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every student. Families need no information about other families' reports. Under the Boston mechanism, ranking a popular school first can cost a student her priority at her second choice. Proposition 3 separates the top trading cycles mechanism from the Gale–Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism, which is also strategy-proof but can select Pareto dominated matchings.

The results are proved in the paper, in short prose arguments in its Appendix. To the best of our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. The platform already has the housing-market version, AGT.ttc_strategyproof, but that statement covers one house per agent with the mechanism characterised as the core. Capacities, school priorities and the step-by-step algorithm are absent from it. This mission produces a checked account of the algorithm with capacities and counters, together with its termination and invariance properties.

Difficulty

The paper's argument moves from the step at which student iii leaves under one report to the step at which she leaves under another. It relies on the claim that the cycles formed before either step are unaffected by iii's report. Informally, iii is not on a cycle yet, so what she points to does not matter. Formally, "the same cycles form" requires comparing two runs of a simultaneous-clearing procedure step by step. At each step one has to show that the set of cycles, and hence the counters and the remaining schools, agree, even though iii points to different schools in the two runs. Reasoning about a single cycle at a time does not work, because the algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once. Termination is also not immediate: without the no-shortage condition the algorithm can leave students unassigned. Seats are counted with multiplicity, so a school can stay in the market for several steps.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace SchoolChoice.TTC. Students and schools are arbitrary finite types with decidable equality; the set of students may be empty. Capacities are q : S → ℕ, and a school of capacity zero is never remaining. A preference is a bijection S ≃ Fin (card S) and a priority is a bijection I ≃ Fin (card I), in both cases with rank 0 the best. Strictness and completeness of both therefore hold by construction, and every school is acceptable. A state of the algorithm consists of the remaining students, the counters and the assignments made so far. run q pri P t is the state after t completed steps, which is the beginning of the paper's Step t + 1. The mechanism ttc q pri P : I → Option S reads off the assignment after card I steps. Every theorem assumes card I ≤ ∑ s, q s.

The algorithm is a concrete, deterministic definition that clears all cycles at every step. The mechanism is not defined as "some Pareto efficient matching" or characterised by properties, since that would make Proposition 3 trivial. The goal asserts that both outcomes exist, so an unassigned outcome cannot satisfy it vacuously. The misreport, the other students' reports and the priorities are all universally quantified.

A complete development needs termination of the algorithm, a combinatorial account of the pointing graph (cycles in a finite functional graph), and the step-by-step invariance argument of the Lemma. The last two are reusable for the type-specific quota variant and for other trading-cycle mechanisms. Contributions of intermediate lemmas are welcome: counter invariants such as "the sum of the counters is at least the number of remaining students", monotonicity of the remaining sets, and the fact that a student on a cycle receives her favourite remaining school.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
  • Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite, Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 4(2), 131–137, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
  • Alvin E. Roth, Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Economics Letters 9(2), 127–132, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Journal of Economic Theory 88(2), 233–260, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553
  • Szilvia Pápai, Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange, Econometrica 68(6), 1403–1433, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166
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Analysis of Generalized Pattern Searches: Nonnegative Clarke Derivatives at Limits of Refining SubsequencesResearch Paper

Motivation

Generalized pattern search (GPS) is a class of derivative-free methods for minimizing a function that can only be evaluated, not differentiated. Such objectives arise in engineering design, where one evaluation is an expensive simulation that may fail and return no value at all. The helicopter rotor design problem of Booker et al. is one example: no value was returned for roughly 66% of the trial points (Booker et al., 1999). A method for such problems has to tolerate objectives that are discontinuous or take the value +∞+\infty+∞.

Earlier convergence theory for GPS assumed continuous differentiability of the objective on a neighbourhood of the level set. Torczon established it for unconstrained problems (SIAM J. Optim. 7, 1997), and Lewis and Torczon extended it to bound constraints (1999) and to finitely many linear constraints (SIAM J. Optim. 10, 2000). Audet and Dennis (SIAM J. Optim. 13, 2003) replaced these analyses with a single argument. Its conclusions are local and are graded by the smoothness of the objective at the limit point only, through Clarke's generalized directional derivative. That paper is the source of this mission. Its analysis is the basis of the later mesh adaptive direct search (MADS) theory (Audet, Dennis, SIAM J. Optim. 17, 2006).

Setting

The problem is

min⁡x∈Ωf(x),f:Rn→R∪{+∞},Ω={x∈Rn:ℓ≤Ax≤u},\min_{x\in\Omega} f(x),\qquad f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\},\qquad \Omega=\{x\in\mathbb R^n:\ell\le Ax\le u\},x∈Ωmin​f(x),f:Rn→R∪{+∞},Ω={x∈Rn:ℓ≤Ax≤u},

with A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n and ℓ≤u\ell\le uℓ≤u in (R∪{±∞})m(\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\})^m(R∪{±∞})m. The algorithm works with the barrier function fΩf_\OmegafΩ​, equal to fff on Ω\OmegaΩ and to +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere.

The algorithm uses a finite set of directions D=GZˉD=G\bar ZD=GZˉ, the columns dj=Gzˉjd_j=G\bar z_jdj​=Gzˉj​ of the product of a nonsingular G∈Rn×nG\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}G∈Rn×n and an integer matrix Zˉ∈Zn×p\bar Z\in\mathbb Z^{n\times p}Zˉ∈Zn×p. The directions form a positive spanning set: their nonnegative combinations give all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn. At iteration kkk, with iterate xkx_kxk​ and mesh size parameter Δk>0\Delta_k>0Δk​>0, the mesh is Mk={xk+ΔkDz:z∈Z+p}M_k=\{x_k+\Delta_k Dz: z\in\mathbb Z_+^{p}\}Mk​={xk​+Δk​Dz:z∈Z+p​}. A poll set {xk+Δkd:d∈Dk}\{x_k+\Delta_k d: d\in D_k\}{xk​+Δk​d:d∈Dk​} is drawn from a positive spanning subset Dk⊆DD_k\subseteq DDk​⊆D. Each iteration ends in one of two ways:

  1. Improved mesh point. Some xk+1∈Mk∩Ωx_{k+1}\in M_k\cap\Omegaxk+1​∈Mk​∩Ω with fΩ(xk+1)<fΩ(xk)f_\Omega(x_{k+1})<f_\Omega(x_k)fΩ​(xk+1​)<fΩ​(xk​) was found, by the free SEARCH step or by the poll. Then Δk+1=τwkΔk\Delta_{k+1}=\tau^{w_k}\Delta_kΔk+1​=τwk​Δk​ with 0≤wk≤w+0\le w_k\le w^+0≤wk​≤w+.
  2. Mesh local optimizer. fΩ(xk)≤fΩ(xk+Δkd)f_\Omega(x_k)\le f_\Omega(x_k+\Delta_k d)fΩ​(xk​)≤fΩ​(xk​+Δk​d) for every d∈Dkd\in D_kd∈Dk​. Then xk+1=xkx_{k+1}=x_kxk+1​=xk​ and Δk+1=τwkΔk\Delta_{k+1}=\tau^{w_k}\Delta_kΔk+1​=τwk​Δk​ with w−≤wk≤−1w^-\le w_k\le-1w−≤wk​≤−1.

Here τ>1\tau>1τ>1 is rational and w−≤−1≤0≤w+w^-\le-1\le 0\le w^+w−≤−1≤0≤w+ are integers. The assumptions are A1 fΩ(x0)<∞f_\Omega(x_0)<\inftyfΩ​(x0​)<∞, A2 AAA is rational, and A3 all iterates lie in a compact set. A refining subsequence is an infinite set of mesh local optimizers {xk}k∈K\{x_k\}_{k\in K}{xk​}k∈K​ along which Δk→0\Delta_k\to 0Δk​→0 (Definition 3.5). For fff Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^, Clarke's derivative is

f∘(x^;d)=lim sup⁡y→x^, t↓0f(y+td)−f(y)t.f^\circ(\hat x;d)=\limsup_{y\to\hat x,\ t\downarrow 0}\frac{f(y+td)-f(y)}{t}.f∘(x^;d)=y→x^, t↓0limsup​tf(y+td)−f(y)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.7

Assume A1–A3. Let x^\hat xx^ be the limit of a refining subsequence, and let d∈Dd\in Dd∈D be a direction polled at a feasible point xk+Δkdx_k+\Delta_k dxk​+Δk​d for infinitely many kkk in the subsequence. If fff is Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^, then

f∘(x^;d) ≥ 0.f^\circ(\hat x;d)\ \ge\ 0 .f∘(x^;d) ≥ 0.

Milestones on the way

  • Theorem 3.1: the iterates have a limit point, lim⁡kf(xk)\lim_k f(x_k)limk​f(xk​) exists and dominates fff at lower semicontinuity limit points, and all continuity limit points share one value.
  • Lemma 3.2: min⁡u≠v∈Mk∥u−v∥≥Δk/∥G−1∥\min_{u\ne v\in M_k}\|u-v\|\ge\Delta_k/\|G^{-1}\|minu=v∈Mk​​∥u−v∥≥Δk​/∥G−1∥ for every norm giving nonzero integer vectors norm at least 111.
  • Lemma 3.3: Δk≤Δ0τr+\Delta_k\le\Delta_0\tau^{r^+}Δk​≤Δ0​τr+ for some positive integer r+r^+r+.
  • Proposition 3.4: lim inf⁡k→∞Δk=0\liminf_{k\to\infty}\Delta_k=0liminfk→∞​Δk​=0.
  • Theorem 3.6: a convergent refining subsequence exists.

Corollaries

  • Theorem 3.9: if Ω=Rn\Omega=\mathbb R^nΩ=Rn and fff is strictly differentiable at x^\hat xx^, then ∇f(x^)=0\nabla f(\hat x)=0∇f(x^)=0.
  • Theorem 3.14: if the poll sets conform to the boundary of Ω\OmegaΩ (Definition 3.13) and fff is strictly differentiable at x^\hat xx^, then ∇f(x^)Tw≥0\nabla f(\hat x)^Tw\ge 0∇f(x^)Tw≥0 on the tangent cone TΩ(x^)T_\Omega(\hat x)TΩ​(x^) and −∇f(x^)∈NΩ(x^)-\nabla f(\hat x)\in N_\Omega(\hat x)−∇f(x^)∈NΩ​(x^). So x^\hat xx^ is a KKT point.

Significance

Theorem 3.7 gives a first-order conclusion at a limit point from a local hypothesis at that point alone. It does not require smoothness elsewhere, finiteness of fff elsewhere, or continuity. It turns the heuristic "the method stopped improving on ever finer meshes" into a statement about generalized derivatives. The unconstrained stationarity result (Theorem 3.9) and the linearly constrained KKT result (Theorem 3.14) follow from it, and they recover the Torczon and Lewis–Torczon theorems under weaker smoothness assumptions. The chain Lemma 3.2 → Lemma 3.3 → Proposition 3.4 → Theorem 3.6 shows that the goal's hypothesis is always met. Every run satisfying A1 and A3 has a refining subsequence, which rests on the rationality of τ\tauτ and on the integer structure of DDD.

All results in this mission are proved in the source paper. None of them has, to the best of our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission contributes a formal model of the GPS algorithm class as a class of runs, a formal Clarke directional derivative, and checked proofs of the mesh-refinement chain and the main theorem.

Difficulty

Given a refining subsequence, the goal is a comparison of limsups: the poll inequalities give nonnegative difference quotients at the points (xk,Δk)(x_k,\Delta_k)(xk​,Δk​), which converge to (x^,0+)(\hat x,0^+)(x^,0+). The difficulty lies in two places. First, the objective is extended-valued, and the barrier hides fff at infeasible poll points, where the poll inequality fΩ(xk)≤+∞f_\Omega(x_k)\le+\inftyfΩ​(xk​)≤+∞ says nothing. The hypothesis on ddd has to supply feasibility, and the Lipschitz hypothesis has to supply finiteness near x^\hat xx^. Second, the existence of refining subsequences is not a compactness argument alone. Coarsening is allowed, so Δk\Delta_kΔk​ need not decrease, and with an irrational τ\tauτ or a direction set that is not an integer lattice image (for instance D=[−1,+π]D=[-1,+\pi]D=[−1,+π] in R\mathbb RR) the meshes can be dense and lim inf⁡Δk\liminf\Delta_kliminfΔk​ can be positive. The lattice argument behind Proposition 3.4 is where the integrality hypotheses are used.

Formalization scope

Points of Rn\mathbb R^nRn are Fin n → ℝ, fff takes values in WithTop ℝ, and the bounds ℓ,u\ell,uℓ,u are EReal-valued, so m=0m=0m=0 gives Ω=Rn\Omega=\mathbb R^nΩ=Rn. The barrier is defined by cases, never by extended addition. Directions are the columns of G * Zbar indexed by Fin p, and DkD_kDk​ is a Finset (Fin p). A GPS run is a structure of sequences xk,Δk,Dk,wkx_k,\Delta_k,D_k,w_kxk​,Δk​,Dk​,wk​ and a per-iteration predicate "mesh local optimizer", subject to exactly the two update rules above, Δ0>0\Delta_0>0Δ0​>0, rational τ>1\tau>1τ>1 and the exponent bounds. The SEARCH step, the choice of DkD_kDk​ and the exponents are left free, since the paper allows any strategy. A subsequence is a strictly increasing map K:N→NK:\mathbb N\to\mathbb NK:N→N. The Clarke derivative of a real function is an EReal-valued limit superior along y→x^y\to\hat xy→x^, t→0+t\to 0^+t→0+. "fff Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^" means that fff agrees near x^\hat xx^ with a real function Lipschitz there, and the conclusions are stated for every such function. Strict differentiability is the directional notion of Section 3.4 of the paper.

The goal is not trivialized by an empty run class: Theorem 3.6, on the same class, asserts that refining subsequences exist. The mesh-local-optimizer branch requires the complete poll inequality over DkD_kDk​. The Clarke limit superior cannot take a default value. The direction ddd must be polled at feasible points infinitely often, which is the paper's "fff was evaluated".

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on positive spanning sets, lattice points in compact sets, and the Clarke derivative (for instance, that it equals ∇f(x^)Td\nabla f(\hat x)^Td∇f(x^)Td under strict differentiability).

Selected references

  • C. Audet, J. E. Dennis Jr., Analysis of Generalized Pattern Searches, SIAM J. Optim. 13(3):889–903, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400378742
  • V. Torczon, On the Convergence of Pattern Search Algorithms, SIAM J. Optim. 7(1):1–25, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623493250780
  • R. M. Lewis, V. Torczon, Pattern Search Methods for Linearly Constrained Minimization, SIAM J. Optim. 10(3):917–941, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623497331373
  • F. H. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983; reprinted SIAM Classics in Applied Mathematics 5, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • A. J. Booker, J. E. Dennis Jr., P. D. Frank, D. B. Serafini, V. Torczon, M. W. Trosset, A rigorous framework for optimization of expensive functions by surrogates, Structural Optimization 17:1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01197559
  • C. Audet, J. E. Dennis Jr., Mesh Adaptive Direct Search Algorithms for Constrained Optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 17(1):188–217, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1137/040603371
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 2: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Many US school districts assign children to public schools centrally. Each family ranks the schools. Each school ranks the children by priority, which is set by state or local law (siblings, walking distance, a lottery). A procedure then turns these rankings into an assignment. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) cast this as a mechanism design problem. They showed that the mechanisms then in use in Boston, Columbus and Minneapolis gave families reasons to misreport their preferences. They proposed two alternatives: the student-optimal stable mechanism of Gale and Shapley, and a school-choice version of Shapley and Scarf's top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism.

Many districts also operate under controlled choice: court-ordered or voluntary rules that keep the racial or ethnic composition of each school within bounds. In Minneapolis, for instance, a 100-seat school could admit at most 75 majority and at most 55 minority students (paper, Section III). Such rules are implemented as type-specific quotas. Section III.B of the paper modifies TTC to respect these quotas. It proves that the modified mechanism keeps both properties that recommend TTC: it wastes nothing beyond what the quotas force (constrained efficiency, Proposition 6), and truth-telling is a dominant strategy (strategy-proofness, Proposition 7). This mission formalizes those two results.

Setting

There is a finite set III of students and a finite set SSS of schools. School sss has a capacity qsq_sqs​, and the total number of seats suffices: ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​. Each student iii has a strict preference over all schools, encoded as a ranking Pi:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i : S\to\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1} with rank 000 the favourite. Each school sss has a strict priority ranking over all students, with rank 000 the highest priority. Each student belongs to exactly one type τ(i)\tau(i)τ(i), and school sss has a type quota qstq_s^tqst​ for each type ttt.

An assignment ν\nuν gives each student a school or nothing (∅\varnothing∅, worse than every school). It satisfies the controlled choice constraints if every school sss receives at most qsq_sqs​ students, and at most qstq_s^tqst​ students of each type ttt. An assignment μ\muμ is constrained efficient if no assignment satisfying the constraints makes every student weakly better off and some student strictly better off.

The top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas, TTCq\mathrm{TTC}^qTTCq, runs in steps. Each school keeps a counter csc_scs​ (initially qsq_sqs​) and one type counter cstc_s^tcst​ for each type (initially qstq_s^tqst​). A school is removed when csc_scs​ reaches zero. At each step:

  • every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school with room for her type, that is, with cs>0c_s>0cs​>0 and csτ(i)>0c_s^{\tau(i)}>0csτ(i)​>0;
  • every remaining school points to its highest-priority remaining student, whatever her type;
  • every student on a cycle of this graph is assigned the school she points to and leaves;
  • that school's counter and its counter for her type each drop by one.

A direct mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever gain by misreporting her preference, whatever the others report.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7 (p. 23)

For every student iii, every profile PPP of announced preferences and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​,

TTCq(Qi,P−i)(i)=s′  ⟹  TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).\mathrm{TTC}^q(Q_i,P_{-i})(i)=s' \implies \mathrm{TTC}^q(P)(i)=s \text{ with } P_i(s)\le P_i(s').TTCq(Qi​,P−i​)(i)=s′⟹TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

This holds for all capacities without shortage, all quotas, all types and all priorities. The priorities are fixed data, not reported.

Milestones

  1. Section III.B, Step 1 (p. 22). At every step there is at least one cycle, after the convention below has removed the students who cannot point.
  2. The Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29; declared valid for the modified mechanism on p. 30). Fix the other students' reports, and suppose student iii is still present at the beginning of a step under two different reports of hers. Then the two runs have the same remaining students and the same counters at that point.
  3. Proposition 6 (p. 23). TTCq(P)\mathrm{TTC}^q(P)TTCq(P) satisfies the controlled choice constraints and is constrained efficient with respect to PPP.

Significance

Strategy-proofness is what lets a district publish a simple instruction: rank the schools in your true order. A strategy-proof mechanism does not reward families who can afford to gather information and game the system. Proposition 7 shows that this guarantee survives the addition of flexible diversity quotas, which many districts are legally bound to impose. Proposition 6 shows that the quotas cost nothing beyond the losses they themselves cause. Both results were proved in 2003 by pen and paper. The published proof of Proposition 7 is a short adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness of plain TTC). It rests on a lemma about how the algorithm's intermediate states depend on one student's report.

To our knowledge neither result has a machine-checked proof. The related platform theorem AGT.ttc_strategyproof concerns the Shapley–Scarf housing market, where every agent owns one house and the mechanism selects the core. It does not cover capacities, priorities or quotas. A formal proof here would check the adaptation that the paper leaves to the reader, and would give a reusable formal model of cycle-clearing allocation algorithms with multiple counters.

Difficulty

The algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once, and a student's report changes the graph at every step she is present. The paper's argument compares two whole runs of the algorithm, under the true report and under a misreport, step by step. That comparison needs precise control of which parts of the state a single student's report can influence, and when. A local argument about one step does not suffice. The student's outcome can depend on cycles that form several steps after the two runs could first have diverged.

With quotas, the pointing graph also depends on the type counters. A school can be present but closed to one type, and a school points to its best remaining student even when it has no room for her type. The comparison must therefore track the type counters as well as the set of remaining schools. Efficiency cannot be read off step by step against unrestricted matchings either: every competing assignment must satisfy both the capacity and the quota constraints.

Formalization scope

Students, schools and types are finite types; no nonemptiness is assumed. Preferences and priorities are bijective rankings onto Fin, so strictness is built in. Rank 000 is the favourite or the highest priority. The no-shortage condition ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​ appears in every theorem, as the standing assumption of Section I. No relation between qsq_sqs​ and qstq_s^tqst​ is imposed, which generalises the paper.

The algorithm is a concrete, total definition: a state with remaining students, counters, type counters and partial assignments, a step map that clears all cycles simultaneously, and ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ iterations. run … t is the state at the beginning of the paper's Step t+1t+1t+1.

The paper's step is undefined when a remaining student has no remaining school with room for her type. She cannot point, and the promised cycle may not exist. The formalization adopts one convention: at the beginning of each step, such a stuck student is removed unassigned, and her outcome is ∅\varnothing∅, ranked below every school. Counters only decrease, so a stuck student stays stuck. Whenever nobody gets stuck, the algorithm is exactly the paper's, and when every quota is at least the capacity it is plain TTC. The goal and Proposition 6 are stated for assignments that may leave students unassigned. When everyone is assigned, they coincide with the paper's statements over matchings.

The formalization does not add a hypothesis that the run never gets stuck. Such a hypothesis would restrict the algorithm's own behaviour and could make the theorems vacuous. Nor may strategy-proofness be weakened to comparisons at the truthful profile only: the others' reports and the misreport are arbitrary.

Contributions welcome: invariants of the step map (counters bounded by the initial values, assigned students leave for good), the cycle-existence lemma for functional graphs on finite sets, and the comparison lemma. These pieces are shared with the plain-TTC mission of this series.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Single-Period Multiproduct Inventory Models with Substitution: No Order for a Product Stocked Above Its Base-Stock LevelResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or manufacturer that stocks several grades of the same item (memory chips of different speeds, steel of different strengths, seats in fare classes) can often meet demand for a lower grade with a higher one when the lower grade runs out. This downward substitution changes the stocking decision: each product now protects the demand of every class below it, so the optimal stock of one product depends on the stock of all the others, and the single-product newsvendor answer no longer applies product by product.

Bassok, Anupindi and Akella (Operations Research 47(4), 1999) set up a single-period model with NNN products and full downward substitution and showed that the optimal ordering policy still has a simple structure: there is a base-stock vector y∗y^*y∗; products below it are ordered up to it, and a product already at or above its base-stock level is not ordered at all. Earlier work on multiproduct ordering, Veinott (1965) and Ignall and Veinott (1969), gave monotonicity conditions through a substitute matrix condition on the Hessian of the cost, which is hard to verify for a general NNN-product substitution structure; the paper works instead with concavity, submodularity and explicit first partial derivatives. Two-product substitution models had been analysed by McGillivray and Silver (1978) and Parlar and Goyal (1984).

Setting

There are NNN products and NNN demand classes, both numbered 1,…,N1,\dots,N1,…,N. Class iii can be served by product jjj whenever j≤ij \le ij≤i, at a unit substitution cost bbb when j<ij < ij<i. Each class iii has unit revenue pip_ipi​ and unit backorder cost πi\pi_iπi​; each product jjj has unit purchase cost cjc_jcj​ and effective unit salvage value sjs_jsj​ (salvage value minus holding cost, possibly negative). Put aji=pia_{ji} = p_iaji​=pi​ if j=ij = ij=i, aji=pi−ba_{ji} = p_i - baji​=pi​−b if j<ij < ij<i, and Tk=pk+πk−bT_k = p_k + \pi_k - bTk​=pk​+πk​−b. The standing assumptions are: (1) πi+pi≥πj+pj\pi_i + p_i \ge \pi_j + p_jπi​+pi​≥πj​+pj​ for i<ji < ji<j; (2) si≥sjs_i \ge s_jsi​≥sj​ for i<ji < ji<j; (3) aij+πj−si≥0a_{ij} + \pi_j - s_i \ge 0aij​+πj​−si​≥0 for i≤ji \le ji≤j.

The sequence of events: the starting inventory xxx is observed; stock is raised to y≥xy \ge xy≥x at unit costs ccc; the demand vector ddd is realized; stock is allocated to classes; leftovers are salvaged. For fixed yyy and ddd the allocation is the linear program

G(y,d)=max⁡∑i∑j≤iajiwji+∑isivi−∑iπiuiG(y,d) = \max \sum_{i}\sum_{j \le i} a_{ji} w_{ji} + \sum_i s_i v_i - \sum_i \pi_i u_iG(y,d)=maxi∑​j≤i∑​aji​wji​+i∑​si​vi​−i∑​πi​ui​

subject to ui+∑j≤iwji=diu_i + \sum_{j\le i} w_{ji} = d_iui​+∑j≤i​wji​=di​, vj+∑i≥jwji=yjv_j + \sum_{i \ge j} w_{ji} = y_jvj​+∑i≥j​wji​=yj​, and w,u,v≥0w, u, v \ge 0w,u,v≥0, where wjiw_{ji}wji​ is the amount of product jjj given to class iii, uiu_iui​ the shortage of class iii and vjv_jvj​ the leftover of product jjj. The expected profit is

P(x,y)=−∑kck(yk−xk)+E G(y,D),P(x,y) = -\sum_k c_k (y_k - x_k) + \mathbb E\, G(y, D),P(x,y)=−k∑​ck​(yk​−xk​)+EG(y,D),

and the ordering problem is max⁡y≥xP(x,y)\max_{y \ge x} P(x,y)maxy≥x​P(x,y); a maximizer is an optimal level yˉ(x)\bar y(x)yˉ​(x).

Allocation Algorithm (A) serves the classes in the order 1,2,…,N1,2,\dots,N1,2,…,N, class iii first from product iii and then from the leftovers of products i−1,…,1i-1,\dots,1i−1,…,1. The subproblem shortage SjkS^k_jSjk​ is the unmet demand of class jjj when (A) runs on the classes k,…,jk,\dots,jk,…,j with the products k,…,jk,\dots,jk,…,j only; S⃗a,nk=0\vec S^k_{a,n} = 0Sa,nk​=0 means Smk=0S^k_m = 0Smk​=0 for all a≤m≤na \le m \le na≤m≤n. The paper's first partial derivatives of PPP are sums of salvage values, substitution costs and the TkT_kTk​, weighted by probabilities of such shortage events.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

With y∗y^*y∗ a maximizer of P(0,⋅)P(0,\cdot)P(0,⋅) over y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, every optimal level yˉ\bar yyˉ​ for every starting inventory x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 satisfies

xi≥yi∗  ⟹  yˉi=xi.x_i \ge y^*_i \implies \bar y_i = x_i .xi​≥yi∗​⟹yˉ​i​=xi​.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1: Algorithm (A) is feasible and optimal for the allocation LP, and its value is G(y,d)G(y,d)G(y,d).
  • Proposition 2: y↦P(x,y)y \mapsto P(x,y)y↦P(x,y) is concave and submodular on {y≥0}\{y \ge 0\}{y≥0}.
  • Eq. (4): the explicit formula for ∂P/∂yi\partial P/\partial y_i∂P/∂yi​ in terms of shortage probabilities.
  • Theorem 1: there is y∗≥0y^* \ge 0y∗≥0 with yˉ(x)=y∗\bar y(x) = y^*yˉ​(x)=y∗ whenever 0≤x≤y∗0 \le x \le y^*0≤x≤y∗.
  • Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 5: identities and monotonicity properties of the shortage probabilities used to compare ∂P/∂yi\partial P/\partial y_i∂P/∂yi​ and ∂P/∂yi+1\partial P/\partial y_{i+1}∂P/∂yi+1​.

Significance

Theorems 1 and 2 give the optimal ordering policy of the substitution model its base-stock form: a vector y∗y^*y∗, computed once, determines the decision for every starting inventory in the region x≤y∗x \le y^*x≤y∗ and fixes the order of every overstocked product elsewhere. The paper builds its bounds on y∗y^*y∗, its iterative algorithm for two products and its computational study of the value of substitution (§3) on this structure. Proposition 1 turns the second-stage linear program into a closed-form greedy allocation, which is what makes the derivative formula (4) explicit.

The results are proved in the paper, but none of them has been machine-checked. Several steps of the paper are informal: Proposition 1 is proved by reference to Monge sequences of transportation problems, the proof of Theorem 2 treats only the adjacent pair j=i+1j = i+1j=i+1, and the paper uses independence of demand classes, densities and a unique optimal level without stating them. A formal development makes these hypotheses explicit and checks each step. The model, the greedy allocation and the shortage calculus are reusable for other multi-product newsvendor and assortment models.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Theorem 2 is the one-dimensional one: if xi≥yi∗x_i \ge y^*_ixi​≥yi∗​ then ∂P/∂yi≤0\partial P/\partial y_i \le 0∂P/∂yi​≤0 at yˉ\bar yyˉ​, so product iii should not be raised. It fails because ∂P/∂yi\partial P/\partial y_i∂P/∂yi​ depends on the other coordinates: at yˉ\bar yyˉ​ some products are raised above xxx and others kept at xj>yj∗x_j > y^*_jxj​>yj∗​, and concavity plus submodularity alone do not control the sign. For a general concave submodular function the conclusion is false; a three-variable quadratic in which raising one coordinate lowers the optimal level of a second one, which in turn raises the marginal value of the first, is a counterexample. The proof has to use the specific structure of the substitution model, through the pairwise comparison of the partial derivatives in Eq. (4). The derivative formula itself requires a careful account of how an extra unit of product iii propagates through the greedy allocation of every later class.

Formalization scope

Products and classes are indexed by Fin N (the paper's index kkk is Lean index k−1k-1k−1); stocks, demands and prices are real. The allocation LP is encoded with the upward arcs wjiw_{ji}wji​, i<ji < ji<j, forbidden (fixed to 000), as in the paper's proof of Proposition 1; GGG is the supremum of the LP objective. The demand law is a product ν1⊗⋯⊗νN\nu_1 \otimes \dots \otimes \nu_Nν1​⊗⋯⊗νN​. Submodularity is the lattice inequality P(x,y∨y′)+P(x,y∧y′)≤P(x,y)+P(x,y′)P(x, y \vee y') + P(x, y \wedge y') \le P(x,y) + P(x,y')P(x,y∨y′)+P(x,y∧y′)≤P(x,y)+P(x,y′), which is equivalent to the paper's nonpositive cross partials (Definition 2) for twice differentiable functions. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt, and the derivative inequalities of Lemmas 2 and 5 in the stronger monotone form, so that no statement is made true by a junk value of deriv. The "…" in Eq. (4) and in the lemmas are expanded as finite sums with the general term inferred from the printed first and last terms.

Hypotheses the paper uses without stating, made explicit here:

  • the substitution cost is nonnegative, b≥0b \ge 0b≥0 (Proposition 1 is false for b<0b < 0b<0);
  • the demand classes are independent (product forms in Lemma 3 and Appendix B);
  • each demand is nonnegative, has finite mean and has a density;
  • si<ci<pi+πis_i < c_i < p_i + \pi_isi​<ci​<pi​+πi​ for every product (Theorem 1's proof);
  • every demand law charges every nonempty open interval of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), standing in for the uniqueness of the optimal level yˉ(x)\bar y(x)yˉ​(x) that the notation presupposes (Theorems 1 and 2).

The goal quantifies over every maximizer y∗y^*y∗ of P(0,⋅)P(0,\cdot)P(0,⋅) and every optimal yˉ\bar yyˉ​; it is not an existence statement, and y∗y^*y∗ is not chosen by the prover. Without the full-support hypothesis the universal statement fails already for one product (a flat-topped profit). Lemmas 4 and 6 of the paper are not included: under the definitions used here both are false as printed (small two- and three-product computations with exponential demands show it), and Theorem 3 comes after the goal and fails as printed for xi≥yi∗x_i \ge y^*_ixi​≥yi∗​.

A proof needs integrals of piecewise-linear functions of the demand vector, differentiation under the integral sign, and facts about product measures. Contributions of any of the milestones, and of general lemmas on the greedy allocation (monotonicity of SjkS^k_jSjk​ in yyy and ddd), are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Bassok, R. Anupindi, R. Akella, Single-Period Multiproduct Inventory Models with Substitution, Operations Research 47(4):632–642, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.4.632
  • A. F. Veinott, Jr., Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem, Management Science 12(3):206–222, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
  • E. Ignall, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Optimality of Myopic Inventory Policies for Several Substitute Products, Management Science 15(5):284–304, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.284
  • A. J. Hoffman, On Simple Linear Programming Problems, in V. Klee (ed.), Convexity, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics, Vol. 7, AMS, 1963.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Decision Making with High-Dimensional Covariates: Regret Bound of the LASSO BanditResearch Paper

Motivation

Many sequential decisions are personalised: a physician chooses a drug dose for each arriving patient, a platform chooses which offer to show each arriving user. Each decision is made after observing a vector of covariates describing the individual, and its outcome is observed only for the option chosen. This is the contextual (covariate) bandit problem, studied in operations research and machine learning since Auer (JMLR 2002) and Goldenshluger and Zeevi (Stochastic Systems 2013).

In medical and e-commerce applications the covariate vector is often high-dimensional: the number of covariates ddd is comparable to or larger than the number of decisions that will ever be made, while the outcome of each option depends on a few of them. Low-dimensional bandit algorithms then incur regret that grows polynomially with ddd. Bastani and Bayati (Operations Research 2020) proposed the LASSO Bandit, which estimates each option's reward model with the LASSO, and proved a regret bound that grows only logarithmically in ddd. The paper evaluates the method on warfarin dosing data.

Timeline:

  • 2002–2003: Auer introduces linear-reward contextual bandits with confidence bounds.
  • 2013: Goldenshluger and Zeevi give a forced-sampling algorithm for two arms in low dimension with O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) regret under a margin condition and an arm-optimality condition, and an information-theoretic lower bound of the same order.
  • 2020: Bastani and Bayati extend the forced-sampling scheme to KKK arms and high-dimensional sparse parameters, with regret O(s02[log⁡T+log⁡d]2)O(s_0^2[\log T+\log d]^2)O(s02​[logT+logd]2).

Setting

There are KKK arms with unknown parameters β1,…,βK∈Rd\beta_1,\dots,\beta_K\in\mathbb R^dβ1​,…,βK​∈Rd. At each time t=1,2,…,Tt=1,2,\dots,Tt=1,2,…,T a covariate vector Xt∈RdX_t\in\mathbb R^dXt​∈Rd arrives; the XtX_tXt​ are i.i.d. with law PX\mathcal P_XPX​ and take values in a fixed set X\mathcal XX. If arm iii is pulled, the reward is Xt⊤βi+εi,tX_t^\top\beta_i+\varepsilon_{i,t}Xt⊤​βi​+εi,t​, where the noises εi,t\varepsilon_{i,t}εi,t​ are independent, σ\sigmaσ-subgaussian (E[esε]≤eσ2s2/2\mathbb E[e^{s\varepsilon}]\le e^{\sigma^2s^2/2}E[esε]≤eσ2s2/2 for all sss), and independent of the covariates. A policy chooses the arm πt\pi_tπt​ from XtX_tXt​ and the past covariates, arms and observed rewards. Its cumulative expected regret is

RT=∑t=1TE[max⁡jXt⊤βj−Xt⊤βπt].R_T=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E\Big[\max_jX_t^\top\beta_j-X_t^\top\beta_{\pi_t}\Big].RT​=t=1∑T​E[jmax​Xt⊤​βj​−Xt⊤​βπt​​].

The sparsity s0s_0s0​ is the smallest integer s0≥1s_0\ge1s0​≥1 with ∥βi∥0≤s0\|\beta_i\|_0\le s_0∥βi​∥0​≤s0​ for all iii.

The four assumptions are: (1) ∥x∥∞≤xmax⁡\|x\|_\infty\le x_{\max}∥x∥∞​≤xmax​ on X\mathcal XX and ∥βi∥1≤b\|\beta_i\|_1\le b∥βi​∥1​≤b; (2) a margin condition Pr⁡[0<∣X⊤(βi−βj)∣≤κ]≤C0κ\Pr[0<|X^\top(\beta_i-\beta_j)|\le\kappa]\le C_0\kappaPr[0<∣X⊤(βi​−βj​)∣≤κ]≤C0​κ; (3) arm optimality: every arm is either suboptimal by a margin hhh at every covariate, or optimal by margin hhh on a region UiU_iUi​ of probability at least p∗p_*p∗​; (4) a compatibility condition: the conditional second-moment matrix Σi=E[XX⊤∣X∈Ui]\Sigma_i=\mathbb E[XX^\top\mid X\in U_i]Σi​=E[XX⊤∣X∈Ui​] of each optimal arm lies in the set C(supp(βi),ϕ0)\mathcal C(\mathrm{supp}(\beta_i),\phi_0)C(supp(βi​),ϕ0​) of matrices M⪰0M\succeq0M⪰0 with ∥vI∥12≤∣I∣ v⊤Mv/ϕ02\|v_I\|_1^2\le|I|\,v^\top Mv/\phi_0^2∥vI​∥12​≤∣I∣v⊤Mv/ϕ02​ whenever ∥vIc∥1≤3∥vI∥1\|v_{I^c}\|_1\le3\|v_I\|_1∥vIc​∥1​≤3∥vI​∥1​.

The LASSO estimator on nnn samples is any minimizer of ∥Y−Xβ′∥22/n+λ∥β′∥1\|Y-\mathbf X\beta'\|_2^2/n+\lambda\|\beta'\|_1∥Y−Xβ′∥22​/n+λ∥β′∥1​. The LASSO Bandit forces arm iii at the prescribed times Ti={(2n−1)Kq+j:n≥0, q(i−1)<j≤qi}\mathcal T_i=\{(2^n-1)Kq+j : n\ge0,\ q(i-1)<j\le qi\}Ti​={(2n−1)Kq+j:n≥0, q(i−1)<j≤qi}. At every other time it keeps the arms whose forced-sample estimate β^(Ti,t−1,λ1)\hat\beta(\mathcal T_{i,t-1},\lambda_1)β^​(Ti,t−1​,λ1​) is within h/2h/2h/2 of the best. Among them it plays the arm with the largest all-sample estimate β^(Si,t−1,λ2,t−1)\hat\beta(\mathcal S_{i,t-1},\lambda_{2,t-1})β^​(Si,t−1​,λ2,t−1​), trained on every past pull of the arm, with λ2,t=λ2,0(log⁡t+log⁡d)/t\lambda_{2,t}=\lambda_{2,0}\sqrt{(\log t+\log d)/t}λ2,t​=λ2,0​(logt+logd)/t​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (regret of the LASSO Bandit)

For q≥4⌈q0⌉q\ge4\lceil q_0\rceilq≥4⌈q0​⌉, K≥2K\ge2K≥2, d>2d>2d>2, T≥C5T\ge C_5T≥C5​, λ1=ϕ02p∗h/(64s0xmax⁡)\lambda_1=\phi_0^2p_*h/(64s_0x_{\max})λ1​=ϕ02​p∗​h/(64s0​xmax​) and λ2,0=[ϕ02/(2s0)]1/(p∗C1)\lambda_{2,0}=[\phi_0^2/(2s_0)]\sqrt{1/(p_*C_1)}λ2,0​=[ϕ02​/(2s0​)]1/(p∗​C1​)​,

RT≤C3(log⁡T)2+[2Kbxmax⁡(6q+4)+C3log⁡d]log⁡T+(2bxmax⁡C5+2Kbxmax⁡+C4),R_T\le C_3(\log T)^2+\big[2Kbx_{\max}(6q+4)+C_3\log d\big]\log T+\big(2bx_{\max}C_5+2Kbx_{\max}+C_4\big),RT​≤C3​(logT)2+[2Kbxmax​(6q+4)+C3​logd]logT+(2bxmax​C5​+2Kbxmax​+C4​),

with the explicit constants C1,…,C5C_1,\dots,C_5C1​,…,C5​, q0q_0q0​ of the paper (p. 285).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1: a LASSO tail inequality for adaptively collected rows with conditionally subgaussian noise.
  2. Lemma 1: a LASSO tail inequality when a constant fraction of the rows is i.i.d. with a compatible second-moment matrix.
  3. Proposition 2: the forced-sample estimator of an optimal arm is within h/(4xmax⁡)h/(4x_{\max})h/(4xmax​) of βi\beta_iβi​ except with probability 5/t45/t^45/t4.
  4. Proposition 3: the all-sample estimator of an optimal arm is within 16(log⁡t+log⁡d)/(p∗3C1t)16\sqrt{(\log t+\log d)/(p_*^3C_1t)}16(logt+logd)/(p∗3​C1​t)​ of βi\beta_iβi​ except with probability 2/t+2e−p∗2C22t/322/t+2e^{-p_*^2C_2^2t/32}2/t+2e−p∗2​C22​t/32.

Significance

The theorem shows that exploiting sparsity makes the regret depend on the ambient dimension only through log⁡d\log dlogd, while its dependence on the horizon is within one log⁡T\log TlogT factor of the Ω(log⁡T)\Omega(\log T)Ω(logT) lower bound known in low dimension. Proposition 1 is a LASSO oracle inequality for adapted designs, where each row may depend on earlier observations. It applies whenever a LASSO is fitted to data gathered by a feedback policy: adaptive experiments, dynamic pricing, sequential treatment assignment.

The results are proved in the paper and its online appendix; none of them has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces a formal model of the covariate bandit with a non-anticipating algorithm, a formal LASSO for adapted designs, and, when complete, a verified regret bound with every constant explicit. Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 are reusable beyond bandits.

Difficulty

The all-sample estimator is trained on the times at which the algorithm chose an arm, and those choices depend on earlier estimates. Its design rows are therefore neither independent nor identically distributed, and the standard LASSO analysis, which starts from i.i.d. rows and a restricted-eigenvalue bound on their population covariance, does not apply. The forced samples are i.i.d. but only O(log⁡t)O(\log t)O(logt) in number, too few for the log⁡t/t\sqrt{\log t/t}logt/t​ rate the regret bound needs. Controlling the compatibility constant of the adaptively selected sample covariance, and the martingale noise term, is where the naive argument breaks.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K (paper arm iii is i.val + 1), coordinates Fin d, times are natural numbers from 111. The model is a structure IsCovariateNoiseModel on a probability space: i.i.d. measurable covariates in a measurable set X\mathcal XX, independent subgaussian noises (Mathlib's HasSubgaussianMGF with parameter σ2\sigma^2σ2), noise independent of covariates. Assumptions 1–4 are separate predicates. ∥x∥∞\|x\|_\infty∥x∥∞​ is Mathlib's sup norm, logarithms are natural, and Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ is the uncentred conditional second moment.

The LASSO minimizer and the arg max need not be unique, so the algorithm takes a selection rule and a tie-breaking rule as parameters, and the theorems hold for all of them. Each round reads only the current covariate, the past covariates, the past arms and their observed rewards. The regret theorem and Proposition 3, whose data set Si,t\mathcal S_{i,t}Si,t​ is chosen by the algorithm, require both rules to be measurable. Otherwise the trajectory would not be a random variable, and the expectations in RTR_TRT​ could be integrals of non-measurable functions, which Lean evaluates to 000 and which would make the goal trivially true. For the same reason every assumption constant is required to be positive, and T≥C5T\ge C_5T≥C5​ is imposed on the horizon. Only the explicit inequality of Theorem 1 is stated, not the trailing O(s02[log⁡T+log⁡d]2)O(s_0^2[\log T+\log d]^2)O(s02​[logT+logd]2) or q0=O(s02log⁡d)q_0=O(s_0^2\log d)q0​=O(s02​logd). Proposition 2 is stated for optimal arms (see its note).

A complete development needs matrix concentration for bounded i.i.d. rows, the Azuma–Hoeffding inequality, and the deterministic LASSO basic inequality under a compatibility condition. Contributions of any of these as standalone lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Bastani and M. Bayati, Online Decision Making with High-Dimensional Covariates, Operations Research 68(1):276–294, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1902
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, A Linear Response Bandit Problem, Stochastic Systems 3(1):230–261, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/11-SSY032
  • P. Auer, Using Confidence Bounds for Exploitation-Exploration Trade-offs, Journal of Machine Learning Research 3:397–422, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • P. Bühlmann and S. van de Geer, Statistics for High-Dimensional Data, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20192-9
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Theory of Dynamic Programming: The Index Rule for Bellman's Stochastic Gold-Mining ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Richard Bellman's survey The theory of dynamic programming (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), 503–515, DOI 10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8) introduced dynamic programming to a general mathematical audience. It states the principle of optimality (§2, p. 504): "An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decisions", and derives from it the functional equations of finite and infinite stochastic decision processes, (4.2) and (5.1) (p. 506).

The survey illustrates the method on a small number of worked examples. The second of them, §8 "Stochastic gold mining" (pp. 508–509), is the one with a sharp answer: a two-armed sequential allocation problem with an absorbing failure state, whose optimal policy is a simple index rule. It is an early instance of the allocation-index phenomenon later made general by Gittins and Jones (1974) and Gittins (1979), and the paper itself notes (p. 509) that the rule "is not valid generally in more complicated decision processes", citing a counterexample of Karlin and Shapiro. The full treatment is in Bellman's RAND report R-245 and his 1957 book Dynamic Programming.

Setting

Two gold mines, Anaconda (AAA) and Bonanza (BBB), hold amounts x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 of gold. A single machine can be used in either mine. A use in Anaconda succeeds with probability ppp: it then mines a fraction rrr of the gold currently in Anaconda and the machine stays undamaged. With probability 1−p1-p1−p it mines nothing and the machine is destroyed. Bonanza behaves the same way with probability qqq and fraction sss. While the machine works, the operator chooses the next mine; the aim is to maximize the expected amount mined before the machine is destroyed.

The only information the operator ever receives is that the machine still works. A policy is therefore a choice sequence σ=(σ0,σ1,… )∈{A,B}N\sigma = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots) \in \{A, B\}^{\mathbb N}σ=(σ0​,σ1​,…)∈{A,B}N: the mine for use number nnn, applied if uses 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 succeeded. With ana_nan​, bnb_nbn​ the numbers of AAA- and BBB-uses among the first nnn, use nnn collects gn=rx(1−r)ang_n = r x (1-r)^{a_n}gn​=rx(1−r)an​ if σn=A\sigma_n = Aσn​=A and gn=sy(1−s)bng_n = s y (1-s)^{b_n}gn​=sy(1−s)bn​ if σn=B\sigma_n = Bσn​=B, and does so with probability ∏k=0nπσk\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}∏k=0n​πσk​​ (πA=p\pi_A = pπA​=p, πB=q\pi_B = qπB​=q). The expected return is

J(σ;x,y)=∑n≥0(∏k=0nπσk)gn,J(\sigma; x, y) = \sum_{n \ge 0} \Big(\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}\Big) g_n ,J(σ;x,y)=n≥0∑​(k=0∏n​πσk​​)gn​,

and Bellman's (8.1) defines the optimal return

f(x,y)=sup⁡σJ(σ;x,y).f(x, y) = \sup_\sigma J(\sigma; x, y).f(x,y)=σsup​J(σ;x,y).

In Lean these are expectedReturn p q r s σ x y and optimalReturn p q r s x y in the namespace BellmanTheoryDP.GoldMining.

Formalization targets

Milestone: the functional equation (8.2), p. 508

f(x,y)=max⁡{p [rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q [sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.f(x, y) = \max\Big\{ p\,[r x + f((1-r)x, y)],\ q\,[s y + f(x, (1-s)y)] \Big\}.f(x,y)=max{p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.

Goal: the decision rule (8.3), p. 509, corrected

Write VA=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)]V_A = p[rx + f((1-r)x, y)]VA​=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)] and VB=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]V_B = q[sy + f(x, (1-s)y)]VB​=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)] for the two branches of (8.2). For 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0:

prx1−p>qsy1−q⇒VA>VB,prx1−p<qsy1−q⇒VA<VB,prx1−p=qsy1−q⇒VA=VB.\frac{prx}{1-p} > \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A > V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} < \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A < V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} = \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A = V_B .1−pprx​>1−qqsy​⇒VA​>VB​,1−pprx​<1−qqsy​⇒VA​<VB​,1−pprx​=1−qqsy​⇒VA​=VB​.

The paper prints the rule with (1−r)(1-r)(1−r) and (1−s)(1-s)(1−s) in the denominators:

a. For prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) > qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s), choose A, b. For prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) < qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s), choose B, c. For prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) = qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s), choose either.

and glosses it as "the locus of points where immediate expected gain over immediate expected loss is the same for both choices". The immediate expected loss is the probability of destroying the machine, 1−p1-p1−p (resp. 1−q1-q1−q), not 1−r1 - r1−r. As printed the rule is false: with p=1/2p = 1/2p=1/2, r=0.9r = 0.9r=0.9, q=0.9q = 0.9q=0.9, s=0.1s = 0.1s=0.1, x=1x = 1x=1, y=2y = 2y=2 the printed indices are 4.5>0.24.5 > 0.24.5>0.2, but VA≈0.924<VB≈1.055V_A \approx 0.924 < V_B \approx 1.055VA​≈0.924<VB​≈1.055. The mission's goal is the corrected rule, the one the paper describes in words.

Companion: the index policy is optimal, p. 509

"Using this prescription, f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) may be computed recurrently": the choice sequence σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ generated by applying the corrected rule to the current amounts at every use satisfies J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y)J(\sigma^*; x, y) = f(x, y)J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y).

Significance

The decision rule reduces an optimization over infinite sequences to comparing two explicit numbers, one per mine, each depending only on that mine's own data. This is the defining property of an index policy, and gold mining is one of the earliest problems where it was observed. The functional equation (8.2) is the concrete form, for this process, of the infinite-horizon equation (5.1) that the paper states formally.

Formalizing the example yields a complete machine-checked instance of the principle of optimality for an infinite-horizon stochastic process whose state space (the amounts left in the two mines) is infinite, where the supremum over policies is not attained trivially and the finite-horizon recursion does not apply directly. It also records, with a checked statement, the correction of the misprint in (8.3). No machine-checked proof of (8.2) or (8.3) is known to exist.

Difficulty

The equation (8.2) looks immediate, and the paper calls it "easily seen". The informal argument treats fff as the value of an optimal policy, but fff is a supremum over infinite sequences that need not be attained a priori, and the return of a sequence is an infinite series. The finite-horizon recursion (4.2) does not apply as it stands, because the process has no last stage and its state space, the amounts left in the two mines, is infinite.

The rule (8.3) compares the two optimal continuations f((1−r)x,y)f((1-r)x, y)f((1−r)x,y) and f(x,(1−s)y)f(x, (1-s)y)f(x,(1−s)y), which are themselves unknown. A comparison of the one-step gains alone does not decide it, as the misprinted rule shows. Parts a and b are strict preferences, so it is not enough to show that one choice is at least as good as the other.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. The mines are a two-element inductive type Mine; a policy is a function ℕ → Mine (ChoiceSeq). All quantities are real numbers. Randomized policies are mixtures of choice sequences and give no larger return, so they are not modelled. No restriction to stationary or Markov policies is made: fff is the supremum over all sequences.
  • Parameter ranges. The paper does not state them. The theorems assume 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0 (zero amounts allowed). p,q<1p, q < 1p,q<1 keeps the indices prx/(1−p)prx/(1-p)prx/(1−p), qsy/(1−q)qsy/(1-q)qsy/(1−q) well defined.
  • Series and supremum. JJJ is a real tsum and fff a real iSup. For the parameter ranges above the terms are nonnegative, the partial sums are bounded by x+yx + yx+y, and the family is bounded above, so neither Lean default value (0 for a divergent series or an unbounded supremum) arises; this is stated as the auxiliary theorem expectedReturn_le_add.
  • Survival indexing. The gold of use nnn is counted only if use nnn itself succeeds, so the survival product runs over k≤nk \le nk≤n.
  • The misprint. The goal and the index policy use (1−p)(1-p)(1−p), (1−q)(1-q)(1−q) in place of the printed (1−r)(1-r)(1−r), (1−s)(1-s)(1−s). The printed rule appears only as the quotation above.
  • No trivializing encoding. fff is defined as the supremum of expected returns over all choice sequences, per (8.1); it is not defined as a solution of (8.2), as the value of the index policy, or as a limit of value iteration, any of which would make the milestone or the goal true by definition.
  • Auxiliary theorems (not from the paper). The bound 0≤J≤x+y0 \le J \le x + y0≤J≤x+y with summability, the one-step unrolling J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)]J(\sigma) = p[rx + J(\sigma'; (1-r)x, y)]J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)] when σ0=A\sigma_0 = Aσ0​=A (and symmetrically), and the single-mine values f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r))f(x, 0) = prx/(1 - p(1-r))f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r)), f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s))f(0, y) = qsy/(1-q(1-s))f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s)) are included as footholds. They are not milestones.
  • Related platform content. AllocationIndices.two_discount_index_policy_optimal (Gittins et al., Theorem 3.4) concerns Markov bandits whose rewards are discounted by ata^tat at global time ttt; gold mining multiplies by the success probability of each use of the mine used, so it is a different model and is not reused. BertsekasDP.dp_algorithm_optimality is finite-horizon and does not give (8.2).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the auxiliary theorems, of (8.2), of the decision rule, and of the optimality of the index policy.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, The theory of dynamic programming, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), no. 6, 503–515. https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8
  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957.
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
  • J. C. Gittins, K. D. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
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Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies I: Subjective Mixed Equilibria of Two-Person Games Have Objective PayoffsResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical non-cooperative game theory randomizes with objective, independent devices: each player spins a private wheel whose odds everyone agrees on. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) asks what changes when the randomizing events are ordinary events of the world, about which players may hold different subjective probabilities and may be differently informed. The paper introduced correlated equilibrium, and it also separates two effects that the classical model fuses: subjectivity (players disagree about probabilities) and correlation (players peg their choices on common or dependent events).

This mission formalizes the paper's result on subjectivity without correlation. Example 2.3 of the paper exhibits a three-person game in which strategies pegged on subjective but mutually secret events form an equilibrium that every player prefers to every classical mixed equilibrium. Proposition 5.1 shows that this cannot happen with two players.

Setting

A game has a finite set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of players, a finite set SiS_iSi​ of pure strategies for each player, a finite set XXX of outcomes and an outcome function ggg from S=×i∈NSiS=\times_{i\in N}S_iS=×i∈N​Si​ onto XXX. Player iii has a utility ui:X→Ru_i:X\to\mathbb Rui​:X→R; write hi(a)=ui(g(a))h_i(a)=u_i(g(a))hi​(a)=ui​(g(a)) for a∈Sa\in Sa∈S.

A randomizing structure consists of a set Ω\OmegaΩ of states of the world with a σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB of events, a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field Ji⊆B\mathcal J_i\subseteq\mathcal BJi​⊆B for each player (the events iii is informed about), and a probability measure pip_ipi​ on B\mathcal BB for each player (the subjective probability of iii). A strategy of iii is a map si:Ω→Sis_i:\Omega\to S_isi​:Ω→Si​ whose level sets {si=a}\{s_i=a\}{si​=a} lie in Ji\mathcal J_iJi​. For a profile s=(s1,…,sn)s=(s_1,\dots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​) of strategies the payoff of iii is

Hi(s)=∫Ωhi(s(ω)) dpi(ω),H_i(s)=\int_\Omega h_i\big(s(\omega)\big)\,dp_i(\omega),Hi​(s)=∫Ω​hi​(s(ω))dpi​(ω),

computed under player iii's own beliefs. An equilibrium point is a profile sss with Hi(s)≥Hi(s1,…,ti,…,sn)H_i(s)\ge H_i(s_1,\dots,t_i,\dots,s_n)Hi​(s)≥Hi​(s1​,…,ti​,…,sn​) for every player iii and every strategy tit_iti​ of iii.

An event AAA is iii-secret if A∈JiA\in\mathcal J_iA∈Ji​ and every other player jjj regards AAA as independent of every event in the σ\sigmaσ-field generated by the Jk\mathcal J_kJk​, k≠ik\ne ik=i: pj(A∩B)=pj(A)pj(B)p_j(A\cap B)=p_j(A)p_j(B)pj​(A∩B)=pj​(A)pj​(B). A strategy is mixed if its level sets are iii-secret, and objective if each level set has the same probability under every pjp_jpj​. A measure is non-atomic on a σ\sigmaσ-field R\mathcal RR if every event of R\mathcal RR of positive measure contains an event of R\mathcal RR of strictly smaller positive measure; a roulette is a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field of B\mathcal BB on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic. Throughout, Assumption II holds: every player iii has a σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of iii-secret events on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic.

For distributions σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ the classical payoff is Fi(σ)=∑a∈Shi(a)∏jσj(aj)F_i(\sigma)=\sum_{a\in S}h_i(a)\prod_j\sigma_j(a_j)Fi​(σ)=∑a∈S​hi​(a)∏j​σj​(aj​), and σ\sigmaσ is a Nash equilibrium point if no player gains by switching to another distribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1 (p. 78)

Let n=2n=2n=2 and assume

p1(B)=0  ⟺  p2(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)p_1(B)=0\iff p_2(B)=0\qquad\text{for every }B\in\mathcal B.\tag{5.2}p1​(B)=0⟺p2​(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)

Then for every equilibrium point sss in mixed strategies there is an equilibrium point ttt in objective mixed strategies with

H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).

The game need not be zero-sum.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 7.1 (p. 81): in a roulette R\mathcal RR, for events B1,…,BlB^1,\dots,B^lB1,…,Bl and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], there is an objective A∈RA\in\mathcal RA∈R with pi(A)=αp_i(A)=\alphapi​(A)=α and pi(A∩Bk)=pi(A)pi(Bk)p_i(A\cap B^k)=p_i(A)p_i(B^k)pi​(A∩Bk)=pi​(A)pi​(Bk) for all i,ki,ki,k.
  2. Lemma 4.1 (p. 77): every distribution σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ is realised by an objective mixed strategy sis_isi​ with p{si=a}=σi(a)p\{s_i=a\}=\sigma_i(a)p{si​=a}=σi​(a).
  3. Lemma 7.3 (p. 82): if every sjs_jsj​, j≠ij\ne ij=i, is mixed, then pi{s=a}=pi{si=ai} pi{sj=aj ∀j≠i}=∏jpi{sj=aj}p_i\{s=a\}=p_i\{s_i=a_i\}\,p_i\{s_j=a_j\ \forall j\ne i\}=\prod_j p_i\{s_j=a_j\}pi​{s=a}=pi​{si​=ai​}pi​{sj​=aj​ ∀j=i}=∏j​pi​{sj​=aj​}.
  4. Corollary 7.4 (p. 83): mixed strategies are independent under every pkp_kpk​.
  5. Proposition 4.3 (p. 77): {F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\{F(\sigma):\sigma\text{ Nash}\}=\{H(s): s\text{ an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\}{F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}.

Significance

The result. Proposition 5.1 isolates correlation as the source of the new equilibrium payoffs of the subjective model in two-person games: disagreement about probabilities alone, with strategies pegged on secret events, reproduces only payoffs already achievable by classical mixed strategies (by Proposition 4.3, only Nash equilibrium payoffs). The paper uses it to explain Example 2.9, where two zero-sum players both expect more than the value, as an effect of subjectivity combined with correlation. Proposition 4.3 is the bridge that embeds classical Nash theory in the subjective model; with Nash's theorem it gives existence of equilibrium points in every game.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has been machine-checked. The mission produces a reusable measure-theoretic model of randomized strategies with private information and subjective beliefs (secret events, mixed and objective strategies, roulettes), a non-atomicity notion relative to a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field, and the Lyapunov-type construction of Lemma 7.1, none of which exists in Mathlib at the pinned revision.

Difficulty

The equilibrium conditions quantify over all strategies of the deviator, i.e. all Ji\mathcal J_iJi​-measurable maps, and the deviator may know events on which the opponent's mixed strategy is pegged. The obvious computation of H1(t1,s2)H_1(t_1,s_2)H1​(t1​,s2​) as a sum of products of marginal probabilities is valid only because the opponent's strategy is pegged on secret events, which is the content of Lemma 7.3; for correlated strategies it fails, and Example 2.9 shows the proposition then fails. A second obstacle is that the replacement t1t_1t1​ must reproduce player 2's beliefs about s1s_1s1​, while player 1's own equilibrium condition is stated under p1p_1p1​; condition (5.2) is what transfers "aaa is played with positive probability" from one player's beliefs to the other's. Constructing objective strategies with prescribed probabilities (Lemmas 7.1 and 4.1) needs the convexity of the range of a non-atomic vector measure (Lyapunov's theorem), which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Players are a finite type (Fin 2 in the goal, players 1,2↦0,11,2\mapsto 0,11,2↦0,1); the SiS_iSi​ and XXX are finite types, and ggg is surjective. The σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB is an explicit parameter mΩ of the structure RandomizingStructure ι Ω mΩ, which carries the Ji\mathcal J_iJi​ and the probability measures pip_ipi​. Probabilities are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued Mathlib measures. Utilities and pip_ipi​ are data (Assumption I is used only to compare lotteries by expected utility; the uniqueness of pip_ipi​ is not encoded). HiH_iHi​ is a Bochner integral; for strategy profiles the integrand has finitely many values and is measurable, hence integrable. Non-atomicity on a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field is defined directly; Mathlib's NoAtoms (singletons are null) would trivialize Assumption II and is not used. "Mixed" means pegged on the family of all iii-secret events, not on the σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of Assumption II. Classical distributions, FiF_iFi​ and Nash equilibrium points are AGT.IsLottery, AGT.expectedPayoff and AGT.IsMixedNash from the published definition agt_games.

A formalization that restricted deviations to mixed or objective strategies, or dropped "mixed" from the hypothesis on sss, would state a different theorem and is ruled out.

Useful contributions: Lyapunov's convexity theorem for finite-dimensional non-atomic vector measures (or the special case needed for Lemma 7.1), the factorization of Lemma 7.3, and the payoff identities used in the proof of Proposition 4.3. The model definitions are shared in meaning with the companion mission on two-person zero-sum games.

Selected references

  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • J. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
  • A. Liapounoff, Sur les fonctions-vecteurs complètement additives, Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR Ser. Mat. 4 (1940) 465–478.
  • L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, 1954.
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Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies II: Subjective Events Let Both Zero-Sum Players Beat the ValueResearch Paper

Motivation

In a two-person zero-sum game with objective randomization, whatever one player gains the other loses: the value vvv of the game is the most player 1 can guarantee and the least player 2 can hold him to, and no arrangement between the players can give player 1 more than vvv and player 2 more than −v-v−v at the same time. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) replaces objective coin flips by ordinary events of the world, about which players may hold different subjective probabilities and may be differently informed. Sect. 6 of the paper shows that this breaks the zero-sum logic: once the players disagree about the probability of events they can observe, a zero-sum game becomes, in expectation as each player computes it, a game in which both can gain.

The phenomenon is the game-theoretic form of betting between people who disagree: two players with different beliefs can each expect to profit from the same wager. Aumann's proposition identifies exactly what information structure makes such an agreement possible inside a given zero-sum game, and shows by an example that informing only one player of a subjective event is not enough. The same paper introduced correlated equilibrium; the companion mission of this series formalizes its two-person result on subjective mixed equilibria (Proposition 5.1).

Setting

A game has a finite set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of players, a finite set SiS_iSi​ of pure strategies for each player, a finite set XXX of outcomes and an outcome function ggg from S=×i∈NSiS=\times_{i\in N}S_iS=×i∈N​Si​ onto XXX. Player iii has a utility ui:X→Ru_i:X\to\mathbb Rui​:X→R; write hi(a)=ui(g(a))h_i(a)=u_i(g(a))hi​(a)=ui​(g(a)) for a∈Sa\in Sa∈S.

A randomizing structure consists of a set Ω\OmegaΩ of states of the world with a σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB of events, a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field Ji⊆B\mathcal J_i\subseteq\mathcal BJi​⊆B for each player (the events regarding which iii is informed), and a probability measure pip_ipi​ on B\mathcal BB for each player (the subjective probability of iii). A strategy of iii is a map si:Ω→Sis_i:\Omega\to S_isi​:Ω→Si​ whose level sets lie in Ji\mathcal J_iJi​. For a profile sss of strategies, player iii's payoff is computed under his own beliefs:

Hi(s)=∫Ωhi(s(ω)) dpi(ω).H_i(s)=\int_\Omega h_i\big(s(\omega)\big)\,dp_i(\omega).Hi​(s)=∫Ω​hi​(s(ω))dpi​(ω).

An event AAA is objective if all pi(A)p_i(A)pi​(A) coincide, and subjective otherwise. It is iii-secret if A∈JiA\in\mathcal J_iA∈Ji​ and every other player jjj regards AAA as independent of every event in the σ\sigmaσ-field generated by the Jk\mathcal J_kJk​, k≠ik\ne ik=i. It is public if it lies in every Ji\mathcal J_iJi​. A measure is non-atomic on a σ\sigmaσ-field R\mathcal RR if every event of R\mathcal RR of positive measure contains an event of R\mathcal RR of strictly smaller positive measure; a roulette is a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field of B\mathcal BB on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic, and a public roulette is a roulette of public events. Throughout, Assumption II holds: every player iii has a σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of iii-secret events on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic.

The game is two-person zero-sum if n=2n=2n=2 and u1(x)+u2(x)=0u_1(x)+u_2(x)=0u1​(x)+u2​(x)=0 for all x∈Xx\in Xx∈X. Its value vvv is player 1's payoff F1(σ)=∑a∈Sh1(a)σ1(a1)σ2(a2)F_1(\sigma)=\sum_{a\in S}h_1(a)\sigma_1(a_1)\sigma_2(a_2)F1​(σ)=∑a∈S​h1​(a)σ1​(a1​)σ2​(a2​) at a Nash equilibrium σ\sigmaσ of the classical mixed extension; by the minimax theorem all such equilibria give the payoff pair (v,−v)(v,-v)(v,−v).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6.1 (p. 80)

Let GGG be a two-person zero-sum game with value vvv, and assume

∃ x,y∈X: u1(x)>v>u1(y),(6.2)\exists\,x,y\in X:\ u_1(x)>v>u_1(y),\tag{6.2}∃x,y∈X: u1​(x)>v>u1​(y),(6.2) for each i∈{1,2} there is Bi∈Ji with p1(Bi)≠p2(Bi).(6.3)\text{for each } i\in\{1,2\} \text{ there is } B_i\in\mathcal J_i \text{ with } p_1(B_i)\ne p_2(B_i).\tag{6.3}for each i∈{1,2} there is Bi​∈Ji​ with p1​(Bi​)=p2​(Bi​).(6.3)

Then there is a pair s=(s1,s2)s=(s_1,s_2)s=(s1​,s2​) of strategies with

H1(s)>v,H2(s)>−v.(6.4)H_1(s)>v,\qquad H_2(s)>-v.\tag{6.4}H1​(s)>v,H2​(s)>−v.(6.4)

The pair is not an equilibrium: it is an agreement that each player, by his own beliefs, strictly prefers to playing the game.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 7.1 (p. 81): in a roulette R\mathcal RR there is, for every α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] and events B1,…,BlB^1,\dots,B^lB1,…,Bl, an objective event A∈RA\in\mathcal RA∈R with p(A)=αp(A)=\alphap(A)=α, independent of each BkB^kBk.
  2. Lemma 4.2 (p. 77): for every iii, event BBB and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] there is an objective iii-secret event of probability α\alphaα independent of BBB.
  3. Lemma 4.4 (p. 77): if there is a public roulette, the same holds with "public" in place of "iii-secret".
  4. Remark after Proposition 6.1 (p. 80): the conclusion (6.4) under (6.2) and
there is a public subjective event B and there is a public roulette,(6.5)\text{there is a public subjective event } B \text{ and there is a public roulette,}\tag{6.5}there is a public subjective event B and there is a public roulette,(6.5)

a special case of the goal in which the players share both the subjective event and the correlating device.

Significance

The proposition shows that the value of a zero-sum game is a property of objective randomization, not of the game alone. With subjective randomization available to both players, the conflict of a zero-sum game can be resolved by agreement, so the classical prediction (each player receives his security level) is not robust to disagreement about probabilities. The counterexample on p. 81 (the game with matrix rows (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) and (2,0)(2,0)(2,0)) shows that hypothesis (6.3) is needed for both players, and the paper notes that in any specific game only one player need use a subjective strategy, though which one depends on the game.

Lemmas 4.2, 4.4 and 7.1 are the model's basic existence results for objective randomization: every probability can be realised by an event that is secret (or public) and independent of finitely many given events. They are used throughout the paper, including in the companion mission.

The paper's proofs are published and accepted; none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces the formal statements and invites complete proofs; Lemma 7.1 requires Lyapunov's convexity theorem for finite-dimensional non-atomic vector measures, which is not in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The central difficulty for the goal is that (6.3) gives each player only some subjective event, of unknown size and in his own information field, while (6.4) requires strict gains for both players under two different measures at once. The obvious approach, betting on one subjective event, gives one player a strict gain but, when that event is not known to the other player, the other player cannot condition his choice on it; the example on p. 81 shows that one-sided information genuinely fails. Both inequalities must be arranged simultaneously, and the strategies must remain measurable with respect to each player's own information.

For Lemma 7.1, a non-atomic scalar measure takes every value in [0,p(Ω)][0,p(\Omega)][0,p(Ω)], but the lemma asks for one event with prescribed values under nnn measures and nlnlnl further measures simultaneously; this is the range of a vector measure, not of a scalar one.

Formalization scope

  • Players of the zero-sum game are 0, 1 : Fin 2 (the paper's 1, 2). S 0, S 1, X are finite types and g is surjective.
  • B\mathcal BB is the σ-field mΩ, an explicit parameter of RandomizingStructure; Ji\mathcal J_iJi​ are σ-fields below it, and each pip_ipi​ is a probability measure on B\mathcal BB. Probabilities are ℝ≥0∞-valued; "probability α\alphaα" is ENNReal.ofReal α with 0≤α≤10\le\alpha\le10≤α≤1.
  • Non-atomicity is the standard notion on a sub-σ-field, not Mathlib's NoAtoms, which would trivialize the roulette hypotheses.
  • HiH_iHi​ is a Bochner integral under pip_ipi​; for strategies with finitely many values it is the finite sum ∑api{s=a}hi(a)\sum_a p_i\{s=a\}h_i(a)∑a​pi​{s=a}hi​(a).
  • The value vvv is not a free real: IsValue u g v requires v=F1(σ)v=F_1(\sigma)v=F1​(σ) for a Nash equilibrium σ\sigmaσ of the mixed extension (AGT.IsMixedNash from the published definition agt_games). A free vvv would make the goal false. The minimax theorem is the published AGT.zero_sum_minimax.
  • Assumption II is a hypothesis of every theorem, including those whose proofs do not need it.
  • The conclusion of the goal and of the Remark asks for strategies, not for an equilibrium point, and does not require the strategies to be independent or objective.

Needed infrastructure: Lyapunov's theorem (or a direct argument for the finite-dimensional case), manipulation of σ-fields generated by families of sub-σ-fields, and computation of HiH_iHi​ for strategies with finitely many values. Lyapunov's theorem is reusable far beyond this mission. Contributions of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • A. Lyapunov, Sur les fonctions-vecteurs complètement additives, Bull. Acad. Sci. URSS Sér. Math. 4 (1940) 465–478.
  • J. von Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928) 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 1: Threshold Purchasing Policies under Contingent PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark the remaining stock down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them who would buy at the premium price instead wait, trading a lower price against the risk that the item sells out and against the decline of their own valuation over the season. How forward-looking ("strategic") customers respond to a markdown policy is the first question any model of such pricing has to answer, because the seller's optimal prices depend on it.

Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) model a seller with a fixed inventory, Poisson arrivals of customers with heterogeneous, exponentially declining valuations, and two pricing regimes: contingent pricing, where the discount depends on the inventory left at the markdown time, and announced fixed discounts. The first step of their analysis of contingent pricing is Theorem 1: whatever the other customers do, a customer's best response is a threshold rule on his current valuation, with a threshold that rises as the markdown approaches. Their numerical study of equilibria and of the value of price commitment (§§4.2–7) is built on this reduction.

Setting

A seller holds QQQ units over a season [0,H][0, H][0,H] split at a fixed time TTT with 0<T≤H0 < T \le H0<T≤H. On [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) the premium price p1p_1p1​ applies. At time TTT the seller observes the remaining inventory QT∈{0,1,…,Q}Q_T \in \{0, 1, \dots, Q\}QT​∈{0,1,…,Q} and charges the discount menu price p2(QT)p_2(Q_T)p2​(QT​), where p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ for q=1,…,Qq = 1, \dots, Qq=1,…,Q. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ and valuation Vj(t)=Vje−αtV_j(t) = V_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​(t)=Vj​e−αt at time ttt, with a common decline factor α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T either buys immediately at p1p_1p1​ or waits until TTT, when he requests a unit if the discounted price leaves him a nonnegative surplus. Waiting is uncertain in two ways: the remaining inventory QTQ_TQT​ is random, and when fewer units remain than customers request them, units are rationed at random. A belief is a probability mass function π\piπ of QTQ_TQT​ on {0,…,Q}\{0, \dots, Q\}{0,…,Q} together with allocation probabilities a(q)=Pr⁡{A∣QT=q}∈[0,1]a(q) = \Pr\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T = q\} \in [0,1]a(q)=Pr{A∣QT​=q}∈[0,1], a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0, where A\mathcal AA is the event that the customer is allocated a unit. It is determined by the other customers' strategies, which are arbitrary.

With δ=e−α(T−t)\delta = e^{-\alpha(T-t)}δ=e−α(T−t), the expected surplus of waiting of a customer with current valuation ψ\psiψ is

Wt(ψ)=EQT ⁣[max⁡{ψδ−p2(QT),0}⋅1{A∣QT}]=∑q=0Qπ(q) a(q) max⁡{ψδ−p2(q),0}.W_t(\psi) = \mathrm E_{Q_T}\!\left[\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(Q_T), 0\}\cdot \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T\}\right] = \sum_{q=0}^{Q}\pi(q)\,a(q)\,\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(q), 0\}.Wt​(ψ)=EQT​​[max{ψδ−p2​(QT​),0}⋅1{A∣QT​}]=q=0∑Q​π(q)a(q)max{ψδ−p2​(q),0}.

The paper's purchase rule (p. 344): buy immediately iff the current surplus V(t)−p1V(t) - p_1V(t)−p1​ is nonnegative and at least Wt(V(t))W_t(V(t))Wt​(V(t)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 and Corollary 1

Assume p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1. For every t∈[0,T)t \in [0,T)t∈[0,T) the equation

ψ−p1=Wt(ψ)(2)\psi - p_1 = W_t(\psi) \tag{2}ψ−p1​=Wt​(ψ)(2)

has a unique solution ψ(t)≥p1\psi(t) \ge p_1ψ(t)≥p1​; a customer arriving at ttt buys immediately under the purchase rule if and only if V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t); and the threshold function ψ:[0,T)→[p1,∞)\psi : [0, T) \to [p_1, \infty)ψ:[0,T)→[p1​,∞) is nondecreasing in ttt.

Milestones

  1. The right-hand side of (2) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in ψ\psiψ, with increments bracketed by δ Pr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\,\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A} at the two endpoints, and this slope is below one.
  2. Equation (2) has a unique solution ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​.

Significance

Theorem 1 reduces a customer's strategy, a function of arrival time and valuation, to one threshold function ψ\psiψ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T). The segment sizes ΛI,ΛS,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_S, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛS​,ΛW​,ΛL​ of §4.2, the seller's menu problem (3), the equilibrium iteration (4) and the closed form of Proposition 2 are all written in terms of ψ\psiψ; without Theorem 1 none of them is defined. Corollary 1, that the threshold rises toward the markdown, is what the paper calls "useful in our analyses below"; the customer segments of Figure 1 are drawn with it.

The result is proved in the paper, with a short appendix argument. No machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a formal statement and proof of the reduction for an arbitrary belief, which fixes the exact hypotheses under which it holds: the paper's slope bound needs either valuation decline (α>0\alpha > 0α>0) or imperfect availability, and the monotonicity of the threshold needs a nonnegative premium price. A formal WtW_tWt​ and threshold are the starting point for formalizing the equilibrium and pricing results of the paper.

Difficulty

The mathematics is one-dimensional. The difficulty is in stating it exactly. WtW_tWt​ is piecewise linear with a kink wherever ψδ\psi\deltaψδ crosses a menu price, so the paper's derivative is only a one-sided derivative, and the uniqueness argument has to use increments. The paper's bound "slope <1< 1<1" is false when α=0\alpha = 0α=0 and a unit is allocated with certainty; then (2) has either no finite solution or a half-line of them. The threshold's monotonicity in ttt rests on Wt(ψ)W_t(\psi)Wt​(ψ) increasing in ttt for fixed ψ\psiψ, which needs ψ≥0\psi \ge 0ψ≥0; with a negative premium price the threshold can decrease. The naive reading of "optimal to use a threshold" as an abstract fixed-point fact about any monotone function with slope below one discards the model and is not the goal.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace SeasonalPricing.Contingent. Time, prices and valuations are real numbers. The belief is a pair pmf alloc : ℕ → ℝ restricted to {0, …, Q} (IsInventoryBelief), not a random variable on a probability space; only the law of (QT,1{A})(Q_T, \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A\})(QT​,1{A}) enters (2). The menu is p2 : ℕ → ℝ with p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ required on {1,…,Q}\{1, \dots, Q\}{1,…,Q} only; p2(0)p_2(0)p2​(0) never matters because a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0. The belief does not depend on the arrival time, as in Eq. (4) of the paper. waitingSurplus is WtW_tWt​ with e−α(T−t)e^{-\alpha(T-t)}e−α(T−t) written Real.exp (-(α * (T - t))); buysNow is the purchase rule, stated on the current valuation V(t)V(t)V(t).

Readings of the paper's words:

  • "the unique solution" of (2): existence and uniqueness of a real ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​ (∃!). The paper's "ψ∈[p1,∞]\psi \in [p_1, \infty]ψ∈[p1​,∞]" includes ∞\infty∞ only in the case excluded by the added hypothesis.
  • "it is optimal to base purchasing decisions on a threshold function": the purchase rule of p. 344 holds exactly when V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t).
  • "derivative … <1< 1<1": a two-sided bracket on increments of WtW_tWt​, with right slope δPr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A}, below one.
  • "increasing" (Corollary 1): nondecreasing (MonotoneOn), since ψ\psiψ is constant on an initial interval whenever no menu price is reachable (p. 347).

Added hypotheses, both named in the statements: α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1, the one hypothesis the paper's proof uses without stating it; and p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, the model's convention that prices are nonnegative. Only the branch 0≤t<T0 \le t < T0≤t<T of the threshold θ\thetaθ is stated: for t≥Tt \ge Tt≥T the paper's θ(t)=p2\theta(t) = p_2θ(t)=p2​ is the model's rule for late customers. The belief enters through the explicit sum; a formalization with an unspecified monotone WWW, or with ψ(t)\psi(t)ψ(t) defined by choice inside a definition, is not the target.

No new library is needed beyond finite sums, max and Real.exp. A lemma on unique roots of ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ)\psi \mapsto \psi - c - f(\psi)ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ) for fff with increments bounded by k(ψ′−ψ)k(\psi' - \psi)k(ψ′−ψ), k<1k < 1k<1, is reusable. Proofs of the milestones and the goal, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • X. Su, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior, Management Science 53(5):726–741, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 2: A Threshold Nash Equilibrium under Announced Fixed-Discount PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them wait, and the seller's pricing problem becomes a game between the seller and a population of forward-looking (strategic) customers. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 10(3), 2008) study this game in a model with limited inventory, stochastic arrivals and valuations that decline over the season, under two classes of seller policies: contingent pricing, where the discount depends on the inventory left, and announced fixed-discount pricing, where the seller commits to both prices upfront. Their numerical study (§7.3) compares the two classes and finds that precommitment can raise expected revenue by up to about 8%.

That comparison needs, for every announced price path, the customers' equilibrium response. Theorem 2 of the paper (p. 348) supplies it: a threshold purchasing policy, pinned down by a scalar fixed-point equation for the probability that a waiting customer is served. This mission formalizes Theorem 2. A companion mission of the same series formalizes Theorem 1, the contingent-pricing counterpart.

Setting

A seller has Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 units to sell over a season [0,H][0, H][0,H], split at a fixed time TTT with 0<T≤H0 < T \le H0<T≤H. Customers arrive by a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ drawn from a continuous distribution FFF (tail Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F), and at time ttt values the product at Vj(t)=Vje−αtV_j(t) = V_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​(t)=Vj​e−αt, where the decline factor α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 is common to all customers.

Under an announced price path the seller commits to a premium price p1p_1p1​ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) and a discount price p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ from TTT on; p2p_2p2​ does not depend on the remaining inventory. Customers know the initial inventory but not the current one.

A customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T buys immediately if and only if (i) the current surplus V(t)−p1V(t) - p_1V(t)−p1​ is nonnegative and (ii) it is at least the expected surplus of waiting,

ω⋅max⁡{V(T)−p2,0},\omega\cdot\max\{V(T) - p_2, 0\},ω⋅max{V(T)−p2​,0},

where ω\omegaω is the probability that a unit will be allocated to the customer at time TTT. Units left at TTT are rationed at random among the customers who request one.

For a threshold function ψ\psiψ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) the paper defines three segment rates: ΛI(ψ)\Lambda_I(\psi)ΛI​(ψ), the expected number of customers who buy at p1p_1p1​; ΛS(ψ,p1,p2)\Lambda_S(\psi, p_1, p_2)ΛS​(ψ,p1​,p2​), those who could buy at p1p_1p1​ but wait and want to buy at p2p_2p2​; and ΛW(p1,p2)\Lambda_W(p_1, p_2)ΛW​(p1​,p2​), those whose valuation was below p1p_1p1​ and who want to buy at p2p_2p2​. Each is λ\lambdaλ times an integral over [0,T][0, T][0,T] of Fˉ\bar FFˉ at scaled prices (p. 345). With P(x∣Λ)P(x \mid \Lambda)P(x∣Λ) the Poisson probabilities, the allocation probability of qqq units is

A(q∣Λ)=∑y=0∞qmax⁡{1+y,q} P(y∣Λ).A(q \mid \Lambda) = \sum_{y=0}^{\infty} \frac{q}{\max\{1+y, q\}}\,P(y \mid \Lambda).A(q∣Λ)=y=0∑∞​max{1+y,q}q​P(y∣Λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 348)

For w∈[0,1]w \in [0,1]w∈[0,1] let

ψA(t)=max⁡{p1,p1−wp21−we−α(T−t)},0≤t<T,(7)\psi_A(t) = \max\left\{p_1, \frac{p_1 - wp_2}{1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}}\right\},\qquad 0 \le t < T, \tag{7}ψA​(t)=max{p1​,1−we−α(T−t)p1​−wp2​​},0≤t<T,(7)

and suppose www solves

w=∑x=0Q−1P(x∣ΛI(ψA))⋅A(Q−x∣ΛS(ψA,p1,p2)+ΛW(p1,p2)).(8)w = \sum_{x=0}^{Q-1} P\big(x \mid \Lambda_I(\psi_A)\big)\cdot A\big(Q-x \mid \Lambda_S(\psi_A, p_1, p_2) + \Lambda_W(p_1, p_2)\big). \tag{8}w=x=0∑Q−1​P(x∣ΛI​(ψA​))⋅A(Q−x∣ΛS​(ψA​,p1​,p2​)+ΛW​(p1​,p2​)).(8)

Then, when all other customers use ψA\psi_AψA​ (so that a waiting customer is served with the probability on the right of (8)), every customer arriving at t∈[0,T)t \in [0, T)t∈[0,T) buys immediately if and only if V(t)≥ψA(t)V(t) \ge \psi_A(t)V(t)≥ψA​(t): the symmetric threshold profile is a Nash equilibrium.

Milestones: the two cases of the proof (p. 358)

  1. If e−α(T−t)≤p2/p1e^{-\alpha(T-t)} \le p_2/p_1e−α(T−t)≤p2​/p1​, the threshold is p1p_1p1​.
  2. If e−α(T−t)>p2/p1e^{-\alpha(T-t)} > p_2/p_1e−α(T−t)>p2​/p1​, the threshold is (p1−wp2)/(1−we−α(T−t))≥p1(p_1 - wp_2)/(1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}) \ge p_1(p1​−wp2​)/(1−we−α(T−t))≥p1​.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces the customers' equilibrium under an announced path to a single scalar www. Everything downstream in §5 and §7 rests on it: the seller's expected revenue πA/S(p1,p2)\pi_{A/S}(p_1, p_2)πA/S​(p1​,p2​) (p. 348) is written in terms of ψA\psi_AψA​, the seller's optimal announced path maximizes it, and the comparison between announced and contingent pricing uses the resulting value πA/S∗\pi^*_{A/S}πA/S∗​. The theorem also explains the qualitative prediction of the model: the threshold exceeds p1p_1p1​ exactly when the announced discount is deep relative to the decline of valuations, and it rises with the perceived availability www.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of our search it has no machine-checked proof. A formal development contributes the model objects (segment rates for threshold policies, the allocation probability for random rationing among Poisson requesters) in a form reusable by the rest of the series and by other strategic-customer pricing models, and a checked proof of the equilibrium property. The existence of a solution to (8) is not proved in the paper and is a natural further target.

Difficulty

The best-response part of the argument is elementary once the availability is known. The substance of the statement lies in the availability itself: the probability that a waiting customer is served is not a free parameter but the one generated, through (8), by the other customers' use of the same threshold. A formalization must connect the segment rates, the Poisson counts and random rationing into one expression and keep the fixed-point coupling between www and ψA\psi_AψA​ intact; dropping it turns the theorem into a one-line inequality about an arbitrary www. The division by 1−we−α(T−t)1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}1−we−α(T−t) also degenerates when w=1w = 1w=1 and α=0\alpha = 0α=0, and has to be excluded explicitly.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in namespace SeasonalPricing.Announced. Conventions:

  • Time is real; base valuations have law μ : Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure μ, FFF = ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, and continuity of FFF (the paper's "continuous distribution") is a hypothesis of the goal. No support condition on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) is imposed; the statement quantifies over every real base valuation VVV.
  • ΛI,ΛS,ΛW\Lambda_I, \Lambda_S, \Lambda_WΛI​,ΛS​,ΛW​ are interval integrals over [0,T][0, T][0,T] exactly as printed. P(x∣Λ)=e−ΛΛx/x!P(x \mid \Lambda) = e^{-\Lambda}\Lambda^x/x!P(x∣Λ)=e−ΛΛx/x! is written out; A(q∣Λ)A(q\mid\Lambda)A(q∣Λ) is the infinite series (tsum) as printed, not its closed form.
  • availability is the right-hand side of (8), with ψA\psi_AψA​ built from www by (7).

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Nash equilibrium" is read as the best-response property the paper's proof checks: against the availability generated by (8), the immediate-purchase rule of p. 344 coincides with the threshold ψA\psi_AψA​ at every t∈[0,T)t \in [0, T)t∈[0,T) and every valuation. The paper defines no strategy space beyond threshold rules.
  • "www is a solution to (8)": the theorem is conditional on a solution; its existence is neither assumed elsewhere nor claimed. The conditional statement has content only when (8) has a solution, which the paper does not prove.
  • www as a likelihood: 0≤w≤10 \le w \le 10≤w≤1 is a hypothesis (it also follows from (8)).
  • Added hypothesis: α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or w<1w < 1w<1, which keeps 1−we−α(T−t)>01 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)} > 01−we−α(T−t)>0 for t<Tt < Tt<T; the paper's formula is undefined when it fails. In the milestones the same condition appears as we−α(T−t)<1we^{-\alpha(T-t)} < 1we−α(T−t)<1, and 0<p10 < p_10<p1​ is added so that p2/p1p_2/p_1p2​/p1​ is meaningful.
  • The rule on [T,H][T, H][T,H] (buy at TTT iff V(T)>p2V(T) > p_2V(T)>p2​) is part of the model and is not restated; HHH does not enter the statements.

A formalization in which www is an arbitrary number in [0,1][0,1][0,1], not tied to (8), is ruled out: it is the best-response lemma alone, not Theorem 2. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and the goal; lemmas such as 0≤A(q∣Λ)≤10 \le A(q\mid\Lambda) \le 10≤A(q∣Λ)≤1 and summability of its series; the closed form of A(q∣Λ)A(q \mid \Lambda)A(q∣Λ) printed on p. 346; and an existence result for (8).

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • X. Su, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior, Management Science 53(5):726–741, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 3: Optimal Contingent-Pricing Revenue with Myopic Customers and Exponential ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, holiday items) sell a fixed stock over a short season and routinely cut prices toward its end. A markdown of this kind segments the market over time: customers with high valuations buy early at a premium price, and customers with lower valuations are served later at a discount price. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) study how much such two-price schemes are worth when customers arrive over time, differ in their valuations, and may or may not anticipate the discount.

To measure the value of price segmentation, the paper compares every two-price scheme with the best fixed-price policy, a single price held for the whole season. Its benchmark is the case of myopic customers, who never delay a purchase strategically. Proposition 3 of the paper computes this benchmark in closed form in the simplest nontrivial setting: exponentially distributed valuations that do not decline over the season, and unlimited inventory. The resulting formula explains the pattern of the paper's Table 1, where the benefit of segmentation grows with the heterogeneity of valuations and with a late discount time.

Setting

A seller offers a product during the season [0,H][0, H][0,H]; throughout this mission H=1H = 1H=1, so time is measured as a fraction of the season. Customers arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ drawn independently from a distribution FFF with tail Fˉ(x)=1−F(x)\bar F(x) = 1 - F(x)Fˉ(x)=1−F(x), and values the product at Vje−αtV_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​e−αt at time ttt, where α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 is the decline factor. The paper reparametrizes it as ρ=e−αH\rho = e^{-\alpha H}ρ=e−αH, the fraction of the base valuation left at the end of the season.

In the numerical study, FFF is a Gamma law with mean μ\muμ and coefficient of variation ccc (standard deviation over mean): shape 1/c21/c^21/c2 and rate 1/(μc2)1/(\mu c^2)1/(μc2). The paper sets μ=1\mu = 1μ=1. For c=1c = 1c=1 this is the exponential law with mean one, Fˉ(x)=e−x\bar F(x) = e^{-x}Fˉ(x)=e−x for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

A contingent two-price policy posts the premium price p1p_1p1​ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T), where 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 is fixed, and a discount price p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ from time TTT on. A myopic customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T buys at p1p_1p1​ if his valuation is at least p1p_1p1​; otherwise he waits and buys at TTT if his valuation is then at least p2p_2p2​. Customers arriving at or after TTT buy if their valuation is at least p2p_2p2​. The numbers of customers in these groups are Poisson with means

ΛI(p1)=λ∫0TFˉ(p1eαt) dt,ΛW(p1,p2)=λ∫0T[Fˉ(min⁡{p1eαt,p2eαT})−Fˉ(p1eαt)]dt,ΛL(p2)=λ∫THFˉ(p2eαt) dt.\Lambda_I(p_1) = \lambda\int_0^T \bar F(p_1 e^{\alpha t})\,dt, \quad \Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) = \lambda\int_0^T \big[\bar F(\min\{p_1e^{\alpha t}, p_2e^{\alpha T}\}) - \bar F(p_1e^{\alpha t})\big]dt, \quad \Lambda_L(p_2) = \lambda\int_T^H \bar F(p_2e^{\alpha t})\,dt .ΛI​(p1​)=λ∫0T​Fˉ(p1​eαt)dt,ΛW​(p1​,p2​)=λ∫0T​[Fˉ(min{p1​eαt,p2​eαT})−Fˉ(p1​eαt)]dt,ΛL​(p2​)=λ∫TH​Fˉ(p2​eαt)dt.

With unlimited inventory, the expected revenue of the policy is

RC/N(p1,p2)=p1ΛI(p1)+p2(ΛW(p1,p2)+ΛL(p2)),R_{C/N}(p_1, p_2) = p_1\Lambda_I(p_1) + p_2\big(\Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) + \Lambda_L(p_2)\big),RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p1​ΛI​(p1​)+p2​(ΛW​(p1​,p2​)+ΛL​(p2​)),

and the expected revenue of a single price ppp is RF(p)=p λ∫0HFˉ(peαt) dtR_F(p) = p\,\lambda\int_0^H \bar F(p e^{\alpha t})\,dtRF​(p)=pλ∫0H​Fˉ(peαt)dt (Eq. (9) of the paper). The optimal values are πC/N∗=max⁡p2≤p1RC/N(p1,p2)\pi^*_{C/N} = \max_{p_2 \le p_1} R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2)πC/N∗​=maxp2​≤p1​​RC/N​(p1​,p2​) and πF∗=max⁡pRF(p)\pi^*_F = \max_p R_F(p)πF∗​=maxp​RF​(p).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

Suppose c=1c = 1c=1, ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞ (unlimited inventory), with μ=1\mu = 1μ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1. Then

πC/N∗=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗⋅eT/e.\pi^*_{C/N} = (\lambda e^{-1})\cdot e^{T/e} = \pi^*_F \cdot e^{T/e}.πC/N∗​=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗​⋅eT/e.

Both maxima are attained. The goal states the two optimal values; it does not fix the optimal prices.

Milestones from the paper's proof

  1. The reduced problem: for 0≤p2≤p10 \le p_2 \le p_10≤p2​≤p1​, RC/N(p1,p2)=p2⋅λe−p2+(p1−p2)⋅λTe−p1R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2) = p_2\cdot\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\cdot\lambda T e^{-p_1}RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p2​⋅λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)⋅λTe−p1​.
  2. Its solution: over p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ the maximum is λe−1+T/e\lambda e^{-1+T/e}λe−1+T/e, attained exactly at p1∗=2−T/e≥1p_1^* = 2 - T/e \ge 1p1∗​=2−T/e≥1, p2∗=p1∗−1≤1p_2^* = p_1^* - 1 \le 1p2∗​=p1∗​−1≤1.
  3. The fixed-price optimum (a supporting item of the goal, stated in the proof on pp. 358–359): p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1 is the unique optimal single price and πF∗=λe−1\pi^*_F = \lambda e^{-1}πF∗​=λe−1.

Significance

Proposition 3 gives the relative benefit of contingent pricing over a single price, eT/e−1e^{T/e} - 1eT/e−1, as a function of the discount time alone. It increases in TTT and is largest at T=1T = 1T=1, where it equals e1/e−1≈44.46%e^{1/e} - 1 \approx 44.46\%e1/e−1≈44.46%. This is the paper's analytic anchor for its numerical findings: segmentation is most valuable when valuations are heterogeneous and customers are carried to the discount at little cost, and a late discount exposes more customers to the premium price. Under strategic customers the same quantity serves as an upper bound on the benefit of segmentation (§6.1 of the paper).

The result is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that states the reduced problem and its solution without the calculus. No machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it produces a reusable Lean encoding of the paper's segment rates ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ as integrals of a valuation tail, a Gamma valuation law through Mathlib's gammaMeasure, and a complete verification that the integral model reduces to the two-variable problem and that the stated prices are its unique maximizer.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to write the revenue in closed form and set the gradient to zero. Two steps of that route are not automatic. First, the reduction requires evaluating the three integrals with the piecewise tail of the exponential law, including the min⁡\minmin inside ΛW\Lambda_WΛW​, and the reduced formula is valid only for nonnegative prices; negative prices must be handled separately in the model itself, where the tail equals one. Second, the reduced objective p2λe−p2+(p1−p2)λTe−p1p_2\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\lambda T e^{-p_1}p2​λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)λTe−p1​ is not concave on the region p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, so a stationary point is not automatically a global maximizer, and the boundary p2=p1p_2 = p_1p2​=p1​ and unbounded directions have to be ruled out. Uniqueness of the maximizer, which the paper asserts, fails at T=0T = 0T=0 and needs T>0T > 0T>0.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace SeasonalPricing.MyopicExp. Time, prices and rates are real numbers. The season is [0,1][0, 1][0,1] with 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 and λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Integrals are interval integrals. The valuation tail is gammaValuationTail μ c x = 1 - cdf (gammaMeasure (1/c^2) (1/(μ c^2))) x, used at μ=c=1\mu = c = 1μ=c=1. The hypothesis ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 is decayRatio α 1 = 1 with α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞" is read as unlimited inventory: the truncated Poisson mean N(q,Λ)N(q,\Lambda)N(q,Λ) of §4.2 is replaced by Λ\LambdaΛ and stock-outs never occur. This is what the proof computes, what p. 348 writes as Q=∞Q = \inftyQ=∞, and what §7.1 calls inventory that is "practically unlimited". A limit of finite-inventory optimal revenues is not stated.
  • "max" is an attained maximum (IsGreatest), not a supremum.
  • The optimum is taken over all real prices with p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, as printed; the paper never restricts signs, and negative prices are never optimal in the model.
  • The seller's discount at TTT is a best response to p1p_1p1​ in the paper (R(q∣p1)R(q \mid p_1)R(q∣p1​), p. 349). With unlimited inventory it does not depend on the realized sales, and the nested maximum equals the joint maximum over (p1,p2)(p_1, p_2)(p1​,p2​), which is what the goal states.
  • "The solution … is" (milestone 2) and "the optimal single price is given by p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1" (the fixed-price item) are read as unique maximizers.

The Gamma density printed on p. 349 has the exponent 1/(sc2−1)1/(sc^2-1)1/(sc2−1), a misprint for 1/c2−11/c^2 - 11/c2−1; at c=1c = 1c=1 the exponent is 000 either way.

A trivializing formalization would state the goal on the reduced two-variable function, dropping the model: the goal here is about RC/NR_{C/N}RC/N​ built from ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ and the Gamma tail, and about RFR_FRF​ built from Eq. (9). The platform's BuyingToBundle.monopolyRevenue (definition monopoly_pricing) is a related object, sup⁡pp ν([p,∞))\sup_p p\,\nu([p,\infty))supp​pν([p,∞)); with ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1, πF∗\pi^*_FπF∗​ equals λ\lambdaλ times it for the exponential law, but it is a supremum without arrivals or time and is not reused.

Contributions welcome: closed forms of the segment rates for the exponential tail, a general lemma that negative prices are dominated, and the two-variable maximization.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • D. Besanko and W. L. Winston, Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Exit Problems for Spectrally Negative Lévy Processes and Applications to (Canadized) Russian Options I: Joint Laplace Transform of the Exit Time and Exit Position of the Reflected ProcessResearch Paper

Motivation

A spectrally negative Lévy process is a process with stationary independent increments whose jumps are all downward: Brownian motion with drift plus a compound Poisson or infinite-activity stream of negative jumps. It is the standard model for a risk reserve that earns premiums continuously and pays claims in lumps, for a storage level or a queue workload seen in reverse, and, in mathematical finance, for a log-price that can crash but not jump up. Exit problems (when and where such a process first leaves an interval) are the basic quantities in ruin theory, in dividend and barrier problems, and in the pricing of path-dependent options.

The reflected process Y=X‾−XY=\overline X-XY=X−X, the distance of XXX below its running maximum, is the drawdown of XXX. Its first passage above a level kkk is the time at which a drawdown of size kkk first occurs. Avram, Kyprianou and Pistorius (AKP 2004) computed the joint Laplace transform of this passage time and of the overshoot YτkY_{\tau_k}Yτk​​ in closed form, in terms of the scale functions of XXX. This is the first of three missions on that paper. The two others use this identity for the perpetual Russian option and its Canadized version.

Timeline. Bertoin gave the upward two-sided exit identity for spectrally negative Lévy processes in terms of scale functions (Bertoin 1996, Theorem VII.8) and the downward one (Bertoin 1997, Corollary 1). Avram, Kyprianou and Pistorius (2004) obtained the joint transform of (τk,Yτk)(\tau_k,Y_{\tau_k})(τk​,Yτk​​) for every spectrally negative Lévy process of unbounded variation, or of bounded variation with absolutely continuous Lévy measure.

Setting

Let X={Xt,t≥0}X=\{X_t,t\ge0\}X={Xt​,t≥0} be a spectrally negative Lévy process on (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P): it starts at 000, has independent and stationary increments, càdlàg paths, no positive jumps, and paths that are not monotone. Its Laplace exponent is ψ(θ)=log⁡E[eθX1]\psi(\theta)=\log\mathbb E[e^{\theta X_1}]ψ(θ)=logE[eθX1​], and "ψ(v)<∞\psi(v)<\inftyψ(v)<∞" means that evX1e^{vX_1}evX1​ is integrable. For such vvv, the tilted exponent is ψv(θ)=ψ(θ+v)−ψ(v)\psi_v(\theta)=\psi(\theta+v)-\psi(v)ψv​(θ)=ψ(θ+v)−ψ(v).

The paper assumes throughout that XXX has unbounded variation, or has bounded variation and a Lévy measure Λ\LambdaΛ with Λ(dx)≪dx\Lambda(dx)\ll dxΛ(dx)≪dx.

For q≥0q\ge0q≥0, Φ(q)\Phi(q)Φ(q) is the largest root of ψ(θ)=q\psi(\theta)=qψ(θ)=q. The qqq-scale function W(q):R→[0,∞)W^{(q)}:\mathbb R\to[0,\infty)W(q):R→[0,∞) is the unique function that vanishes on (−∞,0](-\infty,0](−∞,0], is continuous on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and satisfies

∫0∞e−θxW(q)(x) dx=1ψ(θ)−q,θ>Φ(q).\int_0^\infty e^{-\theta x}W^{(q)}(x)\,dx=\frac1{\psi(\theta)-q},\qquad\theta>\Phi(q).∫0∞​e−θxW(q)(x)dx=ψ(θ)−q1​,θ>Φ(q).

For q<0q<0q<0 it is defined by the series W(q)=∑k≥0qkW⋆(k+1)W^{(q)}=\sum_{k\ge0}q^kW^{\star(k+1)}W(q)=∑k≥0​qkW⋆(k+1), where W=W(0)W=W^{(0)}W=W(0) and ⋆\star⋆ is convolution on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Further, Z(q)(x)=1+q∫−∞xW(q)(z) dzZ^{(q)}(x)=1+q\int_{-\infty}^xW^{(q)}(z)\,dzZ(q)(x)=1+q∫−∞x​W(q)(z)dz. The functions Wv(p)W_v^{(p)}Wv(p)​ and Zv(p)Z_v^{(p)}Zv(p)​ are the same objects built from ψv\psi_vψv​ instead of ψ\psiψ.

Under Ps,x\mathbb P_{s,x}Ps,x​ the process starts at xxx with a prior maximum s≥xs\ge xs≥x. Its running maximum is X‾t=max⁡{s,sup⁡0≤u≤tXu}\overline X_t=\max\{s,\sup_{0\le u\le t}X_u\}Xt​=max{s,sup0≤u≤t​Xu​}, and the reflected process is Y=X‾−XY=\overline X-XY=X−X, which starts at z=s−xz=s-xz=s−x. For k>0k>0k>0,

τk=inf⁡{t≥0:Yt∉[0,k)}.\tau_k=\inf\{t\ge0:Y_t\notin[0,k)\}.τk​=inf{t≥0:Yt​∈/[0,k)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For u≥0u\ge0u≥0 and vvv with ψ(v)<∞\psi(v)<\inftyψ(v)<∞, with z=s−x≥0z=s-x\ge0z=s−x≥0 and p=u−ψ(v)p=u-\psi(v)p=u−ψ(v),

Es,x[e−uτk−vYτk]=e−vz(Zv(p)(k−z)−Wv(p)(k−z)pWv(p)(k)+vZv(p)(k)Wv(p)′(k)+vWv(p)(k)).\mathbb E_{s,x}\big[e^{-u\tau_k-vY_{\tau_k}}\big]=e^{-vz}\left(Z_v^{(p)}(k-z)-W_v^{(p)}(k-z)\frac{pW_v^{(p)}(k)+vZ_v^{(p)}(k)}{W_v^{(p)\prime}(k)+vW_v^{(p)}(k)}\right).Es,x​[e−uτk​−vYτk​​]=e−vz(Zv(p)​(k−z)−Wv(p)​(k−z)Wv(p)′​(k)+vWv(p)​(k)pWv(p)​(k)+vZv(p)​(k)​).

Here vvv may be negative, so ppp may be negative, which is where the series extension of WWW enters.

Milestones

  • (2) E[eθXt]=etψ(θ)\mathbb E[e^{\theta X_t}]=e^{t\psi(\theta)}E[eθXt​]=etψ(θ).
  • Remark 4: W(u)(x)=evxWv(u−ψ(v))(x)W^{(u)}(x)=e^{vx}W_v^{(u-\psi(v))}(x)W(u)(x)=evxWv(u−ψ(v))​(x) for every real uuu.
  • Proposition 1, (9) and (10): for x∈(a,b)x\in(a,b)x∈(a,b), the Laplace transforms of the exit time of XXX from (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) on the events of exit above and exit below.
  • (13): the splitting of the goal's expectation at the first zero of YYY.
  • (14)–(15) and (16): the two expectations of (13).
  • (22): the value CCC of the functional for YYY started at 000.
  • Remark 6, (23): the stopped process whose martingale property is equivalent to Theorem 1.

Items (13)–(22) are stated under the proof's restriction u≥ψ(v)∨0u\ge\psi(v)\vee0u≥ψ(v)∨0. The goal is not.

Significance

The identity gives, for every spectrally negative Lévy process, the law of the first drawdown of size kkk and of its overshoot. With v=0v=0v=0 it is the Laplace transform of the drawdown time. With u=0u=0u=0 it is the transform of the overshoot. The paper uses it, through its Corollary 1, to solve the perpetual Russian option and the Canadized Russian option in closed form. Identities of this form, written in scale functions, are the standard tool for drawdown and reflected-process problems for spectrally negative Lévy processes.

The theorem is proved. As far as the platform and Mathlib show, none of it is formalized: Mathlib has independent increments and cumulant generating functions but no Lévy process, no scale function and no excursion theory. This mission produces a formal statement of the paper's model and of the exit identities. A complete development would also give Mathlib its first fluctuation-theory results for Lévy processes.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is to treat YYY like XXX and read off its exit from [0,k)[0,k)[0,k) from the two-sided exit identities of Proposition 1. This works only until YYY first returns to 000. Up to that time YYY is a copy of −X-X−X. After it, YYY is reflected at 000, it is not a Lévy process, and no two-sided exit problem of XXX describes it. The whole content of the theorem is the constant CCC of (13), the value of the functional for YYY started at 000, where the reflection acts at every instant. A second difficulty is the range of (u,v)(u,v)(u,v). For v<0v<0v<0 the integrand e−vYτke^{-vY_{\tau_k}}e−vYτk​​ is unbounded, because YYY can jump far above kkk. Its finiteness is part of the claim. So is the passage from the region u≥ψ(v)∨0u\ge\psi(v)\vee0u≥ψ(v)∨0, where every scale function in (12) comes from Definition 2, to all u≥0u\ge0u≥0, where ppp can be negative.

Formalization scope

Time is [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (ℝ≥0). XXX is a real process with X0=0X_0=0X0​=0. Px\mathbb P_xPx​ is encoded by the path x+Xx+Xx+X, and Ps,x\mathbb P_{s,x}Ps,x​ by that path together with the prior maximum sss. Random times take values in WithTop ℝ≥0, with ∞\infty∞ as "never". The functional e−uτk−vYτke^{-u\tau_k-vY_{\tau_k}}e−uτk​−vYτk​​ and discount factors e−qTe^{-qT}e−qT are set to 000 where the time is infinite. Every stated expectation carries its integrability as part of the conclusion.

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Lévy process": the paths start at 000, are càdlàg and have no positive jumps for every ω\omegaω, not only almost surely.
  • "We exclude the case that X has monotone paths": the paths are neither almost surely nondecreasing nor almost surely nonincreasing.
  • "unbounded variation": not of bounded variation. The standing assumption is "bounded variation implies (AC)".
  • "Λ(dx)≪dx\Lambda(dx)\ll dxΛ(dx)≪dx": for every Lebesgue-null Borel AAA, almost surely no nonzero jump in (0,1](0,1](0,1] lands in AAA. The Lévy measure is not constructed.
  • "ψ(v)<∞\psi(v)<\inftyψ(v)<∞": evX1e^{vX_1}evX1​ is integrable.
  • "the largest root": the supremum of the nonnegative roots.
  • "the unique function": a definite description by choice.
  • "analytic extension": the series (5) for real negative index. Complex indices are out of scope.
  • "W′W'W′": the derivative at k>0k>0k>0.
  • "is a martingale" in (23): a martingale for the natural filtration of XXX.
  • Misprint: (23) prints vZv(q)(k)vZ_v^{(q)}(k)vZv(q)​(k), and the statement uses vZv(p)(k)vZ_v^{(p)}(k)vZv(p)​(k).

The scale functions are defined from the exponent ψ\psiψ of the given XXX. A formalization in which WWW is an arbitrary function satisfying a Laplace-transform hypothesis is ruled out. So is one in which Wv(p)W_v^{(p)}Wv(p)​ is defined as e−vxW(p+ψ(v))(x)e^{-vx}W^{(p+\psi(v))}(x)e−vxW(p+ψ(v))(x), which would make Remark 4 a tautology.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: Lévy processes and their Laplace exponent, the strong Markov property at stopping times, existence and regularity of scale functions (via Laplace inversion), and the Esscher change of measure. No statement of the mission mentions excursion theory. Contributions of reusable infrastructure for Lévy processes are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Avram, A. E. Kyprianou, M. R. Pistorius, Exit problems for spectrally negative Lévy processes and applications to (Canadized) Russian options, Ann. Appl. Probab. 14(1), 215–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1075828052
  • J. Bertoin, Lévy Processes, Cambridge University Press, 1996. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/levy-processes/
  • J. Bertoin, Exponential decay and ergodicity of completely asymmetric Lévy processes in a finite interval, Ann. Appl. Probab. 7(1), 156–169, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1034625254
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Subject to Resource Constraints: Classification and Complexity I: Unit-Time Chains on Two Identical Machines with One Unit Resource Are Strongly NP-hardResearch Paper

Resource constraints and the easy/hard borderline in scheduling

Machine scheduling asks how to assign jobs to machines over time so that a criterion such as the makespan Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​, the time at which the last job completes, is as small as possible. In practice jobs also compete for scarce resources beyond the machines themselves: tools, operators, memory, power. Błażewicz, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (DAM 1983) extended the standard three-field classification α∣β∣γ\alpha\mid\beta\mid\gammaα∣β∣γ of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979) by a resource field resλσρres\lambda\sigma\rhoresλσρ. They then settled the complexity of every problem with parallel identical or uniform machines, unit-time jobs, precedence constraints and the Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​ criterion. Their Fig. 2 separates the maximal polynomially solvable problems from the minimal NP-hard ones, and it has been the reference map for resource-constrained scheduling since.

Brief timeline of the problems involved:

  • 1975. Garey and Johnson (SIAM J. Comput. 4) show that P2∣res⋯ ,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res\cdots, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res⋯,pj​=1∣Cmax​ is solvable in polynomial time via matchings, and that P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ and P2∣res1⋅⋅,tree,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res1\cdot\cdot, tree, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res1⋅⋅,tree,pj​=1∣Cmax​ are NP-hard in the strong sense, by reduction from 3-PARTITION.
  • 1976. Ullman (Complexity of sequencing problems, in Coffman, ed., Computer & Job/Shop Scheduling Theory, Wiley) gives strong NP-hardness of P2∣res111,prec,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res111, prec, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res111,prec,pj​=1∣Cmax​ under arbitrary precedence constraints.
  • 1983. Błażewicz, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan prove Theorem 7: chains suffice. Two identical machines, one resource of size one, requirements in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and chain-like precedence already give a strongly NP-hard problem. The result dominates both earlier two-machine results.

Setting

There are nnn jobs J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ and mmm machines M1,…,MmM_1,\dots,M_mM1​,…,Mm​. Every job has processing time 111 on every machine, each machine handles at most one job at a time, and jobs are not preempted. There are lll resources; resource RhR_hRh​ has a positive integer size shs_hsh​, the amount available at any time, and job JjJ_jJj​ has a nonnegative integer requirement rhjr_{hj}rhj​, the amount it holds throughout its execution. A directed acyclic graph HHH on the jobs gives the precedence constraints: if HHH has a path from jjj to kkk (Jj→JkJ_j\to J_kJj​→Jk​), then JjJ_jJj​ must complete before JkJ_kJk​ starts. The precedence is chain-like when every vertex of HHH has indegree and outdegree at most one.

A schedule gives each job a machine and a real start time SjS_jSj​; the job occupies [Sj,Sj+1)[S_j, S_j+1)[Sj​,Sj​+1) and completes at Cj=Sj+1C_j = S_j+1Cj​=Sj​+1. It is feasible if jobs on one machine do not overlap, precedence is respected, and at every time ttt the jobs running at ttt require at most shs_hsh​ of each resource RhR_hRh​. The makespan is Cmax⁡=max⁡jCjC_{\max} = \max_j C_jCmax​=maxj​Cj​.

The problem P2∣res111,chain,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res111, chain, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res111,chain,pj​=1∣Cmax​ restricts this to m=2m=2m=2, one resource (λ=1\lambda=1λ=1) of size 111 (σ=1\sigma=1σ=1), every requirement at most 111 (ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1), and chain-like precedence. The problem P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ has m=3m=3m=3, one resource of arbitrary size and requirements, and no precedence.

3-PARTITION: given ttt, a positive integer bbb and positive integers a1,…,a3ta_1,\dots,a_{3t}a1​,…,a3t​ with ∑jaj=tb\sum_j a_j = tb∑j​aj​=tb and 14b<aj<12b\tfrac14 b<a_j<\tfrac12 b41​b<aj​<21​b, can {1,…,3t}\{1,\dots,3t\}{1,…,3t} be split into ttt disjoint 3-element sets SiS_iSi​ with ∑j∈Siaj=b\sum_{j\in S_i}a_j=b∑j∈Si​​aj​=b?

A problem is NP-hard in the strong sense if it remains NP-hard when every number of the instance is written in unary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense  ⟹  P2∣res111, chain, pj=1∣Cmax⁡ is NP-hard in the strong sense.\text{3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense} \;\Longrightarrow\; P2\mid res111,\ chain,\ p_j=1\mid C_{\max}\ \text{is NP-hard in the strong sense.}3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense⟹P2∣res111, chain, pj​=1∣Cmax​ is NP-hard in the strong sense.

The hypothesis is Garey and Johnson's theorem on 3-PARTITION, which the paper cites and does not prove. The conclusion concerns the decision version: given an instance and y∈Ny\in\mathbb Ny∈N, is there a feasible schedule with Cmax⁡≤yC_{\max}\le yCmax​≤y?

Milestones

  1. Proof of Theorem 4, the saturation equivalence. For positive bbb, aja_jaj​ with ∑jaj=tb\sum_j a_j=tb∑j​aj​=tb, the P3∣res1⋅⋅P3\mid res1\cdot\cdotP3∣res1⋅⋅ instance with 3t3t3t unit jobs, resource size bbb and requirements aja_jaj​ has a feasible schedule with Cmax⁡≤tC_{\max}\le tCmax​≤t iff the 3-PARTITION instance has a solution.
  2. Theorem 4 (Garey and Johnson). Under the same hypothesis as the goal, P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ is NP-hard in the strong sense.
  3. Proof of Theorem 7, "if". A 3-PARTITION solution yields a feasible schedule of the constructed two-machine instance with Cmax⁡=2tbC_{\max}=2tbCmax​=2tb.
  4. Proof of Theorem 7, "only if". A feasible schedule of the constructed instance with Cmax⁡≤2tbC_{\max}\le 2tbCmax​≤2tb yields a 3-PARTITION solution.

Significance

Theorem 7 is the sharpest hardness result of the paper's classification. Without resources, two-machine unit-time scheduling with arbitrary precedence is polynomial (Coffman and Graham, Acta Inform. 1972); without precedence, it is polynomial under arbitrary resources (Theorem 1 of the paper). The theorem shows that combining the weakest nontrivial versions of both constraints, chains and one unit resource, already crosses the borderline. The paper's §4.1 extends the same reduction to the ∑Cj\sum C_j∑Cj​ and Lmax⁡L_{\max}Lmax​ criteria.

On the formal side, the mission provides a machine-checked model of resource-constrained scheduling with real start times, a definition of NP-hardness in the strong sense on top of the platform's Turing-machine formalization of P\mathrm PP and NP\mathrm{NP}NP, and 3-PARTITION as a reusable source problem. As far as the platform's corpus shows, none of Theorems 4 and 7, 3-PARTITION, or strong NP-hardness has been formalized before. Both theorems are proved in the literature; what remains is to formalize the reductions and their polynomial running time.

Difficulty

The combinatorial heart is the "only if" direction: a schedule of length 2tb2tb2tb must be shown to be rigid. Start times are arbitrary reals, so the first obstacle is to show that both machines are busy throughout [0,2tb)[0,2tb)[0,2tb), that the chain LLL forces unit spacing, and that the primed jobs of the chains Kj′K'_jKj′​ can only run in the intervals the chain LLL leaves free of the resource. Only after this is established can the index sets SiS_iSi​ be read off. Arguing on integer time slots from the start is not enough: the model allows fractional start times, and ruling them out is part of the proof.

The second obstacle is the complexity layer. NP-hardness is stated with respect to polynomial-time many-one reductions computed by one-tape Turing machines. The reduction from 3-PARTITION therefore has to be implemented and its running time bounded on unary codes. The constructed instance has 4tb4tb4tb jobs, which is polynomial in the unary length of the 3-PARTITION instance; this is exactly why the reduction proves hardness in the strong sense.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs are Fin n and machines Fin m, 0-based. Only identical machines with unit processing times are modelled. Start times are real, execution intervals are half-open, and the resource constraint is imposed at every real time. Precedence is the transitive closure of the arc list of HHH. Cmax⁡=0C_{\max}=0Cmax​=0 for an empty instance.
  • Decision version. Thresholds yyy are natural numbers; this narrower class makes the hardness statement stronger.
  • Encoding. An instance is described by its list of numbers (n,m,ln,m,ln,m,l, the sizes, the requirements row by row, the number of arcs and the arcs, then yyy). The unary language is the set of unary codes of yes-instances over a two-letter alphabet. No pairing function is used. The class conditions (two machines, one unit resource, requirements at most one, chain-like acyclic HHH) are part of the yes-predicate.
  • Strong sense. Strong NP-hardness is NP-hardness of the unary language. This is equivalent to Garey and Johnson's definition, which bounds the largest number by a polynomial in the instance length.
  • Cited hypothesis. The goal and Theorem 4 assume strong NP-hardness of 3-PARTITION (with 14b<aj<12b\tfrac14 b<a_j<\tfrac12 b41​b<aj​<21​b) and nothing else. Stating the goal as a bare reduction between the two languages, or adding P≠NP\mathrm P\ne\mathrm{NP}P=NP, would not be Theorem 7.
  • Constructions. The two scheduling instances built from a 3-PARTITION instance are explicit definitions following the page, not arbitrary instances with a property.
  • Reuse. The scheduling model and the strong-NP-hardness layer are shared with the other missions of this series; 3-PARTITION serves any strong NP-hardness proof by number partitioning.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the four milestones; a formalized polynomial-time implementation of the reduction on unary codes; general lemmas about composing polynomial-time reductions on the one-tape machine model.

Selected references

  • J. Błażewicz, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Scheduling subject to resource constraints: classification and complexity, Discrete Applied Mathematics 5 (1983) 11–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(83)90012-4
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Complexity results for multiprocessor scheduling under resource constraints, SIAM J. Comput. 4 (1975) 397–411. https://doi.org/10.1137/0204035
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979.
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Ann. Discrete Math. 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • J. D. Ullman, Complexity of sequencing problems, in: E. G. Coffman, Jr., ed., Computer & Job/Shop Scheduling Theory, Wiley, 1976, 139–164.
  • E. G. Coffman, Jr., R. L. Graham, Optimal scheduling for two-processor systems, Acta Informatica 1 (1972) 200–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00288685
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute official problem description.
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Subject to Resource Constraints: Classification and Complexity III: The Two-Machine Algorithm for Q2 with One Resource and Unit-Time Jobs Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Many production and computing systems run jobs on parallel machines that also draw on a shared, limited resource: tools, workers, memory, power. Adding such a resource to a scheduling problem can change its complexity entirely. Błażewicz, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (DAM 1983) extended the three-field classification α∣β∣γ\alpha\mid\beta\mid\gammaα∣β∣γ of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan by a resource field resλσρres\lambda\sigma\rhoresλσρ, and determined the complexity of every problem with unit-time jobs on identical or uniform machines under the makespan criterion. Their Fig. 2 separates the maximal polynomially solvable cases from the minimal NP-hard ones.

This mission formalizes the polynomial side. Two identical machines are easy under arbitrary resources (Theorem 1, due to Garey and Johnson, via maximum matching). Three identical machines with one resource are NP-hard in the strong sense (Theorem 4), and so are two uniform machines with unit resources (Theorem 3). What remains for uniform machines is settled by two algorithms: a sorting-and-shifting procedure for two uniform machines with one resource of arbitrary size (Theorem 5), and a bottleneck transportation problem for any number of uniform machines with one resource and 0–1 requirements (Theorem 6). The hardness results are the subject of the companion missions I and II.

Setting

There are nnn jobs J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ and mmm machines M1,…,MmM_1,\dots,M_mM1​,…,Mm​. Machine MiM_iMi​ has speed qi>0q_i>0qi​>0; every job has unit execution requirement, so it takes time 1/qi1/q_i1/qi​ on MiM_iMi​. Identical machines (PPP) have qi=1q_i=1qi​=1; uniform machines (QQQ) have arbitrary speeds. There are lll resources RhR_hRh​ with positive integer sizes shs_hsh​, and job JjJ_jJj​ needs a nonnegative integer amount rhjr_{hj}rhj​ of RhR_hRh​ throughout its execution. The field resλσρres\lambda\sigma\rhoresλσρ records restrictions: λ\lambdaλ bounds the number of resources, σ\sigmaσ their sizes, ρ\rhoρ the requirements, a dot meaning "part of the input". So res1⋅⋅res1{\cdot}{\cdot}res1⋅⋅ is one resource with arbitrary size and requirements, and res1⋅1res1{\cdot}1res1⋅1 is one resource with requirements in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}.

A schedule gives every job a machine μ(j)\mu(j)μ(j) and a start time Sj≥0S_j\ge0Sj​≥0; the job is executed during [Sj,Cj)[S_j,C_j)[Sj​,Cj​) with Cj=Sj+1/qμ(j)C_j=S_j+1/q_{\mu(j)}Cj​=Sj​+1/qμ(j)​. It is feasible if jobs on the same machine do not overlap and, at every time ttt, the jobs executed at ttt use at most shs_hsh​ of each resource RhR_hRh​. The makespan is Cmax⁡=max⁡jCjC_{\max}=\max_j C_jCmax​=maxj​Cj​. No precedence constraints occur in this mission.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5, correctness of the algorithm

For Q2∣res1⋅⋅, pj=1∣Cmax⁡Q2\mid res1{\cdot}{\cdot},\,p_j=1\mid C_{\max}Q2∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ with q1≥q2q_1\ge q_2q1​≥q2​: put all jobs on M1M_1M1​ in order of nonincreasing r1jr_{1j}r1j​, then repeatedly move the last job of M1M_1M1​ to the earliest feasible time on M2M_2M2​ after the jobs already there, as long as this strictly reduces Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​. For every order with nonincreasing requirements, the resulting schedule AAA is feasible and

Cmax⁡(A)≤Cmax⁡(σ)for every feasible schedule σ.C_{\max}(A)\le C_{\max}(\sigma)\quad\text{for every feasible schedule }\sigma.Cmax​(A)≤Cmax​(σ)for every feasible schedule σ.

Milestones for the goal

The paper's proof has two steps, both milestones. Call a schedule an (a)–(c) schedule when (a) M1M_1M1​ runs its jobs back to back from time 000 in nonincreasing r1jr_{1j}r1j​, (b) M2M_2M2​ runs its jobs in nondecreasing r1kr_{1k}r1k​, and (c) every requirement on M1M_1M1​ is at least every requirement on M2M_2M2​.

  1. The algorithm's schedule is feasible, is an (a)–(c) schedule, and is best among feasible (a)–(c) schedules.
  2. Every feasible schedule can be transformed into a feasible (a)–(c) schedule with no larger Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​.

Further results

  • Theorem 1. For P2∣res⋅⋅⋅, pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res{\cdot}{\cdot}{\cdot},\,p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res⋅⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​, with GGG the graph joining two jobs when they can run together and SSS a maximum matching of GGG, the optimal makespan is n−∣S∣n-|S|n−∣S∣.
  • Theorem 6. For Q∣res1⋅1, pj=1∣Cmax⁡Q\mid res1{\cdot}1,\,p_j=1\mid C_{\max}Q∣res1⋅1,pj​=1∣Cmax​ with the s1s_1s1​ fastest machines listed first, the optimal makespan equals the optimal value of a bottleneck transportation problem that assigns jobs to slots (machine, position) with cost k/qik/q_ik/qi​, resource jobs only to the s1s_1s1​ fastest machines.

Significance

Theorems 5 and 6 complete the classification of Fig. 2 for uniform machines: every special case of Q∣res⋅⋅⋅, pj=1∣Cmax⁡Q\mid res{\cdot}{\cdot}{\cdot},\,p_j=1\mid C_{\max}Q∣res⋅⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ not covered by the hardness theorems has a polynomial algorithm. Theorem 1 is the classical reduction of two-machine resource scheduling to maximum matching, the model case for later work on scheduling with conflict graphs.

The paper proves these results briefly: "clearly" for the first half of Theorem 5, "obviously" for Theorem 1, and a one-paragraph model for Theorem 6. The exchange argument of Theorem 5 is presented "in an informal way" through five steps that pass through fractional, preempted jobs. A machine-checked proof makes these arguments exact on a model with real start times. No formalization of these results is known, and the platform had no statement about resource-constrained scheduling on uniform machines before this mission.

Difficulty

With q1≠q2q_1\ne q_2q1​=q2​ the job boundaries on the two machines are misaligned: a job on M2M_2M2​ overlaps parts of several jobs on M1M_1M1​, so the resource check cannot be done slot by slot, and discrete reasoning on integer time grids does not apply. The exchange argument of Theorem 5 must control the resource usage at every real time while jobs are moved between machines and reordered, and it has to end with a nonpreemptive schedule even though the paper's intermediate steps split jobs. For Theorem 1, the hard direction is the lower bound: a feasible schedule with arbitrary real start times must be converted into a matching, which is a statement about how unit jobs on two machines can overlap. For Theorem 6, one must show that restricting resource jobs to the fastest machines and to back-to-back positions loses nothing.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs, machines and resources are Fin n, Fin m, Fin l (0-based). Speeds are positive reals, sizes positive naturals, requirements naturals. Start times are nonnegative reals, execution intervals are half-open, and the resource constraint is checked at every real time. Cmax⁡=0C_{\max}=0Cmax​=0 for n=0n=0n=0. The model carries a precedence digraph for consistency with the companion missions; every statement here assumes it has no arcs.
  • Implicit hypothesis. Theorems 1 and 5 assume every job fits alone (rhj≤shr_{hj}\le s_hrhj​≤sh​), which the paper leaves unstated; without it no feasible schedule exists.
  • The algorithm is a Lean definition following the page: the order is an argument (any nonincreasing order), "as early as possible" is the earliest start after M2M_2M2​'s last job at which the resource constraint holds throughout, and the loop stops at the first move that does not strictly reduce Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​.
  • Optimality is always stated in full: feasibility plus a lower bound against every feasible schedule. No minimum is written as an infimum of a possibly empty set.
  • Theorem 6 is stated with 0–1 slot assignments, the interpretation the paper gives to xijkx_{ijk}xijk​; the page's constraint ∑k=1m\sum_{k=1}^{m}∑k=1m​ is read as ∑k=1n\sum_{k=1}^{n}∑k=1n​.
  • Not formalized: the running times O(ln2+n5/2)O(ln^2+n^{5/2})O(ln2+n5/2) (Theorem 1), O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) (Theorem 5, including the phrase "This O(n log n) algorithm") and O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) (Theorem 6), which depend on a machine model the paper does not fix and, for Theorems 1 and 6, on cited matching and transportation algorithms.
  • Ruled out: a formalization of the goal that proves optimality only against (a)–(c) schedules, against schedules with integer start times, or for one fixed tie-breaking order proves less than Theorem 5.

Contributions welcome: lemmas about step functions of resource usage on half-open intervals, a left-shifting lemma for unit-time schedules on two machines, and the exchange steps of Theorem 5 as separate lemmas.

Selected references

  • J. Błażewicz, J.K. Lenstra, A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan, Scheduling subject to resource constraints: classification and complexity, Discrete Applied Mathematics 5 (1983) 11–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(83)90012-4
  • M.R. Garey, D.S. Johnson, Complexity results for multiprocessor scheduling under resource constraints, SIAM Journal on Computing 4 (1975) 397–411. https://doi.org/10.1137/0204035
  • R.L. Graham, E.L. Lawler, J.K. Lenstra, A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • S. Even, O. Kariv, An O(n^{2.5}) algorithm for maximum matching in general graphs, Proc. 16th IEEE FOCS (1975) 100–112. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1975.23
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